The countries of Eastern Europe after World War II briefly. Western European countries: post-war device

21.09.2019

Best practice in domestic education methodological development on the topic

Properties of alcohols, aldehydes, acids, esters, phenol

Types of chemical reactions in organic chemistry Division of substituents in the benzene ring into two types

The liberation of Europe from fascism opened the way to the establishment of a democratic system and anti-fascist reforms. The defeat of the Nazi troops by the Soviet Army on the territory of these countries had a decisive influence on the internal processes in the states of Eastern Europe.

They were in the orbit of influence Soviet Union.

Changes in the political system. In the conditions of post-war Soviet-American rivalry and as a result of direct pressure and assistance from the USSR in 1947-1948. in the countries of Eastern Europe, the communist parties established themselves in power (the elimination of the multi-party system; the concentration of all power in the executive bodies merged with the communist party apparatus), which pushed back and liquidated their political opponents - the liberal democratic parties.

The communists, having come to power, began to build socialism. The initial model was the socio-economic and political system that was established in the USSR. (Although Yugoslavia chose a slightly different variant of socio-economic policy, in its main parameters it represented a variant of totalitarian socialism, but with a greater orientation towards the West).

Economy. The main attention was paid to the problems of industrialization, the development of heavy industry, in the first place, since, except for Czechoslovakia and the GDR, all other countries were agrarian. Industrialization was accelerated. It was based on the nationalization of industry, finance, and trade. Agrarian reforms ended with collectivization, but without the nationalization of the land. The management system of all branches of the economy was concentrated in the hands of the state. Market relations were reduced to a minimum, and the administrative distribution system triumphed. The overstrain of finances and the budget reduced the possibilities for the development of the social sphere and the entire non-productive sphere - education, health care, and science. Sooner or later, this was bound to have an impact on both the slowdown in the rate of development and the deterioration of living conditions. The model of an extensive type of production, requiring ever greater involvement of material, energy and labor costs, has exhausted itself. The world was entering a different reality - the era of scientific and technological revolution, which implies a different, intensive type of production. The countries of Eastern Europe proved to be immune to the new economic demands.

Social problems. Since the beginning of the 1970s, negative changes have been noted in the countries of the socialist community. economic life. Unemployment was growing in the countries of Eastern Europe, the high cost of consumer goods devalued wages and worsened the material situation of the working masses. The anger and discontent of the masses were expressed in different ways. (In the GDR - mass exodus of the population to West Germany).

In Poland, the discontent of the population took the form of protests and demonstrations. In the process of mass discontent in 1980, an independent trade union “Solidarity” was formed in Poland, headed by Lech Walesa (this trade union, having united all opposition forces in Poland, turned into a powerful political movement). The Polish government was forced to enter into negotiations with Solidarity.

The events in Poland and other countries of the socialist community were evidence of a clear crisis of "totalitarian socialism."

political crises. Discontent in some countries of the socialist camp (there were strikes and demonstrations in some cities of Czechoslovakia, the situation escalated in Hungary. The most serious speeches took place in the GDR, where strikes and demonstrations caused by the deterioration in the living standards of the population brought the country to the brink of a general strike. In East Berlin there were Soviet tanks were brought in. With the help of the police of the GDR, the workers' protests were suppressed.)

In the autumn of 1956 serious crises arose in Poland and Hungary. The difficult internal political situation in Poland was resolved by returning W. Gomulka to the leadership of the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP). At his suggestion, the course of agrarian policy in the countryside was changed, and the policy of forced collectivization was softened.

Street demonstrations and performances began in Budapest and other cities.

They were directed against the then Communist Party of Hungary, the state security agencies, against the union with the USSR. A new government headed by Imre Nagy was formed, the Hungarian Communist Party was dissolved, and the Social Democratic Party was revived. Soviet troops left the country. Hungary announced its withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact.

On November 4, 1956, a group of communists led by J. Kadar announced the creation of the Provisional Workers' and Peasants' Government of Hungary and turned to the Soviet government with a request to send troops back to Budapest to stop the tragic events. The Soviet units again occupied the Hungarian capital. The government of J. Kadar gradually restored order in the country.

Further socialist development diverged more and more actively from the natural-historical process of the development of European civilization. The uprisings in Poland and strikes in other countries, the uprising in the GDR in 1953, the Hungarian uprising of 1956 and the "Prague Spring" of 1968, suppressed by the troops of neighboring socialist countries - all this is sufficient evidence of the implantation of the socialist ideal in the form he was understood by the communist parties of the time. ======

You can also find information of interest in the scientific search engine Otvety.Online. Use the search form:

Eastern European countries after the Second World War. Transformations of the people's democracy period

Participation in the Second World War brought enormous hardships and sacrifices to the peoples of Eastern Europe. This region was the main theater of military operations on the European continent. The Eastern European countries became hostages of the policy of the great powers, turning into disenfranchised satellites of opposing blocs or objects of open aggression. Their economy was seriously undermined. The political situation was also extremely difficult. The collapse of pro-fascist authoritarian regimes, the broad participation of the population in the resistance movement created the prerequisites for profound changes in the entire state-political system. However, in reality, the politicization of the masses and their readiness for democratic transformations was superficial. The authoritarian political psychology was not only preserved, but even strengthened during the war years. The mass consciousness still had a desire to see the state as a guarantor of social stability and a force capable of solving the tasks facing society in the shortest possible time with a firm hand.

The defeat of National Socialism in the global war of social systems brought other implacable opponents face to face - communism and democracy. Supporters of these war-winning ideas gained predominance in the new political elite of the Eastern European countries, but this promised a new round of ideological confrontation in the future. The situation was also complicated by the increased influence of the national idea, the existence of nationalist-oriented trends even in the democratic and communist camps. The idea of agrarianism, revived in these years, and the activities of the still influential and numerous peasant parties also received a national coloring.

Already in the last months of the war, in the overwhelming majority of Eastern European countries, the process of consolidating all the former opposition parties and movements, the formation of broad multi-party coalitions, which were called national or domestic fronts, began. As their countries were liberated, these coalitions took full state power. This happened at the end of 1944 in Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, in 1945 - in Czechoslovakia, Poland. The only exceptions were the Baltic countries, which remained part of the USSR and underwent complete Sovietization during the war years, and Yugoslavia, where the pro-communist People's Liberation Front retained complete predominance.

The reason for such an unexpected at first glance unity of completely heterogeneous political forces was the unity of their tasks at the first stage of post-war transformations. It was quite obvious to communists and agrarians, nationalists and democrats that the most pressing problems were the formation of the foundations of a new constitutional order, the elimination of authoritarian governance structures associated with the previous regimes, and the holding of free elections. In all countries, the monarchy system was abolished (only in Romania did this happen later, after the establishment of the monopoly power of the communists). In Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, the first wave of reforms also concerned the solution of the national question, the formation of federal statehood. The primary task was to restore the destroyed economy, to establish material support population, solving pressing social problems. The nature of the ongoing transformations made it possible to characterize the entire stage of 1945-1946. as a period of "people's democracy".

The first signs of a split in the ruling anti-fascist blocs appeared in 1946. The peasant parties, the most numerous and influential at that time, did not consider it necessary to accelerate modernization, the priority development of industry. They also opposed the expansion state regulation economy. The main task of these parties, which was generally accomplished already at the first stage of the reforms, was the destruction of the latifundia and the implementation of an agrarian reform in the interests of the middle peasantry.

Democratic parties, communists and social democrats, despite political differences, were united in focusing on the “catch-up development” model, striving to ensure a breakthrough in their countries in industrial development, to approach the level of the leading countries of the world. Not having a large advantage individually, all together they made up a powerful force, pushing their opponents out of power. Changes in the upper echelons of power led to the start of large-scale reforms to nationalize large-scale industry and banking system, wholesale trade, the introduction of state control over production and planning elements. However, if the communists considered these transformations as the first stage of socialist construction, then the democratic forces saw them only as a process of strengthening state regulation of the market economy. A new round of political struggle was inevitable, and its outcome depended not only on the alignment of internal political forces, but also on events on the world stage.

Eastern Europe and the Beginning of the Cold War.

After their liberation, the Eastern European countries found themselves at the forefront of world politics. CIIIA and their allies took the most active steps to strengthen their positions in the region. However, since the last months of the war, the decisive influence here belonged to the USSR. It was based both on the direct Soviet military presence and on the great moral authority of the USSR as a liberating power. Realizing their advantage, the Soviet leadership for a long time did not force the development of events and emphasized respect for the idea of the sovereignty of the Eastern European countries .

The situation changed radically by mid-1946. The proclamation of the Truman Doctrine, which announced the beginning of crusade against communism, marked the beginning of the open struggle of the superpowers for geopolitical influence anywhere in the world. The Eastern European countries felt the change in the nature of the international situation already in the summer of 1947. Official Moscow not only refused investment assistance under the American Marshall Plan, but also harshly condemned the possibility of any of the Eastern European countries participating in this project. The USSR offered generous compensation in the form of preferential supplies of raw materials and food, rapidly expanding the scale of technical and technological assistance to the countries of the region. But the main task of Soviet policy - the eradication of the very possibility of a geopolitical reorientation of Eastern Europe - could only be ensured by monopoly power in these countries. communist parties.

2. Formation of the socialist camp. The period of "building the foundations of socialism"

The formation of communist regimes in the countries of Eastern Europe followed a similar scenario. As early as the end of 1946, the formation of left-wing blocs began with the participation of communists, social democrats and their allies. These coalitions proclaimed their goal a peaceful transition to socialist revolution and, as a rule, received an advantage in the conduct of democratic elections. In 1947, the new governments, using the already open support of the Soviet military administration and relying on the organs state security, created under the control of the Soviet secret services on the basis of communist personnel, provoked a series of political conflicts that led to the defeat of the peasant and bourgeois-democratic parties.

Political trials took place over the leaders of the Hungarian Party of Small Farmers Z. Tildi, the Polish People's Party S. Mikolajczyk, the Bulgarian Agricultural People's Union N. Petkov, the Romanian Caranist Party A. Alexandrescu, the Slovak President Tiso and the leadership of the Slovak Democratic Party who supported him. The logical continuation of the defeat of the democratic opposition was the organizational merger of the communist and social democratic parties with the subsequent discrediting, and subsequently the destruction of the leaders of the social democracy. As a result, by 1948-1949. practically in all countries of Eastern Europe the course towards building the foundations of socialism was officially proclaimed.

The political upheaval that took place in the Eastern European countries in 1946-1948 strengthened the influence of the USSR in the region, but did not yet make it overwhelming. To support the "correct" political course of the young communist regimes in Eastern Europe, the Soviet leadership took a number of vigorous measures. The first of these was the formation of a new international coordinating center of the communist movement - the successor to the Comintern. In the autumn of 1947, a meeting of delegations of the communist parties of the USSR, France, Italy, and Eastern European states took place in the Polish city of Szklarska Poreba, which decided to create a Communist Information Bureau. The Cominform became a political instrument for fixing the "correct" vision of the ways of building socialism, i.e. orientation of socialist construction according to the Soviet model. The reason for the decisive eradication of dissent in the ranks of the communist movement was the Soviet-Yugoslav conflict.

Soviet-Yugoslav conflict.

At first glance, of all Eastern European countries, Yugoslavia provided the least grounds for ideological revelations and political confrontation. Ever since the war, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia has become the most influential force in the country, and its leader Josef Broz Tito has become a true national hero. As early as January 1946, a one-party system was legally fixed in Yugoslavia, and the implementation of broad programs for the nationalization of industry and the collectivization of agriculture began. Forced industrialization, carried out according to the Soviet model, was seen as a strategic line for the development of the national economy and the social structure of society. The authority of the USSR in Yugoslavia during these years was indisputable.

The reason for the complication of Soviet-Yugoslav relations was the desire of the leadership of Yugoslavia to present their country as a "special" ally of the USSR, more significant and influential than all other members of the Soviet bloc, to consolidate the countries of the Balkan region around Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav leadership also tried to raise the question of the unacceptable behavior of some Soviet specialists who worked in the country and almost openly recruited agents for the Soviet special services. The answer was the removal from Yugoslavia of all Soviet specialists and advisers. The conflict took an open form.

On March 27, 1948, Stalin sent a personal letter to I. Tito, in which he outlined the accusations leveled against the Yugoslav side. Tito and his associates were accused of criticizing the universality of the historical experience of the USSR, the dissolution of the Communist Party in the Popular Front, the rejection of class struggle, patronage of capitalist elements in the economy. Actually to internal problems Yugoslavia, these reproaches had nothing to do - she was targeted only because of her excessive self-will. But the leaders of other communist parties, invited to participate in the public "exposing the criminal clique of Tito", were forced to officially recognize the criminality of the very attempt to find other ways to build socialism.

The period of "building the foundations of socialism".

At the second meeting of the Cominform in June 1948, formally devoted to the Yugoslav question, the ideological and political foundations of the socialist camp were finally consolidated - the right of the USSR to interfere in the internal affairs of other socialist countries, the recognition of the universality of the Soviet model of socialism, the priority of tasks related to the aggravation of the class struggle, the strengthening of the political monopoly of the communist parties, and accelerated industrialization. From now on, the internal development of the countries of Eastern Europe took place under the strict control of the USSR. The creation in 1949 of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, which assumed the functions of coordinating the economic integration of the socialist countries, and already in 1955 of the military-political bloc of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, completed the creation of the socialist camp.

The transition of the construction of socialism in the countries of Eastern Europe under the strict control of the USSR led to a radical purge of the communist movement itself in this region. In 1949-1952. a wave of political processes and repressions swept through here, liquidating the "national" wing of the communist parties, which advocated the preservation of the state sovereignty of their countries. The political consolidation of the regimes, in turn, became the impetus for the accelerated reform of the entire socio-economic system, the accelerated completion of nationalization, accelerated industrialization with the priority of sectors for the production of means of production, the spread of complete state control over the capital market, securities and labor, the implementation of forced cooperation in agriculture.

As a result of the reforms, by the mid-1950s, Eastern Europe achieved unprecedented success in “catching up development” and made an impressive breakthrough in building up its entire economic potential and in modernizing the social structure. On the scale of the entire region, the transition to an industrial-agrarian type of society was completed. However, the rapid growth of production was accompanied by an increase in sectoral disproportions. Created economic mechanism was largely artificial, not taking into account regional and national specifics. Its social efficiency was extremely low, and even the successful course of reforms did not compensate for the great social tension in society and the decline in living standards caused by the costs of accelerated modernization.

The political crisis in Eastern Europe in the mid-1950s.

Those Eastern European countries suffered the most in which, by the beginning of the reforms, the foundations of a market infrastructure already existed - Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. Here, socialist construction was accompanied by a particularly painful breakdown of the social structure, the liquidation of quite numerous entrepreneurial strata, and a forced change in the priorities of social psychology. With the death of Stalin in 1953 and some weakening of Moscow's control in the ruling circles of these countries, the influence of those politicians who called for a more flexible reform strategy and increased social efficiency began to grow.

In Hungary, since 1953, the government of Imre Nagy began a series of reforms designed to slow down the pace of industrialization, overcome the extremes of forced collectivization in agriculture, and increase the economic independence of enterprises. Faced with opposition from the leadership of the ruling Hungarian Workers' Party, Nagy was removed from his post and returned to power at the end of 1956 against the backdrop of an acute social crisis that gripped Hungarian society. The decisive events began in Budapest on October 23 with spontaneous demonstrations of students protesting against the actions of the old leadership of the HTP. I. Nagy, who again headed the government, announced the continuation of reforms, the resolution of demonstrations and rallies, and freedom of speech. However, Nagy himself did not really have a clear concept of reforming the social order in Hungary, he had obvious populist inclinations and rather followed the events than controlled them. Soon the government completely lost control of what was happening.

The broad democratic movement, directed against the extremes of the Stalinist model of socialism, resulted in an open anti-communist counter-revolution. The country was on the brink of civil war. In Budapest, armed clashes between the rebels and the workers' squads and state security officers began. The Nagy government actually took the side of the opponents of the regime, declaring its intention to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact and secure the status of a neutral state for Hungary. White terror began in the capital and large cities - reprisals against communists and employees of the State Security Service. In this situation, the Soviet government decided to bring tank units into Budapest and suppress the uprising. At the same time, members of the Central Committee of the VPT, headed by Janos Kadar, who fled from the capital, formed a new government, which assumed full power by November 11. Nagy and his closest associates were executed. The party, transformed into the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, was purged. At the same time, Kadar announced his intention to eradicate all manifestations of Stalinism that caused the crisis of Hungarian society, to achieve a more balanced development of the country.

Events unfolded no less dramatically in Poland, where the spontaneous uprisings of workers in 1956 were met by the government with cruel repressions. The social explosion was prevented only thanks to the return to power of the disgraced W. Gomulka, who headed the Central Committee of the Polish Workers' Party in 1943-1948, but was expelled from the party for his passion for the idea of "national socialism". This reshuffle in the leadership of Poland caused great concern in the USSR. However, the new Polish leaders were able to convince the representatives of Moscow of their political loyalty and that the adjustment of the reforms would not affect the foundations of the socialist system. This happened at the moment when Soviet tanks were already heading towards Warsaw.

The increase in tension in Czechoslovakia was not so great, since in the industrially developed Czech Republic there was practically no task of accelerated industrialization, and the social costs of this process in Slovakia were compensated to some extent by the federal budget.

COUNTRIES OF EASTERN EUROPE IN 1945-2000

However, in accordance with the decisions of the Crimean Conference, the process of forming a government of national unity also began in Poland. It included representatives of the Polish Workers' Party (PPR), the Polish Socialist Party (PPS), the Polish Peasants' Party (PSL), as well as the Party of Ludovians and the Social Democratic Party. In June 1945, the coalition government was headed by E. Osubka-Moravsky. By virtue of the same decisions of the Crimean Conference, a political dialogue began internal forces Resistance and emigration anti-fascist forces in Yugoslavia.

The National Liberation Committee, created on the basis of the pro-communist National Liberation Front, in March 1945 reached an agreement with the Šubašić government in exile to hold general free elections to the Constituent Assembly (Constituent Assembly). The undivided predominance of the pro-communist forces was preserved during this period only in Albania.

The reason for such an unexpected at first glance cooperation of completely heterogeneous political forces was the unity of their tasks at the first stage of post-war transformations. Communists and agrarians, nationalists and democrats, it was quite obvious that the most pressing problem is the formation of the very foundations of a new constitutional system, the elimination of authoritarian structures of governance associated with the former regimes, and the holding of free elections. In all countries, the monarchical system was liquidated (only in Romania this happened later, after the establishment of the monopoly power of the communists).

In Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, the first wave of reforms also concerned the solution of the national question, the formation of a federal statehood. The primary task was the restoration of the destroyed economy, the establishment of material support for the population, and the solution of pressing social problems. The priority of such tasks made it possible to characterize the entire stage of 1945-1946. as a period of "people's democracy". However, the consolidation of political forces was temporary.

If the very need for economic reforms was questioned, then the methods of their implementation and the ultimate goal became the mark of the first split in the ruling coalitions. With the stability of the economic situation, it was necessary to determine the further strategy of reforms. Peasant parties, the most numerous and influential at that time (their representatives, as mentioned above, headed the first governments in Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary), did not consider it necessary to accelerate modernization, the priority development of industry.

They also opposed the expansion of state regulation of the economy. The main task of these parties, which was generally completed already at the first stage of reforms, was the destruction of latifundia and the implementation of agrarian reform in the interests of the middle peasantry. The liberal-democratic parties, communists and social democrats, despite political differences, were united in focusing on the “catch-up development” model, striving to ensure a breakthrough in their countries in industrial development, to approach the level of the leading countries of the world. Not having a large advantage in isolation, all together they constituted a powerful force capable of achieving a change in the political strategy of the ruling coalitions.

A turning point in the alignment of political forces took place during 1946, when the peasant parties were pushed aside from power. Changes in the higher echelons of government have also led to an adjustment of the reformist course. The implementation of programs for the nationalization of large-scale industry and the banking system, wholesale trade, the introduction of state control over production and planning elements began. But if the communists considered these reforms as the first step towards socialist transformations, then the democratic forces saw them as a process of strengthening the state element of the market economy, natural for the post-war MMC system.

The definition of a further strategy turned out to be impossible without the final ideological "self-determination". An important factor was the objective logic of the post-war economic transformations. “Catching up development”, which has already gone beyond the period of economic recovery, the continuation of accelerated reforms in the field of large-scale industrial production, structural and sectoral restructuring of the economy, required huge investment costs. There were no sufficient internal resources in the countries of Eastern Europe. This situation predetermined the inevitability of the growing economic dependence of the region on foreign aid. Delan's choice was to be only between the West and the East, and its outcome already depended not so much on the alignment of internal political forces, but on events on the world stage.

Eastern The political fate of Eastern Europe was Europe and began the subject of active discussion at the Crimean and cold Potsdam conferences of the allies. The agreements reached at Yalta between Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill reflected the actual division of the European continent into spheres of influence. Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Yugoslavia and Albania constituted the "zone of responsibility" of the USSR. In the future, Soviet diplomacy invariably retained the initiative in the course of negotiations with former allies on various aspects of a peaceful settlement in Eastern Europe.

The signing by the Soviet Union of bilateral treaties of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance (with Czechoslovakia in 1943, with Poland and Yugoslavia in 1945, with Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria in 1948) finally shaped the contours of these paternalistic relations. However, the direct formation of the Soviet bloc did not occur so rapidly.

Moreover, the San Francisco conference in April 1945 adopted the “Declaration on a Liberated Europe”, where the USSR, the USA and Great Britain equally assumed obligations to support democratic reforms in all countries liberated from the Nazis, to guarantee freedom of choice. for their further development. Over the next two years, the USSR sought to emphatically follow the proclaimed course and not force the geopolitical split of the continent. Real influence in the Eastern European region, based on the military presence and authority of the liberating power, allowed the Soviet government to make demarches more than once in order to demonstrate its respect for the sovereignty of these countries.

Stalin's unusual flexibility even extended to the holy of holies, the ideological realm. With the full support of the top party leadership, Academician E. Varga formulated in 1946 the concept of a "new type of democracy." It was based on the concept of democratic socialism, which is being built taking into account national specifics in countries liberated from fascism. The idea of "people's democracy" - a social system that combines the principles of social justice, parliamentary democracy and individual freedom - was indeed extremely popular then in the countries of Eastern Europe. It was seen by many political forces as a "third way", an alternative to individualistic Americanized capitalism and Soviet-style totalitarian socialism.

The international situation around the Eastern European countries began to change from mid-1946. At the Paris Peace Conference in August 1946, the American and British delegations made active attempts to interfere in the formation of new government bodies in Bulgaria and Romania, as well as the establishment of special judicial structures for international control over the observance of human rights in the countries of the former Hitler bloc. The USSR resolutely opposed such proposals, justifying its position by respecting the principle of sovereignty of the Eastern European powers. The aggravation of relations between the victorious countries became especially evident at the III and IV sessions of the Ministerial Council of Foreign Ministers, held in late 1946 - early 1947 and dedicated to the settlement of border issues in post-war Europe and the fate of Germany.

In March 1947, Mr.. Truman's presidential message proclaimed a new US foreign policy doctrine. The American leadership announced its readiness to support all "free peoples" in resisting external pressure and, most importantly, the communist threat in any form. Truman also said that the United States is obliged to lead the entire "free world" in the fight against the already established totalitarian regimes that undermine the foundations of the international legal order.

The proclamation of the "Truman Doctrine", which announced the beginning of a crusade against communism, marked the beginning of an open struggle of the superpowers for geopolitical influence anywhere in the world. The Eastern European countries felt the change in the international situation already in the summer of 1947. During this period, negotiations took place on the conditions for providing economic assistance from the United States to European countries under the Marshall Plan. The Soviet leadership not only resolutely rejected the possibility of such cooperation, but also ultimatum demanded that Poland and Czechoslovakia, which had shown a clear interest, refuse to participate in the project.

The remaining countries of the Eastern European region prudently held preliminary consultations with Moscow and responded to the American proposals with a "voluntary and decisive refusal." The USSR offered generous compensation in the form of preferential supplies of raw materials and food. But it was necessary to eradicate the very possibility of a geopolitical reorientation of Eastern Europe, that is, to ensure monopoly power in these countries to the communist parties.

Education Formation of pro-Soviet regimes in the countries of Eastern Europe followed a similar scenario. The first step on this path was the consolidation of the Soviet course of the communist parties on the national-democratic revolution into a socialist one. First of all, the corresponding decision was made by the Romanian Communist Party - back in October 1945, the RCP was the politically weakest of the Eastern European communist parties, it was not connected with the mass resistance movement.

The leadership of the party, which was dominated by representatives of national minorities, was disorganized by the conflict of its leader G. Georgiou-Deja with representatives of the Moscow Union of the Romanian Communists A. Pauker and V. Luca. In addition, Georgiou-Deja accused S. Foris, secretary of the Central Committee of the party, of complicity with the occupiers, who was arrested after the arrival of Soviet troops and hanged without a court decision. The adoption of the radical program was associated with an attempt to enlist additional support from the Soviet leadership and did not correspond to the political situation in the country.

In most countries of the Eastern European region, the decision to move to the socialist stage of social transformations was made by the leadership of the communist parties already in 1946 and was not associated with a radical restructuring of the highest echelons of state power. In April, the corresponding decision was adopted by the Plenum of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, in September - by the III Congress of the CPSU. In October 1946, after elections were held in Bulgaria, the Dimitrov government came to power, declaring the same goal; in November, the newly formed bloc of Polish parties PPR and PPS (“Democratic Bloc”) announced a socialist orientation.

In all these cases, the consolidation of the course towards socialist construction did not lead to an escalation of political violence and the planting of communist ideology. On the contrary, the idea of socialist construction was supported by a wide range of center-left forces and inspired confidence among the most diverse sections of the population. Socialism for them was not yet associated with the Soviet experience. The communist parties themselves successfully used bloc tactics during these months.

Coalitions with the participation of communists, social democrats and their allies, as a rule, received an obvious advantage in the first democratic elections - in May 1946 in Czechoslovakia, in October 1946 in Bulgaria, in January 1947 - in Poland, in August 1947 - in Hungary. The only exceptions were Yugoslavia and Albania, where, on the crest of the liberation movement, pro-communist forces came to power in the first post-war months.

In 1947, the new center-left governments, using the already open support of the Soviet military administration and relying on the state security agencies created under the control of the Soviet special services on the basis of communist cadres, provoked a series of political conflicts that led to the defeat of the peasant and liberal-democratic yarty. Political trials took place over the leaders of the Hungarian IMSH 3. Tildy, the Polish People's Party Nikolaychik, the Bulgarian Agricultural People's Union N. Petkov, the Romanian Caranist Party A. Alexandrescu by the Slovak President Tiso and the leadership of the Slovak Democratic Party who supported him. In Romania, this process coincided with the final liquidation of the monarchical system. Despite King Mihai's demonstrative loyalty to the USSR, he was accused of "seeking support among Western imperialist circles" and expelled from the country.

The logical continuation of the defeat of the democratic opposition was the organizational merger of the communist and social democratic parties with the subsequent discrediting, and subsequently the destruction of the leaders of the social democracy. In February 1948, the Romanian Workers' Party was formed on the basis of the RCP and the SDPR. In May 1948, after a political purge of the leadership of the Bulgarian Social Democratic Party, she joined the BKP. A month later, in Hungary, the CPSU and the SDPV were united into the Hungarian Working People's Party. At the same time, the Czechoslovak communists and social democrats united into a single party, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. In December 1948, the gradual unification of the PPS and the PPR ended with the formation of the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP). At the same time, in most countries of the region, the multi-party system has not been formally eliminated.

So, by 1948-1949. in almost all countries of Eastern Europe, the political hegemony of the communist forces became obvious. The socialist system also received legal consolidation. In April 1948, the constitution of the Romanian People's Republic was adopted, proclaiming a course towards building the foundations of socialism. On May 9 of the same year, a constitution of this kind was adopted in Czechoslovakia. In 1948, the course towards socialist construction was fixed by the Fifth Congress of the ruling Bulgarian Communist Party, and in Hungary the beginning of socialist transformations was proclaimed in the constitution adopted in August 1949. Only in Poland was the socialist constitution adopted a little later - in 1952, but already the "Small Constitution" of 1947 fixed the dictatorship of the proletariat as a form of the Polish state and the basis of the social order.

All constitutional acts of the late 40s - early 50s. based on a similar legal doctrine. They consolidated the principle of people's power and the class basis of the "state of workers and working peasants." The socialist constitutional and legal doctrine denied the principle of separation of powers. The "omnipotence of the Soviets" was proclaimed in the system of state power. Local Soviets became "organs of unified state power", responsible for the implementation of acts of the central authorities on their territory. Executive bodies of power were formed from the composition of the Councils of all levels. The executive committees, as a rule, acted according to the principle of dual subordination: to a higher governing body and the corresponding Council. As a result, a rigid power hierarchy took shape, patronized by party bodies.

While maintaining the principle of people's sovereignty (democracy) in the socialist constitutional and legal doctrine, the concept of "people" was narrowed down to a separate social group - "working people". This group was declared the highest subject of legal relations, the true bearer of imperious sovereignty. The individual legal personality of a person was actually denied. The personality was considered as an organic, integral part of the society, and its legal status - as a derivative of the status of a collective social and legal entity ("working people" or "exploiting classes").

The most important criterion for maintaining the legal status of an individual was political loyalty, which was seen as recognition of the priority of the interests of the people over individual, selfish interests. Such an approach opened the way for the deployment of large-scale political repressions. "Enemies of the people" could also be declared those persons who not only carry out some "anti-people actions", but simply do not share the prevailing ideological postulates. The political upheaval that took place in the Eastern European countries in 1947-1948 strengthened the influence of the USSR in the region, but did not yet make it overwhelming.

In the victorious communist parties, in addition to the "Moscow" wing - that part of the communists who went through the school of the Comintern and possessed precisely the Soviet vision of socialism, an influential "national" wing remained, focused on the ideas of national sovereignty and equality in relations with the "elder brother" ( which, however, did not prevent many representatives of the idea of "national socialism" from being more than consistent and tough supporters of totalitarian statehood). To support the "correct" political course of the young communist regimes in Eastern Europe, the Soviet leadership took a number of vigorous measures. The most important of these was the formation of a new international communist organization, the successor to the Comintern.

The idea of creating a coordinating center for the international communist and labor movement arose in Moscow even before the start of active opposition from the West. Therefore, initially the Soviet leadership took a very cautious position, trying to maintain the image of an equal partner of the Eastern European countries. In the spring of 1947, Stalin suggested that the Polish leader W. Gomulka take the initiative to create a joint information periodical for several communist parties. But already in the summer of that year, in the course of the preparatory work, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks took a much tougher position. The idea of a constructive dialogue between various currents of the international working-class movement was replaced by a desire to create a platform for criticizing "non-Marxist theories of a peaceful transition to socialism", the struggle against the "dangerous infatuation with parliamentarism" and other manifestations of "revisionism".

In the same vein, in September 1947, in the Polish city of Szklarska Poreba, a meeting of delegations of the communist parties of the USSR, France, Italy and Eastern European states was held. The Soviet delegation led by A. Zhdanov and G. Malenkov actively supported the toughest speeches about the "aggravation of the class struggle" and the need for a corresponding adjustment in the course of the communist parties. V. Gomulka, the leaders of the Bulgarian and Hungarian delegations V. Chervenkov and J. Revai, as well as the secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia R. Slansky spoke from such positions. The speeches of the Romanian leader G. Georgeu-Deja and the Yugoslav representatives M. Djilas and E. Kardelya turned out to be more restrained.

Moscow politicians were even less interested in the position of the French and Italian communists, who advocated maintaining the course of consolidating all leftist forces in the struggle against "American imperialism." At the same time, none of the speakers proposed to strengthen the political and organizational coordination of the international communist movement - it was about the exchange of "internal information" and opinions. A surprise for the meeting participants was Zhdanov's final report, where, contrary to the initial agenda, the emphasis was shifted to political tasks common to all communist parties and a conclusion was made about the expediency of creating a permanent coordination center.

As a result, the meeting in Szklarska Poręba decided to establish the Communist Information Bureau. True, mindful of all the ups and downs that accompanied the struggle against the Trotskyist-Zinovievist and Bukharinist leadership of the old Comintern, and not wanting to receive a new opposition in the person of the Cominform in the struggle for autocracy in the communist movement, Stalin narrowed the field of activity of the new organization to the utmost. The Cominform was to become only a political tribune for the leadership of the P(b) to present "the correct vision of the ways of building socialism."

In accordance with the tried and tested political recipes of the 20s. The Kremlin tried, first of all, to find a potential adversary among its new allies and roughly punish the "disobedient". Judging by the documents of the foreign policy department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, V. Gomulka was initially considered in this role, who recklessly spoke at a meeting in Szklarska Poreba against the creation of a political coordination center instead of the planned joint publication. However, the "Polish problem" was soon obscured by a more acute conflict with the Yugoslav leadership. Gomulka, on the other hand, was dismissed in 1948 from the post of general secretary of the PPR without additional noise and replaced by B. Bierut, who was more loyal to the Kremlin.

Yugoslavia, at first glance, of all Eastern European countries, gave the least grounds for ideological revelations and political confrontation. Ever since the war, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia has become the most influential force in the country, and its leader Josef Broz Tito has become a national hero. Since January 1946, a one-party system was legally fixed in Yugoslavia, the implementation of broad programs for the nationalization of industry and the collectivization of agriculture began. Forced industrialization, carried out according to the Soviet model, was seen as a strategic line for the development of the national economy and the social structure of society. The authority of the USSR in Yugoslavia during these years was indisputable.

The first reason for the emergence of disagreements between the Soviet and Yugoslav leadership was the negotiations on the disputed territory of Trieste in 1946. Stalin, not wanting to aggravate relations with the Western powers at that time, supported plans for a compromise settlement of this problem. In Yugoslavia, this was considered a betrayal of the interests of an ally. Disagreements also arose on the question of the participation of the USSR in the restoration and development of the Yugoslav mining industry. The Soviet government was ready to finance half of the costs, but the Yugoslav side insisted on full funding from the USSR, contributing only the cost of minerals as its share.

As a result, the economic assistance of the USSR was reduced only to supplies, equipment and the dispatch of specialists. But the real cause of the conflict was precisely political. More and more irritation in Moscow was caused by the desire of the leadership of Yugoslavia to present their country as a "special" ally of the USSR, more significant and influential than all other members of the Soviet bloc. Yugoslavia considered the entire Balkan region as a zone of its direct influence, and Albania as a potential member of the Yugoslav federation. Paternalistic and not always respectful style of relations on the part of Soviet politicians and economic specialists, in turn, caused discontent in Belgrade. To a particular extent, it intensified after the start in 1947 of a large-scale operation of the Soviet special services to recruit agents in Yugoslavia and create an intelligence network there.

From the middle of 1947, relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia began to deteriorate rapidly. Official Moscow reacted sharply to the joint statement of the governments of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria dated August 1, 1947 on the initialing (coordination) of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. This decision not only was not agreed with the Soviet government, but also outstripped the ratification of the peace treaty between Bulgaria and the leading countries of the anti-Hitler coalition. Under pressure from Moscow, the Yugoslav and Bulgarian leaders then admitted their "mistake". But already in the autumn of 1947, the Albanian question became a stumbling block in Soviet-Yugoslav relations. Taking advantage of the differences in the Albanian government, in November Yugoslavia brought charges of unfriendly actions to the leadership of this country.

Criticism mainly concerned the Minister of Economy N. Spiru, who headed the pro-Soviet wing of the Albanian government. Spiru soon committed suicide, and the Yugoslav leadership, anticipating a possible reaction from the Kremlin, itself initiated a discussion of the fate of Albania in Moscow. The negotiations that took place in December-January only temporarily reduced the intensity of the confrontation. Stalin unequivocally hinted that in the future the accession of Albania to the Yugoslav federation could become quite real. But Tito's demands for the entry of Yugoslav troops into the territory of Albania were harshly rejected. The denouement came in January 1948 after the announcement by the Yugoslav and Bulgarian leadership of plans to deepen Balkan integration.

This project received the harshest assessment in the Soviet official press. In early February, the "rebels" were summoned to Moscow. The Bulgarian leader G. Dimitrov hurried to abandon his previous intentions, but the reaction of official Belgrade turned out to be more restrained. Tito refused to personally go to the "public flogging", and the Central Committee of the CPY, after the report of Djilas and Kardelj, who had returned from Moscow, decided to abandon plans for Balkan integration, but to increase diplomatic pressure on Albania. On March 1, another meeting of the Central Committee of the South Yugoslavia took place, at which a very harsh criticism of the position of the Soviet leadership was voiced. Moscow's response was the March 18 decision to withdraw all Soviet specialists from Yugoslavia.

On March 27, 1948, Stalin sent a personal letter to I. Tito, in which the accusations leveled against the Yugoslav side were summarized (however, it is significant that the leaders of the communist parties of other countries participating in the Cominform also received copies) The content of the letter shows the real reason for the break with Yugoslavia - the desire of the Soviet leadership to clearly show how "socialism should not be built." Tito and his comrades-in-arms were reproached for criticizing the universality of the historical experience of the USSR, dissolving the communist party in the Popular Front, renouncing the class struggle, patronizing capitalist elements in the economy.

In fact, these reproaches had nothing to do with the internal problems of Yugoslavia - it was chosen as a target only because of excessive self-will. But the leaders of other communist parties, invited to participate in the public "exposing" of the "criminal clique of Tito", were forced to officially recognize the criminality of the very attempt to find other ways to build socialism.

On May 4, 1948, Stalin sent Tito a new letter with an invitation to the second meeting of the Cominform and a lengthy exposition of his vision of the principles of the "correct" construction of the foundations of socialism. It was about the universality of the Soviet model of social transformations, the inevitability of exacerbation of the class struggle at the stage of building the foundations of socialism and, as a result, the uncontested dictatorship of the proletariat, the political monopoly of communist parties, the uncompromising struggle against other political forces and "non-labour elements", priority programs of accelerated industrialization and collectivization of agriculture. Tito, of course, did not respond to this invitation, and Soviet-Yugoslav relations were actually broken.

At the second meeting of the Cominform in June 1948, formally devoted to the Yugoslav question, the ideological and political foundations of the socialist camp were finally consolidated, including the right of the USSR to interfere in the internal affairs of other socialist countries and the recognition of the universality of the Soviet model of socialism. From now on, the internal development of the countries of Eastern Europe took place under the strict control of the USSR. The creation in 1949 of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, which assumed the functions of coordinating the economic integration of the socialist countries, and later (in 1955) the military-political bloc of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, completed the formation of the socialist camp.

In what political state did the countries of Eastern Europe find themselves in the first post-war years (until the end of 1946)?
2. What was the position of the Soviet Baltic republics after the war?
3. What public sentiments were common in Eastern Europe after the war? What approaches did the USSR follow in determining its policy in Eastern Europe?
4. How was the USSR treated in the countries of Eastern Europe?
5. How were the non-communist forces defeated in the general elections in Poland on January 19, 1947? What consequences did it have?
1. In Hungary after the war, the communists were not the main force. Hungary was an ally of Germany under the Anti-Comintern Pact, and Hungarian units participated in the fighting on the side of Germany in Yugoslavia and on the territory of the Soviet Union. However, back in 1943, dictator M. Horthy began to look for ways to withdraw the country from the war and entered into contacts with British representatives. In the spring of 1944, he even tried to get permission from Hitler to withdraw the Hungarian troops from at least one of the fronts. Berlin refused, and on March 14 German troops were brought into Hungary.
In August 1944, M. Horthy began negotiations with Moscow, asking her consent to the joint occupation of Hungary by the forces of the USSR and the Western allies. In October, he officially announced Hungary's withdrawal from the war. In response, German troops entered Budapest.
After the fall of M. Horthy and the liberation of Hungary by the Soviet troops, the first free elections were held on November 3, 1945. The Party of Small Farmers received the majority of votes. On February 1, 1946, a republic was proclaimed in Hungary. The new government since 1946 was headed by Ferenc Nagy, a representative of the Party of Smallholders. The Communists participated in it, but did not occupy a dominant position.
In other countries, the communists have achieved more. In November 1944, the Communists were included in the Romanian government. True, as early as February 1945, a new cabinet was formed in Bucharest, headed by Petru Groza, leader of the Front of Farmers. It was already essentially a communist government. The Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR A.Ya. Vyshinsky, fulfilling the decisions of the December (1945) meeting of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Moscow, was even forced to make a special visit to Romania in order to achieve the inclusion in the Romanian government of representatives of the "historical" parties - the National Liberal and the National -tzaranist - and thus provide the Romanian government with international recognition. In general, the disappearance of non-communist parties and the establishment of a one-party system occurred before anyone else precisely in those countries where the Soviet military-political presence either did not exist at all (Albania), or it played a secondary role in the formation of the post-war order (Yugoslavia).
The communization of Bulgaria, which during the war years was in allied relations with Germany and Italy, proceeded rather quickly, without declaring war on the USSR. On September 5, 1944, the USSR declared a state of war with Bulgaria, and Soviet troops were brought there. This allowed the Bulgarian communists and other anti-German forces to become more active. A non-communist government was formed in the country, headed by the leader of the Zveno Union, Kimon Georgiev. It included communists who occupied key posts. Members of the regency council were arrested and executed. In November 1945, parliamentary elections were held in Bulgaria, in which the Patriotic Front, a coalition of diverse parties led by the Communists, won. The new cabinet was re-formed by K. Georgiev. In November 1946, as a result of a referendum, the monarchy in Bulgaria was abolished, and the country was proclaimed the People's Republic of Bulgaria. On November 21, 1946, Georgy Dimitrov arrived in Sofia from Moscow and headed the next Bulgarian government.
The situation in Poland developed more complicated. During the war, the western regions of this country were included in Germany, and in the east, a general government headed by a German governor was formed. By the end of the war, two Polish governments claimed the right to represent the interests of the Polish people - one pro-Western emigre government in London (in 1943-1944 it was headed by the leader of the Polish Peasants' Party Stanisław Mikolajczyk) and the other - created in July 1944 on part of the liberated territory of Poland in Lublin Pro-Soviet Temporary national government Poland.
On August 1, 1944, patriotic groups of Poles who supported the London government raised an armed uprising in Warsaw against the German troops. It was launched taking into account the offensive on Warsaw by Soviet troops and counting on their support. Meanwhile, Stalin decided not to support the uprising in Warsaw in order to prevent the strengthening of anti-Soviet forces in Poland. On September 14, 1944, Soviet troops occupied one of the suburbs of Warsaw, and further advancement stopped. The uprising continued until October 2 and was brutally suppressed by the Nazis with the inactivity of the Soviet troops.
The Soviet Union began to strive for the post-war cabinet in Poland to be created on a "Lublin" and not a "London" basis. The key consideration that continued to guide the USSR was to secure recognition of the "Curzon Line" as the future eastern border of Poland. The Soviet side did not allow retreats on the border issue. Soviet representatives believed possible inclusion in the coalition government only those representatives of the "London Poles" who agreed with the "Curzon line". The United States and Britain, without rejecting the position of I. V. Stalin, sabotaged the formation of the Polish cabinet on Soviet terms. Only in Yalta did they agree to the formula of a coalition government "on the basis of Lublin" with the participation of moderate "Londoners". But, fearing that the Western allies would refuse to fulfill the agreements reached, on April 21, 1945, the USSR concluded a Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Post-War Cooperation with the Lublin government for a period of 20 years. It was clear that Moscow would not allow the formation of a coalition government in Poland at all if the US, Britain and the "London Poles" insisted on revising Moscow's position on the border issue. The USSR line won.
On June 28, 1945, a coalition cabinet was formed from the "Lublin" and "London" Poles, headed by the socialist E. Osobka-Moravsky, who represented the Lublin government. S. Mikolajczyk took the posts of Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Agriculture in it, hoping to expand his influence in the future, relying on popularity among the peasantry. Non-communist parties in Poland had many supporters, and Mikolajczyk's Polish Peasants' Party in 1945 outnumbered the Communist Party and the Socialist Party combined. In accordance with the decisions of the Potsdam Conference, the coalition government was recognized by the Western powers. In August 1945, the USSR signed with the new coalition government of Poland the Treaty on the Soviet-Polish state border, which confirmed its passage (with some deviations) along the "Curzon Line".
Of all the Eastern European countries, a non-communist alternative seemed the most viable in Czechoslovakia. Here, its democratic experience between the two world wars, and the country's economic orientation mainly to the West, and Moscow's positive attitude towards the figure of E. Beneš had an effect. Moscow supported his claims to the continuity of the pre-war Czechoslovak state, and as early as December 1943 JV Stalin and E. Beneš signed the Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Post-War Cooperation. After the liberation of Czechoslovakia from fascism, Beneš was automatically restored as a full-fledged president of the country. On June 29, 1945, a Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty was concluded on Transcarpathian Ukraine. Transcarpathia ("Rusinia", "Podcarpathian Rus"), which belonged in 1920-1938. Czechoslovakia, and in 1938-1945. - Hungary (after the destruction of independent Czechoslovakia in 1938), transferred to the Soviet Union.
Post-war reforms (especially in the agrarian sector) in Czechoslovakia were less radical than in other people's democracies, and until the end of 1947 the communists behaved relatively moderately, adhering to the concept of the "Czechoslovak path to socialism." In the elections to the Legislative Assembly of Czechoslovakia in May 1946, the communists managed to become the first influential party (38% of the vote), although their victory was ensured by the votes of the populated Czech lands - in Slovakia the position of the communists was weaker. The Slovaks were wary of the restoration united state with the Czechs, fearing Czech nationalism.
Although Czechoslovakia's chairman Klement Gottwald (Czech) became the prime minister of Czechoslovakia, the government was half non-communist, and the son of the first president of Czechoslovakia, Slovak Jan Masaryk, a supporter of a pro-Western orientation, took over as foreign minister.
2. The Baltic countries - Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania - were included in the USSR in 1940 without taking into account the opinions of the peoples of these countries. After the Second World War, their presence in the USSR was not openly disputed by the governments of other countries. However, the United States of America did not officially recognize the legality of the annexation of the Baltic states to the USSR, although they did not make any representations to Moscow on this matter.
The administrative boundaries of the Baltic republics within the USSR have undergone changes. Another was the line of the administrative border between the Estonian SSR and the Pskov region of the RSFSR - a wedge of territory with a mixed Russian-Estonian population in the area with. Pechory with the old Russian Orthodox Pskov-Pechora Monastery. A section of the Curonian Spit on the Baltic Sea and the former Memel Territory (the city of Memel became known as Klaipeda) were transferred to the Lithuanian SSR. Soviet Lithuania also retained in its composition the Vilna region (modern Vilnius and the adjacent region) with a large Polish minority living there, transferred to it by the Soviet government after the destruction of the Polish state in 1939.
After the expulsion of German troops from the Baltic states, at the beginning of 1945, Soviet authorities were restored on the territory of the Baltic republics, collectivization and partial re-nationalization were carried out. These measures were accompanied by repressions and deportations of "bourgeois elements" to the eastern and northern regions USSR. In total, about 9% of the Baltic population was deported, including 300,000 people from Lithuania. Nearly a hundred thousand more fled to the West. An anti-Soviet partisan movement of the “forest brothers” arose in the Baltic States, which was engaged in terror against regular forces. Soviet army, the disruption of elections and the killings of local communists. By the end of 1946, it was almost completely suppressed in Estonia and Latvia, but continued to operate in Lithuania. Individual activists of the "Forest Brothers" remained underground until the 1970s.
3. In the first post-war years, there was a painful process of mass movements of people in Europe - mainly in a western direction. In addition to the eviction of 6 million Germans from Poland, the Baltic regions of the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and Yugoslavia, about 380 thousand Poles fled or emigrated to the West, 220 thousand Jews (a significant part of whom soon rushed to Palestine), 125 thousand citizens of Yugoslavia , 87 thousand inhabitants of the three Baltic republics included in the Soviet Union, tens of thousands of Ukrainians from the Western Ukrainian regions of the USSR. About 5.4 million Ostarbeiters and political emigrants were returned to the USSR, largely forcibly, the vast majority of whom went through Soviet concentration camps. Population flows also occurred between Eastern European countries: Hungarians left Romania and Yugoslavia, Ukrainian Greek Catholics were expelled from Poland (where they lived in the Rzheshuv region), the Poles themselves left for Poland from the territory of the USSR.
The political and psychological situation in the east of Europe in the first post-war years differed little from the situation in the west. After five or six years of dictatorship and violence everywhere, public sentiment was saturated with fear. To this was added a sense of fatigue both from the ruthless market capitalism that, in the understanding of an ordinary European, became the cause of the crisis of the interwar years, and from the "failed democracy" that could not protect against this crisis. Disillusionment with parliamentary-republican forms of government was part of the psychological legacy of the crisis of 1929-1933, which all countries found a way out of in the 1930s by strengthening executive power.
With the exception of Czechoslovakia, democratic institutions in Eastern Europe were not trusted in any country. In Poland, the regime that existed on the eve of the World War and grew out of the dictatorship of Jozef Pidsudski was by no means liberal, and the intelligentsia in this country did not, in fact, have time to form. Between the wars, Romania was ruled by conservatives who, in the 1940s, surprisingly easily agreed to cooperate with the Nazis. True, in Romania and Hungary in the 1920s and 1930s there were the beginnings of a multi-party system, political parties were firmly embedded in local dictatorships and were part of them. There was no democracy either in Bulgaria or in Yugoslavia, where power belonged to the aristocracy and the conservative bureaucracy. In the perception of Eastern Europeans, the species known to them political structure were discredited, and understandable and attractive models of government worth striving for were absent.
At the final stage of the war and in the first post-war years (until about mid-1947), the Soviet leadership did not set the goal of forming one-party communist regimes in Eastern European countries. At that time, the task was to create a security belt of friendly states on the western border of the USSR. Their socio-political system after the war was formed under Soviet control, thanks to which the left had advantages. However, parliamentarism and multi-party system were not denied. Moscow was tolerant of non-communist moderate parties and encouraged the formation of coalitions and the unification of parties and movements into popular (national, democratic, domestic) fronts that stood on democratic positions. Obviously, anti-communist parties did not fit into this scheme, since they were identified with pro-fascist regimes, although even they, as the experience of Romania in 1944-1947 shows, were not denied access to these coalitions. Such an order ensured the dominance of socialist elements in the economy and political system without destroying the state machine and while maintaining traditional parliamentarism. It was called "People's Democracy".
Keyword
People's Democracy- the political system in the countries of Eastern Europe, with
in which, in fact, the leading role was played by local communists, relying on the support of the USSR, while non-communist parties continued to exist under the condition of their loyalty to the authorities.
The relatively soft course of the USSR until 1947 was dictated by the need for cooperation with the Western allies in the development of Europe. Moscow opposed the attempts of anti-communist forces to break through to power. But Soviet leaders held back the desire of local communist parties to accelerate anti-capitalist reforms. Conducted in 1945-1947. in the Eastern European countries, parliamentary elections, despite the offenses, testified to the growth of the influence of the communists. In Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria, where the Soviet Union directed the work of the allied control commissions, the Soviet representatives insisted on the inclusion in the governments of representatives of non-communist parties, albeit from among those acceptable to Moscow.
4. The Soviet experience did not seem ideal to Eastern Europeans. But he made an impression. O Stalinist repressions Little was known about the 1930s, and the Soviet regime seemed better than the fascist one: at least it seemed to be focused on involving citizens in the state system - in contrast to Nazism, which was built on discrimination and exclusion from society of one or another category of citizens. The USSR was not a sign of a bright future, but it seemed to be a symbol of a departure from a nightmarish past.
In the Soviet Union, in the forests of the Baltic states, "forest brothers" were hiding - detachments of opponents of the accession of the Baltic countries to the Soviet Union, which periodically attacked units of the Soviet Army. In Western Ukraine until 1947, detachments of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, which did not leave together with the Nazis, continued to oppose Soviet power under the leadership of the Western Ukrainian nationalist S.A. Bandera.
It is all the more striking that outside the USSR, the population showed no signs of intent to resist the Soviet presence and the onslaught of the local left. For example, in Poland alone, the number of opponents of communism should have been, according to Western estimates, at least 100 thousand people. But it turned out that in order to neutralize them, it was enough for the Polish communist government to carry out two amnesties (1947), after which the dissenters were simply forgotten for several years.
The sentiments against local collaborators - "prudent inhabitants" who endured the Nazis during the war in order to preserve their property - were stronger than fears against the Communists. At the same time, in the liberal and Catholic circles of Eastern European countries, they hoped for the "fragility of the new government" and "the imminent start of a third world war." While waiting for it, the moderates passively watched the events. In contrast, the poor strata showed signs of activity and a thirst for change. The communists were attracted by their energy and purposefulness against the background of the sluggishness of the centrists. New pro-communist and leftist regimes won the support of the masses. Paramilitary detachments of local communists began to form in the countries of Eastern Europe. Ordinary citizens willingly joined the police forces and the new national armed forces.
A. The Soviet Union behaved prudently in Eastern Europe, not wanting complications with Washington and London. But the cautious line was understood in Moscow as a renunciation of attempts to go beyond the geographical limits of what since 1945, in agreement with the United States and Britain, the USSR began to consider the security belt of the Soviet Union. Actions within this belt were not considered in Moscow to be either offensive or provocative towards the West. The USSR took care of the security of the borders and did this by building a geopolitical barrier out of the Eastern European countries.
In principle, such regimes could exist in the form of neutralist governments without the participation of the communists, as was the case in Finland after the resignation on March 4, 1946 of President Karl Mannerheim. But the experience of Finland, where there were no Soviet troops, was not applicable to the Eastern European countries. Radical forms of transformation began to predominate in them. The change of regime in Warsaw proved to be one of the most painful changes.
The pro-Western forces in Poland were in a difficult position. The USSR did not arouse the sympathy of the Poles. But the Polish peasants began to develop new lands in the territories received from Germany. On June 30, 1946, the leftist government submitted to a referendum and received approval of the program for the nationalization of industry. A land reform was carried out in the country, according to which new lands in the west were included in the calculation of land allotments. Settlers in the areas from which the German population was deported received houses, implements, property and arable land from the rue of communist power. This formed a layer of people interested in its survival in order to preserve the immutability of the western Polish borders.
At this time, the Western governments, as if on purpose, did everything to fuel the anti-Western suspicions of the Poles. British and American politicians shied away from confirming the legitimacy of Poland's borders in the West and pointed to their inconclusive nature. Legally, such statements did not contradict the Potsdam agreements. But this damaged the reputation of the West in the eyes of the Polish population, who feared that Washington and London might "take back" their concessions made at Yalta and Potsdam. Only Moscow firmly declared the final nature of the Polish borders and supported the eviction of the Germans from the territories annexed to Poland. The Polish left played on the fears of the population. It was difficult for pro-Western parties to build their election programs.
The situation was complicated for the non-communist forces by government repression. In 1946, 17 public figures and politicians from among the moderates and centrists were arrested on charges of having links with the anti-government underground. In addition to the main defendants in the process, thousands of grassroots leaders were arrested
Polish Peasants' Party. Starting in the autumn of 1946, she began to be subjected to systematic pressure, her meetings were dispersed by detachments of the Communist Party, in countryside PKP activists were arrested.
In the elections to the Sejm on January 19, 1947, the party of S. Mikołajczyk, on which they pinned their hopes as the non-communist core of the Polish political spectrum, was defeated, winning 28 seats against 394 won by the bloc of socialists and communists. Bolesław Bierut, one of the leaders of the Communist Party, was elected President of Poland.
On September 14, 1947, the Polish government broke the concordat with the Vatican, and a conflict between the state and the Catholic Church began in the country.
Keyword
Concordat-a treaty between the Pope as head of the Catholic Church and
State of the Vatican and any country about legal status in it the Catholic Church and relations with the papacy.
The events in Poland caused the West to grow wary of the intentions of the USSR in Eastern Europe. The West did not recognize the results of the elections in Poland. Watching the actions of the communists in the east of Europe, Western governments were inclined to the appropriateness of repressive measures against the communists in their countries.
Minimum knowledge
1. The post-war situation in Eastern Europe was characterized by tension in social, ethnic, economic and political relations. This was (associated with fatigue, fear and socio-economic exhaustion as a result of participation in the war, mass migrations of peoples, deployment of Soviet troops. The USSR at the first stage did not seek to establish the power of pro-communist forces, agreeing to the participation of traditional Eastern European parties and movements in state bodies The new regimes in Eastern Europe were called "countries of people's democracy."
2. The Baltic Republics, which were included in the USSR against the wishes of a significant part of the population of these countries, were subjected to mass repressions and a change in the socio-economic system in the image of the USSR of the 1920-1930s. The administrative border of these republics with the neighboring RSFSR was also changed.
3. The population of the countries of Eastern Europe perceived the dominance of the USSR in their countries without active resistance. The USSR was perceived as the winner in the war and potentially possible model state-social structure.
4. The situation in Central and Eastern Europe was uncertain. Coalition governments in most countries were unstable, and there were processes of rivalry between left and center. In a number of countries, the communists failed to gain a clear advantage, however, counting on the support of the USSR, they were not going to miss the chance to seize power.
5. After the war, the USSR actually "bribed" the Polish population, transferring to it the material wealth and lands of the off-limits territories that had passed to Poland from Germany. The weakening of the anti-communist forces was also connected with this. An additional role was played by repressions against the Polish opposition. Poland was in the hands of the communists.

The countries of Eastern Europe after World War II briefly. Western European countries: post-war device

Read also

More on the topic 19 Eastern Europe after World War II. Crisisogenic features of the socialist model in the countries of Eastern Europe.:

Eastern European countries after the Second World War. Transformations of the people's democracy period