Lenin called for a civil war. IN AND. Lenin on the Civil War and the hypocrisy of the accomplices of the bourgeoisie - the Mensheviks, the Socialist-Revolutionaries. Causes and class essence of wars. Historical conditions for their occurrence

The psychology of peoples developed in the 19th century in Germany. Its origins were the ideas of Hegel and the psychology of Herbart. Maurice Lazarus and Heinrich Steinthal are considered the founders of the psychology of peoples. The central idea of ​​their psychology of peoples was that there is a "supra-individual soul" that has a "supra-individual integrity" - a people (nation).

Later, the ideas of the psychology of peoples were developed in the views of Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920). Wundt contrasted individual psychology with the psychology of peoples (following Lazarus and Steinthal). Physiological psychology = individual, it is an experimental discipline. The experiment is unsuitable for the study of speech and thinking. From this "point" begins the psychology of peoples. Thinking and speech and other psychological phenomena cannot be understood outside the psychology of peoples.

It must grasp the general in the psychology of large masses. According to W. Wundt, the object of the psychology of peoples is what he calls the "soul of the people", by analogy with the soul of an individual. If we look at the object of psychology research as the totality of all the inner experiences of the individual, what is commonly called the "soul", then the object of the psychology of peoples is the general formations of ideas, feelings and aspirations. According to Wundt, the soul of a people is not reduced to the totality of the actions of individual individuals: the joint life of many individuals gives rise to new, specific laws, which, although they do not contradict the laws of individual consciousness, are not reduced to the latter either.

The main areas of the psychology of peoples are language, myths and customs. Language, myth, custom are not fragments of the national spirit, but this very spirit of the people in its relatively untouched individual form, which determines all other processes.

The language contains the general form of representations living in the spirit of the people and the laws of their connection; myths - the content of these ideas; customs are the general direction of the will that has arisen from these ideas. The word "myth" refers to the entire primitive worldview, the word "custom" - all the beginnings of the legal order. The psychology of peoples explores these three areas and, no less important, their interaction: language is a form of myth; custom expresses the myth and develops it.

Thus, the methods of the psychology of peoples according to W. Wundt are an analysis of the products of culture (language, myths, customs, art, everyday life). Moreover, the psychology of peoples uses exclusively descriptive methods. It does not claim to discover laws. Psychology, any, including the psychology of peoples, is not a science about laws, at least not only about them. It focuses on the problem of development (an important category for Wundt), in the case of the psychology of peoples, the development of the “soul of the people”.

Problems of the psychology of peoples

According to the publication: W. Wundt. "Problems of the psychology of peoples", publishing house "Cosmos", M., 1912

FOREWORD

The first of the four articles put together in this collection is a somewhat modified program published in 1886, in which I tried to give an account of the tasks of the psychology of peoples, developed according to the plan outlined here. It was published in the fourth volume of the journal "Philosophische Studien" published by me and is reprinted in this collection with some additions and with a final section that serves as a transition to the following reports. The second and third articles are an extended reworking of critical objections, of which one appeared in the appendix to the Munich "Allgemeine Zeitung" for 1907, No. 40, the other shortly before that in the "Indogermanische Forschungen", volume 28. general psychological points of view, the questions raised in these objections, and in particular the dispute between the individualist and collectivist theories of society explained in the third article. The fourth article, perhaps, can be called an apologia for German psychology against American-English pragmatism, which is now so highly praised in theological circles. All four articles taken together aim to shed light on the general relation of the psychology of peoples to the historical sciences of the spirit by analyzing some of the problems of linguistics and the philosophy of religion, which are at the same time the main problems of the psychology of peoples.

W. Wundt

FOREWORD

In 1900, Wundt published the first part of his major work, Völkerpsychologie, a two-volume psychology of language. This work had a great influence on linguists and gave rise to a whole literature devoted to criticism of Wundt's views or their further development. Such an outstanding linguist as Professor F. Zelinsky says in his critical abstract of this work ("W. Wundt and the Psychology of Language", Questions of Philology and Psychology, books 61 and 62), that in the face of Wundt, experimental, strong and rich hopes, the psychological system for the first time went towards linguistics. “When studying this work, the reader is imbued with both respect and direct reverence for the author: here, he feels, the limit of human energy in the field of scientific work has been reached ... From the last point reached by Wundt, a new horizon of understanding of linguistic phenomena has opened up for me.” The main task of this work crowning Wundt's system is to pave the way for the creation of a psychology of peoples, which serves as a continuation and supplement of individual psychology. The psychology of peoples, as Lazarus and Steinthal, the founders of this new scientific branch, understood it, does not stand up to criticism, since it is based on something that is incompatible with the concept of the "soul of the people" substantial doctrine of the nature of the soul. The famous linguist Hermann Paul rightly objected to Lazarus and Steinthal, saying that all mental processes take place exclusively in the individual soul. Neither the "national spirit" (Volksgeist or Volksseele) - a concept that originated in the depths of romance - nor its elements, therefore, have a concrete existence. "Let us therefore eliminate all abstractions"! But then the very psychology of peoples is destroyed. Wundt does not agree with the last conclusion. In his opinion, Hermann Paul himself did not go far from Herbartianism: the concept of the soul is also inextricably linked with the idea of ​​some substantial unity, of a special substratum of mental phenomena. Since there is no such substratum in the psychology of peoples, the "soul of the people" is declared to be an abstraction, a myth. But for empirical psychology, the soul is nothing but a directly given connection of psychological phenomena. Only in this empirical sense can the psychology of peoples use the concept of "soul" and from this point of view the concept of "national spirit" has the same real meaning as the individual soul. Consequently, only on the basis of Wundt's up-to-date rather than a substantial understanding of the nature of the soul, it is possible to substantiate the psychology of peoples. Thanks to the doctrine of the actuality of the soul, no one at the present time will begin to understand the "national spirit" as a subconscious soul or oversoul, in the sense of an incorporeal, abiding essence, independent of individuals.

The psychology of peoples must embrace those psychic phenomena which are the products of the coexistence and interaction of people. It cannot, therefore, capture those areas in which the predominant influence of personalities is felt, for example, literature. Excluding such areas, we find that the object of the psychology of peoples will be language, myths(with the beginnings of religion) and customs(with the beginnings of morality). On the basis of such an understanding of the tasks of the psychology of peoples, Wundt managed to combine into an organic whole the articles included in the collection "Problems of the Psychology of Peoples" offered to readers, despite the fact that they were written at different times and on different occasions. The first article defends the right of the psychology of peoples to exist and clarifies its tasks and methods. The second treats the most ancient and difficult problem of the origin of the language, Fuўsei or Jeўsei it arose. The third article discusses the same alternative, extending it to all areas of social life: does spiritual culture in its primitive beginnings, as well as the further evolution of its products, come from a single center, perhaps even from a single individual, or is it conditioned by a common life humanity? This question is elucidated with the help of specific examples, again mainly from the analysis of the language of the examples. Finally, the last article is an apology for the psychology of peoples against the pragmatism of James and related trends in German theology. The psychology of peoples, in contrast to the individualism of the pragmatic philosophy of religion, tries, relying on ethnology and the comparative study of religions, to find out the general conditions of various forms of faith and worship. Wundt's critique of James' Varieties of Religious Experience is original and interesting.

"Problems in the Psychology of Peoples" can therefore serve as an excellent introduction to the study of Wundt's difficult and voluminous main work on the psychology of language, and give the reader the opportunity for the first time to navigate the difficult and controversial issues of a new and most interesting - due to its connection with many other disciplines, especially linguistics - branch psychology.

N. Samsonov

TASKS AND METHODS OF THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PEOPLES

1. THE OBJECTIVE OF PEOPLES' PSYCHOLOGY

It is quite understandable that new fields of knowledge or - if there is not yet a new field in the strict sense - new forms of scientific research must struggle for some time to exist; to a certain extent, this may even be useful: in this way, the newly emerging discipline receives a powerful impetus to secure its position by acquisitions in the field of facts and to clarify its tasks more accurately by distinguishing from areas of knowledge close to it, and it moderates too far running claims and more precisely delimits legitimate claims.

Thus, during the nineteenth century, we observed the separation of comparative anatomy from zoology, linguistics from philology, anthropology from the anatomical and physiological sciences, and from ethnology. But even these areas, already recognized at the present time, have not always taken a complete form. Thus, in the exposition of comparative anatomy, for the most part, the methods of the zoological system are still followed. No matter how undoubted the object of study in linguistics seems, however, linguists are far from unanimous in their opinions about its relation to other objects of historical research. Finally, anthropology has only recently recognized the natural history of man and the history of primitive man, which is inextricably linked with it, as its specific field. In any case, all these areas of knowledge already have a relatively secure property. If opinions about their meaning and task can still fluctuate, then it is hardly possible to doubt about and! x the right to existence and relative independence.

The situation is quite different with that science, the name of which is quite often mentioned, although a clear concept is not always associated with it - with psychology of peoples. For a long time, its objects - the cultural state, languages, customs, religious ideas - have not only been the task of special scientific branches, such as the history of culture and customs, linguistics and the philosophy of religion, - but at the same time, there has long been a need to investigate these objects in their general relation to human nature, which is why for the most part they enter, as an integral part, into anthropological research. Especially Pritchard in his now obsolete work, but which made an era in anthropology in its time, paid due attention to the mental differences between races and peoples. But since anthropology explores these differences only in their genealogical and ethnographic meaning, it also misses! out of sight the only the point of view from which it is possible to consider all mental phenomena connected with the joint life of people - psychological. And since the task of psychology is to describe these states of individual consciousness and explain the connection between its elements and stages of development, then a similar genetic and causal study of facts that presuppose for their development the spiritual relationships that exist in human society, of course, should also be considered as an object of psychological research.

Really, Lazarus and Steinthal opposed in this sense individual psychology - the psychology of peoples. It was supposed to serve as a supplement and necessary continuation of individual psychology and, consequently, only in connection with it completely exhaust the task of psychological research. But since all the separate areas of knowledge, the problems of which are secondarily affected by the psychology of peoples - linguistics, mythology, the history of culture in its various ramifications - have long themselves tried to clarify the psychological conditions of development, the attitude of the psychology of peoples to these individual disciplines becomes to a certain extent controversial, and there is a doubt whether others have already taken care of the comprehensive solution of the task that she sets herself. In order to weigh the solidity of this doubt, let us first of all take a closer look at the program prefaced by Lazarus and Steinthal to their special journal dedicated to the psychology of peoples: "Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft".

Indeed, the program is as extensive as possible: the object of this future science should be not only language, myths, religion and customs, but also art and science, the development of culture in general and in its individual ramifications, even the historical destinies and death of individual nations, as well as the history of all mankind. But the whole field of study must be divided into two parts: an abstract one, which attempts to explain the general conditions and laws of the "national spirit" (Volksgeist), leaving aside individual peoples and their history, and a concrete one, the task of which is to characterize the spirit of individual peoples and their special forms of development. The whole area of ​​the psychology of peoples thus breaks up into " historical psychology of peoples"(Völkergeschichtliche Psychologie) and" psychological ethnology(Psychologiche Ethnologie).

Lazarus and Steinthal have by no means overlooked the objections that may first come to mind with regard to this program. First of all, they rebel against the assertion that the problems posed by the psychology of peoples have already found their solution in history and its individual ramifications: although the subject of the psychology of peoples and history in its various branches is the same, the method of research is different. The history of mankind is "a depiction of past reality in the realm of the spirit"; it refuses to establish laws that govern historical events. Just as descriptive natural history needs to be supplemented by explanatory natural science - physics, chemistry and physiology, so history, in the sense of a kind of natural history of the spirit, needs to be supplemented by the physiology of the historical life of mankind, and this is precisely the psychology of peoples. Since historians, especially cultural historians, philologists, linguists, try to achieve a psychological understanding of the facts they investigate, they provide valuable preliminary work; but the task of elucidating the general laws governing the facts acquired in this way always remains unexplained, and this is already a matter for the psychology of peoples.

These arguments, aimed at defending the right of the existence of the psychology of peoples and its independence, in turn very easily lead to objections. It is unlikely that representatives of history and various other sciences about the spirit will be satisfied with the role assigned to them in such reasoning: in essence, it is reduced to the fact that historians should serve the future psychology of peoples and work for it. In reality, however, this division of labor, proposed with the aim of securing a special area for the psychology of peoples, does not correspond to the actual conditions of scientific work. Of course, any history, if you like, is a "representation of past reality in the realm of the spirit." But such a depiction by no means renounces the causal explanation of events. Every historical discipline, therefore, strives, along with the widest possible grasp of external secondary conditions, to a psychological explanation. Of course, it is quite possible to doubt whether it will ever be possible to find the "laws of historical events" in the sense of the laws of natural science. But if it were possible, the historian, of course, would never waive his right to deduce them from the widest possible knowledge of the very facts he investigates. Comparison with natural history does not hold water just because the opposition between purely descriptive and explanatory processing of the same object or state is not currently considered correct, perhaps, by any of the natural scientists. Zoology, botany, mineralogy, no less than physics, chemistry and physiology, strive to explain the objects of their research and, as far as possible, to understand them in their causal relations. The difference between these sciences lies rather in the fact that zoology, botany, mineralogy deal with knowledge individual objects of nature in their mutual connection, and physics, chemistry and physiology - with knowledge general processes of nature. To a certain extent, general linguistics, comparative mythology, or general history can be compared with these more abstract disciplines, and with more concrete disciplines - zoology, botany, mineralogy - a systematic study of individual languages, individual mythological cycles and the history of individual peoples. But here the objection immediately comes to mind that areas so different in character, in essence, do not allow comparison at all with each other, since they arise and develop in completely different conditions.

In particular, this is clearly manifested, in this case, in the incomparably closer connection of general disciplines with special ones in the sciences of the spirit. The evolution of individual languages, mythological cycles, and the history of individual peoples are such integral parts of general linguistics, mythology and history that general and concrete disciplines presuppose each other, and abstract disciplines are especially dependent on concrete ones. One can be a good physicist or physiologist without having a particularly deep knowledge of mineralogy and zoology, but specific areas here require general knowledge. On the contrary, it is impossible to study general linguistics, general history without a thorough acquaintance with individual languages ​​and individual historical epochs - even the opposite case is rather possible here: the study of the particular, to a certain extent, does not need the foundation of the general. In the development of mental life, the particular, the individual, is incomparably more direct a component of the ca! whole than in nature. Nature breaks up into many objects, which, along with the general laws of their emergence and decay, must serve as objects of independent research, while spiritual development in each of its main areas is constantly decomposed only into a large number of partial development processes that form integrating components of the whole. Therefore, both the object and the method of research remain the same both in individual areas and in the general sciences based on them. The contrast between the purely descriptive and explanatory study of phenomena in the sciences of the mind, already unsatisfactory from the point of view of the natural sciences, is thus completely untenable. Where it is not a question of a different content, but only of a different scope of the objects under study, there can no longer be any talk of a difference in the main methods or general tasks. The general task everywhere is not simply to describe the facts, but at the same time to indicate their connection and, as far as possible in each given case, in their psychological interpretation. In whatever field, consequently, the psychology of peoples enters with its research, everywhere it finds that its functions are already performed by individual disciplines.

However, it can be assumed that in one In this regard, there is still a gap that needs to be filled through especially subtle and deep research. Each of the individual historical sciences traces the historical process only in one direction of spiritual life. Thus, language, myths, art, science, state structure and the external destinies of peoples are separate objects of various historical sciences. But is it not clear that these individual rays of spiritual life must be brought together, as it were, in a single focus, once again making the results of all individual processes of development the subject of a historical study that unites and compares them? Indeed, this problem has attracted the attention of many researchers for a long time. In part, the representatives of general history themselves felt the need to include in their presentation of historical events various aspects of culture and mores. In particular, such a comprehensive study has always been considered a true task. philosophy of history. Both Lazarus and Steinthal by no means overlooked the close connection of the program of the psychology of peoples proposed by them with the philosophy of history; but the fact is that, in their opinion, in the philosophy of history they have always tried to give until now only a compressed, resonant image of the spiritual content, a kind of quintessence of history, and have never paid attention to the laws of historical development. I do not think that this reproach is justified in such a general form. How Herder, and Hegel, which we must first of all remember when it comes to the philosophy of history, tried to indicate certain laws of development in the general course of history. If they, in our modern opinion, did not come to a satisfactory result, then the reason for this lay not in the fact that they did not attempt to generalize the laws, but in the imperfection or inexpediency of the auxiliary means and methods used by them, i.e. in those conditions who are in essence every attempt in this one hundred! le difficult area give a more or less transient character. If, on the other hand, neither Herder nor Hegel sought, in particular, to establish a purely psychological laws of historical development, then in this they were probably right, since psychic forces are still only one of the elements that must be taken into account for a causal explanation in history: in addition to psychic forces in the historical process, the influence of nature, already emphasized by Herder and too ignored by Hegel, and numerous external influences that arise along with culture, play a significant role.

2. PROGRAM OF HISTORICAL SCIENCE OF PRINCIPLES

But should we, in view of the above doubts, deny the right of the psychology of peoples to exist in general? Do its problems, as it may seem after the above clarifications, belong entirely to other areas of knowledge, so that there is no longer an independent task for it? Indeed, such a conclusion was made. In particular, he emphasized Herman Paul in his venerable and important work: Prinzipien der Sprachgeschichte. However, he arrives at this view by starting from points of view somewhat different from those developed above.

Paul proceeds in his explanations from the division of all sciences into legal sciences and on historical sciences. The first breaks down into natural science and psychology, the last - on historical sciences of nature and on historical sciences of culture. The concept of development is completely alien to the sciences of laws, it is even incompatible with the concept of these sciences; on the contrary, in the historical sciences the concept of development dominates everything. This antagonism between the two areas requires reconciliation in the third area standing between them, in the science of the philosophy of history or in science of principles. What Lazarus and Steinthal considered the task of the psychology of peoples, according to Paul, will be precisely the task of the science of principles, which, in his opinion, gives as many ramifications as there are areas of historical development that are to a certain extent separated from each other. Therefore, all the efforts of these sciences of principles should be directed to finding out how, under the condition! permanent forces and relationships are possible, however, development. Since only individual souls exist, according to Paul, only individual psychology is possible. In the development of culture connected with human society, no forces can be released that did not already exist in the individual soul; therefore, in the development of culture there can be no laws that would no longer operate in the individual soul.

Of course, already Lazarus and Steinthal did not lose sight of the possibility of this last objection, based on the denial of the existence of the mythological "soul of the people", objection. And in their opinion, "juchў people", in the proper sense of the word - is unthinkable. But even for individual psychology - this self-evident objection is immediately rejected - "knowledge of the soul, i.e., its substance or quality, is by no means the goal, and does not even represent an essential side in its task." The task of psychology is rather in "the depiction of the mental process or progress, therefore, in the discovery of the laws according to which any internal activity of a person takes place, and the explanation of the causes and conditions of any progress and any increase in this activity." Therefore, psychology is also called by Lazarus and Steinthal the "science of the spirit", while the "science of the soul" will rather be part of metaphysics or natural philosophy, since by "soul" we mean the essence or substance of the soul, and by "spirit" - the activity of the soul. and its laws. In this sense, one can speak, if not about the soul of peoples, then, in any case, about the spirit of nations(Volksgeist), just as we speak of the individual spirit, the psychology of peoples can develop along with individual psychology with an equal right to exist.

Few adherents of the substantial concept of the soul have admitted with greater certainty that it is completely unsuitable for psychological explanation than is shown in the above quotations from both Herbartians. It is especially remarkable that the question of the substance of the soul has been transferred from psychology to natural philosophy, which is indeed the true source of this concept; and there is no doubt that natural philosophy formed it not for its own needs, but for the sake of the supposed service of psychology. If, however, this help is rejected, as we saw above with Lazarus and Steinthal, then it becomes incomprehensible what meaning this concept should have in general. In any case, the influence of metaphysical points of view is clearly reflected in the doctrine of the soul. Lazarus and Steinthal actually renounced Herbart's basic premise, and only thanks to this it became possible for them to arrive at the idea of ​​the psychology of peoples. Hermann Paul returns to the exact interpretation of Herbart, and since, s! According to this understanding, only individual psychology is possible, he quite consistently denies the right of the psychology of peoples to exist. It is remarkable, however, that Lazarus and Steinthal, while renouncing Herbart's basic point of view in principle, nonetheless adhere to certain of its presuppositions: although they speak of developmental processes also in the individual soul, nonetheless, all their explanations are based on Herbartian idea of ​​the mechanism of representations, in essence, excluding any development. If all mental processes, from the lowest to the highest, are based on a monotonous repetition of the same mechanics of representations, then the conditions of any development will be progressively decomposed into external random interactions with the surrounding nature. So Herbart himself, quite in the spirit of his basic premise, admitted that the difference between man and animal is ultimately based on the difference in physical organization and on those reciprocal effects that it has on the soul. Nowhere is the unconscious materialism underlying the whole metaphysics of the soul more clearly visible. And on this point, Paul remains true to Herbartian metaphysics. Psychology, according to Paul, is "the science of laws"; therefore the concept of development is foreign to it. The abstract laws it finds precede all spiritual development: development is always the latest product. culture, i.e., the interaction of these laws of spiritual life with external material conditions and influences. But consideration of the products of this interaction is a matter historical research.

However, Paul cannot fail to recognize, along with Lazarus and Steinthal, that the laws of mental life - the establishment of which is the task of psychology as a science of laws - must be borrowed not from the concept of the soul, introduced from outside, but from inner experience itself. But then the true object of psychology will be, as Lazarus and Steinthal have already admitted, in essence, state of consciousness data. In this case, the soul will no longer be an entity that is outside these given spiritual experiences, but these experiences themselves; in other words: the distinction between soul and spirit, which has already transferred the concept of soul from psychology to metaphysics or even to natural philosophy, is completely devoid of object in psychology. If she calls, according to the traditional word usage, the object of her research the soul, then this word means only the totality of all inner experiences. Many of these experiences are no doubt common to a large number of individuals; moreover, for many products of mental life, for example, language, mythical representations, this commonality is downright a vital condition for their existence. Why, in this case, not to consider from the point of view of the actual concept of the soul these general formations of ideas, feelings and strivings, as the content the souls of the people, on the same basis on which we consider our own ideas and mental movements as the content of our individual soul; and why should we ascribe less reality to this "soul of the people" than to our own soul?

Of course, it can be objected to this that the soul of a people always nevertheless consists of individual souls that participate in it; it is nothing outside the latter, and everything that it generates necessarily leads us back to the properties and powers of the individual soul. But if, as it goes without saying, preconditions for everything, which is generated by a known composite whole, must already be contained in its members, but this by no means asserts that all products created by a composite whole are fully explicable from its preliminary conditions. Rather, it can be expected that the joint life of many individuals identical in organization and their interaction with each other resulting from this life should, as a newly transcending condition, give rise to new phenomena with peculiar laws. Although these laws can never contradict the laws of individual consciousness, they are by no means contained, thanks to this, in the latter, in exactly the same way as the laws of metabolism, for example, in organisms they are not contained in the general laws of the affinity of bodies.

In the psychological field, this is joined by the peculiar moment that the reality of the soul of the people for our observation is just as primordial as the reality of individual souls, why the individual not only takes part in the functions of society, but to an even greater degree, perhaps, depends on development of the environment to which he belongs. Thus, for example, logical combinations of ideas already belong to the field of individual psychological research. But it is clear at the same time that language and the development of thought connected with evolution have such a strong influence on the logical combinations of the individual's ideas that all attempts to abstract from this influence in the study of individual consciousness must remain futile. Therefore, if we adhere only to the facts and discard metaphysical hypotheses that are completely useless for research, then the psychology of peoples will fully retain its right to exist. Although the problems discussed in it, in general, presuppose an individual psychology, yet the psychology of peoples in many respects, especially in the analysis of complex mental processes, can influence the explanation of individual states of consciousness.

Apparently, however, not only the indicated metaphysical prejudice blocks the way to the recognition of a new psychological discipline: Paul adduces two more factual grounds in defense of his opinion. First, every interaction of individuals, and therefore every culture, is conditioned at the same time and physical influences; therefore, cultural-historical areas cannot be objects of purely psychological, directed only at mental processes, research. Secondly, every history of culture is development, psychology is law science, its goal is only to establish uniformly at all stages of development the laws in force, and not to trace and even deduce the development itself.

However, I cannot recognize both of these objections as sound, since, in my opinion, they are based on a false concept of psychology. First of all, such a psychology must establish the laws of mental life as such, i.e., independently of any influences of the physical environment. But are there mental phenomena completely independent of physical influences that could be understood in their causal connection apart from any relation to the physical environment? Our mental life, from the simple sensations of the sense organs and perceptions to the most complex mental processes, is connected with those relations to the physical organization, which we, remaining on the basis of empirical psychological research, must understand as physical influences in the same sense in which we are trying to reduce , for example, cultural development in its various ramifications to the relationship of the psyche with the external natural conditions of life. The mechanics of the soul - treating representations as imaginary entities subject to laws of motion and delay completely independent of physical influences - is a completely transcendent discipline that has nothing but a name in common with actual psychology, which seeks to understand these mental states in their conditions and relationships.

The same concept of the imaginary mechanics of the soul - related to real psychology in the same way that metaphysical castles in the air, depicting the world in themselves, to real natural science - makes the second objection understandable for us: psychology is the "science of laws"; therefore the concept of development is not only alien to psychology, but even contradicts it. Of course, with the concept of the soul, which serves as a kind of tinsel decoration for this psychological doctrine, the concept of development may be in conflict. But does it also contradict actual psychic life, as it is given to us in a form undistorted by psychological hypotheses in the facts of individual consciousness? Would not everything here again be a development, starting with the simplest perceptions of the sense organs and ending with the emergence of the most complex emotional and thought processes? If psychology, insofar as it is feasible for it, must reduce these phenomena to laws, then at least not by any means! abstraction of these laws from the facts of spiritual development itself. We must never forget that the "laws" established in relation to any field of facts retain their significance only so long as they actually bring these facts into an explanatory connection. Laws that do not satisfy this requirement do not help knowledge, but hinder it. But is there a more significant fact, both in individual and in general mental life, than the fact of development?

And in this case, as is often the case in general, the correct understanding of the subject, in my opinion, was prevented by the use of irrelevant analogies. Considering mechanics and abstract physics as a model that any explanatory science should imitate, one forgets about the difference in the conditions of both areas of knowledge. If psychology can be generally compared methodologically with any natural science discipline, then first of all, of course, with physiology (since we are talking about human psychology - with human physiology), and not with mechanics and abstract physics, which arose from the study of the most common and completely unchanging properties of the material world. After all, not a single physiologist will agree that the question of the development of life and vital functions is not subject to the judgment of physiology, and that physiology should not, in the end, discover the "laws" that explain this development to us. If this proposition is indisputable in physiology, then, in my opinion, it is all the more important for psychology. In the study of physiological processes, in many cases, when it is only a matter of understanding the mechanical or chemical processes in the body, it is still possible to digress from the question of genesis. In the psychological realm, however, everything is just drawn into the stream of that never calming spiritual development, which, although it can take other forms in the realm of historical phenomena, however, here too, in its foundations, remains identical with individual spiritual evolution, for any historical development takes its source in the basic facts of spiritual evolution, which also manifest themselves in individual life. If, therefore, one ever succeeds in bringing the facts under laws in this area, the latter will never be able to satisfy us, unless they themselves are for the most part laws of development.

Psychology proceeds in this no differently than any other science of the spirit. And linguistics, despite the fact that its object is constantly changing in the stream of historical development, by no means refuses to formulate empirical laws. It is immaterial to the essence of the matter whether such generalizations extend to a narrower or broader area. The important thing is that the empirical laws found by natural science, in the last resort - both in aggregate and separately taken - are the laws of development. Sound transition laws, for example, establish how the sound composition of one language or group of languages ​​changes over time. The laws of formation of forms establish how the forms of speech developed and what modifications they underwent. If psychology designates a certain regularity in psychic phenomena as "laws" that do not give direct knowledge of a given moment in the course of psychic processes, then these laws, in essence, are only apparent exceptions. In this case, the situation is the same as when establishing the laws of grammar, when one abstracts from changes in the sounds of speech and forms in order to present the organism of a given language in a certain state, taken as unchanged, or in the same way as when establishing those laws of physiology, in the basis of which are laid exclusively in the developed human organism given conditions of life. Thus, the laws of associations and apperception for a certain stage in the development of consciousness acquire, to a certain extent, general validity. But this stage itself is a link in a long chain of developmental processes, and the psychological understanding of the laws that have significance for it always presupposes an acquaintance with the lower forms of psychic phenomena from which their higher forms have developed.

Soul life in the consciousness of man is different from that in the consciousness of higher animals; in part, even the psyche of a cultured person differs from the psyche of a savage. And it would be completely vain to hope that someday we will be able to completely bring the mental phenomena of the highest stage of development under the same "laws" to which the psyche is subject at the lower stage of evolution. Nevertheless, there is a close connection between the two stages of development, which, apart from any assumptions of a genealogical nature, sets before us the task of examining the laws of the highest stage of the development of psychic life, in a certain sense as a product of the evolution of the lower stage. All spiritual phenomena are drawn into that stream of historical evolution, in which the past, although it contains the beginnings of the development of laws suitable for the future, however, these laws can never be exhaustively predetermined by the past. Therefore, at any given moment, it is possible, in the extreme case, to predict direction future development, but never development itself. The main reason for this lies in the fact that already during the development of the general functions of consciousness, along with the conditions favorable for this development contained in the very facts of mental life, an important role is always played by the influence of external environmental conditions. This dependence of the development of the psyche on the surrounding nature makes it an unacceptable fiction to admit psychological laws that precede any relation to the physical organization and turn the latter only into a means to achieve their goals. Psychology everywhere deals with processes of development which, like all spiritual processes, are connected with numerous external relations and with the relation to one's own body. Therefore, in psychology it is just as impossible to establish the laws of mental life in their abstraction from all these relations, as in any other area of ​​historical development. Only in the event that we accept the concept of "law" not in the sense of an abstract generalization of known regular phenomena in experience, accepted in all empirical sciences, but give it the meaning of a norm derived from metaphysical premises, to which reality, for some reason, must obey a priori, - only in this case, "laws" can take the form of such norms beyond any conditions of time and external conditions. But such laws, not derived directly from the subject of psychology, but introduced into it from an alien field, have always proved unsuitable for explaining mental phenomena, although there has been, as goes without saying, a lack of attempts to artificially connect them with facts. But even if such an attempt succeeded, these imaginary laws would still leave untouched just the main problem of psychology - the question of the development of the psyche.

Federal Agency for Education of the Russian Federation

State educational institution

higher professional education

Belgorod State University

Department of the second foreign language

Course work

topic: Psychology of peoples by Wilhelm Wundt

Belgorod - 2010

Introduction

In 1900, Wundt published the first part of his work, a two-volume psychology of language. This work greatly influenced linguists who criticized Wundt's ideas. Some linguists said that thanks to Wundt, the psychological system began to come into contact with linguistics.

The main task of W. Wundt's work is the creation of a system of psychology of peoples, which will continue and complement individual psychology. Lazarus and Steinthal argued that the psychology of peoples does not stand up to criticism, because it is indivisible from the concept of the nature of the soul. And the linguist Hermann Paul said that all mental processes occur only in the soul of every person.

The psychology of peoples includes mental phenomena that are products of the coexistence and interaction of people. It cannot capture such areas as, for example, literature, since the predominant influence of personalities affects them. Consequently, the object of the psychology of peoples is language, myths and customs.

The psychology of peoples tries, relying on ethnology and the comparative study of religions, to find out the general conditions of various forms of faith and worship.

"Psychology of Peoples" can serve as an excellent introduction to the study of Wundt's main work on the psychology of language, and also enables the reader for the first time to navigate the difficult and controversial issues of a new and most interesting branch of psychology.

Wundt singled out two disciplines in the science of "national spirit": "historical psychology of peoples" and "psychological ethnology". The first is an explanatory discipline, and the second is a descriptive one.

Relevance of this work is to convey the full importance of the works and achievements of Wilhelm Wundt, as well as the psychology of peoples.

Object of study is the psychology of peoples.

Subject of study is a problem of the psychology of peoples.

Target This work consists in identifying such a phenomenon as the psychology of peoples, assessing the general attitude of the psychology of peoples to the historical sciences by analyzing some problems of linguistics and the philosophy of religion.

To achieve this goal, it is necessary to solve a number of tasks:

1) to investigate the origin of the psychology of peoples;

2) to study the tasks of the psychology of peoples;

3) determine the main areas of the psychology of peoples.

1. The origin of the psychology of peoples

Romanticism opposes the individualism of the previous epoch and promotes the idea that the people, which gives rise to language, customs and law, is itself a person. At the same time, this is the basis of the concept of "national spirit", which in Hegel and in the representatives of the historical school of law serves as an addition and completion of the traditional concept of the individual soul. In particular, Hegel used in application to human society the general word "spirit", which makes us mentally abstract from the bodily basis of mental life. However, he did not think that the material conditions in this case are completely absent. It expresses itself clearly in the sense that society is made up of individuals, and the national spirit is made up of individual souls. But the larger the circle that spiritual life embraces, the more its ideal content rises in value and lasting significance above the inevitable material substratum of life processes.

Consequently, the common national spirit is opposed to individual souls, not in the sense of a qualitative difference, but in the sense of a modified predicate of value; likewise, representatives of the historical school of law use this term in the same sense. At the same time, in their understanding of the state, they still remained closed within the framework of the old theory of the contract, so that the idea of ​​the national spirit remained immersed in mystical twilight for them. All the more so because it is precisely law, by virtue of the outstanding importance that the individual person has for the precise definition of legal concepts, that easily led to too close an approximation of that individual of the highest degree, who was considered the bearer of the national spirit, with the real individual. This uncertainty of the concept also influenced the beginnings of a new psychology of peoples. In substantiating this new discipline, Steinthal proceeded from the philosophy of Hegel and the ideas of Wilhelm Humboldt akin to it. When he subsequently came into contact with the Herbartian Lazarus, he considered it necessary to submit in his judgments to his more philosophically versed colleague. Thus, it happened that Hegel's idea of ​​the national spirit was clothed in the garb of a philosophy completely unsuitable for it.

In order to create a psychology of peoples that truly justifies the hopes placed on it, it was necessary to translate the Hegelian dialectic of concepts into an empirical psychology of actual mental processes. Herbartian atomism of the soul and Hegel's "national spirit" related to each other like water and fire. The individual substance of the soul in its inert isolation left room only for individual psychology. The concept of it could only be transferred to society with the help of a dubious analogy. Just as in his mechanics of representations Herbart deduces mental life from the play of imaginary representations, so in this way it was possible to think of individual members of society as something analogous to representations in individual consciousness.

In the sense of this dubious analogy, one could speak of the "soul of the people" - an analogy, of course, just as empty and external as the analogy of ideas with members of human society. Thus, a deeper reason for the ineffectiveness of the psychology of peoples in its original form can be seen in this combination of prerequisites that are irreconcilable with each other. And since Lazarus, in essence, never went further than the program of future science that had not yet been fulfilled, Steintal, as a scientist incomparably more significant and influential than Lazarus, always remained within the boundaries of individual psychological research, with which his studies in the field of linguistics and mythologies have no connection. Hermann Paul deserves the merit of clarifying the internal impossibility of connecting the Herbartian mechanics of the soul with the idea of ​​the national spirit, which has its roots in romanticism, and, consequently, the futility of operating with such a combination of the psychology of peoples. Being himself a supporter of Herbartian psychology, armed at the same time with a thorough acquaintance with the history of language, Paul, more than anyone else, was able to notice the incompatibility of the psychological point of view adopted by Lazarus and Steinthal with the program of the future psychology of peoples. Therefore, a criticism of their program was a very appropriate introduction for the first edition of Paul's Prinzipien der Sprachgeschichte, published in 1880. But Paul kept this view unchanged in all subsequent editions of his work. Several newly added notes directly confirm that the author continues to stand on the same point of view, which he held thirty years ago. Of course, he has every right to do so. However, it seems to me that Paul is mistaken in this in two respects: firstly, modern psychology in his eyes is still identical with the psychology of peoples in the spirit of Lazarus and Steinthal; secondly, in his opinion, the psychology of Herbart, in essential features, is everything is still the last word in psychology in general. I deny both. Not only do I personally defend the latest psychology of peoples: it is presented in a whole series of ethnological and philological works that draw attention to the psychological side of the problems. But this psychology of peoples will no longer be identical with the ethnopsychology of Lazarus-Steinthal; and Herbart's mechanics of representations belongs to the past. It is only an interesting page in the history of the development of the new psychology. But to take the standpoint of its premises for explaining the facts of psychic life is just as impermissible at the present time as it is to deny psychological problems simply because they do not agree with these premises. And not only the psychology of peoples and general psychology have now become different from what they were at the time when Hermann Paul first expressed his thoughts about the impossibility of the psychology of peoples: much has changed since then in philology. "Wörter und Sachen" is the significant title of a new journal whose motto is a study of the past that extends to all aspects of culture. Thus, it seems to me, the conviction gradually begins to penetrate everywhere that the linguist should interpret language not as a manifestation of life isolated from human society; on the contrary, assumptions about the development of forms of speech must, to a certain extent, agree with our views on the origin and development of man himself, on the origin of forms of social life, on the beginnings of customs and law. No one at the present time will no longer understand the "national spirit" like the subconscious soul or the oversoul of modern mystical psychologists - in the sense of an incorporeal, abiding essence, independent of individuals, as the founders of the historical school of law believed in their time. Even the rationalization of this concept on a dialectical canvas by Hegel has become unacceptable for us. But the idea that served as the basis for this concept of the national spirit, that language is not an isolated phenomenon, that language, customs and law are manifestations of the common life of people inextricably linked with each other, this idea remains as true today as it was then. the time when Jacob Grimm made her the guiding star of his entire area of ​​the past of the Germanic people covering works. Whoever claims that a common language arose by merging a certain number of individual languages, willy-nilly, must also return to the fictions of the former rationalism about a primitive man living in solitude, who, by means of an agreement with his neighbors, created a legal order and realized the state.

The individualistic theory of society of Thomas Hobbes was not afraid of this conclusion. In the question of the origin of language, she dealt with a problem that in those days could generally be solved only with the help of arbitrary constructions. However, at present, the working conditions, largely due to the development of philology, have changed significantly. Is it only one language, and even then with a stretch, that can be interpreted in such a constructive way, since it is the oldest and least accessible product of the joint life of people for the study of the genesis. But even in the study of language, this is possible only if, relying on the division of labor so far-reaching today, we consider linguistics as a completely separate kingdom, governed by its own historical "principles": then the linguist can just as little care about the history of culture, as well as about psychology. However, F. Kaufman brilliantly showed with several examples that the individualistic theory collapses even when explaining those phenomena in the history of language that concern the above-mentioned broader areas of people's common life. If we compare with each other in the history of the German language the original meanings of such words that express the mutual relations of members of society, for example, gemein (general) and geheim (secret), Geselle (comrade, originally in the sense of home, own person, Hausgeselle) and Genosse (comrade in general), we note that not only, as is observed in other cases, the once-living, visual meaning of the word pales and weakens, but at the same time everywhere there is a change in meaning, in which the concept, which previously expressed a closer connection of members society, now permits a freer relationship between them.

In the history of human society, the first link is not the individual, but precisely their community. From the tribe, from the circle, from the relatives, through gradual individualization, an independent individual personality emerges, contrary to the hypotheses of the rationalist Enlightenment, according to which individuals, partly under the yoke of need, partly through reflection, united in society.

2. Tasks and methods of the psychology of peoples

2.1 Tasks of the psychology of peoples

It is quite understandable that new fields of knowledge or - if there is not yet a new field in the strict sense - new forms of scientific research must struggle for some time to exist; to a certain extent, this may even be useful: in this way the newly emerging discipline receives a powerful impetus to secure its position by acquisitions in the field of facts and to clarify its tasks more accurately by distinguishing from areas of knowledge close to it, and it moderates too far running claims and more precisely delimits legitimate claims.

Thus, during the nineteenth century, we observed the separation of comparative anatomy from zoology, linguistics from philology, anthropology from the anatomical and physiological sciences, and from ethnology. But even these areas, already recognized at the present time, have not always taken a complete form. Thus, in the exposition of comparative anatomy, for the most part, the methods of the zoological system are still followed. No matter how undoubted the object of study in linguistics seems, however, linguists are far from unanimous in their opinions about its relation to other objects of historical research. Finally, anthropology has only recently recognized the natural history of man and the history of primitive man, which is inextricably linked with it, as its specific field. In any case, all these areas of knowledge already have a relatively secure property. If opinions about their meaning and task can still fluctuate, then it is hardly possible to doubt their right to exist and relative independence.

The situation is quite different with that science, the name of which is quite often mentioned, although a clear concept is not always associated with it - with the psychology of peoples. For a long time, its objects - the cultural state, languages, customs, religious ideas - have not only been the task of special scientific branches, such as the history of culture and customs, linguistics and the philosophy of religion, - but at the same time, there has long been a need to investigate these objects in their general relation to human nature, which is why they are for the most part included, as an integral part, in anthropological research. Pritchard, in particular, in his now obsolete work, but which in its time made an era in anthropology, drew due attention to the mental differences between races and peoples. But since anthropology studies these differences only in their genealogical and ethnographic meaning, it loses sight of the only point of view from which all mental phenomena associated with the common life of people can be considered - psychological. And since the task of psychology is to describe these states of individual consciousness and explain the connection between its elements and stages of development, then a similar genetic and causal study of facts that presuppose for their development the spiritual relationships that exist in human society, of course, should also be considered as an object of psychological research.

Indeed, Lazarus and Steinthal contrasted individual psychology in this sense with the psychology of peoples. It was supposed to serve as a supplement and necessary continuation of individual psychology and, consequently, only in connection with it completely exhaust the task of psychological research. But since all the separate areas of knowledge, the problems of which are secondarily affected by the psychology of peoples - linguistics, mythology, the history of culture in its various ramifications - have long themselves tried to clarify the psychological conditions of development, the attitude of the psychology of peoples to these individual disciplines becomes to a certain extent controversial, and there is a doubt whether others have already taken care of the comprehensive solution of the task that she sets herself. To weigh the validity of this doubt, let us first take a closer look at the program created by Lazarus and Steinthal.

Indeed, the program is as extensive as possible: the object of this future science should be not only language, myths, religion and customs, but also art and science, the development of culture in general and in its individual ramifications, even the historical destinies and death of individual nations, as well as the history of all mankind. But the whole area of ​​research must be divided into two parts: an abstract one, which attempts to explain the general conditions and laws of the "national spirit", leaving aside individual peoples and their history, and a concrete one, the task of which is to characterize the spirit of individual peoples and their special forms of development. The whole area of ​​the psychology of peoples falls into "historical psychology of peoples."

Lazarus and Steinthal have by no means overlooked the objections that may first come to mind with regard to this program. First of all, they rebel against the assertion that the problems posed by the psychology of peoples have already found their solution in history and its individual ramifications: although the subject of the psychology of peoples and history in its various branches is the same, the method of research is different. The history of mankind is "a depiction of past reality in the realm of the spirit"; it refuses to establish laws that govern historical events. Just as descriptive natural history needs to be supplemented by explanatory natural science - physics, chemistry and physiology, so history, in the sense of a kind of natural history of the spirit, needs to be supplemented by the physiology of the historical life of mankind, and this is precisely the psychology of peoples. Since historians, especially cultural historians, philologists, linguists, try to achieve a psychological understanding of the facts they investigate, they provide valuable preliminary work. These arguments, aimed at defending the right of the existence of the psychology of peoples and its independence, in turn very easily lead to objections. It is unlikely that representatives of history and various other sciences about the spirit will be satisfied with the role assigned to them in such reasoning: in essence, it is reduced to the fact that historians should serve the future psychology of peoples and work for it. In reality, however, this division of labor, proposed with the aim of securing a special area for the psychology of peoples, does not correspond to the actual conditions of scientific work. Of course, any history, if you like, is a "representation of past reality in the realm of the spirit." But such a depiction by no means renounces the causal explanation of events. Every historical discipline, therefore, strives, along with the widest possible grasp of external secondary conditions, to a psychological explanation. Of course, it is quite possible to doubt whether it will ever be possible to find the "laws of historical events" in the sense of the laws of natural science. But if it were possible, the historian, of course, would never waive his right to deduce them from the widest possible knowledge of the very facts he investigates. Comparison with natural history does not stand up to criticism if only because the opposition between purely descriptive and explanatory processing of the same object or state is not currently considered correct, perhaps by any of the natural scientists. Zoology, botany, mineralogy, no less than physics, chemistry and physiology, strive to explain the objects of their research and, as far as possible, to understand them in their causal relations. The difference between these sciences lies rather in the fact that zoology, botany, and mineralogy deal with the knowledge of individual objects of nature in their mutual connection, while physics, chemistry, and physiology deal with the knowledge of the general processes of nature. To a certain extent, general linguistics, comparative mythology, or general history can be compared with these more abstract disciplines, and with more concrete disciplines - zoology, botany, mineralogy - a systematic study of individual languages, individual mythological cycles and the history of individual peoples. But here the objection immediately comes to mind that areas so different in character, in essence, do not allow comparison at all with each other, since they arise and develop in completely different conditions.

In particular, this is clearly manifested, in this case, in the incomparably closer connection of general disciplines with special ones in the sciences of the spirit. The evolution of individual languages, mythological cycles, and the history of individual peoples are such integral parts of general linguistics, mythology and history that general and concrete disciplines presuppose each other, and abstract disciplines are especially dependent on concrete ones. One can be a good physicist or physiologist without having a particularly deep knowledge of mineralogy and zoology, but specific areas here require general knowledge. On the contrary, it is impossible to study general linguistics, general history without a thorough acquaintance with individual languages ​​and individual historical epochs - even the opposite case is rather possible here: the study of the particular, to a certain extent, does not need the foundation of the general. In the development of mental life, the particular, the individual, is incomparably more directly an integral part of the whole than in nature. Nature breaks up into many objects, which, along with the general laws of their emergence and decay, must serve as objects of independent research, while spiritual development in each of its main areas is constantly decomposed only into a large number of partial development processes that form integrating components of the whole. Therefore, both the object and the method of research remain the same both in individual areas and in the general sciences based on them. The contrast between the purely descriptive and explanatory study of phenomena in the sciences of the mind, already unsatisfactory from the point of view of the natural sciences, is thus completely untenable. Where it is not a question of a different content, but only of a different scope of the objects under study, there can no longer be any talk of a difference in the main methods or general tasks. The general task everywhere is not simply to describe the facts, but at the same time to indicate their connection and, as far as possible in each given case, in their psychological interpretation. In whatever field, consequently, the psychology of peoples enters with its research, everywhere it finds that its functions are already performed by individual disciplines.

Nevertheless, it can be assumed that in one respect there is still a gap that needs to be filled through especially subtle and deep research. Each of the individual historical sciences traces the historical process in only one direction of mental life. Thus, language, myths, art, science, state structure and the external destinies of peoples are separate objects of various historical sciences. But is it not clear that these individual rays of spiritual life must be brought together, as it were, in a single focus, once again making the results of all individual processes of development the subject of a historical study that unites and compares them? Indeed, this problem has attracted the attention of many researchers for a long time. In part, the representatives of general history themselves felt the need to include in their presentation of historical events various aspects of culture and mores. In particular, this kind of comprehensive study has always been considered the true task of the philosophy of history. Both Lazarus and Steinthal by no means overlooked the close connection of the program of the psychology of peoples proposed by them with the philosophy of history; but the fact is that, in their opinion, in the philosophy of history they have always tried to give until now only a compressed, resonant image of the spiritual content, a kind of quintessence of history, and have never paid attention to the laws of historical development. I do not think that this reproach is justified in such a general form. Both Herder and Hegel, whom we must first of all remember when it comes to the philosophy of history, attempted to indicate certain laws of development in the general course of history. If they, in our modern opinion, did not come to a satisfactory result, then the reason for this lay not in the fact that they did not attempt to generalize the laws, but in the imperfection or inexpediency of the auxiliary means and methods used by them, i.e. in those conditions which, in essence, render any attempt in this so difficult a field more or less transient. If, on the other hand, neither Herder nor Hegel sought, in particular, to establish purely psychological laws of historical development, then they were probably right in this, since mental forces are still only one of the elements which must be taken into account for a causal explanation in history: in addition to mental forces, the influence of nature and external influence play a significant role in the historical process.

2.2 Major areas of peoples psychology

Apparently, the end result of the reasoning will be complete uncertainty in the answer to the question of what actually should be considered the true task of the psychology of peoples. On the one hand, it must be admitted that the program proposed by Lazarus and Steinthal is unacceptable. The complete distinction they made between description and explanation is not justified in any science, and the new discipline they demand, wherever they turn, finds all the places occupied everywhere. On the other hand, one cannot agree with the objections to the right of the psychology of peoples to exist, drawn from the concept of individual psychology and its tasks. The individual, no less than any group or society, depends on external influences and on the process of historical development; therefore, one of the main tasks of psychology will forever remain the study of the interaction of the individual with the environment and the elucidation of the process of development. If we leave aside the metaphysical concept of the soul, unsuitable for empirical research, and the fiction about "laws" associated with it, and we understand by "soul" only the total content of spiritual experiences, and by mental laws - the regularity seen in these experiences, then "the soul of the people "will be just as acceptable and even a necessary object of psychological study as the individual soul. And since regularity is also noticeable in those mental processes that are associated with the interaction and relationship of individuals, the psychology of peoples with no less right than individual psychology can claim the title of "science of laws."

Under such conditions, it can be assumed that the program of the psychology of peoples proposed by Lazarus and Steinthal is unacceptable, not because such a science with an independent program does not exist at all, but because of the too broad scope of the program and the imperfect limitation of the task of this new discipline.

Indeed, in the latter respect, justified objections are already raised by the formulation of the problem special or specific part of the psychology of peoples. It must investigate "the really existing national spirit of this or that people (Volksgeister) and the special forms of development of each of them," therefore, give a psychological description and characterization of individual peoples. But such an undertaking is a true task ethnology, which rightfully strives for the simultaneous depiction of the physical and mental properties of this or that people in their mutual relation and in their dependence on nature and history. Of course, a temporary separation of the psychological part of this study may be useful in the interests of the division of labor. But a fundamental division can never be allowed in this case, and even those researchers who worked primarily in the field of psychological ethnology spoke positively against such a division. True, ethnology can first of all provide material for a general characterization of the mental properties of a person, which is why it is in any case an important auxiliary discipline for the psychology of peoples - however, the general discipline corresponding to it will not be the psychology of peoples, but anthropology. But anthropology also occupies a middle place between the physiological and psychological study of man, since it, as a natural history of man, considers him both in his physical and spiritual qualities.

If we single out these ethnological and anthropological problems, then nevertheless, in what, according to Lazarus and Steinthal, constitutes the content of the general part of the psychology of peoples, there will still be such areas that, it seems to me, should be excluded, at least from the main ones. , its general research. First of all, this applies General history. Psychology is an important auxiliary tool for it, since psychological interpretation is necessary for any deeper insight into the connection of historical events. On the contrary, history, taken by itself, can by no means - due to the complex nature of historical processes - be ranked among the main areas of the psychology of peoples. The historical destinies of an individual people are so peculiar in nature that they allow only analogies between different eras, and not the induction of universally valid psychological laws of development. In the study of general history, spiritual motives are combined, on the contrary, with a mass of natural-historical and sociological conditions that go far beyond the scope of the tasks of psychological analysis, since all these elements, taken as a whole, tend to pass already into philosophical study. Therefore, always and in all attempts to formulate the general laws of historical development, the latter, regardless of the degree of success in their formulation, due to internal necessity, have the character philosophical principles. In cases where the psychology of peoples also takes part in establishing these laws—which is inevitable if we do not want the philosophy of history to go along the wrong path of speculative constructions—it will certainly be subject to discussion. private problems. Thus, the problems of elucidating the laws of the evolution of society, customs and law, art, religion, etc., are primarily related to the psychology of peoples and then, in a more general connection, to the philosophy of history. But these individual processes of development become the subject of consideration from the side of the psychology of peoples only because in them - by virtue of the properties of human nature common to all peoples - essentially coinciding features appear. This applies primarily to initial period social life, while at the later stages of development, along with the growth of external and internal private influences, the variety of evolutionary processes more and more pushes universally significant mental motives and makes them dissolve in the totality of historical conditions; therefore, general history and the psychology of peoples touch only in the sense that both these disciplines must unite with each other in order to achieve a philosophical study of historical humanity. But the development of art and science essentially deviates from evolution in history.

Art in its beginnings is not an independent area of ​​social life; it still merges so closely in the initial period of development with myths and customs that it is possible to delimit it from them only in terms of general forms, and not in terms of the main motives for its emergence and initial evolution. If, along with external natural conditions, there are technical and early independent aesthetic motives that determine artistic creativity, then they themselves are partly from the need for mythology, which must be objectified in mimic and plastic representations or in song and narration in order to achieve original development. And science initially merges completely with mythological thinking, and it influences it for a long time. For an even longer time, finally, the third area of ​​social life remains associated with myths - religion why the problem of its development from mythology is in general one of the most important problems of the psychology of peoples, which at the same time completely coincides with the problem of the development of mythology itself. What all these three areas have in common is that from the moment of their separation from myths and customs and the beginning of independent existence, an individual person begins to influence the general development more decisively, and at the same time, distinctive, characteristic features of individual cycles of evolution begin to appear more and more sharply. At the same time, studies relating specifically to the psychology of peoples stand out from general historical research. But since in the psychology of peoples there is no lack of general motives, which for the most part can be considered as a direct continuation of the forces acting in the initial period of the spiritual development of mankind, a new task arises before this new discipline - to indicate the ways along which one can proceed to these historical differentiations of general spiritual development. Here again, the psychology of peoples comes into contact, on the one hand, with the aesthetics and philosophy of religion, and, on the other, with the philosophy of history.

According to this remain, in the end, three large areas that apparently require special psychological research - three areas that - in view of the fact that their content exceeds the volume of individual consciousness - at the same time embrace the three main problems of the psychology of peoples: language, myths and customs.

These three areas are also objects of purely historical research, and psychological explanation in this research, as in all history, is taken into account only as an auxiliary means of interpretation. But these three areas differ from history in the proper sense of the word. generally valid the nature of certain spiritual processes of development, manifested in them. However, this character is by no means manifested in all facts: every language, every national mythological cycle and the evolution of customs are dependent on peculiar, irreducible to any generally valid rules and conditions. But along with the manifestation of this peculiar character inherent in them, as in any historical process, they are subject, in contrast to the products of historical development in the narrow sense of the word, to the general spiritual law of development.

The reason for this phenomenon lies in the fact that the evolution of these creatures of the creative spirit common to all mankind is based on the commonality of spiritual forces, the manifestations of which are also consistent in certain general features. In history, a similar relationship is observed only in certain individual motives of behavior, which are equally repeated everywhere due to our organization common to all mankind. However, in this case, individual motives, due to the repeated intersection of interests, can never provide the actions caused by them with universal significance for the general course of historical development: and in the results that are obtained from them in the field of the psychology of peoples, these motives retain their individual character. In this way, individual psychology in relation to the external history of peoples always plays the role of an auxiliary means, and nowhere in history are objects of independent psychological research found.

On the contrary, between psychology and the three above-mentioned fields of study (language, myths, customs), a relationship of this kind is carried out in full. And in this case, psychology naturally serves to explain individual phenomena; on the other hand, language, myths, customs are themselves spiritual products of development, in the generation of which peculiar psychological laws are manifested. Although the properties of individual consciousness already contain the last motives for the emergence of these laws, it cannot be said that these laws themselves were already predetermined in motives. Therefore, all processes of evolution arising from the community of spiritual life become problems of independent psychological research; and it makes sense for him to keep the name psychology of peoples for the reason that the nation is the most important of those concentric circles in which a common spiritual life can develop. The psychology of peoples, for its part, is a part of general psychology, and its results often lead to valuable conclusions in individual psychology as well, since language, myths and customs, these products of the spirit of peoples, at the same time provide material for conclusions also about the soul. the lives of individuals. Thus, for example, the structure of the language, which, taken in itself, is a product of the spirit of the people, sheds light on the psychological regularity of individual thinking. The evolution of mythological representations provides a model for the analysis of the creations of individual fantasy, and the history of customs illuminates the development of individual motives of the will. Just as individual psychology, on the one hand, serves to illuminate the problems of the psychology of peoples, so, in turn, the facts gleaned from the psychology of peoples acquire the value of valuable objective material for explaining the states of individual consciousness.

The psychology of peoples is an independent science along with individual psychology, and although it uses the services of the latter, it also provides considerable assistance to individual psychology. Against such a formulation of the psychology of peoples, it could be objected that language, myths and customs in this case would simultaneously serve as objects of various sciences: the history of language, myths and customs on the one hand, the psychology of peoples on the other. However, this objection does not withstand scrutiny. This duality of research is common in other fields of knowledge as well. In geology and paleontology, anatomy and physiology, philology and history, the history of art and aesthetics, in the system of knowledge and its methodology - in all these areas, the objects of forms of scientific processing coordinated with each other are either completely or partially common, and the difference between disciplines is reduced only to one or another point of view from which the problems are discussed. Even the life of an individual can, in a similar sense, be the subject of a twofold way of considering it: it can be considered in its individual, unique nature and in its peculiar course of development peculiar only to it, and then it will serve as an object biographies, this most narrow and limited form of history, nevertheless very important if the life of a person depicted in it is significant in its content. But it is also possible to investigate individual experiences from the point of view of their general meaning, or the general laws of psychic life manifested in them; - this will already be the point of view of individual psychology, completely ignoring the specific value of this individual life, since in individual experiences it sees only material in which the general laws of spiritual development are manifested.

In language, myths and customs, the same elements that make up the data, the present states of individual consciousness are repeated, as if at a higher stage of development. However, the spiritual interaction of individuals, from whose common ideas and inclinations the spirit of the people is formed, introduces new conditions. It is these new conditions that force the national spirit to manifest itself in two different directions, related to each other approximately, like form and matter - in language and in myths. Language gives the spiritual content of life that external form, which for the first time makes it possible for it to become common property. Finally, in customs, this common content is expressed in the form of similar motives of the will. But, just as, in the analysis of individual consciousness, representations, feelings, and will must be considered not as isolated forces or abilities, but as components inseparable from each other of the same stream of spiritual experiences, in the same way, language, myths, and customs represent are common spiritual phenomena, so closely fused with each other that one of them is unthinkable without the other. Language not only serves as an auxiliary means for uniting the spiritual forces of individuals, but, moreover, takes a lively part in the content that finds expression in speech; language itself is completely permeated with that mythological thinking, which is originally its content. In the same way, myths and customs are everywhere closely connected with each other. They relate to each other in the same way as motive and action: customs express in actions the same life views that are hidden in myths and made common property through language. And these actions in turn solidify and further develop the ideas from which they spring. The study of such interaction is therefore, along with the study of the individual functions of the soul of a people, an important task for the psychology of peoples.

At the same time, one should not completely lose sight of the main difference between the history of language, myths and customs from other processes of historical development. In relation to language, they thought to find this difference in the fact that its development is supposedly not a historical, but a process of natural history. However, this expression is not entirely successful; it is based on the recognition that language, myths and customs at the main moments of their development do not depend on the conscious influence of individual volitional acts and are a direct product of the creativity of the spirit of the people. The individual will, on the other hand, can always introduce only insignificant changes into these creations of the common spirit. But this feature is due not so much to actual independence from individuals as to the fact that their influence in this case is infinitely more fragmented and therefore does not manifest itself as noticeably as in the history of political life and higher forms of development of spiritual life. But because of this invisibility of individual influences, each of them can be long-lasting only if it meets the aspirations already operating in the general spirit of the people. Thus these processes of historical development, which go back to the very beginnings of human existence, do indeed acquire a certain affinity with processes in nature, insofar as they seem to spring from widespread impulses. Volitional impulses are combined in them into integral forces, revealing a certain similarity with the blind forces of nature also in that their influence cannot be resisted. Because these primeval products of the general will are the derivatives of widespread spiritual forces, the generally valid character inherent in phenomena in certain basic forms becomes understandable. It becomes clear that this character makes them not only objects of historical research, but at the same time gives them the meaning of common products of the human common spirit, requiring psychological research.

If at first glance it may seem strange that it is language, myths and customs that we recognize as the main problems of the psychology of peoples, then this feeling, in my opinion, will disappear if the reader weighs the fact that the nature of the universal significance of the basic forms of phenomena is observed mainly in the indicated areas, in the rest - only insofar as they are reduced to the indicated three. The subject of psychological research - which has as its content the consciousness of the people in the same sense in which individual psychology has its content in the individual consciousness - can, therefore, in a natural way, be only that which has the same general meaning for the consciousness of the people, which for the individual consciousness have facts studied in individual psychology. In reality, therefore, language, myths and customs are not some fragments of the creative spirit of the people, but this very spirit of the people in its form relatively unaffected by the individual influences of individual processes of historical development.

Conclusion

Wilhelm Wundt is considered the founder of experimental psychology. He was a versatile researcher, like many other prominent psychologists of his contemporaries. Wilhelm Wundt is known as a linguist, physiologist and philosopher. But his name immortalized the creation in 1878 of the first experimental psychological laboratory, which became a "Mecca" for psychologists of all countries. Wundt believed that external mental processes were inaccessible to experimental study and proposed a cultural-historical method.

During 1900-1920. W. Wundt undertook the publication of a grandiose 10-volume "Psychology of Peoples". He considered language activity to be the main manifestation of the "folk spirit" (in contrast to the language system - the subject of study of linguists). This work, along with the Fundamentals of Physiological Psychology, became the main contribution of W. Wundt to psychology. "Problems of the Psychology of Peoples" is a collection of articles representing a summary of W. Wundt's research program and served as an introduction to the multi-volume "Psychology of Peoples".

The laws of the “psychology of peoples” are the laws of development, and its basis is three areas, the content of which “exceeds the volume of individual consciousness: language, myths and customs.” W. Wundt was least of all interested in mass behavior and the problem of “personality and mass”, and more in the content of the “national spirit”, which, incidentally, corresponded to the idea of ​​psychology as a “science of consciousness”. He emphasizes the genetic priority of the "national spirit" over the individual. W. Wundt, using the examples of the assimilation of two languages ​​by individuals, shows that imitation is not the main, but only an accompanying factor in interactions in human society, and he subjected the “theory of individual invention” to similar criticism. In their place, he puts the processes of "general creativity", "assimilation" and "dissimilation", but does not fully reveal their nature.

Undoubtedly, Wundt possessed the most powerful organizational and critical intellect, as well as the ability to generate research programs. However, meaningful intuitive creativity was not his element. And, in my opinion, today the deep and verbose works of Wundt are read with less interest than the more "journalistic", but also more "creative" works of a number of his contemporaries. Still, psychologists will always honor Wilhelm Wundt as the "founding father" of experimental and cultural-historical versions of psychology.

Pavlenko V.N., Taglin S.A. 2005: 327

Wundt W. 1912: 12

Wundt W. 1912: 14

Wundt W. 1912:17

Wundt W. 1912: 19

Sukharev V.A., Sukharev M.V. 1997: 21

Krysko V.G. 2002: 303

- psychology peoples. It arose and proved to be most developed in Germany in the second half of the 19th century. - beginning of XX century. The most famous representatives are M. Lazarus, X. Steinthal. W. Wundt. Psychology peoples- a direction that arose at the intersection of sociology and social psychology. Its essence lies in the fact that the main driving force of the historical process is the people, the ethnos, which is characterized by an active principle in the form of a "folk spirit", manifested in culture, religion, language, myths, customs, mores. This "folk spirit" determines the individual consciousness, the psyche of people who are representatives of a given people (ethnos). It ("people's spirit") has specific common features inherent in the ethnos, manifests itself in similar structures of national culture, certain coinciding character traits. Based on the analysis of the "folk spirit", it is permissible to draw a certain socio-psychological portrait of a given ethnic group, which will include its mythology, folk customs, national culture, and thus may be subject to specific research.

The most subject psychology peoples analyzed Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920), who devoted the main (ten-volume) work of his life to this - "Psychology peoples"(1900-1920). An abbreviated presentation of the main ideas of this work was published in Russian*29. peoples and ethnic groups, about the specific manifestations of their "folk spirit" in culture, art, language, myths, customs, mores, habits, etc. Wundt was known both for his scientific works and for the fact that he created in Leipzig in 1879 the first in the world a psychological laboratory that has become an international center for experimental psychology. For services to world science, including Russian science, in 1902 he was elected an honorary member of the Academy of Sciences in St. Petersburg. In the world, the scientist was given the fame of the founder of empirical ethnopsychology.

*29: (Wundt W. Problems of psychology peoples. M.. 1912.)

Wundt considered mental processes in close connection with physical ones, believing that they constitute two sides of one real being, which manifests itself from the outside as a body, and from the inside - as a soul. Studying consciousness by self-observation of its phenomena and facts, he came to the conclusion that many mental processes, primarily thinking, speech, will, are inaccessible to experiment. They should be studied using the cultural-historical method, especially since they belong not to individual psychology, but to psychology. peoples.

He believed that " psychology peoples- an independent science along with individual psychology, and although it uses the services of the latter, it also provides significant assistance to individual psychology "[Wundt. 1996. P. 23]. He did not agree with the opposition proposed by Lazarus and Steinthal between individual psychology and psychology peoples, believing that they are interconnected, the latter in this relationship acts as a complex creative synthesis of individual consciousnesses [Ibid. S. 6-7].

According to Wundt, psychology peoples covers three large areas and three main problems that require special psychological research: language, myths, customs. They "represent common spiritual phenomena, so closely fused with each other that one of them is inconceivable without the other" [Ibid. S. 26]. The study of their interaction is an important task of psychology peoples. Its other important task is the desire to psychologically cognize the essence of the spirit of the people and discover the laws according to which its spiritual activity proceeds.

Language, myths and customs, as Wundt writes, are a direct product of the creativity of the spirit of the people, and they are not some fragments of this creativity, but represent "this very spirit of the people in its relatively unaffected by the individual influences of individual historical processes. development form" [Ibid., p. 27]. Wundt seeks to prove that language, myths and customs do not depend on individual consciousness and individual volitional acts. Moreover, this consciousness and this will are influenced by the spirit of the people as the content of its psychology. That's why psychology peoples- primary, and psychology individuals - is secondary to it.

Wundt considers language, myths and customs not only together, in a "company", in interconnection, but also separately, characterizing each of these three main components of the "spirit of the people". He's writing:

"Language contains the general form of ideas living in the spirit of the people and the laws of their connection. Myths conceal the original content of these ideas in their conditionality by feelings and inclinations. Finally, customs are the general directions of will that have arisen from these ideas and inclinations" [Ibid. . S. 25]. As you can see, language, myths, and customs are interpreted in a purely psychological spirit, as elements of consciousness, the spiritual life of people, connecting individuals in a certain way with each other. Therefore, it is no coincidence that Wundt argues that between psychology and the three above-mentioned areas of research, the relationship is carried out in full.

Considering Psychology peoples as part of general psychology, the scientist believes that its development gives a lot for individual psychology, because language, myths and customs provide material about the mental life of individuals. “So, for example,” writes Wundt, “the structure of language, which, taken by itself, is a product of the spirit of the people, sheds light on the psychological regularity of individual thinking. The evolution of mythological ideas provides a model for analyzing the creations of individual fantasy, and story customs illuminates the development of individual motives of the will" [Ibid., pp. 22-23].

Wundt sought to give psychology peoples a more concrete, realistic look due to the program of empirical studies of the language, myths, and customs of a number of ethnic groups that he proposed. In this way he created a kind of sociology of everyday consciousness. Such a proposal subsequently turned out to be just right, by the way, with the emergence of phenomenological sociology and ethnomethodology and the proclamation of the daily, everyday life of people and ethnic groups as the object of their research interests. The implementation of the program of empirical research was supposed to transform psychology peoples into a descriptive scientific discipline that studies the inner, deep features of their spiritual life.

It should be noted that in general psychology peoples played a positive role, posing a number of sociological problems of the spiritual life of ethnic groups and managing to involve linguists, historians, ethnographers, philologists, and most importantly, psychologists and sociologists in their study. It was one of the first attempts to study the interaction of culture and individual consciousness. But the theoretical concept of this interaction was not created. As for the large descriptive material used by psychologists, it was far from being used in the creation of explanatory concepts. Research done within psychology peoples, were of considerable importance for the process of emergence and convergence of such branches of knowledge as historical psychology, ethnopsychology, cultural anthropology, psycholinguistics. However, sociology received from psychology peoples much less than the above-mentioned scientific disciplines.

Wilhelm Wundt (1832 - 1920) - German philosopher and psychologist, one of the founders of experimental psychology. In 1879, at the University of Leipzig, he organized the world's first laboratory of experimental psychology, which became the most important international scientific center and the only school of experimental psychology for researchers from many European and American countries. However, Wundt considered the creation of the so-called `Volkerpsychologie` - `psychology of peoples`, a descriptive and historical psychology of higher mental processes, the method of which is the analysis of the manifestations of the human spirit in the forms of culture (in language, religion, customs, myths), as the main work of his life. The ten-volume `Psychology of Peoples` written by him (1900-1920) had a huge impact on world science. The proposed book, first published in 1911, was conceived by the author as an introduction to the study of this work.

Wilhelm Wundt

Author's preface.

The first of the four articles put together in this collection is a somewhat modified program published in 1886, in which I tried to give an account of the tasks of the psychology of peoples, developed according to the plan outlined here. It was published in the fourth volume of the journal "Philosophische Studien" published by me and is reprinted in this collection with some additions and with a final section that serves as a transition to the following reports. The second and third articles are an extended reworking of critical objections, of which one appeared in the appendix to the Munich "Allgemeine Zeitung" for 1907, No. 40, the other shortly before that in the "Indogermanische Forschungen", volume 28. general psychological points of view, the questions raised in these objections, and in particular the dispute between the individualist and collectivist theories of society explained in the third article. The fourth article, perhaps, can be called an apologia for German psychology against American-English pragmatism, which is now so highly praised in theological circles. All four articles taken together aim to shed light on the general relation of the psychology of peoples to the historical sciences of the spirit by analyzing some of the problems of linguistics and the philosophy of religion, which are at the same time the main problems of the psychology of peoples.

W. Wundt

Translator's preface.

In 1900, Wundt published the first part of his major work, Völkerpsychologie, a two-volume psychology of language. This work had a great influence on linguists and gave rise to a whole literature devoted to criticism of Wundt's views or their further development. Such an outstanding linguist as Professor F. Zelinsky says in his critical abstract of this work ("W. Wundt and the Psychology of Language", Questions of Philology and Psychology, books 61 and 62), that in the face of Wundt there is an experimental, strong and rich hopes, the psychological system for the first time went towards linguistics. “When studying this work, the reader is imbued with both respect and direct reverence for the author: here, he feels, the limit of human energy in the field of scientific work has been reached ... From the last point reached by Wundt, a new horizon of understanding of linguistic phenomena has opened up for me.” The main task of this work crowning Wundt's system is to pave the way for the creation of a psychology of peoples, which serves as a continuation and supplement of individual psychology. The psychology of peoples, as Lazarus and Steinthal, the founders of this new scientific branch, understood it, does not stand up to criticism, since it is based on something that is incompatible with the concept of the "soul of the people" substantial doctrine of the nature of the soul. The famous linguist Hermann Paul rightly objected to Lazarus and Steinthal, saying that all mental processes take place exclusively in the individual soul. Neither the "national spirit" (Volksgeist or Volksseele) - a concept that originated in the depths of romance - nor its elements, therefore, have a concrete existence. "Let us therefore eliminate all abstractions"! But then the very psychology of peoples is destroyed. Wundt does not agree with the last conclusion. In his opinion, Hermann Paul himself did not go far from Herbartianism: the concept of the soul is also inextricably linked with the idea of ​​some substantial unity, of a special substratum of mental phenomena. Since there is no such substratum in the psychology of peoples, the "soul of the people" is declared to be an abstraction, a myth. But for empirical psychology, the soul is nothing but a directly given connection of psychological phenomena. Only in this empirical sense can the psychology of peoples use the concept of "soul" and from this point of view the concept of "national spirit" has the same real meaning as the individual soul. Consequently, only on the basis of Wundt's up-to-date rather than a substantial understanding of the nature of the soul, it is possible to substantiate the psychology of peoples. Thanks to the doctrine of the actuality of the soul, no one at the present time will begin to understand the "national spirit" as a subconscious soul or oversoul, in the sense of an incorporeal, abiding essence, independent of individuals.

The psychology of peoples must embrace those psychic phenomena which are the products of the coexistence and interaction of people. It cannot, therefore, capture those areas in which the predominant influence of personalities is felt, for example, literature. Excluding such areas, we find that the object of the psychology of peoples will be language, myths(with the beginnings of religion) and customs(with the beginnings of morality). On the basis of such an understanding of the tasks of the psychology of peoples, Wundt managed to combine into an organic whole the articles that are part of the collection "Problems of the Psychology of Peoples" offered to readers, despite the fact that they were written at different times and on different occasions. The first article defends the right of the psychology of peoples to exist and clarifies its tasks and methods. The second treats the most ancient and difficult problem of the origin of the language, Fuўsei or Jeўsei it arose. The third article discusses the same alternative, extending it to all areas of social life: does spiritual culture in its primitive beginnings, as well as the further evolution of its products, come from a single center, perhaps even from a single individual, or is it conditioned by a common life humanity? This question is elucidated with the help of specific examples, again mainly from the analysis of the language of the examples. Finally, the last article is an apology for the psychology of peoples against the pragmatism of James and related trends in German theology. The psychology of peoples, in contrast to the individualism of the pragmatic philosophy of religion, tries, relying on ethnology and the comparative study of religions, to find out the general conditions of various forms of faith and worship. Wundt's critique of James' Varieties of Religious Experience is original and interesting.

"Problems in the Psychology of Peoples" can therefore serve as an excellent introduction to the study of Wundt's difficult and voluminous main work on the psychology of language, and give the reader the opportunity for the first time to navigate the difficult and controversial issues of a new and most interesting - due to its connection with many other disciplines, especially linguistics - branch psychology.

N. Samsonov

I. Tasks and methods of the psychology of peoples.

1. The task of the psychology of peoples.

It is quite understandable that new fields of knowledge or - if there is not yet a new field in the strict sense - new forms of scientific research must struggle for some time to exist; to a certain extent, this may even be useful: in this way the newly emerging discipline receives a powerful impetus to secure its position by acquisitions in the field of facts and to clarify its tasks more accurately by distinguishing from areas of knowledge close to it, and it moderates too far running claims and more precisely delimits legitimate claims.

Thus, during the nineteenth century, we observed the separation of comparative anatomy from zoology, linguistics from philology, anthropology from the anatomical and physiological sciences, and from ethnology. But even these areas, already recognized at the present time, have not always taken a complete form. Thus, in the exposition of comparative anatomy, for the most part, the methods of the zoological system are still followed. No matter how undoubted the object of study in linguistics seems, however, linguists are far from unanimous in their opinions about its relation to other objects of historical research. Finally, anthropology has only recently recognized the natural history of man and the history of primitive man, which is inextricably linked with it, as its specific field. In any case, all these areas of knowledge already have a relatively secure property. If opinions about their meaning and task can still fluctuate, then it is hardly possible to doubt their right to exist and relative independence.