Expert of the 19th Congress of the Communist Party of China Dan. 19th CCP Congress: Socialism with Chinese Characteristics Enters a New Era. The West is afraid of the "one-party dictatorship"

29.06.2020

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In the context of an unprecedented information vacuum, the 19th Congress of the Communist Party of China opens today in Beijing, which will determine the composition of the country's leadership for the next five years. The last year was marked by an undercover struggle within the Chinese elite, whose factions sought to get as many "their" people as possible into leading positions in party and government bodies. General Secretary Xi Jinping has consolidated power to align with China's founding fathers and bring about much-needed reforms. The results of the congress will show whether he has accumulated enough political capital to finally defeat his opponents and break the unspoken rules by which the country has lived for the past 25 years.

The political process of the era of change

Usually the list of those who will enter the Politburo governing the country is known three or four months before the congress. This has been the case since the early 1990s, when investment poured into China and predictability began to be valued over secrecy. Foreign politicians and businessmen were convinced that regardless of who heads the state, factories will work, foreigners will be able to withdraw profits, and political and social upheavals are not expected. Certainty served as a signal that there are no two views on the development of society: there is a consensus in the Communist Party. Confucian harmony in the elite was ensured by the process of general accumulation of capital, against which political squabbles looked out of place.

This time the tradition was broken. Chinese, Russian and American experts, in a conversation with Kommersant, only shrugged their shoulders: who, following the results of the 19th Congress, will take the helm of the state, one can only guess.

The rising level of secrecy may be a testament to the strengthening of internal party discipline that Xi Jinping has been working on for the past five years. However, it can also indicate that, compared with the times of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, the number of people actually involved in decision-making has greatly decreased, and with them, the number of “leaks” to the press. The current head of China has already seriously changed the face of the country's political system, and it is possible that in a week (when the congress ends), it will change even more.

The Congress of the Communist Party of China, which meets once every five years, is the supreme governing body of the 89 millionth party and, in fact, the entire country. Approximately 2.3 thousand party delegates approve the composition of the Central Committee (CC), which includes 200 members and 176 candidate members who do not have the right to vote, but who have a chance to become full members later. The Central Committee, in turn, approves the Politburo (25 people) and the Standing Committee of the Politburo (PCPB, seven people), which make the main political decisions. In fact, both the composition of the Central Committee and the composition of the future Politburo are determined by the previous composition of the Politburo in the course of intense bargaining between competing interest groups.

Since at least the beginning of the 1990s, the unspoken rule "sixty-seven - pass, sixty-eight - delete" has been in effect. Members of the Politburo over 67 at the congress must resign in order to clear the way for a new generation and prevent the system from falling into insanity. Age limits have been set for other authorities as well. In accordance with them, according to the results of the 19th Congress, the composition of the Central Committee should be renewed by more than half, the Politburo will leave 11 people, and the PCPB - five, all except Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Li Keqiang.

In the tradition of Chinese reform architect Deng Xiaoping, the general secretary and premier take office at a congress whose year ends in a deuce (1992, 2002, 2012, 2022), while congresses ending in a seven (1997, 2007, 2017 , 2027) serve the purpose of summarizing the interim results of the board. During them, as a rule, the future Secretary General and Prime Minister are introduced into the PCPB, who differ from the rest of its members in their youth (they are usually about 50 years old, while the rest of the PCPB members are 60–65 years old). In 2022, they were supposed to be the protégés of former Secretary General Hu Jintao Sun Zhengcai and Hu Chunhua, the youngest members of the current Politburo.

Foundation Shaker

The fact that this whole harmonious system is likely to collapse has been talked about almost from the very beginning of Xi Jinping's rule. The General Secretary immediately showed himself as a much stronger and more authoritarian leader than his two predecessors. The anti-corruption campaign he launched turned into an unprecedented purge: Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong, the deputy heads of the Central Military Council (CMC) that controls the army, and the head of the party committee of Chongqing (the largest city of central subordination in China) were sent to prison on charges of corruption. ) Bo Xilai, who were previously considered untouchable. But the real shock was the removal in July from his post and subsequent arrest of the new head of the party committee of Chongqing, Sun Zhengcai, who was considered one of the two future leaders of the country agreed upon by the elite.

Then there were rumors that Xi Jinping might defy the age limit and retain his closest associate, the head of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI, the main anti-corruption body) Wang Qishan, who turned 69 in 2017. For the past five years, he has fought tirelessly with the political enemies of the Secretary General, and it would not be easy to find a replacement for him. Over the past year, high-ranking party officials in the official Chinese media have been setting the stage for Wang Qishan to remain in office, casually dropping phrases such as “age restrictions are a custom, not a rule” and “given the development of modern medicine, human skills are important, not his age."

Against the backdrop of clear disagreements among the top officials in the ruling tandem, many experts began to say that a "vote of no confidence" in Prime Minister Li Keqiang could well be passed at the congress. He belongs to the “Komsomol” group opposing Xi Jinping, the head of which is considered former Secretary General Hu Jintao. Differences in views between the two leaders due to the closed nature of the system are not always obvious, but in general, the Secretary General is a supporter of much more radical changes in the economy. Liu Keqiang's actions in 2015 and 2016 were criticized in the official media by Xi Jinping's economic adviser Liu He, who signed his articles as an "authoritative person." He pointed to the indecisive and erroneous nature of the prime minister's actions in the situation with the reform of state enterprises and the financial crisis of 2015.

Finally, the main long-term intrigue of the congress will be the issue of maintaining the powers of Xi Jinping himself beyond the established ten-year period. “He will not leave in 2022,” Akio Takahara, a professor at the University of Tokyo, assured Kommersant. “Given the scale of the reforms he initiated and the desire to remain in history, he will look for ways to stay in power and finish what he started.” Technically, the absence of two young successor politicians in the new composition of the PCPB will indicate the intention to break the ten-year limit. However, there are options here. “For example, Xi Jinping can retain real power in 2022, remaining the head of the party and the Central Military Commission, and give his post of chairman of the PRC to someone else,” Ivan Zuenko, a researcher at the Center for Asia-Pacific Studies of the Institute of Energy and the Far East of the Russian Academy of Sciences, told Kommersant. Until 1992, these positions were divided and the post of the PRC chairman was not so important.

New Zhejiang Army

At the congress, the general secretary, like any leader before him, will try to get as many of his people as possible into the governing bodies. “He needs not just personnel in high positions, but those who really influence political decision-making. At the same time, formally, they can even occupy not so prominent posts, - Alexander Gabuev, head of the Asian program of the Carnegie Moscow Center, tells Kommersant. - In particular, he will most likely try to staff the leadership of the departments of the CPC Central Committee and appoint the heads of all the most important small groups where the real development of the course takes place.

Xi Jinping’s protégé is called the “new Zhejiang army” in China, as most of his nominees clashed with him in one way or another during his time in Zhejiang province. Among them, the most interesting figure is the current head of the Chongqing party committee, Chen Miner. He served as head of Zhejiang's propaganda department during Xi Jinping's presidency. In terms of age, Chen Miner is well suited to the role of one of the two leaders of the next generation of leaders. This is his second appointment to the role of head of the region's party committee: before Chongqing, he led Guizhou province and thus fulfilled one of the unspoken conditions for joining the PCPB: to work as the head of at least one rich and one poor region.

Among other supporters of Xi Jinping who may enter the PCPB and the Politburo, they name the head of the organizational department of the CPC Central Committee Zhao Leji, the heads of the Shanghai and Beijing party committees Han Zheng and Cai Qi, the head of the office of the CPC Central Committee Li Zhanshu, his economic adviser Liu He and a number of other people. The general secretary has enough people to fill all the vacant posts in the highest party body of power, but he may not have enough political capital. Because of this, as noted by many experts interviewed by Kommersant, he can agree to reduce the standing committee of the Politburo from seven to five people, which the internal party rules fully allow. This will allow Xi Jinping to enforce his decisions more easily, but could spark resentment within the party, which has become accustomed to more democratic decision-making over the past 30 years.

The most consensus configuration of the elite today seems to be the introduction into the PCPB of both the protege of Secretary General Chen Miner and the Party Secretary of Guangdong Province Hu Chunhua, who belongs to the "Komsomol" faction opposing Xi Jinping. This would allow maintaining intra-elite harmony and ensuring the continuity of power in 2022.

An idea thrown to the masses

At the congress, the Secretary General will present a report that will sum up the results of the past five years and set guidelines for the next five. It usually consists of approximately 29 thousand characters and 13 sections. Briefly, the most important points of the report were outlined in a communiqué issued on October 14 at the end of the Seventh Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the XVIII convocation. According to him, changes will be made to the charter of the Communist Party, which in fact is higher than the constitution of the PRC. These changes "will reflect the latest achievements of the sinicization of Marxism, new management concepts, new experience in strengthening party leadership."

In other words, the contribution of Xi Jinping himself will be added to the party charter, which, unlike its predecessors, has already generated several concepts that claim a place in history. The intrigue here is whether the Secretary General's ideas will be listed in the charter impersonally, such as Hu Jintao's "concept of scientific development", or with a name mentioned, like "Mao Zedong's ideas" and "Deng Xiaoping's theory" already included in the text. If the second option is chosen, it will mean that the current leader of China will stand on a par with the founding fathers of the country and far above his two predecessors.

The Chinese press ahead of time began to prepare the ground for the inclusion of "the ideas of Xi Jinping" in the charter. In July, the influential communist publication Party Building Studies published an article about them, which said the concept of the general secretary helps "further localize Marxism in China and develop a theory of socialism with Chinese characteristics." As Igor Denisov, a senior researcher at the Center for East Asian and SCO Studies at IMI MGIMO, noted in an interview with Kommersant, “most likely, the ideas of the Secretary General will be included in the text of the charter as a new concept of public administration.”

However, if the charter is supplemented with “the ideas of Xi Jinping”, then this will rather indicate the authoritarian nature of the new government, and not that the current general secretary has become on a par with Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping in terms of personality. Although the entire pre-Congress week, Xinhua News Agency recalled the successes achieved over the past five years (an average annual economic growth of 7.2%, an increase in household disposable income from 7.3 thousand yuan to 23.8 thousand yuan, a two-fold reduction in poverty), the majority of them were the result of the work of the economic machine built by Xi Jinping's predecessors. For the past five years, he has basically consolidated power in order to break the inert bureaucratic environment. The epoch opened by the 19th Congress will show whether he uses his powers to transform society or whether the strengthening of power was still an end in itself.

Mikhail Korostikov

On October 25, 2017, the day after the end of the 19th Congress of the Communist Party of China, which elected a new composition of the Central Committee of the Party, the first plenum of the CPC Central Committee was held. He re-elected Xi Jinping as Secretary General of the world's largest political force. This decision, as well as the election of seven members of the standing committee of the Politburo and 25 members of the Politburo, marked the creation of a new power configuration around the Chinese leader.

Xi Jinping and New Members of the Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC Central Committee
Reuters
Jason Lee

In the seven members of the standing committee of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee, five people were replaced, except for Xi Jinping himself and the head of the Chinese government, Li Keqiang. The newly appointed members are about 65 years old, and all of them have previously distinguished themselves in various party posts in the province and Beijing.

Third in the party hierarchy, Li Zhanshu, head of the office of the CPC Central Committee, worked in the party apparatus of the Hebei region with Xi Jinping in the 1980s and is considered his close associate. Vice Premier of the State Council Wang Yang, coming fourth, on the contrary, is considered close to the previous leader of China, Hu Jintao, a representative of the Komsomol group (party leaders who left the bureaucracy of the Communist Youth League of China). Xi Jinping is referred to as the "princes" - the descendants of the leaders of the CCP from the time of Mao Zedong.

The fifth person in the party is now the head of the Central Committee Political Research Center Wang Huning, in charge of the ideology of the CCP. This native of Shanghai rose to prominence under Jiang Zemin, who represented the "Shanghai group". Sixth is Zhao Leji, head of the Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee for Central Committee Discipline Inspection, who will lead the fight against corruption, replacing retired party veteran Wang Qishan. Zhao Leji joined the Politburo five years ago when Xi Jinping came to power. Finally, Han Zheng, head of the Shanghai party organization, became the seventh member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee.

Among the new members of the Politburo are Liu He, head of the office of the Central Committee's working group on finance and economics and one of Xi Jinping's top economic advisers, and Chen Miner, the head of the party organization in Chongqing, who is also considered very close to Xi Jinping.

“The composition of the standing committee of the Politburo, which experts spoke about before the congress, was almost completely justified,” said Alexei Maslov, a professor at the National Research University Higher School of Economics, in an interview with RT. “The majority of Xi Jinping’s supporters have entered there.”

With the completion of the congress and re-election to the highest party post of the chairman of the PRC, world leaders congratulated.

“The results of the vote fully confirmed the political authority of Xi Jinping, broad support for his course towards accelerated socio-economic development of China, strengthening its international positions,” Russian President Vladimir Putin emphasized.

Congratulated the Chinese leader and US President Donald Trump. Speaking on Fox Business, he stated that “now you can call (C. - RT) the emperor of China, but he is called the chairman."

Living classic

According to experts, Xi Jinping managed to achieve the main thing at this congress - he significantly strengthened his power by placing people loyal to himself in key positions. At the same time, for the first time in a long time, the figure of a successor was not designated at the congress. Political analysts believe this means that Xi Jinping plans to remain party leader beyond 2022, when the next congress of the Communist Party of China is held.

Xi Jinping at the Congress of the Chinese Communist Party
Reuters
Aly Song

The strengthening of Xi Jinping's position was also reflected in the fact that he was the third after the Chinese party leaders Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping to be mentioned in the new version of the party charter, which was approved by the congress. Moreover, Xi Jinping's concept of a "new era of socialism with Chinese characteristics" received the status of "ideas". Previously, the term had only been applied to "the ideas of Mao Zedong". The ideology of Deng Xiaoping, for example, was called only a "theory", emphasizing the superiority of Mao. The current Chinese leader has actually stood on a par with the founding father of the PRC.

"Xi Jinping's ideas of socialism with Chinese characteristics in the new era are the continuation and development of Marxism-Leninism, the ideas of Mao Zedong, the theory of Deng Xiaoping, the important ideas of the triple representation and the scientific concept of development, the latest achievement of the Sinicization of Marxism<…>as well as a guide to action in the implementation of the party and the people of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, ”Xinhua News Agency quoted the resolution of the 19th Congress of the CPC on the draft revised party charter.

“Now Xi Jinping is joining the ranks of major theorists of Marxism,” says Maslov. - In fact, he is on a par with Marx, Lenin, Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. That is, Xi Jinping positions himself as the peak of the development of world Marxist thought.”

In addition, this step, from the point of view of a political scientist, demonstrates that the Chinese President plans to stay in power for a long time.

“Fixing the name of Xi Jinping in the charter also fixes his role in history, and in this case it doesn’t matter what his position will be called in five years,” the expert emphasized. “Obviously, he will remain an active leader of the country. The policy that he outlines will continue at least until 2027.”

Socialism with a Chinese face

The meaning of the policy of "building socialism with Chinese characteristics in a new era" is, first of all, to improve the well-being of ordinary Chinese. If earlier the Chinese economy developed mainly due to the production of products for export, now the country's authorities plan to increase domestic demand first of all.

The streets of Beijing
Reuters
Tyrone Siu

The 19th Congress of the CPC set ambitious goals for the party and the state: by 2021, the centenary of the CPC, to complete the construction of a middle-class society and eradicate poverty.

Already now, as the president of the ANO Russian-Chinese Analytical Center Sergey Sanakoev noted in an interview with RT, up to 300 million people can be attributed to the middle class in China.

“These are people who are able to buy houses, cars, travel abroad,” the expert explained. “A middle-income society means that most of the 1.5 billion China will approach this level of consumption.”

Beijing plans to achieve this goal not through the extensive development of already existing sectors of the economy, but by actively promoting new technologies. Therefore, the next task, announced by the congress, is to build a modernized innovative economy with a serious environmental component by 2035. To do this, the environmental program "Beautiful China" is being launched. Experts note that already now 55% of China's economic growth is provided by high-tech industries.

The next landmark is 2049, the centenary of the founding of the PRC. By this time, China intends to complete the construction of a "modernized socialist state."

“Taking into account a certain linguistic specificity of the imagery of thinking that our eastern neighbors show, I would state that by the middle of the 21st century they plan to build communism,” Sanakoev specified.

global project

Increased attention to China's internal development does not mean a course of self-isolation and abandonment of global ambitions. On the contrary, among the decisions of the 19th Congress of the CPC is the inclusion of Xi Jinping's "One Belt, One Road" initiative in the party charter. This is a strategy for the economic integration of the Eurasian space, focused on China.

The leading ideologists of China's foreign policy of the past five years have found their place in the new Politburo: former Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, who accompanied Xi Jinping on his visits to Russia and the United States, Li Zhanshu, and Wang Huning, whom Western experts call the father of a more aggressive foreign policy towards West.

China not only declares its course towards building a great power, but also emphasizes that it is ready to try on the role of a global leader, experts say.

“China’s participation in the creation of a number of organizations was noted as a major merit of China at the congress: the One Belt, One Road project, BRICS, SCO, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank,” notes sinologist Alexei Maslov. “This means that China is not only starting to play an active role in world politics, but also forming a new political space.”

The ideological justification for this policy is the concept of a “community of a common destiny” formulated back in 2015, which the Chinese leader voiced at the anniversary session of the UN General Assembly.

“Countries must live a common destiny, uphold common values that are evident from the results of the Second World War, and build a single multipolar safe world,” Sergey Sanakoev explains the meaning of this concept.

Xi Jinping spoke about the "community of common destiny" both at the congress and at the end of the first plenum of the renewed CPC Central Committee.

“The Chinese people, who have self-confidence and self-respect, will be resolute in protecting the sovereignty, security and development interests of their country.<…>At the same time, China will actively work with other countries to build a community with a common destiny for mankind, constantly making new and more significant contributions to the noble cause of peace and human development,” Xinhua quoted Xi Jinping as saying.

Together with Russia

Experts note that this concept is close to Russia's orientation towards building a multipolar world.

“We offer a much safer world than the model of Western globalism, which is obviously in a global crisis,” Sanakoev says.

As the political scientist notes, it is under Xi Jinping that Beijing and Moscow are increasingly supporting each other, interacting both in world politics and in the economy.

“We are building serious integration processes, we even have integration of integrations,” he stressed, referring to the potential for linking the One Belt, One Road project and the Eurasian Economic Union.

Construction of the Power of Siberia gas pipeline
RIA News
Alexey Nikolsky

According to Sanakoev, the two countries are expected to strengthen cooperation, deeper interaction, especially in the Far Eastern regions of Russia, increase trade turnover and attract investment.

“Not only energy cooperation is actively developing, such areas as space, aviation, nuclear energy are much more serious, everything that concerns industries with high added value,” the expert says.

In turn, Maslov is sure that the strengthening of the positions of Xi Jinping supporters in the leadership of the PRC will make relations between Moscow and Beijing more pragmatic and focused on a specific result.

“China is now talking a lot about the effectiveness of the actions it is taking. This means that one should not expect any empty investments or investments for declarative projects,” the expert believes.

At the same time, Maslov predicts, the military-political component of cooperation will also develop. According to him, Beijing intends to make its army and navy one of the strongest in the world and is interested both in Russian technologies and in military and diplomatic support for our country. Another area of cooperation is the expansion of Moscow's participation in the One Belt, One Road project.

“China will, one way or another, involve Russia in more active cooperation with regard to the One Belt, One Road project. The activation or non-activation of investments in Russia depends on participation in this project,” the expert concluded.

The Party Congress is the main political event of the five-year plan. The current one began on October 19 with a speech to more than 2,000 participants by Chinese President Xi Jinping, and ended on October 24 with the adoption of amendments to the charter of the Communist Party and the approval of a new composition of the party's central committee of 300 people.

On October 25, the first plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the 19th convocation was held, in which 204 members with the right to vote took part. They elected the composition of the new Politburo of 25 people and the new composition of the Standing Committee of the Politburo - the main governing body of China, which includes seven people. The Standing Committee meets weekly to resolve the main issues of the country, the Politburo meets once a month.

The personnel issue was the main one before the start of the congress. They drew attention to the fact that under the two previous leaders of the PRC - Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao - at the congress, which fell at the end of their first term, even before the event, it was known who would enter the Politburo and Standing Committee. It was possible to indicate with certainty who would take the post of General Secretary of the Party, and then the chairman of the country at the end of the next five-year period. So it was with Xi Jinping himself: he joined the PCPB in 2007. Then experts pointed to him with almost absolute certainty as the next leader of China. The prediction came true: Xi Jinping was elected Secretary General of the Communist Party in 2012, and later took two other top leadership positions - the Chairman of the PRC and the head of the Central Military Council.

Rookies without intimacy

Of the seven people who served on the Standing Committee in the previous five years, two have retained their seats - Xi Jinping, 64, and State Council Chairman Li Keqiang, 62. According to Reuters forecast, the head of the country's parliament, the National People's Congress, will be Li Zhanshu, who joined the PCPB, and the head of the office of the central committee of the Communist Party. Li Zhanshu, 67, is one of the closest officials to Xi, who has worked with him since the 1980s and actually headed his apparatus, writes Bloomberg. His approval for the post of the third person in the country will take place only in March, when the parliament meets for the next congress, reports Reuters.

The names of the people included in the PCPB are arranged in the approved list by rank in descending order, says Alexander Gabuev, head of the Russia in the Asia-Pacific Region program at the Carnegie Moscow Center. In the same order, the new composition of the PCPB went out for photographing. The second person in the hierarchy, Li Keqiang, came out first after Xi Jinping, followed by Li Zhanshu. Next came Vice Premier Wang Yang, the fifth was the head of the Center for Political Research under the CPC Central Committee Wang Huning, the sixth was the new head of the party disciplinary commission Zhao Leji, and the head of the Shanghai party committee Han Zheng rounded out the seven, RIA Novosti reported.

The new PCPB has seven members, just like the previous one, so newcomers can be expected to fill the same positions as their predecessors, Gabuev says. According to the expert, it can be expected that Wang Yang will become the chairman of the People's Political Consultative Council, Wang Huning the first secretary of the Party Central Committee, Zhao Leji has already been appointed chairman of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, and Han Zheng can become the first vice premier of the State Council.

For the first time, the composition of the PCPB was formed from participants who were born after the Chinese revolution of 1949. The majority in the new PCPB does not belong to people who can be considered close to Xi, but in the 25-seat politburo at least 14 people worked with him over the years, Reuters calculated.

Rise of Xi

The congress consolidated the special role of Xi Jinping in the history of the PRC. He became the first modern leader whose name was inscribed in the charter of the Communist Party. Until this congress, only the founder of modern China, Mao Zedong, and the reformer Deng Xiaoping were named in the Charter: “The Communist Party of China is guided in its activities by Marxism-Leninism, the ideas of Mao Zedong, the theory of Deng Xiaoping, the important ideas of the triple general population) and the scientific concept of development”. Now the charter also spells out "Xi Jinping's ideas of socialism with Chinese characteristics in a new era," Reuters quoted the text of the adopted amendment.

“It is clear that Xi sees himself as the third big leader after Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. Naming a successor now would weaken Xi's position,” Bloomberg quotes Joseph Fewsmith, professor at Boston University.

The consolidation of Xi's status and the absence of a clear indication of a successor are connected not so much with the personal ambitions of the PRC chairman, but with the tasks that China faces, says Alexei Maslov from the Higher School of Economics. According to him, the nature of the Chinese government is becoming more authoritarian, as the leadership has set large-scale tasks in the economy, the country wants to make a new breakthrough, and a new team needs to be fixed for it. The leader can remain the same, Maslov points out. The expert recalls that Deng Xiaoping did not have the title of Chairman of the PRC or Secretary General of the Communist Party, but from 1978 to 1989 he was the leader of the country. At the end of the second five-year plan, Xi may change the Chinese constitution, which now prohibits one person from holding the post of chairman for more than two consecutive terms, Maslov points out. However, it is more likely that Xi will remain the de facto leader, occupying a different post. The fact that the year 2035 has appeared in Chinese planning, by which the army should be modernized and the construction of a “moderately prosperous society” should be completed (both goals Qi called at the congress), may signal Xi’s plans to remain in power until then, says Maslov.

The concentration of power is necessary to carry out the task of a serious restructuring of the economy, says Vasily Kashin, a leading researcher at the Institute of the Far East of the Russian Academy of Sciences. And to keep Xi in power after 2022, China's top three positions of power - the post of chairman of the country, the secretary general of the Communist Party and the chairman of the Central Military Council - can be separated, they will no longer be occupied by the same person, says Kashin. China's GDP growth in annual terms has been declining since 2010, when this figure was at the level of 10.4%. By 2015, China's economic growth slowed to 6.9%, and in 2016 to 6.7%. At the end of September, the international rating agency S&P downgraded China's long-term sovereign credit rating to A+ from AA- with a stable outlook. The agency has downgraded China's sovereign credit rating for the first time since 1999. Prior to this, at the end of May, China's sovereign credit rating was revised (for the first time since 1989) by Moody's: it was downgraded from Aa3 to A1 with a stable outlook.

Xi's rise is beneficial to Russia, as he is positive about developing relations with Moscow, he has a good personal relationship with President Vladimir Putin, and some of the new PCPB members are also well known in Russia, Kashin says. Thus, Wang Yang is actively involved in the development of economic cooperation, regularly participated in the Eastern Economic Forum. In politics, Beijing's cooperation with Moscow will grow as China has set itself the task of creating a "comfort zone" around itself, Maslov says. However, in economic cooperation, the Chinese side can become more pragmatic, as it sets itself tough development goals.

Save

The 19th Congress of the Communist Party of China opened in Beijing. Based on its results, a new top leadership of the country will be elected and the charter of the party will be revised. 2,287 delegates arrived in the capital from the provinces, who were elected from among the 89 million members of the CCP.

The Congress of the Communist Party takes place every five years and lasts a week. This year it will end on October 24th.

Speaking at the opening of the congress, Chinese President Xi Jinping said that the Chinese Communist Party will continue to make active efforts to maintain world order and intends to make the PRC a powerful state: "China will continue to make efforts to maintain peace in the world, continue to contribute to global development China should become a strong modernized state by 2050. In the first stage, from 2020 to 2035, we will build up the base of a middle-income society, and through another 15 years of hard work, we will generally achieve modernization.In the second stage, from 2035 to mid-21st century, the party will work hard for another 15 years to turn China into a rich, powerful, democratic, harmonious, civilized modernized socialist state."

Expert assessments ↓

Outwardly, the feature of the congress is the socialist modesty of the entourage and fidelity to the long-term tradition of holding such forums. Does the format correspond to the essence of the events taking place? Absolutely matches. That is, socialism for a simple Chinese person continues to be based on the principle of Mao Zedong: to serve the people. Accordingly, when Xi Jinping noted that income inequality is China's most important problem, a huge mass of the population has not yet reached a sufficiently high standard of living, boasting of luxury is absolutely unacceptable.

In political terms, the first important feature of the Congress is that we see the adherence of the Chinese political system to the tradition that was established about 100 years ago at the 1st Congress of the CCP. That is, the institution of congresses, the institution of the Communist Party (the largest political organization in the world - 89.5 million members), the power structure, five-year elections, the Standing Committee of the Politburo and the Politburo itself - all this will remain for decades to come.
The second thing that this congress confirmed is that China continues to move within the framework of socialism with Chinese characteristics. A socialist-national system is being affirmed, which involves the construction of general welfare on the principles of socialism or by means of socialism - with equal opportunities, support for the poor and other specifics that characterize the socialist system.
The third important feature that can be concluded is that the list of the Standing Committee of the Presidium of the Congress has already appeared, 42 people. It consists of three groups. The first group is the current composition of the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee. The second group is, let's say, new nominees in the Politburo. The list also includes the previous composition of the Standing Committee of the Politburo. That is, the old group, which is called the supporters of the former General Secretary Hu Jintao, and the nominees of Xi Jinping coexist.

Now Xi Jinping is a centrist force. In China, on the eve of the Congress, the political field was divided into three main parts. The first part is right-wing, these are the forces of the Communist Youth League of China, which is an independent political group. It can be compared with the US Democratic Party, Komsomol members are its natural supporters. They are like-minded people of the previous CPC general secretary, Hu Jintao, who are striving to lead China to a democracy with universal suffrage.
A conditionally left-wing group (I would even say that it’s not a left-wing, but, say, a military-radical group) believes that the Communist Party has exhausted itself, but the power of the red military aristocracy must remain in China, that is, the hereditary inheritance of power with all the ensuing features close to an authoritarian regime, a military dictatorship. The current composition of the Standing Committee of the Presidium of the Congress, which will elect the Standing Committee of the Politburo, that is, the main group of people who will make the most important decisions in the country in the next five years, shows us that, in principle, compromise will remain in China, that the centrist forces have won, and that development will be stable.

The congress is held in a calm atmosphere. The Standing Committee of the Presidium included not only the previous secretary general Hu Jintao, but another previous secretary general Jiang Zemin. This is evidence that compromise is winning in China's top leadership. The struggle could go beyond political methods. This did not happen, and the course towards compromise development will continue. But at the same time, the course towards strengthening the socialist and national system, that is, socialism with Chinese characteristics, the idea of which was put forward by Deng Xiaoping, confirmed at the 18th Congress of the CPC and received an expanded interpretation at the 19th Congress, will remain.
It is also expected that the statute of the CCP will change. The ideas of Xi Jinping, the current chairman of the PRC, will be added to it, just as the ideas of Mao Zedong were added in their time. That is, the chairman will be given the status of a theoretician of Marxism or a theoretician of socialism with Chinese characteristics. This will greatly enhance his status. If we proceed from the real contribution of Xi Jinping to the theory, then we will not see any absolutely new theses. That is, in this case, Xi Jinping resembles the figure of Stalin, who was not a theoretician, but successfully worked in the ideological direction, developing the ideas of his predecessor and applying them to his era. Xi Jinping takes the theses of Deng Xiaoping and becomes their extended interpreter. By the way, this is a very common technique in the Chinese political tradition. It was the same in ancient China and in medieval China, when the text of Confucius was taken, and the ideology was formed by a person who interpreted this text or wrote extended comments on it. And in this case, we see that Xi Jinping is a commentator of some more authoritative teacher.

And this is where the most important worldview question arises. With President Trump just assuming the throne, a landmark globalist rally took place earlier this year in Davos. And there, the brightest event was the speech of Xi Jinping, which many perceived as an oath of allegiance to globalism. What was it in reality and how can one evaluate now, based on the speech of the President of the People's Republic of China at the congress, then the speech in Davos?
Xi Jinping's speech in Davos was perceived by many in form, but not in essence. Xi Jinping essentially suggested that the economies of the whole world reorient themselves towards China. This is not contrary to China's interests, its welfare, its citizens, and so on. That is, he essentially proposed to transfer the flag of world development from the United States to China. What does this mean politically? That the markets of the countries of the world should be filled with Chinese goods, the countries of the world should switch from the dollar to the yuan, and, naturally, China will become the beneficiary of this development. That is, in this case, we see a very traditional attempt for the Chinese to put new content into the old form and at the same time achieve their own interests. It was the same when Mao Zedong proposed to make China the center of the world socialist movement. This absolutely did not imply that China was ready to sacrifice something for the sake of other countries.

Xi Jinping said at the congress that the Chinese dream is closely related to the dreams of the peoples of other countries. It can only be realized in a peaceful international environment and a stable international order. What is behind these words?
Xi Jinping has repeatedly stressed that China exports the world. China has not participated in any coup, has not committed any aggression. China continues to support the official authorities of the countries with which it cooperates, never participated in supporting the opposition. He always focused on the existing regimes elected according to the constitution - in contrast to the United States.
What does the new congress mean for us? Depending on how many members of Xi Jinping's team come to the Politburo Standing Committee, this could mean a virtual complete victory for Xi Jinping. Xi Jinping is an obvious ally of Russia and, in particular, of the system of power that has developed in the Russian Federation. This will mean indirect support for us and will contribute to the stability of the political situation that exists in the Russian Federation. Now there is a lot of talk about the fact that Li Zhanshu is a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo. He now heads the Security Committee of the CPC Central Committee, an analogue of our Security Council. He is a special negotiator for Russia, meaning he met with Vladimir Putin. Depending on what position Li Zhanshu takes in the Standing Committee of the Politburo, the further deepening and expansion of Russian-Chinese relations will depend. Maybe it's too early to talk about a military alliance. but there is no doubt that the election of Li Zhanshu to the Standing Committee of the Politburo will contribute to a more stable political situation, and maintaining the status of allies for China and Russia, and maintaining a stable political situation in the Russian Federation.

The XXVII Congress of the CPSU gave the impression of the triumph of the country, its ruling class, showed them as something monolithic and indestructible. But very soon everything collapsed. We all know and remember that the main blows were delivered in such areas as the formation of a column of traitors within the elite, as well as inciting local separatism. Xi Jinping did not say a single empty word in his speech at the 19th CPC Congress. Therefore, when he called on the citizens of the country to resolutely fight against separatism and any actions that undermine national unity, does it mean that there are some alarming bells?
Yes, indeed, such dangers are extremely relevant now, but in a particular case, the quote from the President of the People's Republic of China referred to Taiwan. What is this about? Conditionally democratic pro-American forces won in Taiwan, the first woman president appeared in Taiwan - Tsai Ing-wen. The basis of her party's program is the renaming of Taiwan from the Republic of China to the Republic of Taiwan. The official proclamation of a certain Taiwanese nation, although ethnically they are Chinese. For China, this can be a certain trigger that will launch, first of all, analogous processes in South China, when the southern Chinese sub-ethnoi, ethnically distant from the northern Chinese ethnic group, will begin some kind of movement towards the formation of their own nations. This Taiwanese separatism, in fact, was discussed by Xi Jinping.
But if we turn to the experience of the USSR, to the separatist movements in the republics of the Soviet Union, then the composition of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee, which will now be elected, is very important. There is a very big possibility that representatives of a number of major provinces, in particular Guangdong (this is the most ethnically distant province from the North Chinese sub-ethnos), will not be included in the Politburo Standing Committee and will practically be excluded from the main political processes in the country. Naturally, this will provoke the local elites in Guangdong, who have already been subjected to certain repressions to a fairly strong degree, to seek closer protection in the West and start moving from a single Chinese space. This applies mainly to Guangdong - but not only.

Continuing to remember the USSR: what about the traitors in China? Are the specific features of Yakovlev, Shevardnadze, Gorbachev and other camarilla visible in the internal Chinese elite?
If we are talking about the extreme right bloc of the Chinese elite, these are representatives of the Chinese Komsomol, oriented towards Hu Jintao, who was completely oriented towards America, towards the development of trade, economic, cultural and other ties with the USA. In the same grouping is the Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, Li Keqiang, who was also the general secretary of the Komsomol organization. There is also the head of the Supreme Court, Zhou Qiang. This is Hu Chunhua, secretary of Guangdong, who may not get into the Standing Committee of the Politburo. And a number of other figures. That is, we are talking about those whom in Russia we like to call the liberal clan, but I simply call representatives of the extreme right wing of the Chinese political elite. They essentially led the country before Xi Jinping. They actively drew closer to the United States within the framework of an unspecified, but rather obvious project of connecting the Chinese and American economies in a single Pacific ring. After Xi Jinping came to power, the positions of the liberals were greatly weakened. Now everyone is waiting for the final stage, when the Komsomol will be almost completely or largely withdrawn from the political process. Naturally, the response of the liberal figures squeezed into a corner will be some kind of radical action. The last time radical actions led to the events in Tiananmen Square in 1989. That is, students were brought to the streets. He was opposed by military elements in order to keep the country intact. And there was a very cruel, severe political crisis. Today, this option is also not excluded for China.
But it can be concluded that all the concerns that I have expressed are recognized by the leaders of China, and there really are good chances for fulfilling the goals and objectives that Xi Jinping proclaimed in his speech today. China drew conclusions on the example of the collapse of the USSR. Appropriate decisions have been made. It remains for Xi Jinping to realize the main task - to reach a compromise among his supporters, because contradictions are growing among his supporters as their influence grows.

○ Nikolai Vavilov, Chinese writer. October 18, 2017

Chinese President Xi Jinping called on the people of all countries to abandon the Cold War mentality. He also promised investors easy access to the Chinese market. According to him, all companies registered in China will be able to carry out their activities on equal and fair terms. Experts call the congress an important milestone in the development of China, as Xi Jinping begins reformatting the party, and, accordingly, the inter-clan struggle escalates.

Inter-clan confrontation

There are not two clans, as it used to be, but much more. The traditional division into two groups: Komsomol clan(and people from there) and clan of princes(party aristocracy) changed a few years ago. Today, the positions of the flock are more fractional: there are tough marketers, there are neomaoists that require the strengthening of old party traditions. Each group has a role to play. It is obvious that the group that gathers around Xi Jinping is winning today. It demands the maximum expansion of China's influence on the outside world, which he spoke about today. There was a maxim about the need to increase China's participation in solving international affairs, the formation of countries with a "common destiny." This all just reflects the tendency to expand the influence that this group represents.

Possible permutations

Xi Jinping talked a lot about the economy and promised that the reforms would continue. But at the same time, he paid more attention to the ideological component. He, in particular, assured that socialism with Chinese characteristics will be built in the new era. He spoke about strengthening party discipline.
Obviously, now the Central Committee of the Politburo, that is, the Areopagus that governs China, will become more pro-Jinping.
It is very important whether the Chairman of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, Li Kejian, remains in his post. It represents another block. Li Kejian and Xi Jinping have been balancing the situation for a long time. Now it is possible that Li Kejian will be moved to the post of head of the National People's Congress (Chinese Parliament).
Most likely, new young supporters of Xi Jinping, who held posts in the secretariat, and fellow countrymen of the PRC chairman from Shaanxi province will be introduced to the Politburo. Thus, the formation of the pro-Jinping bloc will be completed, which opens up opportunities for it to carry out the reforms that he spoke about today.

The role of the military

It should be noted that now the role of the military in China has somewhat weakened, although they continue to play an important role. Rather, the role of State Security officers in the PRC leadership will increase in the future.
The party struggle, of course, is going on, and at two levels: at the level of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee and at the level of regions (provinces and regions), where there are both supporters of Xi Jinping's tough reforms and supporters of a softer scenario.
In reality, the party struggle will not be felt in the outside world. Xi Jinping is of course consolidating his authoritarian power, which is why he talked so much about the unity of the Communist Party.

Reformatting the Communist Party

A split in the party is unlikely. The situation is not at all like the years of perestroika in the USSR. Those people who came up with completely different ideas than Xi Jinping were either arrested or removed from leadership. We do not see that grouping or leader who could lead the opposition, as it was in the early nineties in Russia. We do not see the Chinese Yeltsin, there is no Chinese Gorbachev.
The reformatting of the Chinese Communist Party is focused exclusively on China.

Relations with Russia

It is always more profitable for Russia to communicate with predictable China and those leaders whose actions we understand (maybe we do not fully share). In this regard, the results of the congress will not disappoint Russia. The question is different - China's policy will become even more pragmatic and tougher. Today, Xi Jinping essentially emphasized that there are countries with a "common destiny" that have signed a corresponding agreement. Russia has not signed it, although it is actively cooperating on various projects.
Beijing shows that the "train will leave" without Russia or other countries, even if they do not join. In fact, nothing will change for Russia in relations with China, but China's policy will be more pragmatic.

○ Alexey Maslov, Head of the HSE School of Oriental Studies. 1 8 October 2017

Keywords

CPC / CHINA / PRC / 19TH CPC CONGRESS / RUSSIAN-CHINESE RELATIONS / Sino-American Relations / PACIFIC ASIA/ AUTHORITARISM / DEMOCRACY / CHINA MODEL OF DEVELOPMENT / SOCIALISM WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS/ CHINA DREAM / COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA / CHINA / PRC / 19 CONGRESS OF THE CCP / RUSSIAN-CHINESE RELATIONS / CHINA-US RELATIONS / PACIFIC ASIA / AUTHORITARIANISM / DEMOCRACY / CHINESE DEVELOPMENT MODEL / SOCIALISM WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS/ CHINESE DREAM

annotation scientific article on political sciences, the author of scientific work -

The editorial staff of the Comparative Politics magazine publishes brief materials of the discussion on the results of the 19th Congress of the CCP. Researchers from the Center for Comprehensive Sinology and Regional Projects of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, the Institute of the Far East of the Russian Academy of Sciences, the Institute of Asian and African Countries (ISAA) of Moscow State University, and the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies (RISI) made presentations and took part in the discussion at the round table. Leading Russian experts discussed the significance of the 19th Congress of the Communist Party of China, held in October 2017, both in terms of analyzing the documents of the Congress and the party documents adopted at it, and in terms of comprehending the results of the first five years of the new generation of PRC leaders in power. The issues of transformation of political power in the PRC were touched upon, the new composition of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee was analyzed, the change in China's ideology and perception of the challenges and goals of socio-economic development was assessed, the chances of different models of modernization, the reforms carried out by the government and their effectiveness, the transformation of national interests and foreign policy priorities of the PRC were weighed. , relations between the PRC and the USA, Russia, East Asian countries. The Editorial Board of the journal Comparative Politics Russia publishes brief proceedings of the roundtable discussion on the 19th Congress of the Communist Party of China . The discussion gathered the researchers from the Center for Comprehensive Chinese Studies and Regional Projects of Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO University), the Institute of Far Eastern Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, the Institute of Asian and African Studies (IAAS) of Moscow State University, and the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies. Leading Russian experts discussed the significance of the 19th Congress of the CPC held in October 2017, analyzing the documents of the Congress and assessing the results of the first five years in power of the new generation of Chinese leaders. The participants of the roundtable touched upon the transformation of political power in the PRC , analyzed the new Politburo of the CPC Central Committee, assessed the changing ideology and perception of China's social and economic development goals, discussed the prospects of different models of modernization carried out by the government and their effectiveness, transformation of China's national interests and foreign policy priorities, Chinese relations with the USA, Russia and the East Asian countries.

The text of the scientific work on "19th Congress of the Communist Party of China: External and Internal Consequences and Prospects of Reform in China"

http://dx.doi.org/10.18611/2221-3279-2018-9-2-140-159

19th CPC CONGRESS:

EXTERNAL AND DOMESTIC CONSEQUENCES AND PROSPECTS FOR REFORM IN CHINA

We bring to the attention of readers the materials of the round table held on December 19, 2017 in the editorial office of the journal "Comparative Politics" by the Center for Comprehensive Sinology and Regional Projects of MGIMO of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia.

Reports were made at the round table: O.N. Boroch, Ph.D. leading researcher Center for Socio-Economic Research of China, IFES RAS; A.V. Vinogradov, Dr. polit. n. Head of the Center for Political Studies and Forecasts, IFES RAS, Senior Researcher Center for Comprehensive Sinology and Regional Projects of MGIMO of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia; HELL. Voskresensky, prof. d.polit.sci. director of the Center for Comprehensive Sinology and Regional Projects at MGIMO of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Yu.M. Galenovich, Doctor of History prof. senior researcher Center for the Study and Forecasting of Russian-Chinese Relations, IFES RAS; K.A. Efremova, Ph.D. Assoc. cafe oriental studies, researcher Center for Comprehensive Sinology and Regional Projects of MGIMO of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia; A.N. Karneev, Deputy Director, Assoc. cafe history of China ISAA MSU; A.V. Lomanov, Doctor of History Prof. RAS Senior Researcher Center for the Study and Forecasting of Russian-Chinese Relations, IFES RAS, Senior Researcher Center for Comprehensive Sinology and Regional Projects of MGIMO of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia; V.Ya. Poryatkov, Doctor of Economics prof. deputy director IFES RAS; E.N. Rumyantsev, Senior Researcher RISI.

The round table was also attended by: E.V. Koldunova, Candidate of Political Sciences Assoc. cafe oriental studies, deputy Dean of the Faculty of International Relations, Ved. expert of the ASEAN Center of MGIMO of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia; A.A. Kireeva, Ph.D. Assoc. cafe oriental studies, researcher Center for Comprehensive Sinology and Regional Projects of MGIMO MFA of Russia.

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Keywords:

PDA; China; PRC; 19th CCP Congress; Russian-Chinese relations; Sino-American relations; Pacific Asia; authoritarianism; democracy; Chinese model of development; socialism with Chinese characteristics, the Chinese dream

Annotation: The editorial staff of the Comparative Politics magazine publishes brief materials of the discussion on the results of the 19th Congress of the Communist Party of China. Researchers from the Center for Comprehensive Sinology and Regional Projects of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, the Institute of the Far East of the Russian Academy of Sciences, the Institute of Asian and African Countries (ISAA) of Moscow State University, and the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies (RISI) made presentations and took part in the discussion at the round table. Leading Russian experts discussed the significance of the 19th Congress of the Communist Party of China, held in October 2017, both in terms of analyzing the documents of the Congress and the party documents adopted at it, and in terms of comprehending the results of the first five years of the new generation of PRC leaders in power. The issues of transformation of political power in the PRC were touched upon, the new composition of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee was analyzed, the change in China's ideology and perception of the challenges and goals of socio-economic development was assessed, the chances of different models of modernization, the reforms carried out by the government and their effectiveness, the transformation of national interests and foreign policy priorities of the PRC were weighed. , relations between the People's Republic of China and the USA, Russia, the countries of East Asia.

HELL. Resurrection. The situation on the eve of and during the congress changed, and China not only skillfully took advantage of these changes, but also managed to reformat some of them in its favor. So

First of all, the initiative was seized from the United States during Xi Jin-ping's speech at the Taoist Forum, in his speech he concentrated on the problem of development, stated the need to protect

international institutions and concretized this program in the form of the Chinese development model already at the 19th Congress of the CPC, declaring the need for a common win for all participants in international life, putting forward the idea of a "public good" that China can provide to the world, including through the implementation of the mega-project "one belt - one way", while formulating the idea of a "community of common destiny" for all mankind. In parallel, Xi Jinping has tightened the authoritarian nature of domestic politics, declaring the need to amend the constitution by creating a State Control Commission, which should be able to make arrests in addition to the prosecutor's office. Thus, in particular, at the congress, Xi said that it is necessary to “... at the state, provincial, city and county levels, establish control commissions that work on the basis of combining official duties together with party organs to inspect party discipline, thus ensuring comprehensive control over all civil servants exercising public authority. The need for this at the congress was substantiated by the catchy slogan "put the government in the cage of the law." In addition, a tough campaign was carried out to combat illegal migrants who lived in the suburbs of Beijing, the rules for the work of non-governmental organizations were tightened, including through the law on foreign NGOs, the decision was made to create party cells in all foreign private enterprises, giving them the right to influence investment policy and the exercise of private property rights. Measures were also taken to take control of Western IT companies in China, the introduction of a "public affairs accounting system" was announced, and much more. All this caused a harsh reaction from a number of Western media and even a statement from the German Chamber of Commerce that German campaigns could leave the Chinese market. In parallel with this, China began to promote in every possible way the mega-project "one belt -

one way” as a tool for public good and globalization expansion, and also successfully held the next Budapest Forum, which brought together 11 EU countries, 5 Balkan countries and China to discuss trade and economic issues.

It is important for us to understand how the ideas of the Chinese leadership proclaimed earlier and during the work of the congress are combined, how these ideas are revealed in the materials of the 19th Congress of the Communist Party of China1. To do this, it is important to analyze how the concentration and distribution of power in the political system of China takes place, what role the new system of state control will play, what party cells in foreign enterprises can actually do, what criticism of foreign elements in the educational process means and whether this will affect the cooperation between Russia and China in the scientific and educational sphere, in which direction the system of social order and models of China's modernization, building a system of legal regulation will be transformed.

The main contradiction of the current stage of China's development, outlined in the congress documents, is "the contradiction between the ever-growing needs of the people for a wonderful life and the uneven and incomplete socio-economic development of the country", as well as the needs for democracy, law, equality, justice, security, ecology and etc. At the same time, the question remains about the path that China is going to take for further modernization and how it will deal with the challenges it faces:

Uneven and incomplete development;

Insufficiently powerful innovation potential;

The labor intensity of the process of intensive elimination of poverty;

A large gap in the level of development between urban and rural areas, between regions of China, in the distribution of incomes of the population;

1 For the full text of the report delivered by Xi Jinping at the 19th Congress of the CPC, see http://russian. news.cn/2017-11/03/c136726299.htm

in solving difficulties in the field of employment, education, medical care, housing, ensuring a decent old age, etc.

One gets the impression that in order to resolve these issues, China is going to choose the Singapore path of development, to become a "greater Singapore." For Russia, there remains a largely reactive (or even imitative) role, as China is the strongest world-class player in the Eurasian space, and its influence in Eurasia is only increasing as it formulates world-class projects. However, for Russia, cooperation with China is more profitable than rivalry. Accordingly, the rapprochement between Russia and China continues, despite all the international difficulties. Thus, today we are faced with many complex issues of a debatable nature that will require our diplomacy and analytics to develop new non-trivial solutions of a complex nature.

I propose that our discussion today focus on the following questions:

What can the new composition of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee testify to? What are the possible further scenarios / options for the transformation of political power in the PRC? What might be the consequences of such a transformation?

Are there new accents in the concept of socialism with Chinese characteristics? What difficulties and challenges of social and economic development might China face? How might China's reform strategy transform in response to new challenges?

How will China's national interests and foreign policy priorities be transformed? How might this affect China's relations with Western countries? With Russia?

V.Ya. Portyakov. The results and documents of the 19th Congress of the CCP are quite actively analyzed and commented on by the Russian

MASS MEDIA. Among serious materials, I would like to mention an article by our former trade representative in the PRC, S.S. Tsyplakov, Leadership Modernization of China. The system of collective leadership laid down by Deng Xiaoping is a thing of the past,” published in Nezavisimaya Gazeta on December 16, 2017. The author correctly captured the essence of the decisions of the congress, which raised the current leader of the PRC, Xi Jinping, to political and ideological heights comparable to those previously occupied by Mao Zedong . In addition, Xi has achieved a significant strengthening of his positions in power structures. Many members of the new Politburo of the CPC Central Committee are its nominees and even worked directly with it, incl. in the provinces of Fujian and Zhejiang.

The congress also reinforced the prevailing opinion in the Sinology community that Xi Jinping's rule may not be limited to two five-year terms. In any case, a potential pair of successors to the highest party and state posts was not designated in any way. As is known, after the 18th CCP Congress, the Hong Kong media named Hu Chunhua and Sun Zhengcai as such. The first remained in the Politburo, but did not receive any noticeable promotion in the media. And the second was completely removed from the post of head of the party committee of Chongqing.

In the field of international relations, it seems important to consolidate in the Charter of the CPC the two main innovations of Xi Jinping - the Belt and Road initiative and the provision on "humanity as a community of a common destiny." In our opinion, the second provision serves as a theoretical basis for the course of "China's peaceful development" declared by Beijing.

On the whole, there are some nuances in the international section of Xi Jinping’s Report to the 19th Party Congress in comparison with Hu Jintao’s report to the 18th Party Congress in 2012. So, if earlier the thesis about “the formation of a new type of international relations” was unambiguously addressed by China to the United States of America, now it has a less definite character and is focused on all major states of the world.

It is possible that the retention of the former term, with some reformatting of its addressee, was an attempt to "save face" after the US refused to accept the wording proposed by Beijing.

The congress demonstrated China's final departure from Deng Xiaoping's "taoguang yanhui" formula - "try not to show yourself in anything", "not to flaunt your abilities." On the contrary, Beijing has publicly declared the international value, especially for developing countries, of its experience in economic construction. Curious in this context are the titles of a number of articles after the congress issue of the Qiushi magazine in English (Qiushi, October-December 2017), for example: “A Comparative Analysis of Order in China and Disorder in the West”, “Western-Centrism Hides the Current State of Disorder in the West” , "China is a key force in promoting global stability, peace and development." Judging by this assertive and even intrusive propaganda, China will be noticeably more active in the next five years than before to strengthen its role and place in global governance.

I would also like to draw the attention of the audience to the fact that the congress notes China's entry into a new stage of foreign economic openness. Its essence is the ever deeper penetration of Chinese capital, goods and services into the fabric of the world economy.

Yu.M. Galenovich. Let us turn first of all to our bilateral relations with China. Here, first of all, it is important to analyze the content of the exchange of views following the results of the congress between Russian President Vladimir Putin and General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee, Chinese President Xi Jinping.

Xinhua News Agency reported that on October 26, 2017, Chinese President Xi Jinping had a telephone conversation with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Vladimir Putin warmly congratulated Xi Jinping on his re-election to the post of General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee, as well as on the successful holding of the 19th Congress of the CPC. He stressed that the approval at the congress of Xi Jinping's idea of socialism with Chinese characteristics is

the howl of the era is extremely important. The results of the congress fully demonstrated the trust and support enjoyed by the CPC, led by Xi Jinping, from the broad masses of the people of China. Xi Jinping has high authority both in the CCP and among the citizens of the PRC. The Russian President wholeheartedly wished Xi Jinping to lead the CPC, the world's largest political party, to new successes. Relations between Russia and China are an example of the peaceful coexistence of major powers in the modern world. V.V. Putin also expressed his intention to maintain close contact with Xi Jinping, promote cooperation between Russia and China on all fronts, and maintain close ties and coordination on important international and regional issues.

Xi Jinping thanked V.V. Putin for congratulations and noted that the 19th Congress of the Communist Party of China, which has just ended, approved the general course and program for the future development of the party and the state, which reflects the high level of unanimity of opinion among the 89 million members of the Communist Party of China. The CCP has both the confidence and the ability to lead the people of China to the goal of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. This is the historical duty and mission of the CCP.

Xi Jinping also stressed that China's development cannot be separated from the world. China and Russia share a comprehensive relationship of strategic cooperation and partnership, and China will continue to resolutely deepen relations with Russia regardless of changes in the international environment. China intends to follow a common trajectory with Russia, to achieve even greater development of bilateral relations and even greater results.

The exchange of views between the President of the Russian Federation and the President of the People's Republic of China, the disclosure of the contents of the telephone conversation between them makes it possible to find out exactly what each of the interlocutors emphasizes. These statements create a high-level atmosphere in our bilateral relations. This atmosphere is taken into account in their practice

public figures and officials at all levels. In this atmosphere, sinologists, experts in those fields where one has to deal with China, are studying the relevant issues.

Based on the above exchange of views, Sinologists in Russia should take into account that interstate relations between the Russian Federation and the PRC are currently of such a nature that the President of the Russian Federation, that is, the head of state, congratulates the head of the ruling political party in China, the Communist Party of China, on his re-election to the the post of general secretary of the CPC Central Committee and the successful holding of the congress of the aforementioned party. Compliance with courtesy, respect for each other is an indispensable condition for maintaining relations.

At present, judging by the words of the President of the Russian Federation, a positive attitude towards both the Communist Party of China and its leader is the basis for maintaining a benevolent atmosphere in bilateral relations between Russia and China. This sets the stage for approval in our country, in particular, by our experts on China, as well as the media, of the activities of the Communist Party of China.

Further, it also follows from this that in our country, when assessing the policy of the modern leadership of the CPC-PRC, Xi Jinping's statement about socialism with Chinese characteristics in a new era should be considered extremely important. This further leads to a positive attitude towards both the General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee and the term "socialism with Chinese characteristics in the new era." This includes a positive attitude towards the terms "original Chinese socialism", "Chinese specificity", "new era" in the interpretation of all this by the Chinese Communist Party and its general secretary. The trust and support of the broad masses of the people of China in the Communist Party of China, led by Xi Jinping as its general secretary, should be considered unconditional. One should also proceed from the fact that Xi Jinping has a high authority, both in the CCP and among the citizens of the PRC. Further, it should be emphasized

that the Chinese Communist Party is the largest political party in the world. It is Xi Jinping who should be willing to lead the party to new successes.

So, the official assessment by the President of the Russian Federation of the results of the 19th Congress of the CPC is the full approval of the activities of Xi Jinping personally, the Communist Party of China, which he leads, as well as what is now called in China "Xi Jinping's idea of socialism with Chinese characteristics in a new era."

From this point of view, both "modern Chinese original socialism" and Xi Jinping's opinion that the present is a "new era" should be approved. It is from these positions that one should evaluate both the activities of Xi Jinping personally, and the domestic and foreign policy of the CPC-PRC. Only such a position will contribute to the preservation and development of an atmosphere of peace, good neighborliness and partnership between Russia and China.

From the same point of view, relations between the Russian Federation and the PRC are an example of the peaceful coexistence of major powers in the modern world.

From our point of view, eternal peace in relations between Russia and China is one of the main coincidences of the national interests of both peoples and both countries.

So, Xi Jinping, judging by the words of the President of the Russian Federation, is our main partner in China; the basis of our bilateral relations is the principle of cooperation, we should put the interests of cooperation at the forefront; our side is also striving to harmonize positions on foreign policy issues and in the field of bilateral, multilateral, regional and global relations and problems. From this follows a positive attitude in our country towards the foreign policy of the CCP-PRC.

In general, the main thing in this position seems to be attaching importance to preserving the current, external or decorative, side of our bilateral relations, maintaining an atmosphere of goodwill in our relations. Our side is interested in maintaining such an atmosphere.

A.V. Lomanov. The core idea of the report at the 19th Congress of the CPC was the proclamation of "a new era of socialism with Chinese characteristics." It was stated that the Chinese nation was making a "great leap" (weida foye) from "standing up" (zhanqilai) and "enriching" (fuqilai) to "strengthening" (qiangqi-lai). In the context of China's political history, this means that the main theme of Xi Jinping's rule is the strengthening of Chinese power. The current period is becoming a continuation of the era of Mao Zedong, in which China "rose" and laid the foundations of economic and military independence, as well as the era of Deng Xiaoping, when the reforms made it possible to enrich the most active members of society and the country as a whole. The new emphasis on "strengthening" was embodied in the double use of the character "might - strength" in the strategic program goal to build "a rich, strong (qiang) democratic, civilized, harmonious, beautiful, socialist modernized state (qiangguo)" by the middle of the century.

The thesis about the transition from "enrichment" to "strengthening" indicates that the former priority of increasing wealth through a quantitative increase in the volume of the economy is receding into the background for China. It is in this vein that the adoption at the congress of a new interpretation of the main contradiction of Chinese society as a contradiction "between the growing need of the people for a good life and uneven incomplete development" should be interpreted.

The appearance of this formulation marks the final distancing of the official theory of China's development from the legacy of Soviet political economy. Proposed in the USSR in the middle of the twentieth century. "the basic economic law of socialism" demanded to ensure "the maximum satisfaction of the ever-growing material and cultural needs of the whole society through the continuous growth and improvement of socialist production on the basis of higher technology." Previous Chinese interpretations of the main social conflict (1956 and 1981) followed this approach and pointed to a gap between the needs

people and the backwardness of production, which required focusing on the development of economic potential.

Xi Jinping said at the congress that in a number of areas of production, China has already become a world leader. And this corresponds to the thesis about the country's transition from "enrichment" to "strengthening". At the same time, the former assessments of China as the world's largest developing country, which is at the "initial stage of socialism", were inherited and preserved. This statement makes it possible to balance the excessive optimism in the interpretation of the "new era" of China.

The ternary scheme of interaction with the world community (developed countries - neighbors - developing countries), traditional for previous congresses, was modified in 2017. In the first place, instead of developed countries, the theme of relations with “big states” (da go) was placed, with which it is supposed to build stable, balanced, coordinated cooperation relations. In the lexicon of Chinese foreign policy in recent years, the phrase "relationship of a new type between large states" has served as an indication of Sino-American relations. Even assuming that at the convention this wording was used in an expanded context and referred to "big states" other than the United States, it is clear that small developed countries have dropped out of the new classification. This may serve as an indirect indication that the new Chinese self-assessment as a country that has become rich and quite developed in a number of ways has led to a decrease in interest in developed countries with little international influence.

Duality can also be traced in relation to the world order and its rules. The report stressed that China will contribute to global development and act as a "protector" of the international order. At the same time, it has been said that the specific feature of the modern era is "the accelerating advancement of change in global governance and world order." China wants to emphasize that it does not seek

undermine or eliminate the modern world order, but the thesis about the need to transform global rules, taking into account the interests of developing countries, remains valid. As a large responsible state, China intends to actively participate in the "reform and construction" of the global governance system.

At the congress, it was stated that the Chinese approach to global governance is based on "joint discussion, joint creation and sharing." This provision received a normative status and was included in the program section of the CCP statute. The obvious problem is that the rules created by the West have not been discussed with China, and China is not an equal participant in the institutions that support the functioning of these norms - even if Western politicians are sure that the use of these rules and mechanisms brings China significant and “unfair” benefits. During the period of “strengthening”, China intends to become an equal participant in the process of developing new rules, which does not find support from the leading developed countries.

In order to move from discussing private issues to shaping the global agenda, China invited the outside world to work together to "create a community of human destiny." This concept became part of the "Xi Jinping's ideas of a new era of socialism with Chinese characteristics" canonized at the 19th CPC Congress. The report mentioned "lasting peace", "common security", "shared prosperity", "openness and inclusiveness", "a clean and beautiful world" as key components of the "community of the destiny of mankind".

This set of ideas was elaborated in Xi Jinping's speech on December 1, 2017 in Beijing at the High-Level Dialogue Forum between the CCP and world political parties. The Chinese leader said in the first person that it was he who, for the first time in 2013, put forward the initiative to build a "community of the destiny of mankind", explaining that his "One Belt, One Road" initiative is aimed at practical implementation

the emergence of the idea of "community". Xi Jinping also talked about the traditional concepts of “The Heavenly Empire is One Family” (Tianxia and Jia) and the wonderful world of the Great Unity (Datong), when “they walked along the great path and the Heavenly Empire belonged to everyone” (dao dao xing e, Tianxia wei gong). These considerations point to a desire to bring Chinese values and beliefs into the "community of destiny" project.

Xi Jinping said that on the basis of understanding its own experience, China is ready to share with the outside world new interpretations of the patterns of development of human society, but at the same time it will not "export" the "Chinese model" or require other countries to "copy" Chinese methods. Even with these reservations, China's attempt to enter the world stage as the bearer of a set of non-Western ideas and values suitable for creating a "community of the destiny of mankind" is likely to provoke opposition from the developed countries.

At the “strengthening” stage, China wants to declare itself as the creator of a new concept of organizing interaction within the world community. The 19th Congress set the course for turning the country into an influential international player, putting forward global ideas and putting into practice serious trans-regional initiatives like the Belt and Road.

Yu.M. Galenovich. Our bilateral relations also have their essence, their main inner content. A certain idea about this is also given by Xi Jinping's statements in the aforementioned telephone conversation with the President of the Russian Federation. Xi Jinping, first of all, stressed that the last congress approved the general course and program for the future development of the Party and the state.

This, in essence, means the demand for recognition in our country of just such an assessment of the results of the congress. At the same time, any criticism of Xi Jinping, and the CPC, and what Xi Jinping calls the general course and program for the future development of the Party and the state is unacceptable. In fact, we have before us a new general course of the CPC, the main and

the only first leader of which, the “core” of which, is now Xi Jinping. We are talking about the recognition in our country of a kind of personality cult of Xi Jinping, as well as his "idea" as the general course of the party and the state. Xi Jinping emphasizes precisely the unity of the party and the state in modern China. From this point of view, no doubts about unity both within the party and within the state are unacceptable. In fact, this is a demand not to question the stability of the position of Xi Jinping, the CCP, inside the country, the stability of the situation in China.

Xi Jinping emphasized the assertion that all members of the CPC have a unanimous opinion. This means a manifestation of the desire that no one outside of China, including in our country, had, and should not have, any doubts about this.

Xi Jinping stressed that the CCP is approaching 90 million people. This is a reminder that everyone on the planet has and will have to deal with the largest and largest party-state mechanism for governing the country with the largest population on Earth. Xi Jinping also conveys to our people and our country that the goal of the CCP is the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation or the nation of China. The term "Great Renaissance" is already directly used here. Realizing this goal, according to Xi Jinping, is the CCP's historical duty and mission. Therefore, Xi Jinping warns that everyone on earth will have to adapt to the CCP fulfilling its historical mission, its historical duty, that is, to act to resurrect the nation of China, to force all other nations on earth to reckon with the demands of the nation of China, to do what is from they are required if it is interpreted in China as part of the rebirth of the nation of China.

Xi Jinping reaffirms the characterization of the current state of relations between Russia and China as a relationship of comprehensive strategic cooperation and partnership, and further says that such relations, from the point of view of China,

will remain regardless of changes in the situation in the world. Here one can see the desire to convey to our side the idea that it should be satisfied that it is viewed in the CCP-PRC as a "partner" (but not an ally). At the same time, regardless of changes in the international situation, that is, “always”, “forever”, it should be “on the sidelines” of world politics, in particular, relations between China and America. Not to enter into any unions and alliances that China considers unnecessary, and, in fact, to do what is required of her in order to revive the nation of China.

Xi Jinping said at the congress that China intends to follow a common trajectory with Russia. This is still the same idea of Xi Jinping that humanity has a single or common destiny. In other words, every nation, including Russia, must follow the nation of China. In general, it turns out that immediately after the 19th Congress of the CPC, in his first conversation with the President of the Russian Federation, Xi Jinping outlined the scope and limits of Russia's actions, which is dictated by the need for the CPC to fulfill its historical duty - the Great Revival of the Great Nation of China.

HE. Boroch. The economic section of the report at the 19th Congress includes the main concepts in the field of economics that have emerged in previous years under Xi Jinping's rule. This is the thesis about the "decisive" role of the market in the allocation of resources, enshrined at the 3rd Plenum of the 18th CPC Central Committee (2013). This is the concept of “supply-side structural reform”, which, starting in 2015, has been guiding the implementation of a set of measures to reduce excess production capacity, reduce inventories, restructure debts and reduce costs. At the same time, the authorities proposed "new development concepts" (innovation, coordination, environmental friendliness, openness, accessibility). In the reporting section of the report at the congress, the concept of the “new normal” proposed in 2014 was also mentioned, which reflected the reaction of the Chinese leadership to the objective trend of slowing down the growth rates of the Chinese economy and focusing on the quality of growth.

At the center of the CPC's economic policy is the thesis of the transition from high-growth growth to high-quality growth. In 2017, for the first time at the party congress, the goal of increasing GDP was not set. The rationale for this change is the emergence of a new interpretation of the main contradiction of Chinese society as a contradiction "between people's desire for a good life and uneven and incomplete development." The backwardness of production in this formulation is no longer discussed, which makes it possible to remove the task of increasing the volume of the economy. However, the inertia of the pursuit of pace is so great that Chinese experts warn against considering "incompleteness" of development in isolation from "unevenness." Otherwise, the backward regions will refer to their "incomplete development", demand investments and new projects, which will eventually lead to a desire for high growth rates.

The economic decisions of the 19th Congress are aimed at solving structural problems, at increasing the efficiency and quality of development. The preservation of the market course of reforms is beyond doubt. The report made a slight stylistic refinement of the previous wording about "the decisive role of the market in allocating resources and better deploying the role of the government" (replacing the conjunction "and" with a comma), which, according to Chinese commentators, further emphasizes the importance of the role of the market over the role of the government. The provision on the "decisive role of the market" was included in the updated CPC charter, replacing the previous characterization of the role of the market as "basic". The materials of the congress contain the thesis about the improvement of the system of property rights in the process of reforms, including a new wording about property rights as an "effective mechanism for stimulating" the activities of economic entities. It is about clearly defining and protecting property rights, including intellectual property.

As an important aspect of economic reforms, the 19th Congress pointed to the improvement of the market for factors of production.

leadership. Chinese economists note that the market for factors of production lags behind in development from the markets for goods and services, and this hinders the market exchange of labor, land, capital, technology, and information. To solve problems in the labor market, it is planned to reform the propiska system, improve labor legislation, and continue work to reduce the gaps between town and countryside, between individual regions and individual industries. It is supposed to speed up the creation of a single market for the use of land in town and countryside. An important task was proclaimed to reform the financial market, to ensure its healthy and stable development. The response to excessive speculative fluctuations in the securities market was the demand to put the financial market at the service of the real economy and increase the share of direct financing. If previously the official wording demanded that "state enterprises become strong, good and big", then at the congress these demands were addressed to state capital. It is expected that this will help promote the reform of state enterprises, improve the system of state property management and the system of property rights in the public sector of the economy.

The economic section of the report at the congress is notable for its content and concreteness. All proposed measures are closely related to each other. To build on the gains already made in reducing excess inventories and capacity through supply-side structural reform, the authorities want not only to expand the role of market mechanisms of competition and bankruptcy, but also to control the threat of financial risks as much as possible. To increase the international competitiveness of the Chinese economy, it is proposed to expand the use of the "negative list" system, which indicates which areas are closed to investors, allowing entry into other sectors without requiring additional permits. This system is already in place in China in 11 pilot free trade zones.

Yu.M. Galenovich. Xi Jinping said at the congress that China welcomes globalization and also understands the challenges that globalization brings with it. All countries should join forces and act in the same direction, promote economic globalization on the basis of openness, inclusiveness, favorability, balance and win-win.

As far as globalization is concerned, the CPC-PRC seeks to take advantage of economic globalization. They claim to be the best in the world to manage the affairs of the globe when it comes, above all, to economic globalization. The call for all countries to join forces turns into a call to recognize the leading, guiding and managing role of China in the course of economic globalization. At the same time, in practice, it turns out that the Chinese side cares, first of all and mainly, about the benefit for itself, and only for itself.

HE. Boroch. Based on the provisions of the 19th Congress, at a meeting of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee in December 2017, the directions of economic work for 2018 were formulated. The key theses were “moving forward in conditions of stability”, maintaining a high quality of growth, and deepening the structural reform of supply. There was a thesis about the holding in 2018 of "three key battles" aimed at preventing major risks, a targeted targeted fight against poverty, and combating environmental pollution. Emphasis was placed on developing the real economy and accelerating the growth of advanced industries so that China can take a leading position in global value chains.

A notable event was the appearance at the end of 2017 at the Central Conference on Economic Work of the concept of "Xi Jinping's economic ideas of a new era of socialism with Chinese characteristics." It became a concretization in the economic sphere of “Xi Jinping’s ideas of a new era of socialism with Chinese characteristics”, which

rye were included at the congress in the charter of the CPC. The new term is inscribed in the context of the normative party ideology, it has replaced the arguments of Chinese theorists about "the political economy of Xi Jinping" and "the political economy of socialism with Chinese characteristics." It was noted that under Xi Jinping there was a continuous deepening of knowledge of the laws of economic development.

The convention's announcement of a "new era" of socialism with Chinese characteristics means that China's economic development has also entered a new era of transition from rapid growth to high quality. This statement will have a great influence on the choice of priorities in the formation of economic policy. It will not be easy to implement what has been planned, and the Chinese leadership understands this. In Chinese political journalism, Xi Jinping is often quoted as saying that if you do not concentrate on carrying out the tasks set, then "even the best goals and best plans will remain flowers in the mirror and the reflection of the month in the water."

Yu.M. Galenovich. For us in this regard, another important question that Xi Jinping raised in his speech at the Congress is how to treat the Sino-American rivalry? Having a global perspective is key.

If you look at the text of the report, it turns out that the Chinese side is proposing to the American side, Xi Jinping is proposing to D. Trump, first, to reckon with China, perceiving it as it presents itself. Secondly, proceed from the fact that China offers the only correct path for the development of mankind under its leadership, proceed from the fact that only adaptation to China can bring benefits to the United States. Finally, thirdly, the Chinese suggest to the Americans that there is only one perspective for humanity, that is, the perspective that the CCP-PRC proposes to interpret.

This perspective has two parts. First, as the largest economies in the world and permanent members of the UN Security Council, China and the United States have a common

broad common interests in protecting peace and stability on the planet, stimulating global development and prosperity; they bear an important responsibility. The interests of the two countries are deeply intertwined, they need each other. China is not a rival or an enemy, as some Americans think.

Judging by what was said at the congress, including in the economic part of the report, perhaps on the initiative and on the terms of China, the prospect of a “big two” from China and America is again emerging on the planet.

A.N. Karneev. One of the most important circumstances, which perhaps not a single commentator missed, was the consolidation of the power of Xi Jinping and his team, the rapid transformation of the current secretary general into a figure equal in importance to the founder of the PRC Mao Zedong and the “foreman of Chinese reforms” Deng Xiaoping, as well as the potential transformation of the structure of supreme power in the PRC into a new quality. While it was more or less clear long before the congress that everything was moving towards crowning Xi (who had already concentrated an unprecedented number of tools of control and management in his hands) with an even more sonorous title, the inclusion of “Xi Jinping’s ideas” in the party charter and other documents, after only five years of work, it still looks like some kind of aberration, not entirely clear to foreign observers. The surprise of Western experts was best expressed by Eyvan Oznos of The New Yorker: “how did it happen that a little-known middle-level party functionary suddenly turned into a leader in a few years, who is now put next to Mao?”

On November 17, 2017, Xinhua News Agency published an editorial titled "Xi Jinping: Leader of the New Era, Pointing the Way Forward" (Xi Jinping: xin shidai de lingluzhen), which named the general secretary as the "helmsman" of the dream ship, the core leader " great struggle" against corruption and decay, a servant of the common people, constantly thinking about the happiness of all Chinese citizens, the commander-in-chief of military reform, the leader

great power, "general designer of construction in a new era", etc., etc. There was also an attempt in one of the provincial party organizations (in Guizhou) to throw the term “great leader” into the official lexicon, but it did not receive support from above, probably due to the fact that it could provoke unflattering comparisons with the North Korean leader Kim Jong-un.

Almost openly, the reflections of party publicists are already slipping that, they say, the two general secretaries who preceded Xi Jinping were generally “weak leaders”, which additionally highlights the importance of Xi Jinping’s leadership, as if called by history itself to become a crisis manager in a situation of a dangerous process. a more noticeable separation of the party from the moods and aspirations of ordinary Chinese. According to the publication of the radical left-wing resource “Red China”, in private speeches of some high-ranking advisers of Xi Jinping, they explain to the party activists the dialectics of the party leadership of the last twenty years as follows: “compared to Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, the same Jiang Zemin, Zhu Rongji, Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao were weak leaders (zhoshi lindao) who, in order to maintain unity in leadership and prioritize economic development, turned a blind eye or pretended not to notice such actions that contained serious violations of discipline or law. This attitude allowed many people to widely practice corruption schemes, and all this led to the emergence of a privileged layer of people (quangui zeceng), who shamelessly used their position to take resources and money for their own benefit, which not only aggravated the problem of the gap between the poor and the rich, but also led to the fact that the economic development of the country took place in a perverted form”2.

2 Yuanhan Yihao.

^ÉIÙÈX Xi de zhidao xixiang wanquan shi fandong de ziyuzhui (Xi Jinping's guiding ideas are in fact naked neoliberalism) / Hongse zhongguo, 07.07.2014.

Against this background, it becomes clear how important the anti-corruption campaign, called the “great struggle” in the report, is playing in strengthening Xi’s authority. On the eve of the congress, the most resonant project of the party propaganda in this area was the 60-episode film “In the name of the people” (Yi renmin de minyi), designed to instill in the audience an understanding of how dramatic the struggle of the party leadership with the above negative phenomena is. As an indicator of the hypersensitivity of this topic in modern conditions, we note the fact that this series (in which, by the way, the last name and first name of Xi Jinping is encrypted in the names of the three main positive characters) after the initial propaganda by the official media, suddenly ceased to be mentioned and, following the results of the past year, the most successful The ultra-nationalist action movie Fighting Wolf 2 (Zhanlang 2) has become a cinematic project that meets all the requirements of party propaganda.

Another trend of the work of the Congress and after the Congress is an attempt at an offensive strategy in the fight against various trends in the ideological, political and information spheres that are unfavorable for the CCP, including the so-called "erroneous views" and the ideology of "hostile forces." It is no secret that the entire first term of Xi and his associates in power was characterized by a rather noticeable tightening of control over the ideological sphere, which in previous years (especially in the era of Hu Jintao) developed towards greater pluralism of opinions and opportunities to express a variety of ideas. This, no doubt, reflected the fears of the party leadership that in the era of the information revolution, the party did not win at all in the ideological confrontation with opposing views. The slogan about the "four certainties", according to experts, just reflects these concerns.

After the 5th generation of Chinese leaders came to power in 2012, a clear “freeze” of the ideological sphere followed - both forces,

advocating further liberalization of the political atmosphere, as well as groups of publicists and political activists defending the “leftist perspective” of development, magazines and websites were closed, stricter requirements were put forward for the regulation of virtual space, individual dissidents and bloggers were arrested, certain dissidents and bloggers were removed from store shelves books. Many of China's so-called "public intellectuals", who gained notoriety in the previous period for their prominent media and Internet appearances, now prefer silence, although it is not entirely clear how long this situation will last.

One gets the feeling that after the congress, the so-called “red genes” of Xi Jinping, manifested in the call to “not forget those principles” (bu wang chu xin), with which the CCP created its power, and in a bizarre way combined with a completely liberal-oriented agenda days in the field of deepening economic reforms will show themselves with new ideas and initiatives, and Chinese intellectuals who are waiting for a turn towards "universal values" will have to shelve their hopes.

A week after the conclusion of the 19th Congress of the CPC, an important event was held to emphasize the immutability of the ultimate goals of the Communist Party of China. Accompanied by all members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the Central Committee, General Secretary Xi Jinping arrived in Shanghai to visit the house-museum of the founding of the party.

Members of the Politburo Standing Committee, following Xi, repeated the oath of everyone joining the party, and it is curious that Xi spoke from memory, without any paper. “It is not difficult to memorize the oath of a party member,” Xi Jinping said that day, making a speech at the museum of the second half of the congress (it was held in Jiaxing on Nanhu Lake). "It's hard to keep all your life devoted to the ideas [with which a person joined the party]."

Yu.M. Galenovich. The CCP and its leadership continue to hold power in their hands. At the same time, nothing significant happens, if we talk about allowing

solve existing problems of political and economic reforms. Perhaps the situation could be characterized as a situation in which the tops cannot start and implement reforms, fearing to cause movements that will shake their power, and the bottoms do not want to rebel, risk their lives, preferring to endure until the tops themselves decompose and let go of power .

Judging by what was reported about the congress, it seems that there are no problems in the party and in the country. The congress was not devoted to real problems, their discussion. No solutions were offered.

The main concern of the leaders of the CCP is the preservation of power. Under normal circumstances, there would be no need to take measures to maximize the concentration of power in the hands of one leader. At one time, it was precisely the emergency situation, in fact, the transition to a kind of struggle against the CPSU (b)-USSR, the need to mobilize the party for this struggle that led to the creation of such a phenomenon as the emergence of "Chairman Mao". At present, in a similar situation, the need for the appearance of a "core" has arisen. The appearance of the term "core" or "chief representative" is a manifestation of a kind of weakness in the leadership of the ruling party, and indeed the weakness of the party itself, the abnormal situation in the party and in the country. There is no democracy in the CCP, no elections, no debate.

There are no elections in China, in the CCP. Real policy is determined, personnel issues are decided by the top leadership and the apparatus of the party. They represent the coordination of issues between groupings of leaders within the party.

In any case, there is no reason to talk about the real and real autocracy of Xi Jinping. Moreover, the main thing in the previous five years of Xi Jinping's activity is his efforts to gain a foothold in power. In fact, he has no real authority, and there is no general support either.

Although the situation in the country and in the party is such, there are so many problems that all, or most of the leaders of the party, found it necessary to strengthen at least

Xi Jinping's nominal first place in the party hierarchy. The party, its nomenklatura, needs this, obviously feeling that without it it will be impossible to firmly hold power in the country.

Judging by the report, the party members are invited to consider the following as the main goal: to tirelessly fight for the Chinese dream (Chinese dream, Chinese dreams, Chinese dream), that is, for the Great Revival of the Chinese Nation.

The main thing, the national idea is a revival. The Great Revival of the Nation of China. The nation and its revival are the key words and concepts. The nation is all Chinese both in China and on Earth. Rebirth is the achievement of a dominant position among all nations, in relation to all mankind.

The report at the CPC Congress, in a certain sense, seems to be an attempt, instead of Marxism with its emphasis on the class struggle, to propose some kind of universal concepts as an ideology: both as attitudes within China and as principles of China's foreign policy.

A.N. Karneev. Observers drew attention to the fact that despite the large-scale restrictive measures of the authorities, seeking to put an end to the growing polarization of Chinese society and public space, ideological camps criticizing the policies of the authorities both from the left and from the right continue to exist and try to periodically remind themselves of themselves, despite any measures. cleaning up the information space. One of these challenges for the authorities is the participation of a part of the population in events in memory of Mao Zedong that are not encouraged from above.

It is curious that at the congress and after the congress, the problems of the so-called "Chinese project" (foreign wenyan, another translation option is "Chinese solution") were put forward in the field of public discussion - the reincarnation of the theme of the "Chinese model" (foreign moshi), the discussion about which is actively conducted in China from 2009 to 2012. However, if in discussions about the "Chinese model" most of the participants unambiguously spoke out against the fact that

to export Chinese experience of successful adaptation to the processes of globalization, now the emphasis has slightly changed: the report said that “the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics, its theory, institutions, culture is constantly developing, .... which has provided countries wishing to accelerate own development and defend their sovereignty, new choices. “The Chinese project has its own cultural subjectivity, and this is the space of China's discourse. Going your own way means putting an end to the theory of Western-centrism, going beyond mindless copying, the narrow gauge of Western cultural hegemony, when “whatever you say, here is Ancient Greece, here is the Renaissance, and here is the Enlightenment”3.

E.N. Rumyantsev. The Charter of the Communist Party, approved at the congress, includes "Xi Jinping's ideas on the original Chinese socialism of the new era" among the so-called "guiding ideas" of the CCP. Such a decision in Beijing is justified by the merits of Xi Jinping in the development of "original Chinese socialism" after the 18th CPC Congress (2012), as well as the "grand" tasks of the party for decades to come, the complication of the international situation and the interests of "China's approach to the center of the world stage ". In practice, it means, in particular, that now speaking out against Xi Jinping will mean speaking out against the "party line." There is also a desire to place the current Chinese leader above Deng Xiaoping and at least on a par with Mao Zedong. One gets the impression that a part of the population of the PRC, especially the intelligentsia and representatives of a number of factions in the CPC, greeted the emergence of "Xi Jinping's ideas" without much enthusiasm.

A.V. Vinogradov. The 19th Congress of the CPC adopted several strategic decisions, the main of which was the renewal of the ideological doctrine. All predecessors of C

3 Cheng Meidong. Zhongguo fan'an de zhongguo tese (Chinese specificity of the "Chinese project"). http://csr.mos.gov.cn/content/2017-11/29/content56165.htm

Jinping as party leader contributed to the ideological and theoretical platform of the CPC. But if "Mao Zedong's ideas" and "Deng Xiaoping's theory" symbolized turning points in the development of theory, they were therefore defined as the result of combining the main provisions of Marxism-Leninism "with the specific practice of the Chinese revolution" or "with the practice of modern China and the characteristics of the era", respectively. Then the idea of the "triple representation" of the 3rd generation of leaders led by Chiang Tse-min and the "scientific concept of development" of the 4th generation led by Hu Jintao were only "the continuation and development of Marxism-Leninism, the ideas of Mao Zedong and the theory of Deng Xiaoping ", but not a new page. A clear trend towards a reduction in the theoretical contribution of the leaders of the CCP showed that, within the framework of existing views, further development of the theory is difficult and is possible only in the form of clarifications and additions.

Yu.M. Galenovich. Xi Jinping formally consolidated his position in power. China's problems remain: the gap between rich and poor people, between the regions of the country, the separation of the party from the people (primarily from the peasantry), the separation of the party's nomenklatura from its rank and file, the problem of private property, the problem of land ownership for peasants, the problem of self-affirmation and providing for their own rights for nationalities, the problem of political and economic freedom, the problem of trust in relations between people, the problem of the correlation of man, human personality, human dignity and the state, power, party, leader or "core", etc. There are other problems, these are: the problem of assessing the figures of Mao and Teng; in particular their policies towards our people and our country; the problem of assessing the history of the party, including the events of 1989 in China and the events on the border with us in 1969.

Ways to solve cardinal problems have not been found. The country remains with its problems in a state of inertia. The possibility of domestic political and domestic economic protests and explosions remains.

A.V. Vinogradov. The decline in growth rates and obsolescence of the former socio-economic model, as well as its negative social, environmental and other consequences, have put on the agenda the question of its replacement. Over the past 30 years, the main method of the CPC's activity has been the improvement and completion of economic and political mechanisms within the framework of the current course, and the main instrument is the institutionalization of positive changes. The obsolescence of the model predetermined that the possibilities for improvement and institutionalization have also been exhausted.

At the 19th Congress, the first after being elected General Secretary, Xi Jinping declared the entry of socialism with Chinese characteristics into a new era. According to the Marxist-Leninist tradition, when epochs change, old patterns go away and open the way for new ones. The implementation of the new democratic revolution and the beginning of the construction of socialism were inextricably linked with the "ideas of Mao Zedong"; the policy of reform and opening up and building a xiaokang society - with the theory of building socialism with Chinese characteristics of Deng Xiaoping. At the 19th Congress, it was stated that by 2020, China will complete the task of fully building a Xiaokang society. The question arose: what next?

From the very beginning, Xi Jinping set a new historical landmark - the "great rebirth of the Chinese nation", that is, the completion of socialist modernization and becoming one of the first powers in the world. Since the revival of China as a world leader is not yet possible in all respects, first of all, it was necessary to re-formulate the development goals and propose a new ideological and theoretical structure, successive from the previous one.

In Marxism, the characterization of an epoch is the starting point of historical analysis, the result of which could be a whole series of no less fundamental changes. Thus, the theoretical scheme of the report was predetermined: the construction of socialism with Chinese characteristics in China entered a new era, a new era

lags the emergence of a new main contradiction, the solution of which is described by the new guiding ideology.

To understand the mechanism of development, the central place in this scheme is occupied by the main contradiction. The previous change of the main contradiction from the class struggle to the economic one marked the end of the "cultural revolution" and the beginning of the reform phase. In the Charter of the CPC at the 12th Congress, the main contradiction was recorded - "the contradiction between the growing material and cultural needs of the people and backward social production." At the 19th Congress, a new basic contradiction of Chinese society was proclaimed - "the contradiction between the constantly growing needs of the people for a wonderful life and uneven and incomplete development."

In keeping with the old controversy, the main focus of the CCP was economic growth. The negative environmental and social impacts and the impossibility of increasing domestic consumption to world-leading levels have been taken into account in the new wording. It inevitably leads to a shift in priority from economic growth to quality improvement, i.e. to solve social problems by improving social relations and public administration.

The ideological and theoretical innovations were not limited to this. To achieve the goal of the second 100th anniversary in 2049, 2 stages were identified. The first is the implementation of mainly socialist modernization by 2035, which was previously planned for the middle of the 21st century, and the second, completely new, is the complete implementation of socialist modernization, which obviously implies the elimination of the negative consequences of the previous stage of economic development. The next 3 years will thus be a transitional period from one task to another. Its completion will be the main content of the report of the current generation, which has achieved the goal of completely building a xiaokang society and has already proclaimed new strategic goals corresponding in scale to those achieved. In this

In connection with this, attention is drawn to the use by Xi Jinping in the final paragraph of his speech of another position of traditional Chinese philosophy - “tian xia wei gong”.

As a result, the CCP has a new theoretical platform, which means that the old era, the era of Deng Xiaoping, is ending. It is this theoretical innovation that opens up wide opportunities for making changes in the economy, domestic and foreign policy, the specific content of which has yet to be determined.

There are already definite indications of the direction in which the course and policy of the CCP will change. In order to maintain the pace of economic growth, China needs to develop a new foreign policy strategy, counteract the tendencies to curb and limit economic globalization, which has become a key element of its economic success, and to do this, take a leading role in its promotion, not focus on contradictions in the world, but seek and create areas of cooperation. Unlike the previous congress, the report of the Central Committee did not find a place for the SCO and BRICS, which emphasized the division of the world at the global level, and clearly gave priority to other Chinese foreign policy initiatives - the idea of a community with a common destiny for mankind at the global level and the One Belt, One Road initiative at the regional level. , which were also fixed in the Charter of the CPC.

E.N. Rumyantsev. The first five years of Xi Jinping's rule were for him, first of all, a period of struggle to maintain and strengthen his power. Accordingly, this was the main task of the congress. The composition of the new governing bodies of the party and the inclusion in the Charter of the CPC of the provision on "Xi Jinping's ideas on the original Chinese socialism of the new era" indicate that this task has been basically solved.

Despite various projects for the reorganization of the supreme bodies of the party, information about which was leaked to the Hong Kong press in the period preceding the congress, their structure was preserved. The number of Politburo of the CPC Central Committee remained the same

(25 people) and its Standing Committee (7 people, of which 5 are new). The number of secretaries of the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee has been increased from 5 to 7 (6 are new). The size of the CPC Central Military Council has been reduced from 11 to 7 people. The 19th CPC Central Committee elected 204 members, of which 126 were elected for the first time. 172 candidate members of the CPC Central Committee and 133 members of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection were also elected.

Of the 376 members and candidate members of the 18th CPC Central Committee, 38 (about 10%) were purged.

According to the Brookings Institution experts, the 19th CPC Central Committee was renewed by 67.3% (compare: 50.6% at the 16th Congress in 2002 and 48.7% at the 18th Congress in 2012) . The average age of members and candidate members of the Central Committee of the 19th convocation is 57 years, 0.9 years more than five years ago. The youngest in composition over the past 50 years was the 17th CPC Central Committee (2007). The average age of its members and candidate members was 53.5 years. In terms of age, the Central Committee of the 19th convocation is the oldest in the last thirty years. It has only 28 members and candidate members under the age of 53. There were 71 of them in the Central Committee of the CPC of the 18th convocation, and 96 in the Central Committee of the 17th convocation.

The two youngest members of the Central Committee of the 19th convocation are candidate members of the Central Committee Tsai Sung-tao (43 years old) - Secretary of the Party Committee of Lankao County, Prov. Henan, and Zhou Qi (47), director of the Institute of Zoology of the Chinese Academy of Sciences. These cadres symbolize two of Xi Jinping's most important policies: poverty alleviation and innovation.

According to a number of foreign experts, Xi Jinping "broke the system of promotion of cadres that had developed over the past 20 years by introducing a large number of his supporters into the 19th CPC Central Committee." The same applies to the new composition of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee, in which 11 out of 25 members are his countrymen, classmates or worked under his supervision.

The "Komsomol" faction fell into disgrace. In 2013, during a meeting with the leadership of the KSMK, Xi Jinping lashed out at them for "not going to

keeping up with the times”, for “bureaucracy”, “arrogance”, “losing ties with the youth”. In 2016, the leadership of the KSMK was criticized by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection of the CPC Central Committee. Some KSMK cadres were accused of considering themselves "political aristocrats". Thus, the line of personnel rejuvenation initiated by Deng Xiaoping in the early 1980s is no longer a priority for the CCP leadership.

The current members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee are Xi Jinping, Li Keqiang, Li Zhanshu, Wang Yang, Wang Huning, Zhao Leji, Han Zheng. The posts of members of the Political Bureau Standing Committee (PCP) of the CPC Central Committee on the state line, according to existing practice, will be finally agreed at the plenum of the CPC Central Committee and officially approved at the sessions of the National People's Congress (NPC) and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Council (CPPCC) in March 2018 .

In terms of the balance of power between intra-party factions, the composition of the Politburo Standing Committee is as follows: out of seven members, two (Li Keqiang and Wang Yang) represent the "Komsomol" group, Han Zheng is Jiang Zemin's group, and Wang Huning is a party theorist who worked in the Central Committee party under three general secretaries. The closest to Xi Jinping are Li Zhanshu and Zhao Leji. Li Keqiang appears to have largely succumbed to Xi Jinping's influence. Wang Yang also managed to earn some confidence from the Chairman. He was co-chair of the Sino-US Strategic and Economic Dialogue. In addition, as vice premier, Wang oversees the anti-poverty program, which is a priority for Xi Jinping because of his personal prestige. Jiangzemin Han Zheng, according to some estimates, will most likely be relegated to the background.

At the same time, the successor to the current Chinese leader is not visible among the above-mentioned persons. Thus, Xi Jinping eliminated an important "party

institution”, namely the appointment of a successor to the current supreme leader through the generation that has existed in the CCP since 1997. This once again confirms that there is in fact no system of planned change of leaders in the PRC and the CPC.

Supporters of Xi Jinping now dominate the leadership of key departments of the CPC Central Committee apparatus. The positions of head of the Chancellery, heads of departments of propaganda, organizational, international relations are now occupied by Ding Xuexiang, Huang Kunming, Chen Xi (all members of the Politburo of the Central Committee) and Song Tao devoted to him.

Thus, the analysis indicates a sharp weakening of the positions of the "Komsomol" and Jiangzemin groups. It is also noteworthy that over the past five years in the CCP, a group of representatives of the so-called "party of heirs to the throne" has been removed from power and practically lost influence on the top leadership.

In the next five years, Xi Jinping's leadership position in the party and the state, at first glance, seems secure. At the same time, the activities of Xi Jinping and his entourage in the first five years of being in power give reason to believe that there will most likely be no significant political and economic reforms in the party and the country in the coming years, although life may force them to be taken seriously. An "assertive" foreign policy will be pursued, and China's military buildup program will be implemented. Inside the country, further tightening of policy towards the media, dissidents and human rights activists, Xinjiang and Tibet is not ruled out.

K.A. Efremov. In his keynote speech on 10/18/2017, Xi Jinping focused on two points that are directly related to the Southeast Asian region: these are paragraph 10 "Steady on the path of strengthening the army with Chinese characteristics, comprehensively stimulate the modernization of national defense and the army" and paragraph 12 " Invariably follow the path of peaceful development, stimulate the creation of a community of a common destiny for mankind.” These two points set the main contours of the relationship

relations between Beijing and its neighbors in the near future and deserve special consideration.

On issues related to defense and army building, Xi Jinping stressed the invariability of the course towards creating a powerful modernized armed forces "with Chinese characteristics." The Chairman of the Military Council of the CPC Central Committee set the goal of "basically modernizing the national defense and army by 2035, and fully transforming the Chinese people's army into a world-class advanced military force by the middle of this century." At the same time, "the army must always be ready for battle," one should "deploy military training, simulating a real war." These words sound very disturbing, given that they were said after the mention of Chinese economic activity on the islands and reefs in the South China Sea, which are the subject of territorial disputes between China and the ASEAN countries (Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei).

At the same time, Xi Jinping's report contains a reference to the "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence" first put forward by Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai in December 1953 and included in the 1982 PRC Constitution. These principles - mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, peaceful coexistence - were enshrined in the Sino-Indian Agreement on Tibet and the Sino-Burmese Declaration (June

1954), and then entered the final document of the Bandung Conference (April

1955). Thus, they are the fundamental principles that guide China in building relations with the countries of Southeast Asia (and with the outside world in general).

The idea of a “community with a common destiny for mankind” is certainly a key one in understanding the global claims of China, positioning itself as a country that, under the leadership of the Communist Party, “fights for the happiness of the people and the progress of [all] humankind.”

honors". At the same time, Xi Jinping explicitly stated that "China will in no case sacrifice the interests of other countries for the sake of its own development, and under no circumstances will it give up its legitimate rights and interests"*. A natural question arises, how will China behave if, in order to exercise its “legitimate rights and interests”, it has to sacrifice the interests of other countries, including the countries of Southeast Asia? This question remains open.

In general, Southeast Asian countries have no illusions about China's true intentions towards their region. Despite the words that “no matter what level China has reached in its development, it will never claim the position of hegemon, will never pursue a policy of expansion”, Southeast Asia is traditionally considered by Beijing strategists as a special, geopolitically significant zone priority Chinese interests. First of all, this concerns Myanmar, through which China is trying to get access to the Indian Ocean, bypassing the narrow Strait of Malacca. "Soft" pressure from Beijing is a reality in which the ASEAN countries have to live and which they are forced to put up with in one way or another.

In this context, the Belt and Road Initiative is the “carrot” that China offers to the countries of Southeast Asia in exchange for their willingness to listen to Chinese interests. As part of this initiative, the states of the region can count on investments in the construction of energy and infrastructure projects, transport and economic corridors that will allow them to solve their own problems. At the same time, Chinese patronage often results in Chinese dominance in the economies of these countries, which causes the inevitable growth of nationalist sentiments among the Southeast Asian elites.

In conclusion, it should be noted that the 19th Congress of the CPC did not fundamentally change China's policy towards the Southeast Asian region, since the idea of "Economic

of the Silk Road Corridor” and “The Maritime Silk Road of the 21st Century” has been expressed since the autumn of 2013 (it is characteristic that Xi Jinping first voiced it while on a visit to Indonesia). In addition, China and ASEAN are linked by a common free trade area (since 2010) and smaller economic cooperation projects (for example, in the Greater Mekong subregion). The interests of China and these countries are so closely interconnected that, despite objective contradictions (such as dissatisfaction with the “creeping” Chinese expansion and territorial disputes), their relations can be safely described as “benevolent and partner-like”. There is every reason to believe that they will remain so in the future.

HELL. Resurrection. Let me summarize the most important points of the discussion. Firstly, at the 19th Congress of the CPC, in contrast to the previously adopted system of transferring collective leadership, the next generation of leaders of the PRC was not selected and designated, and a large number of Xi Jinping's colleagues who worked with him earlier in various provinces were introduced into the Politburo. In this regard, it is important to note the high intensity of propaganda in various spheres of the PRC's social life during and after the congress. This propaganda reinforces the message of Xi's report that his report heralds the achievement of a new stage in China's development, when the country is more actively involved in the formation of a new world order. At the same time, there is a contradiction between the fact that China, on the one hand, positions itself as a defender of the world order, and, on the other hand, calls for reforming global governance.

Secondly, judging by the report, the country's leadership apparently considers China to be a fully developed country, and that is why the materials of the congress focus on foreign policy interaction with developing and neighboring countries.

Thirdly, there was a consolidation of the CCP around Xi Jinping under the banner of the Chinese dream, which was largely made possible thanks to the active anti-corruption campaign in the country. Against this background, the President of the People's Republic of China appears as a great leader.

on a par with leaders like Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, in contrast to the weaker leaders of the previous two generations.

Fourth, the economic agenda of the congress demonstrated an understanding of the challenges facing China and the need for structural reforms in the economy. The role of the market is put in the first place, and the emphasis is shifted from the pace to the quality of economic growth. The need to improve property rights, the market for production factors, macrocontrol to overcome financial risks, etc. is noted. Apparently, the key issue for the success of the proclaimed policy will still be the real results of socio-economic reforms.

Fifth, the CCP and the party nomenklatura continue to concentrate power in their hands, and the party lacks the institutions of elections, democracy, and discussion. At the same time, there is a group of party members within the CCP who oppose the excessive concentration of power in the hands of Xi Jinping and believe that the current level of propaganda is excessive.

In this regard, it can be said without exaggeration that China is currently a strong state that pursues an active foreign policy, which means that relations with China are one of the most important for Russia's foreign policy. To understand the socio-political processes taking place in China, it is important to participate in discussions and expert discussions both at the Russian and international levels, and therefore, the importance of expert support for decisions is increasing.

The material was prepared by A.D. Voskresensky

Prepared by Alexei D. Voskressenski