Plan for a lightning war against the USSR (Plan Barbarossa). Lightning War

In the early 40s of the twentieth century, the main leadership of Germany tried to develop its own unique plan to capture Soviet Union. What made the idea unique was its time frame. It was assumed that the capture would last no more than five months. To development of this document They approached it very responsibly; not only Hitler himself worked on it, but also his inner circle. Everyone understood that if they did not quickly occupy the territory of a huge state and stabilize the situation in their favor, many adverse consequences could occur. Hitler clearly understood that he had already begun the Second World War and quite successfully, however, in order to achieve all the intended goals, it was necessary to attract maximum resources, including mental ones. In the event of a failure in the plan, the Union can be provided with various assistance by other countries that are not interested in the victory of Nazi Germany. Fuhrer understood that the defeat of the USSR would enable Germany's ally to completely free its hands in Asia and prevent the insidious United States of America from intervening.
The European continent was firmly concentrated in the hands of Adolf, but he wanted more. Moreover, he understood perfectly well that the USSR was not a powerful enough country (yet) and I. Stalin would not be able to openly oppose Germany, but he had interests in Europe and, in order to eliminate any attempts, it was necessary to eliminate an undesirable rival in the future.

Adolf Hitler planned to end the war against the Soviet Union even before he could end the war he started against Great Britain. This was going to be the fastest company of all time to conquer a huge territory in such a short time. German ground forces were planned to be sent to conduct combat operations. The Air Force will be required to fully provide any necessary support to cover and protect its warfighters. Any actions that are planned to be carried out on the territory of the Soviet Union must be fully coordinated with the command and must not interfere with established interests in capturing Great Britain.
It was said that all large-scale actions aimed at carefully preparing a lightning takeover against the USSR should be carefully disguised so that the enemy could not find out about them and not take any countermeasures.

Hitler's main mistakes

Many historians, who have been studying for several decades the situation with the development and implementation of the plan for the instant capture of the Union, come to one single thought - regarding the adventurousness and meaninglessness of this idea. The fascist generals also assessed the plan. They considered it his main, one might say fatal, mistake - the Fuhrer’s keen desire to occupy the territory of the country of the Soviets until the final end of the war with England.
Hitler wanted to take action in the fall of 1940, but his military leaders were able to dissuade him from this crazy idea, citing a lot of convincing arguments. The events described suggest that Hitler had an obsessive manic idea of ​​​​establishing complete world domination and the crushing and intoxicating victory in Europe did not give him the opportunity to thoughtfully make some of the most important strategic decisions.
The second, most important, according to historians, mistake in the plan was that it was constantly retreated from. Hitler changed his instructions several times, causing valuable time to be lost. Although he surrounded himself with excellent commanders, whose advice would help him achieve what he wanted and conquer the territory of the country of the Soviets. However, they were opposed by the personal ambitions of the dictator, which were higher for the Fuhrer than common sense.
In addition, an important mistake of the Fuhrer is the involvement of only part of the combat-ready divisions. If all possible forces had been used, the consequences of the war could have been completely different, and history would have been written completely differently now. At the time of the offensive, some of the combat-ready divisions were in Great Britain, as well as North Africa.

Hitler's main idea regarding the lightning speed of the plan

He believed that the important point was the ability to defeat ground forces through active tank attacks. Adolf saw the purpose of the operation exclusively as division existing Russia into two parts along the Volga and Arkhangelsk. This would allow him to leave the main industrial region of the country in operation, but have full control over it, and also create an unprecedented shield dividing the country into European and Asian parts.
In addition, the first priority was to deprive the Baltic Fleet of its bases, which would allow the Germans to exclude Russian participation in the battles.
Directions were given for complete secrecy regarding future acts of conquest. Only a certain circle of people were privy to this. They were charged with coordinating actions to prepare for the invasion without unnecessary dissemination of information. It got to the point that I was closely involved in preparation the whole country, but what exactly was going to happen and what exactly the tasks were set for the fascist army, only a few knew.

Bottom line

The plan failed. In fact, this happened with Hitler's consent when he began to retreat from his intended goals. For the entire Russian people, this is a huge plus; we don’t know how we would live now if the legendary plan for the instant conquest of Russia, created in the fortieth year of the twentieth century, became successful and achieved all its goals. One can only rejoice that the commanders-in-chief by German troops made several cardinal mistakes that did not allow him to achieve world domination and establish his ideology throughout the globe.

A catastrophic start. On June 22, 1941, without a declaration of war, Nazi Germany troops invaded Soviet territory. The most difficult and bloody war in the history of our Fatherland has begun. At 4 o'clock in the morning, German aircraft began to bomb Soviet cities - Smolensk, Kyiv, Zhitomir, Murmansk, Riga, Kaunas, Liepaja, military bases (Kronstadt, Sevastopol, Izmail), railway tracks and bridges. On the first day of the war, 66 airfields and 1,200 aircraft were destroyed, of which 800 were on the ground. By the end of June 22, enemy groups had advanced to a depth of 50–60 km.

Stalin's mistakes and miscalculations regarding the timing and location of the German invasion allowed the aggressor to gain significant advantages. According to the defense plan state border USSR, developed and approved by the government in February 1941, mobilization activities were launched during May-June. About 2,500 reinforced concrete structures were built in the border areas, and the network of military airfields expanded. In the second half of May - early June, the movement of troops from the internal military districts began with the aim of bringing them closer to the western border. However, by the time the Germans attacked, the strategic deployment of troops had not been completed. To G.K. Zhukov’s repeated proposals to bring the border troops to a state of combat readiness, Stalin stubbornly refused. Only on the evening of June 21, having received a message from a defector that at dawn German troops would launch an attack on the USSR, the High Command sent Directive No. l to the border districts to bring troops to a state of combat readiness. As evidenced by the analysis of this directive, it was drawn up unprofessionally, did not give specific instructions to the troops and allowed for ambiguous interpretation of individual points, which was unacceptable in combat conditions. In addition, the directive was delivered to the troops very late: some border districts, which took the first blows from the enemy, never received it.

On the eve of the attack, Hitler's Germany and its allies concentrated 190 divisions (5.5 million people), almost 4 thousand tanks, 5 thousand combat aircraft, and over 47 thousand guns and mortars along the borders of the Soviet Union.

The military potential of the Red Army, in principle, was not much lower than the German one. 170 divisions (2.9 million people) were concentrated in the western border military districts. By the number of military equipment, armored vehicles and aircraft Soviet troops were not inferior to the German ones, but a significant part of the tanks, and especially the aircraft, were of outdated types, new weapons were just being mastered by personnel, many tank and aviation formations were at the stage of formation. The lack of understanding of the scale of the German invasion by the Soviet command, and primarily Stalin, is evidenced by the second directive sent to the troops at 7 a.m. on June 22: “The troops are to attack enemy forces with all their might and means and destroy them in areas where they violated the Soviet border " Stalin’s note “From now on, until further notice, ground troops will not cross the border” indicated that Stalin still thought that war could be avoided. This directive, like Directive No. 1, was drawn up unprofessionally and hastily, which once again indicates that the Soviet command did not have clear plans in case of forced defense.

On June 22, Molotov made a radio call to repel the aggressor. Stalin's speech took place only on July 3.

Resistance to the aggressor. The fascist command organized an offensive in three strategic directions: Leningrad, Moscow and Kiev. The Soviet command was waiting main blow in the southwest, but Hitler struck it in the center, in a western direction. The Germans' advance in all directions, contrary to their expectations, was accompanied by fierce fighting. From the very beginning of the war, Soviet troops put up serious resistance to the enemy. For the first time since 1939, the Germans began to suffer significant losses.

A striking manifestation of the heroism and courage of our soldiers and officers in initial stage war was the defense of the Brest Fortress. Its garrison under the command of Major P. M. Gavrilov held back attacks from superior enemy forces for more than a month.

On June 23, soldiers of the 99th Infantry Division knocked out the Germans from Przemysl with a counterattack and held the city for 5 days. In the very first battles, the 1st Artillery Anti-Tank Brigade, which consisted mainly of young Muscovites, destroyed 42 tanks of General Kleist’s group. On June 23, the division of Colonel I. D. Chernyakhovsky completely destroyed the motorized regiment of the 4th Panzer Group of General Hepner. There were many such examples.

But despite the massive heroism and self-sacrifice of Soviet soldiers, the results of the initial stage of the war were catastrophic for the Red Army. By mid-July 1941, fascist troops captured Latvia, Lithuania, a significant part of Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova, the cities of Pskov, Lvov, and a huge number of military personnel were captured.

A terrible tragedy took place near Minsk. Here, by July 9, the Germans managed to encircle almost 30 Soviet divisions. Minsk was abandoned in battle, 323 thousand Soviet soldiers and officers were captured, the losses of the Western Front amounted to 418 thousand people. Stalin blamed the commander of the Western Front, D. G. Pavlov, and a number of other military leaders for this defeat. All of them were shot by the Supreme Court on July 22, 1941 on charges of cowardice (rehabilitated in 1956). The flywheel of repression did not stop even with the start of the war. On August 16, 1941, during the retreat of the Soviet troops, Stalin issued order No. 270, according to which deserters from command personnel should be “shot on the spot,” and those who were surrounded should not surrender and fight to the last bullet. Stalin's accusations of desertion of military leaders were largely unfounded, nevertheless, only from July 1941 to March 1942, 30 generals were shot (all also rehabilitated).

The repressive policy also affected the civilian population. In August 1941, Soviet Germans (about 1.5 million people) were deported to Siberia and Kazakhstan and most of them were sent to the labor army. In September 1941, 170 political prisoners were shot in the Oryol prison, among whom were famous revolutionaries Kh. Rakovsky and M. Spiridonova. A special meeting of the NKVD continued to pass sentences in large numbers without trial or investigation. Spreading false rumors was punishable imprisonment from 2 to 5 years.

In these harsh conditions The Soviet people managed to unite against a common enemy - fascism - and showed their heroic character.

The occupation of a significant part of Soviet territory was assessed by the Nazi command as a decisive success in the war, but the Red Army turned out to be much stronger than the fascist strategists expected. Soviet troops not only defended themselves, but also struck back at the enemy.

Advancing towards Moscow, the enemy encountered fierce resistance during the capture of Smolensk. The Battle of Smolensk lasted two months (from July 10 to September 10, 1941). During the battle, the Soviet command used the famous Katyushas for the first time. Rocket launchers under the command of Captain I.A. Flerov struck the enemy in the Orsha area, and then Rudnya and Yelnya. In bloody battles, Soviet soldiers and commanders showed true heroism. On July 30, the Germans were forced to go on the defensive for the first time. On September 5, 1941, troops of the Reserve Front formed on July 30 under the command of G.K. Zhukov broke through the enemy’s defenses during a counteroffensive and liberated Yelnya. The enemy lost several divisions (more than 50 thousand soldiers). For their distinction in the Elninsky operation, the four best rifle divisions were the first in the Red Army to receive the rank of guards.

During the battles near Smolensk from August 9 to 10, 1941, the air division under the command of M.V. Vodopyanov on heavy Pe-8 aircraft, having made a heroic and most dangerous flight, bombed Berlin for the first time.

The battle near Smolensk allowed the Soviet command to gain time to prepare the defense of Moscow. On September 10, the enemy was stopped 300 km from Moscow. Hitler's “blitzkrieg” was dealt a serious blow.

Organizational events. The beginning of the war is the most tragic pages history of the Great Patriotic War. By mid-July 1941, out of 170 Soviet divisions, 28 were completely defeated, 70 divisions lost over 50% of their personnel and equipment. The troops of the Western Front suffered especially heavy losses.

German troops, having advanced 300–500 km into the interior of the country over several weeks of fighting in different directions, captured the territory where almost 2/3 of industrial and agricultural products were produced before the war. About 23 million fell into occupation Soviet people. By the end of 1941 total number prisoners of war reached 3.9 million people.

In the very first days of the war, the country's leadership took a number of measures to organize resistance to the enemy: general mobilization was announced, and the Headquarters of the Main Command of the Armed Forces of the USSR was created. In a secret directive dated June 29, 1941, the country's leadership spoke for the first time about the scale of military defeats to party and Soviet organizations in the front-line regions. The directive contained a strict requirement to defend every inch of Soviet land, to leave nothing to the enemy during a forced retreat, to destroy valuable property that cannot be taken out, to organize partisan detachments and sabotage groups in the occupied territory, and to create unbearable conditions for the enemy.

The Soviet totalitarian system, ineffective in peaceful conditions, turned out to be more effective in wartime conditions. Its mobilization capabilities, multiplied during the Great Patriotic War by patriotism and sacrifice Soviet people, played an important role in organizing resistance to the enemy, especially at the initial stage of the war.

The call “Everything for the front, everything for victory!” was accepted by all the people. Hundreds of thousands of Soviet citizens voluntarily joined the active army. In the week since the start of the war, over 5 million people were mobilized.

June 30, 1941 was created State Committee Defense (GKO) – extraordinary highest government agency USSR led by J.V. Stalin. The State Defense Committee concentrated all power in the country during the war. Much attention was paid to military-economic work. A week after the start of the war, the “Mobilization Plan” for the third quarter of 1941 was adopted. By the Decree of the State Defense Committee of July 4, 1941, the development of a military-economic plan for the use of resources and the development of enterprises relocated to the eastern regions of the country began. Throughout the war, quarterly and monthly plans for military economic work were drawn up.

From the very first days of the war, all industrial and scientific institutions Countries have begun to restructure their work to meet defense needs. During the wartime period, the entire working population of cities was mobilized to work in production and construction. Decree “On the working hours of workers and employees in war time» of June 26, 1941, a working day of 11 hours was established, mandatory overtime was introduced, and vacations were abolished. In the fall of 1941, a card system for distributing food among the population was reintroduced.

An important part of creating a military economy was the movement of industrial enterprises, equipment, material and cultural assets to the rear. In just the first six months, over 1,500 large industrial enterprises were relocated from areas threatened by occupation, and many were evacuated educational establishments, research institutes, libraries, museums, theaters. More than 10 million people were sent to the east of the country (according to some sources, 17 million people). The deployment of the military-industrial base in the eastern regions of the country took place under extremely difficult conditions. In the rear, people worked around the clock, often under open air, in severe frosts.

By mid-1942, the restructuring of the economy on a war footing was largely completed. The eastern regions of the country became the main arsenal of the front and the main production base of the country.

Defensive battles of the summer-autumn 1941 The outcome of the entire Great Patriotic War was seriously influenced by the defensive battles waged by the Red Army in the summer and autumn of 1941. Hitler’s strategic failures near Smolensk forced him to change the direction of the main attack and direct it from the center to the south - to Kyiv, Donbass, Rostov. Significant forces were concentrated near Kiev from both the German and Soviet sides. Together with the personnel units, militias and residents of Kyiv heroically fought against the fascists. However, the Germans managed to enter the rear of the 6th and 12th armies and encircle them. For almost a whole week, Soviet soldiers and officers offered heroic resistance. Trying to save the army, the commander of the Southwestern Front, Marshal S. M. Budyonny, asked Headquarters for permission to leave Kyiv, but Stalin was against it. Only on September 18 such permission was given, but the situation worsened so much that few managed to escape the encirclement. In fact, both armies were lost. With the enemy's capture of Kyiv, the road to Moscow through Bryansk and Orel was opened.

At the same time, the Germans were attacking Odessa, an important base of the Black Sea Fleet. The legendary defense of Odessa lasted more than two months. The Red Army soldiers, sailors and city residents became a single combat garrison and successfully repelled the onslaught of several Romanian divisions. Only on October 16, in connection with the threat of the seizure of Crimea by order of the Supreme High Command, the defenders of Odessa left the city. A significant part of the participants in the defense of Odessa was transferred to Sevastopol.

on his defensive lines The soldiers of the Primorsky Army (commander General I.E. Petrov) and the sailors of the Black Sea Fleet, led by Vice Admiral F.S. Oktyabrsky, destroyed almost as much enemy manpower as the Nazi army lost in all theaters of combat before the attack on the USSR. The enemy tried more than once to take the city by storm, but Sevastopol stood unshakable.

Army Group North, having captured Pskov on July 9, advanced close to Leningrad. His fall, according to the plans of the German command, should have preceded the capture of Moscow. However, despite repeated attempts, the Germans and the Finns working together with them failed to take the city. On September 8, 1941, the 900-day siege of Leningrad began. For 611 days the city was subjected to intense artillery shelling and bombing. The blockade put its defenders in an extremely difficult position. Daily norm bread in November-December 1941 was 250 for workers, 125 for employees and dependents. About a million residents of Leningrad died from hunger, cold, bombing and shelling. To connect the city with the mainland, an ice route was built across Lake Ladoga, called by Leningraders the “Road of Life”.

Despite the occupation of a significant part of the western regions of the country, the German army did not achieve decisive successes in any of the three main strategic directions of the offensive.

Failure of Operation Typhoon. After the capture of Kyiv, the Nazi General Staff began to develop new operation for the capture of Moscow, called “Typhoon”. On September 30, 1941, after some calm that occurred on the Central Front after the Battle of Smolensk, a new offensive by enemy troops began. The tank army of the German General Guderian directed an attack along the Orel-Tula-Moscow line and captured Orel and Bryansk.

In accordance with the Typhoon plan, the enemy concentrated 1.8 million soldiers and officers and a significant amount of military equipment in the Moscow direction, creating a numerical superiority over Soviet troops. Despite the heroic resistance of the Red Army, during the offensive the fascists managed to capture the cities of Vyazma, Mozhaisk, Kalinin and Maloyaroslavets and came within 80–100 km of Moscow. Hitler’s directive stated: “The city must be surrounded so that not a single Russian soldier, not a single inhabitant - be it a man, woman or child - can leave it. Suppress any attempt to leave by force. Make the necessary preparations so that Moscow and its surroundings are flooded with water using huge structures. Where Moscow stands today, a sea must appear that will forever hide the capital of the Russian people from the civilized world.”

At the beginning of October, the situation became critical: as a result of the encirclement of five Soviet armies, the path to Moscow was practically open. The Soviet command took a number of urgent measures. On October 12, the Western Front was created under the command of General G.K. Zhukov, and the armies of the Reserve Front were also transferred to it. Particularly fierce fighting in the Moscow direction flared up in mid-October. On October 15, 1941, the State Defense Committee decided to evacuate part of the government and party institutions, the diplomatic corps to the city of Kuibyshev and prepare for the destruction of 1,119 industrial enterprises and facilities in Moscow and the region. Stalin was supposed to be evacuated. Under the influence of rumors about the surrender of Moscow on October 16, panic arose in the capital. Subsequently, according to contemporaries, the words “man of October 16” became synonymous with shameful behavior and cowardice. Three days later, the panic was stopped by the order of Stalin, who remained in the Kremlin. Tough measures were taken against cowards, alarmists, and looters, including execution. A state of siege was declared in Moscow.

The whole country rose to defend the capital. Trains with reinforcements, weapons, and ammunition from Siberia, the Urals, the Far East, and Central Asia were rushing to Moscow. 50 thousand militia fighters came to the aid of the front.

The defenders of Tula made an invaluable contribution to the defense of Moscow. Guderian's army was unable to take the city and was stopped by the heroic actions of the defenders of Tula. Moscow was also reliably protected from air attack. Defending the skies of Moscow, pilot V.V. Talalikhin was one of the first to use a night air ram.

As a result of the measures taken, the Nazi offensive was stopped at the end of October and beginning of November. Operation Typhoon failed. On November 6, in Moscow, in the hall of the Mayakovskaya metro station, a ceremonial meeting was held dedicated to the 24th anniversary of the October Revolution, at which I.V. Stalin made a speech. On November 7, 1941, a traditional military parade took place on Red Square, after which the troops immediately went to the front. All these events were of great importance for maintaining the morale of Soviet soldiers.

By mid-November, German troops launched a new offensive against Moscow. 51 divisions took part in it, including 13 tank and 7 motorized divisions, armed with 1.5 thousand tanks and 3 thousand guns. They were supported by 700 aircraft. The Western Front, holding back the offensive, at that time already had more divisions than the enemy, and was 1.5 times larger than German aviation in the number of aircraft.

As a result of the offensive, the Germans managed to capture Klin, Solnechnogorsk, Kryukovo, Yakhroma, Istra and approach Moscow within 25–30 km. The fighting was especially stubborn in the defense zone of the 16th Army (commander - General K.K. Rokossovsky) in the Istra region. A group of tank destroyers from the 316th Infantry Division of General I.V. Panfilov stood to their death. He himself died in battle on November 18. Through heroic efforts Nazi troops were stopped almost at the walls of the capital.

Counter-offensive of Soviet troops near Moscow. At the beginning of December 1941, the Soviet command, in secrecy, was preparing a counteroffensive near Moscow. Such an operation became possible after the formation of ten reserve armies in the rear and a change in the balance of forces. The enemy retained superiority in the number of troops, artillery and tanks, but it was no longer overwhelming.

In early December, the Germans launched another attack on Moscow, but during the attack on December 5–6, Soviet troops launched a counteroffensive along the entire front, from Kalinin to Yelets. It was attended by troops of three fronts - Western (under the command of G.K. Zhukov), Kalinin (under the command of I.S. Konev) and South-Western (under the command of S.K. Timoshenko). This offensive was a complete surprise for the German command. It was unable to repel the powerful attacks of the Red Army. By the beginning of January 1942, Soviet troops pushed the Nazis back from Moscow 100–250 km. The winter offensive of the Red Army continued until April 1942. As a result, the Moscow and Tula regions, many areas of the Smolensk, Kalinin, Ryazan and Oryol regions were completely liberated.

The “blitzkrieg” strategy finally collapsed near Moscow. The failure of the attack on Moscow prevented Japan and Turkey from entering the war on the German side. The victory of the Red Army pushed the USA and England to create an anti-Hitler coalition.

In post-Soviet Russia, it has become fashionable to trample on old conclusions and opinions; the liberal fad also affected Soviet-Japanese relations during the Second World War.

Despite the conclusions of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, which summed up the foreign policy of Imperial Japan towards the USSR: “The Tribunal considers that an aggressive war against the USSR was foreseen and planned by Japan... that it was one of the main elements of Japanese national policy and that its goal was to seize the territories of the USSR...", current liberal publicists and modern Japanese historians are trying to refute this conclusion.

Even the carefully developed and begun implementation of the plan of aggression against the Union - "Kantokuen" ("Special Maneuvers of the Kwantung Army") - is being tried to be presented as a purely defensive plan adopted to protect against attack by Soviet troops.

Although Japan has published a whole layer of previously secret documents of imperial meetings, the coordination committee of the imperial headquarters and the government, the General Staff and the Main Naval Staff, and other bodies of state and military leadership, which confirm the conclusions of the International Military Tribunal.

Lightning War in Japanese

At the meeting of the imperial conference held on July 2, 1941, the Japanese leadership took a course towards preparing a solution to the problem of the “North”: “Our attitude towards the German-Soviet war will be determined in accordance with the spirit Tripartite Pact(an alliance of three powers - Germany, Japan, Italy - S.A.). However, for now we will not interfere in this conflict. We will secretly strengthen our military preparations against the Soviet Union, maintaining an independent position. During this time, we will conduct diplomatic negotiations with great caution. If the German-Soviet war develops in a direction favorable to our empire, we, by resorting to armed force, will resolve the northern problem and ensure the security of the northern borders."

With the adoption of this course, the Army General Staff and the Japanese War Ministry planned a whole system of measures aimed at quickly preparing the Kwantung Army to wage an offensive war in the Far East and Siberia. This plan was called "Kantokuen" in secret documents.

On July 11, 1941, the imperial headquarters sent a special directive numbered 506 to the Kwantung Army and other Japanese armies in Northern China. It confirmed that the purpose of the “maneuvers” was to prepare for an attack on the USSR. This plan was based on the development of the Japanese General Staff in 1940.

The essence of the strategic plan:

It was planned that a series of successive attacks by Japanese forces on the main directions would defeat the Red Army troops in Primorye, the Amur region and Transbaikalia and force them to capitulate; capture strategic military, industrial facilities, food bases and communications;

Much attention was paid to the Air Force; they were supposed to eliminate the Soviet Air Force in the first hours of the war with a surprise attack;

The task is to get to Baikal in 6 months and complete the main operation;

On July 5, they issued a directive from the high command, according to which they carried out the first stage of mobilization, increasing the Kwantung Army by 2 divisions (51st and 57th).

On July 7, the emperor authorized a secret conscription and conscription of half a million people into the armed forces, and ships with a tonnage of 800 thousand tons were also allocated for transporting military goods to Northern China. All events were carried out in the strictest secrecy, under the legend of training camps for enlisted personnel, and was called an “extraordinary conscription.” Families were prohibited from seeing off, and in the documents the word “mobilization” was replaced with the term “extraordinary formations.”

On July 22, they began to concentrate troops near the Soviet border, but such large-scale events were difficult to keep secret. Up to 10 thousand soldiers and 3.5 thousand horses passed through points on Korean territory alone per day. The Ambassador of the Third Reich to Japan, Ott, and the military attache, Kretschmer, reported to Berlin on July 25 that 900 thousand people aged 24 to 45 were conscripted in Japan. Persons who spoke Russian were sent to Northern China.

3 fronts were formed - eastern, northern and western, 629 units and subunits were sent to them, a total of 20 divisions, then they planned to strengthen their numbers with another 5 divisions. Some units were transferred from the Sino-Japanese front. After the second stage of mobilization (order No. 102 of July 16, 1941), the number of Japanese troops near the borders of the USSR increased to 850 thousand people.

Military units on the Kuril Islands, South Sakhalin and Hokkaido were put on full combat readiness.

In total, it was planned to involve up to a million people in the attack; reserves of ammunition, fuel, food, and medicine were created in Korea and northern China to wage an intensive war for 2-3 months.

Auxiliary forces

In addition to the Japanese army itself, they planned to introduce the armed forces of the puppet forces into battle. state entities - Manchu Imperial Army State of Manchukuo. Its number was more than 100 thousand people (in 1944 - over 200 thousand), small arms were no worse than Japanese, there were sufficient machine guns, artillery was weak, and there was practically no air force or armored vehicles.

Mengjiang National Army– Mengjiang, a puppet state formed by the Japanese military administration in the central part of Inner Mongolia (Chahar, Zhehe and Suiyuan provinces). The size of the army ranged from 4 to 20 thousand people. The armament is weak, most of the personnel are cavalry.

They were under the command of the Kwantung Army headquarters and under the direct supervision of Japanese military advisers. Japanese officers prepared military-trained reserves from local residents. In 1940, a law on compulsory military service was introduced in Manchukuo. The Mengjiang Army was intended to join Japanese forces in invading the Mongolian People's Republic. According to the Kantokuen plan, it was envisaged to “create a situation in which the voluntary unification of Outer Mongolia with Inner Mongolia would occur.”

White emigrants, the Japanese did not forget about the White Guards; since 1938, units from Russians (who had extensive combat experience) were formed for the war with the USSR, for example: the brigade of Colonel of the Kwantung Army Makoto Asano, Cossack cavalry detachments under the command of Colonel Ivan Aleksandrovich Peshkov, united in the unit “ Peshkovsky detachment." Due to their vast combat experience, they were intended to carry out reconnaissance and sabotage operations: their tasks included damaging railways and other communications, communications, striking supply bases in the rear of Soviet troops, conducting reconnaissance, committing sabotage, conducting anti-Soviet propaganda. According to the Kantokuen plan, by order of the commander of the Kwantung Army, special units were formed from them.

Missions of the Imperial Japanese Navy

The Japanese Navy was supposed to support the landing of amphibious forces in Kamchatka, support the operation from the sea to occupy Northern Sakhalin and capture Vladivostok, and destroy the Soviet Pacific Navy. On July 25, an order was given to form the 5th Fleet specifically for the war with the USSR.

Readiness for surgery

By August, the Japanese armed forces were ready for a blitzkrieg. By the beginning of the Soviet-German War, Japan had 14 personnel divisions in Korea and Northern China. At the beginning, they planned to increase their number to 34 divisions, transferring 6 divisions from Japan and 14 from the Chinese front. But the command of the Japanese Expeditionary Army in China opposed it.

At the end of July, the War Ministry and the General Staff decided to reduce the invasion force to 25 divisions, then to 20. On July 31, 1941, at a meeting between the Chief of Operations of the General Staff, Tanaka, and War Minister Tojo, the final decision was made: 24 divisions would be needed for the war against the Soviet Union. In reality, the Japanese concentrated a group of forces numbering 850 thousand “bayonets,” which is equal to 58-59 Japanese infantry divisions. The Japanese command believed that they would be opposed by up to 30 Soviet divisions, and created double superiority.

Doubts of the Japanese command

In the second half of July, the Japanese command began to doubt the success of the German Blitzkrieg. The Japanese began to analyze the course of military operations and made several comments:

The enormity of the tetra of military operations allows the Wehrmacht to wage a war of maneuver, but at the same time helps the Soviet troops to conduct a proper retreat, and the Red Army could not be destroyed in border battles.

Guerrilla warfare would seriously complicate life for the Wehrmacht.

Japan is trying to find out from Berlin the timing of the completion of the campaign. The Japanese ambassador in Berlin, Oshima, testified subsequently: “In July - early August it became known that the pace of the German army’s advance had slowed down. Moscow and Leningrad were not captured on time. In this regard, I met with Ribbentrop to get clarification. He invited me to meeting of Field Marshal Keitel, who stated that the slowdown in the pace of the German army’s offensive was due to the large length of communications, as a result of which the rear units were lagging behind. Therefore, the offensive was delayed by three weeks.” Tokyo increasingly doubts the possibility of a quick defeat of the USSR. Doubts are reinforced by Berlin's increasingly insistent demands to open a second front against the Soviet Union.

Japan had doubts that the Red Empire was a titan with feet of clay before. Thus, an employee of the Japanese embassy in Moscow, Yoshitani, warned in September 1940: “The idea that Russia will collapse from within when the war starts is completely absurd.” On July 22, 1941, Japanese generals were forced to admit in the “Secret Diary...” (it assessed the events and situation on the fronts of World War II): “Exactly a month has passed since the beginning of the war. Although the operations of the German army continue, the Stalinist regime, contrary to expectations, turned out to be durable."

By the beginning of August, the 5th department Intelligence Agency The General Staff (its area of ​​activity is the USSR) concluded in the document “Assessment of the current situation in the Soviet Union” that: “Even if the Red Army leaves Moscow this year, it will not capitulate. Germany’s intention to quickly complete the decisive battle will not be realized. Further development of the war will not be beneficial for the German side."

But the military command of the army and navy did not support the doubts of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and intelligence, military preparations were in full swing. Chief of the General Staff Sugiyama and War Minister Tojo said: “There is a high probability that the war will end with a quick German victory. It will be extremely difficult for the Soviets to continue the war. The statement that the German-Soviet war is dragging on is a hasty conclusion.” The Japanese army leadership did not want to miss the opportunity to strike at the Union together with Germany.

The military of the Kwantung Army especially insisted: its commander Umezu conveyed to the center: “A favorable moment will definitely come... Right now a rare opportunity has presented itself, which happens once in a thousand years, to implement the state policy towards the Soviet Union. It is necessary to seize on this... If there is an order to start fighting, I would like the leadership of operations to be given to the Kwantung Army... I repeat once again that the main thing is not to miss the moment to implement the policy of the state." The Kwantung Army insisted on an immediate strike. Its chief of staff, Lieutenant General Yoshimoto, convinced the chief of the operational department of the General Staff, Tanaka: " The beginning of the German-Soviet war is an opportunity sent down to us from above to resolve the northern problem. We need to discard the “ripe persimmon” theory and create a favorable moment ourselves... Even if the preparation is insufficient, if you perform this fall, you can count on success.”

Why didn't Japan strike?

The main sign of the emergence of a favorable moment - “ripe persimmon” - was considered to be the weakening of Soviet forces in the Far East and Siberia. The Japanese General Staff believed that “blitzkrieg” in Japanese style was possible only if the Russian group was reduced from 30 divisions to 15, and the number of armored vehicles, artillery and aircraft was reduced by two-thirds.

Intelligence reported that during the 3 weeks of the war, only 17% of the personnel and about a third of the armored vehicles were transferred from the Far East. In addition, the personnel were immediately replenished with reservists. They noted that they were mainly transferring the forces of the Trans-Baikal Military District, while other groups of the Red Army were almost not affected.

The Japanese General Staff also monitored Soviet aviation with great attention. According to him, the Soviet Air Force had 60 heavy bombers, 450 fighters, 60 attack aircraft, 80 long-range bombers, 330 light bombers and 200 naval aircraft. One of the headquarters documents dated July 26, 1941 stated: “In the event of a war with the USSR, as a result of several bombing attacks at night by ten, and during the day by twenty to thirty aircraft, Tokyo could be turned into ashes.” After the German attack from the Far East, according to Japanese intelligence, no more than 30 squadrons were transferred. This was not enough to weaken the Soviet Air Force, especially its bomber potential.

The Soviet army in the Far East remained a formidable force, the Japanese perfectly learned the lesson of Khalkin Gol. A sudden blow to a defeated country is one thing, a blow to a well-trained and technically equipped army is another thing. Berlin's promise to capture Moscow in 3 weeks was not fulfilled.

On August 28, an entry full of pessimism was made in the “Secret War Diary”: “Even Hitler is mistaken in his assessment of the Soviet Union. Therefore, what can we say about our intelligence department. The war in Germany will continue until the end of the year... What is the future of the empire? The prospects are gloomy. Truly you can’t guess the future ..."

On September 3, at a meeting of the coordination council of the government and the imperial headquarters, the meeting participants came to the conclusion that “since Japan will not be able to launch large-scale operations in the north until February, it is necessary to quickly carry out operations in the south during this time.”

Thus, in the summer of 1941, the Red Army broke not only the plan of the German blitzkrieg, but also the plan of the Japanese “blitzkrieg war” against the USSR; Tokyo decided not to take risks and come to grips with the Southern strategic direction. September 6 in the "Implementation Program public policy empire" it was decided to seize the colonies of Western powers in the South, and, if necessary, go to war with the USA, Great Britain, and Holland. To do this, all military preparations should be completed by the end of October. The meeting participants unanimously agreed that there was no better time to attack England and the USA will not be.

Military preparations against the USSR were postponed until the spring of 1942, and Soviet intelligence officer Richard Sorge reported this to Moscow.

In Berlin, Japanese Ambassador Oshima informed the Reich leadership: “At this time of year, military action against the Soviet Union can only be undertaken on a small scale. It will probably not be too difficult to occupy the northern (Russian) part of Sakhalin Island. Due to the fact that Soviet troops have suffered heavy losses in battles with German troops, they can probably also be pushed back from the border. However, an attack on Vladivostok, as well as any advance towards Lake Baikal, is impossible at this time of year, and due to the current circumstances it will have to be postponed until spring." The Japanese army had experience of invading Far East and Siberia in 1918-1922, therefore, in the conditions of the Siberian winter, launching an invasion was even more dangerous.

Results

Japan did not attack the USSR not because of strict implementation of the neutrality pact between the USSR and Japan, but because of failure German plan blitzkrieg and Moscow maintaining reliable cover for the Eastern regions of the country.

To the question when the lightning war plan asked by the author was thwarted Nastena the best answer is December 5, 1941

Answer from 22 answers[guru]

Hello! Here is a selection of topics with answers to your question: when was the plan for a lightning war disrupted?

Answer from Salt out[expert]
From the first days of the war, everything went wrong - the pace of advance slowed down, enemy resistance increased, communications were stretched...

Answer from Neuropathologist[guru]
According to the blitzkrieg plan, the Germans expected to end the war with the USSR a maximum of three months before October 1; the war was supposed to end with the Germans reaching the line of Arkhangelsk, Gorky, Kuibyshev, Astrakhan. In reality, on October 1, the Germans were stuck somewhere near Vyazma, it turns out that Hitler’s plan was thwarted already in the first days of the war.

Answer from VictoryZi[expert]
in 1941

Answer from Welfare[master]
Among the major events of the Second World War, the great battle of Moscow occupies a special place. The defeat of fascist troops near Moscow was the beginning of a radical turn in the course of the war. The legend of the invincibility of Hitler's army has been debunked.

Answer from Zabiiaka[guru]
If you don't rely on school curriculum, then it was actually immediately disrupted.
"...But from the first days of the war, the enemy met with fierce, truly heroic resistance from Soviet soldiers and the population of the front-line areas. Without a stubborn struggle, bloody battles, not a single position, not a single locality. The aggressor suffered heavy losses in men and military equipment, and its advance into the interior of the country slowed down every day.
Until the last bullet, Soviet border guards fought against the fascist hordes, armed only small arms. A number of border outposts, the garrisons of which numbered only 40-50 people, held their lines for 2-3 days, although the Nazi command planned to crush them in 15-30 minutes of battle. The whole world knows the epic of the heroic defense of the Brest Fortress. Amazing examples of resilience and mass heroism were shown by Soviet soldiers and the local population in defending the cities of Liepaja, Tallinn, Siauliai, and Przemysl.
In the first days of the war, Soviet mechanized troops launched a powerful counterattack against enemy tank forces in the area Ukrainian cities Dubno, Lutsk, Brody, Rivne. As a result of this, the advance of the fascist hordes on Kyiv was delayed.
Similar heroic deeds and events occurred every day on all sectors of the huge Soviet-German front. This cooled the ardor of the fascist strategists and forced them to think about what the adventure they had begun would threaten them with. In particular, one of the highest military leaders in Germany, Chief of the Wehrmacht General Staff, General F. Halder, wrote in his diary on June 24, 1941: “The tenacity of individual Russian formations in battle should be noted. There were cases when garrisons of pillboxes blew themselves up along with the pillboxes, not wanting to surrender." Five days later, Halder again notes: “Information from the front confirms that the Russians are fighting everywhere until last person» .
In general, there is evidence that the USSR was preparing for this war. And even more than that, he intended to inflict preemptive strike, for example, why the spacecraft were plagued by failures in the first months of the war - because all military equipment was mainly of an offensive nature, i.e. lighter tanks - for marching along European roads, and not powerful and heavy ones for defense. And so on, but I'm afraid they don't study this in school =)))

Most military historians are inclined to think that if the plan of the Chief of the German General Staff Alfred von Schlieffen had been implemented, the first World War could have gone completely according to the script. But back in 1906, the German strategist was removed from his post and his followers were afraid to implement Schlieffen’s plan.

Blitz War Plan

At the beginning of the last century, Germany began planning great war. This was due to the fact that France, defeated several decades earlier, clearly harbored plans for military revenge. The German leadership was not particularly afraid of the French threat. But in the east, Russia, an ally of the Third Republic, was gaining economic and military power. For Germany there was a real danger of a war on two fronts. Well aware of this, Kaiser Wilhelm ordered von Schlieffen to develop a plan for a victorious war in these conditions

And Schlieffen, in a fairly short time, created such a plan. According to his idea, Germany was supposed to start the first war against France, concentrating 90% of all its armed forces in this direction. Moreover, this war was supposed to be lightning fast. Only 39 days were allotted for the capture of Paris. For final victory - 42.

It was assumed that Russia would not be able to mobilize in such a short period of time. After the victory over France, German troops will be transferred to the border with Russia. Kaiser Wilhelm approved the plan, saying the famous phrase: “We will have lunch in Paris, and we will have dinner in St. Petersburg.”

Failure of the Schlieffen Plan

Helmuth von Moltke, who replaced Schlieffen as chief of the German General Staff, accepted the Schlieffen plan without much enthusiasm, considering it excessively risky. And for this reason, I subjected it to thorough revision. In particular, he refused to concentrate on western front the main forces of the German army and, for reasons of precaution, sent a significant part of the troops to the east.

But Schlieffen planned to envelop the French army from the flanks and completely encircle it. But due to the transfer of significant forces to the east, the German group of troops on the western front simply did not have enough available funds for this. As a result, the French troops not only were not surrounded, but were also able to deliver a powerful counterattack.

The reliance on the slowness of the Russian army in terms of protracted mobilization also did not justify itself. Invasion Russian troops The German command was literally stunned into East Prussia. Germany found itself in the grip of two fronts.