11th tank brigade khalkhin goal. The defeat of the Japanese troops in the battle with the Soviet on the Khalkhin-Gol River (Mongolia)

Khalkhin Gol (May - September 1939)

KHASAN PROLOGUE

August 1938. Far East, border area between the Tumen-Ula River and Khasan Lake. Soviet troops over and over again storm the hills Bezymyannaya, Zaozernaya, Black, Machine-gun Hill, captured by the Japanese. After the most difficult three-day battles, the enemy was driven out of our territory, the heights were cleared of "samurai", and the red flag was again raised over Zaozernaya.
However, the victory turned out to be unconvincing - the battles unexpectedly dragged on, our losses exceeded the Japanese by more than two times.
And there is no longer any doubt that the Hassan events are only the first round of the fight, that a continuation is to come. In the late 30s, the whole country knows that in the East "clouds are gloomy", and the samurai are ready to "cross the border by the river" again.
Indeed, not even a year had passed after the Khasan battles, when a new border conflict erupted - now in Mongolia, on the Khalkhin Gol River.

BACKGROUND OF THE CONFLICT

From the beginning of the 1930s, the Japanese government hatched aggressive plans for the Mongolian People's Republic. Back in 1933, the Japanese Minister of War, General Araki, demanded the occupation of Outer Mongolia, which "must be the Mongolia of the East." Beginning in 1935, on Japanese official maps, the line of the state border in the region of the Khalkhin-Gol River began to be moved deep into the Mongolian People's Republic at a distance of up to 20 km.
At the end of January, the Japanese-Manchurian troops attacked the border posts of Khalkhin-Sume and "Mongolryba", left by the Mongolian border guards without a fight. To prevent conflict in June 1935, negotiations began on the demarcation of the state border between Mongolia and Manchukuo. But the positions of the parties immediately diverged. The representative of Japan, on behalf of the government of Manchukuo, demanded that "their representatives, who will enjoy the right of free movement, be allowed to the appropriate points on the territory of the MPR (including Ulaanbaatar) for permanent residence." Mongolia rejected these demands "as a direct attack on the sovereignty and independence of the MPR." As a result, the negotiations were interrupted. At the same time, the representative of Manchukuo said: "In the future, we are going to resolve all issues at our discretion."

In March 1936, several minor skirmishes took place on the Mongol-Manchurian border. In response to this, on March 12, a protocol on mutual assistance was signed between the USSR and the MPR, and Stalin warned in an interview with an American journalist: "If Japan decides to attack the Mongolian People's Republic, encroaching on its independence, we will have to help the Mongolian People's Republic." On May 31, speaking at a session of the Supreme Soviet, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Molotov confirmed "that we will defend the border of the MPR as resolutely as our own border."
In accordance with the agreement on mutual assistance in September 1937, a "limited contingent" of Soviet troops was introduced into Mongolia, consisting of 30 thousand people, 265 tanks, 280 armored vehicles, 5000 cars and 107 aircraft. The headquarters of the corps of Soviet troops, which received the name of the 57th special, settled in Ulaanbaatar. The corps commander was N. V. Feklenko. However, the Japanese continued to prepare for an attack on the MPR. It was not by chance that the Japanese command chose the area near the Khalkhin Gol River for the invasion - two railways led here from Manchuria, the nearest station was only 60 km from the intended combat area. But from the Soviet railway station Borza to Khalkhin Gol there were more than 750 km, and the stretch of communications made it very difficult to concentrate the Soviet-Mongolian troops, their supply of ammunition and food.

We have to admit that on the eve of the conflict, both the command of the Mongolian border corps and commander Feklenko showed unforgivable carelessness. The state border beyond the Khalkhin-Gol River was not actually guarded, and there were no stationary observation posts on the western bank - only sometimes Mongolian horse patrols passed here. The commanders of the 57th special corps did not study the threatened area. There were no reconnaissances on the ground. The fighters were distracted by wood harvesting for long periods.

The Japanese acted differently. Long before the attack, they carried out a reconnaissance of the future combat area, issued excellent maps, and made many reconnaissance flights not only in the border zone, but also over Mongolian territory. With the command staff of the units and formations intended for the operation, field trips were carried out. The troops were trained taking into account the conditions of the area.
From January 1939, the Japanese resumed provocations in the Khalkhin Gol region - they raided Mongolian territory, fired on border guards, and attacked outposts. And in mid-May, they begin to deploy full-scale hostilities.

THE BEGINNING OF THE BATTLE

On May 11, about two hundred Japanese-Manchus, accompanied by a truck and a pickup truck, armed with light machine guns and 50-mm mortars, violated the border, attacked a Mongolian outpost of twenty people and pursued them to the Khalkhin Gol River. Here, reinforcements approached the border guards; A battle ensued that lasted about 12 hours. The violators were thrown back.
On May 14, three hundred Japanese-Manchurian horsemen again invaded the territory of the MPR, occupied Dungur-Obo and reached the Khalkhin-Gol River.
On May 15, border guards observed up to seven hundred enemy horsemen, seven armored vehicles, one tank and vehicles with infantry in the Dungur-Obo area.
Japanese aviation repeatedly violates the border, shelling and bombing Mongolian frontier posts. So, on May 15, five Japanese bombers raided the location of the 7th outpost (west of Dungur-Obo) and dropped 52 bombs. As a result, 2 Cyrics were killed and 19 wounded.
All these events clearly indicated that the Japanese were launching a serious operation, but the command of the 57th Special Corps continued to regard them as "petty border trifles." Although on Khalkhin Gol for the fifth day there were battles with regular Japanese-Manchurian troops supported by aviation, on May 15 the command of the special corps left for logging 130 km from Ulaanbaatar. And only the order of the People's Commissar of Defense Voroshilov on the 16th forced Feklenko to finally take measures to bring the troops to combat readiness.

The 6th Cavalry Division of the MPR was sent to the Khalkhin-Gol River, as well as the operational group of the 11th Tank Brigade - consisting of a rifle and machine-gun battalion, a company of armored vehicles and a 76-mm battery - under the command of Senior Lieutenant Bykov. On May 20, he sent reconnaissance to the eastern coast of Khalkhin Gol, which was met by strong rifle and machine-gun fire and after a 4-hour battle retreated. However, the next day, the vanguard of Bykov's detachment, together with the Mongol cavalry, managed to push the enemy into the territory of Manchuria, go to the border and take up defense.
Meanwhile, the Japanese ambassador in Moscow was summoned to the Kuznetsky Most to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, where Molotov, on behalf of the Soviet government, made an official statement to him: “We received information about the violation of the border of the Mongolian People's Republic by the Japanese-Manchu troops, who attacked the Mongolian units in the area Nomon-Kan-Burd-Obo, as well as in the Dongur-Obo area. AT military units The MPR has wounded and killed. Japanese-Manchurian planes also took part in this invasion of the MPR. I must warn that there is a limit to all patience, and I ask the ambassador to convey to the Japanese government that this should not happen again. It will be better in the interests of the Japanese government itself.” The Japanese ambassador immediately transmitted the text of this statement to Tokyo. However, there was no answer.

On May 25, the Japanese began to concentrate large forces from the 23rd Infantry Division and the Manchurian cavalry in the Nomonhan-Burd-Obo area. At dawn on May 28, the Japanese-Manchus launched a surprise offensive and, pushing back the Mongolian cavalry regiment and the left-flank company of Bykov's detachment, deeply engulfed our left flank, threatening the crossing. Bykov himself, who was trying to organize a counterattack, came under heavy machine-gun fire and narrowly escaped capture, leaving an armored car stuck in the mud. The Mongolian-Soviet units retreated in disarray to the Sand Hills, 2-3 km from the crossing, where they detained the enemy.
At this time, Major Remizov's 149th Infantry Regiment, which approached in vehicles from Tamtsak-Bulak, without waiting for the concentration of all forces, immediately entered the battle. The divisions of the regiment acted inconsistently, without interaction with artillery. The control of the battle was poorly organized, and with the onset of darkness it was completely lost.

The shooting went on all night. The next morning the battle resumed and went on with varying degrees of success. On the right flank, Bykov's companies could not hold on to the occupied heights and withdrew, mistakenly fired upon by their own artillery. But on the left flank, our flamethrower tanks, supported by infantry, defeated the Japanese reconnaissance detachment of Lieutenant Colonel Azuma, who was killed.
By evening, the fighting finally subsided. One gets the impression that both sides considered themselves losers - exhausted by continuous two-day battles, having suffered significant losses, the Japanese hastily withdrew troops beyond the border line, but the Soviet units also retreated to the western coast of Khalkhin Gol (the commander of the 57th special corps, Feklenko, reported to Moscow, that they had to retreat "under the onslaught of the enemy", and explained the defeat by the complete dominance of enemy aircraft in the air). Moreover, our intelligence discovered the very fact of the Japanese retreat only 4 days later. As a result of the May battles, which can hardly be called successful, Feklenko was removed from his post; G.K. Zhukov was appointed to replace him.

FIGHT FOR AIR DOMINATION

The war at Khalkhin Gol began unsuccessfully for the Soviet pilots as well. The May battles revealed the overwhelming superiority of enemy aircraft. On May 21, the Japanese shot down a P-5 liaison aircraft with impunity. The first air battle, which took place the next day, also ended in favor of the Japanese aces - at 12:20 a flight of I-16s and a pair of I-15s, loitering over Khalkhin Gol, collided with five Japanese fighters. Noticing them, pilot Lysenkov single-handedly rushed at the enemy and was shot down, the rest Soviet aircraft did not enter the battle.

Having information about the strengthening of enemy aviation in the conflict zone and the increase in its activity, the Soviet command also increased its air forces: at the end of May, the 22nd Fighter Aviation Regiment and the 38th bombing, - however, it was not possible to immediately turn the tide.

On May 27, the I-16 squadron, consisting of eight aircraft, was in an ambush at the forward airfield in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bMount Khamar-Daba with the task of taking off and destroying it when an air enemy appeared. In total, the squadron flew four alert sorties that day. In the first three meetings with the enemy, there were no, but two pilots burned the engines of their cars. During the fourth sortie, the squadron commander's engine failed to start. He ordered the pilots, who started the engines, to take off before him. The pilots took off and headed for the front line. The squadron commander, having started the engine, was the last to take off. Six I-16 fighters followed to the border one at a time, gaining altitude along the route. Above Khalkhin Gol, these single aircraft, being at an altitude of 2000-2200 m, met with two units of enemy fighters that were in formation. The forces were too unequal, our pilots were in a deliberately losing position, so after the first attack, turning around, they began to leave for their territory, and the enemy, being higher, pursued them to the airfield and even shot them after landing. As a result, two out of six pilots died (including the squadron commander), one was wounded, and two more burned their engines.
On the same evening, the command of the 57th special corps held unpleasant conversation by direct wire with People's Commissar of Defense Voroshilov, who expressed Moscow's dissatisfaction with the losses of Soviet aviation.

But the next day, May 28, became truly "black" for our pilots. In the morning, an order was received to fly twenty I-15bis fighters “to the area of ​​operation of ground forces”, but only the first flight managed to take off when the order to “stop the flight” followed. Since there was no radio communication with the trio that had already taken off, the pilots did not receive a warning that they were left alone, continued to carry out the mission and were attacked by superior enemy forces over Khalkhin Gol - none of them returned from this unequal battle.

Three hours later, another I-15 squadron was taken by surprise by an attack from behind the clouds and lost seven out of ten fighters in a fleeting battle, shooting down only one enemy plane.
Thus, the score of the May battles was 17:1 in favor of the Japanese aviation. After such a defeat, Soviet fighters did not appear over Khalkhin Gol for more than two weeks, and "Japanese bombers bombed our troops with impunity."

Moscow reacted immediately by taking emergency measures to strengthen our aviation in the conflict zone. Already on May 29, a group of the best Soviet aces headed by the Deputy Chief of the Red Army Air Force Smushkevich flew to Mongolia. In just three weeks, they managed to do incredibly much - combat training of flight personnel was established, supplies were radically improved, a whole network of new runways was created, the number of air groups was increased to 300 aircraft (against 239 Japanese). And when the next round of air battles began over Khalkhin Gol, the Japanese met a completely different enemy.
Our pilots took revenge for the May defeats already on June 22: after a fierce two-hour battle, the Japanese were forced to flee, missing 30 aircraft (they themselves, however, admitted the loss of only seven aircraft, but experts who worked with documents claim that, as a rule, the Japanese side in official reports underestimated the figures of their own losses by about half). And although our losses that day were also great - 17 aircraft - it was an undoubted victory, the first since the beginning of the war in the air.

On June 24, three more clashes with the enemy took place, and twice the Japanese did not accept the battle, dispersing and retreating to their territory after the first attack. Their attempt to intercept a group of Soviet bombers returning from a mission also ended in vain - the airborne gunners were able to fight off the fighters. On the same day, a Japanese pilot was taken prisoner for the first time, parachuting out of a downed plane over our territory. Another "samurai" in a similar situation chose to shoot himself in the temple.
But Major Zabaluev, commander of the 70th Fighter Aviation Regiment, was more fortunate. June 26, during the next air battle, he had to make an emergency landing in the Japanese rear. The Bargut riders were already hurrying to the downed plane, when Captain Sergei Gritsevets landed his I-16 next to the commander’s car, literally dragged him into his cockpit, squeezing it into narrow space between the armored back and the side, and took off in front of the confused enemies 1.

Convinced that it would not be possible to cope with Russian aviation in air battles, the Japanese decided to destroy it on the ground, inflicting a sudden blow on our airfields. Early on the morning of June 27, 30 Japanese bombers under cover of 74 fighters attacked the airfields at Tamtsak-Bulak and Bain-Burdu-Nur. In the first case, the approach of enemy bombers was detected in time, and the fighters of the 22nd Air Regiment managed to rise to intercept - after the battle, the Japanese missed five aircraft, shooting down only three of ours. But during a raid on the airfield of the 70th Fighter Regiment, they managed to achieve tactical surprise, since telephone line, which connected the airfield with air observation posts, was cut by Japanese saboteurs. As a result, 16 Soviet aircraft were destroyed on the ground and on takeoff, while the Japanese had no losses. On the same day, they also raided the rear airfield in Bain-Tumen, shooting down one fighter on takeoff.

The Japanese command tried to inflate its tactical success and pass it off as a complete defeat of Soviet aviation by announcing the destruction of one and a half hundred aircraft - but it seems that even the Japanese themselves did not really believe these victorious reports. Despite individual successes, they lost their former dominance in the air - the "unpunished bombardments" of ground troops ceased, air battles from now until the end of July went on with varying success, and the scales gradually leaned in our direction.

BAIN-TSAGANSK BATTLE

By the end of June, the Japanese had concentrated the entire 23rd Infantry Division and half of the 7th, two tank regiments, artillery, engineering, and three Manchurian cavalry in the combat area.

According to the plan of the Japanese command, in the "second period of the Nomonkhan incident" it was supposed to strike at the western coast of Khalkhin Gol, in the rear of the Soviet-Mongolian troops.
The strike group under the command of Major General Kobayashi, consisting of the 71st and 72nd infantry regiments, reinforced by artillery, had the task of crossing the river in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bMount Bain-Dagan and moving south, cutting off our units of the escape route from the eastern bank. The 26th Infantry Regiment, mounted on vehicles, was supposed to operate on the approaching flank of the strike group and prevent the approach of Soviet reserves, and in the event of a retreat of our units, pursue them. The crossing and advancement of the strike group was provided by the 23rd Engineer Regiment.
The restraining group under the command of Lieutenant General Yasuok, which, in addition to infantry and cavalry, included both tank regiments, was supposed to act against Soviet units on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol in order to prevent their breakthrough from the "boiler", and then completely destroy .

The fighting on July 2-3, 1939 (until 10.00 am)

The Japanese launched an offensive on the night of July 2-3. At 9 pm, the Soviet units, which were on guard, were attacked by tanks and infantry. In a stubborn battle, Lieutenant Aleshkin's battery knocked out up to ten Japanese tanks, but the rest broke through to the firing position and began to crush the guns and iron the cracks with the soldiers hiding in them. However, light Japanese tanks were unable to cause significant damage. Having broken the rules of the guns and plowed the trenches, they began to leave. Then the gunners jumped out of hiding and opened fire on the retreating tanks, knocking out several more vehicles. Turning around, the tanks attacked the battery again. This was repeated three times. Finally, the attack was repulsed.
The next day, the first duel between Soviet and Japanese tankers took place. Despite their numerical superiority, the Japanese were never able to advance a single step, losing seven tanks against three Soviet ones. Even more heavy losses the enemy suffered in a collision with a reconnaissance battalion of the 9th motorized armored brigade - our BA-10 cannon armored cars acted exemplarily, shooting the advancing enemy formations from cover, destroying 9 tanks and not losing a single armored vehicle. You can’t call these events otherwise than a defeat - only on July 3, during unsuccessful attacks, the Japanese lost more than half of their armored vehicles (44 tanks out of 73) on the eastern shore of Khalkhin Gol. Soon both of their tank regiments were withdrawn to the rear.

At first, the offensive of the Kobayashi shock group developed much more successfully. After crossing the river at dawn on July 3 and breaking the weak resistance of the 15th Mongol Cavalry Regiment, the Japanese quickly moved south, going into the rear of the main Soviet-Mongolian forces that were fighting defensive battles on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol. The situation was becoming threatening. Scattered counterattacks by armored cars and tankers, at the cost of heavy losses, made it possible to halt the advance of the enemy to the crossings and gain time before the main reserves arrived.

Around 11.30, the 11th Tank Brigade launched a counteroffensive - on the move, without preliminary reconnaissance, without information about the enemy, without infantry support. Having suffered terrible losses - more than half of the tanks and personnel - the brigade broke into the Japanese defenses, only a little before reaching their crossing. Together with the tankers, the 24th motorized rifle regiment and a detachment of the Mongolian cavalry were supposed to advance, but the motorized riflemen lost their way during the march and attacked with an hour and a half late, and the cavalry was scattered by artillery and enemy aircraft. At 15.00, an armored battalion of the 7th motorized armored brigade approached and was thrown into battle from the march, however, met by concentrated fire from anti-tank guns that shot armored cars at close range, it was forced to retreat, losing 33 armored vehicles out of 50. In the evening, another one was organized, now a total one, attack, but the Japanese, surrounded from three sides, pressed against the river, were able to fortify themselves on Mount Bain-Tsagan, created a layered defense and put up stubborn resistance, repelling all attacks. We have to admit that the management of the battle that day left much to be desired - the arriving Soviet reserves rushed to the offensive one by one, the interaction between them was organized only in the evening, when all units had already suffered heavy losses and were bled to death as a result of uncoordinated attacks.

Fighting on the afternoon of July 3, 1939

The shooting continued until the morning. The next day, the Japanese began to withdraw their troops back to the right bank of Khalkhin Gol. Huge crowds gathered near the only bridge, clogged with infantry and equipment, along which our aircraft and artillery worked. According to Soviet sources, “the only pontoon bridge built by the Japanese for the crossing turned out to be prematurely blown up by them. Panic-stricken, Japanese soldiers and officers threw themselves into the water and drowned in front of our tank crews. In the area of ​​Mount Bain-Tsagan, the enemy lost thousands of soldiers and officers, as well as a huge amount of weapons and military equipment abandoned here. However, the Japanese themselves admit the loss of only 800 people (10% of the strike force), claiming that they allegedly managed to evacuate all heavy equipment and blew up the bridge only after completing the crossing.
After the defeat at Bain-Tsagan, the Japanese command tried to take revenge on the eastern shore of Khalkhin Gol. On the night of July 7-8, the enemy managed to push back our right-flank battalions, which were able to re-establish themselves only 3-4 km from the river. On July 11, the Japanese captured the Remizov height, but their further advance was stopped by artillery fire and tank counterattacks. On the night of July 12, taking advantage of a command mistake, the Japanese detachment managed to penetrate deep into our defenses, taking the crossing under machine-gun fire, but by morning was surrounded in one of the pits and destroyed after a fierce battle. This pit was later nicknamed the "samurai grave."
In the second half of July - early August, the lull was interrupted three more times by short-term battles, in which the opponents suffered significant losses, but did not achieve any significant results. Meanwhile, both sides continued to build up their forces, moving fresh reinforcements into the combat area.

The struggle for air supremacy continued, during which the initiative finally passed to Soviet aviation. In July, our pilots attacked enemy airfields on the territory of Manchukuo several times. So, on July 27, two I-16 squadrons attacked the Ukhtyn-Obo airfield, catching the enemy by surprise and shooting 4 Japanese fighters and 2 tankers on the ground with impunity. On July 29, the I-16 cannons took part in a raid on an enemy airfield near Lake Uzur-Nur. Once again, the enemy was caught off guard. Attack aircraft destroyed 2 enemy aircraft in the parking lots and damaged nine more. On the same day, a second strike was carried out - with even more impressive results: this time it was lucky to "catch" the Japanese during the landing approach, when they were completely helpless, and shoot down three fighters at once, another one was burned on the ground. And again, our pilots returned from a sortie without loss. On August 2, during another attack on the Japanese airfield in the Jinjin-Sume area, the aircraft of Colonel Katsumi Abe was shot on takeoff, and six aircraft were destroyed on the ground at once, not counting the damaged ones.
In the air battles of early August, our pilots also acted more and more confidently, inflicting irreparable losses on the enemy - several more Japanese aces died these days. And given the two-fold numerical superiority over the enemy, achieved by this time, it is quite possible to talk about the conquest of Soviet aviation air supremacy, which will be confirmed by its actions during the general offensive.

GENERAL OFFENSIVE

In mid-August, an operation plan was approved to defeat the Japanese troops, according to which, after pinning down the enemy in the center, breaking through his defenses with two flank attacks, encircling the Japanese grouping between the Khalkhin-Gol River and state border and completely destroy. For this purpose, three groups were created - Southern, Central and Northern - which were assigned the following tasks:
1) Southern group under the command of Colonel Potapov (57th rifle division, 8th motorized armored brigade, 6th tank brigade (without the 1st battalion), 8th cavalry division, 185th artillery regiment, SU-12 division, two tank battalion and machine-gun battalion of the 11th tank brigade, 37th anti-tank gun battalion, XV-26 tank company): advance in the direction of Nomon-Kan-Burd-Obo and, in cooperation with the Central and Northern groups, encircle and completely destroy the Japanese grouping south and north of the Khailastyn-Gol river; the immediate task is to destroy the enemy on the southern bank of the Khailastyn-Gol River, in the future - on the northern bank of the Khailastyn-Gol River; when reserves appear, destroy them first; 8th Mongol Cavalry Division to secure the right flank.
2) The central group (82nd and 36th motorized rifle divisions): attack from the front, pinning down the enemy with fire to the full depth and depriving him of the possibility of maneuvering to the flanks.
3) Northern group under the command of Colonel Olekseenko (7th motorized armored brigade, 601st rifle regiment, 82nd howitzer regiment, two battalions of the 11th tank brigade, 87th anti-tank division, 6th Mongolian cavalry division): advance in the direction of the lakes 6 km northwest of Nomon-Kan-Burd-Obo and, in cooperation with the 36th Motorized Rifle Division and the Southern Group, encircle and destroy the enemy north of the Khailastyn-Gol River; The 6th cavalry division of the Mongolian army to secure the left flank.
4) Reserve (212th airborne brigade, 9th motorized armored brigade, 1st battalion of the 6th tank brigade): by the morning of August 20, concentrate in the area 6 km southwest of Sumbur-Obo and be ready to build on the success of the Southern or Northern Group .
5) Air Force: to strike before artillery preparation on the nearest reserves and on the main line of defense of the enemy. The fighters must cover the actions of the SB bombers and ground forces, and in the event of the approach of enemy reserves, fall upon them with all their forces. The duration of the artillery preparation is 2 hours 45 minutes.

Particular attention was paid to misinformation of the enemy in order to give him the impression that our units had gone on the defensive. To do this, the troops were sent "Memo to a fighter in defense." False reports about the built defensive structures and requests for engineering property were transmitted. A powerful sound broadcasting station arrived at the front, imitating the driving of stakes, creating the complete impression of great defensive work. All troop movements were made only at night. In order to accustom the Japanese to the noise of tanks, 10-12 days before the offensive, several vehicles with silencers removed were constantly cruising along the front. All these measures proved to be very effective, allowing the enemy to be misled and taken by surprise.

On the eve of the offensive, thorough reconnaissance of the front line of the Japanese defense was carried out, during which the command staff dressed in Red Army uniforms for the purpose of camouflage, and the tankers - in combined arms. Data on the battle formations and defensive structures of the enemy were clarified by aerial reconnaissance with photographing the terrain and night searches, accompanied by the capture of "tongues".
Although Soviet propaganda so inflated the importance of party political work at the front that over time this phrase began to cause only a smile - nevertheless, the ideological factor should not be underestimated: party political work undoubtedly strengthened the offensive impulse of the Soviet troops. Many well-known writers who visited Khalkhin Gol took part in the ideological campaign, including Konstantin Simonov, who did not hesitate in expressions:
“We will forget all pity in battle, We will find these snakes in holes, They will pay for your grave With an endless Japanese cemetery!” “Nate, you, get it! Once the war, so the war: We will not leave a single Japanese for seeds!

At dawn on August 20, 150 SB bombers under the cover of 144 fighters dealt a crushing blow to the front line, troop concentrations and artillery positions of the Japanese. Bombing was carried out from a height of 2000 m at maximum speeds with a left turn away from the target. The successful actions of the Soviet bombers forced the enemy to open anti-aircraft fire, which made it possible to detect the location of his firing points and deliver a massive assault strike against them. As a result, Japanese anti-aircraft artillery was temporarily suppressed, and the second echelon of bombers attacked enemy positions from medium heights without interference, without encountering serious opposition: Japanese fighters did not appear over the battlefield.

At 6.15 the Soviet artillery opened fire. The artillery preparation lasted 2 hours and 45 minutes. 15 minutes before its end, a second air raid was carried out. This time, the Japanese interceptors arrived in time and, breaking through the fighter cover, attacked our bombers over the target, damaged three aircraft (all of them returned safely to the airfield), but they could not prevent the targeted bombing.

Fighting 20 August 1939

At 9 o'clock in the morning, Soviet troops went on the offensive along the entire front. The greatest success that day was achieved by the Southern Group, which captured the Great Sands despite the fact that it acted without the support of tanks: the 6th Tank Brigade, delayed at the crossing due to poorly prepared exits and entrances, was late for 4 hours and did not participate in the offensive. The central group also basically completed the task of the day, not only tying the enemy in battle, but also moving forward 0.5-1 km. The most serious difficulties were encountered by the Northern Group, which was never able to break through the Japanese defenses, underestimating the strength of the enemy. The command assumed that no more than two Japanese companies were defending at the Finger height and expected to take it on the move - but unexpectedly ran into desperate resistance: only during the fighting it turned out that the Japanese created a powerful stronghold here, which lasted four days.
All day on August 20, Soviet bomber aviation worked along the enemy’s forward line and artillery positions, ensuring the advancement of ground troops. And our fighters not only successfully covered bombers over the battlefield, but also repeatedly stormed Japanese airfields, which forced the enemy to evacuate their aircraft further from the front line. We can say that on this day our pilots for the first time completely dominated the air.

The next morning, the Japanese tried to turn the tide by inflicting massive strikes on Soviet airfields, but they failed to repeat the June success - enemy bombers were timely detected by VNOS posts and met by Soviet fighters. Only the first of the three waves was able to break through to the target, but was bombed hastily and inefficiently; the other two were scattered by fighters on their way.
Having failed to suppress our aircraft, the Japanese command tried to redirect its bombers to strike at the advancing ground forces, but both strike groups were intercepted by fighters over the front line and, dropping bombs anywhere, hastily left the battle.

Fighting 21-22 August 1939

These days were turning points not only in the air, but also on the ground. As early as August 21, the troops of the Southern Group, reinforced by the 6th Tank Brigade, which had finally entered the battle, completely captured the Big and Small Sands and cut off the Japanese-Manchurian units operating south of the Khailastyn-Gol River, the exit to the east. In the northern direction, the 9th motorized armored brigade, bypassing the Finger height blocked by our troops, reached the spurs of the Nomonkhan-Burd-Obo mountain, threatening to close the encirclement.
On August 22, units of the Southern Group defeated Japanese reserves in the area of ​​Small Sands and proceeded to liquidate individual centers of resistance. Every trench, every firing point had to be stormed: the guns fired point-blank, the flamethrower tanks burned out the dugouts and trenches, and then the infantry advanced forward.

By the evening of August 23, the Finger height finally fell. This stronghold was a well-fortified area with a diameter of up to one and a half kilometers with all-round defense, reinforced anti-tank artillery, barbed wire and dugouts with concrete floors. "Samurai" had to be knocked out with bayonets and grenades, no one surrendered. At the end of the fighting, more than six hundred enemy corpses were removed from the trenches and dugouts. The encirclement of the Japanese group was completed.

The next day, the Japanese tried to break through the ring from the outside, large forces attacked the positions of the 80th Infantry Regiment in the Great Sands area, but were driven back. The attack was repeated on August 25 - with the same result. The encircled units also made attempts to break out of the "cauldron". At dawn on August 27, a large Japanese detachment (up to a battalion) tried to retreat east along the Khailastyn-Gol river valley, but was met by artillery fire, partly destroyed, and partly retreated. On the same day, another group tried to get out of the encirclement in the same way, but the story repeated itself: falling under hurricane fire, the Japanese fled to the northern shore of Khailastyn-Gol, where they were finished off by the 9th motorized armored brigade.
Japanese pilots unsuccessfully tried to help their doomed troops. The August aviation losses were so great that the enemy had to commit all available reserves into battle - even units flying on hopelessly outdated biplanes were transferred to Khalkhin Gol. But the war in the air was already hopelessly lost - as, indeed, on the ground.

By the morning of August 28, all pockets of resistance south of Khailastyn-Gel were eliminated. On the northern coast, the Japanese had the last, most fortified defense center - the Remizov hill. Blocked from all sides, after a powerful artillery preparation, the height was taken by the Soviet troops. However, the fighting here dragged on for another day - sowing in "fox holes" and dugouts, the Japanese fought to the last man. On August 30, the liquidation of individuals and small groups continued, trying to break out of the encirclement or seep through the orders of the Soviet troops. And only by the morning of August 31, the operation was completed and the territory of Mongolia was completely cleared of the Japanese-Manchu invaders.

SEPTEMBER - LAST CLUSTER

According to the official Soviet version, the fighting on the Khalkhin Gol River ended by September 1, 1939. But in reality, the clashes on the border continued for another half a month. In addition to daily skirmishes, the Japanese attacked our positions three times - on 4, 8 and 13 September. The most intense battle was on the 8th, when, in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe height of Eris-Ulin-Obo, two Japanese battalions managed to surround our company. However, help arrived in time, and the enemy was first driven back by Soviet tanks and infantry, and then surrounded and destroyed (only the dead Japanese lost 450 people that day).
Even more intense fighting took place in the air. Soviet fighters patrolling the border repeatedly engaged in skirmishes with the enemy.

Only in the first days of September, five air battles took place, in which the Japanese again suffered serious losses. Then it rained for a week, but on September 14, as soon as the weather improved, the enemy tried to bomb the advanced Soviet airfields, but was unsuccessful. The next day, the Japanese repeated the raid with larger forces. Despite the fact that they managed to catch our pilots by surprise - the VNOS posts warned of the approach of the enemy late, so the fighters had to take off under fire, immediately losing four - the operation again ended in failure for the Japanese: their bombers bombed inaccurately, without hitting on the ground not a single aircraft, and meanwhile reinforcements were already hurrying from neighboring airfields, attacking the lingering enemy from all sides and not allowing them to leave the battle with impunity. As a result, even according to their own data (usually underestimated), the Japanese lost ten aircraft, and our pilots - only six.
This air battle was the last. On the same day - August 15 - a ceasefire agreement was signed.
According to the agreement reached, on September 23, Soviet troops opened access to Japanese funeral teams on the battlefield. Under the terms of the agreement, the Japanese officers carried sabers and the soldiers carried bayonets, but no firearms. The exhumation and removal of the corpses continued for a whole week. Black smoke hung over the Japanese positions on the other side of the border from morning until late at night - the "samurai" burned the remains of their soldiers.

LOSSES OF THE PARTIES

At the end of the fighting, the Soviet side announced that the enemy had lost 52-55 thousand people at Khalkhin Gol, of which at least 22 thousand were killed. The Japanese figures are much more modest - 8632 killed and 9087 wounded (however, this ratio of sanitary and irretrievable losses itself raises serious suspicions of falsification).
According to statistical studies, Soviet troops suffered the following losses in personnel on the Khalkhin Gol River:

Of the military personnel admitted to hospitals, according to incomplete data, 3964 people were returned to service, 355 people were dismissed from the Red Army and 720 died.
There were relatively few prisoners on both sides. At the end of hostilities, the USSR returned 88 people to Japan, and the Japanese released 116 Soviet citizens.

Our losses in armored vehicles turned out to be very high - 253 tanks and 133 armored vehicles, not counting those restored during the battles. Which is not surprising - after all, it was the tank units that bore the brunt of the fighting (it is no coincidence that among the Heroes Soviet Union, awarded this title based on the results of the battles at Khalkhin Gol, most of all were tankers). In this category, a comparison with Japanese losses seems incorrect, because, unlike the Red Army, the enemy used his tanks very limitedly, and after the catastrophic losses suffered in early July, he completely brought both tank regiments to the rear.

As for aviation, Soviet sources cited such figures.

Enemy losses:

Period	Fighters	Scouts	Bombers	Transport aircraft	Total aircraft
16.05-3.06	1	-	-	-	1
17.06-27.06	53	-	-	-	55
28.06-12.07	103	-	-	-	105
21.07-8.08	161	6	-	-	173
9.08-20.08	32	-	-	1	33
21.08-31.08	146	22	35	5	208
1.09-15.09	68	2	1	-	71
Total	564	32	44	6	646

Soviet losses (from 22.05 to 16.09)

	Combat	non-combat	Total
I-16	83	22	105
I-16P	4	-	4
I-15bis	60	5	65
I-153	16	6	22
Sat	44	8	52
TB-3	-	1	1
Total	207	42	249

The Soviet figures for the losses of enemy aircraft are clearly overestimated, which, however, is quite natural - at all times and in all wars, enemy losses are considered according to the principle: "why should you feel sorry for him, the adversary." In this sense, Soviet pilots still surprise with their modesty - the Germans or the same Americans lie much more shamelessly, and even Japanese postscripts cannot even be called fantastic - they are simply anecdotal. So, the “samurai” claim that, having lost 162 aircraft at Khalkhin Gol, they themselves shot down 1340 Soviet ones and destroyed another 30 on the ground (that is, two times more than we had there at all). In a word, everything is like in that old joke: "Eighty of the forty tanks that broke through to our shore were destroyed."

1 In fairness, it must be said that Japanese pilots, too, risked their lives several times, landing in the depths of Mongolian territory in order to pick up their downed pilots.

Michitaro Komatsubara
Ryuhei Ogisu
Kenkichi Ueda Side forces by early August:
57,000 people
542 guns and mortars
2255 machine guns
498 tanks
385 armored vehicles
515 aircraft by early August:
75,000 people
500 guns
182 tanks
700 aircraft Military casualties 9284 - 9,703 killed, dead and missing, 15,952 wounded and sick
45000 people killed and wounded,
162 aircraft (according to Soviet sources - 660 aircraft and 2 balloons)

Japanese infantry crossing the river. Khalkhin Gol

In foreign historiography, in particular in American and Japanese, the term "Khalkhin Gol" is used only for the name of the river, and the military conflict itself is called the "incident at Nomon Khan." "Nomon-Khan" is the name of one of the mountains in this region of the Manchu-Mongolian border.

Background to the conflict

The conflict began with the demands of the Japanese side to recognize the Khalkhin-Gol River as the border between Manchukuo and Mongolia, although the border ran 20-25 km to the east. The main reason for this requirement was the desire to ensure the safety of the railway being built by the Japanese in this area, bypassing the Greater Khingan. Khalun-Arshan - Ganchzhur to the border of the USSR in the region of Irkutsk and Lake Baikal, since in some places the distance from the road to the border was only two or three kilometers. To substantiate their claims, Japanese cartographers fabricated false maps with the border along Khalkhin Gol and " a special order was issued to destroy a number of authoritative Japanese reference publications, on the maps of which the correct border was given in the area of ​​the Khalkhin Gol River» .

May 1939. First battles

The Soviet command took radical measures. On May 29, a group of aces pilots headed by the deputy head of the Red Army Air Force Yakov Smushkevich flew from Moscow to the combat area. 17 of them were heroes of the Soviet Union, many had combat experience in the skies of Spain and China. They began to train pilots, reorganized and strengthened the system of air surveillance, warning and communications. After that, the forces of the parties in the air became approximately equal.

Downed Soviet fighter

In early June, Feklenko was recalled to Moscow, and at the suggestion of the head of the operational department of the General Staff, M.V. Zakharov, G.K. Zhukov was appointed in his place. Brigade commander M. A. Bogdanov, who arrived with Zhukov, became the chief of staff of the corps. Shortly after arriving in the military conflict area in June, the chief of staff of the Soviet command proposed a new plan of military operations: conducting active defense on the bridgehead behind Khalkhin Gol and preparing a strong counterattack on the opposing grouping of the Japanese Kwantung Army. The People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff of the Red Army agreed with Bogdanov's proposals. The necessary forces began to be drawn to the combat area: the troops were brought along the Trans-Siberian Railway to Ulan-Ude, and then across the territory of Mongolia they followed the march order for 1300-1400 km. Corps Commissar J. Lkhagvasuren became Zhukov's assistant in command of the Mongolian cavalry.

To coordinate the actions of the Soviet troops on Far East and units of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army from Chita, the commander of the 1st Separate Red Banner Army, commander of the 2nd rank, G. M. Stern arrived in the area of ​​​​the Khalkhin Gol River.

Downed Japanese plane

Air battles resumed new force from 20 June. In the battles of June 22, 24 and 26, the Japanese lost more than 50 aircraft.

Throughout June, the Soviet side was engaged in arranging defenses on the eastern shore of Khalkhin Gol and planning a decisive counteroffensive. To ensure air supremacy, new Soviet modernized I-16 and Chaika fighters were deployed here, with which, for the first time in the world, combat unguided air-to-air missiles were used, later used to create multiple rocket launchers. So, as a result of the battle on June 22, which became widely known in Japan (in this battle, the famous Japanese ace pilot Takeo Fukuda, who became famous during the war in China, was shot down and captured), the superiority of Soviet aviation over the Japanese was ensured and it was possible to seize dominance in the air . In total, in air battles from June 22 to June 28, Japanese aviation forces lost 90 aircraft. The losses of Soviet aviation turned out to be much smaller - 38 aircraft.

July. The offensive of the Japanese group

Commander G.K. Zhukov and Marshal Choibalsan

Fierce battles unfolded around Mount Bayan-Tsagan. On both sides, up to 400 tanks and armored vehicles, more than 800 artillery pieces and hundreds of aircraft took part in them. Soviet artillerymen fired at the enemy with direct fire, and in the sky above the mountain at some points there were up to 300 aircraft from both sides. The 149th Infantry Regiment of Major I.M. Remizov and the 24th Motorized Rifle Regiment of I.I. Fedyuninsky especially distinguished themselves in these battles.

On the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol, by the night of July 3, the Soviet troops, due to the numerical superiority of the enemy, withdrew to the river, reducing the size of their eastern bridgehead on its bank, but the Japanese strike force under the command of Lieutenant General Masaomi Yasuoki did not fulfill its task.

The grouping of Japanese troops on Mount Bayan-Tsagan was in a semi-encirclement. By the evening of July 4, Japanese troops held only the top of Bayan-Tsagan - a narrow strip of terrain five kilometers long and two kilometers wide. On July 5, Japanese troops began to retreat towards the river. In order to force their soldiers to fight to the last, on the orders of the Japanese command, the only pontoon bridge over Khalkhin Gol that they had at their disposal was blown up. In the end, the Japanese troops at Mount Bayan-Tsagan began a wholesale retreat from their positions by the morning of July 5. According to some Russian historians more than 10 thousand Japanese soldiers and officers died on the slopes of Mount Bayan-Tsagan, although according to the estimates of the Japanese themselves, their total losses for the entire period of hostilities amounted to 8632 people. killed. However, it should be noted that some sources indicate the total losses on both sides of 120 thousand people, which significantly contradicts the official, both Soviet (7632 people killed) and Japanese data (8632 people killed). Japanese side almost all tanks and most of the artillery were lost. These events became known as the "Bayan-Tsagan battle".

The result of these battles was that in the future, as Zhukov later noted in his memoirs, the Japanese troops "no longer risked crossing to the western bank of the Khalkhin Gol River." All further events took place on the eastern bank of the river.

However, Japanese troops continued to remain on the territory of Mongolia, and the Japanese military leadership planned new offensive operations. Thus, the focus of conflict in the Khalkhin Gol region remained. The situation dictated the need to restore the state border of Mongolia and radically resolve this border conflict. Therefore, Zhukov began to plan an offensive operation with the aim of completely defeating the entire Japanese grouping located on the territory of Mongolia.

The 57th special corps was deployed into the 1st army (front) group under the command of Commander Stern Grigory Mikhailovich. In accordance with the decision of the Main Military Council of the Red Army, to lead the troops, the Military Council of the army group was established, consisting of: commander commander of the 2nd rank Shtern G. M., chief of staff commander commander Bogdanov M. A., commander of aviation commander Smushkevich Ya. V., commander Zhukov G.K., divisional commissar Nikishev M.S.

New troops urgently began to be transferred to the place of conflict, including the 82nd Infantry Division. The 37th Tank Brigade, which was armed with BT-7 and BT-5 tanks, was transferred from the Moscow Military District, partial mobilization was carried out on the territory of the Trans-Baikal Military District and the 114th and 93rd Rifle Divisions were formed.

General Ogisu and his staff also planned the attack, which was scheduled for 24 August. At the same time, taking into account the sad experience of the battles for the Japanese on Mount Bayan-Tsagan, this time the enveloping strike was planned on the right flank of the Soviet group. Forcing the river was not planned.

During the preparation by Zhukov for the offensive operation of the Soviet and Mongolian troops, a plan for operational-tactical deception of the enemy was carefully developed and strictly observed. All movements of troops in the front line were carried out only at night, it was strictly forbidden to send troops to the initial areas for the offensive, reconnaissance on the ground by the command staff was carried out only on trucks and in the form of ordinary Red Army soldiers. To mislead the enemy early period preparation for the offensive, the Soviet side at night with the help of sound installations imitated the noise of the movement of tanks and armored vehicles, aircraft and engineering work. Soon the Japanese got tired of reacting to sources of noise, so during the actual regrouping of Soviet troops, their opposition was minimal. Also, all the time preparing for the offensive, the Soviet side conducted an active electronic warfare against the enemy. Knowing that the Japanese were conducting active radio reconnaissance and listening in on telephone conversations, a program of false radio and telephone messages was developed in order to misinform the enemy. Negotiations were only about the construction of defensive structures and preparations for the autumn-winter campaign. The radio exchange in these cases was based on an easily decipherable code.

Despite the general superiority in the forces of the Japanese side, by the beginning of the offensive, Stern managed to achieve almost three times superiority in tanks and 1.7 times in aircraft. For the offensive operation, two-week stocks of ammunition, food, fuel and lubricants were created. More than 4,000 trucks and 375 tank trucks were used to transport goods over a distance of 1,300-1,400 kilometers. It should be noted that one car trip with cargo and back lasted five days.

During the offensive operation, Zhukov, using maneuverable mechanized and tank units, planned to encircle and destroy the enemy with unexpected strong flank attacks in the area between the state border of the MPR and the Khalkhin-Gol River. At Khalkhin Gol, for the first time in world military practice, tank and mechanized units were used to solve operational tasks as the main striking force of flank groupings that performed encirclement maneuvers.

The advancing troops were divided into three groups - Southern, Northern and Central. The main blow was delivered by the Southern group under the command of Colonel M. I. Potapov, the auxiliary blow was delivered by the Northern group, commanded by Colonel I. P. Alekseenko. The central group under the command of the brigade commander D. E. Petrov was supposed to tie down the enemy forces in the center, on the front line, thereby depriving them of the ability to maneuver. In the reserve, concentrated in the center, were the 212th airborne, 9th motorized armored brigades and a tank battalion. Mongolian troops also participated in the operation - the 6th and 8th cavalry divisions under the overall command of Marshal X. Choibalsan.

The offensive of the Soviet-Mongolian troops began on August 20, thereby preempting the offensive of the Japanese troops, scheduled for August 24.

Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army at Khalkhin Gol, 1939.

The offensive of the Soviet-Mongolian troops, which began on August 20, turned out to be a complete surprise for the Japanese command.

At 06:15 a powerful artillery preparation and an air raid on enemy positions began. At 9 o'clock the offensive of the ground forces began. On the first day of the offensive, the attacking troops acted in full accordance with the plans, with the exception of a hitch that occurred during the crossing of the tanks of the 6th tank brigade, since the pontoon bridge induced by the sappers could not withstand the weight of the tanks during the crossing of Khalkhin Gol.

The enemy offered the most stubborn resistance in the central sector of the front, where the Japanese had well-equipped engineering fortifications. Here the attackers managed to advance only 500-1000 meters in a day.

Already on the 21st and 22nd of August, the Japanese troops, having come to their senses, fought stubborn defensive battles, so Zhukov had to bring into battle the reserve 9th motorized armored brigade.

Forcing by Soviet tanks of the river. Khalkhin Gol

Soviet aviation also operated well at that time. On August 24 and 25 alone, SB bombers made 218 sorties and dropped about 96 tons of bombs on the enemy. During these two days, fighters shot down about 70 Japanese aircraft in air battles.

In general, it should be noted that the command of the Japanese 6th Army on the first day of the offensive was unable to determine the direction of the main attack of the advancing troops and did not attempt to support its troops defending on the flanks. The armored and mechanized troops of the Southern and Northern groups of the Soviet-Mongolian troops by the end of August 26 joined and completed the complete encirclement of the 6th Japanese Army. After that, it began to be crushed by cutting blows and destroyed in parts.

Captured Japanese soldiers

In general, Japanese soldiers, mostly infantrymen, as Zhukov later noted in his memoirs, fought extremely fiercely and extremely stubbornly, to the last man. Often, Japanese dugouts and bunkers were captured only when there was no longer a single living Japanese soldier there. As a result of the stubborn resistance of the Japanese on August 23 in the Central sector of the front, Zhukov even had to bring his last reserve into battle: the 212th airborne brigade and two companies of border guards. At the same time, he took a considerable risk, since the closest reserve of the commander - the Mongolian armored brigade - was in Tamtsak-Bulak, 120 kilometers from the front.

Repeated attempts by the Japanese command to conduct counterattacks and release the group surrounded in the Khalkhin Gol region ended in failure. On August 24, the regiments of the 14th Infantry Brigade of the Kwantung Army, which approached the Mongolian border from Hailar, engaged in battle with the 80th Infantry Regiment, which covered the border, but neither that day nor the next could they break through and retreated to the territory of Manchukuo . After the fighting on August 24-26, the command of the Kwantung Army, until the very end of the operation on Khalkhin Gol, did not try to release its encircled troops, resigned to the inevitability of their death.

The Red Army captured 100 vehicles, 30 heavy and 145 field guns, 42 thousand shells, 115 easel and 225 light machine guns, 12 thousand rifles and about 2 million cartridges, and many other military equipment as trophies.

The last battles still continued on August 29 and 30 in the area north of the Khailastyn-Gol River. By the morning of August 31, the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic was completely cleared of Japanese troops. However, this was not yet the complete end of hostilities.

Through its ambassador in Moscow, Shigenori Togo, the Japanese government turned to the government of the USSR with a request to cease hostilities on the Mongolian-Manchurian border. On September 15, 1939, an agreement was signed between the Soviet Union, the MPR and Japan on the cessation of hostilities in the area of ​​the Khalkhin Gol River, which entered into force the next day.

Results

The victory of the USSR and the MPR at Khalkhin Gol became one of the reasons for Japan's non-aggression on the USSR during the Great Patriotic War. Immediately after the start of the war, the General Staff of Japan, taking into account, among other things, the experience of Khalkhin Gol, decided to enter the war against the USSR only if Moscow fell before the end of August. In response to Hitler's demand in a telegram dated June 30 to immediately fulfill their allied obligations and strike at the USSR from the east, at a meeting of the Council of Ministers on July 2, the final decision was made to wait until Germany was certain of victory.

In Japan, the defeat and the simultaneous signing of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact led to a government crisis and the resignation of Hiranuma Kiichiro's cabinet. The new Japanese government announced on September 4 that it did not intend to interfere in any form in the conflict in Europe, and on September 15 signed an armistice agreement, which led to the conclusion of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact on April 13, 1941. In the traditional confrontation between the Japanese army and navy, the "sea party" won, advocating the idea of ​​​​cautious expansion in Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands. The military leadership of Germany, having studied the experience of the Japanese wars in China and Khalkhin Gol, very lowly assessed the military capabilities of Japan and did not recommend Hitler to associate himself with her alliance.

The fighting on the territory of the MPR coincided with the negotiations of the Japanese Foreign Minister Hachiro Arita (English) Russian With the English ambassador in Tokyo by Robert Craigie. In July 1939, an agreement was concluded between England and Japan, according to which Great Britain recognized the Japanese seizures in China (thus providing diplomatic support for the aggression against the MPR and its ally, the USSR). At the same time, the US government extended the trade agreement with Japan, which was denounced on January 26, for six months, and then completely restored it. As part of the agreement, Japan purchased trucks for the Kwantung Army, machines for aircraft factories for $3 million, strategic materials (till 10/16/1940 - steel and iron scrap, until 07/26/1941 - gasoline and oil products), etc. A new embargo was imposed only on July 26 1941 . However, the official position of the US government did not mean a complete cessation of trade. Goods and even strategic raw materials continued to flow to Japan until the start of the war with the United States.

The influence of the Khalkhin-Gol campaign on the Sino-Japanese War is poorly understood.

"Golden Star"

Aviation Commander of the 1st Army Group Ya. V. Smushkevich and Commander G. M. Stern were awarded the Gold Star medals for the battles at Khalkhin Gol. After the end of the conflict, Smushkevich was appointed head of the Red Army Air Force, Stern commanded the 8th Army during the Soviet-Finnish War. In June 1941, both commanders were arrested and shot a few months later. Rehabilitated in 1954.

The chief of staff of the 1st Army Group, brigade commander M. A. Bogdanov, was awarded the Order of the Red Banner by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of November 17, 1939. At the end of hostilities in September 1939, by order of the NKO of the USSR, he was appointed deputy commander of the 1st Army Group (Ulaanbaatar). In the same month, by a Decree of the Government of the USSR, he was appointed chairman of the Soviet-Mongolian delegation to the Mixed Commission for resolving disputes over the state border between the MPR and Manchuria in the conflict area. At the end of the negotiations, as a result of a provocation from the Japanese side, Bogdanov made "a gross mistake that damaged the prestige of the USSR", for which he was put on trial. On March 1, 1940, the Military Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court convicted him under Art. 193-17 paragraph "a" for 4 years ITL. By the Decree of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of August 23, 1941, he was amnestied with the removal of a criminal record and sent to the disposal of the NPO of the USSR. He finished the Great Patriotic War as a division commander and the rank of major general.

Propaganda in the USSR

The events at Khalkhin Gol important element propaganda in the USSR. Novels, poems and songs were written, articles were published in newspapers. The essence of propaganda was reduced to the idea of ​​the invincibility of the Red Army in a future war. Participants in the tragic events of the summer of 1941 repeatedly noted the harm of excessive optimism on the eve of the great war.

In literature

• Simonov K. M. - the novel "Comrades in Arms".
• Simonov K. M. - the poem "Far in the East."
• Simonov K. M. - poem "Tank".

In cinema

• « Khalkhin Gol» () - documentary film, TSSDF.
• "Listen, on the other side" () - Soviet-Mongolian Feature Film, dedicated to the battles at Khalkhin Gol.
• "Officers" (, dir. V. Rogovoi) - in one of the episodes of the film, the heroes of G. Yumatov and V. Lanovoy meet in a military conflict at Khalkhin Gol.
• "I, Shapovalov T.P." (, dir. Karelov E. E.) - the first part of the dilogy "High rank", an episode in the film.
• “By the Ways of the Fathers” () is a television film by the Irkutsk TV journalist Natalya Volina, dedicated to the 65th anniversary of the end of the fighting on the Khalkhin Gol River and the Soviet-Mongolian expedition to places of military glory.
• Khalkhin Gol. Unknown War"() - a documentary film dedicated to the 70th anniversary of the victory on the Khalkhin Gol River. Used in the film a large number of chronicles, as well as comments by veterans participating in those events and historians.

Literature

• Bakaev D. A. In the fire of Khasan and Khalkhin Gol. Saratov, Volga Prince. publishing house, 1984. - 151 pages.
• Vorozheikin A.V. Stronger than death. - M .: Children's literature, 1978.
• Vorotnikov M.F. G.K. Zhukov at Khalkhin Gol. Omsk: book publishing house, 1989-224 pages (circulation 10,000 copies)
• Gorbunov E. A. August 20, 1939. M., "Young Guard", 1986.
• Zhukov G.K. Memories and reflections. (Chapter 7. Undeclared war on Khalkhin Gol). - M .: OLMA-PRESS, 2002.
• Kondratiev V. Khalkhin Gol: War in the Air. - M .: Techniques - Youth, 2002.
• Kondratiev V. Battle over the steppe. Aviation in the Soviet-Japanese armed conflict on the Khalkhin-Gol River. - M .: Aviation Assistance Fund "Russian Knights", 2008. - 144 p. - (Series: Air Wars of the XX century). - 2000 copies. - ISBN 978-5-903389-11-7
• Koshkin A. A."Kantokuen" - "Barbarossa" in Japanese. Why didn't Japan attack the USSR?
• Koshkin A. A. The collapse of the "Ripe Persimmon" strategy: military policy Japan in relation to the USSR 1931-1945. - M.: Thought, 1989. - 272 p.
• Kuznetsov I.I. Heroes of Khalkhin Gol. 3rd ed., add. Ulaanbaatar, Gosizdat, 1984-144 pp.
• Simonov K. M. Far to the east. Khalkhin-Gol notes. - M .: Fiction, 1985.
• At Khalkhin Gol. Memoirs of Leningraders-participants in the battles with the Japanese militarists in the area of ​​the Khalkhin-Gol River in 1939. Comp. N. M. Rumyantsev. - L .: Lenizdat, 1989.
• Novikov M.V. Victory at Khalkhin Gol. - M .: Politizdat, 1971. - 110 p. - 150,000 copies.
• Panasovsky V. E. Lessons from Khasan and Khalkhin Gol. M., "Knowledge", 1989.
• Fedyuninsky I.I. In the East. - M .: Military Publishing House, 1985.
• Shishov A.V. Russia and Japan. History of military conflicts. - M .: Veche, 2001.

see also

• List of associations, formations, units and subdivisions that were part of the Army in the area of ​​the river. Khalkhin Gol in 1939

Notes

1. Team of authors. Russia and the USSR in the wars of the twentieth century: Losses Armed Forces/ G. F. Krivosheev. - M .: OLMA-PRESS, 2001. - S. 177. - 608 p. - (Archive). - 5,000 copies. - ISBN 5-224-01515-4
2. History of the Second World War. 1939-1945 (in 12 volumes). Volume 2, M., Military Publishing, 1974. p.217
3. (English) . Combat Studies Institute, fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1981. Retrieved June 20, 2010.
4. The team of authors. Russia and the USSR in the Wars of the 20th Century: A Statistical Study. M., 2001. S. 179
5. Kolomiets M. Battles near the Khalkhin-Gol River, May-September 1939. M., 2002. S. 65.

Mongolia Mongolia 2 260 people (2 cavalry divisions)

In Japanese historiography, the term " Khalkhin Gol" is used only for the name of the river, and the military conflict itself is called " Incident at Nomon Khan”, by the name of a small village in this region of the Manchurian-Mongolian border.

Encyclopedic YouTube

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✪ Battles at Khalkhin Gol

✪ Battle of Khalkhin Gol in 1939.

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Background to the conflict

According to the Soviet side, the beginning of the conflict was laid by the demands of the Japanese side for the recognition of the Khalkhin Gol River as the border between Manchukuo and Mongolia, although the border ran 20-25 km to the east. The main reason for this requirement was the desire to ensure the safety of the railway being built by the Japanese in this area, bypassing the Great Khingan railway. Khalun-Arshan - Ganchzhur to the border of the USSR in the region of Irkutsk and Lake Baikal, since in some places the distance from the road to the border was only two or three kilometers. According to the Soviet historian M. V. Novikov, in order to substantiate their claims, Japanese cartographers fabricated false maps with the border along Khalkhin Gol and “ a special order was issued to destroy a number of authoritative Japanese reference publications, on the maps of which the correct border was given in the area of ​​the Khalkhin Gol River”, but the Russian historian K. E. Cherevko points out that the administrative border along the Khalkhin Gol channel was marked on a map published on the basis of Russian topographic surveys of 1906 and on the physical map of Outer Mongolia of the General Staff of the Republic of China in 1918.

May

The Soviet command took radical measures. On May 29, a group of aces-pilots headed by Ya. V. Smushkevich, deputy head of the Red Army Air Force, flew from Moscow to the combat area. 17 of them were heroes of the Soviet Union, many had combat experience of the war in Spain and China. They began to train pilots, reorganized and strengthened the system of air surveillance, warning and communications.

To strengthen the air defense, two divisions of the 191st Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment were sent to the Trans-Baikal Military District.

In early June, Feklenko was recalled to Moscow, and at the suggestion of the head of the operational department of the General Staff, M.V. Zakharov, G.K. Zhukov was appointed in his place. Brigade commander M. A. Bogdanov, who arrived with Zhukov, became the chief of staff of the corps. Shortly after arriving in the area of ​​the military conflict in June, the chief of staff of the Soviet command proposed a new plan of military operations: conducting active defense on the bridgehead behind Khalkhin Gol and preparing a strong counterattack against the opposing grouping of the Japanese Kwantung Army. The People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff of the Red Army agreed with Bogdanov's proposals. The necessary forces began to be drawn to the combat area: the troops were brought along the Trans-Siberian railway to Ulan-Ude, and then across the territory of Mongolia they followed the march order for 1300-1400 km. Zhukov's assistant in command of the Mongolian cavalry was the corps commissar Zhamyangiin Lkhagvasuren.

To coordinate the actions of the Soviet troops in the Far East and units of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army from Chita, the commander of the 1st Separate Red Banner Army commander of the 2nd rank G. M. Stern arrived in the region of the Khalkhin Gol River.

Air battles resumed with renewed vigor on June 20. In the battles of June 22, 24 and 26, the Japanese lost more than 50 aircraft.

July

Fierce battles unfolded around Mount Bayan-Tsagan. On both sides, up to 400 tanks and armored vehicles, more than 800 artillery pieces and hundreds of aircraft took part in them. Soviet artillerymen fired at the enemy with direct fire, and in the sky above the mountain at some points there were up to 300 aircraft from both sides. The 149th Infantry Regiment of Major I.M. Remizov and the 24th Motorized Rifle Regiment of I.I. Fedyuninsky especially distinguished themselves in these battles.

On the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol, by the night of July 3, the Soviet troops, due to the numerical superiority of the enemy, withdrew to the river, reducing the size of their eastern bridgehead on its bank, but the Japanese strike force under the command of Lieutenant General Masaomi Yasuoka did not fulfill the task assigned to it.

The grouping of Japanese troops on Mount Bayan-Tsagan was in a semi-encirclement. By the evening of July 4, Japanese troops held only the top of Bayan-Tsagan - a narrow strip of terrain five kilometers long and two kilometers wide. On July 5, Japanese troops began to retreat towards the river. In order to force their soldiers to fight to the last, on the orders of the Japanese command, the only pontoon bridge over Khalkhin Gol that they had at their disposal was blown up. In the end, the Japanese troops at Mount Bayan-Tsagan began a wholesale retreat from their positions by the morning of July 5. According to some Russian historians, more than 10 thousand Japanese soldiers and officers died on the slopes of Mount Bayan-Tsagan, although according to the estimates of the Japanese themselves, their total losses for the entire period of hostilities amounted to 8632 people. killed. The Japanese side lost almost all tanks and most of the artillery. These events became known as the "Bayan-Tsagan battle".

The result of these battles was that in the future, as Zhukov later noted in his memoirs, the Japanese troops "no longer risked crossing to the western bank of the Khalkhin Gol River." All further events took place on the eastern bank of the river.

However, Japanese troops continued to remain on the territory of Mongolia, and the Japanese military leadership planned new offensive operations. Thus, the focus of conflict in the Khalkhin Gol region remained. The situation dictated the need to restore the state border of Mongolia and radically resolve this border conflict. Therefore, Zhukov began to plan an offensive operation with the aim of completely defeating the entire Japanese grouping located on the territory of Mongolia.

July August

The 57th special corps was deployed into the 1st army (front) group under the command of commander G. M. Stern. In accordance with the decision of the Main Military Council of the Red Army, the Military Council of the army group was established to lead the troops, consisting of: commander of the army commander of the 2nd rank G. M. Stern, chief of staff brigade commander M. A. Bogdanov, commander of aviation corps commander Ya. commander G. K. Zhukov, divisional commissar M. S. Nikishev.

New troops urgently began to be transferred to the place of conflict, including the 82nd Rifle Division. The 37th tank brigade, which was armed with BT-7 and BT-5 tanks, was transferred from the Moscow military district, partial mobilization was carried out on the territory of the Trans-Baikal military district and the 114th and 93rd rifle divisions were formed.

General Ogisu and his staff also planned an offensive, which was scheduled for August 24th. At the same time, taking into account the sad experience of the battles for the Japanese on Mount Bayan-Tsagan, this time the enveloping strike was planned on the right flank of the Soviet group. Forcing the river was not planned.

During the preparation by the Soviet command of the offensive operation of the Soviet and Mongolian troops, a plan for the operational-tactical deception of the enemy was carefully developed and strictly observed. All movements of troops in the front line were carried out only at night, it was strictly forbidden to send troops to the initial areas for the offensive, reconnaissance on the ground by the command staff was carried out only on trucks and in the form of ordinary Red Army soldiers. To mislead the enemy in the early period of preparation for the offensive, the Soviet side at night, using sound installations, imitated the noise of the movement of tanks and armored vehicles, aircraft and engineering work. Soon the Japanese got tired of reacting to sources of noise, so during the actual regrouping of Soviet troops, their opposition was minimal. Also, all the time preparing for the offensive, the Soviet side conducted an active electronic warfare against the enemy. Knowing that the Japanese were conducting active radio reconnaissance and listening in on telephone conversations, a program of false radio and telephone messages was developed in order to misinform the enemy. Negotiations were only about the construction of defensive structures and preparations for the autumn-winter campaign. The radio exchange in these cases was based on an easily decipherable code.

Despite the general superiority in the forces of the Japanese side, by the beginning of the offensive, Stern managed to achieve almost three times superiority in tanks and 1.7 times in aircraft. For the offensive operation, two-week stocks of ammunition, food, fuel and lubricants were created. More than 4,000 trucks and 375 tank trucks were used to transport goods over a distance of 1,300-1,400 kilometers. It should be noted that one car trip with cargo and back lasted five days.

During the offensive operation, the Soviet command, using maneuverable mechanized and tank units, planned to surround and destroy the enemy with unexpected strong flank attacks in the area between the state border of the MPR and the Khalkhin Gol River. At Khalkhin Gol, for the first time in world military practice, tank and mechanized units were used to solve operational tasks as the main striking force of flank groupings that performed encirclement maneuvers.

The advancing troops were divided into three groups - Southern, Northern and Central. The main blow was delivered by the Southern Group under the command of Colonel M. I. Potapov, the auxiliary blow was delivered by the Northern Group, commanded by Colonel I. P. Alekseenko. The central group under the command of the brigade commander D. E. Petrov was supposed to tie down the enemy forces in the center, on the front line, thereby depriving them of the ability to maneuver. In the reserve, concentrated in the center, were the 212th Airborne, 9th Motorized Armored Brigade and a tank battalion. Mongolian troops also participated in the operation - the 6th and 8th cavalry divisions under the overall command of Marshal X. Choibalsan.

The offensive of the Soviet-Mongolian troops began on August 20, thereby preempting the offensive of the Japanese troops, scheduled for August 24.

The balance of forces of the parties before the start of the offensive

August

The offensive of the Soviet-Mongolian troops, which began on August 20, turned out to be a complete surprise for the Japanese command.

At 06:15 a powerful artillery preparation and an air raid on enemy positions began. 153 bombers and about 100 fighters were lifted into the air. At 9 o'clock the offensive of the ground forces began. On the first day of the offensive, the attacking troops acted in full accordance with the plans, with the exception of a hitch that occurred during the crossing of the tanks of the 6th tank brigade, since the pontoon bridge induced by the sappers could not withstand the gravity of the tanks during the crossing of Khalkhin Gol.

The enemy offered the most stubborn resistance in the central sector of the front, where the Japanese had well-equipped engineering fortifications. Here the attackers managed to advance only 500-1000 meters in a day.

Already on the 21st and 22nd of August, the Japanese troops, having come to their senses, fought stubborn defensive battles, so the Soviet command had to bring into battle the reserve 9th motorized armored brigade.

Soviet aviation also operated well at that time. On August 24 and 25 alone, SB bombers made 218 sorties and dropped about 96 tons of bombs on the enemy. During these two days, fighters shot down about 70 Japanese aircraft in air battles.

In general, it should be noted that the command of the Japanese 6th Army on the first day of the offensive was unable to determine the direction of the main attack of the advancing troops and did not attempt to support its troops defending on the flanks. The armored and mechanized troops of the Southern and Northern Groups of the Soviet-Mongolian Forces united by the end of August 26 and completed the complete encirclement of the 6th Japanese Army. After that, it began to be crushed by cutting blows and destroyed in parts.

In general, Japanese soldiers, mostly infantrymen, as Zhukov later noted in his memoirs, fought extremely fiercely and extremely stubbornly, to the last man. Often, Japanese dugouts and bunkers were captured only when there was no longer a single living Japanese soldier there. As a result of the stubborn resistance of the Japanese on August 23 in the Central sector of the front, the Soviet command even had to bring into battle its last reserve: the 212th airborne brigade and two companies of border guards. At the same time, it took a considerable risk, since the closest reserve of the commander - the Mongolian armored brigade - was in Tamtsak-Bulak, 120 kilometers from the front.

Repeated attempts by the Japanese command to conduct counterattacks and release the group surrounded in the Khalkhin Gol region ended in failure. On August 24, the regiments of the 14th Infantry Brigade of the Kwantung Army, which approached the Mongolian border from Hailar, engaged in battle with the 80th Infantry Regiment, which covered the border, but neither that day nor the next could break through and retreated to the territory of Manchukuo . After the fighting on August 24-26, the command of the Kwantung Army, until the very end of the operation on Khalkhin Gol, did not try to release its encircled troops, resigned to the inevitability of their death.

The Red Army captured 100 vehicles, 30 heavy and 145 field guns, 42 thousand shells, 115 easel and 225 light machine guns, 12 thousand rifles and about 2 million cartridges, and many other military equipment as trophies.

The last battles still continued on August 29 and 30 in the area north of the Khailastyn-Gol River. By the morning of August 31, the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic was completely cleared of Japanese troops. However, this was not yet the complete end of hostilities.

In total, during the conflict, the USSR lost 207 aircraft, Japan - 162.

During the fighting near the Khalkhin-Gol River, Soviet troops actively used artillery: according to incomplete data (the results of the shelling of a number of objects in the adjacent territory were not established), 133 artillery pieces were destroyed by artillery fire (six 105-mm guns, 55 pcs. 75- mm guns, 69 small-caliber and three anti-aircraft guns), 49 mortars, 117 machine guns, 47 artillery, 21 mortar and 30 machine-gun batteries were suppressed, 40 tanks and 29 armored vehicles were knocked out, 21 observation posts, 55 dugouts, 2 fuel depots and 2 warehouses with ammunition

Through its ambassador in Moscow, Shigenori Togo, the Japanese government turned to the government of the USSR with a request to cease hostilities on the Mongolian-Manchurian border. On September 15, 1939, an agreement was signed between the Soviet Union, the MPR and Japan on the cessation of hostilities in the area of ​​the Khalkhin Gol River, which entered into force the next day.

But "de jure" the conflict ended only in May 1942 with the signing of the final settlement agreement. Moreover, it was a compromise settlement, largely in favor of the Japanese, based on old map. For the Red Army, which suffered defeats on the Soviet-German front, then there was enough a difficult situation. Therefore, the settlement was pro-Japanese. But it lasted only until 1945, before the surrender of Japan in the Second World War.

Results

The victory of the USSR and the MPR at Khalkhin Gol became one of the reasons for the refusal of Japan's attack on the USSR during the Great Patriotic War. Immediately after the start of the war, the General Staff of Japan, taking into account, among other things, the experience of Khalkhin Gol, decided to enter the war against the USSR only if Moscow fell before the end of August. In response to Hitler's demand in a telegram dated June 30th to immediately fulfill his allied obligations and strike at the USSR from the east, at a meeting of the Council of Ministers on July 2nd, the final decision was made to wait until Germany was certain of victory.

In Japan, the defeat and the simultaneous (August 23) signing of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact led to a government crisis and the resignation of Hiranuma's Kiichiro cabinet. On September 4, the new Japanese government declared that it did not intend to interfere in any form in the conflict in Europe, and on September 15 signed an armistice agreement, which led to the conclusion of the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact on April 13, 1941. In the traditional confrontation between the Japanese army and navy, the “sea party” won, advocating the idea of ​​​​cautious expansion in Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands. The military leadership of Germany, having studied the experience of the Japanese wars in China and Khalkhin Gol, very lowly assessed the military capabilities of Japan and did not recommend Hitler to associate himself with her alliance.

The fighting on the territory of the MPR coincided with the negotiations of the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Hachiro Arita with the British Ambassador to Tokyo Robert Craigie. In July 1939, an agreement was concluded between England and Japan, according to which Great Britain recognized the Japanese seizures in China (thus providing diplomatic support for the aggression against the MPR and its ally, the USSR). At the same time, the US government extended the trade agreement with Japan, which was denounced on January 26, for six months, and then completely restored it. As part of the agreement, Japan purchased trucks for the Kwantung Army, machines for aircraft factories for $3 million, strategic materials (till 10/16/1940 - steel and iron scrap, until 07/26/1941 - gasoline and oil products), etc. A new embargo was imposed only on July 26 1941. However, the official position of the US government did not mean a complete cessation of trade. Goods and even strategic raw materials continued to flow to Japan until the start of the war with the United States.

The events at Khalkhin Gol also became an important element of propaganda in the USSR. Its essence boiled down to the idea of ​​the invincibility of the Red Army in a future war. Participants in the tragic events of the summer of 1941 have repeatedly noted the harm of excessive optimism on the eve of the great war.

The influence of the Khalkhin-Gol campaign on the Sino-Japanese War is poorly understood.

"Golden Star"

The government of the Mongolian People's Republic established the badge “Participant in battles at Khalkhin Gol”, which was awarded to distinguished Soviet and Mongolian military personnel.

Khalkhin-Gol was the beginning of the military career of G.K. Zhukov. The previously unknown division commander (deputy commander of the ZapOVO), after the victory over the Japanese, headed (June 7, 1940) the largest Kyiv military district in the country, and then became the chief of the General Staff of the Red Army.

The commander of the 1st Army Group, Commander G. M. Stern and the commander of aviation Ya. V. Smushkevich, were also awarded the Gold Star medals for the battles at Khalkhin Gol. After the end of the conflict, Smushkevich was appointed head of the Air Force of the Red Army, Stern commanded the 8th Army during the Soviet-Finnish War.

The chief of staff of the 1st Army Group, brigade commander M. A. Bogdanov, was awarded the Order of the Red Banner by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of November 17, 1939. At the end of hostilities in September 1939, by order of the NKO of the USSR, he was appointed deputy commander of the 1st Army Group (Ulaanbaatar). In the same month, by a Decree of the Government of the USSR, he was appointed chairman of the Soviet-Mongolian delegation to the Mixed Commission for resolving disputes over the state border between the MPR and Manchuria in the conflict area. At the end of the negotiations, as a result of a provocation from the Japanese side, Bogdanov made "a gross mistake that damaged the prestige of the USSR", for which he was put on trial. On March 1, 1940, by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR, he was convicted under Art. 193-17 paragraph "a" for 4 years ITL. By the Decree of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of August 23, 1941, he was amnestied with the removal of a criminal record and sent to the disposal of the NPO of the USSR. He finished the Great Patriotic War as a division commander and the rank of major general.

Side losses

According to official Soviet data, the losses of the Japanese-Manchurian troops during the fighting from May to September 1939 amounted to more than 61 thousand people. killed, wounded and captured, including about 25,000 killed (of which about 20,000 were actually Japanese losses). Officially announced losses of the Kwantung Army: 18 thousand people [ ] . Independent Japanese researchers give figures up to 45 thousand people. [ ] . In the studies of A. Nakanishi, only the Japanese lost 17,405 - 20,801 people killed and wounded, the losses of the Manchus are not taken into account.

According to Soviet data, 227 Japanese and Manchurian soldiers were captured during the fighting. Of these, 6 died in captivity from wounds, 3 refused to return to Japan, the rest were handed over to the Japanese side). Also, three Barguts refused to return to Inner Mongolia.

The irretrievable losses of the Soviet troops amounted to 9,703 people (including 6,472 dead, 1,152 dead from wounds in hospitals, 8 dead from diseases, 2,028 missing, 43 dead from accidents). Sanitary losses amounted to 15,952 people (including 15,251 wounded, shell-shocked and burned, 701 sick). According to official data, the losses of the Mongolian troops amounted to 165 killed and 401 wounded (sometimes, with reference to a certain Mongolian historian T. Ganbold, data are given about 234 killed and 661 wounded, and a total of 895 people were the total losses of the Mongolian troops). In the studies of A. Nakanishi, the losses of the Soviet-Mongolian side amounted to 23,000 - 24,889.

During the fighting, 97 Soviet servicemen were captured. Of these, 82 were returned by prisoner exchange in September, 11 people were killed by the Japanese in captivity, 4 refused to return from captivity. Of the prisoners of war returned to the Soviet Union, 38 people were tried by a military tribunal on charges of voluntarily surrendering or collaborating with the Japanese in captivity.

Reflection in literature and art

The events at Khalkhin Gol were reflected in Soviet and world literature and art. Novels, poems and songs were written about them, articles were published in newspapers.

• K. M. Simonov - the novel "Comrades in Arms", the poem "Far in the East", the poem "Tank", the poem "Doll".
• F. Bokarev - poem "Memory of Khalkhin Gol"
• H. Murakami - the novel "Chronicles Clockwork Birds" (a long story by Lieutenant Mamiya).
• Gelasimov A. V. - novel "Steppe gods", 2008.

In cinema

• "Khalkhin-Gol" () - documentary film, TSSDF.
• “Listen, on the other side” () is a Soviet-Mongolian feature film dedicated to the battles at Khalkhin Gol.
• "I, Shapovalov T.P." (, dir. Karelov E. E.) - the first part of the dilogy "High rank", an episode in the film.
• “By the Ways of the Fathers” () is a television film by the Irkutsk TV journalist Natalya Volina, dedicated to the 65th anniversary of the end of the fighting on the Khalkhin Gol River and the Soviet-Mongolian expedition to places of military glory.
• Khalkhin Gol. Unknown War ”() - a documentary film dedicated to the 70th anniversary of the victory on the Khalkhin Gol River. The film uses a large number of chronicles, as well as comments by veterans participating in those events and historians.
• Volunteers
• My Way (film, 2011) (Korean: 마이웨이) is a Korean film directed by Kang Jae-gyu, released in 2011. The film is based on the story of Korean Yang Kyongjon and Japanese Tatsuo Hasegawa, who were captured by the Red Army at Khalkhin Gol.

Battles on the Mongolian-Manchurian border between the Soviet-Mongolian and Japanese troops, during which Soviet troops under command carried out a classic deep offensive operation with encirclement and complete defeat of the enemy. Tanks, aviation, artillery were actively involved in the battle.

Late 30s. The 20th century was characterized by great growth international tension. At the same time, militarized Germany and Japan pursued an active policy of expanding their territories at the expense of neighboring states. The Soviet Union was also quite active in this regard. His interests in the Far East clashed with those of Japan.

The name of the big battle that took place in Mongolia between the two powers, Khalkhin Gol, is replaced by many Western historians with the term “the incident at Nomon Khan” (after the name of the border mountain), allegedly provoked by the Soviet side to show their military strength.

This is probably not entirely true. Undoubtedly, the USSR, during the fighting in the Far East, worked out schemes for conducting deep offensive operations, which was going to be used in the coming big war in Europe. There is no need to harbor illusions about the sincerity of the friendship of the Soviet government with the countries that are oppressed and captured by all sorts of aggressors. Indeed, among the new "friends" of the Stalinist regime, in addition to the future "16th Soviet Republic" of Mongolia (by the way, recognized by that time only by the Soviet Union), Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Moldova, and Western Ukraine soon turned out to be. Finland also experienced the power of friendly Soviet disposition. Japan's aims, however, were no more noble. The militarized and aggressive power sought to secure a military foothold for itself, invaded foreign territories, and created a fortified military region here. The actions of the Japanese in relation to Outer Mongolia may well be assessed as aggressive.

* * *

In the 30s. the Japanese army invaded China, occupied the entire territory of Manchuria, creating here the puppet state of Manchukuo, headed by Emperor Pu Yi. Manchuria was turned by Japan into a base of aggression against the USSR, Mongolia and China. The first step of aggression was the invasion of the Japanese in July 1938 into Soviet territory near the lake. Hasan. This nothing special, unremarkable frontier strip of land, cut by hills, river valleys, became a place of heated battles. Soviet troops in stubborn battles won an important victory here.

The Japanese believed that the mastery of the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic gave them major strategic benefits. The chief of staff of the Kwantung Army, General Itagaki, said that Mongolia “is very important from the point of view of the Japanese-Manchu influence of today, because it is the flank of the defense of the Trans-Siberian Railway, connecting Soviet territories in the Far East and Europe. If Outer Mongolia is united with Japan and Manchukuo, then the Soviet territories in the Far East will be in a very difficult position and it will be possible to destroy the influence of the Soviet Union in the Far East without much military effort. Therefore, the goal of the army should be to extend the Japanese-Manchu domination of Outer Mongolia by any means."

In Manchuria, on the borders with the Soviet Union and the Mongolian People's Republic, the Japanese created 11 fortified regions, strong military garrisons were placed in settlements along the state borders; they built and improved highways. The main grouping of the Kwantung Army was concentrated in Northern and Northeastern Manchuria. By the summer of 1939, its number here was increased to 350 thousand people; the grouping had more than a thousand artillery pieces, 385 tanks and 355 aircraft.

The Japanese command, in addition to the Harbin - Qiqihar - Hailar (formerly CER) railway, began building a new strategic railway from Solun to Halun - Arshan and further to Ganchzhur. It was conducted around the spurs of the Great Khingan ridge and was supposed to run almost parallel to the Mongol-Manchurian border, at a distance of only two or three kilometers from it in places.

The Japanese feared that the Khalun-Arshan-Ganchzhur railway might come under aimed fire from the dominating sandy heights on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol. In this regard, it was decided to capture part of the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic east of the river. Owning this territory, it was possible to eliminate the threat to the strategic railway, as well as reduce the possibility of a strike on the rear of the Japanese troops concentrated in the Hailar fortified region. It could also become a good springboard for military operations against the MPR and the Soviet Union.

Taking into account the tension of the situation and the threat of a military attack, the USSR took measures of a diplomatic and military nature. As early as March 12, 1936, the Soviet-Mongolian Protocol on Mutual Assistance was signed. In accordance with this agreement, units of the Red Army were sent to Mongolia, from which the 57th special corps was formed. The Soviet government officially declared that "by virtue of the treaty of mutual assistance concluded between us, we will defend the border of the Mongolian People's Republic as resolutely as our own."

By the summer of 1939, the Soviet troops in the Far East included the 1st Separate Red Banner Army under the command of Commander 2nd Rank G. M. Stern, the 2nd Separate Red Banner Army Commander I. S. Konev, the Trans-Baikal Military District (commander commander F. N. Remizov). The 1st Separate Red Banner Army was operationally subordinate to the Pacific Fleet, the 2nd Separate Red Banner Army was the Red Banner Amur Flotilla, and the Trans-Baikal Military District was the 57th Special Corps stationed on the territory of the MPR.

The construction of many defensive areas in the most threatened directions was completed. A new operational formation, the 2nd Air Army, was created from aviation units and formations. Rifle and cavalry formations included tank battalions and mechanized regiments.

The Japanese command chose the eastern ledge of the republic in the area of ​​the river as the object of attack. Khalkhin Gol. Mastering this area would give the Japanese a number of advantages. The Khalkhin-Gol River, 100–130 m wide and 2–3 m deep, has steep slopes, is swampy in many places, and in some places was difficult to access for military equipment. A few kilometers to the east of it stretches a ridge of heights. Along with this, there are many sandy pits in the river valley. The river flows into Khalkhin Gol here. Khailastyn-Gol, cutting the area of ​​upcoming hostilities into two parts.

From the Manchurian side, two railways approached this area closely, while the nearest railway station for supplying the Soviet and Mongolian troops, Borzya, was at a distance of 750 km. Steppe and deserted area east of the river. Khalkhin Gol was guarded only by separate border patrols, the outposts were located at a distance of 20–30 km from the state border.

In May 1939, the Japanese military command brought about 38,000 soldiers, 135 tanks, and 225 aircraft to the planned combat area. Soviet-Mongolian troops defending east of the river. Khalkhin-Gol at the front of 75 km, had 12.5 thousand soldiers, 186 tanks, 266 armored vehicles and 82 aircraft. In terms of the number of personnel and aviation, the enemy was three times superior to the forces of the Soviet-Mongolian troops.

To substantiate their claims to the territory located on the right bank of Khalkhin Gol, Japanese cartographers fabricated fake maps on which the state border ran along the river - more than 20 kilometers west of its true location.

On May 11, 1939, Japanese units attacked the outposts of the Mongolian People's Army east of the river. Khalkhin-Gol near the lake. Buir Nur. Mongolian soldiers were forced to retreat to the river. The fighting went on here for ten days, but they did not bring any success to the Japanese.

The Soviet command took urgent measures to strengthen the leadership of troops in the area of ​​the outbreak of hostilities. In the first days of June, the Deputy Commander of the Belorussian Military District for Cavalry Divisional Commander G.K. Zhukov was sent there. He came to the conclusion that “with the forces that the 57th Special Corps had in the MPR, it would be impossible to stop the Japanese military adventure ...” The Soviet High Command immediately decided to strengthen the corps. G.K. Zhukov was appointed its commander. Soon, fresh units and subunits began to arrive to help the Soviet-Mongolian troops in the Khalkhin Gol region. New fighters (Chaika and I-16) were sent to reinforce the aviation group.

On June 20, the commander of the Kwantung Army ordered the offensive of the Japanese-Manchurian troops in the Khalkhin Gol region. On June 30, the commander of the 23rd Japanese division, Lieutenant General Kamatsubara, in turn, ordered the troops to go on the offensive. The plan of the Japanese command boiled down to the following: going on the offensive throughout the sector, pinning down the Soviet units from the front, and then bypassing the left flank of the defense with a shock group, crossing the river. Khalkhin-Gol, take the height of Bain-Tsagan, which dominates in this area, and hit the rear of the Soviet-Mongolian units.

On the night of July 3, Japanese troops went on the offensive. Having crossed Khalkhin Gol, they developed a blow in the direction of Mount Bain Tsagan. The battle lasted three days, on both sides about 400 tanks and armored vehicles, more than 300 guns and several hundred aircraft took part in it. Part of the Japanese group moved to the left bank of the river. Khalkhin Gol. Mount Bain-Tsagan was busy.

The Soviet command sent motorized units to the area: the 11th tank brigade of brigade commander M.P. Yakovlev, the 24th motorized rifle regiment of colonel I.I. Fedyuninsky. By 7 p.m. on July 3, the enemy was attacked from three sides. The battle continued through the night and all day on 4 July. All attempts by the Japanese to go on the counterattack and throw new units across the river were repulsed. By the morning of July 5, the Japanese retreated (or rather, fled) to the crossing. Their strike force, pressed against the river, was utterly defeated. The enemy lost almost all tanks, a significant part of the artillery, 45 aircraft and about 10 thousand soldiers and. On July 8, the Japanese tried to take revenge for this defeat by going on the attack. After a bloody four-day battle, the Japanese troops, having lost another 5.5 thousand people killed and wounded, were forced to withdraw.

Despite the Bain-Tsagan disaster, the Japanese still hoped to change the course of events in their favor. A "general offensive" was planned for August 1939. Within a month, the Japanese command transferred new units and formations to the battle area. On August 10, the 6th Army was formed from them, led by General Ogisu Rippo. This army, located on the territory of 70 km along the front and 20 km in depth, had 75 thousand people, 500 guns, 182 tanks, more than 300 aircraft.

In turn, the USSR decided on large-scale military assistance to the MPR. By mid-August, the Soviet-Mongolian troops numbered about 57 thousand people, they were armed with 500 tanks, 385 armored vehicles, 542 guns and mortars, 2255 machine guns and 515 combat aircraft.

On July 15, 1939, the 1st Army Group was formed (the group commander was G.K. Zhukov, already commander). The Mongolian troops operating in the battle area were led by Marshal X. Choibalsan.

A lot of work was done to organize the rear. Thousands of vehicles from the supply station, located, as already mentioned, on long distance, delivered in a short time 18,000 tons of artillery ammunition, 6,500 tons of ammunition for aviation, 15,000 tons of fuel and lubricants, 7,000 tons of fuel, 4,000 tons of food.

The plan of the Soviet-Mongolian command was based on the following idea: having pinned down the forces of the Japanese troops from the front, deliver a preemptive bilateral strike on the flanks in general direction on Nomon-Khan - Burd-Obo, and then surround and destroy the enemy between the river. Khalkhin Gol and the state border. To implement this plan, three groups of troops were created. The main blow was delivered by the southern group of Colonel M. I. Potapov, which consisted of two divisions, tank, motorized armored brigades and several tank battalions, and the auxiliary one was the northern group led by Colonel I. V. Shevnikov. The central group under the command of brigade commander D. E. Petrov was tasked with forging the enemy from the front.

The preparations for the operation were carried out in the strictest secrecy with extensive use of operational camouflage and disinformation. The unit commanders were brought up to date only 3-4 days before the operation, and the Red Army soldiers - on the night of August 20, on the eve of the offensive. In the course of preparation, measures were taken to give the enemy the impression of the intended wintering of our units: stakes were driven in, wire fences were built, false demands were transmitted over the radio to send stakes and wire, winter uniforms. Moreover, the orders were transmitted by a code known to the Japanese.

The Japanese command expected to launch a "general offensive" on August 24, 1939. Having preempted the enemy by four days, the Soviet-Mongolian troops launched a decisive offensive on the morning of August 20. More than 150 bombers and powerful artillery fell on the enemy's battle formations, his artillery positions. About 100 Soviet fighters were covering from enemy air strikes, concentrated in the initial areas for the offensive of part of the shock groups of the Soviet-Mongolian troops.

After a powerful aviation and artillery preparation, which lasted 2 hours and 45 minutes, Soviet tanks went on the attack. Following them along the entire front, the Soviet-Mongolian infantry and cavalry units rushed at the enemy.

The strike of aviation and artillery of the Soviet-Mongolian troops turned out to be so powerful and sudden that the enemy did not fire a single artillery shot for an hour and a half, the aircraft did not make a single sortie.

While the troops of the central sector with frontal attacks pinned down the main Japanese forces, the southern and northern shock groups of the Soviet-Mongolian troops broke through the enemy defenses on the flanks and began to surround the enemy with rapid deep coverage. The Japanese command threw a large number of tanks, artillery and aircraft against the Soviet-Mongolian troops. Under their cover, infantry and cavalry increasingly began to cross into counterattacks. A fierce battle broke out on the entire front.

Despite the desperate resistance of the enemy, by the end of the first day, serious success was achieved on the outer flanks of the southern and northern groups, where the cavalry formations of the Soviet-Mongolian troops defeated parts of the Japanese-Manchurian cavalry and captured the planned lines along the state border.

Having assessed the situation, the commander of the 1st Army Group, G.K. Zhukov, decided to introduce all reserve forces into the battle in the northern direction. The mobile group under the command of Colonel I.P. Alekseenko, having gone on the offensive, reached Nomon-Khan - Burd-Obo by the end of August 23 and the next day entered into fire contact with units of the southern group. Japanese troops were completely surrounded. Attempts by the Japanese command to break through the encirclement from the outside with blows from fresh reserves brought up were unsuccessful.

The Soviet-Mongolian command began the systematic destruction of the encircled Japanese troops. Simultaneously with the outer front of the encirclement, which consisted mainly of motorized armored, cavalry, aviation and partially rifle troops, who went on the defensive along the border, an inner front was formed from rifle units that delivered converging blows to the enemy.

Once in the pocket, the Japanese troops resisted fiercely, but on August 31 the last pockets of their defenses were eliminated. After the complete defeat of their ground grouping, the Japanese command made attempts to defeat the Soviet aviation. However, this plan also failed. During the first half of September 1939, Soviet pilots fought a series of air battles in which 71 Japanese aircraft were destroyed. The large grouping of the Kwantung Army ceased to exist. On September 16, the Japanese government was forced to admit the defeat of its troops and asked for a cessation of hostilities. In the battles at Khalkhin Gol, the Japanese lost about 61 thousand killed, wounded and captured, 660 aircraft, and a significant amount of military equipment. The trophies of the Soviet-Mongolian troops were 12 thousand rifles, 200 guns, about 400 machine guns, more than 100 vehicles. Japanese command in in full force was forced to resign. The commander of the Kwantung Army, General Ueda, and the chief of staff of the army, General Mosigan, were removed.

In terms of scale and nature, the operation at Khalkhin Gol was the largest operation for that time by modern armies equipped with the latest military equipment. At Khalkhin Gol, for the first time, modern tanks and aircraft were used on a massive scale. In individual battles, the number of vehicles numbered in the hundreds, and at decisive moments of the battle, up to 300 aircraft rose into the air. The creation of an external and internal front to eliminate the encircled enemy was a new contribution to the further development of military art.

The defeat of the Japanese troops at Khalkhin Gol basically confirmed the correctness of the views that existed in Soviet military theory on the conduct of offensive operations, and in particular the deep operation. The August operation showed that its success is inextricably linked with skillful maneuvering of troops, the use of counterattacks, the gaining of air supremacy, the isolation of the combat area from suitable enemy reserves and the disruption of its communications. At the same time, the experience of Khalkhin Gol made it possible to draw conclusions about the need to increase the density of artillery.

The battles at Khalkhin Gol once again confirmed the growing role of reserves in the war and their timely and skillful use at decisive moments in hostilities. The introduction of mobile reserves, carried out by the commander of the army group G.K. Zhukov, made it possible to significantly speed up the complete encirclement of the enemy.

More than 17 thousand fighters, commanders and political workers were awarded government awards, 70 of them received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, among them the commander of the army group G.K. Zhukov; pilots Ya. V. Smushkevich, G. P. Kravchenko and S. I. Gritsevets became twice Heroes of the Soviet Union.

In the summer of 1939, Soviet and Japanese troops converged near the Khalkhin Gol River on the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR). The battle arena has become endless steppe, near the riverbed itself, small sandy hills alternated with deep basins. With the help of Soviet and Japanese documents, we will try to figure out how the hostilities at Khalkhin Gol were organized, and how the opponents - the armies of the USSR and the Empire of Japan - assessed each other.

Start

The first battles were marked by extreme confusion. For several days, reports of skirmishes at the border did not even reach Moscow. When it became known about the Japanese provocations on the borders of the MPR, the command of the Red Army had to hurry to look for the area of ​​battles on the maps and try to understand what the Japanese wanted to achieve in the bare steppe, which had almost no water. For the Red Army, Khalkhin Gol became the first after the end of the civil and Soviet-Polish wars major battle, in which literally everything was tested in combat: from the medical service and the organization of supplies to infantry tactics.

At the end of May, after a series of skirmishes, the Soviet and Japanese troops left the right bank of Khalkhin Gol. On the left, western bank of the river, the flywheel of war was only gaining momentum. Tank and aviation units were transferred from the USSR to Mongolia thousands of kilometers away.

Summer battles were characterized by extreme tension - no one wanted to give in. The Soviet troops managed to hold back the July offensive of the Japanese at Mount Bain-Tsagan and push the enemy back to the eastern bank of the river. By August 20, the time the decisive offensive began, the Soviet troops pulled up 574 guns to the battlefield - against 348 in July.

invisible enemy

The enemy did not sit idly by. The Japanese defense was built on separate nodes of resistance and consisted of several lines of trenches. Separate trenches were equipped for snipers and tank fighters, who used gasoline bottles and mines on poles. Each node was adapted for long-term all-round defense and had fire links with its neighbors. Soviet reports after the battles noted that “even with a large presence of hillocks and pits, there was no dead and unaffected space in front of the leading edge”.

In front of their trenches, the Japanese set up targets for shooting - turf sticks, sheets of white paper, cartridge cases and white flags. They were used not only by artillerymen and machine gunners, but also by individual shooters with rifles. The firing points were carefully camouflaged, and the soldiers in positions moved exclusively by crawling or crouching.

Soviet specialists highly appreciated the Japanese tray-shaped shovel, as well as the presence in the troops of ... braids that easily cut thick Mongolian grass. This made it easier to camouflage structures. Often, in order to mislead observers, the Japanese exhibited models of tanks and guns, and stuffed soldiers.

From left to right: Army Commander 2nd Rank Grigory Stern, Marshal of the MPR Khorlogiyin Choibalsan and Commander Georgy Zhukov, 1939

Ceilings of field fortifications made of small concrete slabs allowed to withstand shelling even with 152-mm shells. But the Japanese had almost no minefields, as well as barbed wire. Only in front of some defense nodes were sections of barriers 100–150 m wide. Another drawback of the Japanese defense, according to Soviet estimates, was the crowded location of shelters for infantry.

The Soviet side also had weak points. For example, there was an acute shortage of well-trained infantry, as well as special equipment for it. Even after the first battles, excessive losses in the command staff were noted:

“The reason for the great loss of command staff was the lack of proper disguise (dress uniform, walking in height) and the desire to personally destroy O.T.(firing points) enemy".

Unlike the Japanese army, in the Soviet units, many military personnel, and especially officers, almost universally ignored self-entrenchment and camouflage. Yes, and camouflage equipment in the units either did not exist at all, or they did not match the color of the background of the area.

It turned out that the Soviet small sapper shovel is not very suitable for working in sandy soil. Since in the company and battalion defensive areas they did not bother to dig communication passages, they had to move from unit to unit in open areas. This also led to additional losses of commanders. It is significant that even at the command post of the army group near Mount Khamar-Daba, until August, only commander Georgy Zhukov and the operations department had dugouts with a light overlap. The rest of the departments were located in cars near dug out cracks - shelters from the bombardment.

The leadership of the 36th Infantry Division called Achilles heel Red Army weak interaction between all branches of the military, as well as insufficient use of the terrain, unsatisfactory observation, lack of means of communication for artillery. Particularly poor training stood out for the units recently deployed for mobilization. Strengths were called a good supply of automatic weapons and "loyalty to the Socialist Motherland, to the cause of the Lenin-Stalin Party".

The Japanese noted the "intrusiveness" of the Soviet attacks, but they easily guessed about their preparation by the loud noise when moving. Night attacks of the Red Army took place stubbornly, but randomly, scattered. That is why, as the Japanese believed, they each time ended unsuccessfully for the Red Army. At the same time, according to Soviet data, at night the Red Army soldiers succumbed to panic more easily: "we are afraid of the enemy at night". More than once there are references to the White Guards, who gave false commands at night. Perhaps it was the ease of such small victories that caused the Japanese contempt for the enemy, for which they soon had to pay.

"The nature of the battles is a real meat grinder"

In early August, units of the Red Army on Khalkhin Gol received many instructions from the command. The fighters needed to learn close combat and marksmanship, crawling to a distance of up to 400 m, orienteering and self-digging. They should have camouflage nets for helmets and torso: a single fighter and even a group should not have been visible from 50 m. The soldiers should have been able to crawl close to the curtain of their artillery fire in the offensive. Intelligence was instructed to cope with the recognition of the enemy fire system. At night, their troops were required to be designated with white armbands and open fire on the enemy only at point blank range.

On August 20, 1939, having concentrated forces and accumulated fuel and ammunition, the Soviet troops suddenly went on the offensive in order to encircle and destroy the Japanese group. The attack was preceded by a massive artillery and air raid; commander of the 2nd rank Grigory Mikhailovich Stern, who led the actions of the 1st Army Group, personally observed the work of one and a half hundred SB bombers. Fighters made 5 - 8 sorties a day. The Japanese heavy artillery, which had not changed positions during the lull, was largely disabled by the first blow. The dominance of Soviet aviation and artillery is repeatedly confirmed by Japanese sources.

The Japanese infantry fought back fiercely. Fights were going on for every height. According to Stern, “the nature of the battles is a real meat grinder, since they don’t surrender except for singles, as long as they go only to death”.

The Soviet troops were rescued by equipment, the infantry went on the attack with the support of tanks and armored vehicles. As noted in the documents following the battles, "each shooting firing point delayed the attack, the attackers lay down until the tank or armored vehicle destroyed it". The tanks broke through the Japanese defenses, went forward, and if the infantry was delayed, they returned and destroyed the surviving enemy firing points. The T-26 chemical (that is, flamethrower) tanks proved to be indispensable in this matter. In the July battles, 13 rifle battalions accounted for 8-9 tank ones. In August, the density of tanks reached 20 vehicles per 1 km of the front, or two companies of tanks per rifle regiment (not counting artillery and flamethrower tanks).

On the other hand, such saturation with armored vehicles led to a shortage of escort infantry. It happened that after the defeat of the next defense unit, tanks without infantry left for refueling and replenishment of ammunition, which was enough for only 3-4 hours of battle. And when the infantry went forward, the already, it would seem, destroyed firing points of the Japanese came to life again. Therefore, Stern demanded first to crush the surrounded pockets of resistance with field cannons, "forty-fives" and flamethrowers, and then to launch tank and infantry units on the offensive.

Zhukov ordered to feed the fighters with hot food and provide hot tea no later than by dawn. "with biscuits and sugar". When conducting encirclement battles, he pointed out: "The main means of combat is a hand grenade, point-blank fire and a bayonet", since the artillery could hit its own.

In August, infantry commanders often threw their last reserve, scouts, into the attack. They were sent to the most difficult points, so intelligence losses were very high - up to 70% of the personnel. Already in the first days of the August offensive, many reconnaissance units of companies and battalions simply ceased to exist.

By the end of the fourth day of the offensive on the territory of the MPR, only, according to Stern, "a group of isolated pockets of desperate and rabid Japanese". But the encircled enemy also had to be destroyed before fresh Japanese units arrived. Captured Japanese often "did not know" (and in fact did not want to say) even elementary things, for example, the numbers of their own unit. Stubborn fighting continued until August 30, and in September 1939, Soviet troops repelled Japanese attempts to cross the border again.

Characteristic is the indication of the head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, Lev Mekhlis, who saw the newspaper article “The Japanese fled like frightened hares” and noted its wrong tone:

“It is true that no army in the world can compare with the Red Army in terms of staunchness and heroism of soldiers. But it was impossible to turn a blind eye to the fact that an illiterate, downtrodden and deceived Japanese soldier, terrorized by officers, showed great stubbornness, especially in defense: even the wounded fired back, but did not surrender. That is why it was impossible to print this note under such a noisy heading. She incorrectly orients, demagnetizes the fighters. On the other hand, talking about the successes and victories of the Red Army soldiers, units, one should not allow any exaggeration. The material must be checked carefully. We have a sufficient number of truly miraculous feats, heroic episodes, so as not to compose or exaggerate.

Indeed, at Khalkhin Gol in 1939, the Red Army won a difficult, hard, but well-deserved victory over a strong and skillful enemy.

Sources and literature:

1. RGVA, f. 32113.
2. Battles at Khalkhin Gol. Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1940.
3. Armed conflict in the area of ​​the Khalkhin-Gol river. M.: "Novalis", 2014.
4. Svoisky Yu. M. Prisoners of war of Khalkhin Gol. Moscow: Dmitry Pozharsky University, 2014.