Abdication of the Sovereign Emperor from the Throne of the Russian State. What can we Christians know about him? What made Nicholas II abdicate the throne

ABANDY OF EMPEROR NICHOLAS

+ video - a story about events through the eyes of a man who accepted the abdication of Emperor Nicholas II

On March 2, 1917, Emperor Nicholas II abdicated the throne in favor of brother Mikhail

Thirty years ago, we, young parishioners of Moscow churches, had very long synodics. We submitted notes “On the repose” with dozens of names, of which we didn’t even have a dozen of our own relatives. For most of them, we no longer order memorial services; prayers are now served for them themselves. In my synodik at that time, the first to stand were Nikolai, Alexandra, Olga, Tatiana, Maria, Anastasia, and the youth Alexy...

I learned about the near-death ordeal and brutal death of the royal family when I was 25 years old. I had just been baptized then and tried my best to get something uplifting to read. And then, through third hands, a book by some General Dieterichs, completely unknown to me at that time, came to me for two days about the murder of the royal family in the Urals. As it turned out later, this general served with Kolchak in 1919, and it was he who was entrusted with organizing the investigation into this case when the Whites occupied Yekaterinburg.

I read his book for two days and two nights, almost without breaks for sleep and food. However, I couldn’t eat for a long time afterwards - the piece couldn’t go down my throat. What happened to me was about the same as with Bulgakov’s Margarita, when she looked closely at Volonda’s magic globe: a square of land expanded, first turned into a relief map, then a village appeared, a house with Matchbox, then it was swept away by an explosion and, bringing her eyes even closer, Margarita saw a dead woman lying on the ground, and next to her, in a pool of blood, a child with his arms scattered. That’s how it is for me - history came to life and became part of my own life, here and now. And it was a real painful shock.

What did I know from childhood about the last Russian Tsar? Khodynka, the disastrous Russo-Japanese War, Bloody Sunday, the 1905 revolution, “Stolypin ties”, World War I, ministerial leapfrog, Rasputin, the collapse of the front, February Revolution, the tsar is weak, weak-willed, he was manipulated by all and sundry, as a result the country was destroyed, and the former autocrat and his family were shot “in the interests of the revolution”...

I look closer, the picture comes to life and... changes beyond recognition.

February 1917. The Tsar is at Headquarters, in Mogilev. From Petrograd they report a riot: it all started with women in lines for bread, which was not delivered, was picked up by workers, then by soldiers of the reserve infantry regiment - and these are 160 thousand armed, propaganda men, who, on the eve of the coming spring offensive, were brought to the capital and squeezed into barracks, designed for 20 thousand people. And now the sovereign is informed: the situation in Petrograd is actually out of control - the arsenal is destroyed, the police are dispersed, prisoners are released from prisons, the Winter Palace and the Peter and Paul Fortress are captured, the Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies is elected...

This was a real stab in the back - the situation at the front had just stabilized, supplies of food, medicine, and warm clothes had been established, and an offensive was being prepared. All that was left was to be patient just a little bit. What to do now? Suppress unrest in the capital by force, risking provoking a civil war in a country at war with an external enemy? Moreover, nothing is really clear, the information is contradictory, and there, in Tsarskoe, in the very thick of these incomprehensible events - a wife, girls, a sick son. What's wrong with them?

And Nikolai, having nevertheless ordered that units from the front be sent to Petrograd and transferring command to General Alekseev, rushed there to protect his family. Where there! It turned out that all the junction stations were occupied by the rebels, and the tsar was forced to turn to Pskov, to the headquarters of the commander of the Northern Front, Adjutant General Ruzsky, where he was forced to act in a performance that had already been prepared for him: General Ruzsky convinced him that “the situation is hopeless”, he ordered stop sending troops to the capital, and then the sovereign was informed that the newly created State Duma committee was inviting him to voluntarily abdicate the throne.

General Alekseev sent a telegram to front commanders asking about the desirability of abdication.

Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich replied: “As a loyal subject, I consider it the duty of the oath and the spirit of the oath to kneel and beg the sovereign to renounce the crown in order to save Russia and the dynasty.” Generals Evert (Western Front), Brusilov (Southwestern Front), Sakharov (Romanian Front), commander Baltic Fleet Admiral Nepenin. And only the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Admiral Kolchak, did not send an answer.

All this was a complete surprise to the king. Of course, news of intrigues in the “higher spheres” reached him, but he relied on the integrity of the generals who swore allegiance to him before God and owed him their promotion, and did not allow the thought that they, together with members of the House of Romanov and the leaders of the right political parties For a year and a half they were preparing a “palace coup”.

As Pierre Gilliard later recalled, who lived for many years in the royal family as a French teacher and educator of Tsarevich Alexei, the outcome of events was determined by the tsar’s heightened sense of duty, inner nobility and “the effect of his immediate circle” - he was able to convince him that his abdication “meets public expectations and will prove to be the best possible step to stabilize the country.”

And in fact? This is what General Denikin, by no means a monarchist by conviction, writes in his “Essays on the Russian Troubles”: “As for the attitude towards the throne, as a general phenomenon, in the officer corps there was a desire to distinguish the person of the sovereign from the court dirt that surrounded him, from political mistakes and crimes of the government, which clearly and steadily led to the destruction of the country and the defeat of the army. They forgave the sovereign, they tried to justify him.

Among the soldiers... a certain conservatism, a habit “from time immemorial,” the indoctrination of the church - all this created a certain attitude towards the existing system, as something completely natural and inevitable.

In the mind and heart of the soldier, the idea of ​​a monarch, so to speak, was in a potential state, sometimes rising to high exaltation when direct communication with the tsar (reviews, detours, random appeals), then falling to indifference.

Be that as it may, the mood of the army was quite favorable for both the idea of ​​​​a monarchy and a dynasty. He was easy to support."

But the closest people convinced Nicholas II that his abdication would be the fulfillment of the “will of the people,” and therefore the will of God. And the king, only person in Russia, who all his life carried his power as a cross, as a ministry entrusted to him by God, before whom he was responsible for the fate of the people entrusted to him, decided to renounce.

In 1983, the confession of the main ideologist of the February Revolution, the minister of the first composition of the Provisional Government Miliukov, was published, made in a narrow circle of like-minded people after his resignation in May 1917, and then, after the October revolution, repeated in one of the letters: “History will curse the leaders, so called proletarians, but he will also curse us, who caused the storm.”

Most of the participants in those events did not have to wait long for their fate. 20 of the 65 members of the House of Romanov were brutally murdered by the Bolsheviks. None of them fought on the side of the whites, organized conspiracies to overthrow the Soviet regime, or tried to take away untold wealth.

Of the conspiratorial generals, only Brusilov, who helped the new government create a regular army, lived until 1926 and died in Moscow from pneumonia. Vice Admiral Nepenin was already killed on March 4, 1917 in the port of Helsingfors in a crowd of revolutionary sailors by “unknown persons.” In October 1918, General Alekseev died of pneumonia in the Volunteer Army. General Ruzsky was hacked to death by the Reds in November of the same year at the Pyatigorskoe cemetery along with other hostages, General Ervet was shot by the Bolsheviks in Mozhaisk, and General Sakharov was shot in Crimea by the “Greens” in 1920.

...Nikolai Alexandrovich Romanov, according to people’s testimony who were nearby with him in the last months of his life, accepted his way of the cross as atonement for the tragic mistake of renunciation. Before exile to Tobolsk, according to Count Benckendorff, he said: “I don’t feel sorry for myself, but I feel sorry for those people who have suffered and are suffering because of me. I feel sorry for the Motherland and the People.”

Vasily Shulgin, politician, Duma deputy, who accepted the abdication of Nicholas II, talks about this event in the documentary reconstruction film “Before the Judgment of History” (1965).

Reference:

Shulgin V.V. (1878-1976) - Member of the State Duma
In 1915, Shulgin became one of the leaders of the Progressive Bloc.
After October 1917, Shulgin, being an irreconcilable opponent of the Bolsheviks, became one of the organizers and ideologists of the Volunteer Army.
In 1920 he emigrated from Crimea to Yugoslavia.
In 1945, he was arrested by SMERSH in Yugoslavia, taken to the USSR and sentenced to 25 years in prison for counter-revolutionary activities during the years civil war.
In 1956, Shulgin was released early and was even allowed to engage in literary work.
Shulgin spent the last years of his life in Vladimir, where he died in 1976.

Chronicle of the fall of autocracy

February 21 (March 6) Nicholas II accepts the report of the Minister of Internal Affairs Protopopov, in which he informs the Tsar in complete calm in Petrograd.

February 22 (March 7) Nicholas II leaves Petrograd for Mogilev to the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

February 23 (March 8) The imperial train arrives in Mogilev.

February 24 (March 9) Nicholas receives a telegram from the Empress, it talks about the destruction of bakeries on Vasilyevsky Island and the dispersal of pogromists by the Cossacks.

February 25 (March 10) Headquarters receives two telegrams from the commander of the Petrograd Military District, Lieutenant General Khabalov, and the Minister of Internal Affairs, Protopopov, about strikes and street riots in the capital. Nikolai orders General Khabalov to stop the unrest by military force.

February 27 (March 12) Khabalov telegraphs: “Please report to His Imperial Majesty that I could not fulfill the order to restore order in the capital. Most of the units, one after another, betrayed their duty, refusing to fight against the rebels. Other units fraternized with the rebels and turned their weapons against those loyal to His Majesty The troops who remained faithful to their duty fought against the rebels all day, suffering heavy losses. By evening, the rebels captured most of the capital. Small units of various regiments remained faithful to the oath, gathered at the Winter Palace under the command of General Zankevich, with whom I will continue to fight. Khabalov".

February 28 (March 13) At 5 am the royal train left for Tsarskoe Selo, but could not get through.

March 1 (March 14) at 19-05 The royal train, after 38 hours of wandering along the railways, arrives in Pskov at the headquarters of the armies of the Northern Front of General N.V. Ruzsky. Further events unfold here.

March 1 (March 14) news comes from Moscow from the commander of the Moscow Military District, General Mrazovsky: “There is a complete revolution in Moscow. Military units are going over to the side of the revolutionaries.”

At 20-29 General Klembovsky V.N. sends telegrams to army commanders: “There is a complete uprising in Moscow... There is an uprising in Kronstadt, and the Baltic Fleet, with the consent of the fleet commander, went over to the side of the Provisional Committee. Admiral Nepenin’s decision was caused by the desire to save the fleet. Adjutant General Alekseev telegraphed to the sovereign, asking issue an act capable of calming the population and stopping the revolution."

March 2 (March 15) General Alekseev sends a dispatch to army commanders on the question of the desirability of abdication. Generals A. E. Evert (Western Front), A. A. Brusilov (South-Western Front), V. V. Sakharov (Romanian Front), Commander of the Baltic Fleet Admiral A. I. Nepenin, and Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich spoke in favor of abdication (Caucasian Front).. The only answer not received was from the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Kolchak.

March 2 (March 15) at 15-00 Nicholas II abdicated the throne in favor of Grand Duke Mikhail Alexandrovich.

The year will come, Russia's black year,
When the kings crown falls;
The mob will forget their former love for them,
And the food of many will be death and blood...

M.Yu. Lermontov

On March 2, 1917, Emperor Nicholas II Alexandrovich Romanov abdicated the throne for himself and his son Alexei in favor of his younger brother Grand Duke Mikhail Alexandrovich. On March 3, Mikhail Alexandrovich signed an act of non-acceptance of the throne, thereby confirming the legitimacy of the newly created Provisional Government. The rule of the Romanov dynasty, as well as the monarchy in Russia, was over. The country plunged into chaos.

For a hundred years in national historiography, as in the historiography of the Russian diaspora, mixed assessments were given to the event that occurred on March 2, 1917.

Soviet historians diligently ignored the true circumstances of the abdication the last Romanov, as well as the personalities of people who took, one might say, direct participation in deciding the fate of a huge country. And this is not surprising. According to the Marxist-Leninist view of the historical process, when one formation replaces another as a result of a revolution, the monarchy is obliged to withdraw itself, otherwise it will be swept away in righteous anger by the revolutionary masses. In this situation, it is completely unimportant what, where, when and why the debunked monarch signed. His further fate was also hushed up or justified by the interests of the revolution.

Russian foreign historiography of the liberal persuasion, which shared the views of those who personally slipped the act of abdication to the emperor on March 2, 1917, also believed that the monarchy in Russia was doomed. The departure of the emperor was seen as a definitely positive moment. Since a monarch like Nicholas II could not change anything in the current situation, he only prevented the new “saviors” of Russia from saving it. The physical, especially the violent, removal of an emperor or dynasty could give an extra trump card to the opposition. But the public discrediting (from the rostrum of the State Duma) of a useless ruler with his subsequent self-denial looked quite decent.

Monarchist emigrant historiography, on the contrary, considered the abdication of Nicholas II to be key point, when the political Rubicon between order and anarchy was crossed. The monarchists, of course, could not blame the tsar himself (otherwise they would not have been monarchists), and therefore they brought down all their anger on the generals and the liberal public who betrayed Nicholas II.

The attitude of historiographers of all stripes towards the personality and actions of the last Russian emperor throughout the 20th century also constantly changed from complete rejection and contempt to exaltation, idealization and even canonization. In the 1990s, yesterday’s Istpartists began vying with each other to praise human qualities the last Romanov, his devotion to duty, family, Russia. It was proposed to consider the fact of the martyrdom of Nicholas II and his entire family at the hands of the Bolsheviks as atonement for the fatal miscalculations and incompetent policies that brought the country to revolution and a bloody civil war.

Thus, in the minds of people living today, Nicholas II appears as a kind of meek, frightened martyr who, during his 23-year reign, committed whole line irreparable errors, both in external and in domestic policy. Then weak, but very good man Nikolai Alexandrovich Romanov, incidentally the All-Russian Emperor, did not find the strength to resist the circumstances. Like a true martyr, he was vilely deceived, betrayed by his own generals and relatives, driven into a trap at the Dno station, and then went to the slaughter. And all this happened almost on the eve of the victory of Russia and its allies in the First World War.

This touching version continues to be served to the general public, albeit under different sauces, to this day.

But practically none of the historians asked and are not asking the question: did he have the right not to a common person and the father of the family, and the Emperor of All Russia, God’s anointed, even finding himself in such difficult circumstances, resign his powers? Did he have the right to shrug off the responsibility assigned to him from birth for the fate of one-sixth of the entire Earth?

No matter how painful it is to realize, Nicholas II renounced Russia much earlier than he waved the Manifesto already prepared for him in Pskov. He renounced, deciding for himself that government he can't handle it. Conscious refusal of radical reforms in domestic policy, of a tough fight against revolutionary terrorism, of dialogue and interaction with that part of society that expected and desired changes, abandonment of the country's national interests and entry into a world war - all this led to Russia by 1917, she herself renounced Nicholas II, and the entire dynasty.

Nikolai Aleksandrovich Romanov was neither a bloody tyrant, nor an insane holy fool, nor a frightened fool. He understood perfectly well what people who suddenly imagined themselves to be “the flower of the nation” could offer in return for the “rotten monarchical system.” And although Nicholas II himself could not offer the country anything, he still had the prerogative to retain the honor of a soldier who did not completely leave his post.

By his act of abdication, the emperor abandoned this honor, trying to buy life and freedom for himself and his family, and again he lost. He lost not only his life and the lives of his own children, but also the lives of many millions of Russian people who lost their faith, the Tsar, and the Fatherland at the same time.

How it was

Conspiracy theory

IN modern research, near-historical literature. and also in the domestic media, a version of the Judeo-Masonic conspiracy against the Romanov dynasty and Nicholas II personally appears more and more often. The goal of this conspiracy was to weaken Russia as a world player, appropriate its victories and eliminate the victorious powers from the clan in the First World War.

The initiator of the conspiracy, of course, is a certain hypothetical “world government”, acting through representatives of the Entente powers. The theorists and implementers of the conspiracy were Duma liberals and oligarchs (Milyukov, Guchkov, Rodzianko, etc.), and the direct executors were the highest generals (Alekseev, Ruzsky) and even members of the royal family (Vkn. Nikolai Nikolaevich).

The murder of Grigory Rasputin, a court psychic capable of not only treating the heir, the crown prince, but also foreseeing the future, fits perfectly into this theory. Throughout 1916, Rasputin and the Tsarina persistently “shuffled” senior government officials, trying to get rid of the traitor-conspirators. At the instigation of Rasputin, the queen repeatedly demanded that the sovereign “disperse the Duma,” which was persistently discrediting the monarchy.

However, the king, who supposedly “trusted only his wife,” did not heed the warnings. He appointed himself Supreme Commander-in-Chief, having offended his uncle, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich (who later joined the conspirators), and spent all his time at Headquarters, where he felt safe in the company of his adjutants general. As a result, the generals also betrayed him, lured him into a trap, and with threats and blackmail forced him to sign an act of renunciation, which legalized the Provisional Government created by Rodzianko.

In fact, everyone knew that the Duma was preparing some kind of coup at the turn of 1916-1917. Guchkov and Miliukov discussed their plans almost daily on the sidelines of the Duma. Nicholas II was well aware of this. Thus, the upcoming “coup” was given a certain operetta character - and no one believed in its seriousness. It must be said that the “conspirators” initially did not plan to eliminate or completely abdicate the emperor, much less to cause any harm to his family. In the most radical version, only isolation from state affairs of the queen was assumed. They wanted to send her further away - to Crimea, to treat her upset nerves.

The main mistake of Nicholas II at this stage was his absolute confidence in the loyalty of the army and military leadership to him personally. The Emperor naively believed that as soon as he, as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, ended the war victoriously, all internal problems would disappear by themselves.

Today, the connections of the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, General M.I., have been documented. Alekseev with the leaders of the Duma “Progressive Bloc” Guchkov, Lvov and Rodzianko. However, as A.I. later reported. Denikin, M.I. Alekseev rejected the idea of ​​any coups and political upheavals in the rear during the period of hostilities. He understood that the implementation of even very moderate plans of the liberal opposition would inevitably lead to anarchy, the collapse of the army and, as a consequence, to defeat in the war.

The commanders-in-chief of the Southwestern and Northern Fronts, Generals Brusilov, Ruzsky and a number of other adjutant generals did not share this opinion, insisting on immediate action until, as it seemed to them, the inevitable victory of the Russian army on all fronts.

If we put aside the theory of the Judeo-Masonic conspiracy, invented, by the way, by emigrant historiography in the 1920-30s, and take a sober look at the current situation in 1916-1917, then we can say with confidence that the “conspiracy” against There was undoubtedly a monarchy, since there were still sensible and decent people in the country. Changes in the country at that time were long overdue, and the war, related problems in the economy, dissatisfaction with the monarch and his entourage, the threat of revolutionary terror and ministerial leapfrog only contributed to general political destabilization. Was it a “conspiracy of the adjutant generals” who suddenly began to hate the incompetent commander-in-chief? Or a revolutionary situation, when the monarchical “tops” could no longer do anything and didn’t want to, the proletarian “bottoms” were not ready, and liberal opposition I wanted something, but I couldn’t decide: sturgeon with horseradish or constitution?

Only one thing can be said with confidence: a way out of the current political impasse was needed, but complete confusion reigned in the minds of the so-called “conspirators” themselves. Some believed that they themselves were quite capable of bringing the war to a victorious end and that they did not need a monarchy at all for this, a military dictatorship was enough; others were going to preserve the monarchy as a factor uniting the nation, but remove Nicholas II and his “advisers”; still others were simply eager for power, having absolutely no idea what they would do once they received it. And “when there is no agreement among comrades,” the result of their actions is usually very, very unpredictable...

Trap for the Emperor

The beginning of the February events in Petrograd found Nicholas II at Headquarters in Mogilev. He left there on February 22, 1917 at the urgent request of General M.I., who had just returned from Sevastopol. Alekseeva. What the “urgent matter” was that the chief of staff wanted to talk about with the Supreme Commander-in-Chief is unclear to historians to this day.

Supporters of the “conspiracy” claim that Alekseev deliberately lured the sovereign to Mogilev on the eve of the uprising in the capital. In this way, the conspirators’ plan to isolate the emperor from his family and force him to abdicate was to be realized.

But here it is worth noting that even the most persistent request of the general might not have any effect on Emperor Nicholas II. And if the sovereign had not gone to Mogilev, all the plans of the conspirators would have collapsed?

In addition, Alekseev, as we remember, until the evening of March 1, acted as a resolute opponent of any changes in domestic policy until the end of hostilities, and even more so the abdication of the emperor.

Perhaps Nicholas II himself suspected that something was again being started in the army, and not in Petrograd, or he decided, as always, that in the event of unrest, it would be better for him, as an emperor, to be with loyal troops than among traitorous courtiers.

And then, the emperor did not need to look for a special reason to leave Petrograd. From the moment Nikolai Nikolayevich was removed from the post of Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the emperor spent almost all his time at Headquarters, leaving only Alexandra Fedorovna “on the farm.” His visits to Mogilev were more like escapes from internal problems, which were caused by urgent need.

News of the uprising in the capital reached Headquarters only 2 days after the start of the events - February 25, and even then in a very distorted form.

According to eyewitnesses, Nicholas II brushed off reports of unrest for several days, considering them another “bakers’ strike” that would take a few days to suppress.

On February 26, the State Duma stopped working. A Provisional Committee of the State Duma was elected, chaired by Rodzianko. Representatives of the Provisional Committee understood that if they did nothing, all power in the country would pass to the Petrograd Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies (Petrosovet), which led the uprising.

Rodzianko began bombarding Headquarters with panicked telegrams. They clearly spoke about the need for decisive action, namely: the choice of a new government accountable to the State Duma, i.e. it turned out that it was already for him personally, A.I. Rodzianko, because the Duma was dissolved.

Nicholas II considered all Rodzianko's telegrams complete nonsense. He did not want to answer them, feeling himself still under the protection of Alekseev. The only thing that interested the sovereign in those days was the fate of the family remaining in Tsarskoe Selo.

General Alekseev was ordered to remove loyal troops from the front and send them to Petrograd. The expedition was led by General N.I., loyal to the emperor. Ivanov. But according to the testimony of Colonel A. A. Mordvinov, who was on the royal train, General Alekseev immediately ordered the concentration of allocated troops in Tsarskoe Selo and only after that sent them to Petrograd. That is, Ivanov’s first priority should have been the protection (or capture?) of the royal family, and the suppression of unrest in Petrograd itself faded into the background.

On February 27, Nicholas II talked with the empress for several hours by telegraph, after which in the evening he suddenly broke down and announced his departure to Tsarskoe.

General Alekseev tried in vain to dissuade him from this trip. Alekseev, like no one else, knew how it could end for the emperor, and for all of Russia.

The Emperor and his retinue left on two letter trains. They had to cover about 950 miles along the route Mogilev - Orsha - Vyazma - Likhoslavl - Tosno - Gatchina - Tsarskoe Selo, but, as subsequent events showed, the trains were not destined to reach their destination. By the morning of March 1, trains were only able to reach Malaya Vishera through Bologoe, where they were forced to turn around and head back to Bologoe. By order of the Commissioner of the Provisional Committee of the State Duma A. A. Bublikov, the emperor’s train was stopped at Dno station (not far from Pskov).

While the emperor was there, Rodzianko was actively processing telegrams from Alekseev and the commander of the Northern Front, General N.V. Ruzsky, assuring that Petrograd was completely under his control.

Alekseev, still apparently doubting the need for a coup d'etat, decided to submit to the inevitable.

After this excellent work done by Rodzianko, by the evening of March 1, both letter trains arrived in Pskov, where the headquarters of the Northern Front was located.

March 1. Pskov.

Arriving in Pskov, the sovereign naively hoped that he had finally entered a territory with firm military power, and that they would help him get to Tsarskoe Selo.

But it was not there! There was no talk at all about moving the train to Tsarskoye Selo.

Commander of the Northern Front, General N.V. Ruzsky, one of the supporters of the “most decisive changes,” began to passionately prove to the emperor the need for a responsible ministry, that is, changing the existing system to a constitutional monarchy. Nicholas II began to object, pointing out that he did not understand the position of a constitutional monarch, since such a monarch reigns but does not govern. Assuming supreme power as autocrat, he simultaneously accepted, as a duty to God, the responsibility for governing state affairs. By agreeing to transfer his rights to others, he deprives himself of the power to control events without getting rid of responsibility for them. In other words, transferring power to a government that will be responsible to parliament will in no way relieve it of responsibility for the actions of that government.

The only thing the emperor was ready to do was agree to the appointment of Rodzianko as prime minister and give him the choice of some cabinet members.

The negotiations dragged on until late at night and were interrupted several times.

The turning point was the receipt at 22:20 of the draft manifesto for the establishment of a responsible government, which was prepared at Headquarters and sent to Pskov signed by General Alekseev. According to the draft, Rodzianko was tasked with forming a Provisional Government.

Alekseev's telegram was the decisive moment of the action aimed at breaking the will of the emperor. It showed that the chief of staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and the actual commander-in-chief of the army in the field unconditionally supported the decision proposed by Ruzsky.

Obviously, at that moment, Nicholas II realized that he had finally fallen into a trap, and the door slammed behind him. In the presence of only Count Fredericks, the Minister of the Court, as a witness, he signed a telegram authorizing the publication of the manifesto proposed by Alekseev.

Later, Nicholas II, in communication with his loved ones, complained about rudeness and pressure from General Ruzsky. According to the emperor, it was he who forced him to change his moral and religious convictions and agree to concessions that he did not intend to make. The story of how Ruzsky, having lost patience, began impolitely insisting on the need for an immediate decision, came from the Dowager Empress Maria Feodorovna. It was to her that Nicholas II, after his abdication, told in detail about everything that happened in Pskov.

General A.I. Spiridovich wrote in his memoirs:

That evening the Emperor was defeated. Ruzsky broke the exhausted, morally tormented Sovereign, who in those days did not find serious support around him. The Emperor gave up morally. He gave in to force, assertiveness, and rudeness, which at one point reached the point of stamping his feet and banging his hand on the table. The Emperor spoke with bitterness about this rudeness later to his August mother and could not forget it even in Tobolsk.

On March 2, at one in the morning, signed by Nicholas II, a telegram was sent to General Ivanov: “I hope you arrived safely. I ask you not to take any measures until I arrive and report to you.” At the same time, General Ruzsky orders to stop the advance of the troops allocated to him towards Petrograd, return them to the front and telegraphs to Headquarters about the recall of the troops sent from the Western Front. The armed suppression of the rebellion in the capital did not take place.

On the night of March 1-2, Ruzsky informed Rodzianko that he had “pressured” the tsar until he agreed to form a government responsible “to the legislative chambers,” and offered to give him the text of the corresponding tsar’s manifesto. In response, Rodzianko stated that the situation in Petrograd had changed radically, and the demand for a responsible ministry had already become obsolete. Renunciation is necessary.

Ruzsky realized that his work was not finished yet and he could not do without assistants, so he immediately telegraphed to Headquarters.

Then Alekseev, on his own initiative, compiled and sent summary conversation between Ruzsky and Rodzianko to all the commanders-in-chief of the fronts: Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich on the Caucasian Front, General Sakharov on the Romanian Front, General Brusilov on the Southwestern Front, General Evert on the Western Front. Alekseev asked the commanders-in-chief to urgently prepare and send to Headquarters their opinion specifically about the abdication of the sovereign.

Alekseev's telegram to the commander-in-chief was formulated in such a way that they had no choice but to speak out for abdication. It said that if the commanders-in-chief shared the views of Alekseev and Rodzianko, then they should “telegraph very quickly their loyal request to His Majesty” for abdication. At the same time, not a word was mentioned about what should be done if they do not share this view.

On the morning of March 2, Ruzsky also received the text of a telegram sent by General Alekseev to the commander-in-chief of the fronts, and read it to the tsar. It became clear that Alekseev fully supported Rodzianko’s positions.

Renunciation. Option 1.

The emperor's mood changed greatly by morning. In the current situation, abdication attracted him as a more worthy solution than the position of a constitutional monarch. This exit gave him the opportunity to relieve himself of all responsibility for what had happened, what is happening and the inevitable future of Russia under the rule of people who, as they themselves assured, “are taking advantage of people's trust" At lunchtime, walking along the platform, Nicholas II met with Ruzsky and told him that he was inclined to renounce.

At 14-14:30, responses from the commanders-in-chief of the fronts began to arrive at Headquarters.

Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich (the Tsar's uncle) stated that “as a loyal subject, I consider it the duty of the oath and the spirit of the oath to kneel and beg the sovereign to renounce the crown in order to save Russia and the dynasty”.

Generals A.E. spoke in favor of abdication. Evert (Western Front), A.A. Brusilov (South-Western Front), V.V. Sakharov (Romanian Front), as well as the commander of the Baltic Fleet, Admiral A.I. Nepenin (on his own initiative). The commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Admiral A.V. Kolchak, did not send any response.

Between two and three o'clock in the afternoon, Ruzsky entered the tsar, taking with him the texts of telegrams from the commanders-in-chief received from Headquarters. Nicholas II read them and asked the generals present to also express their opinions. They all spoke in favor of renunciation.

At about three o'clock the Tsar announced his decision in two short telegrams, one of which was addressed to the Chairman of the Duma, the other to Alekseev. The abdication was in favor of the crown prince, and Grand Duke Mikhail Alexandrovich was appointed regent.

Undoubtedly, this was a step back from the concessions of the previous night, since not a word was said about the transition to a parliamentary system and a government responsible to the Duma. Ruzsky intended to immediately send telegrams, but for the members of the imperial retinue the abdication came as a complete surprise, and they considered that this step had been taken with excessive haste. They immediately began to persuade the Tsar to stop the telegrams. Ruzsky had to return the telegram addressed to Rodzianko to the tsar.

At this time, Ruzsky was informed that representatives of the State Duma A.I. were leaving for Pskov. Guchkov and V.V. Shulgin.

While the Duma representatives were traveling, members of the retinue asked what the abdicated monarch was going to do next? How does citizen Nikolai Romanov even imagine his future existence in Russia? He said that he would go abroad and live there until the end of hostilities, and then return, settle in Crimea and devote himself entirely to raising his son. Some of his interlocutors expressed doubts that he would be allowed to do this, but Nikolai replied that parents are never prohibited from taking care of their children. Nevertheless, some doubts arose in him, and for the first time he openly turned to S.P.’s personal doctor. Fedorov about the health of the prince. The king asked him to sincerely answer whether it was possible for the heir to be cured, to which he received the answer that “miracles do not happen in nature” and that in case of abdication, the heir would most likely have to live in the family of the regent. After this, Nikolai decided to immediately abdicate for his son, in order to leave Alexei with him.

Renunciation. Option 2.

Representatives of the Duma arrived on the royal train at 21:45. Before their arrival, General Ruzsky received information that “armed trucks” with revolutionary soldiers expelled from Petrograd were moving toward the Tsar’s train. According to Colonel A. A. Mordvinov, Shulgin informed him about the strong friction between the State Duma and the Petrograd Soviet: “Something unimaginable is happening in Petrograd, we are completely in their hands, and we will probably be arrested when we return.”

Guchkov told Nicholas II that they had come to report what had happened in Petrograd and to discuss the measures necessary to save the situation, since it continued to remain formidable: no one planned or prepared the popular movement, it broke out spontaneously and turned into anarchy . There is a danger of unrest spreading to the troops at the front. The only measure that can save the situation is abdication in favor of the young heir of the Tsarevich under the regency of Grand Duke Michael, who will form the new government. This is the only way to save Russia, the dynasty and the monarchy.

After listening to Guchkov, the tsar uttered a phrase that, according to G. M. Katkov, had the effect of a bomb exploding. He said that even during the day he decided to renounce in favor of his son. But now, realizing that he cannot agree to separation from his son, he will deny both himself and his son.

Guchkov said that they must respect the tsar's paternal feelings and accept his decision. Representatives of the Duma proposed a draft act of renunciation, which they brought with them. The Emperor, however, said that he had his own edition, and showed the text, which, on his instructions, was compiled at Headquarters. He has already made changes to it regarding the successor; the phrase about the oath of the new emperor was immediately agreed upon and also included in the text.

On March 2 (15), 1917 at 23:40, Nikolai handed over to Guchkov and Shulgin the Act of Abdication, which, in particular, read: “We command our brother to rule over the affairs of the state in complete and inviolable unity with the representatives of the people in legislative institutions, on those principles that will be established by them, taking an inviolable oath to that effect. »

In addition to the Act of Abdication, Nicholas II signed a decree dismissing the former composition of the Council of Ministers and appointing Prince G.E. Lvov as Chairman of the Council of Ministers, an order for the Army and Navy appointing Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich as Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

To avoid the impression that the abdication occurred under pressure from the Duma delegates, it was officially stated that the abdication took place on March 2 at 3 o’clock in the afternoon, that is, precisely at the moment when the decision about it was actually made. The time of appointment decrees was marked as 14:00, so that they had the legal force of being made by the rightful emperor before the moment of abdication and to respect the principle of continuity of power.

The entire protocol of negotiations between Nicholas II and representatives of the Duma was recorded by the head of the campaign office, General Naryshkin, under the title “Protocol of Abdication.”

At the end of the audience, Guchkov left the carriage and shouted into the crowd:

“Russian people, bare your heads, cross yourself, pray to God... For the sake of saving Russia, the Sovereign Emperor withdrew his royal service. Russia is embarking on a new path!”

In the morning Ruzsky came and read his long conversation on the phone with Rodzianko. According to him, the situation in Petrograd is such that now the ministry from the Duma is powerless to do anything, since the Social Democratic Party, represented by the working committee, is fighting it. My renunciation is needed. Ruzsky conveyed this conversation to headquarters, and Alekseev to all commanders in chief. To 2? h. answers came from everyone. The point is that in the name of saving Russia and keeping the army at the front calm, you need to decide to take this step. I agreed. Headquarters sent a draft manifesto. In the evening, Guchkov and Shulgin arrived from Petrograd, with whom I talked and gave them the signed and revised manifesto. At one o'clock in the morning I left Pskov with a heavy feeling of what I had experienced. There is treason, cowardice, and deceit all around!

What's next?

The Tsar's train departed Pskov back to Mogilev shortly after midnight on March 2-3, 1917. The former emperor wanted to say goodbye to the generals and meet his mother, who came from Kyiv especially for this purpose. He was never released to his family in Tsarskoye Selo.

Before the train departed, Nicholas II handed over a telegram to the palace commandant V.N. Voeikov for Grand Duke Mikhail Alexandrovich:

"Petrograd. To His Imperial Majesty Michael the Second. Events last days forced me to irrevocably decide to take this extreme step. Forgive me if I upset you and didn’t have time to warn you. I will forever remain a faithful and devoted brother. I fervently pray to God to help you and your Motherland. Nicky."

The telegram was sent from railway station Sirotino (45 km west of Vitebsk) already in the afternoon. According to the assurance of the wife of the Grand Duke N. Brasova, Mikhail Alexandrovich never received this telegram.

The abdication in favor of Mikhail was an unpleasant surprise, both for the Grand Duke himself and for the revolutionaries. Members of the Provisional Government decided not to publish the manifesto on the abdication of Nicholas II for now, and immediately sent their representatives to Grand Duke Mikhail Alexandrovich.

According to A.F. Kerensky, he was completely shocked by the decision of his older brother. While Tsarevich Alexei was alive, Mikhail, who was in a morganatic marriage, had no rights to the throne and did not intend to reign.

After a three-hour meeting with members of the Provisional Government, who (except Miliukov and Guchkov) advised the Grand Duke to renounce the throne, Mikhail Alexandrovich signed the following document:

“A heavy burden has been placed on me by the will of my brother, who handed over to me the Imperial All-Russian Throne in a time of unprecedented war and popular unrest.

Inspired by the same thought with all the people that the good of our Motherland is above all, I made a firm decision in that case to assume the Supreme power, if such is the will of our great people, who must, by popular vote, through their representatives in the Constituent Assembly, establish a form of government and new basic laws of the Russian State. Therefore, calling on God’s blessing, I ask all citizens of the Russian State to submit to the Provisional Government, which arose at the initiative of the State Duma and is vested with full power, until the Constituent Assembly is convened as soon as possible on the basis of universal, direct, equal and secret suffrage by its decision on the form of government will express the will of the people. 3/III - 1917 Mikhail.

Petrograd."

He later wrote in his diary:

“Alekseev came with the latest news from Rodzianko. It turns out that Misha renounced. His manifesto ends with a four-tail for elections in 6 months of the Constituent Assembly. God knows who convinced him to sign such disgusting stuff! In Petrograd, the unrest stopped - as long as it continues like this."

The next morning, the usual meeting with Alekseev took place at Headquarters. After him, Alekseev conveyed to the Provisional Government the emperor’s “request” or “wish” that he be allowed to return to Tsarskoe Selo, wait there for the recovery of the children who had fallen ill with measles, and then the whole family leave for England through Murmansk.

As you know, the plans of the ex-emperor were not destined to come true. By signing the abdication, Nicholas II did not stipulate any mandatory conditions or guarantees of security for himself and his family. What, exactly, he didn’t know what to negotiate: there were no precedents for the voluntary abdication of a monarch in Russia. And is it a royal thing to bargain with conspirators, revolutionaries, rebels?..

The officers in the troops accepted the tsar’s abdication without enthusiasm, but almost everyone remained silent (isolated riots by Colonel of the Preobrazhensky Regiment A.P. Kutepov and the “first checker of Russia” General A.F. Keller do not count).

Almost immediately after the abdication of the tsar, a collapse began in the army. Death blow she was struck by “Order No. 1” for the Petrograd garrison, issued by the Petrograd Soviet on March 1, 1917 (i.e., even before the abdication). The order ordered the immediate creation of elected committees from representatives of the lower ranks in all military units, units and services, as well as on ships. The main thing in Order No. 1 was the third point, according to which in all political speeches, military units were no longer subordinate to officers, but to their elected committees and the Council. All weapons were transferred under the control of soldiers' committees. The order introduced equality of rights for “lower ranks” with other citizens in political, general civil and private life, and the title of officers was abolished. Subsequently, with the connivance of the new Minister of War A. Guchkov, this order was extended to the entire army and led to its complete disintegration.

Order No. 1 buried the hopes of the highest Russian generals to bring the war to a victorious end. Neither the already self-defeating “conspirator” Alekseev, nor his comrades in the Provisional Government, Milyukov and Guchkov, were able to achieve its abolition in May 1917, before the planned offensive on the Western Front.

“With the fall of the Tsar,” wrote General P.N. Wrangel, - the very idea of ​​power has fallen, in the concept of the Russian people, all the obligations that bind them have disappeared. At the same time, power and these obligations could not be replaced by anything.”

Version...

Today it is difficult to imagine what would have happened if General Alekseev, in those fateful days of March 1917, had had a glimpse of his very near future, even for a moment. What would happen if he suddenly saw how, together with Denikin, Kornilov, Markov, he was walking or riding in a miserable cart across the snow-covered Kuban steppe, how officers of the Kornilov regiment, unarmed, rushed into a “psychic attack” near Ekaterinodar, how they were fighting for their lives and honor the remnants of the Russian army near the village of Dmitrovskaya already in February of the following year, 1918?...

Perhaps Alekseev, Ruzsky, Milyukov, Guchkov and other “saviors” would have immediately stopped rocking the already flimsy edifice of Russian statehood, stopped on the edge, imbued with loyal feelings for their monarch and really saved the country from the impending disaster. Perhaps not.

Unfortunately or fortunately (?), no one can foresee even the very near future. Not by chance various kinds“prophets” were persecuted and killed at all times.

However, the reign of the last Russian Tsar Nicholas II was marked by the most vulgar mysticism. The royal couple, as you know, did not shy away from prophets, fortune tellers, or notorious charlatans. There is also a known legend about the prophecies of the monk Abel, received by Nikolai and Alexandra Feodorovna on the centenary of the death of Paul I (1901), and the predictions of the English astrologer Cairo (1907), and the prophecy of Seraphim of Sarov, which allegedly accidentally fell into the hands of the emperor, the ominous predictions of Rasputin, etc. .. etc.

If we assume that Nicholas II was the only emperor in history who knew his fate, knew the year of his death and the death of his entire family, then it is this mystical knowledge, and not “weakness,” that explains many facts of his reign. It is known that he tried several times to change his fate, and especially decisively in March 1905, trying to abdicate the throne and become a monk, but he could not. The entire second half of his reign (after March 1905) passed under the sign of fatal prophecies raining down on him from all sides, invisible to anyone else (except Alexandra Fedorovna).

All of the above allows us to look at the life and fate of the royal couple more objectively, but does not exclude a new “conspiracy theory.”

Playing on the inclination of Nicholas II (and especially Alexandra Feodorovna) towards mysticism, “slipping” them with predictions, prophecies and the prophets themselves - all this could be a multi-step combination for the collapse of the country and the elimination of the ruling dynasty.

The authorship of this operation, which was too long in time, but very effective in its results, could belong to British intelligence. UK with late XIX centuries, she only dreamed of eliminating Russia, her main rival on the continent and in the eastern possessions, from the political arena.

The mystic king, Job the Long-Suffering, armed, or rather disarmed, with numerous prophecies about his unhappy fate - what could be worse for a country drawn into a world war? And his elimination on the eve of victory and the collapse of the state played into the hands not so much of the opponents in the war as of yesterday’s Entente allies, who rushed under the guise of help to rob Russia, already torn by civil strife and bleeding.

Version by A. Razumov

Currently, A. Razumov’s version, supported by some representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church and historian and publicist N. Starikov, which denies the very fact of Nicholas II’s abdication of the throne, has also gained great popularity among jingoistic patriots.

Razumov compared the published text of the Manifesto on abdication and the text of General Alekseev’s telegram No. 1865 dated March 1, 1917, addressed to Nicholas II, found a number of coincidences in them and came to the conclusion that all known witnesses of the abdication (Shulgin, Guchkov, Rodzianko, Fredericks and others ) formed a conspiracy of liars. For many years they unanimously lied that on March 2, Nicholas II himself drew up the text of his abdication in favor of his brother Mikhail and voluntarily signed it. The conspirators needed a living monarch who had independently abdicated the throne in order to cut the ground from under the feet of pro-monarchy-minded patriots who were supposedly capable of preventing the rapid collapse of the army and the country.

As a key argument, Starikov cites the complete coincidence of individual fragments of the text, as well as the signature of Nicholas II, written for some reason in pencil.

Meanwhile, there is nothing surprising or sensational in the coincidence of the texts of the telegram and the Manifesto.

Judging by the diaries and letters of Nicholas II that have come down to us, the last emperor was not particularly distinguished by his quickness of pen. It is unlikely that he had any skill in drafting official documents. As you know, during the days of the sovereign’s stay in Pskov, more than a dozen different telegrams were drawn up on his behalf at Headquarters, as well as several options for abdication (including in favor of his son). Standard clerical phrases could have been used by one of the adjutants or by the same Lukomsky and Basili, who prepared the texts of telegrams and draft versions of the Abdication Manifesto for Nicholas II. He, in turn, simply made his changes to the finished text sent from Headquarters and signed the Manifesto like a telegram - in pencil.

Of course, for various kinds of conspiracy theorists, the version about the deliberate use of a pencil when signing such an important document looks much more attractive. They say that the unfortunate emperor wanted to show his subjects that violence had been committed against him, and this document could not be trusted. But the subjects did not understand this or did not want to understand. The last senseless protest of the last emperor could not erase 23 years of incompetent rule, nor restore lost opportunities, nor correct fatal mistakes that had already become history.

Elena Shirokova

Sources and literature:

Spiridovich A.I. The Great War and the February Revolution of 1914-1917

Shulgin V.V. Days. 1925.

Multatuli P.V. “May the Lord bless my decision...” - St. Petersburg: Satis, 2002.

It's him. Nicholas II. A renunciation that never happened. - M.: AST, Astrel. 2010. - 640 p.

The story of Nicholas 2's abdication from the throne is one of the most tragic and bloody moments of the twentieth century. This fateful decision predetermined the course of development of Russia for many decades, as well as the very decline of the monarchical dynasty. It is difficult to say what events would have occurred in our country if, on that very significant date of Nicholas 2’s abdication from the throne, the emperor would have made a different decision. It is surprising that historians are still arguing over whether this renunciation actually took place or whether the document presented to the people was a real forgery, which served as the starting point for everything that Russia experienced over the next century. Let's try to understand exactly how the events unfolded that led to the birth of citizen Nikolai Romanov instead of the Russian Emperor Nicholas II.

The reign of the last emperor of Russia: features

In order to understand what exactly led to the abdication of Nicholas 2 from the throne (we will indicate the date of this event a little later), it is necessary to give a brief description of the entire period of his reign.

The young emperor ascended the throne after the death of his father Alexander III. Many historians believe that the autocrat was not morally prepared for the events that Russia was approaching with leaps and bounds. Emperor Nicholas II was confident that in order to save the country it was necessary to strictly adhere to the monarchical foundations that were formed by his predecessors. He had difficulty accepting any reform ideas and underestimated the revolutionary movement that swept many European powers during this period.

In Russia, from the moment Nicholas 2 ascended the throne (on October 20, 1894), revolutionary sentiments gradually grew. The people demanded from the emperor reforms that would satisfy the interests of all sectors of society. After lengthy deliberation, the autocrat signed several decrees granting freedom of speech and conscience, and editing laws on the division of legislative power in the country.

For some time, these actions extinguished the flaring revolutionary fire. However, in 1914, the Russian Empire was drawn into the war and the situation changed dramatically.

The First World War: impact on the internal political situation in Russia

Many scientists believe that the date of Nicholas 2’s abdication of the throne simply would not exist in Russian history, if not for military actions, which turned out to be disastrous primarily for the economy of the empire.

Three years of war with Germany and Austria became a real test for the people. Each new defeat at the front caused discontent ordinary people. The economy was in a deplorable state, which was accompanied by devastation and impoverishment of most of the country's population.

More than once, workers' uprisings arose in cities, paralyzing the activities of factories and factories for several days. However, the emperor himself treated such speeches and manifestations of popular despair as temporary and fleeting discontent. Many historians believe that it was this carelessness that subsequently led to events that culminated on March 2, 1917.

Mogilev: the beginning of the end of the Russian Empire

For many scientists, it still remains strange that Russian monarchy collapsed overnight - almost in a week. This time was enough to lead the people to revolution, and the emperor to sign the document of abdication.

The beginning of the bloody events was the departure of Nicholas 2 to Headquarters, located in the city of Mogilev. The reason to leave Tsarskoe Selo, where all the imperial family, served as a telegram from General Alekseev. In it, he reported on the need for a personal visit by the emperor, and the general did not explain what caused such urgency. Surprisingly, historians have not yet figured out the fact that forced Nicholas 2 to leave Tsarskoye Selo and head to Mogilev.

However, on February 22, the imperial train departed under guard for Headquarters; before the trip, the autocrat talked with the Minister of Internal Affairs, who described the situation in Petrograd as calm.

A day after leaving Tsarskoe Selo, Nicholas II arrived in Mogilev. From this moment began the second act of the bloody historical drama that destroyed the Russian Empire.

February unrest

The morning of February twenty-third was marked by workers' strikes in Petrograd. About one hundred thousand people took to the streets of the city; the next day their number already exceeded two hundred thousand workers and members of their families.

It is interesting that for the first two days none of the ministers informed the emperor about the atrocities that were happening. Only on February 25, two telegrams flew to Headquarters, which, however, did not reveal the true state of affairs. Nicholas 2 reacted to them quite calmly and ordered to immediately resolve the issue with the help of law enforcement forces and weapons.

Every day the wave of popular discontent grew and by the twenty-sixth of February the State Duma was dissolved in Petrograd. A message was sent to the emperor, which described in detail the horror of the situation in the city. However, Nicholas 2 took this as an exaggeration and did not even respond to the telegram.

Armed clashes between workers and military began in Petrograd. The number of wounded and killed quickly grew, the city was completely paralyzed. But even this did not force the emperor to react somehow. Slogans about the overthrow of the monarch began to be heard on the streets.

Revolt of military units

Historians believe that on February 27 the unrest became irreversible. It was no longer possible to solve the problem and calm people down peacefully.

In the morning, military garrisons began to join the striking workers. All obstacles were swept away on the way of the crowd, the rebels seized weapons depots, opened the doors of prisons and burned government institutions.

The emperor was fully aware of what was happening, but did not issue a single intelligible order. Time was quickly running out, but at Headquarters they were still waiting for the autocrat’s decision, which would satisfy the rebels.

The emperor's brother informed him of the need to publish a manifesto on the change of power and publish several programmatic theses that would calm the people. However, Nicholas 2 announced that he plans to postpone the adoption important decision before arriving in Tsarskoe Selo. On February 28, the imperial train departed from Headquarters.

Pskov: a fatal stop on the way to Tsarskoe Selo

Due to the fact that the uprising began to grow beyond Petrograd, the imperial train was unable to reach its destination and, turning around halfway, was forced to stop in Pskov.

On March 1, it was finally clear that the uprising in Petrograd was successful and all infrastructure facilities came under the control of the rebels. Telegrams were sent to Russian cities describing the events that took place. The new government took control of the railway communication, carefully guarding the approaches to Petrograd.

Strikes and armed clashes swept Moscow and Kronstadt; the emperor was fairly well informed about what was happening, but could not decide to take drastic actions that could correct the situation. The autocrat constantly held meetings with ministers and generals, consulting and considering various options for solving the problem.

By the second of March, the emperor was firmly convinced of the idea of ​​abdicating the throne in favor of his son Alexei.

"We, Nicholas II": renunciation

Historians say that the emperor was primarily concerned about the safety of the royal dynasty. He already understood that he would not be able to retain power in his hands, especially since his comrades saw the only way out of the current situation in abdication of the throne.

It is worth noting that during this period Nicholas 2 still hoped to calm the rebels with some reforms, but right time was missed, and the empire could only be saved by a voluntary renunciation of power in favor of others.

“We, Nicholas II” - this is how the document that predetermined the fate of Russia began. However, even here historians cannot agree, because many read that the manifesto had no legal force.

Manifesto of Nicholas 2 on the abdication of the throne: versions

It is known that the document of renunciation was signed twice. The first contained information that the emperor was renouncing his power in favor of Tsarevich Alexei. Since he could not independently govern the country due to his age, Michael, the emperor’s brother, was to become his regent. The manifesto was signed at approximately four o'clock in the afternoon, and at the same time a telegram was sent to General Alekseev informing about the event.

However, at almost twelve o'clock at night, Nicholas II changed the text of the document and abdicated the throne for himself and his son. Power was given to Mikhail Romanovich, who, however, the very next day signed another document of renunciation, deciding not to put his life in danger in the face of growing revolutionary sentiments.

Nicholas II: reasons for relinquishing power

The reasons for the abdication of Nicholas 2 are still being discussed, but this topic is included in all history textbooks and even appears when taking the Unified State Exam. It is officially believed that the following factors prompted the emperor to sign the document:

• reluctance to shed blood and fear of plunging the country into another war;
• the inability to receive reliable information about the uprising in Petrograd on time;
• trust in their commanders-in-chief, who actively advise publishing the abdication of power as soon as possible;
• desire to preserve the Romanov dynasty.

In general, any of the above reasons in itself and all together could have contributed to the fact that the autocrat made an important and difficult decision for himself. Be that as it may, the date of Nicholas 2’s abdication from the throne marked the beginning of the most difficult period in the history of Russia.

The Empire after the Emperor's Manifesto: a brief description

The consequences of Nicholas 2's abdication from the throne were catastrophic for Russia. They are difficult to describe in a nutshell, but we can say that the country, which was considered a great power, ceased to exist.

Over the following years, it was plunged into numerous internal conflicts, devastation and attempts to build a new branch of government. Ultimately, this is what led to the rule of the Bolsheviks, who managed to keep a huge country in their hands.

But for the emperor himself and his family, the abdication of the throne became fatal - in July 1918, the Romanovs were brutally murdered in the dark and damp basement of a house in Yekaterinburg. The empire ceased to exist.

It is widely known that the abdication of Nicholas II from the throne occurred on March 2 (15), 1917, in a train carriage at the Pskov station. But why do legends still circulate that this happened at a station with the ugly name Dno, 100 km from Pskov? Maybe because of the desire to theatricalize the situation? “Russia sank to the bottom in March 1917.” Sounds dramatic. Scary.

I read today an interesting material about the Malaya Vishera station and remembered that this town, one of the points of the Nikolaev railway, entered the history of the events of 1917 in the most direct way: it was here that the royal train was stopped under the pretext that further points Lyuban and Tosno were occupied rebels (which, by the way, is questioned by some researchers and regarded as disinformation).

Having decided to clarify some points related to this stage of the revolution, I was surprised to notice that different sources call the place of abdication differently: some consider Pskov to be such (as I myself always believed), others - the Dno station. Most often, messages of the latter type are found, sometimes accompanied by metaphors like “Russia sank to the Bottom on March 1, 1917.” Russian Wikipedia (an unreliable source, but often cited and used by everyone on the Internet) also gives the palm to Dn.

There are also messages like this:
Today, March 13, participants in a mixed religious procession from Moscow, St. Petersburg and Pskov erected a worship cross at the Dno railway station, where the last Russian Emperor Nicholas II abdicated the royal throne in 1917, Interfax writes.

However, in Pskov there is also a chapel called “Tsarskaya” and erected precisely in memory of the abdication of the Emperor, which, as Pskovites believe, happened in their city. And who is right in this situation?
I wasn't the first to ask this question. Here, for example: http://my-my.livejournal.com/106492.htm l (pay attention to the comments - there are different versions).

But you don’t need to be a great researcher to understand where one of the key events of 1917 actually happened. Sovereign Nicholas II himself tells us about this in his diary ( in bold highlighted by me):

March 1st. Wednesday
At night we turned back from M. Vishera, because Lyuban and Tosno were occupied by the rebels. Let's go to Valdai, Bottom and Pskov, where I stayed for the night. I saw Ruzsky. He, Danilov and Savvich were having lunch. Gatchina and Luga also turned out to be busy. Shame and shame! It was not possible to get to Tsarskoe. And thoughts and feelings are there all the time! How painful it must be for poor Alix to go through all these events alone! Lord help us!

March 2nd. Thursday
In the morning Ruzsky came and read his long conversation on the phone with Rodzianko. According to him, the situation in Petrograd is such that now the ministry from the Duma is seemingly powerless to do anything, since the social-democratic party, represented by the working committee, is fighting it. My renunciation is needed. Ruzsky conveyed this conversation to headquarters, and Alekseev to all commanders in chief. By 2½ o'clock answers came from everyone. The point is that in the name of saving Russia and keeping the army at the front calm, you need to decide to take this step. I agreed. Headquarters sent a draft manifesto. In the evening, Guchkov and Shulgin arrived from Petrograd, with whom I spoke and gave them the signed and revised manifesto. At one o'clock in the morning I left Pskov with a heavy feeling of what I had experienced. There is treason and cowardice and deceit all around!

Dno station appears in the diary on March 1, after which Pskov is immediately mentioned. And we are talking about abdication only the next day, March 2, when the emperor was already in Pskov. Therefore, it could only happen there.

Colonel Mordvinov, who accompanied the Emperor in those February-March days, writes practically nothing about the Dno station - he only mentions it as one of the points on the way, first to Tsarskoe Selo, and then, after changing the route, to Pskov. The same can be seen in the memoirs of General Dubensky, Shulgin’s memoirs, and other sources. None of the eyewitnesses speak of the Dno station as the place of the abdication of the Emperor. Official documents do not confirm this either.

Thus, by comparing sources we arrive at the conclusion that the story of the end of the Russian autocracy at the station with the self-explanatory name “Dno” is myth. Beautiful (“sank to the Bottom”), repeatable and replicable, but myth.

But here’s what’s still unclear: where did the legend about the Dno station come from? And why, given such an obvious misconception, do they continue to repeat it (the installation of a worship cross at the station is further confirmation of this)?

It’s also sad, of course, that everyone forgot about the Malaya Vishera station - but its importance in those days turned out to be no lower than Pskova!

It would be much more appropriate to place a worship cross here...

http://brusnik.livejournal.com/57698.html?media - link

On the abdication of Sovereign Emperor Nicholas II
from the Russian throne and about the abdication of supreme power

Abdication of the Sovereign Emperor from the Throne of the Russian State. What can we Christians know about him?

1. Is authentic

“We didn’t believe it, just as we didn’t believe any bad news from the first hearing, but the next day a manifesto of renunciation appeared in the newspapers, set out in those simple and great words that only one Sovereign knew how to speak” (Tatyana Melnik (born Botkin). Memories of The Royal Family and its life before and after the revolution. Belgrade, 1921. P.30).

2. Eat legally. Accepted by virtue of the King's fulfillment of His personal duty

The Tsar was not obliged to defend his power over Russia. This was the duty of every single military and civilian rank, who swore an oath to serve him personally to the last extreme, that is, to death. This point - to protect his power and not leave the throne - was not part of his duties as a Tsar. He had the right to abdicate in favor of his brother for the good of the Motherland. Lawless deception regarding the situation in the country, perpetrated by those people whose reports the Tsar believed, does not make the Tsar a participant in the deception.

The king recorded his decision on paper and marked this paper with the time of the decision: 15 hours 5 minutes on March 2. But even if this paper - the Act of Renunciation - is illegitimate before the letter of the laws of the Russian Empire, even if the Renunciation itself is not provided for by any legal norms, it is still legal before God, as committed by His Anointed One for legal reasons, which formed the subject of His promise to God - the good of the people : preventing internal bloodshed, protecting subjects from a sinful fall into rebellion and fratricide in the face of an external adversary.

The confidence that His departure was a good thing finally matured in the Emperor after receiving telegrams from the commanders of the fronts.

“Ultimately, the factor that weighed in the king’s decision was the advice of his generals. For Nicholas, each of these telegrams was more significant than a dozen messages from Rodzianko. They were his comrades in arms, his friends, his brave warriors. Nicholas loved the army and also sincerely loved his country. He cared more about winning the war than his crown. Starting a civil war, with Russians killing Russians while the hated Germans watched, was a denial of everything he deeply believed in. If this was the opinion of his generals, then the highest act of patriotism that he could perform was abdication.” (Robert Massey. Nicholas and Alexandra. Moscow, Interprax, 1990, p. 355).

Deep confidence in the impeccable correctness of what was done breathes in the entry in the Emperor's Diary the next day after the Abdication.

I slept long and soundly. I woke up far beyond Dvinsk. The day was sunny and frosty. I talked to my people about yesterday. I read a lot about Julius Caesar. At 8.20 arrived in Mogilev. All the ranks of the headquarters were on the platform. Received Alekseev in the carriage. At 9 1/2 he moved into the house. Alekseev came with the latest news from Rodzianko. It turns out that Misha renounced. His manifesto ends with the quadrilateral for elections in 6 months of the Constituent Assembly. God knows who convinced him to sign such disgusting stuff! In Petrograd, the unrest stopped - as long as it continues like this."

The Tsar, as we see, does not regret his action and wants only one thing: so that there is no continuation of the unrest.

The same confidence that the power he gave not to the enemies of Russia, but to patriots who love the Motherland, although opposed to him, will serve for the good and bring the country to victory, comes through in another precise observation of Gilliard:

“At seven o’clock in the evening there is a service upstairs in the children’s rooms. There are only fifteen of us. I notice that the Sovereign devoutly crosses himself when the priest commemorates the Provisional Government" (P. Gilliard. Emperor Nicholas II and His Family. "Rus". Vienna, 1921, p. 172).

3. Accepted individually

“The Emperor said: “I have made up my mind. I renounce the throne,” and crossed himself. The generals crossed themselves” (Gen. S.S. Savvich. Nicholas II’s decision to abdicate. Abdication, p. 198).

"Today I see you in last time. This is the will of God and the consequence of my decision” (Gen. N.M. Tikhmenev. The last visit of Nicholas II to Mogilev. Abdication, p. 211).

“...I couldn’t believe that the sovereign, the most generous and honest of the entire Romanov family, would be condemned to become an innocent victim of his relatives and subjects. But the tsar, with a completely calm expression in his eyes, confirmed all this, adding that “if all of Russia on its knees asked him to return to the throne, he would never return (A. Taneeva (Vyrubova). Pages of my life. M., 2016, p. 124).

“And it seemed to me, I was then even convinced that the decision had come to the sovereign earlier, even before receiving telegrams from the commanders-in-chief and Ruzsky’s insistence. It probably flashed in his thoughts for the first time, back on Tuesday, February 28, late in the evening, when they dared not to let him into Tsarskoe, but demanded to be escorted to Petrograd, and began to strengthen in the painful night from March 1 to 2, when in the morning I was so struck by his exhausted appearance . This Decision was made by him, as always, individually, in a struggle with himself, and to initiate others, even close ones, into his spiritual Drama, due to the nature of his shy, proudly noble nature, he probably not only did not want, but also did not could” (Col. A. A. Mordvinov. The Last Days of the Emperor. Abdication, p. 121).

4. Accepted in good faith and therefore legally

Abstracted from the practice and experience of life, a plumb line motionless in its vertical - conscience - or the internal Law of God - is the basis of law.

“WE considered it a duty of conscience,” the King explained to His people the reason for His renunciation.

“His Majesty calmly and firmly said that he is doing what his conscience tells him, and he is renouncing the throne for himself and for his son, with whom, due to his ill condition, he cannot part.” (Dubensky, Renunciation, p. 71).

The Tsar abdicated, yielding not to the revolution, but to the voice of His conscience, which said that he must renounce in favor of the next Tsar, and leave the kingdom himself for the sake of pacifying his subjects - patriots and monarchists. For the sake of victory for your country in the war. Of the 11 phrases of the Act of Abdication, eight are dedicated to the war, the front and victory over the external enemy, whom the Tsar calls “cruel” and “seeking to enslave our Motherland for three years.” The Emperor did not see any internal enemy at that hour, since neither Rodzianko, nor Ruzsky, nor Alekseev were enemies in his mind. The units in Petrograd that disobeyed were not enemies either.

5. Was the result of deception

Yes, the Emperor was deceived.

Yes, he was betrayed by his own service people.

Yes, he believed them, they convinced him. Apparently, it did not occur to the Emperor to arrest the main traitor Ruzsky, in whom he saw a loyal subject to the end.

This occurred to Flag Admiral Nilov and other members of the Retinue who sincerely loved the Emperor.

“Adjutant General K.D. Nilov was especially excited and when I entered his compartment, he said breathlessly that this traitor Ruzsky must be arrested and killed, that the Sovereign and all of Russia would perish.” (Dubensky, Renunciation, p. 61).

But they did not decide to do this without the will of the Tsar. The Tsar, upon his arrival in Pskov late in the evening of March 1, deliberately summoned Ruzsky, had a frank conversation with him, argued and objected, trusting him to negotiate with the Chairman of the Duma Rodzianka on straight wire and not suspecting either him or the other generals of treason.

The true - vile - character of the Russian Judas - Adjutant General A.V. Ruzsky was revealed to the Emperor only late in the evening of the second of March. “At the door He turned to me with the words: “And Guchkov was completely decent in his demeanor; I was preparing to see something completely different from him... Did you notice Ruzsky’s behavior? “The expression on the Sovereign’s face showed me better than words what impression His Adjutant General made on Him” (With the Tsar and without the Tsar. Memoirs of the last Palace Commandant of the Sovereign Emperor Nicholas II B . N. Voeykova. M., 1994, p.

At the same time, the Tsar had no doubts about the correctness of the decision.

6. Does not contain any other meaning or motivation than that revealed by the Sovereign Himself in the public document signed by Him at 3 p.m. on March 2, 1917

The motives for the Emperor’s abdication of the throne come down to a succinct phrase from the arrested Empress, said to Pierre Gilliard in the Alexander Palace after Kerensky’s arrival with a demand to separate Their Majesties during the investigation:

“A little later, the very excited Empress came up to me and said:

To do this to the Sovereign, to do this nasty thing to him after he sacrificed himself and renounced in order to avoid civil war - how low, how petty! The Emperor did not want the blood of even one Russian to be shed for him. He was always ready to give up everything if he was sure that it was for the good of Russia.” (Gilliard, p. 171).

7. It was a political mistake - that is, a mistake that means nothing before God

The abdication was politically erroneous: it did not achieve any of the earthly goals proclaimed by its initiators and led to the fall of the thousand-year-old Russian Empire, which those who persuaded the Tsar to abdicate did not want.

The king was deceived by people whom he trusted infinitely.

“Tears sounded in his voice when he spoke about his friends and family, whom he trusted most and who turned out to be accomplices in his overthrow from the throne. He showed me telegrams from Brusilov, Alekseev and other generals, members of his family, including Nikolai Nikolaevich: everyone asked His Majesty on his knees, to save Russia, to abdicate the throne.” (A. Taneeva (Vyrubova). Pages of my life. M., 2016, p. 124).

8. Sinless before God

Renunciation is sinless: accepted in conscience and in resonance with the feeling of the Tsar’s duty to God, which was the subject of the Tsar’s oath at the Holy Confirmation and Coronation in 1896.

“I was not protecting autocratic power, but Russia,” the Emperor said to General Ivanov on the night of February 28. (Dubensky, p.53).

“There is no sacrifice that I would not make in the name of the real good and for the salvation of my dear Mother Russia. Therefore, I am ready to abdicate the throne in favor of my son so that he will remain with me until he comes of age under the regency of my brother, Grand Duke Mikhail Alexandrovich. Nikolai." (telegram from the Sovereign to Rodzianka on March 2 in the afternoon).

“By 2 1/2 replies came from all (commanders in chief). The point is that in the name of saving Russia and keeping the army at the front calm, you need to decide to take this step. I agreed” (Diary, March 2).

“We considered it a duty of conscience to facilitate close unity and rallying of all the people’s forces for our people to achieve victory as quickly as possible” (Act of Renunciation).

“To His Imperial Majesty Michael. The events of recent days forced Me to irrevocably decide to take this extreme step. Forgive Me if I upset you and did not have time to warn you. I remain forever a faithful and devoted Brother. I am returning to Headquarters and from there in a few days I hope to come to Tsarskoe Selo. I fervently pray to God to help You and Your Motherland. Nicky." (Telegram from the Sovereign to Brother Mikhail after the Abdication).

In essence, this is the motivation of the Holy Princes Boris and Gleb in their refusal of supreme power so as not to shed fraternal blood for their own sake.

For citizens of the earthly City, such motivation is madness.

For the citizens of the Heavenly City, it is a memorable example of an unmistakable decision in personal presence before God.

Archpriest Vladimir Pereslegin