A kun legends and myths of ancient Greece. Nikolai kun - legends and myths of ancient Greece. Ancient myths and legends of Ancient Greece

Denikin A I

Essays on the Russian Troubles (Volume 2)

General A. I. Denikin

Essays on the Russian Time of Troubles

Volume two

The fight of General Kornilov

August 1917 - April 1918

CONTENTS OF THE SECOND VOLUME Preface I. The divergence of the paths of the revolution. The inevitability of a coup II. The beginning of the struggle: General Kornilov, Kerensky and Savinkov. Kornilov's "note" on the reorganization of the army III. Kornilov movement: secret organizations, officers, Russian public IV. The ideology of the Kornilov movement. Preparing a speech. "Political environment." A three-way "conspiracy." V. Kerensky’s provocation: V. Lvov’s mission, announcement to the country of the “rebellion” of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief VI. Speech by General Kornilov. Headquarters, military commanders, allied representatives, the Russian public, organizations, troops of General Krymov - on the days of the speech. Death of General Krymov. Negotiations on the liquidation of the speech VII. Liquidation of the Bet. Arrest of General Kornilov. Kerensky's victory is a prelude to Bolshevism VIII. Moving of the "Berdichev group" to Bykhov. Life in Bykhov. General Romanovsky IX. Relationships between Bykhov, Headquarters and Kerensky. Future plans. "Kornilov program" X. Results of Kerensky's victory: loneliness of power; its gradual takeover by the Soviets; decay state life. Foreign policy government and councils XI. Military reforms of Kerensky - Verkhovsky - Verderevsky. State of the army in September, October. German occupation of Moonsund XII. Bolshevik revolution. Attempts at resistance. Gatchina. The end of the Kerensky dictatorship. Attitude to the events at Headquarters and Bykhov XIII. The first days of Bolshevism in the country and army. The fate of the Bykhovites. Death of General Dukhonin. Our departure from Bykhov to Don XIV. The arrival of General Alekseev to the Don and the birth of the "Alekseev organization." Traction to the Don. General Kaledin XV General outline of the military-political situation in Ukraine at the beginning of 1918. Don, Kuban, North Caucasus and Transcaucasia XVI. "Moscow Center" Connection between Moscow and the Don. Arrival of General Kornilov to the Don. Attempts at organization state power in the South: “triumvirate” Alekseev - Kornilov - Kaledin; "advice"; internal friction in the triumvirate and council XVII. Formation of the Volunteer Army. Her tasks. The spiritual appearance of the first volunteers XVIII. The end of the old army. Organization of the Red Guard. The beginning of the armed struggle of the Soviet government against Ukraine and the Don. Allied Policy; the role of the Czech-Slovak and Polish corps. Fights between the Volunteer Army and the Don partisans on the approaches to Rostov and Novocherkassk. Abandonment of Rostov by the Volunteer Army XIX. 1st Kuban campaign. From Rostov to Kuban: military council in Olginskaya; fall of the Don; popular sentiment; battle at Lezhanka; new tragedy of Russian officers XX. Trip to Ekaterinodar: the mood of Kuban; battles near Berezanka. Vyselki and Korenovskaya; news of the fall of Ekaterinodar XXI. The army's turn to the south: the battle at Ust-Laba; Kuban Bolshevism; Army headquarters XXII. Campaign in the Trans-Kuban region: bonze Laboy and Filippovsky; shadow sides of army life XXIII. The fate of Ekaternnodar and the Kuban volunteer detachment; meeting with him XXIV. Ice campaign - battle on March 15 near Novo-Dmitrievskaya. Agreement with the Kuban people on the accession of the Kuban detachment to the army. Trip to Ekaterinodar XXV. Assault on Ekaterinodar XXVI. Death of General Kornilov XXVII My entry into command of the Volunteer Army. Lifting the siege of Ekaterinodar. Battles at Gnachbau and Medvedovskaya. The feat of General Markov XXVIII. Hike to the east - from Dyadkovskaya to Uspenskaya; the tragedy of the wounded; life in Kuban XXIX. Uprising on the Don and Kuban. Return of the army to the Don. Battles at Gorkaya Balka and Lezhanka. Liberation of Zadonya XXX. Campaign of the Drozdovites XXXI. German invasion of the Don. Communication with outside world and three problems: front unity, external “orientation” and political slogans. Results of the first Kuban campaign.

On March 31, 1918, a Russian grenade, directed by the hand of a Russian man, killed the great Russian patriot. His corpse was burned and his ashes scattered to the wind.

For what? Is it because in the days of great upheaval, when recent slaves bowed before the new rulers, he told them proudly and boldly: leave, you are destroying the Russian land.

Was it because, not sparing his life, with a handful of troops devoted to him, he began to fight against the elemental madness that gripped the country, and fell defeated, but did not betray his duty to the Motherland?

Is it because he deeply and painfully loved the people who betrayed him and crucified him? Years will pass, and thousands of people will flow to the high bank of the Kuban to worship the ashes of the martyr and creator of the idea of ​​​​the revival of Russia. His executioners will come too.

And he will forgive the executioners.

But he will never forgive one.

When the Supreme Commander-in-Chief was languishing in the Bykhov prison awaiting Shemyakin's trial, one of the destroyers of the Russian temple said: “Kornilov must be executed; but when this happens, I will come to the grave, bring flowers and kneel before the Russian patriot.”

Curse them - adulterers of words and thoughts! Away with their flowers! They desecrate the holy grave. I appeal to those who, both during Kornilov’s life and after his death, gave him the flowers of their souls and hearts, who once entrusted him with their fate and life:

In the midst of terrible storms and bloody battles, we will remain faithful to his covenants. To him - everlasting memory Speech delivered by the author in Ekaterinodar in 1919.

Brussels 1922

Essays on the Russian Time of Troubles

The divergence of the paths of the revolution. The inevitability of a revolution.

A broad generalization of the constituent forces of the revolution into two resultants, the Provisional Government and the Council, is permissible to a certain extent only in relation to the first months of the revolution. In its further course, a sharp stratification occurs among the ruling and leading circles, and the months of July and August already give a picture of a multilateral internecine struggle. At the top, this struggle is still going on within fairly clear boundaries separating the fighting parties, but its reflection among the masses reveals an image of complete confusion of concepts, instability political views and chaos in thoughts, feelings and movements. Sometimes only, in days of serious upheaval, differentiation occurs again, and the most heterogeneous and often politically and socially hostile elements gather around the two fighting sides.

This happened on July 3 (Bolshevik uprising) and August 27 (Kornilov’s speech). But immediately after the acute crisis has passed, the external unity, caused by tactical considerations, disintegrates, and the paths of the leaders of the revolution diverge.

Sharp lines were drawn between the three main institutions: the Provisional Government, the Council (Central Executive Committee) and the High Command.

As a result of the long-term government crisis caused by the events of July 3-5, the defeat at the front and the irreconcilable position taken by liberal democracy, in particular the Cadet Party, on the issue of forming power*1, the Council was forced to formally release the socialist ministers from responsibility to itself and provide Kerensky's right to form a government alone. The joint central committees, by a resolution of July 24, conditioned the support of the councils on the government on its compliance with the July 8 program and reserved the right to recall socialist ministers if their activities deviated from the democratic tasks outlined in the program. But, nevertheless, the fact of a certain emancipation of the government from the influence of the soviets, as a result of the confusion and weakening of the leading bodies of revolutionary democracy in the July days, is beyond doubt. Moreover, the 3rd government included socialists who were either of little influence or, like Avksentyev (Minister of Internal Affairs), Chernov (Minister of Agriculture), Skobelev (Minister of Labor), who were not knowledgeable in the affairs of their department. F. Kokoshkin in the Moscow committee of the pariah k.d.

said “during the month of our work in the government, the influence of the Council of Deputies on him was not noticeable at all... The decisions of the Council of Deputies were never mentioned, government decrees were not applied to them”... And outwardly the relationship changed: the minister-chairman either avoided or sometimes he ignored the Council and the Central Committee, not appearing at their meetings and not giving them a report, as before.*2 But the struggle, muted and intense, continued, with immediate causes being the divergence of the government and the central bodies of revolutionary democracy in matters of the beginning of the persecution of the Bolsheviks, repressions in the army, the organization of administrative power, etc.

The High Command took a negative position in relation to both the Council and the Government. How such relationships gradually matured was discussed in Volume 1. Leaving aside the details and reasons that aggravated them, let us dwell on the main reason: General Kornilov clearly sought to return power in the army to the military leaders and introduce military judicial repression throughout the country, which was largely directed against the Soviets and especially their left sector . Therefore, not to mention the deep political divergence, the struggle of the Soviets against Kornilov was, at the same time, their struggle for self-preservation. Moreover, it has long been governing bodies revolutionary democracy, the most fundamental issue of the country's defense lost its self-sufficient significance and, according to Stankevich, if it was sometimes brought to the fore in the Executive Committee, “it was only as a means to settle other political scores.” The Council and the Executive Committee therefore demanded that the government change the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and destroy the “counter-revolutionary nest”, which in their eyes represented Headquarters.

Denikin A I

Essays on the Russian Troubles (Volume 2)

General A. I. Denikin

Essays on the Russian Time of Troubles

Volume two

The fight of General Kornilov

August 1917 - April 1918

CONTENTS OF THE SECOND VOLUME Preface I. The divergence of the paths of the revolution. The inevitability of a coup II. The beginning of the struggle: General Kornilov, Kerensky and Savinkov. Kornilov's "note" on the reorganization of the army III. Kornilov movement: secret organizations, officers, Russian public IV. The ideology of the Kornilov movement. Preparing a speech. "Political environment." A three-way "conspiracy." V. Kerensky’s provocation: V. Lvov’s mission, announcement to the country of the “rebellion” of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief VI. Speech by General Kornilov. Headquarters, military commanders, allied representatives, the Russian public, organizations, troops of General Krymov - on the days of the speech. Death of General Krymov. Negotiations on the liquidation of the speech VII. Liquidation of the Bet. Arrest of General Kornilov. Kerensky's victory is a prelude to Bolshevism VIII. Moving of the "Berdichev group" to Bykhov. Life in Bykhov. General Romanovsky IX. Relationships between Bykhov, Headquarters and Kerensky. Future plans. "Kornilov program" X. Results of Kerensky's victory: loneliness of power; its gradual takeover by the Soviets; collapse of state life. Foreign policy of the government and councils XI. Military reforms of Kerensky - Verkhovsky - Verderevsky. State of the army in September, October. German occupation of Moonsund XII. Bolshevik revolution. Attempts at resistance. Gatchina. The end of the Kerensky dictatorship. Attitude to the events at Headquarters and Bykhov XIII. The first days of Bolshevism in the country and army. The fate of the Bykhovites. Death of General Dukhonin. Our departure from Bykhov to Don XIV. The arrival of General Alekseev to the Don and the birth of the "Alekseev organization." Traction to the Don. General Kaledin XV General outline of the military-political situation in Ukraine at the beginning of 1918. Don, Kuban, North Caucasus and Transcaucasia XVI. "Moscow Center" Connection between Moscow and the Don. Arrival of General Kornilov to the Don. Attempts to organize state power in the South: the “triumvirate” Alekseev - Kornilov - Kaledin; "advice"; internal tensions in the triumvirate and council XVII. Formation of the Volunteer Army. Her tasks. The spiritual appearance of the first volunteers XVIII. The end of the old army. Organization of the Red Guard. The beginning of the armed struggle of the Soviet government against Ukraine and the Don. Allied Policy; the role of the Czech-Slovak and Polish corps. Fights between the Volunteer Army and the Don partisans on the approaches to Rostov and Novocherkassk. Abandonment of Rostov by the Volunteer Army XIX. 1st Kuban campaign. From Rostov to Kuban: military council in Olginskaya; fall of the Don; popular sentiment; battle at Lezhanka; new tragedy of Russian officers XX. Trip to Ekaterinodar: the mood of Kuban; battles near Berezanka. Vyselki and Korenovskaya; news of the fall of Ekaterinodar XXI. The army's turn to the south: the battle at Ust-Laba; Kuban Bolshevism; Army headquarters XXII. Campaign in the Trans-Kuban region: bonze Laboy and Filippovsky; shadow sides of army life XXIII. The fate of Ekaternnodar and the Kuban volunteer detachment; meeting with him XXIV. Ice campaign - battle on March 15 near Novo-Dmitrievskaya. Agreement with the Kuban people on the accession of the Kuban detachment to the army. Trip to Ekaterinodar XXV. Assault on Ekaterinodar XXVI. Death of General Kornilov XXVII My entry into command of the Volunteer Army. Lifting the siege of Ekaterinodar. Battles at Gnachbau and Medvedovskaya. The feat of General Markov XXVIII. Hike to the east - from Dyadkovskaya to Uspenskaya; the tragedy of the wounded; life in Kuban XXIX. Uprising on the Don and Kuban. Return of the army to the Don. Battles at Gorkaya Balka and Lezhanka. Liberation of Zadonya XXX. Campaign of the Drozdovites XXXI. German invasion of the Don. Communication with the outside world and three problems: front unity, external “orientation” and political slogans. Results of the first Kuban campaign.

On March 31, 1918, a Russian grenade, directed by the hand of a Russian man, killed the great Russian patriot. His corpse was burned and his ashes scattered to the wind.

For what? Is it because in the days of great upheaval, when recent slaves bowed before the new rulers, he told them proudly and boldly: leave, you are destroying the Russian land.

Was it because, not sparing his life, with a handful of troops devoted to him, he began to fight against the elemental madness that gripped the country, and fell defeated, but did not betray his duty to the Motherland?

Is it because he deeply and painfully loved the people who betrayed him and crucified him? Years will pass, and thousands of people will flow to the high bank of the Kuban to worship the ashes of the martyr and creator of the idea of ​​​​the revival of Russia. His executioners will come too.

And he will forgive the executioners.

But he will never forgive one.

When the Supreme Commander-in-Chief was languishing in the Bykhov prison awaiting Shemyakin's trial, one of the destroyers of the Russian temple said: “Kornilov must be executed; but when this happens, I will come to the grave, bring flowers and kneel before the Russian patriot.”

Curse them - adulterers of words and thoughts! Away with their flowers! They desecrate the holy grave. I appeal to those who, both during Kornilov’s life and after his death, gave him the flowers of their souls and hearts, who once entrusted him with their fate and life:

In the midst of terrible storms and bloody battles, we will remain faithful to his covenants. Eternal memory to him. Speech delivered by the author in Ekaterinodar in 1919.

Brussels 1922

Essays on the Russian Time of Troubles

The divergence of the paths of the revolution. The inevitability of a revolution.

A broad generalization of the constituent forces of the revolution into two resultants, the Provisional Government and the Council, is permissible to a certain extent only in relation to the first months of the revolution. In its further course, a sharp stratification occurs among the ruling and leading circles, and the months of July and August already give a picture of a multilateral internecine struggle. At the top, this struggle is still going on within fairly clear boundaries separating the fighting parties, but its reflection among the masses reveals an image of complete confusion of concepts, instability of political views and chaos in thoughts, feelings and movements. Sometimes only, in days of serious upheaval, differentiation occurs again, and the most heterogeneous and often politically and socially hostile elements gather around the two fighting sides.

This happened on July 3 (Bolshevik uprising) and August 27 (Kornilov’s speech). But immediately after the acute crisis has passed, the external unity, caused by tactical considerations, disintegrates, and the paths of the leaders of the revolution diverge.

Sharp lines were drawn between the three main institutions: the Provisional Government, the Council (Central Executive Committee) and the High Command.

As a result of the long-term government crisis caused by the events of July 3-5, the defeat at the front and the irreconcilable position taken by liberal democracy, in particular the Cadet Party, on the issue of forming power*1, the Council was forced to formally release the socialist ministers from responsibility to itself and provide Kerensky's right to form a government alone. The joint central committees, by a resolution of July 24, conditioned the support of the councils on the government on its compliance with the July 8 program and reserved the right to recall socialist ministers if their activities deviated from the democratic tasks outlined in the program. But, nevertheless, the fact of a certain emancipation of the government from the influence of the soviets, as a result of the confusion and weakening of the leading bodies of revolutionary democracy in the July days, is beyond doubt. Moreover, the 3rd government included socialists who were either of little influence or, like Avksentyev (Minister of Internal Affairs), Chernov (Minister of Agriculture), Skobelev (Minister of Labor), who were not knowledgeable in the affairs of their department. F. Kokoshkin in the Moscow committee of the pariah k.d.

On March 31, 1918, a Russian grenade, directed by the hand of a Russian man, killed the great Russian patriot. His corpse was burned and his ashes scattered to the wind.

For what? Is it because in the days of great upheaval, when recent slaves bowed before the new rulers, he told them proudly and boldly: leave, you are destroying the Russian land.

Was it because, not sparing his life, with a handful of troops devoted to him, he began to fight against the elemental madness that gripped the country, and fell defeated, but did not betray his duty to the Motherland?

Was it because he deeply and painfully loved the people who betrayed him by crucifying him?

Years will pass, and thousands of people will flock to the high bank of the Kuban to worship the ashes of the martyr and creator of the idea of ​​​​the revival of Russia. His executioners will come too.

And he will forgive the executioners.

But he will never forgive one.

When the Supreme Commander-in-Chief was languishing in the Bykhov prison awaiting Shemyakin's trial, one of the destroyers of the Russian temple said: “Kornilov must be executed; but when this happens, I will come to the grave, bring flowers and kneel before the Russian patriot.”

Curse them - adulterers of words and thoughts! Away with their flowers! They desecrate the holy grave

I appeal to those who, both during Kornilov’s life and after his death, gave him the flowers of their souls and hearts, who once entrusted him with their fate and life:

In the midst of terrible storms and bloody battles, we will remain faithful to his covenants. Eternal memory to him

Brussels 1922

Essays on the Russian Time of Troubles

Chapter I
The divergence of the paths of the revolution. The inevitability of a coup

A broad generalization of the constituent forces of the revolution into two resultants - the Provisional Government and the Council - is permissible to a certain extent only in relation to the first months of the revolution. In its further course, a sharp stratification occurs among the ruling and leading circles, and the months of July and August already give a picture of a multilateral internecine struggle. At the top, this struggle is still going on within fairly clear boundaries separating the fighting parties, but its reflection among the masses reveals an image of complete confusion of concepts, instability of political views and chaos in thoughts, feelings and movements. Sometimes only, in days of serious upheaval, differentiation occurs again, and the most heterogeneous and often politically and socially hostile elements gather around the two fighting sides. This happened on July 3 (Bolshevik uprising) and August 27 (Kornilov’s speech). But immediately after the acute crisis has passed, the external unity caused by tactical considerations disintegrates, and the paths of the leaders of the revolution diverge.

Sharp lines were drawn between the three main institutions: the Provisional Government, the Council (Central Executive Committee) and the High Command.

As a result of the long-term government crisis caused by the events of July 3–5, the defeat at the front and the irreconcilable position taken by liberal democracy, in particular the Kadet Party, on the issue of the formation of power, 1
The Cadets demanded the creation of a government resting on a national basis and represented by individuals not responsible to any organizations or committees.

The Council was forced to formally release the socialist ministers from responsibility to themselves and give Kerensky the right to individually form the government.

The joint central committees, by a resolution of July 24, conditioned the support of the councils on the government on its compliance with the July 8 program and reserved the right to recall socialist ministers if their activities deviated from the democratic tasks outlined in the program. But, nevertheless, the fact of a certain emancipation of the government from the influence of the soviets, as a result of the confusion and weakening of the leading bodies of revolutionary democracy in the July days, is beyond doubt. Moreover, the 3rd government included socialists who were either of little influence or, like Avksentyev (Minister of Internal Affairs), Chernov (Minister of Agriculture), Skobelev (Minister of Labor), who were not knowledgeable in the affairs of their department. F. Kokoshkin in the Moscow committee of the pariah k.d. said “during the month of our work in the government, the influence of the Council of Deputies on him was not noticeable at all... The decisions of the Council of Deputies were never mentioned, government resolutions were not applied to them”... And outwardly the relationship changed: the minister - the chairman either avoided or ignored the Council and the Central Committee, not appearing at their meetings and not giving them a report, as before. 2
Was there once in 1 month.

But the struggle, silent and intense, continued, with immediate causes being the divergence of the government and the central bodies of revolutionary democracy on issues of the beginning of the persecution of the Bolsheviks, repressions in the army, the organization of administrative power, etc.

The High Command took a negative position in relation to both the Council and the Government. How such relationships gradually matured was discussed in Volume 1. Leaving aside the details and reasons that aggravated them, let us dwell on the main reason: General Kornilov clearly sought to return power in the army to the military leaders and introduce throughout the country such military-judicial repressions, which were largely directed against the Soviets and especially their left sector . Therefore, not to mention the deep political divergence, the struggle of the Soviets against Kornilov was, at the same time, their struggle for self-preservation. Moreover, long ago in the leading bodies of revolutionary democracy the most fundamental issue of the country’s defense lost its self-sufficient importance and, according to Stankevich, if it was sometimes brought to the fore in the Executive Committee, “it was only as a means for settling other political scores.” The Council and the Executive Committee therefore demanded that the government change the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and destroy the “counter-revolutionary nest”, which in their eyes represented Headquarters.

Kerensky, who had actually concentrated government power in his hands, found himself in a particularly difficult position: he could not help but understand that only the measures of severe coercion proposed by Kornilov could perhaps save the army, finally liberate the government from Soviet dependence and establish internal order in the country. Undoubtedly, liberation from the Soviets, carried out by someone else's hands or accomplished as a result of spontaneous events that removed responsibility from the Provisional Government and the Kerenskagr, seemed to him to be useful and desirable for the state. But the voluntary acceptance of the measures prescribed by the command would have caused a complete break with revolutionary democracy, which gave Kerensky his name, position and power and which, despite the opposition it offered, nevertheless, strangely enough, served him, albeit shaky, but the only one support. On the other hand, the restoration of the power of the military command threatened not with a reaction - Kerensky often spoke about this, although he hardly seriously believed in it - but, in any case, with a shift in the center of influence from socialist to liberal democracy, the collapse of the social-revolutionary party policy and the loss of the prevailing , perhaps any influence on the course of events. Added to this was the personal antipathy between Kerensky and General Kornilov, each of whom did not hesitate to express, sometimes in a very sharp form, their negative attitude towards each other and expected to encounter not only opposition, but also a direct attempt on the part of the other side. Thus, General Kornilov was afraid to go to Petrograd on August 10th for a meeting of the Provisional Government, expecting for some reason removal from his post and even personal detention... And when, nevertheless, on the advice of Savinkov and Filonenko, he went, he was accompanied by a detachment of Tekinites who placed machine guns near entrances to the Winter Palace during the stay of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. In turn, Kerensky, back on August 13–14 in Moscow during the days of the state meeting, expected active action from Kornilov’s adherents and took precautions. Several times Kerensky raised the issue of removing Kornilov, but, not meeting sympathy for this decision either in the War Ministry or among the government itself, he anxiously awaited the development of events. As early as August 7, the assistant commissioner under the Supreme Commander-in-Chief warned Kornilov that the issue of his resignation had been finally resolved in Petrograd. Kornilov replied: “Personally, the question of remaining in office is of little interest to me, but I ask that it be brought to the attention of those who need to know that such a measure is unlikely to be useful in the interests of the cause, since it could cause unrest in the army”...

The split was not limited to the heights of power: it went deeper and wider, affecting its organs with impotence.

The Provisional Government was a mechanical combination of three groups, not connected with each other either by a commonality of tasks and goals, or by a unity of tactics: ministers - socialists, 3
Avksentyev (s.-r.), Skobelev (s.-r.), Pashekhonov (s.-s.), Chernov (s.-r.), Zarudny (s.-r.), Prokopovich (s.-d.) , Nikitin (S.-D.).

Liberal ministers 4
Oldenburg, Yurenev, Kokoshkin, Kartashov (K. d-ty), Efremov (r.-d.).

And separately - a triumvirate, consisting of Kerensky (S.-R.), Nekrasov (R.-D.) and Tereshchenko (S.-R.). If some of the representatives of the first group often found a common language and the same state understanding with the liberal ministers, then Avksentyev, Chernov and Skobelev, who concentrated all the most important departments in their hands, were separated from them by an abyss. However, the importance of both groups was quite insignificant, since the triumvirate “decided everything independently” critical issues outside the government, and sometimes even their decisions were not reported to the latter.” 5
Report by F. Kokoshkin on August 31.

The ministers' protests against this order of government, which represented a completely undisguised dictatorship, remained in vain. In particular, Kerensky tried in every possible way to remove his disagreement with Kornilov and the question of the measures he proposed almost as an ultimatum from the government’s discussion.

Somewhat apart from these three groups, arousing the sympathy of the liberal, the socialist opposition and the poorly hidden irritation of the triumvirate, stood Savinkov’s War Ministry. 6
The manager is Savinkov, the head of the political department is Stepun, the commissioner at Headquarters is Filonenko.

Savinkov broke with the party and the Soviets. He sharply and decisively supported Kornilov’s measures, putting constant and strong pressure on Kerensky, which, perhaps, would have been successful if the issue concerned only the ideology of the new course, and did not threaten Kerensky with the prospect of self-abolishing... At the same time, Savinkov did not go all the way and with Kornilov, not only dressing his simple and harsh provisions in conditional external forms“gains of the revolution”, but also defending broad rights to military-revolutionary institutions - commissars and committees. Although he recognized the foreignness of these bodies in the military environment and their inadmissibility in a normal organization, he... apparently hoped that after coming to power, “faithful” people could be appointed as commissars, and committees could be taken over. At the same time, the existence of these bodies served as a certain insurance against the command staff, without whose help Savinkov could not achieve his goal, but in whose loyalty to himself he had little faith. The nature of the “commonwealth” and cooperation between General Kornilov and Savinkov is determined by the not uninteresting fact that Kornilov’s entourage considered it necessary to take certain precautions during Savinkov’s visits to Headquarters and especially during their face-to-face conversations... This happened not only at the end of August in Mogilev, but also in early July in Kamenets-Podolsk.

Savinkov could go with Kerensky against Kornilov and with Kornilov against Kerensky, coldly weighing the balance of forces and the degree to which they corresponded to the goal that he was pursuing. He called this goal the salvation of the Motherland; others saw it as his personal desire for power. Last opinion Both Kornilov and Kerensky adhered to this.

A split has also matured in the leading bodies of revolutionary democracy. The Central Executive Committee of the Soviets was increasingly at odds with the Petrograd Soviet, both on issues of principle, especially on the structure of the supreme power, and due to the claim of both to the role of the highest representative of democracy. The more moderate Central Committee could no longer compete with the Petrograd Soviet, which was irresistibly moving towards Bolshevism, with slogans that captivated the masses. Among the council itself, on major political issues, a strong coalition of Mensheviks - internationalists, left social revolutionaries and Bolsheviks was increasingly emerging. If the boundaries between the two main divisions of Social Democracy were sharply aggravated, then the disintegration of the other dominant party - the Social Revolutionaries - became even more pronounced, from which, after the July days, without completely breaking the formal connection with the old party, its left wing emerged, the most prominent representative of which was Spiridonova. During August, the left s. - the ry., having increased numerically in the Soviet faction to almost half of its composition, become in sharp opposition to both the party and circles of the same mind with the Central Executive Committee, demanding a complete break with the government, the abolition of exceptional laws, immediate socialization of the land and separate truce with the Central Powers.

The entire month of July and August passed in such a nervous, tense atmosphere. It is difficult to take into account and differentiate the dependence of two similar phenomena of complete confusion - among the ruling and leading elites on the one hand and the masses- on the other hand: was the confusion at the top a direct reflection of the state of fermentation of the country, in which the final goals, aspirations and will of the people could not yet be determined, or vice versa - the disease at the top supported and deepened the process of fermentation. As a result, however, not only did not the slightest signs of recovery appear, but on the contrary, all aspects of people's life quickly and invariably moved towards complete disorder.

The external manifestations this disorder, especially in the field of national defense. On August 20, the Riga disaster broke out, and the Germans clearly began to prepare for a large landing operation that threatened Revel and Petrograd. At a time when the productivity of the military industry was falling at an alarming rate (shell production by 60 percent), on August 14, a grandiose explosion of gunpowder factories and artillery warehouses in Kazan, undoubtedly caused by malicious intent, occurred, which destroyed up to a million shells and up to 12 thousand machine guns. In the second half of August, a general railway strike was brewing, threatening paralysis of our transport, hunger at the front and all the fatal consequences associated with this phenomenon. Cases of lynching and disobedience have become more frequent in the army. That verbiage that flowed continuously from Petrograd and there poisoned and intoxicated the thought and conscience of the leaders of revolutionary democracy, in the broad arena of people's life turned into direct action. Entire regions, provinces, and cities broke administrative ties with the center, turning the Russian state into a series of self-sufficient and self-governing territories connected with the center almost exclusively... by the incredibly increased need for state banknotes. In these “new formations,” the interest in political issues caused by the first upsurge of the revolution gradually disappeared, and social struggle flared up, taking on increasingly chaotic, cruel, non-state forms.

And against the background of this devastation, a new shock was approaching - the Bolshevik uprising was again and clearly being prepared. It was timed for the end of August. If then there could have been doubts and hesitations in assessing the situation and the threatening danger, in choosing the “resultant” and in the agonizing search for a viable coalition, now, when August 1917 is already a distant past that has become part of history, there can be no doubt at least in one thing: that only the government, inspired by the determination of a merciless fight against Bolshevism, could save a country that was almost doomed.

This could not be done by the Council, organically connected with its left wing. It could not and did not want to, “not allowing a fight against the entire political movement” and hypocritically demanding from the government an end to “illegal arrests and persecution” applied to “representatives of the extreme currents of socialist parties.” 7
Resolutions July 24 and August 20.

Kerensky, a comrade of the Chairman of the Council, who once threatened the Bolsheviks with “iron and blood,” could not and did not want to do this. Even on October 24, that is, on the eve of the decisive Bolshevik uprising, finally recognizing “the actions of the Russian political party(Bolsheviks) betrayal and treason To the Russian state", Kerensky, speaking about the seizure of power in the Petrograd garrison by the military revolutionary committee, explains: "but here too there is military power according to me it is indicated, although there was all the data available in order to take decisive and energetic measures, I considered it necessary to first give people the opportunity to realize their conscious or unconscious mistake”... 8
Speech in the “Council of the Republic”.

Thus, the country was faced with an alternative: to fall under the rule of the Bolsheviks without a fight and in a very short time, or to put forward a force willing and able to enter into a decisive struggle with them.

Chapter II
The beginning of the struggle: General Kornilov, Kerensky and Savinkov. Kornilov’s “note” on the reorganization of the army

In the struggle between Kerensky and Kornilov, which led to such fatal results for Russia, it is remarkable that there were no direct political and social slogans that would separate the fighting parties. Never, either before the speech or during it, either officially or in private information, did Kornilov put a certain “ political program" He didn't have it. The document that is known by this name, as we will see below, is the fruit of the later collective creativity of the Bykhov prisoners. Exactly the same in the field practical activities Supreme Commander-in-Chief, vested with unabated rights in the field of civil administration in the war zone, he avoided any interference in government policy. His only order in this area had in mind land anarchy and, without touching on the legal relations of landowners, established only judicial reprisals for violent actions that threatened the systematic supply of the army, as a result of “arbitrary theft of state property in the theater of military operations.” Kornilov’s answer to the Podolsk landowners who came to him is worthy of attention: 9
At the beginning of July on the Southwestern Front.

– I will provide armed forces to protect the harvest necessary for the army. I will not hesitate to use this armed force against those madmen who, for the sake of satisfying base instincts, are destroying the army. But I will not think of shooting any of you in the same way if negligence or malice is discovered during the harvest of the current harvest.

The lack of a bright political face on the part of the leader, who was supposed to temporarily take the helm of the Russian ship of state into his own hands, is somewhat unexpected. But given the disintegration of the Russian public and the confusion of political trends that had developed by the fall of 1917, it seemed that only this kind of neutral force, in the presence of some favorable conditions could have a chance of success in a numerically huge, but intellectually loose combination of popular strata that stood outside the framework of “revolutionary democracy.” Kornilov was a soldier and commander. He was proud of this title and always put it in the forefront. We cannot read souls. But in deed and word, sometimes frank, not intended for the ears of others, he sufficiently defined his view of the role ahead of him, without claiming political infallibility, he looked at himself as a mighty battering ram that was supposed to make a hole in the vicious circle of forces , who surrounded the authorities, depersonalized and bled it dry. He had to clear this power of non-state and non-national elements and, fully armed with force, relying on the restored army, support and carry this power until the expression of genuine popular will.

But, perhaps too tolerant, trusting and poorly versed in people, he did not notice how, from the very inception of his idea, it was also surrounded on all sides by small-state elements, sometimes simply unprincipled. This was a deep tragedy in Kornilov’s activities.

Kornilov’s political image remains unclear to many even now, more than three years after his death. Legends are woven around this issue, drawing their justification from the nature of that environment, which more than once created its will in his name.

On this shaky and too elastic basis, presented in a wide range from a peaceful terrorist through a repentant Trudovik to a friend of Illiodor, one can draw any patterns you like, with the same probability of a complete distortion of the truth. A monarchist is a republican. A reactionary is a socialist. Bonaparte - Pozharsky. "Rebel" is a folk hero. Reviews of the late leader are full of such contrasts. And, if the “village minister” Chernov once, in his outrageous appeal, explained Kornilov’s plans with the desire to “stifle freedom and deprive the peasants of land and freedom,” then Metropolitan Anthony, in a word dedicated to the memory of Kornilov, shortly before the Russian army abandoned Crimea, reproached the deceased ... for “hobby revolutionary ideas."

One thing is true: Kornilov was neither a socialist nor a reactionary. But it would be in vain to look within this broad framework for any party stamp. Like the overwhelming majority of officers and command personnel, he was distant and alien to any party dogmatism; in his views and convictions he belonged to broad layers of liberal democracy; perhaps he did not deepen in his consciousness the motives for her political and social differences and did not attach of great importance those of them that went beyond professional interests army.

The book went through many editions.

Structure and content

History of creation

General Denikin, after leaving the AFSR in the spring of 1920 and transferring command of the remaining forces of the White movement in the South to General Wrangel, left for England, where in August 1920, in the Times, he refused Lord Curzon’s proposal to conclude a truce with the Bolsheviks, and reported that:

As before, so now I consider it inevitable and necessary to wage an armed struggle against the Bolsheviks until they are completely defeated. Otherwise, not only Russia, but all of Europe will turn into ruins.

Having left his military posts, Denikin by the fall of 1920 limited his participation in the political struggle, transferring the main efforts of his irreconcilable struggle against Bolshevism to the plane of journalism. In the fall of 1920, Denikin moved to Belgium, where he began writing his fundamental documentary study of the Civil War, “Essays on the Russian Troubles.” On Christmas Eve in December 1920, General Denikin wrote to his colleague, the former head of the British mission in the South of Russia, General Briggs:

I completely withdrew from politics and went completely into historical work. I am finishing the first volume of “Essays”, covering the events of the Russian Revolution from February 27 to August 27, 1917. In my work I find some oblivion from difficult experiences.

In 1922, Denikin moved from Belgium to Hungary, where he lived and worked until 1926. During the three years of his life in Hungary, he changed his place of residence three times. The general first settled in Sopron, then spent several months in Budapest, and after that he settled again in a provincial town near Lake Balaton.

Thus, the first two volumes of “Essays on Russian Troubles” were written by Denikin in Belgium, and the next three in Hungary.

Difficulties at work

Dmitry Lekhovich writes that General Denikin has interesting information about how difficult it was for him to work on compiling the “Essays”:

The archive he brought from Russia was far from complete. He had to do all the work associated with searching for documents, systematizing them, checking, drawing up drawings, etc., personally. The chest with the affairs of the office of the Special Conference (that is, the former government of the South of Russia), taken to Constantinople, came into the general’s possession only in 1921. In addition to the journals of the Special Meeting, the chest contained the original orders of the Commander-in-Chief, as well as relations with foreign powers and information about the situation in all the new states on the outskirts of Russia. With the archive of the former Headquarters of General Denikin, the issue was more complicated. Anton Ivanovich did not want to contact his successor as Commander-in-Chief. But this issue was resolved successfully by itself. Knowing about the work of Anton Ivanovich, General Kusonsky, Deputy Chief of Staff of General Wrangel, suggested that Denikin use the Headquarters archive. Soon, General Wrangel himself (who was in Yugoslavia after he left Crimea) ordered that all affairs of the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief during the management of the South of Russia by General Denikin would be transferred to the latter for safekeeping. It was necessary to conduct a lot of correspondence with former employees and subordinates in order to obtain from them detailed information about what was happening.

General Denikin himself recalls the following episode related to the writing of the “Essays”:

Filimonov, a former Kuban ataman, offered me his cooperation, but before that, without waiting for my description of the Kuban period in “Essays on the Russian Troubles,” he published a pamphlet article in the “Archive of the Russian Revolution,” in which he was biased towards my activities and told a lie, which was not difficult to refute with documentation... Having met (once) Colonel Uspensky (former adjutant of General Romanovsky), Filimonov told him:

Have you read it? General Denikin will probably scold me in his Essays. So, according to Cossack skill, I ran ahead and scolded him myself. Until his book comes out, a trace of my writing will still remain.

Subsequently, not finding any attacks on himself in my book, which would have been unfair, Filimonov sent me a letter in which he expressed his readiness to shed light on the Kuban events for me. I didn't take advantage of his offer, which I regret.

Dmitry Lekhovich writes that the general’s closest assistant was his wife. She retyped manuscripts and was, as Anton Ivanovich recalled, his “first reader and censor,” making her comments, often very thorough, in particular from the point of view, as she said, of the ordinary man in the street.

First edition in Paris and Berlin

The first volume of “Essays on Russian Troubles” entitled “The Collapse of Power and the Army (February-September 1917)” was published in two editions in Paris, and was completely published by October 1921. The second volume, entitled “The Struggle of General Kornilov,” was dedicated to the events of the second half of 1917 - early 1918. and also published in Paris by the Povolotsky publishing house in November 1922. The third volume, entitled “The White Movement and the Struggle of the Volunteer Army,” covering a description of the events of the spring - autumn of 1918, was first published in Berlin in March 1924 by the Slovo publishing house. The fourth and fifth volumes are devoted to the events of 1919-1920. in Russia, engulfed in the flames of the Civil War, were also published for the first time in Berlin: the fourth volume in September 1925 by the Slovo publishing house, and the fifth in October 1926 by the Bronze Horseman publishing house.

According to historian S.V. Karpenko, the publication of the last volume of “Essays” prompted Wrangel to publish his “Notes”, which were written back in 1921-1923, but published by Gen. A. A. Lampe in the collections “White Deed” in 1928, shortly after Wrangel’s death. At the same time, although Wrangel himself did not want his “Notes” to be perceived as a response to Denikin’s “Essays on Russian Troubles,” many emigrants perceived them as such.

Book in the USSR and Russia

Fragmentary editions in the 1920s.

The stereotype that Denikin was not published in the Soviet state until the late 1980s is not entirely true. In the mid-1920s, during the NEP period in the USSR, fragments of Denikin’s “Essays on Russian Troubles” found their way into the official press. There are several known cases of publication of fragments of Denikin's book by the Soviet State Publishing House. For example, a fragment of the second volume of “Essays on Russian Troubles” on 25 pages with the title “Bolshevik Revolution” was published in the USSR in 1926 in the collection “ October Revolution"Series "Revolution and Civil War in Descriptions of the White Guards". In 1927, various fragments of Denikin's Sketches were published along with excerpts from the memoirs of other participants civil war. Also in 1928, the state publishing house published a fragment of the second volume of Denikin’s “Essays” on 106 pages under the title “The Campaign and Death of General Kornilov” as a separate book, with a circulation of 5 thousand copies.

In addition, the Soviet publishing house "Federation" published in 1928 a book with a volume of 313 pages with a circulation of 10 thousand copies entitled "The March on Moscow" with selections from the fourth and fifth volumes of "Essays on the Russian Troubles." “We tried to extract from Denikin,” the preface said, “all the most interesting pages.” Denikin’s biographer, writer Dmitry Lekhovich writes that “in accordance with the purpose of the book, these “curious pages” were only a manipulation of facts, with a deliberately one-sided coverage of events.”

Since the late 1920s. to the 1980s Denikin's books were not published in the USSR.

First editions during perestroika

After 1991

But Denikin’s book “Essays on Russian Troubles” became available to a truly wide readership in the CIS countries only after 1991. For the 1990s and 2000s. The book went through a lot of reprints.

In 2013, “Essays on the Russian Time of Troubles” was included by the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation among the 100 books recommended for reading by Russian schoolchildren.

Reviews and testimonials

The “Essays” were conceived very broadly. They contain not only the author’s personal memories, but also an attempt to illuminate the events of the revolution with some more common point vision. Both of these problems have not been resolved with equal success. Where the author conveys what he has personally experienced and what is directly known to him, the “Essays” are of exceptional interest; enormous knowledge of the environment, along with sincerity and directness of judgment, lively presentation, vivid and imaginative characteristics constitute the indisputable advantages of those chapters that are devoted to the course of the revolution in the army, at the front. On the contrary, Denikin’s critical excursions in the field of political and social relations revolutionary era; betraying second-hand knowledge, revealing bias and lack of historical perspective, they are of interest only for characterizing the author himself.

Of course, Denikin’s entire book is a harsh indictment against the so-called. "revolutionary democracy". She and she alone is responsible for the collapse of the state, for the “corruption and death” of the army. The relatively restrained tone, which, by the way, distinguishes Denikin’s work favorably from the books of Nazhivin and other denouncers of the revolution, does not weaken, but only strengthens, the serious nature of the accusation.

I also read the 3rd volume of Anton Ivanovich [Denikin], and in delight from this thorough and impartial, truthful work, little things have not yet caught my eye, like attacks against Lisovoy; As for the disputes with P.N. and the writer, he could not pass them by in silence, and I must admit that A.I., apparently, has worked a lot on himself in this regard over the past 4-5 years, for he writes about the writer calmly, giving him his due, whereas at one time he could not talk about him without irritation.

see also

Notes

1. Denikin A.I. Bolshevik revolution // October Revolution: Memoirs. (Reprint edition of the book: October Revolution. Compiled by S. A. Alekseev. - M., Leningrad State Publishing House, 1926. - P. 271-296). - M. Orbita, 1991. - 464 p. ISBN 5-85210-008-0
2. “Essays on Russian Troubles” on the website militera.ru. Full version
3. Quote by Denikin A.I. Essays on Russian Troubles T. 5. “Armed forces of the south of Russia. March to Moscow. 1919-1920." Chapter XXIII. Evacuation of Novorossiysk.

Denikin Anton Ivanovich

Essays on the Russian Troubles. Volume 1

Preface

Chapter I. Foundations of the old army: faith, king and fatherland

Chapter II. The state of the old army before the revolution

Chapter III. The old army and the sovereign

Chapter IV. Revolution in Petrograd

Chapter V. Revolution and the royal family

Chapter VI. Revolution and the army. Order No. 1

Chapter VII. Impressions from Petrograd at the end of March 1917

Chapter VIII. Bid; her role and position

Chapter IX. Little things in life at Headquarters

Chapter X. General Markov

Chapter XI. Power: Duma, Provisional Government, command, Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies

Chapter XII. Power: the struggle for power of the Bolsheviks; the power of the army, the idea of ​​dictatorship

Chapter XIII. Activities of the Provisional Government: domestic politics, civil administration; city ​​and countryside, agrarian question

Chapter XIV. Activities of the Provisional Government: food, industry, transport, finance

Chapter XV. The position of the Central Powers in the spring of 1917

Chapter XVI. The strategic position of the Russian front in the spring of 1917

Chapter XVII. The question of the Russian army going on the offensive

Chapter XVIII. Military reforms: generals and expulsion of senior officers

Chapter XIX. "Democratization of the Army": management, service, life

Chapter XX. "Democratization of the Army": committees

Chapter XXI. "Democratization of the Army": Commissars

Chapter XXII. "Democratization of the Army": the history of the "Declaration of the Rights of the Soldier"

Chapter XXIII. Press and propaganda from outside

Chapter XXIV. Press and propaganda from within

Chapter XXV. State of the army at the time of the June offensive

Chapter XXVI. Officer organizations

Chapter XXVII. Revolution and Cossacks

Chapter XXVIII. National units

Chapter XXIX. Army surrogates: "revolutionary" women's battalions etc.

Chapter XXX. The end of May and the beginning of June in the field of military management. The departure of Guchkov and General Alekseev. My departure from Headquarters. Office of Kerensky and General Brusilov

Chapter XXXI. My service as Commander-in-Chief of the armies of the Western Front

Chapter XXXII. The offensive of the Russian armies in the summer of 1917. Defeat.

Chapter XXXIV. General Kornilov

Chapter XXXV. My service as commander-in-chief of the armies Southwestern Front. Moscow meeting. Fall of Riga

Chapter XXXVI. Kornilov's speech and its echoes on the Southwestern Front

Chapter XXXVII. In Berdichev prison. Moving of the "Berdichev group of arrested" to Bykhov

Chapter XXXVIII. Some results of the first period of the revolution

Notes

Preface

In the bloody fog of the Russian Troubles, people are dying and the real boundaries of historical events are being erased.

Therefore, despite the difficulty and incompleteness of working in a refugee situation without archives, without materials and without the possibility of exchanging living words with participants in the events, I decided to publish my essays.

The first book talks mainly about the Russian army, with which my life is inextricably linked. Political, social, and economic issues are touched upon only to the extent that it is necessary to outline their influence on the course of the struggle.

The army in 1917 played a decisive role in the fate of Russia. Her participation in the course of the revolution, her life, corruption and death should serve as a great and cautionary lesson for the new builders of Russian life.

And not only in the fight against the country’s current enslavers. After the overthrow of Bolshevism, along with the enormous work in the field of reviving the moral and material strength of the Russian people, the latter, with an urgency unprecedented in Russian history, will face the question of preserving its sovereign existence.

For beyond the borders of the Russian land, gravediggers are already knocking with their spades and jackals are baring their teeth, in anticipation of her death.

They won't wait. From blood, dirt, spiritual and physical poverty, the Russian people will rise in strength and intelligence.

A. Denikin

Brussels.

Chapter I. Foundations of the old government: faith, king and fatherland

An inevitable historical process that has ended February revolution, led to the collapse of Russian statehood. But, if philosophers, historians, sociologists, studying the course of Russian life, could foresee the coming upheavals, no one expected that the people's element would so easily and quickly sweep away all those foundations on which life rested: the supreme power and ruling classes- gone aside without any struggle; the intelligentsia - gifted, but weak, groundless, weak-willed, at first, amid a merciless struggle, resisting with words alone, then obediently putting their necks under the knife of the victors; finally a strong, ten-million-strong army with a huge historical past, which collapsed within 3 - 4 months.

The last phenomenon, however, was not so unexpected, having a terrible and warning prototype in the epilogue of the Manchurian War and subsequent events in Moscow, Kronstadt and Sevastopol... After living for two weeks in Harbin at the end of November 1905 and traveling along the Siberian route for 31 days ( December 1907) through whole line"republics" from Harbin to Petrograd, I composed for myself clear concept about what can be expected from the unbridled, uninhibited soldier mob. And all the rallies, resolutions, councils and, in general, all manifestations of the military revolt of that time - with greater force, on an incomparably wider scale, but with photographic precision - were repeated in 1917.

It should be noted that the possibility of such a rapid psychological degeneration was by no means inherent in the Russian army alone. Undoubtedly, fatigue from the 3-year war played a significant role in all these phenomena, to one degree or another affecting all the armies of the world and making them more susceptible to the corrupting influences of extreme socialist teachings. In the fall of 1918, the German corps that occupied the Don and Little Russia disintegrated in one week, repeating to a certain extent the history we had gone through of rallies, councils, committees, the overthrow of officers, and in some parts the sale of military property, horses and weapons... Only then did the Germans understood the tragedy of the Russian officers. And our volunteers had to see more than once the humiliation and bitter tears of German officers - once arrogant and impassive.