Polish-Russian dictionary. Polish contribution to great Russia

The topic of this article is somewhat unusual. As a rule, a lot is written about the long and uncompromising struggle of Polish patriots against Russia, which they hated. The struggle is protracted and bloody. The purpose of this article is to talk about the Poles, who did not see existential enemies in the Russians.

It was believed that the Poles have an ineradicable antipathy towards everything Russian. This is partly true. Even pardoned or amnestied participants in Polish-Russian battles and Polish uprisings XVIII-XIX centuries were certainly mistaken locally for anti-Russian propaganda. “So young, and already a Pole!” - this is how the Siberian people reacted in the 19th century. to the appearance of young men in snowy Siberia, who introduced themselves as Poles when meeting the local population. In the Russian consciousness, the words “Pole” and “rebel” were synonymous.

At that time, many hundreds of Poles were sent into exile for anti-government activities. Some of them were pardoned, and, instead of Siberia, they were assigned to Kharkov educational establishments, away from the western borders of Russia. But even there, the Polish professors continued to gradually instill in students the idea of ​​Polish nobility, Ukrainian separatism and Russian barbarism. Today, Kharkov is sometimes called the Russian-speaking capital of Ukrainian nationalism. In fact, of all the cities so close to the Russian border (only 26 km!), it is in Kharkov that there are, albeit proportionally small, but aggressive groups of Russian-speaking Ukrainian national-particularists. Idle rumor claims that these are echoes of the propaganda work of the Polish intelligentsia of the 19th century.

Polish journalist Piotr Skwerczynski, considering the problems of Polish-Russian relations, admitted that the Poles would only be satisfied with Russia, which had shrunk to the size of the Garden Ring. But even then, he assured, most Poles would be unhappy. And if the Russians commit collective suicide at once, the Poles would be incredibly happy, although they would still not miss the opportunity to call the Russians “barbarians” for such a strange act. Indeed, Russia and Poland have been linked for centuries by difficult and often extremely conflicting relations, which could not but be reflected in the Polish mass consciousness. Polish historical consciousness, unlike Russian, is more emotionally charged. Everything that was tragic in Polish-Russian relations is absolutized in the Polish consciousness, takes on large-scale forms and constantly weighs on our common history. The policy of historical memory, considered by other countries as unproductive and overly pessimistic, in Poland is the dominant form of relations with its largest eastern neighbor.

Ethnosociologist Wilhelm Mühlmann introduced the concept of ethnocentrum. Ethnocentrum is an ethnos’ awareness of itself within the space where this ethnos lives. This is a form of ethnic thinking, where the ethnos includes everything that surrounds it: from the terrain (mountains, rivers, forests) to highly differentiated concepts (state idea, wars, alliances, economic ties, cultural and diplomatic contacts). Each ethnocentrum strives to remain intact. Ethnocentrum is afraid of conceptual split, bifurcation, because a split in the ethnocentrum would mean a split in ethnic identity and modification inner life people. Relations between Poles and Russians can also be described in ethnosociological terms. The Polish ethnocentrum subconsciously feels the power of the Russian ethnocentrum, as a more numerous imperial people, and, moreover, not a Catholic one.

The Polish ethnocentrum is not inclined towards peaceful relations with the Russians for the reason that it is afraid to “let in” someone who is more powerful, more energetic and more numerous. As the ethnocentrum of a less numerous people, the Polish ethnocentrum is afraid of “drowning” and dissolving in the Russian ethnocentrum, afraid of being absorbed by it or split in two, i.e. accept both Catholic and Orthodox identities. Therefore, a considerable number of Orthodox Poles or Poles who served the Russian Empire, and then the USSR, are bracketed out by Polish historiography itself, considered by it as ideological antibodies, as something that carries the danger of inoculating elements of the ethnic consciousness of the neighboring people (Russians), and contributes to the split exclusively -Catholic anti-Russian consciousness, characteristic of the Poles. The ethnocentrum of the Poles sees only one salvation - building such relations with the Russians that it would be absolutely impossible for an excessive amount of Russian, non-Catholic influence to penetrate into the Polish ethnocentrum. This is a subconscious mechanism of ethnic defense, under which everything else is already adjusted - politics, culture, religion, the media. The Poles feel safe only if they maintain maximum cultural and political distance from the vast Russian people, and they actively use anti-Russian propaganda to establish and consolidate this paradigm. In fact, the contribution of the Poles, who until 1917 were the second largest people of the empire, after the Russians, to the strengthening and establishment Russian statehood quite significant. It is regrettable that Polish historiography itself is silent about this, lips tightly clenched white with annoyance. Therefore, we will try to tell you about it.

Poles began to appear relatively often in Russia under Tsar Ivan the Terrible. Some Polish soldiers voluntarily came to serve the Russian Tsar. In that era, condottieri were common occurrence. The thin “Polish trickle” did not stop later. Jozef Tausch was the name of the Polish diplomat who was at the court of Peter I. Colonel Tausch enjoyed the trust of the Russian monarch and his retinue. Even modern Polish sources barely mention this. Tausch went through many battles alongside Peter the Great, and in 1709 he was allowed to observe the progress of the Battle of Poltava, while the ambassadors of other powers were kept away for fear of espionage. But Tausch was not the only Pole in Peter’s circle. Just remember Pavel Yaguzhinsky, who started as a tsar’s orderly and ended as an adjutant general, who received from Peter I the eternal possession of an island on the Yauza River near the German Settlement in Moscow.

Patriotic War of 1812. Poles en masse joined the ranks of Napoleonic army to participate in the campaign against Russia. In Napoleon's retinue are Polish generals, waiting only for the command to lead their legions to the east. But at the Russian headquarters the same Polish generals are waiting for them: Field Marshal M. Kamensky, General M. Kakhovsky, Lieutenant General I. Przhibyshevsky, General. from the cavalry A. Ozharovsky, general. from the cavalry N. Raevsky (the same famous Raevsky who walked towards the French cannonballs with his teenage sons, taking them by the hands!) and many others, ready to lead their Russian soldiers against the French regiments. Sometimes entire battles took place between two Polish generals: one led the French into battle, the other led the Russians. By the way, at that time the number of Polish generals in the Russian army was greater than the number of Poles among the French generals. There were even more Poles among the junior officers and enlisted personnel of the Russian army than among the generals. Stories are known of the volunteer lancers of the Polish regiment under the command of Lieutenant K. Biskupsky, who partisans together with Russian peasants, attacking Napoleonic warriors, and the Poles as part of Cossack formations.

Many Poles converted to Orthodoxy, especially those heading deeper into Russia. There was not a shadow of hatred between the Orthodox Pole and the Russian. This gave the gene. M. Muravyov has a reason to declare that “Orthodox Poles are even more Russian than the Russians themselves.” The history of the Carpatho-Russian movement of Galicia knows the name of Ippolit Terletsky, a Pole who converted to Orthodoxy and advocated the cleansing of not only Western Ukrainian Orthodoxy, but even Greek Catholicism from the stratifications of the Latin faith. And today in Belarus many Poles receive Orthodox baptism. Their Catholic compatriots, by default, no longer consider them Poles, classifying them as Russians.

In subsequent wars, the Poles also not so rarely found themselves on the side of Russia. General Adam Rzhevussky is one of these glorious names. Member of the Turkish (1828-1829) and Crimean War(1853-1856). In 1830, the Pole Rzhewussky, as a supporter of Poland's orientation towards Russia, was an active participant in the suppression of the Polish uprising. Not only Adam, but also many other representatives of this glorious family served Russia faithfully.

In general, the theme of the Polish uprisings runs like a red thread through all official Polish historiography. And undeservedly little attention is paid to the Polish generals and officers who remained faithful to the oath they gave to the Russian Emperor and Polish King Nicholas I. In 1841. In Warsaw, a monument was solemnly opened in honor of the fallen Polish officers who did not violate their oath of loyalty to the Russian sovereign: Count Stanislav Potocki, generals Jozef Nowicki, Thomas Sementkowski, Stanislav Trebitsky, Ignatius Blumer, Maurice Hauke ​​and Colonel Philip Mieczyszewski. By order of Nicholas I, the inscription on the monument read: “To the Poles who died in 1830. for loyalty to your Monarch." Now this monument does not exist. It was destroyed in 1917 because it did not fit in with the official interpretation of Polish history, where “the entire Polish people in one impulse rose up to fight the Russian oppressors.”

During the Caucasian War, many Poles were especially awarded state awards for personal courage on the battlefields. Major General Felix Krukovsky is one of them. In the 1840s, he took part in the pacification of the Chechens and in skirmishes with the Kabardians. He commands the Khoper Linear Cossack Regiment, then the Nizhny Novgorod Dragoon Regiment, with which he made a number of dangerous expeditions to Chechnya and Dagestan. In 1848, F. Krukovsky (oh, horror for Polish historiography!) was appointed ataman of the Caucasian Line Army. Being a Catholic, Krukovsky (oh, horror for the Polish religious feeling!) went to the Orthodox Church every Sunday with the Cossacks. Unfortunately, in one of the battles F. Krukovsky was seriously wounded. A Cossack orderly (Russian) rushed to his aid. F. Krukovsky ordered the orderly to save himself, but the Cossack disobeyed and was cut down with sabers along with his commander.

Also noteworthy is the story of an entire Polish captive detachment that received freedom from the hands of the highlanders (they thought that the liberated Poles, and even with weapons in their hands, would immediately rush to partisans and shoot Russian soldiers). But the squad in in full force returned to duty and continued to fight so devotedly for Mother Rus' that some of the former captured Poles were awarded the Cross of St. George.

Thousands of Poles shed blood for Russia in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, when Józef Pilsudski had already agreed with the Japanese government on the formation of combat groups from among Polish soldiers of the Russian army to participate in the war on the side of Japan. Admiral Heinrich Cywinski, a Pole, then lost one of his sons in the battle of Tsushima. The admiral's second son would die later, in World War I, and also for Russia.
By the way, during the First World War there were plenty of generals of Polish origin in the Russian General Staff: Vladislav Klembovsky, Anatoly Kelchevsky, Nikolai Kashtalinsky, Mikhail Kvetsinsky, Kazimir Ketlinsky, Pyotr Kondzerovsky and dozens of others.

In modern Poland they do not like Felix Dzerzhinsky. His life path does not fit into the narrow framework of official Polish patriotism. Dzerzhinsky was a supporter of the territorial integrity of the Russian state and was categorically against the signing of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, the purpose of which was the dismemberment of Russia by the countries of the Quadruple Alliance, which included Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria. Coming from an aristocratic family, he studied at the same gymnasium with the famous Russophobe Jozef Pilsudski. When Jozef went to war against Soviet Russia in 1920, Felix was in Russia and was appointed to the post of chief of rear security and order. After the war, in 1921. he took the post of People's Commissar of Railways, where he immediately set about restoring order: “On our roads, in the area of ​​theft and mismanagement, there is sheer horror... Theft from cars, theft from cash registers, theft from warehouses, theft from contracts, theft from procurement. You must have strong nerves and will to overcome this sea of ​​revelry.” Then there was the fight against homelessness, when millions of young citizens were provided with shelter and free food and activities as heads of the Cheka. Therefore, it is Dzerzhinsky that the Russian special services consider their ancestor, just as the Soviet ones considered it before. Historians give an ambiguous assessment of Dzerzhinsky’s activities in revolutionary Russia, but, abstracting from ideological assessments, one cannot fail to mention his sincere service to the cause that he considered most important for himself. It’s interesting that many years later Dzerzhinsky admitted: “As a child, I dreamed of putting on an invisibility hat, sneaking into Moscow and killing all the Muscovites.” Dzerzhinsky's successor as head of the OGPU was also a Pole - a descendant of an aristocratic family, Vyacheslav Menzhinsky. Being a seriously ill man, with a long list of illnesses and injuries, he continued to work hard, holding meetings of operatives at home, resting on the sofa.

The formation of Soviet power in general, and in the lands that previously belonged to Poland (Western Ukraine, Western Belarus), in particular, is presented by Polish historians as a complete nightmare. Of course, it’s difficult to call those times prosperous days. For some reason, it is forgotten that at the beginning of the 1930s the share of ethnic Poles in the Communist Party of Ukraine was approximately twice as large as among the entire population of Soviet Ukraine, and general secretary The Central Committee of the CP(b)U was a Pole, Stanislav Kosior.

There is no place in the modern pantheon of Polish heroes for Marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky. In 1914, 18-year-old Konstantin, having added two more years to his age, volunteered to join the 6th squadron of the 5th Kargopol Dragoon Regiment of the 5th Cavalry Division of the 12th Army and went to the fronts of the First World War. In battles with the German invaders, he distinguished himself with courage and ingenuity, for which he was awarded the Cross of St. George. Then in his life there was the Second World War and service as the Minister of National Defense of Poland. In 1950, Polish nationalists from among the supporters of the Home Army made two attempts on Rokossovsky’s life. During the battles with the Nazis in Poland, executioners from the AK slaughtered a platoon of Soviet women anti-aircraft gunners who served in Rokossovsky’s army. Intelligence revealed that the killers came from a neighboring village, where they fled after committing the crime, enjoying the full support of the local population. Having learned about this, Rokossovsky ordered the guns to be deployed towards the Polish village and cover it with several salvos. It is not surprising that Polish nationalists could not forgive Rokossovsky for the fact that he faithfully served not only Poland, but also Russia, which became his second homeland. In 1962, Khrushchev asked Konstantin Rokossovsky to write a “blacker and thicker” article against Joseph Stalin. According to Air Chief Marshal Alexander Golovanov, Rokossovsky replied: “Nikita Sergeevich, Comrade Stalin is a saint to me!” and did not clink glasses with Khrushchev at the banquet.

One could go on and on about those Poles who contributed to the prosperity of Russia and the growth of its power. Of Polish origin were Grigory Potemkin (his grandfather had the surname Potempkovsky and spoke Polish), mathematician Nikolai Lobachevsky, classics of Russian literature Nikolai Gogol (real name Gogol-Yanovsky) and Ivan Bunin, poet Robert Rozhdestvensky, artist Kazimir Malevich (“Black Square” ), philosophers Nikolai Lossky and Vasily Zenkovsky, travelers and explorers of Central Asia Nikolai Przhevalsky and Leon Barshchevsky, the founder of Russian cosmonautics Konstantin Tsiolkovsky, the national idol of the 1930s pilot Sigismund Levanevsky, academician Gleb Krzhizhanovsky. The idols of Soviet children and teenagers, Yanina Zheimo, who played the role of Cinderella, and Vladislav Dvorzhetsky, who played Captain Nemo, are also Poles.

Russian scientist Nikolai Danilevsky noted the amazing “likening power” of Russia. Many foreigners who came here and stayed for a long time, in a short period, stopped hating everything Russian and gradually began to feel sympathy for it. “Digesting” foreign ethnic elements, Russia considered them its own, did not reject them and did not push them to the margins historical science. Unfortunately, in Poland the opposite is true. In Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk there is a monument to the ethnographer Bronislaw Pilsudski, the brother of the odious Jozef Pilsudski, who dreamed of breaking Russia into a dozen small pseudo-state fragments. In Poland there are practically no such monuments erected in honor of Russians. Monuments in memory of the Soviet soldiers who died in 1944-1945 for the liberation of Poland from Nazism still stand thanks to the small number of activists among elderly Poles who remember the feat of the Soviet soldier. And the Polish elite is still afraid to shamelessly demolish monuments to fighters against Hitlerism. But he tries a little bit.

At one time, there was even a song among the Poles with the words “The Polish Army took Berlin, but the Soviet Army helped.” The innocent children's film “Four Tankmen and a Dog” was even banned from showing in independent Poland, because it promoted unimaginably seditious things - Polish-Soviet friendship. It is difficult for the Polish ethnic consciousness to admit to itself that without the Russian Ivan, Poland would probably not be on the world map. Therefore, the Polish ethnocentrum is “strained”, squeezing out any hint of affection for Russia.

The history of Poland is closely connected with the history of Russia. Peaceful periods in relations between the two countries were interspersed with frequent armed conflicts.

In the XVI-XVII centuries. Russia and Poland fought numerous wars among themselves. The Livonian War (1558-1583) was fought by Muscovite Russia against Livonian Order, Polish-Lithuanian state, Sweden and Denmark for hegemony in the Baltic states. In addition to Livonia, the Russian Tsar Ivan IV the Terrible hoped to conquer the East Slavic lands that were part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The unification of Lithuania and Poland into a single state, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (Union of Lublin 1569), became important for Russian-Polish relations during the war. The confrontation between Russia and Lithuania gave way to the confrontation between Russia and Poland. King Stefan Batory inflicted a number of defeats on the Russian army and was stopped only under the walls of Pskov. According to Yam Zapolsky's (1582) peace treaty with Poland, Russia renounced its conquests in Lithuania and lost access to the Baltic.

During the Time of Troubles, the Poles invaded Russia three times. The first time was under the pretext of providing assistance to the supposedly legitimate Tsar Dmitry - False Dmitry I. In 1610, the Moscow government, the so-called Seven Boyars, itself called the Polish prince Vladislav IV to the Russian throne and allowed Polish troops into the city. IN 1612 g. The Poles were expelled from Moscow by the people's militia under the command of Minin and Pozharsky. In 1617, Prince Vladislav made a campaign against Moscow. After an unsuccessful assault, he entered into negotiations and signed the Deulin Truce. Smolensk, Chernigov and Seversk lands were given to the Poles.

In June 1632, after the Deulin truce, Russia tried to recapture Smolensk from Poland, but was defeated (Smolensk War, 1632-1634). The Poles failed to build on their success; the borders remained unchanged. However, for the Russian government the most an important condition was the official renunciation of the Polish king Wladyslaw IV of his claims to the Russian throne.

New Russian-Polish war ( 1654-1667 ) began after the acceptance of the hetmanate of Bohdan Khmelnytsky into Russia under the Pereyaslav agreements. According to the peace Treaty of Andrusovo, the Smolensk and Chernigov lands and Left Bank Ukraine were transferred to Russia, and Zaporozhye was declared under a joint Russian-Polish protectorate. Kyiv was declared a temporary possession of Russia, but according to the “Eternal Peace” on May 16, 1686 it finally passed to it.

Ukrainian and Belarusian lands became a “bone of contention” for Poland and Russia until the middle of the 20th century.

The cessation of the Russian-Polish wars was facilitated by the threat to both states from Turkey and its vassal Crimean Khanate.

In the Northern War against Sweden 1700-1721 Poland was an ally of Russia.

In the 2nd half of the 18th century. The Polish-Lithuanian gentry, torn apart by internal contradictions, was in a state of deep crisis and decline, which made it possible for Prussia and Russia to interfere in its affairs. Russia took part in the War of the Polish Succession of 1733-1735.

Sections of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1772-1795 between Russia, Prussia and Austria took place without big wars, because the state, weakened due to internal turmoil, could no longer provide serious resistance to its more powerful neighbors.

As a result of the three sections of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the redistribution at the Congress of Vienna 1814-1815 Most of the Duchy of Warsaw was transferred to Tsarist Russia (the Kingdom of Poland was formed). Polish national liberation uprisings of 1794 (led by Tadeusz Kościuszko), 1830-1831, 1846, 1848, 1863-1864. were depressed.

In 1918 The Soviet government annulled all agreements of the tsarist government on the division of the country.

After Germany's defeat in World War I, Poland became an independent state. Its leadership made plans to restore the borders of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1772. The Soviet government, on the contrary, intended to establish control over the entire territory of the former Russian Empire, making it, as it was officially declared, a springboard for the world revolution.

Soviet-Polish War 1920 began successfully for Russia, Tukhachevsky’s troops stood near Warsaw, but then a defeat followed. According to various estimates, from 80 to 165 thousand Red Army soldiers were captured. Polish researchers consider the death of 16 thousand of them to be documented. Russian and Soviet historians put the figure at 80 thousand. According to the Riga Peace Treaty of 1921, Western Ukraine and Western Belarus went to Poland.

August 231939 The Non-Aggression Pact, better known as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, was concluded between the USSR and Germany. Attached to the treaty was a secret additional protocol that defined the delimitation of the Soviet and German spheres of influence in Eastern Europe. On August 28, an explanation was signed to the “secret additional protocol”, which delimited the spheres of influence “in the event of territorial and political reorganization of the regions that are part of the Polish State.” The zone of influence of the USSR included the territory of Poland east of the line of the Pissa, Narev, Bug, Vistula, and San rivers. This line roughly corresponded to the so-called "Curzon Line", which was supposed to establish the eastern border of Poland after the First World War.

On September 1, 1939, with an attack on Poland, Nazi Germany unleashed the Second world war. After defeating the Polish army within a few weeks, it occupied most of the country. September 17, 1939 In accordance with the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the Red Army crossed the eastern border of Poland.

Soviet troops captured 240 thousand Polish troops. More than 14 thousand officers of the Polish army were interned in the fall of 1939 on the territory of the USSR. In 1943, two years after the occupation of the western regions of the USSR by German troops, reports emerged that the NKVD had shot Polish officers in the Katyn Forest, located 14 kilometers west of Smolensk.

In May 1945 The territory of Poland was completely liberated by units of the Red Army and the Polish Army. More than 600 thousand died in the battles for the liberation of Poland. Soviet soldiers and officers.

By the decisions of the Berlin (Potsdam) Conference of 1945, its western lands were returned to Poland, and the Oder-Neisse border was established. After the war, the construction of a socialist society under the leadership of the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP) was proclaimed in Poland. The Soviet Union provided great assistance in the restoration and development of the national economy. In 1945-1993. the Soviet Northern Group of Forces was stationed in Poland; in 1955-1991 Poland was a member of the Warsaw Pact Organization.
By the manifesto of the Polish Committee of National Liberation of July 22, 1944, Poland was proclaimed the Polish Republic. From July 22, 1952 to December 29, 1989 - Polish People's Republic. Since December 29, 1989 - Republic of Poland.

Diplomatic relations between the RSFSR and Poland were established in 1921, between the USSR and Poland - from January 5, 1945, the legal successor is the Russian Federation.

May 22, 1992 The Treaty on Friendly and Good-Neighbourly Relations was signed between Russia and Poland.
The legal foundation of relations is formed by an array of documents concluded between the former USSR and Poland, as well as over 40 interstate and intergovernmental treaties and agreements signed over the past 18 years.

During 2000-2005 political ties between Russia and Poland were maintained quite intensively. There were 10 meetings between the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin and the President of the Republic of Poland Alexander Kwasniewski. There were regular contacts between heads of government and foreign ministers through the parliamentary line. There was a bilateral Committee on the Strategy of Russian-Polish Cooperation, and regular meetings of the Russia-Poland Public Dialogue Forum were held.

After 2005 the intensity and level of political contacts have decreased significantly. This was influenced by the confrontational line of the Polish leadership, expressed in maintaining a socio-political atmosphere unfriendly towards our country.

Formed in November 2007 The new government of Poland, headed by Donald Tusk, declares an interest in normalizing Russian-Polish relations and a readiness for open dialogue in order to find solutions to the accumulated problems in bilateral relations.

August 6, 2010 The inauguration of the elected President of Poland Bronislaw Komorowski took place. In his solemn speech, Komorowski stated that he would support the ongoing process of rapprochement with Russia: “I will contribute to the ongoing process of rapprochement and Polish-Russian reconciliation. This is an important challenge facing both Poland and Russia.”

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Russian-Polish wars- a series of wars between Kievan Rus, and then the Russian state on the one hand, Poland and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth on the other.

Vladimirovich v. Poland

Background

During the period of the Old Russian state

In 981, the chronicle notes the first clash between Kievan Rus and Poland. Vladimir Svyatoslavich captured the Cherven cities. The Galicia-Volyn Chronicle, which tells in 1229 about the participation of the Romanovichs in the Polish civil strife, notes that only Vladimir Svyatoslavich went so far into Poland.

Participation of Poles in civil strife

At the end of the 12th century, an alliance between Roman Mstislavich of Volyn and the Poles was formed. Roman helped the Kazimirovichs against their internal political opponents, and they helped him take control of Galich (1199). However, in the reign of Zavikhosta Roman was killed (1205).

In 1287, the Russian princes with Telebuga and Alguy went to Poland.

The war ended with the signing of the Yam-Zapolsky (1582) and Plyussky (1583) truces. Russia lost all the conquests made as a result of the war, as well as lands on the border with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the coastal Baltic cities (Koporye, Yama, Ivangorod). The territory of the former Livonian Confederation was divided between the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Sweden and Denmark.

Russian-Polish War 1609-1618

IN Time of Troubles, which began after the death of Boris Godunov, Polish troops invaded Russia, initially under the pretext of providing assistance to impostors, and then with the express purpose of conquering the Russian state. Taking advantage of the proposal of some boyars to install the Polish prince Vladislav as king in Moscow, Sigismund III (Grand Duke of Lithuania and King of Poland), in September moved to Smolensk and besieged this city, in which there were up to 4,000 troops, under the command of Shein. The Russian army, under the command of Prince Dimitry Shuisky, which came to the rescue of Smolensk in the spring, was attacked and defeated on the way near the village of Klushina by the Polish troops of Hetman Zholkiewski, mainly due to the betrayal of the mercenary Swedes Delagardi and the bad leadership of the poorly trained militia.

After this, Zolkiewski moved towards Moscow; The boyar duma entered into negotiations with the king, agreeing to recognize Vladislav as their king, on the conditions of maintaining the independence of the Moscow throne and Vladislav’s adoption of Orthodoxy. On the night of September 20-21, Zolkiewski occupied Moscow. Smolensk was also taken, after a 1½-year siege, due to the betrayal of a defector, who showed the enemy a weak spot in the wall. Meanwhile, Sigismund, not agreeing to Vladislav’s accession, laid claim to all of Rus' and sent detachments of Poles to occupy the cities. This is what united all the Russian people in difficult times to liberate the state from the Poles and other enemies [ ] .

Russian-Polish War 1654-1667

The annexation of Little Russia to Russia in January 1654 served as a pretext for war with Poland under Alexei Mikhailovich. The detachments of Alexy Trubetskoy, Shein and Khovansky threw back the Polish-Lithuanian detachments and fought to occupy Roslavl, Mstislavl, Bely, Nevel, Polotsk; advanced detachments of the main forces took Dorogobuzh, and then the tsar approached Smolensk and began its siege. At the same time, Disna and Druya ​​were busy; in the Mstislavl voivodeship, Trubetskoy drove the enemy beyond the Dnieper, and in August Zolotarenko occupied Gomel, Chersk, Propoisk and stood on the Dnieper at Novy Bykhov. The Lithuanian hetman Radzivil was defeated at Gomel and Orsha. Among the Belarusian population, a gravitation towards Moscow began to clearly emerge, expressed in the voluntary surrender of Mogilev and in the formation special squad from the residents of Mogilev for joint action with Russian troops. By this time, after a three-month siege, Smolensk had surrendered and Vitebsk was occupied. The further advance of Russian troops deep into Belarus stopped, mainly due to the departure of Alexei Mikhailovich from the army and disagreements among the governors. Bogdan Khmelnitsky, for his part, acted slowly and inconsistently with the tsarist governors; Even relations between the highest Little Russian clergy and the Polish government were discovered. In the city, the Poles went on the offensive in Lithuania, but without success. In the city, Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich reappeared at the theater of war; Gonsevsky and Radzivil lifted the siege of Mogilev and were defeated near Tolochin (near Orsha). Moscow troops occupied Svisloch and Minsk without a fight, approached Vilna at the end of July, again defeated the Poles here and captured the capital of Lithuania; Kovno and Grodno were soon occupied, and near Brest, the Lithuanian hetman Sapega was defeated by Urusov’s detachment. At the same time, Prince Volkonsky’s detachment was sent on ships from Kyiv up the Dnieper and further along Pripyat; this detachment defeated the Lithuanian troops in Polesie and occupied the city of Pinsk from battle. Khmelnitsky defeated Potocki at Grodsk and, together with voivode Buturlin, occupied Lublin. In one campaign, Alexei Mikhailovich temporarily took possession of almost all the lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania; this was the first offensive movement of Russian weapons to the west since the cessation of the energetic activities of the princes of the pre-apparition period.

The successes of Russian weapons in Lithuania caused a war between Moscow and the Swedish king Charles X, who also laid claims to Lithuania and White Rus' (see Russian-Swedish wars). Negotiations with the Polish commissioners, through the ambassadors of the Roman emperor, were unsuccessful, since Alexei Mikhailovich wanted to be elected heir to the Polish crown. At the beginning of the year, hostilities opened again: the detachments of Sapieha and Gonsevsky were defeated by Dolgoruky; in the south, the Ukrainian hetman Vygovsky, who went over to the side of the Poles, was repulsed from Kyiv by Sheremetev. In the city of Trubetskoy he besieged Konotop, but had to retreat. The Ukrainian Cossacks, who were drawn to Moscow, elected a new hetman, Yuri Khmelnytsky; Vygovsky retreated to Chigirin and was defeated here. The following year, the Poles, having made peace with the Swedes, directed all their forces to fight Moscow and went on the offensive: Sapieha defeated Khovansky at Polonnoy, Pototsky defeated Sheremetev at Chudnov. In the city the king took Grodno and besieged Vilna; Moscow troops, under the command of Dolgoruky, were defeated near the village of Glubokoye by Charnetsky, after which Vilna, despite the heroic resistance of Prince Myshetsky, fell; The cities of Lithuania gradually began to pass back into the hands of the Poles. In the autumn of the year, the Polish king Jan Casimir entered Little Russia beyond the Dnieper, which had fallen away from Moscow, and then moved to the left bank of the Dnieper, where many cities surrendered to him, but near Glukhov the royal army was defeated. The war continued without significant results until the city, when representatives of both sides gathered in the village of Andrusovo for negotiations. A truce was concluded in the city for 13½ years: Russia received left-bank Little Russia, Smolensk and Seversky lands and temporary possession of Kyiv, with its immediate surroundings.

The initial failure of Prince Golitsyn in storming the Khotyn fortress (in the war with the Turks) encouraged the Confederates; in May, they, numbering 5,000 people, approached Lvov, but were repulsed and headed to Lublin and Podolia, where they were scattered by Russian troops. At the end of August, Pulawski gathered 5,000 people and occupied the Zamosc fortress, which he abandoned as the Russians approached and was defeated by A.V. Suvorov and Rene at Orekhov and Wlodawa. Attempts made by Russia to reconcile with the Confederates were unsuccessful due to the intrigues of France: at a meeting in Eperies, the Confederates declared King Stanislaus deposed and at the beginning of the year they opened offensive operations from Galicia, under the leadership of Dumouriez; in a short time they captured Krakow and other fortified points on the border, but then disagreements began between their leaders. At the beginning of May, Suvorov defeated Dumouriez at Landskrona and scattered the Confederates, then attacked Pulawski at Zamosc and forced him to retreat to Galicia. The Lithuanian crown hetman Oginsky, having gathered 8,000 confederates, began to act against small Russian detachments scattered throughout Lithuania, but was defeated by Suvorov at the Battle of Stolovichi, which put an end to the uprising in Lithuania. Sent by the French government to replace Dumouriez, General Viomenil took possession of the Krakow castle (in the city), but after 3 days he was besieged by Suvorov. After a 2½-month siege, the castle was taken; the detachments of Zaremba and Pulawski were defeated, and the remnants of the Confederates were driven out of Greater Poland by the Prussian troops that entered there. This ended the struggle of Russia with the Confederates, which entailed the first partition of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth between Russia, Prussia and Austria in May.

On May 14, 1792, in the small town of Targowica near Uman, large Polish magnates, dissatisfied with the new constitution of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, adopted on May 3, 1791, formed the so-called Targowitza Noble Confederation, and Stanislav Szczesny Potocki was elected marshal of the confederation. The Targowica Confederation advocated the abolition of the Polish constitution and the restoration of all previous feudal orders in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Those who did not submit to the Targowitz Confederation were declared enemies of the homeland. Tribunals, commissions and all kinds of judicial institutions created by adherents of the new constitution and operating in Poland were considered abolished. In their place, confederation courts were established to judge state crimes, that is, reluctance to proceed to confederation. Following the main confederation, provincial confederations were formed, with the active support of Russian troops, for individual voivodeships, with voivodeship marshals and advisers. The four-year Sejm, which adopted a new constitution on May 3, 1791, was declared illegal and violent. The act of drawing up the constitution on May 3 was called a conspiracy. The Confederation published its own universals directed against the Polish constitution. On May 18, Russian troops entered the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

Russian troops operated from two directions, from Belarus and Ukraine. After they won a number of victories (at Boruszkowtsy, Zelwa, Dubienka, Brest), the Polish king Stanislaw Poniatowski was forced to join the Targowica Confederation. Stanisław August Poniatowski organized the meeting, which was attended by the marshals of the Sejm, primates and government ministers. The majority was in favor of joining the Targowica Confederation. The main supporters of the May 3 Constitution (Sejm Marshal Stanislaw Malachowski, Ignacy Potocki, Kazimir-Nestor Sapieha, etc.) were forced to leave Warsaw and emigrated abroad. King Stanisław August Poniatowski sent messengers to the Polish and Lithuanian armies, ordering them to cease hostilities against Russian troops and join the Targowica Confederation. The war led to the second partition of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth between Russia and Prussia, in January 1793.

Part of the Polish gentry, outwardly expressing submission to the Russian Empire, secretly prepared for an uprising, hoping for help from France, where at that moment the revolution was in full swing. Kosciuszko was elected leader of the uprising, who proved himself to be a brave warrior and a competent leader. General Madalinsky, refusing to obey the decision of the Grodno Sejm and disband his cavalry brigade (in Pułtusk on March 12), unexpectedly attacked the Russian regiment and seized the regimental treasury, and then, having dispersed the Prussian squadron in Šląsk, headed towards Krakow. Having learned about this, Kosciuszko hurried there; On March 16, 1794, the inhabitants of Krakow proclaimed him dictator of the republic. In Krakow, the Act of Insurrection was proclaimed and Tadeusz Kościuszko took a public oath. The act of uprising proclaimed Tadeusz Kosciuszko the supreme commander of the national armed forces and gave him full power in the country. IN different parts Armed revolts broke out in the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The Russian ambassador and head of the Russian troops in Warsaw, General Igelstrom, sent Denisov and Thomasov’s detachments against Madalinsky; At the same time, Prussian troops entered Poland. The Russian army has achieved a number of successes. September 29 in the Battle of Maciejowice, Duchy of Warsaw, Kingdom of Poland. and Zamość.

February 26, 1832 - was published, according to which the Polish Kingdom was declared part of Russia, the Sejm and the Polish army were abolished. The old administrative division into voivodeships was replaced by a division into provinces. In fact, this meant adopting a course to transform the Kingdom of Poland into a Russian province - the monetary system in force throughout Russia, the system of weights and measures, was extended to the territory of the Kingdom. After the suppression of the uprising, a policy was pursued to force the Greek Catholics to join Orthodoxy.

After the suppression of the uprising of 1830-31. Poland's autonomy was sharply limited, and the process of Russification began. The revolutions of 1848-1849 in Europe again aggravated the Polish question. In 1848-49, Russia, at the request of Austria, participated in the suppression of the Hungarian uprising, where Polish volunteers took part in the fighting on the side of the rebel Hungarians. But in Poland itself there was no uprising. In the early 1860s. unrest in Poland intensified again. This happened mainly under the influence of Polish emigration; in addition, the population demanded agrarian reform. Finally, in January 1863, attacks on Russian garrisons began in different parts of Poland and Lithuania. Unlike 1830, the uprising was partisan in nature. There were no major battles, only small skirmishes. The overall advantage remained on the side of the Russian troops, and by April 1864 the uprising was suppressed. The losses of the rebels amounted to about 30,000 people, the Russian troops - about 3,500 people. Most of the leaders of the uprising, among whom Romuald Traugutt, raised an uprising in the Baikal region. It was suppressed within a month, the leaders of the uprising were executed.

Our victory in the Battle of Warsaw on August 15, 1920 was proclaimed the “Miracle on the Vistula.” When it seemed that the Red Army’s advance into the West could no longer be stopped, an unexpected maneuver of Polish troops, wedged between the Western Front of Mikhail Tukhachevsky and the Southwestern Front of Alexander Egorov, and entering the Red Army from the flank, allowed them to be thrown back from the capital, and later squeezed out of Poland. Young independence was saved, and Józef Pilsudski strengthened his image as the most outstanding Polish military strategist of the 20th century.

This coming week we will celebrate the 92nd anniversary of these events. Fortunately, we can celebrate this date in a free country that is not in danger. But since our country is free, we can take advantage of this freedom and play a little “political fiction”. What would a Polish-Russian war look like today? Below we outline three hypothetical scenarios.

War for influence

It is difficult to expect that at the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century, Russia would suddenly decide to fulfill its eternal dreams of creating a huge pan-Slavic state controlled from Moscow and march with its army towards the Vistula. These are not the times and the opportunities are no longer the same. The most likely area of ​​conflict these days appears to be a struggle for influence. A conflict, the role of which is not to seize control over an enemy country, but to strengthen one’s position in it and, possibly, weaken its power. Russia does not shy away from such incidents. The proof is the war with Georgia in 2008. Moscow's goal was not to take control of this former Soviet republic, but only to weaken it: The Kremlin was irritated by President Mikheil Saakashvili's defiantly pro-American and consistently anti-Russian policies, so Moscow decided to rein them in. However, the clash, which lasted several days, did not end with Russia's occupation of Georgia. The Kremlin had enough of the separation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia; it decided that such a click on Saakashvili’s nose would be enough and completely withdrew its troops from Georgian territory.

A Polish-Russian war for spheres of influence would certainly have a different character than the clash of 2008. The Russians moved into Georgia with tanks and sent an army and heavy equipment there. “In the case of Poland, we would most likely be faced with sabotage actions of Russian special forces or surgically precise missile strikes for strategic facilities in our country, for example, Petrochemicals in Plock,” believes General Bolesław Balcerowicz, an employee of the University of Warsaw. Such actions would be aimed solely at weakening Poland, their goal would not be to seize our country.

War for territory

Robert Kaplan, an analyst at Stratfor, recently published a book, “The Revenge of Geography,” in which he presented the thesis that the main driving force behind world conflicts is changes in the map. In other words, if a border has been moved once, sooner or later its new location may cause a military conflict. In turn, Kaplan’s boss at Stratfor, George Friedman, wrote in his book “The Next 100 Years” that thundered three years ago that in 2020-2050 the economic situation in Russia will become completely hopeless, and it will have to launch an armed strike on its neighbors, since the Kremlin will not be able to otherwise ensure the functioning of this huge state. If both of these theses turned out to be true, war between Poland and Russia would be inevitable, and it would be real war, that is, the kind we dealt with in previous centuries - with battles and attempts to occupy enemy territory.

If we analyze the potential of the Russian army, we can conclude that such a classic war would not be too different from the conflicts of the 20th century. Under President Medvedev, Russia announced a radical modernization of its army, but the promises ended there. The most modern Russian weapons- These are Antey-class submarines, but they would not be very useful in a war with Poland.

Apart from the Antey, Russia does not have any technology that would allow it to move away from the strategy that brought success in World War II: throwing such large quantity soldier, which the enemy would be unable to stop.
Geography helps Russians with this. They could hit our country from two sides: from the Kaliningrad region and from the territory of friendly Belarus. We could only hope that we could hold out for two or three weeks, and then NATO allies would come to the rescue. teaches that it works best with the allies in joint photographs taken at the next summit, but still, there is reason to believe that they remember what happened in 1939, when they did not help us.

Offensive war

Let me remind you that all these thoughts are from the category of political fiction. And since this is a game, why not consider a scenario in which Poland itself attacks Russia? This option is just as likely as the fact that we will have to defend ourselves from the Russian army. A Polish invasion could occur, for example, if the Kremlin attempted to carry out a military invasion of the Baltic states: Lithuania, Latvia or Estonia. These three countries are members of NATO, and at the moment of such a strike, Article 5 of the Washington Treaty would come into force, stating that an attack on one of the Alliance members obliges the others to provide assistance to him. Poland is in this case the closest neighbor, which, due to natural circumstances, could come to the rescue faster than anyone else.

What do we have? Firstly, 48 F-16 aircraft, which conduct regular training over the Baltic countries and can be very effective in such a war, especially since the Russians have few aircraft of this class. But we don’t have many other offensive weapons. The strategy of the Polish armed forces provides for the purchase of equipment that improves the mobility of our army: there will be more Wolverines and other armored personnel carriers known from Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as unmanned aircraft (they are already in service with NATO) and helicopters. Perhaps, units of superbly trained military personnel dynamically moving throughout the entire combat arena would be capable of pinning down the numerous forces of the Russians.

And yet, the game of inventing scenarios for a hypothetical Polish-Russian war does not make one feel optimistic. We have too few advantages to contemplate such a conflict without fear. If it happened, we would have to rely on the same advantages as in 1920: higher morale, determination in battle, better strategy and a certain amount of happiness. First of all, we should hope that the times of traditional confrontations are irrevocably a thing of the past. “Every civilization has its own wars. In the era of information civilization, the war will unfold for information,” emphasizes General Baltserovich. The miracle on the Vistula was also possible because we managed to solve Soviet codes, and thanks to this, we knew in advance about the movements of the Red Army. During World War II, the Poles were able to crack Enigma. So maybe a war for information wouldn’t be so scary for us?

"You don't mess around with your brothers - it's all okay,

You won’t hang out with them yourself, you won’t invite your friends over. (...)

For imperial nonsense, that idea is not the last -

Be it a holiday, be it an everyday day. (...)

And it’s not fun at all that this whole thing -

Who should go and who shouldn’t - it has grown out of size.”

These are the words of the song by Kazik Stashevsky "Bald goes to Moscow"(1995). Ten years ago, the discussion was about whether then-Prime Minister Józef Oleksy should go to Moscow when it was pursuing a policy of genocide in the Caucasus. Now Kazik could write the song “Óle (diminutive form of the name Alexander - approx. per.) goes to Moscow.” Who will Alexander Kwasniewski represent in Moscow on May 9? One third of Poles - follows from the survey public opinion, conducted by order of the weekly "Wprost" by the "Pentor" center. 45.8% of respondents believe that he is going there only “in a personal capacity,” and only 34.5% believe that he will also represent them.

On May 9, President Kwasniewski and General Jaruzelski will stand together on a marble podium with the inscription “Lenin” in Moscow. The officially stated reason for their trip is to help ensure that Russia looks favorably on Poland and does not trumpet around the world that Warsaw is infected with anti-Russian phobia. Kwasniewski and Jaruzelski allegedly want to tell the Russians the truth about their history. In fact, they will obediently trail behind the triumphal chariot of Vladimir Putin.

In May 1856, Tsar Alexander II came to Warsaw for a visit. The liberals of Europe at that time loved him just as much as Gorbachev did 130 years later. After all, he was, they say, a liberal and reformer, completely different from his predecessor, the bloody satrap Nicholas I. The Poles turned to him with a loyal petition to return autonomy to the Kingdom of Poland and restrain the unscrupulous arbitrariness of officials. The king's answer was icy: “Everything that my father did, he did well. I do not intend to change anything. The happiness of Poland depends on its complete unity with the people of my empire. No illusions, sir.”. It is worth listening to the royal advice. After all, Poland’s relations with Russia are determined by illusions or an ordinary distortion of history.

Myth one - natural allies

A dangerous illusion is the belief that friendly Polish-Russian relations depend on good will and a refusal to “tease Russia.” Publicists and politicians (obviously working partly on Russian orders) compete with each other in the belief that the natural Polish-Russian friendship was spoiled by our stupid gestures only for a short time, although we, “brother Slavs,” have always been allies, and nothing does not share. You just need to drop the conversation about history and “choose the future.” Instead of shunning each other, President Kwasniewski, together with General Jaruzelski, should obediently stand on Lenin's mausoleum and accept the Russian vision of history.

Communist propaganda for decades convinced us that Russia and the Russians throughout our history were allies of Poland, with interruptions for a few wars (the causes of which were often “incitement” from outside, rather than Polish interests). The mythical Smolensk regiments near Grunwald became a symbol of the supposedly existing brotherhood in arms, which continued uninterrupted until the Second World War. While even a cursory analysis of history indicates completely the opposite. In the history of independent Poland it is difficult to find any period of cooperation with Russia. Moreover, there was a fundamental and constant conflict of interest for centuries. The conflict is over the territory of today's Belarus, Ukraine, the Baltic countries and Moldova.

Poland's participation in supporting the Orange Revolution in Ukraine and our active role in bringing Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia into NATO reminded us that this conflict still exists. And even if Alexander Kwasniewski came to Moscow with a portrait of Stalin on the lapel of his jacket, nothing would change until he forgot about the pipe dreams of partnership with Ukraine. Even during the time of Boris Yeltsin, who sincerely wanted Russian-Polish reconciliation, any attempts at Polish-Ukrainian cooperation caused an allergic reaction in the Kremlin. The main motive that prompted Yeltsin to sign the famous declaration that he had nothing against Poland joining NATO was the conviction that this would delay the possibility of close cooperation between Warsaw and Kiev. The same Yeltsin hastened to let the President of Ukraine listen to secretly recorded tapes of conversations with Lech Walesa, where it was said that Poland’s priority was the West, not Ukraine.

Support for pro-Western tendencies in Ukraine and Belarus has always displeased Moscow. Only demonstrative gestures of friendship between Alexander Kwasniewski and Leonid Kuchma were allowed - it was well known that this former director plant for the production of nuclear missiles will not make a political turn to the West. After the “Orange Revolution” in Kyiv, the state of the cold Polish-Russian world moved into the Cold War phase. War, which is a normal state in Polish-Russian relations.

Myth two - the proximity of civilizations

The fallacy that the “Moscow party” stubbornly insists on in Poland is the assertion that the civilizations of our peoples are close. Samuel Huntington reminds us: “The Orthodox civilization, centered in Russia, is distinguished from the West by its Byzantine ancestry, its isolated religion, two hundred years of Tatar rule, and its limited contact with Western values ​​such as the Renaissance, Reformation, and Enlightenment.” The dispute between Poland and Russia is a deep conflict of civilizations. On the one hand, there are individualism, respect for private property and democracy, and on the other, collectivism and total nationalization, “including human soul", as Jan Lehon wrote in his diaries. The young democracies of the West, following the Constitution of the United States, declared "We the people. . ".

The first Russian constitution ("Basic Laws of the Empire"), written on the initiative of the tsar after the revolution of 1905, said in the meantime: "The supreme autocratic power belongs to the Emperor of All Rus'. Submission to his authority is a requirement of conscience, not fear. God Himself commands so." . And although the names of the emperor changed - he was the general secretary communist party, then president - a principle that remains deeply rooted in the Russian political system. However, like the close ties between spiritual and secular power, alien Western culture. It is these close ties that explain the absence of the Russian President and Patriarch Alexy II at the funeral of John Paul II, which amazed all observers.

When Peter I, the model and beloved historical figure of Vladimir Putin, abolished the institution of the patriarch, transferring power in the Church to the Holy Synod, he argued as follows: " Simple people, seeing one ruler of the Church, they believe that he is a second sovereign on a par with the monarch, and moreover, that the Church is another, completely separate and better state. This demoralizes simple hearts to such an extent that in any matter they turn to their shepherd, and not to a representative of the authorities." If we replace the word "Church" with "Yukos", and "patriarch" with "chairman", then we get an argument that became the reason that the recent favorite of the Kremlin and the richest man in Russia, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, sits behind iron bars and has every prospect of spending the next 10 years behind it.

The closeness of the Slavic peoples has only one connotation in Russia - subordination. Modern Russian political scientists argue that Poles, Czechs or Balts, joining Western world They don't understand at all what they are doing. In Eastern Europe, according to leading Russian political scientist Alexander Panarin, Polish or Czech culture played a leading role. And now these peoples have turned into the “lumpen proletariat of the West” and a source of cheap labor. Renaissance Russian Empire(i.e., at a minimum, the annexation of Ukraine and Belarus), according to Panarin, “will allow the Slavs to avoid the fate of blacks in Europe”. Summing up the dominant current in Russian political thought, Professor Andrzej Nowak wrote in his “Idea of ​​Empire”: “As for the countries of the former outer empire, in Europe, the concept of a border strip should become a kind of geopolitical compromise." These states should not be integrated with the West, whose symbol was NATO, "so that the road is not cut off for the return of these countries to the role of a border strip, not of the West, but of the East." .

Myth three - Russian liberals

The Poles are looking for partners among the so-called Russian liberals to the point of nausea. True, there are die-hards in power now, but there is also a powerful pro-Western group in Russia - we read in dozens of articles in the Polish and Western press. Despite this, for centuries, admiration for the West and Russia’s readiness to join Europe have been conditioned by one condition: Russia can only join Europe as a powerful and equal power. “Yes, we will accept your civilization,” the liberals say, “but on the condition that we, the Russians, will, on your behalf, “civilize” the Ukrainians, Belarusians, as well as the Poles and the Baltic states.”

Dislike of Poland united prominent intellectuals in Russian history. Pushkin, Dostoevsky and Bulgakov wrote about the Poles with a mixture of hostility, fear and contempt. In Bulgakov's unfinished story "Pan Pilsudski", the contemptuously depicted Kyiv intellectuals, fearing the Bolsheviks, wait for "Pan Pilsudski" in the salon, and when the Polish officers enter, they turn it into a stable. In turn, Pushkin thanks Catherine II for “defeating Sweden and conquering Poland”. All Russian scientific literature - from the 18th century until recently - in its main stream is built around an extremely negative stereotype of the Pole. According to modern historian Stanislav Kunyaev, Poland was “Europe’s special forces” deployed against Russia.

Myth four - a huge sales market

A harmful and persistently cultivated illusion in Polish politics is the belief about the enormous Russian market, which could have become a discovery for us if “not for the stupid insult to Russia.” It’s okay that this myth loses logic after reading the first available data, from which it follows that the GDP indicators of great Russia correspond to small Holland (such, however, is the purchasing power of this state). Moreover, the absurdity of this situation lies in itself. If trade with Russia depends on our political or propaganda actions, then it should be avoided altogether, since it makes us dependent on a large and militarily powerful neighbor. Meanwhile, the “Moscow party” in Poland calmly proves that the name of the peripheral square in Warsaw named after. Dzhokhar Dudayev, the President of Chechnya, is causing damage to the Polish economy. And at the same time he believes that buying almost 100% of the energy resources we need from Russia is a “pure business” that has nothing to do with politics.

Perhaps the use of the word "illusion" is too flattering towards the authors of such statements. At best, this is stupidity, at worst, national betrayal. When various enterprises, with the support of intelligence services and government levers, are included in Russian plans to capture Polish energy market, it is difficult to talk about pure stupidity. This term should be reserved for politicians who are inclined to make political concessions in exchange for the opportunity to export bad potatoes and fatty pork to Russia.

But naturally, this term should be reserved for numerous representatives of the “Moscow party” who convince society that there is nothing more important than recognition of a great neighbor and friendship with him. Great with its territory, because Russian economy- This is a typical example of a third world state economy that exists solely through the sale of raw materials.

Myth fifth - willingness to cooperate

Russians have no illusions. After Viktor Yushchenko came to power in Ukraine and a chance arose to build the Odessa-Gdansk oil pipeline (allowing independent export of this energy from the Caspian Sea to Europe), Russia immediately signed an agreement with Greece and Bulgaria and began construction of an oil pipeline bypassing Bosphorus to control the transportation of Caspian oil.

In the field of energy, Russian policy is the best example of when there can be no talk of either sentiment or money. We can only talk about politics and maintaining permanent mechanisms of dependence of the states of Central and Eastern Europe on Moscow. The agreement signed by President Putin in Germany on the construction of a gas pipeline along the seabed Baltic Sea has no economic justification. But in political terms, this agreement serves to deepen the Russian-German alliance, which, according to Henry Kissinger, has always contributed to limiting the role of Poland.

Ever-living imperialism

Perhaps, as the strong “Moscow party” existing in our country advises, we should calm down in relation to Ukrainians and Belarusians and try to make money on economic and political cooperation with Russia. Only the only price that Russia is willing to accept for this is Ukrainian and Polish independence. Russia is consistently building bridgeheads of its economic and political influence, creating an image of Poles eternally suffering from Russophobia in order to reduce the devaluation of Polish eastern policy in the eyes of Brussels and Washington. Moscow is expanding its economic influence in leading European countries and is making a clear revision of history. The upcoming celebrations on the occasion of the anniversary of the end of World War II will be subordinated to the idea of ​​​​an “injection” of the Russian, imperial vision of this conflict. Ten years ago, Russian historian Mikhail Meltyukhov said: “The actions of the Red Army in Poland (after September 17, 1939) can be considered, using modern terminology, as a peacekeeping operation.” In addition, he added that “the Red Army was returning the lands lost as a result of external aggression.” Currently, the Russian authorities accept Mr. Meltyukhov’s vision of history as mandatory.

Russians, like Pushkin and Dostoevsky once did, believe in a tendentious and distorted picture of history. Poland has been a very profitable external enemy for Moscow for many years. In real politics, our country was not taken into account. As one of President V.V. Putin’s advisers told me, “There is no topic of Polish-Russian cooperation. We resolve economic issues related to the transit of energy resources in Brussels. We will not conduct a dialogue with you about Ukraine, since we consider your policy to be hostile. Remain for dialogue historical issues- here the conversation will be rather unpleasant. Although it is always worth talking about cultural cooperation. There is still something that can be done in this area."

There is no point in opposing imperial views in Russia itself. We can only win this cold war in the West. We, however, will not win it through a trip to Moscow on an excursion to A. Kwasniewski with General W. Jaruzelski, the living symbol of Yalta. We will win it when, together with the Baltic peoples, Ukrainians or Slovaks, we help our allies understand that the policy of “no illusions, gentlemen” has its own logical continuation- from Tsar Alexander, through V.I. Lenin, L.I. Brezhnev up to V.V. Putin.

Results of a public opinion poll (Pentor Center):

Question: Who will Alexander Kwasniewski represent in Moscow at the celebrations marking the anniversary of the end of World War II?

Result: 45.8% - only themselves; 34.5% - me too; 19.7% - hard to say.

Result: 38.6% - with the beginning of the new occupation; 49.5% - with the liberation of Poland; 11.9% - hard to say.

Question: With whom did Poland conflict more often?

Result: 36.9% - with Germany; 47.1% - with Russia; 16% is hard to say.

Question: What will Poland’s relations with Ukraine, Lithuania and Estonia be like after A. Kwasniewski takes part in the celebration of the 60th anniversary of the end of World War II in Moscow?

Result: 50.7% of respondents believe that the relationship will remain the same, 21.4% believe that it will worsen, while 6.8% have the opposite opinion. 15.1% of respondents found it difficult to answer this question.

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Expert opinions

, Member of the European Parliament, former President of Lithuania:

“I expected that A. Kwasniewski, after the Russian prosecutor’s office closed the case of the crime in Katyn, would refuse to travel to Moscow to celebrate Victory Day. The cessation of the investigation into the Katyn case is a clear signal that Russia will not be able to admit that it allowed Katyn genocide. This indicates the need to look carefully at the future of its relations with its neighbors. Katyn is only one of the planes in which the Polish-Russian conflict is developing. It has deeper roots that go back to the perception of human life. in the individual and national dimension, but in Russia it is completely different from this point of view. this state still remains barbaric, nothing has changed in it after the collapse of the USSR".

, historian at Yale University:

"From a historical perspective, Polish-Russian relations have never been good. There has always been tension between your states, although now everything is going quite well. Russia considers Poland a traitor to the Slavic tradition, because your country adopted Catholicism. In turn, the Poles do not like Russians , because you have suffered too much from them. Therefore, friendship between you, strictly speaking, is impossible, but the latest disputes will not enter the stage of a more serious conflict.

The positive thing is that Kwasniewski will go to Moscow on May 9, I advised him this myself. However, the Polish president should not be in any “special” way grateful for help in gaining independence. He should thank, but at the same time make it clear that Poland continues to remember the times of the bloody Soviet dictatorship and expects an apology."

Irina Kobrinskaya, chief researcher at IMEMO RAS:

“For centuries, Warsaw has suspected Moscow of imperial ambitions, and this topic comes up during important events. So this time too - starts in Poland election campaign and the discussion about the state of relations with Russia immediately revives. In the context of their shared history, Polish concerns about Russian imperialism are well founded, but the Russians react poorly to them. They don't understand their meaning.

It’s good that Kwasniewski will be in Moscow on May 9. Only 3 European leaders - Estonia, Lithuania and Ukraine - will not attend the Victory Day celebrations. I am glad that Kwasniewski did not join them, although he may have decided to do so because he is not participating in the presidential elections. The Polish leader should not make sharp political declarations in Moscow, but should limit himself to gratitude for the liberation."

, former adviser to President B. Clinton on Russia:

“Poland effectively uses its ability to influence Moscow, although it does not always do it carefully. Inclusion in the Ukrainian “orange” revolution was constructive. It also had an impact on Moscow: the majority of Russians opposed it, but deep down in their hearts they knew that they were wrong. Poland forced them to do this. At the same time, it is a mistake to name a square in Warsaw after D. Dudayev. This does not mean, of course, that Russian policy towards Chechnya is correct. However, if Poland wants to emphasize its disagreement with it, it must do so in a different way. For example, A. Kwasniewski must refuse a trip to Moscow on May 9. This would be a clear signal that your state does not agree with the actions of Moscow, its reluctance to admit to the Katyn genocide and apologize for the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact." (Trybuna, Poland)

("Trybuna", Poland)

("Polityka", Poland)

("Nie", Poland)

InoSMI materials contain assessments exclusively from foreign media and do not reflect the position of the InoSMI editorial staff.