History of Russia in the 18th-19th centuries Milov Leonid Vasilievich

§ 4. Eastern question

§ 4. Eastern question

Ottoman Empire and European powers. IN early XIX In Russian foreign policy, the Eastern Question did not play a noticeable role. The Greek project of Catherine II, which provided for the expulsion of the Turks from Europe and the creation in the Balkans Christian Empire, the head of which the empress saw her grandson Constantine, was abandoned. Under Paul I, the Russian and Ottoman empires united to fight revolutionary France. The Bosporus and Dardanelles were open to Russian warships, and F. F. Ushakov's squadron successfully operated in the Mediterranean Sea. The Ionian Islands were under Russian protectorate, their port cities served as a base for Russian warships. For Alexander I and his “young friends,” the Eastern Question was the subject of serious discussion in the Secret Committee. The result of this discussion was the decision to maintain the integrity Ottoman Empire, about abandoning plans for its division. This contradicted Catherine’s tradition, but was completely justified in the new international conditions. The joint actions of the governments of the Russian and Ottoman empires ensured relative stability in the Black Sea region, the Balkans and the Caucasus, which was important against the general background of European upheavals. It is characteristic that opponents of a balanced course in the Eastern Question were F.V. Rostopchin, who came forward under Paul I, who proposed detailed designs division of the Ottoman Empire, and N.M. Karamzin, who was considered advanced, who considered the collapse of the Ottoman Empire “beneficial for reason and humanity.”

At the beginning of the 19th century. For the Western European powers, the eastern question was reduced to the problem of the “sick man” of Europe, which was considered the Ottoman Empire. Her death was expected any day now, and there was talk of dividing the Turkish inheritance. England, Napoleonic France and the Austrian Empire were especially active in the Eastern Question. The interests of these states were in direct and sharp conflict, but they were united in one thing, trying to weaken the growing influence of Russia on affairs in the Ottoman Empire and in the region as a whole. For Russia, the Eastern Question consisted of the following aspects: the final political and economic establishment in the Northern Black Sea region, which was mainly achieved under Catherine II; recognition of her rights as the patroness of the Christian and Slavic peoples of the Ottoman Empire and, above all, the Balkan Peninsula; favorable regime of the Black Sea straits of the Bosporus and Dardanelles, which ensured its trade and military interests. IN in a broad sense The Eastern Question also concerned Russian politics in Transcaucasia.

The accession of Georgia to Russia. Alexander I's cautious approach to the Eastern Question was to a certain extent due to the fact that from the first steps of his reign he had to solve a long-standing problem: the annexation of Georgia to Russia. The Russian protectorate over Eastern Georgia proclaimed in 1783 was largely formal in nature. Having suffered severely from the Persian invasion in 1795, Eastern Georgia, which made up the Kartli-Kakheti kingdom, was interested in Russian patronage and military protection. At the request of King George XII, there were Russian troops, an embassy was sent to St. Petersburg, which was supposed to ensure that the Kartli-Kakheti kingdom “was considered to belong to the Russian state.” At the beginning of 1801, Paul I issued a Manifesto on the annexation of Eastern Georgia to Russia with special rights. After some hesitation caused by disagreements in the Permanent Council and the Secret Committee, Alexander I confirmed his father’s decision and on September 12, 1801 signed a Manifesto to the Georgian people, which liquidated the Kartli-Kakheti kingdom and annexed Eastern Georgia to Russia. The Bagration dynasty was removed from power, and a Supreme Government composed of Russian military and civilians was created in Tiflis.

P. D. Tsitsianov and his Caucasian policy. In 1802, General P. D. Tsitsianov, a Georgian by origin, was appointed chief administrator of Georgia. Tsitsianov’s dream was the liberation of the peoples of Transcaucasia from the Ottoman and Persian threat and their unification into a federation under the auspices of Russia. Acting energetically and purposefully, he in a short time achieved the consent of the rulers of Eastern Transcaucasia to annex the territories under their control to Russia. The Derbent, Talysh, Kubin, and Dagestan rulers agreed to the patronage of the Russian Tsar. Tsitsianov launched a successful campaign against the Ganja Khanate in 1804. He began negotiations with the Imeretian king, which later ended with the inclusion of Imereti in the Russian Empire. In 1803, the ruler of Megrelia came under the protectorate of Russia.

Tsitsianov's successful actions displeased Persia. The Shah demanded the withdrawal of Russian troops outside Georgia and Azerbaijan, which was ignored. In 1804, Persia started a war against Russia. Tsitsianov, despite the lack of forces, led active offensive operations - the Karabakh, Sheki and Shirvan khanates were annexed to Russia. When Tsitsianov accepted the surrender of the Baku Khan, he was treacherously killed, which did not affect the course of the Persian campaign. In 1812, the Persian crown prince Abbas Mirza was completely defeated by General P. S. Kotlyarevsky near Aslanduz. The Persians had to clear all of Transcaucasia and negotiate. In October 1813, the Gulistan Peace Treaty was signed, according to which Persia recognized Russian acquisitions in Transcaucasia. Russia received the exclusive right to keep military ships in the Caspian Sea. The peace treaty created a completely new international legal situation, which meant the approval of the Russian border along the Kura and Araks and the entry of the peoples of Transcaucasia into the Russian Empire.

Russo-Turkish War 1806–1812 Tsitsianov’s active actions in Transcaucasia were viewed with caution in Constantinople, where French influence had noticeably increased. Napoleon was ready to promise the Sultan the return of Crimea and some Transcaucasian territories to his rule. Russia considered it necessary to agree to the Turkish government’s proposal for an early renewal of the union treaty. In September 1805, a new treaty of alliance and mutual assistance was concluded between the two empires. Important had articles of agreement on the regime of the Black Sea straits, which during hostilities Turkey undertook to keep open for the Russian navy, while at the same time not allowing military ships of other states into the Black Sea. The agreement did not last long. In 1806, incited by Napoleonic diplomacy, the Sultan replaced the pro-Russian rulers of Wallachia and Moldavia, to which Russia was ready to respond by sending its troops into these principalities. The Sultan's government declared war on Russia.

The war, started by the Turks in the hope of weakening Russia after Austerlitz, was fought with varying degrees of success. In 1807, having won a victory near Arpachai, Russian troops repelled an attempt by the Turks to invade Georgia. The Black Sea Fleet forced the Turkish fortress of Anapa to surrender. In 1811, Kotlyarevsky took the Turkish fortress of Akhalkalaki by storm. On the Danube, hostilities became protracted until in 1811 M.I. Kutuzov was appointed commander of the Danube Army. He defeated the Turkish forces at Ruschuk and Slobodzeya and forced the Porte to make peace. This was the first enormous service provided by Kutuzov to Russia in 1812. Under the terms of the Peace of Bucharest, Russia received the rights of guarantor of the autonomy of Serbia, which strengthened its position in the Balkans. In addition, she received naval bases on Black Sea coast Caucasus and part of Moldova between the Dniester and Prut rivers went to it.

Greek question. The system of European balance established at the Congress of Vienna did not apply to the Ottoman Empire, which inevitably led to the aggravation of the Eastern Question. The Holy Alliance implied the unity of European Christian monarchs against the infidels and their expulsion from Europe. In reality, the European powers waged a fierce struggle for influence in Constantinople, using the growth of the liberation movement of the Balkan peoples as a means of putting pressure on the Sultan's government. Russia widely used its opportunities to provide patronage to the Christian subjects of the Sultan - Greeks, Serbs, Bulgarians. The Greek question became particularly acute. With the knowledge of the Russian authorities in Odessa, Moldova, Wallachia, Greece and Bulgaria, Greek patriots were preparing an uprising, the goal of which was the independence of Greece. In their struggle they enjoyed widespread support from the progressive European public, who viewed Greece as the cradle European civilization. Alexander I showed hesitation. Based on the principle of legitimism, he did not approve of the idea of ​​Greek independence, but did not find support either in Russian society or even in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where I. Kapodistria, the future first president of independent Greece, played a prominent role. In addition, the king was impressed by the idea of ​​the triumph of the cross over the crescent, of expanding the sphere of influence of European Christian civilization. He spoke about his doubts at the Verona Congress: “Nothing without a doubt seemed more appropriate public opinion country, like a religious war with Turkey, but in the unrest of the Peloponnese I saw signs of revolution. And he abstained."

In 1821, the Greek national liberation revolution began, led by the general of the Russian service, aristocrat Alexander Ypsilanti. Alexander I condemned the Greek revolution as a rebellion against the legitimate monarch and insisted on a settlement Greek question through negotiations. Instead of independence, he offered the Greeks autonomy within the Ottoman Empire. The rebels, who had hoped for direct help from the European public, rejected this plan. The Ottoman authorities did not accept him either. The forces were clearly unequal, the Ypsilanti detachment was defeated, the Ottoman government closed the straits to the Russians merchant fleet, advanced troops to the Russian border. To resolve the Greek issue, at the beginning of 1825, a conference of the great powers met in St. Petersburg, where England and Austria rejected Russian program joint action. After the Sultan refused the mediation of the conference participants, Alexander I decided to concentrate troops on the Turkish border. Thus, he crossed out the policy of legitimism and moved on to open support for the Greek national liberation movement. Russian society welcomed the emperor's determination. A firm course in the Greek and, more broadly, Eastern question was defended by such influential dignitaries as V.P. Kochubey, M.S. Vorontsov, A.I. Chernyshov, P.D. Kiselev. They were concerned about the possible weakening of Russian influence among Christian and Slavic population Balkan Peninsula. A.P. Ermolov argued: “Foreign cabinets, especially English ones, are guilty of patience and inaction, presenting us in a disadvantageous position before all peoples. It will end with the Greeks, who are loyal to us, leaving their justified anger towards us.”

A.P. Ermolov in the Caucasus. The name of A.P. Ermolov is associated with a sharp increase in the military-political presence of Russia in the North Caucasus, a territory that was ethnically diverse and whose peoples were at very different levels of socio-economic and political development. There were relatively stable state formations - the Avar and Kazikumyk khanates, the Tarkov shamkhalate; patriarchal “free societies” dominated in the mountainous regions, the prosperity of which largely depended on successful raids on their lowland neighbors engaged in agriculture.

In the second half of the 18th century. The Northern Ciscaucasia, which was the object of peasant and Cossack colonization, was separated from the mountainous regions by the Caucasian line, which stretched from the Black to the Caspian Sea and ran along the banks of the Kuban and Terek rivers. A postal road was built along this line, which was considered almost safe. In 1817, the Caucasian cordon line was moved from the Terek to the Sunzha, which caused discontent among the mountain peoples, because thereby they were cut off from the Kumyk Plain, where cattle were driven to winter pastures. For the Russian authorities, the inclusion of the Caucasian peoples in the orbit of imperial influence was a natural consequence of the successful establishment of Russia in Transcaucasia. In military, trade and economic terms, the authorities were interested in eliminating the threats that the raiding system of the highlanders concealed. The support that the mountaineers received from the Ottoman Empire justified Russia's military intervention in the affairs of the North Caucasus.

Appointed in 1816 to the post of chief administrator of the civilian unit in Georgia and the Caucasus and at the same time commander of the Separate Corps, General A.P. Ermolov considered his main task ensuring the security of Transcaucasia and the inclusion of the territory of mountainous Dagestan, Chechnya and the North-Western Caucasus into the Russian Empire. From Tsitsianov’s policy, which combined threats and monetary promises, he moved on to a drastic suppression of the raiding system, for which he widely used deforestation and the destruction of rebellious villages. Ermolov felt like a “proconsul of the Caucasus” and did not hesitate to use military force. It was under him that the military-economic and political blockade of mountainous regions was carried out; he considered demonstrations of force and military expeditions the best remedy pressure on mountain peoples. On Ermolov’s initiative, the fortresses Groznaya, Vnezapnaya, Burnaya were built, which became strongholds of the Russian troops.

Ermolov's military expeditions led to opposition from the highlanders of Chechnya and Kabarda. Yermolov’s policy provoked resistance from “free societies”, the ideological basis for the unity of which was muridism, a type of Islam adapted to the concepts of mountain peoples. The teachings of muridism required from each believer constant spiritual improvement and blind obedience to the mentor, student, whose murid he became. The role of the mentor was exceptionally great; he united spiritual and secular power in his person. Muridism imposed on its followers the obligation to wage a “holy war,” ghazavat, against infidels until they converted to Islam or were completely exterminated. Calls for gazavat, addressed to all mountain peoples who professed Islam, were a powerful incentive to resist Ermolov’s actions and at the same time helped to overcome the disunity of the peoples inhabiting the North Caucasus.

One of the first ideologists of Muridism, Muhammad Yaragsky, preached the transfer of strict religious and moral norms and prohibitions to the area of ​​social and legal relations. The consequence of this was the inevitable clash of muridism, based on Sharia, a body of Islamic law, relatively new for the Caucasian peoples, with adat, the norms of customary law, which for centuries determined the life of “free societies”. Secular rulers were wary of the fanatical preaching of the Muslim clergy, which often led to civil strife and bloody massacres. For a number of peoples of the Caucasus who professed Islam, muridism remained alien.

In the 1820s. the opposition of previously disparate “free societies” to Ermolov’s straightforward and short-sighted actions grew into organized military-political resistance, the ideology of which became muridism. We can say that under Yermolov events began that contemporaries called the Caucasian War. In reality they were deprived general plan multi-temporal actions of individual military detachments, which either sought to suppress attacks by the mountaineers, or undertook expeditions into the depths of mountainous regions, without representing the enemy’s forces and without pursuing any political goals. Military operations in the Caucasus became protracted.