Soviet-Japanese war Khalkhin goal. Defeat of Japanese troops in the battle with the Soviets on the Khalkhin Gol River (Mongolia)

The fighting at Khalkhin Gol was an armed conflict that lasted from spring to autumn 1939 near the Khalkhin Gol River in Mongolia near the border with Manchuria (Manchukuo), between the USSR and Japan. The final battle took place at the end of August and ended with the complete defeat of the Japanese 6th Army. On September 15, a truce was concluded between the USSR and Japan.

In Fig. map of the fighting near the Galkhin-Gol River on August 20-31, 1939.

Let us turn to one of the key, and perhaps the decisive moment of the battles at Khalkhin Gol - the offensive of Japanese troops with the aim of encircling and defeating the combined Soviet-Mongolian forces. In early July, the Japanese command brought all 3 regiments of the 23rd Infantry Division (ID), two regiments of the 7th Infantry Division, a cavalry division of the Manchukuo Army, two tank and one artillery regiments to the conflict site. According to the Japanese plan, it was planned to deliver two strikes - the main one and the restraining one. The first involved crossing the Khalkhin Gol River and reaching the crossings behind Soviet troops on the eastern bank of the river. The group of Japanese troops for this attack was led by Major General Kobayashi. The second strike (Yasuoka group) was to be delivered directly to the positions of Soviet troops on the bridgehead.

The Yasuoka group was the first to attack. It was a kind of mousetrap: the Japanese wanted to draw parts of the Red Army into positional battles, force G.K. Zhukov to reinforce troops on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol, and then slam the mousetrap with a strike from Kobayashi’s group on the crossings on the western bank of the river. Thus Soviet troops would have been forced to either evacuate the bridgehead and suffer moral defeat, or be under the threat of complete defeat.

The Yasuoka group's offensive began on July 2 at 10:00. The Japanese offensive was seriously countered by Soviet artillery. On the evening of July 3, the Japanese launched several attacks. Zhukov, faced with a Japanese advance on the bridgehead, decided to launch a flank attack on the attackers. On the night of July 2-3, the concentration of units intended for a counterattack began: the 11th Light Tank Brigade (separate light tank brigade) and the 7th motorized armored brigade, as well as the Mongolian cavalry. It was this decision that saved the Soviet troops from defeat. At 3:15, Kobayashi’s group began crossing to the western bank of the Khalkhin Gol River near Mount Bain-Tsagan. The Japanese knocked down the Mongol cavalry guarding the crossing from their positions and dispersed their counterattack with air strikes. By 6:00 in the morning, two battalions had already crossed and immediately moved south, towards the crossings. At 7:00, units of a motorized armored brigade moving towards their initial positions for a counterattack encountered Japanese units. So the direction of the attack of the Japanese forces became completely clear to the Soviet command.

In the photo: Soviet tanks cross Khalkhin Gol.

The commander of the 1st Army Group, G.K. Zhukov reacted with lightning speed. He decided to immediately counterattack the bridgehead formed by the Japanese. For this purpose, the 11th Tank Brigade under the command of M. Yakovlev was used. By original plan she was supposed to cross to the eastern bank of the river in the “ruins” area, that is, north of the point where the Japanese began crossing. The brigade was urgently redirected to attack the bridgehead. All three tank battalions attacked the Japanese infantry that had crossed from different directions.

At 9:00, the lead company of the 2nd battalion - 15 BT tanks and 9 armored vehicles - in an oncoming battle, using a flank maneuver, completely defeated the marching column of the Japanese infantry battalion with a horse-drawn anti-tank battery, moving in a southerly direction. The 2nd battalion could not advance further, since the 71st Infantry Regiment (IR) of the Japanese had already deployed on the southern slopes of Mount Bain-Tsagan.

With the arrival of the main forces of the 11th LTBr, a simultaneous attack began from three directions: northern (1st battalion together with the Mongolian motorized armored division), southern (2nd battalion) and western (3rd battalion together with the 24th motorized rifle regiment). The attack was scheduled for 10:45, but the motorized rifle regiment (MSR) lost its orientation during the march, lost its way and did not reach its original positions by the appointed time. Under these conditions, it was decided to attack the enemy with tanks without infantry support. At the appointed time, the attack began.

In the photo: Soviet tanks support an infantry attack.

The battle lasted 4 hours. Advancing from the south, tank companies of the 2nd battalion (53 BT-5 tanks) encountered Japanese suicide bombers armed with Molotov cocktails and anti-tank mines on bamboo poles. As a result, 3 tanks and two armored vehicles were lost, of which 1 tank and both armored vehicles were evacuated.

On the morning of July 4, Japanese troops attempted a counterattack. After a 3-hour artillery barrage and raid large group bombers, the Japanese infantry went on the attack. During the day, the enemy attacked unsuccessfully 5 times, suffering heavy losses.

At 19:00, Soviet and Mongolian units launched an assault. The Japanese could not stand it and began to retreat to the crossing at night. At dawn, tanks of the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 11th LTBr broke through to the crossing and began shelling it. In order to avoid the capture of the crossing, the Japanese command gave the order to blow it up, thereby cutting off the retreat routes for their group on the western bank of the river, which was attacked and defeated. The Japanese were scattered, abandoning all their weapons. Soviet troops captured all equipment and heavy weapons, only steep slopes the mountains and floodplain of the Khalkhin Gol River, impassable for tanks, did not allow us to pursue and completely destroy the enemy.

On the morning of July 5, the commander of a tank company of the 11th Leningrad Brigade Art. Lieutenant A.F. Vasiliev led the attack of four BT tanks against 11 Japanese tanks. Using maneuver and constantly firing, Soviet tank crews knocked out 4 Japanese tanks without losing a single vehicle. For this fight, Vasiliev was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

In the photo: Soviet tanks attack on Japanese positions in the area of ​​Mount Bayin-Tsagan.

Of the 133 tanks that took part in the attack at Mount Bayin-Tsagan, 77 vehicles were lost, of which 51 BT-5 and BT-7 were irretrievably lost. Losses in the personnel of the tank battalions of the 11th brigade were moderate: the 2nd battalion lost 12 people killed and 9 wounded, the 3rd battalion - 10 killed and 23 missing. The battlefield remained with the Soviet troops and many tanks were restored. Already on July 20, the 11th LTBr had 125 tanks.

In the reporting documents of the 1st Army Group compiled after the battles, the losses of BT tanks are classified as follows:

From anti-tank fire - 75-80%;
from bottlers - 5-10%;
from field artillery fire - 15-20%;
from aviation - 2-3%;
from hand grenades, min 2-3%.

The tanks suffered the greatest losses from anti-tank missiles and from “bottle bottlers” - approximately 80-90% of all losses. From throwing bottles, tanks and armored cars burn; from hits from anti-tank artillery, almost all tanks and armored cars also burn and cannot be restored. The cars become completely unusable, and a fire breaks out within 15–20 seconds. The crew always jumps out with their clothes on fire. The fire produces intense flames and black smoke, visible from a distance of 5–6 km. After 15 minutes, the ammunition begins to explode, after which the tank can only be used as scrap metal." (The style and spelling of the original have been preserved). As one Japanese officer figuratively put it, “the funeral pyres of burning Russian tanks were like the smoke of the steel mills in Osaka.”

The Japanese faced the same problem of superiority of weapons over the protection of armored vehicles. For example, out of 73 tanks that took part in the Yasuoka group’s attack on the Soviet bridgehead on July 3, 41 tanks were lost, of which 18 were irretrievably lost. Already on July 5, the tank regiments were withdrawn from the battle, “due to loss of combat capability,” and on the 9th they returned to their permanent location. dislocations.

Delay in eliminating the Japanese bridgehead could undoubtedly have fatal consequences. The lack of forces would lead to the impossibility of containing the breakthrough of the Japanese infantry to the crossings in the rear of the Soviet troops. If the Japanese had been left alone, they could have easily walked the 15 km that separated them from the crossings. Moreover, they had already covered half of this distance by the time the marching column was discovered by the advanced units of the 7th Motorized Armored Brigade. Waiting for the lost infantry of a motorized rifle regiment to approach, in a situation of acute time pressure, was suicide. In just 4 months, commanders less decisive than Zhukov will find themselves surrounded by “motties” in Karelia in much less dramatic situations. Because they will not attack the Finns who have infiltrated to the rear with the forces at hand. With his determination, Georgy Konstantinovich managed to avoid encirclement, albeit at the cost of several dozen burnt tanks.

In the photo: a damaged Japanese Ha-Go tank captured by the Red Army.

As a result of the battles for the bridgehead on the western bank of the Khalkhin Gol River and the withdrawal from it that dragged on for almost a day under attacks from tanks of the 11th Light Brigade, Soviet artillery and aviation, the Japanese lost 800 people killed and wounded from Kobayashi’s 8,000-strong group. The losses of the tank crews of the 11th Brigade in a decisive attack on the bridgehead without infantry support were more than justified. Their sacrifices were recognized and appreciated: 33 tankmen, based on the results of the battles at Khalkhin Gol, were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, of which 27 were from the 11th Brigade.

Fighting on the Mongolian-Manchurian border between Soviet-Mongolian and Japanese troops, during which Soviet troops under the command carried out a classic deep offensive operation with encirclement and complete defeat of the enemy. Tanks, aircraft, and artillery were actively involved in the battle.

Late 30s The 20th century was characterized by great growth international tension. At the same time, militarized Germany and Japan pursued an active policy to expand their territories at the expense of neighboring states. The Soviet Union was also quite active in this regard. His interests in the Far East collided with the interests of Japan.

The name of the great battle that took place in Mongolia between the two powers, “Khalkin Gol,” is replaced by many Western historians with the term “Incident at Nomon Khan” (named after the border mountain), allegedly provoked by the Soviet side in order to show its military strength.

This is probably not entirely true. Undoubtedly, the USSR, during the battles in the Far East, worked out schemes for conducting deep offensive operations, which I was going to use in the future big war in Europe. One should not have any illusions about the sincerity of the friendship of the Soviet government with countries oppressed and captured by all sorts of aggressors. Indeed, among the new “friends” of the Stalinist regime, in addition to the future “16th Soviet republic“Mongolia (by the way, recognized by that time only by the Soviet Union) soon became Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Moldova, and Western Ukraine. Finland also experienced the power of friendly Soviet disposition. However, Japan's goals were no more noble. A militarized and aggressive power sought to secure a military foothold for itself, invaded foreign territories, and created a fortified military area here. The actions of the Japanese in relation to Outer Mongolia can be assessed as aggressive.

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In the 30s Japanese army invaded China, occupied the entire territory of Manchuria, creating here the puppet state of Manchukuo, headed by Emperor Pu Yi. Manchuria was turned by Japan into a springboard of aggression against the USSR, Mongolia and China. The first step of aggression was the Japanese invasion in July 1938 of Soviet territory near Lake. Hassan. This unremarkable border strip of land, cut by hills and river valleys, became the site of heated battles. Soviet troops won an important victory here in stubborn battles.

The Japanese believed that conquering the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic would provide them with major strategic benefits. The Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, General Itagaki, said that Mongolia “is very important from the point of view of the Japanese-Manchu influence of today, because it is the defensive flank of the Trans-Siberian Railway, connecting Soviet territories in the Far East and Europe. If Outer Mongolia were united with Japan and Manchukuo, then the Soviet territories in the Far East would be in a very difficult situation and it would be possible to destroy the influence of the Soviet Union in the Far East without much military effort. Therefore, the goal of the army should be to extend Japanese-Manchu rule to Outer Mongolia by any means necessary."

In Manchuria, on the borders with the Soviet Union and the Mongolian People's Republic, the Japanese created 11 fortified areas and placed strong military garrisons in settlements along the state borders; they built and improved highways. The main group of the Kwantung Army was concentrated in Northern and Northeastern Manchuria. By the summer of 1939, its number here had been increased to 350 thousand people; the group had more than a thousand artillery pieces, 385 tanks and 355 aircraft.

The Japanese command, in addition to the Harbin – Qiqihar – Hailar railway (formerly the Chinese Eastern Railway), began building a new strategic railway from Solun to Halun – Arshan and further to Ganchzhur. It was carried out bypassing the spurs of the Greater Khingan ridge and was supposed to run almost parallel to the Mongol-Manchu border, at a distance of only two or three kilometers from it in places.

The Japanese feared that the Khalun-Arshan-Ganchzhur railway might come under targeted fire from the dominant sandy heights on the eastern shore of Khalkhin Gol. In this regard, it was decided to seize part of the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic east of the river. By owning this territory, it was possible to eliminate the threat to the strategic railway, as well as reduce the possibility of a strike to the rear of Japanese troops concentrated in the Hailar fortified area. It could also become a good springboard for military operations against the Mongolian People's Republic and the Soviet Union.

Given the tension of the situation and the threat of a military attack, the USSR took diplomatic and military measures. Back on March 12, 1936, the Soviet-Mongolian Protocol on Mutual Assistance was signed. In accordance with this agreement, units of the Red Army were sent to Mongolia, from which the 57th Special Corps was formed. The Soviet government officially declared that “the border of the Mongolian People’s Republic, by virtue of the mutual assistance agreement concluded between us, we will defend as resolutely as our own.”

By the summer of 1939, the Soviet troops in the Far East included the 1st Separate Red Banner Army under the command of 2nd Rank Army Commander G. M. Stern, the 2nd Separate Red Banner Army of Corps Commander I. S. Konev, the Transbaikal Military District (commander Corps commander Φ. N. Remizov). The operational subordination of the 1st Separate Red Banner Army was the Pacific Fleet, the 2nd Separate Red Banner Army was the Red Banner Amur Flotilla, and the Transbaikal Military District was the 57th Special Corps, stationed on the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic.

The construction of many defensive areas in the most threatened areas was completed. A new operational formation was created from aviation units and formations - the 2nd Air Army. Rifle and cavalry formations included tank battalions and mechanized regiments.

The Japanese command chose the eastern protrusion of the republic in the area of ​​the river as the target of attack. Khalkhin Gol. Mastering this area would give the Japanese a number of advantages. The Khalkhin Gol River, 100–130 m wide and 2–3 m deep, has steep slopes, is swampy in many places, and in some places was difficult to access for military equipment. A few kilometers east of it stretches a ridge of heights. Along with this, there are many sand pits in the river valley. The river flows into Khalkhin Gol here. Khaylastyn-Gol, cutting the area of ​​upcoming hostilities into two parts.

On the Manchu side, two railways came close to this area, and the nearest railway station for supplying Soviet and Mongolian troops, Borzya, was 750 km away. Steppe and deserted area east of the river. Khalkhin Gol was guarded only by separate border patrols; the outposts were located 20–30 km from the state border.

In May 1939, the Japanese military command brought about 38 thousand soldiers, 135 tanks and 225 aircraft to the intended combat area. Soviet-Mongolian troops defending east of the river. Khalkhin-Gol, on a front 75 km away, consisted of 12.5 thousand soldiers, 186 tanks, 266 armored vehicles and 82 aircraft. In terms of the number of personnel and aircraft, the enemy was three times larger than the forces of the Soviet-Mongolian troops.

To substantiate their claims to the territory located on the right bank of Khalkhin Gol, Japanese cartographers fabricated false maps on which the state border ran along the river - more than 20 kilometers west of its true location.

On May 11, 1939, Japanese units attacked the outposts of the Mongolian People's Army east of the river. Khalkhin Gol in the lake area. Buir-Nur. The Mongol warriors were forced to retreat to the river. The fighting lasted here for ten days, but it did not bring any success to the Japanese.

The Soviet command took urgent measures to strengthen the leadership of troops in the area of ​​​​the outbreak of hostilities. In early June, the deputy commander of the Belarusian Military District for cavalry, divisional commander G.K. Zhukov, was sent there. He came to the conclusion that “with the forces that the 57th Special Corps in the Mongolian People’s Republic had, it would be impossible to stop the Japanese military adventure...” The Soviet High Command immediately decided to strengthen the corps. G.K. Zhukov was appointed its commander. Soon, fresh units and units began to arrive to help the Soviet-Mongolian troops in the Khalkhin Gol area. New fighters (Chaika and I-16) were received to strengthen the aviation group.

On June 20, the commander of the Kwantung Army ordered the offensive of the Japanese-Manchurian troops in the Khalkhin Gol area. On June 30, the commander of the Japanese 23rd Division, Lieutenant General Kamatsubara, in turn, ordered the troops to go on the offensive. The plan of the Japanese command boiled down to the following: going on the offensive throughout the entire area, pinning down the Soviet units from the front, and then using a strike group to bypass the left flank of the defense and cross the river. Khalkhin Gol, occupy the dominant heights of Bain-Tsagan in this area and strike in the rear of the Soviet-Mongolian units.

On the night of July 3, Japanese troops went on the offensive. Having crossed Khalkhin Gol, they developed a strike in the direction of Mount Bain-Tsagan. The battle lasted three days, about 400 tanks and armored vehicles, more than 300 guns and several hundred aircraft took part on both sides. Part of the Japanese group moved to the left bank of the river. Khalkhin Gol. Mount Bayin-Tsagan was occupied.

The Soviet command sent motorized units to this area: the 11th tank brigade of brigade commander M.P. Yakovlev, the 24th motorized rifle regiment of Colonel I.I. Fedyuninsky. By 19:00 on July 3, the enemy was attacked from three sides. The battle continued at night and all day on July 4th. All attempts by the Japanese to launch a counterattack and transfer new units across the river were repulsed. By the morning of July 5, the Japanese retreated (or rather, they fled) to the crossing. Their strike force, pressed against the river, was completely defeated. The enemy lost almost all the tanks, a significant part of the artillery, 45 aircraft and about 10 thousand soldiers and. On July 8, the Japanese tried to take revenge for this defeat by going on the attack. After a bloody four-day battle, the Japanese troops, having lost another 5.5 thousand people killed and wounded, were forced to retreat.

Despite the Bain-Tsagan disaster, the Japanese still hoped to change the course of events in their favor. A “general offensive” was planned for August 1939. Over the course of a month, the Japanese command transferred new units and formations to the battle area. On August 10, the 6th Army was formed from them, led by General Ogisu Rippo. This army, located on an area of ​​70 km along the front and 20 km in depth, consisted of 75 thousand people, 500 guns, 182 tanks, and more than 300 aircraft.

In turn, the USSR decided to provide large-scale military assistance to the MPR. By mid-August, the Soviet-Mongolian troops numbered about 57 thousand people, they were armed with 500 tanks, 385 armored vehicles, 542 guns and mortars, 2255 machine guns and 515 combat aircraft.

On July 15, 1939, the 1st Army Group was formed (the group commander was G.K. Zhukov, already a corps commander). The Mongolian troops operating in the battle area were led by Marshal X. Choibalsan.

Much work was done to organize the rear. Thousands of vehicles from the supply station, which, as already mentioned, was located at a great distance, delivered in a short time 18 thousand tons of artillery ammunition, 6500 tons of aviation ammunition, 15 thousand tons of fuels and lubricants, 7 thousand tons of fuel, 4 thousand tons of food.

The plan of the Soviet-Mongolian command was based on the following idea: having pinned down the forces of the Japanese troops from the front, launch a preemptive bilateral strike on the flanks in general direction on Nomon-Khan - Burd-Obo, and then encircle and destroy the enemy between the river. Khalkhin Gol and the state border. To implement this plan, three groups of troops were created. Main blow The attack was carried out by the southern group of Colonel M.I. Potapov, which consisted of two divisions, a tank, motorized armored brigades and several tank battalions, and the auxiliary group was carried out by the northern group led by Colonel I.V. Shevnikov. The central group under the command of brigade commander D.E. Petrov was tasked with pinning down the enemy from the front.

Preparations for the operation were carried out in the strictest secrecy with extensive use of operational disguise and disinformation. The unit commanders were brought up to date only 3-4 days before the operation, and the Red Army soldiers - on the night of August 20, on the eve of the offensive. During the preparation, measures were taken to create an impression on the enemy about the intended wintering of our units: stakes were driven in, wire barriers were built, and false demands were broadcast over the radio for the sending of stakes, wire, and winter uniforms. Moreover, orders were transmitted using a code known to the Japanese.

The Japanese command expected to launch a “general offensive” on August 24, 1939. Having anticipated the enemy by four days, the Soviet-Mongolian troops launched a decisive offensive on the morning of August 20. More than 150 bombers and powerful artillery attacked the enemy’s battle formations and artillery positions. About 100 Soviet fighters provided cover from enemy air strikes for part of the strike forces of the Soviet-Mongolian forces concentrated in the initial areas for the offensive.

After powerful aviation and artillery preparation, which lasted 2 hours and 45 minutes, Soviet tanks moved into the attack. Following them, Soviet-Mongolian infantry and cavalry units rushed towards the enemy along the entire front.

The air and artillery strike of the Soviet-Mongolian troops turned out to be so powerful and sudden that the enemy did not fire a single artillery shot for an hour and a half, and the aviation did not make a single sortie.

While the troops of the central sector pinned down the main Japanese forces with frontal attacks, the southern and northern strike groups of the Soviet-Mongolian troops broke through the enemy defenses on the flanks and quickly began to encircle the enemy in deep envelopment. The Japanese command threw against the Soviet-Mongolian troops a large number of tanks, artillery and aviation. Under their cover, infantry and cavalry increasingly began to launch counterattacks. A fierce battle broke out along the entire front.

Despite the desperate resistance of the enemy, by the end of the first day serious success had been achieved on the outer flanks of the southern and northern groups, where cavalry formations of the Soviet-Mongolian troops defeated units of the Japanese-Manchu cavalry and captured the designated lines along the state border.

Having assessed the current situation, the commander of the 1st Army Group G.K. Zhukov decided to commit all reserve forces to the battle in the northern direction. The mobile group under the command of Colonel I.P. Alekseenko, going on the offensive, reached Nomon-Khan - Burd-Obo by the end of August 23 and the next day entered into fire contact with units of the southern group. Japanese troops were completely surrounded. Attempts by the Japanese command to break through the encirclement from the outside with attacks from fresh reserves were unsuccessful.

The Soviet-Mongolian command began the systematic destruction of the encircled Japanese troops. Simultaneously with the external front of the encirclement, which consisted mainly of motorized armored, cavalry, aviation and partly rifle troops, which went over to the defense along the border, an internal front was formed of rifle units that delivered converging blows to the enemy.

Finding themselves in a cauldron, the Japanese troops desperately resisted, but on August 31, the last centers of their defense were eliminated. After the complete defeat of its ground force, the Japanese command attempted to defeat Soviet aviation. However, this plan also failed. During the first half of September 1939, Soviet pilots conducted a series of air battles in which 71 Japanese aircraft were destroyed. A large group of the Kwantung Army ceased to exist. On September 16, the Japanese government was forced to admit the defeat of its troops and asked for a cessation of hostilities. In the battles at Khalkhin Gol, the Japanese lost about 61 thousand killed, wounded and prisoners, 660 aircraft, and a significant amount of military equipment. The trophies of the Soviet-Mongolian troops included 12 thousand rifles, 200 guns, about 400 machine guns, and more than 100 vehicles. The entire Japanese command was forced to resign. The commander of the Kwantung Army, General Ueda, and the chief of staff of the army, General Mosigan, were removed.

In terms of scale and nature, the operation at Khalkhin Gol was largest operation for that time modern armies, equipped with the latest military equipment. At Khalkhin Gol, modern tanks and aircraft were used on a mass scale for the first time. In some battles, the number of vehicles numbered in the hundreds, and at decisive moments of the battle up to 300 aircraft took to the air. The creation of an external and internal front to eliminate the encircled enemy was a new contribution to the further development of military art.

The defeat of Japanese troops at Khalkhin Gol basically confirmed the correctness of the views existing in Soviet military theory on the conduct of offensive operations, and in particular deep operations. The August operation showed that its successful implementation is inextricably linked with skillful maneuvering of troops, the use of counterattacks, gaining air superiority, isolating the combat area from suitable enemy reserves and disrupting his communications. At the same time, the experience of Khalkhin Gol allowed us to draw conclusions about the need to increase the density of artillery.

The battles at Khalkhin Gol once again confirmed the growing role of reserves in the war and their timely and skillful use at decisive moments of hostilities. The introduction of mobile reserves, carried out by the commander of the army group G.K. Zhukov, made it possible to significantly speed up the complete encirclement of the enemy.

More than 17 thousand soldiers, commanders and political workers were awarded government awards, 70 of them received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, among them the commander of the army group G. K. Zhukov; pilots Ya. V. Smushkevich, G. P. Kravchenko and S. I. Gritsevets became twice Heroes of the Soviet Union.

In Mongolia, on the Khalkhin Gol River, starting in the spring and ending in the fall of 1939, there were battles between Japan and Japan. In the spring of 1939, the Japanese government sent numerous troops to Mongolian territory in order to ensure the creation of a new border between Mongolia and Manchukuo, so that the new border strip would run along the Khalkhin Gol River. Soviet troops were sent to help friendly Mongolia and, uniting with Mongolian military units, prepared to repel the aggressor. After the invasion of Mongolian soil, the Japanese immediately met powerful resistance from Soviet troops and by the end of May were forced to retreat to Chinese territory.
The next attack by Japanese troops was more prepared and massive. Heavy equipment, guns and planes were sent to the border, and the number of soldiers already numbered about 40 thousand people. The strategic goal of the Japanese was to defeat the Soviet troops on the Khalkhin Gol River, which he commanded, and to occupy important heights and bridgeheads for future offensives. The Soviet-Mongolian group was almost three times inferior to the Japanese troops, but bravely entered into battle with enemy forces. Having first achieved strategic results and captured Mount Bain-Tsagan on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol, the Japanese intended to encircle and destroy the Soviet troops, but during stubborn battles for three days, were defeated and were forced to retreat again.
But the Japanese army did not calm down and in August began to prepare a new, even more powerful offensive, bringing additional reserves to Khalkhin Gol. The Soviet troops were also actively strengthening, about 500 tanks appeared, a fighter brigade, a large number of guns and the number of personnel was already almost 60 thousand soldiers. G.K. Zhukov was appointed corps commander and prepared to launch a counterattack against Japanese formations, carefully camouflaging himself and spreading false information that Soviet troops would only be ready to attack by winter. And Japanese troops planned to launch another attack at the end of August.
But the Soviet troops, unexpectedly for the enemy, unleashed all their power on August 20 and, having pushed the Japanese 12 km, brought in tank troops and entrenched themselves at important heights. The central, southern and northern groups of Soviet-Mongolian troops, as planned, pinned down the enemy with constant attacks and by August 23, they captured the main Japanese forces in a tight ring. And by the end of August, the Japanese were fragmented into small units and completely destroyed.
As early as half of September, the Japanese invaders tried to take revenge; they broke through Khalkhin Gol several times both by land and by air, but the skillful actions of the Soviet troops constantly forced them to retreat, suffering heavy losses. Ultimately, the aggressive Japanese government was forced to conclude a peace treaty with the Soviet Union, which was signed on September 15.
Victory in this conflict was very important for the USSR, security guarantees appeared in the east of the country, and in the future it was because of this battle that the Japanese did not dare to help the Germans in the war against the Soviet Union.

“When we got into the car, a thought occurred to me, which I immediately expressed to Stavsky, that it would be nice, when the conflict ends, instead of all the usual monuments to be erected in the steppe on high place one of the tanks that died here, battered by shell fragments, torn apart, but victorious.”

Konstantin Simonov

From May 11 to September 16, 1939, in Mongolia, near the previously unknown Khalkhin Gol River, there were clashes between Soviet and Japanese troops - starting with small border skirmishes, they ended in full-scale battles using hundreds of tanks, guns and aircraft.

Back in 1937, a new stage of the war with Japan began in China. The Soviet Union actively supported China. Soviet instructors trained Chinese crews of T-26 tanks sold to China by the USSR, and Soviet pilots fought in the skies of China, preventing Japan from achieving final victory. Naturally, the Japanese did not like this. In the summer of 1938, “reconnaissance in force” on Khasan, according to the Japanese, confirmed the low qualities of the Red Army, but the desired effect was not achieved - Soviet aid continued to flow into China.

The next place to test our strength was Mongolia. The Japanese, developing the territory of Manchuria under their control, pulled the railway towards the Soviet border - to Chita. About fifteen kilometers from the border between Mongolia and Manchuria, the first spurs of the Khingan Range began, and in the Khalkhin-Gol section, the Mongolian border formed a large protrusion towards Manchuria. Thus, the Japanese had to either build a railway through the mountains or run it close to the border within gunshot. Capturing the right bank of the Khalkhin Gol River would put the USSR “in its place”, test its determination to further aggravate relations with Japan and ensure the safety of the road. The nearest railway station on the USSR side, Borzya, was approximately 700 km from the site of the alleged battles; there were no railways at all in Mongolia, and on the Japanese side, the Hailar station was only 100 km away. The nearest settlement, Tamtsak-Bulak, was 130 km of desert steppe. Thus, Soviet troops would be cut off from supply bases, and mongol army did not pose a serious danger to the Japanese.

From the beginning of 1939, the Japanese shelled Mongolian outposts and crossed the border in small groups, and in May, with the support of aviation, several sections of Mongolian territory were occupied. The USSR transferred its units to the Khalkhin Gol River area (in March an order was given to move the operational group of the 11th Tank Brigade to Tamtsak-Bulak). On May 28-29, a group of Japanese soldiers in a truck, encountering a Soviet T-37 tank, threw a couple of cans of gasoline out of the back. When the tank ran over one of the canisters, it was engulfed in flames. Perhaps this incident served as an impetus for the use of gasoline bottles against tanks. On May 29, the debut of 5 HT-26 flamethrower tanks took place, defeating a Japanese reconnaissance detachment. However, in general, as a result of the May battles, Soviet troops retreated to the western bank of Khalkhin Gol. On June 12, G.K. became commander of the 57th Special Corps in Mongolia. Zhukov.

Meanwhile, General Michitar Kamatsubara, considered an expert on the USSR, decided to cross Khalkhin Gol, capture Mount Bain-Tsagan, which dominates the area, and cut off and destroy Soviet units on the right bank, located 5-6 km east of the river. By the morning of July 3, two infantry regiments with sappers and artillery managed to reach Bain-Tsagan, while at the same time an offensive towards the Soviet crossing developed along the coast. On the right bank, two Japanese tank regiments (86 tanks, of which 26 Otsu and 34 Ha-Go) also advanced towards the crossing, losing about 10 tanks in the night battle on July 2-3.

The Soviet command decided to fend off the threat of encirclement by tanks. The 11th Tank Brigade, the 7th Motorized Armored Brigade and the 24th Motorized Rifle Regiment moved to the Bayin-Tsagan area. Their task was to destroy the enemy on the eastern bank, so retargeting troops that had already crossed over took place at the last moment. The 1st battalion of the brigade (44 BT-5) at a speed of 45-50 km/h encountered Front edge Japanese, destroyed the enemy with fire and caterpillars. The attack was not supported by infantry and artillery, and the tankers withdrew, leaving 20 damaged tanks on the battlefield, which were then burned with gasoline bottles. The 3rd battalion, consistently attacking Japanese units, lost 20 out of 50 armored vehicles burned out and 11 knocked out. The battalion of armored cars was shot at point-blank range by anti-tank guns, losing 20 burned out and 13 damaged out of 50 armored vehicles.

Although the Soviet tank crews, attacking without reconnaissance and cooperation with each other, suffered huge losses, the Japanese were shocked by the number of Soviet armored vehicles, reporting an attack of as many as 1000 tanks!!! In the evening, Kamatsubara gave the order to withdraw to the eastern bank.

On the same day, a battle took place on the eastern bank between Soviet BT-5s, armored cars and Japanese tanks that had crossed at night. The advancing Japanese tanks were shot from cover from a distance of 800-1000 m. According to various sources, the Japanese lost 41-44 of the 77 tanks they initially had. On July 5, the Japanese tank regiments were withdrawn from the battle and did not participate in any more battles. The plan to defeat the Soviet troops was thwarted.

Although the July Soviet attacks were also unsuccessful, by August 20, 438 tanks and 385 armored vehicles were concentrated in the Khalkhin Gol area. The units were preparing for battle, a large amount of ammunition and fuel was collected.

On August 20, the Soviet offensive began at 6:15 a.m., and by the evening of August 23, Japanese troops were surrounded. In hot pursuit, the “stubborn struggle for each dune” and the “high resistance of the surrounded individual centers of defense” were noted. By the morning of August 31, the remaining Japanese units in the cauldron were completely destroyed.

Soviet soldiers examine abandoned Japanese equipment. In the foreground light tank A Type 95 "Ha-Go" armed with a 37 mm Type 94 gun, the exhaust system of a 120 hp Mitsubishi NVD 6120 diesel engine is visible. On the left, a soldier inspects a 75 mm gun, an "improved Type 38", the main field weapon of the Kwantung Army in battles on Khalkhin-Gol

The reports compiled following the battles testified:

“...the BT-5 and BT-7 tanks showed themselves very well in battle. T-26 - showed exceptionally good performance, walked perfectly on the dunes, the tank had very high survivability. There was a case in the 82nd Rifle Division when a T-26 received five hits from a 37-mm gun, the armor was destroyed, but the tank did not catch fire and after the battle it went to SPAM under its own power. Artillery tanks have proven to be an indispensable weapon in the fight against anti-tank guns. The SU-12 artillery mounts have not justified themselves, since they cannot support tanks in an attack. T-37, T-38 proved to be unsuitable for attack and defense. Slow moving, caterpillars fly off".

Flamethrower T-26s boasted:

“The introduction of only one chemical tank, which fired a stream of fire at the center of resistance, caused panic in the enemy’s ranks, the Japanese from the front line of trenches fled deep into the pit and our infantry arrived in time, occupying the crest of the pit, this detachment was completely destroyed.”.

The tanks and armored cars suffered the greatest losses from anti-tank artillery and “bottle shooters” - in total about 80-90% of all losses:

“Tanks and armored cars burn from throwing bottles, and from being hit by anti-tank shells, almost all tanks and armored cars also burn and cannot be restored. The cars become completely unusable, and a fire breaks out within 15-30 seconds. The crew always jumps out with their clothes on fire. The fire produces strong flames and black smoke (burns like a wooden house), observed from a distance of 5-6 km. After 15 minutes, the ammunition begins to explode, after which the tank can only be used as scrap metal.”

Japanese soldiers pose with trophies captured in the battles at Khalkhin Gol. One of the Japanese is holding a Soviet 7.62-mm tank machine gun of the Degtyarev system, model 1929, DT-29. Trophies could have been captured from both Soviet troops and the troops of the Mongolian People's Republic

In the August battles, tanks went into battle in two echelons - the second echelon shot the Japanese who appeared with bottles and mines.

Based on the results of the entire operation, among the main reasons for unnecessary losses were “inattention to reconnaissance and the inability to organize and directly conduct it, especially in night conditions... Our commanders and political workers, unfortunately, forget that the loss of an organizer and leader in battle weakens the troops, and inappropriate, reckless courage increases casualties and harms the cause”(it is worth noting that the commander of the 11th Tank Brigade, Yakovlev, died while raising lying infantry), “... our infantry is poorly trained in joint actions with artillery and tanks”.

At least a third of all Red Army prisoners of war were captured by the Japanese wounded, burned, shell-shocked, and sometimes unconscious. Both Soviet and Japanese documents note that the Soviet crews of damaged and burned tanks and armored vehicles desperately resisted to the last and were extremely rarely captured. Those captured were often killed soon after, especially in surrounded Japanese units. So, on August 22, several tanks of the 130th separate tank battalion of the 11th tank brigade in the Japanese rear jumped out to artillery positions and were shot at point-blank range by 75-mm cannons. At least six of their crews were captured and killed.

Thus, it can be stated that, despite the use of tanks not always in the “correct” way, especially at Bayin Tsagan on July 3, tanks made a decisive contribution to the victory. Without tank attacks, the Japanese attempt to encircle Soviet troops could well have been successful, and this was on the eve of the outbreak of World War II in Europe, in which the USSR managed to avoid fighting on two fronts.

Bibliography:

• Battles at Khalkhin Gol. Main Directorate of Political Propaganda of the Red Army.– M.:Military Publishing House, 1940.
• Kolomiets M. Fighting near the Khalkhin Gol River. – M.: KM Strategy, 2002.
• Simonov K.M. Far to the east. Khalkhin-Gol notes. – M.: Fiction, 1985.
• Svoisky Yu.M. Prisoners of war of Khalkhin Gol. – M.: Russian Foundation for the Promotion of Education and Science, 2014