Losses of the Soviet army in the war with Japan. Soviet-Japanese War (1945)

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(To the 65th anniversary of the victory over militaristic Japan)

If the neutrality pact between the USSR and Japan remains in force in 1941-1945. allowed the Soviet Union to transfer troops and military equipment from the Soviet Far East and from Eastern Siberia on the Soviet-German front, the defeat of Japan's European allies put on the agenda the issue of the accelerated redeployment of Soviet armed forces from Europe in the opposite direction, so that the USSR could fulfill its obligation to its allies on time to enter the war on their side with Japan, which waged an aggressive war against them since 1941, no later than three months after the defeat of Nazi Germany, given by them at the Yalta Conference on February 12, 1945.

On June 28, the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief approved plan for war with Japan according to which everything preparatory activities were to be completed by August 1, 1945, and the combat operations themselves were ordered to begin by special order. At first, these actions were planned to begin on August 20-25 and finish in one and a half to two months, and if successful, in a shorter period of time. The troops were tasked with attacks from the MPR, Amur region and Primorye to dismember the troops of the Kwantung Army, isolate them in Central and Southern Manchuria and completely eliminate disparate enemy groups.

In response to a memo from the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Admiral N.N. Kuznetsov on July 2, Stalin gave him a number of instructions, in accordance with which the Soviet naval commander set before the USSR Pacific Fleet next tasks:

1. prevent a Japanese landing in Primorye and the penetration of the Japanese Navy into the Tatar Strait;
2. disrupt Japanese Navy communications in the Sea of ​​Japan;
3. carry out air strikes on Japanese ports when a concentration of enemy military and transport ships is detected there;
4. support ground forces operations to occupy naval bases in North Korea, South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands, and also be prepared for landings in Northern Hokkaido.

Although the implementation of this plan was originally scheduled for August 20-25, 1945, it was later moved by the Red Army General Staff to midnight from August 8 to 9.

The Japanese Ambassador in Moscow Sato was warned that from August 9 the Soviet Union would be at war with his state. On August 8, less than one hour before this date, he was summoned by Molotov to the Kremlin at 17.00 Moscow time (23.00 Japanese time), and a declaration of war was immediately read and handed to him by the USSR government. He received permission to send it by telegraph. (True, this information never reached Tokyo, and Tokyo first learned about the USSR’s declaration of war on Japan from a Moscow Radio report at 4.00 on August 9.)

In this regard, attention is drawn to the fact that the accession directive Soviet Union August 9 to the war against Japan) Stalin signed at 16:30 on August 7, 1945, i.e. after receiving news of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, which marked the beginning of “nuclear diplomacy” against our country.

In our opinion, if Stalin, before the Yalta Conference, had agreed with the opinion of Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Lozovsky that, while continuing negotiations on the renewal of the neutrality pact with Japan, not allowing the allies to “drag the USSR into the Pacific War” against it, expressed in his reports notes to Molotov dated January 10 and 15, 1945, then the United States - with its allies, quickly achieved the defeat of Japan as a result of the use nuclear weapons, would immediately take a dominant position in East Asia and sharply undermined the geostrategic positions of the USSR in this region.

On August 9, 1945, the advanced and reconnaissance detachments of the Transbaikal, 1st and 2nd Far Eastern Fronts under the command of Marshals of the Soviet Union R.Ya., respectively. Malinovsky and K.A. Meretskov and Army General M.A. Purkaev under the overall command of Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky crossed the state border between the USSR and Manchukuo and entered enemy territory. With the onset of dawn, they were joined by the main forces of three fronts, border guards and sailors of the Red Banner Amur River Flotilla. On the same day, Soviet aviation began to operate.

Well-mobilized and trained Soviet troops, who had behind them the experience of war with the Nazi armies, armed with first-class weapons for that time, and many times outnumbered the enemy in the directions of the main attacks, relatively easily crushed the scattered units of the Kwantung Army, which offered stubborn resistance only in isolated areas. points. The almost complete absence of Japanese tanks and aircraft allowed individual Soviet units to penetrate deep into Manchuria almost unhindered.”

Meanwhile, in Tokyo after the outbreak of the Soviet-Japanese War, discussions continued on the issue on the adoption of the Potsdam Declaration.

On August 10, the Japanese government, in accordance with the opinion of the Emperor, unanimously approved the decision to adopt the Potsdam Declaration, subject to the preservation of the Emperor's prerogatives. “Now, after the atomic bombing and the entry of the Russians into the war against Japan,” wrote Japanese Foreign Minister S. Togo, “no one, in principle, objected to the adoption of the Declaration.”

On August 10, the corresponding note was sent to USA. China was also informed of its contents. And on August 13, an official response from Washington was received, which indicated that the final form of government would be established on the basis of the free will of the Japanese people. To discuss the response of the US government and make a final decision, on August 14, a meeting of the government and the high command of the army and navy was convened in the emperor’s bomb shelter, at which, despite military opposition, the emperor proposed a draft of his rescript on the unconditional surrender of the Japanese armed forces on the terms of the Potsdam Declaration, and after its approval By the majority of cabinet members, this document was sent to the United States on August 15.

On August 18, the commander of the Kwantung Army, General Yamada, announced an order at a meeting with the Soviet command in Shenyang (Mukden) on the cessation of hostilities and disarmament of the Kwantung Army. And on August 19, in Changchun, he signed an act of surrender.

Having received a radiogram on August 17 with Yamada’s statement of readiness to immediately cease hostilities and disarm, Vasilevsky sent him a response by radio, in which he ordered the Kwantung Army to cease hostilities not immediately, but at 12.00 on August 20, citing the fact that “Japanese troops had crossed into counter-offensive on a number of sectors of the front.”

During this time, Soviet troops managed to significantly expand the territories included in the zone where they were supposed to accept the surrender of the Japanese armed forces, in accordance with Order No. 1 of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Allied Powers on Pacific Ocean General D. MacArthur dated August 14. (The next day after this, he issued a directive on the cessation of hostilities against Japan and, as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of the Allied Powers, handed it over to the Chief of Staff of the Red Army, General A.I. Antonov, for execution, but received the answer that he could take the proposed actions only if will receive an order to this effect from the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the USSR.)

In order to maximize the expansion of the zone, which would be under the control of Soviet troops by the time the Japanese armed forces surrendered, on August 18-19 they landed airborne assault forces in Harbin, Girin and Shenyang (with the capture of the Manchukuo Emperor Pu-yi), Changchun and in a number of other cities of Manchuria, and also made significant progress in other areas, in particular, on August 19 they occupied the city of Chengde and reached the Liaodong Peninsula, and on August 22-23 they occupied Port Arthur and Dalny, contrary to the initial intentions of the Americans to send their troops here, ahead of the Russians, under with the pretext that the Kwantung Peninsula is supposedly not included in Manchuria as a Soviet zone for accepting the surrender of the Japanese armed forces.

IN North Korea, the troops in which, as in South Korea, were subordinate to the command of the Kwantung Army, joint actions of the troops of the 1st Far Eastern Front and the Red Navy of the Pacific Fleet landed troops, in particular in Pyongyang and Kanko (Hamhin), where they accepted the surrender of Japanese troops.

By August 19, Soviet troops had killed 8,674 Japanese troops and captured 41,199 Japanese soldiers and officers.

In accordance with Order No. 106 of the commander of the Kwantung Army, General Yamada, dated August 16, the troops subordinate to him in Manchuria and Korea, as well as the troops of Manchukuo, were ordered to immediately stop hostilities, concentrate in the places of their deployment at the moment, and in major cities- on the outskirts and when Soviet troops appear, through Soviet envoys, surrender positions, weapons collected in advance to stop resistance, avoiding damage to military property and weapons, food and fodder concentrated in other places, control the surrender of Manchukuo troops.

In order to prevent a sharp drop in the morale of Japanese military personnel, who were grieving defeat in a war in which they were ready to die for their emperor, but not surrender, in part Japanese army Was launched on August 18 special order. This document stated that military personnel and civilians who find themselves under enemy control on the basis of the Emperor's rescript on the cessation of hostilities under the terms of the Potsdam Declaration are considered by the Japanese authorities not as prisoners of war (hore), but only as internees (yokuryusha). At the same time, surrendering weapons and submitting to the enemy is not, from their point of view, capitulation.

However, this definition of these actions by the Japanese side, although worthy of a positive assessment, since it reduced bloodshed, did not receive international legal recognition.

It is also important to note the fact that as a result of negotiations on August 18 in the village of Dukhovnoye about the actual surrender from August 20 of the Japanese troops mentioned above, the chief of staff of the Kwantung Army, General X. Hata obtained consent from the Red Army command to ensure the safety of the Japanese civilian population. However, the obligation was later violated, and these individuals were deported to labor camps along with the Japanese military.

During these days, in relation to the Japanese in the areas occupied by the Red Army, it was proposed to act in accordance with the telegram of Beria, Bulganin and Antonov No. 72929 to Vasilevsky dated August 16, in which, in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration, the axis was indicated:

Prisoners of war of the Japanese-Manchurian army will not be transported to the territory of the USSR. Prisoner of war camps should be organized, if possible, in places where Japanese troops are disarmed... Food for prisoners of war should be carried out according to the standards existing in the Japanese army located in Manchuria at the expense of local resources.”

Although the Japanese often, albeit half-heartedly, largely obeyed the orders of their superiors to surrender, battles with small groups of Japanese who ignored these orders were fought in various areas of Manchuria, especially in the hills. In their discovery and destruction or capture, the local Chinese population, who hated their enslavers, actively helped the Soviet troops.

The surrender of Japanese troops on all fronts was generally completed by September 10. In total, during combat operations, Soviet troops captured 41,199 Japanese military personnel and accepted the surrender of 600 thousand Japanese soldiers and commanders.

“Yes, this issue has been resolved,” Stalin said at this historic meeting... “They managed enough in the Soviet Far East in the years Civil War. Now their militaristic aspirations have come to an end. It's time to pay off debts. So they will give them away.” And by signing the State Defense Committee resolution No. 9898ss on the reception, deployment and labor service of Japanese military personnel. He verbally ordered Comrade Vorobyov from the People's Commissariat of Defense through the secretary of the State Defense Committee, “that he must certainly and in a short time transfer 800 tons of barbed wire to the NKVD,” and ordered Beria, who was present at the meeting, to take control of the implementation of this decision.

This step, illegal from the point of view of the Potsdam Declaration, can, however, be explained by the Japanese attack on Russia in 1904, and the Japanese intervention in Russia in 1918-1925, and Japan’s active position in the armed border conflicts of the 30s. as well as the difficult internal economic situation.

On the morning of August 9, Soviet artillery began shelling the Japanese border post Handenzawa (Handasa), located at 50 degrees north latitude. The Japanese resisted desperately for three days, taking refuge in permanent structures, until they were surrounded and destroyed by two battalions of Soviet troops attacking them.

On August 11, Soviet troops launched an offensive in Southern Sakhalin against the fortified area of ​​Koton (Pobedino) near the Soviet-Japanese border. Japanese troops put up stubborn resistance. The fighting continued until August 19, when the Japanese side officially stopped resistance completely and the surrender of 3,300 Japanese troops was accepted.

In the battles for Maoka (Kholmsk), occupied on August 20, the Japanese lost 300 people killed and wounded, 600 prisoners were taken, and Soviet soldiers - 77 killed and wounded. Otomari was taken relatively easily with the capture of 3,400 Japanese troops. Japanese literature contains the statement that in response to the proposal Japanese side cease hostilities in Southern Sakhalin, made on August 17 after receiving an order from Tokyo on the emperor's rescript on unconditional surrender on the terms of the Potsdam Declaration, Soviet troops in this area, fulfilling the initial order to accept the surrender of Japanese troops from 12.00 on August 20, refused their offer under with the pretext that it was allegedly accompanied by certain conditions, i.e. was not unconditional.

In addition, the Soviet side knew that in the previous days the Japanese, in order to regroup their forces for the purpose of more successful resistance, tried three times to achieve a cessation of the fighting, using fake envoys for this.

This, according to the Japanese side, led to the death of some of the “genuine” envoys during the shootout.

By August 25, after the occupation of the cities of Maoka (Kholmsk), Khonto (Nevelsk) and Otomari (Korsakov), the occupation of Southern Sakhalin by Soviet troops in cooperation with the Soviet Pacific Fleet was completed.

On August 12, the US Navy began combat operations in its combat zone south of the Fourth Kuril Strait, subjecting not only the Matua Islands to heavy artillery fire, but also the Paramushir Island, in violation of the agreement reached with the USSR at the Potsdam Conference.

On the same day, US Secretary of State Byrnes ordered their Navy to prepare to occupy the combat zone. "at the appropriate time". On August 14, the initial version of the general order to the allied forces No. 1 without mentioning the Kuril Islands was sent to Stalin.

On August 14, in accordance with the agreement reached between the military representatives of the USSR and the USA at the Potsdam Conference, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff sent a memorandum to the State Coordination Committee for Naval Warfare on preparations for accepting the surrender of Japanese troops in the Kuril Islands zone south of the Fourth Kuril (Onekotan) Strait, which is why the Kuril Islands were not mentioned in the original version of General Order No. 1 of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Allied Powers, General MacArthur.

However, the lack of mention of the Kuril Islands in this order received by Stalin alarmed him, and he suggested that by doing so the American side was trying to evade its obligation to transfer all the Kuril Islands to the USSR, in accordance with the agreement reached in Crimea. That is why, early in the morning of August 15 (Vladivostok time), Stalin ordered Vasilevsky, together with the Pacific Fleet, to prepare for a landing on the Kuril Islands.

On August 16, upon receipt of Truman’s telegram of August 15, Stalin raised the question of including all the Kuril Islands, and not just the Northern ones, in the zone where Soviet troops accepted the surrender of Japanese troops. On August 17, a positive response to this proposal was received, and Vasilevsky immediately gave the order to land troops on the Northern Kuril Islands.

In his answer, Stalin emphasized that the Liaodong Peninsula is part of Manchuria, i.e. the Soviet Kwantung Army surrender zone, and proposed that Korea be divided at 38 degrees north latitude. to the Soviet and American occupation zones.

In addition, Stalin proposed that the northern part of Hokkaido from the city of Rumoi to the city of Kushiro be included in the Soviet zone of occupation. The corresponding order No. 10 on preparations for the occupation of this area from August 19 to September 1 by troops of the 1st Far Eastern Front and Pacific Fleet dated August 18 was sent to the Soviet command. According to the Japanese historian H. Wada, Truman’s consent to the Soviet occupation of all the Kuril Islands was explained by the fact that Stalin decided not to lay claim to the occupation of South Korea.

Question about occupation of Hokkaido was discussed at a meeting of members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR with the participation of Soviet military leaders on June 26-27, 1945 during the consideration of preparations for war with Japan. Marshal Meretskov's proposal to occupy this island was supported by Khrushchev, and Voznesensky, Molotov and Zhukov opposed it.

The first of them substantiated his opinion by the statement that it was impossible to “expose” our army to the blows of the powerful Japanese defense, the second stated that the landing on this island was a gross violation of the Yalta Agreement, and the third considered the proposal simply a gamble.

When asked by Stalin how many troops would be needed for this operation, Zhukov replied that four armies full composition with artillery, tanks and other equipment. Having limited himself to a general statement of the fact of the USSR’s readiness for war with Japan, Stalin returned to this issue after the success of the Soviet troops in the battles on the fields of Manchuria. The corresponding order - No. 10 on preparations for the occupation of Hokkaido from September 19 to 1 by the troops of the 1st Far Eastern Front and the USSR Pacific Fleet dated August 18 was sent to Vasilevsky.

Having agreed to the Soviet occupation of all Kuril Islands, subject to the division of Korea with the United States into occupation zones at 38 degrees north latitude, Truman categorically rejected Stalin’s proposal for the Soviet occupation of Northern Hokkaido. As a result, the mentioned order No. 1.0 after Stalin’s reply of August 22 to Truman to his telegram of August 18 to Vasilevsky was canceled.

The US refusal to allow Soviet troops to occupy the northern part of the island of Hokkaido, where Stalin, in order not to formally violate the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration on the return of Japanese prisoners of war to their homeland, was going to move them for forced labor in special camps, led to the fact that he gave a new order. Vasilevsky’s order of August 18, 1945 (as a change to the original above-mentioned order of Beria and others of August 16 about their sending to the metropolis) had another tragic consequence, which had a detrimental effect on post-war Soviet-Japanese relations - Japanese military personnel and internees laid down their arms civilians from areas occupied by Soviet troops, on the basis of the USSR State Defense Committee order No. 9898ss of August 23 (initially 0.5 million people), were sent to special camps in Siberia and the Far East. There they were engaged in forced labor in a harsh climate unusual for the Japanese.

On August 16, Soviet landing ships with troops of the 2nd Far Eastern Army and the people's militia left Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky and on the morning of August 18 began landing on the heavily fortified islands of Shumshu (Northern Kuriles) and Paramushir. The enemy met them with hurricane fire, and he believed that he was repelling an attack not by Soviet, but by American troops, since the Japanese garrisons did not know about the USSR's entry into the war with Japan, and thick fog made it difficult to identify the enemy.

In the battles for Shumsha, 8,800 Soviet soldiers fought, of whom 1,567 people died. against 23 thousand Japanese, of whom 1018 people died. Until August 24, fighting continued for the island of Paramushir.

Battle for the Northern Kuril Islands began after Japan adopted the Potsdam Declaration and sent an order to Japanese troops to cease hostilities, with the exception of the continuation of active hostilities by the enemy, and the unconditional surrender of Japanese troops on the terms of the said declaration.

Large losses on both sides, in our opinion, could have been avoided if a few days later the Soviet side had entered into negotiations with the Japanese garrisons of the Kuril Islands, which by that time, in addition to the emperor’s rescript of surrender, had received the same order from their command. As a result, on the morning of August 23, the surrender of all Japanese began, total number which on about. The noise reached, judging only by the personnel of the 73rd and 91st infantry divisions, 13,673 people. This point of view is supported by the bloodless occupation of the island of OneKotan by Soviet troops on August 25, the islands of Matua, Urup and Iturup on August 28 and their landing on the islands of Kunashir and Shikotan on September 1 with the capture without fighting of 63,840 Japanese troops.

Simultaneously with the cancellation of the order to land on Hokkaido, Vasilevsky sent to the commander Navy The USSR sent a telegram to Admiral Kuznetsov and the commander of the STF Yumashev, in which, referring to the emperor's rescript on surrender, he invited the latter to consider the possibility of transporting the main forces of the 87th Rifle Corps of Sakhalin to the Southern Kuriles (Kunashir and Iturup islands), bypassing the island of Hokkaido, with a report about their opinion no later than the morning of August 23.

From this telegram it is clear that in connection with the cancellation of the Soviet landing on Hokkaido, the Soviet command, reacting flexibly to the change in the situation, decided to try to use this landing to occupy the Southern Kuriles, after Kuznetsov and Yumashev reacted positively to Vasilevsky’s request, starting the landing of troops here before official signing of the Instrument of Surrender.

As a result of this, on August 26, the separate combat operation without the participation of troops, ships and aircraft intended to occupy the Northern and Middle Kuriles up to the island of Urup inclusive.

Captain V. Leonov, having received order No. 12146 in Korsakov on that day to occupy the islands of Kunashir and Iturup by September 3, due to lack of fuel on August 28 at 21.50, he initially limited himself to sending only two trawlers to Iturup. On August 28, an advanced detachment of Soviet troops landed on this island. The Japanese garrison of the island expressed its readiness to surrender.

On September 1, fearing the small number of Soviet troops, Captain G.I. Brunstein first landed an advance detachment from the first trawler on Kunashir Island, and then a second detachment to reinforce it. And although these detachments did not encounter Japanese resistance, the occupation of Kunashir was completed only by September 4. The island of Shikotan from the Lesser Kuril Ridge was also occupied by Soviet troops on September 1 without a fight.

The operation is occupation of the Habomai Islands (Flat)- they received these names later, and then they were called Suisho - began on September 2, when Captain Leonov received an order from his command to prepare an operational plan for the occupation of these islands and instructed Captain First Rank Chicherin to lead the corresponding group of troops in the event of their occupation. Due to poor communication in difficult weather conditions Leonov could not, according to him, accurately explain to Chicherin that only the landing plan was required, and not its implementation, which began on September 3.

Arriving on Kunashir at 6.00 the same day, Chicherin organized two groups for landing on the Habomai islands: the first to occupy the islands of Shibotsu (Green Island), Suisho (Tanfilyeva Island), Yuri (Yuri Island) and Akiyuri (Anuchina Island) , and the second - to occupy the islands of Taraku (Polonsky Island) and Harukarumoshir (Demina Island).

On September 3, these groups set out without the sanction of the higher Soviet command for the indicated islands and, without encountering any resistance from the Japanese, completed their occupation on September 5; after the Japanese side signed the official Instrument of Surrender. At the same time, the headquarters of the Far Eastern District called them “original Russian territories” (but only with Japanese names), although these islands could be torn away from Japan only as a measure of punishment for aggression, and not as “original Russian territories,” which they were not .
Having a political and administrative map of Japan, the Soviet command could know that these islands are not administratively part of the Kuril Islands (Chishima), but belong to Hanasaki County, Hokkaido Prefecture. But from the point of view of ordinary geographical use, in a number of official publications, including explanatory dictionaries and lectures, the Habomai Islands were included in Japan as part of the Kuril Islands. But if the Americans, emphasizing the political and administrative division of Japan, had occupied them as part of their zone of occupation - Hokkaido Prefecture, then the Soviet side, obviously, would not have insisted on a different, usual and, therefore, legally valid interpretation of the limits of the Kuril Islands, so as not to conflict with the United States. And since the Soviet troops were one way or another ahead of the American ones here, the latter, knowing that the Kuril Islands (Tishima) in common usage included the Habomai Islands, given their small strategic importance, did not, in turn, begin to conflict with the USSR and insist that When distributing zones for accepting the surrender of Japanese troops, the United States took the political and administrative division of the country as a basis, postponing this issue until negotiations on a peace settlement with Japan.

In connection with the above considerations, it is curious that upon arrival at Habomai, the fighters of Chicherin’s detachment first of all inquired whether American troops had landed here, and only calmed down when they received Negative answer.

From a legal point of view, in our opinion, the reproach against our country does not matter that the occupation of the Habomai Islands by the Soviet side occurred after the signing of the Act of Surrender, which legally implemented final version General MacArthur Order No. 1 on the distribution of surrender zones for Japanese troops, since these documents do not define the deadline for the implementation of the said order.

On September 2, 1945, the official ceremony of signing the Instrument of Surrender took place on board the American battleship Missouri in Tokyo Bay.

On the Japanese side, this document was signed on behalf of the Emperor and the Japanese government by the Minister of Foreign Affairs M. Shigemitsu and the representative of the Imperial Main Headquarters of the Japanese Armed Forces, the Chief of the General Staff E. Umezu, on behalf of the Allied Powers - General D. MacArthur, on behalf of the USA - Admiral Ch. Nimitz, from the Republic of China - Su Yongchang, from Great Britain - B. Fraser, from the USSR - Major General K.N. Derevianko, then representatives of Australia, Canada, France, the Netherlands and New Zealand.

This document declared Japan's acceptance of the terms of the Potsdam Declaration of the Allied Powers— USA, China and Great Britain, joined by the Soviet Union, agreement to the unconditional surrender of all armed forces of Japan and the armed forces under its control and the immediate cessation of hostilities, as well as the obligation to carry out all orders of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the Allied Powers necessary for the implementation this surrender and the terms of the Potsdam Declaration, or any other representative appointed by the Allied Powers.

This document also ordered the Japanese government and general staff to immediately release all Allied prisoners of war and interned civilians, and ordered the emperor and government to submit to the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the Allied Powers.

An important feature of the Far Eastern campaign of the Soviet armed forces in 1945 was concentration of troops and equipment in the directions of the main attacks. For example, the military leadership of the Trans-Baikal Front concentrated 70% of rifle troops and up to 90% of tanks and artillery on the direction of the main attack. This made it possible to increase superiority over the enemy: in infantry - 1.7 times, in guns - 4.5 times, mortars - 9.6 times, tanks and self-propelled guns - 5.1 times and aircraft - 2.6 times. In the 29-kilometer section of the breakthrough of the 1st Far Eastern Front, the ratio of forces and means was as follows: in manpower - 1.5: 1, in guns - 4: 1, tanks and self-propelled guns - 8: 1, in favor of the Soviet troops. A similar situation arose in the breakthrough areas in the direction of the main attack of the 2nd Far Eastern Front.

As a result of the selfless actions of the Soviet troops, the enemy suffered significant damage in manpower and equipment, more than half a million Japanese troops were captured and large trophies were taken.

In addition, the Japanese lost about 84,000 people killed.

During the Soviet-Japanese War, the courage and heroism of Soviet soldiers. Over 550 formations, units, ships and institutions of the Soviet armed forces were awarded guards ranks and honorary titles or awarded military orders of the USSR. 308 thousand Far Eastern soldiers were awarded military orders and medals for their personal exploits.

87 soldiers and officers received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, and six, in addition, were awarded the second Gold Star medal.

On September 30, 1945, to commemorate the brilliant victory of the Soviet armed forces in the final campaign of the Great Patriotic War, the medal “For Victory over Japan” was established, which was awarded to more than 1.8 million people.

Since the invasion of Manchuria by Japanese troops in 1931, under the influence of the Japanese military, the Japanese government began to pursue an anti-Soviet policy, which led to a series of border incidents and armed conflicts in the second half of the 30s. and created in 1941 the threat of war between Japan and the USSR in alliance with Germany and Italy (“Special Maneuvers of the Kwantung Army”), despite the conclusion in the same year of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact. Under these conditions, guided by the principles of modern International law, which allows non-compliance with treaties with aggressors, reflected in the UN Charter of 1945, the Soviet Union, reciprocating the cooperation of the allied powers, primarily the USA, Great Britain and China, contrary to the neutrality pact, decided to enter into the war against Japan, which launched an aggressive war against these states.

What were they results of the Soviet-Japanese war of 1945? What was it like for her historical meaning and, most importantly for the topic of this work, the role of the Soviet Union in the victory over Japan and thereby ending the Second World War? The main result of the USSR's war against Japan was its defeat in this war as an integral part of the war in the Pacific Ocean and the Far East, as a consequence of the adventurism in the expansionist foreign policy of Japanese militarism. An important role in its failure was played by the underestimation of the growth of the Soviet military-industrial potential and positive changes in the military doctrine of our country in the 30s and 40s compared to the period of the Russo-Japanese War.

The Japanese military doctrine did not take into account the qualitatively increased combat power of the armed forces of our country compared to the period of the Russian-Japanese War, as well as the close coordination and interaction of all branches of the military. By the end of the 30s. certain changes occurred in this assessment, which kept Tokyo from entering the war with the USSR in 1941.

With the same durability and fighting spirit Japanese and Soviet military personnel gained strength due to the extraordinary power of simultaneous coordinated fire support from artillery, armored forces and aviation.

Some historians reproach the USSR for the fact that the occupation of the southernmost islands of Habomai (Flat) - the southern part of the Lesser Kuril ridge - occurred after the signing of the Act of Surrender from September 3 to 5, 1945. But this did not represent the only exception, because battles with the occupation of territory, occupied by Japanese troops, occurred another 40 days after the decision to surrender on the Asian continent, i.e. after the signing of the aforementioned document on ending the war with Japan both in certain regions of Manchuria and Northern China, as well as in the southern seas, and Chiang Kai-shek, without disarming some Japanese units, threw them into battle as anti-communist mercenaries in all provinces of Northern China right up to until 1946

As for the opinion of foreign scientists from among the critically thinking modern opponents of Soviet policy towards Japan, let us consider the point of view of the professor as characteristic Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, a Japanese national who moved to the United States long ago, is interesting, especially in reflecting the Japanese attitude to this war and its consequences for Soviet-Japanese relations. “It would be too unrealistic to expect that the consciousness of Japan's guilt for starting the war would also extend to relations with the Soviet Union. However, until the Japanese begin to self-critically evaluate their past, striking a difficult balance between their commitment to militarism, expansion and war and their justified demand for correction negative sides Stalin’s foreign policy,” this historian writes, not without reason, “true reconciliation between the two countries is impossible.”

Hasegawa concludes that “the most important reason this tragedy” is Tokyo’s rejection of the Potsdam Declaration immediately after its presentation, which would, in principle, exclude both the possibility of war with the USSR and the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki! And one cannot but agree with this conclusion.

The Soviet Union, with its armed forces, made an important contribution to the Allied victory over militaristic Japan in the war in the Far East during the Soviet-Japanese War of 1945 - an integral part of its allies' war in the Pacific of 1941-1945, and in a broader sense and World War II 1939-1945.

The USSR's accession to the Potsdam Declaration and its entry into the war against Japan was a decisive factor in Tokyo's decision to unconditionally surrender its armed forces on the terms of the Potsdam Declaration of the Allies after the use of the US atomic weapons against the Japanese civilian population in the sense that this event, contrary to the calculations of the mediation of the Soviet Union in ending the war in the Pacific, dispelled the last hope of the imperial government for its end without a crushing defeat in the hope of splitting the ranks of the Allied coalition.

The victory of the USSR in this war played a huge role in the successful completion of World War II

The Soviet-Japanese War began in 1945. After the surrender of Nazi Germany, the military-political position of its partner Japan sharply worsened. The USA and England, which had superior naval forces, reached the closest approaches to this state. However, the Japanese rejected the ultimatum of the United States, England and China to surrender.

The Soviets agreed to America and England to enter into military action against Japan - after Germany was completely defeated. The date for the Soviet Union's entry into the war was set at the Crimean Conference of the Three Allied Powers in February 1945. This was supposed to happen three months after the victory over Germany. Preparations began for a military campaign in the Far East.

"At war with Japan..."

Three fronts were to enter hostilities - Transbaikal, 1st and 2-1 Far Eastern. The Pacific Fleet, the Red Banner Amur Flotilla, and the border air defense troops were also supposed to participate in the war. During the period of preparation for the operation, the number of the entire group increased and amounted to 1.747 thousand people. These were serious forces. 600 rocket launchers, 900 tanks and self-propelled artillery units were put into service.

What forces did Japan oppose? The basis of the grouping of Japanese and puppet forces was the Kwantung Army. It consisted of 24 infantry divisions, 9 mixed brigades, 2 tank brigades and a suicide brigade. The weapons included 1,215 tanks, 6,640 guns and mortars, 26 ships and 1,907 combat aircraft. The total number of troops was more than a million people.

To direct military operations, the State Defense Committee of the USSR decided to create the Main Command of Soviet troops in the Far East. It was headed by Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky. On August 8, 1945, a statement by the Soviet government was published. It stated that from August 9, the USSR would consider itself in a state of war with Japan.

Start of hostilities

On the night of August 9, all units and formations received a Statement from the Soviet Government, appeals from the military councils of the fronts and armies, and combat orders to go on the offensive. The military campaign included the Manchurian Strategic Offensive Operation, the Yuzhno-Sakhalin Offensive Operation and the Kuril Landing Operation.

The main component of the war - the Manchurian strategic offensive operation - was carried out by the forces of the Transbaikal, 1st and 2nd Far Eastern fronts. The Pacific Fleet and the Amur Flotilla entered into close cooperation with them. The planned plan was enormous in scale: the encirclement of the enemy was planned to cover an area of ​​one and a half million square kilometers.

And so hostilities began. The enemy's communications connecting Korea and Manchuria with Japan were cut by the Pacific Fleet. Aviation carried out strikes on military installations, troop concentration areas, communication centers and communications of the enemy in the border zone. The troops of the Transbaikal Front marched through waterless desert-steppe regions, overcame the Greater Khingan mountain range and defeated the enemy in the Kalgan, Thessaloniki and Hailar directions; on August 18 they reached the approaches to Manchuria.

The strip of border fortified troops was overcome by the troops of the 1st Far Eastern Front (commander K.A. Meretskov). They not only repelled strong enemy counterattacks in the Mudanjiang area, but also liberated the territory North Korea. The Amur and Ussuri rivers were crossed by troops of the 2nd Far Eastern Front (commander M.A. Purkaev). Then they broke through the enemy’s defenses in the Sakhalyan area and crossed the Lesser Khingan ridge. After Soviet troops entered the Central Manchurian Plain, they divided the Japanese forces into isolated groups and completed the maneuver to encircle them. On August 19, Japanese troops began to surrender.

Kuril landing and Yuzhno-Sakhalin offensive operations

As a result of successful military operations by Soviet troops in Manchuria and South Sakhalin, conditions were created for the liberation of the Kuril Islands. The Kuril landing operation lasted from August 18 to September 1. It began with a landing on the island of Shumshu. The island's garrison outnumbered the Soviet forces, but on August 23 it capitulated. Next, on August 22-28, our troops landed on other islands in the northern part of the ridge up to the island of Urup (inclusive). Then the islands of the southern part of the ridge were occupied.

On August 11-25, troops of the 2nd Far Eastern Front carried out an operation to liberate Southern Sakhalin. 18,320 Japanese soldiers and officers surrendered to the Soviet army after it captured all the heavily fortified strongholds in the border zone, defended by the forces of the 88th Japanese Infantry Division, units of the border gendarmerie and reservist detachments. On September 2, 1945, the act of unconditional surrender of Japan was signed. This happened aboard the battleship Missouri in Tokyo Bay. On the Japanese side it was signed by Foreign Minister Shigemitsu, Chief of the Japanese General Staff Umezu, on the USSR side by Lieutenant General K.M. Derevianko.

The million-strong Kwantung Army was completely defeated. The Second World War of 1939-1945 was over. On the Japanese side, casualties amounted to 84 thousand people, and about 600 thousand people were taken prisoner. The losses of the Red Army amounted to 12 thousand people (according to Soviet data).

The Soviet-Japanese War had enormous political and military significance

The Soviet Union, having entered the war with the Japanese Empire and making a significant contribution to its defeat, accelerated the end of the Second World War. Historians have repeatedly stated that without the USSR entering the war, it would have continued for at least another year and would have cost an additional several million human lives.

By decision of the Crimean Conference of 1945 (Yalta Conference), the USSR was able to return to its composition the territories that were lost by the Russian Empire in 1905 following the Peace of Portsmouth (South Sakhalin), as well as the main group of the Kuril Islands, which was ceded to Japan in 1875.

How more people is able to respond to the historical and universal, the broader his nature, the richer his life and the more capable such a person is of progress and development.

F. M. Dostoevsky

The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, which we will talk briefly about today, is one of the most important pages in the history of the Russian Empire. Russia was defeated in the war, demonstrating a military lag behind the world's leading countries. Another important event of the war was that as a result the Entente was finally formed, and the world began to slowly but steadily slide towards the First World War.

Prerequisites for the war

In 1894-1895, Japan defeated China, as a result of which Japan had to cross the Liaodong (Kwantung) Peninsula along with Port Arthur and Farmosa Island (the current name of Taiwan). Germany, France and Russia intervened in the negotiations and insisted that the Liaodong Peninsula remain in the use of China.

In 1896, the government of Nicholas 2 signed a friendship treaty with China. As a result, China allows Russia to build a railway to Vladivostok through Northern Manchuria (China Eastern Railway).

In 1898, Russia, as part of a friendship agreement with China, leased the Liaodong Peninsula from the latter for 25 years. This move drew sharp criticism from Japan, which also laid claim to these lands. But this did not lead to serious consequences at that time. In 1902, the tsarist army entered Manchuria. Formally, Japan was ready to recognize this territory as Russia if the latter recognized Japanese dominance in Korea. But the Russian government made a mistake. They did not take Japan seriously and did not even think about entering into negotiations with it.

Causes and nature of the war

The reasons for the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 are as follows:

• Lease by Russia of the Liaodong Peninsula and Port Arthur.
• Economic expansion of Russia in Manchuria.
• Distribution of spheres of influence in China and the cortex.

The nature of hostilities can be defined as follows

• Russia planned to defend itself and raise reserves. The transfer of troops was planned to be completed in August 1904, after which it was planned to go on the offensive, right up to the landing of troops in Japan.
• Japan planned to wage an offensive war. The first strike was planned at sea with the destruction of the Russian fleet, so that nothing would interfere with the transfer of troops. The plans included the capture of Manchuria, Ussuri and Primorsky Territories.

Balance of forces at the beginning of the war

Japan could field about 175 thousand people in the war (another 100 thousand in reserve) and 1140 field guns. The Russian army consisted of 1 million people and 3.5 million in reserve (reserve). But in the Far East, Russia had 100 thousand people and 148 field guns. Also at the disposal of the Russian army were border guards, of whom there were 24 thousand people with 26 guns. The problem was that these forces, inferior in number to the Japanese, were widely scattered geographically: from Chita to Vladivostok and from Blagoveshchensk to Port Arthur. During 1904-1905, Russia carried out 9 mobilizations, conscripting about 1 million people for military service.

The Russian fleet consisted of 69 warships. 55 of these ships were in Port Arthur, which was very poorly fortified. To demonstrate that Port Arthur was not completed and was ready for war, it is enough to cite the following figures. The fortress was supposed to have 542 guns, but in fact there were only 375, and of these, only 108 guns were usable. That is, the gun supply of Port Arthur at the start of the war was 20%!

It is obvious that the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905 began with clear Japanese superiority on land and at sea.

Progress of hostilities

Map of military operations

rice. 1 - Map of the Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905

Events of 1904

In January 1904, Japan broke off diplomatic relations with Russia and on January 27, 1904, attacked warships near Port Arthur. This was the beginning of the war.

Russia began to transfer its army to the Far East, but this happened very slowly. A distance of 8 thousand kilometers and an unfinished section of the Siberian Railway - all this interfered with the transfer of the army. The road capacity was 3 trains per day, which is extremely low.

On January 27, 1904, Japan attacked Russian ships located in Port Arthur. At the same time, in the Korean port of Chemulpo, an attack was launched on the cruiser “Varyag” and the escort boat “Koreets”. After an unequal battle, the “Korean” was blown up, and the “Varyag” was scuttled by the Russian sailors themselves so that it would not fall to the enemy. After this, the strategic initiative at sea passed to Japan. The situation at sea worsened after the battleship Petropavlovsk, with the fleet commander S. Makarov on board, was blown up by a Japanese mine on March 31. In addition to the commander, his entire staff, 29 officers and 652 sailors were killed.

In February 1904, Japan landed a 60,000-strong army in Korea, which moved to the Yalu River (the river separated Korea and Manchuria). There were no significant battles at this time, and in mid-April the Japanese army crossed the border of Manchuria.

Fall of Port Arthur

In May, the second Japanese army (50 thousand people) landed on the Liaodong Peninsula and headed towards Port Arthur, creating a springboard for the offensive. By this time, the Russian army had partially completed the transfer of troops and its strength was 160 thousand people. One of the most important events of the war was the Battle of Liaoyang in August 1904. This battle still raises many questions among historians. The fact is that in this battle (and it was practically a general battle) the Japanese army was defeated. Moreover, so much so that the command of the Japanese army declared the impossibility of continuing combat operations. The Russo-Japanese War could have ended here if the Russian army had gone on the offensive. But the commander, Koropatkin, gives an absolutely absurd order - to retreat. During the further events of the war, the Russian army would have several opportunities to inflict a decisive defeat on the enemy, but each time Kuropatkin either gave absurd orders or hesitated to act, giving the enemy the necessary time.

After the Battle of Liaoyang, the Russian army retreated to the Shahe River, where a new battle took place in September, which did not reveal a winner. After this there was a lull, and the war moved into a positional phase. In December, General R.I. died. Kondratenko, who commanded the ground defense of the Port Arthur fortress. The new commander of the troops A.M. Stessel, despite the categorical refusal of the soldiers and sailors, decided to surrender the fortress. On December 20, 1904, Stoessel surrendered Port Arthur to the Japanese. At this point, the Russo-Japanese War in 1904 entered a passive phase, continuing active operations in 1905.

Subsequently, under public pressure, General Stoessel was put on trial and he was sentenced to death penalty. The sentence was not carried out. Nicholas 2 pardoned the general.

Historical reference

Port Arthur defense map

rice. 2 - Port Arthur defense map

Events of 1905

The Russian command demanded active action from Kuropatkin. The decision was made to launch the offensive in February. But the Japanese forestalled him by launching an attack on Mukden (Shenyang) on ​​February 5, 1905. From February 6 to 25, the largest battle of the Russian-Japanese War of 1904-1905 continued. On the Russian side, 280 thousand people took part in it, on the Japanese side - 270 thousand people. There are many interpretations of the Battle of Mukden in terms of who won it. In fact it was a draw. The Russian army lost 90 thousand soldiers, the Japanese - 70 thousand. Fewer losses on the part of Japan is a frequent argument in favor of its victory, but this battle did not give the Japanese army any advantage or gain. Moreover, the losses were so severe that Japan made no further attempts to organize large land battles until the end of the war.

Where fact is more important the fact that the population of Japan is much smaller than the population of Russia, and after Mukden, the island country has exhausted its human resources. Russia could and should have gone on the offensive in order to win, but 2 factors played against this:

• Kuropatkin factor
• Factor of the 1905 revolution

On May 14-15, 1905, the Tsushima naval battle took place, in which the Russian squadrons were defeated. The losses of the Russian army amounted to 19 ships and 10 thousand killed and captured.

Kuropatkin factor

Kuropatkin, commanding the ground forces, during the entire Russian-Japanese War of 1904-1905 did not use a single chance for a favorable offensive to inflict great damage on the enemy. There were several such chances, and we talked about them above. Why did the Russian general and commander refuse active action and not strive to end the war? After all, had he given the order to attack after Liaoyang, and with a high degree of probability the Japanese army would have ceased to exist.

Of course, it is impossible to answer this question directly, but a number of historians put forward the following opinion (I cite it because it is well-reasoned and extremely similar to the truth). Kuropatkin was closely associated with Witte, who, let me remind you, by the time of the war had been removed from the post of prime minister by Nicholas 2. Kuropatkin's plan was to create conditions under which the Tsar would return Witte. The latter was considered an excellent negotiator, so it was necessary to bring the war with Japan to a stage where the parties would sit down at the negotiating table. To achieve this, the war could not be ended with the help of the army (the defeat of Japan was a direct surrender without any negotiations). Therefore, the commander did everything to reduce the war to a draw. He successfully completed this task, and indeed Nicholas 2 called on Witte towards the end of the war.

Revolution factor

There are many sources pointing to Japanese financing of the 1905 revolution. Real facts transferring money, of course. No. But there are 2 facts that I find extremely interesting:

• The peak of the revolution and movement occurred at the Battle of Tsushima. Nicholas 2 needed an army to fight the revolution and he decided to start peace negotiations with Japan.
• Immediately after the signing of the Portsmouth Peace, the revolution in Russia began to decline.

Reasons for Russia's defeat

Why was Russia defeated in the war with Japan? The reasons for Russia's defeat in the Russo-Japanese War are as follows:

• The weakness of the grouping of Russian troops in the Far East.
• The unfinished Trans-Siberian Railway, which did not allow the full transfer of troops.
• Mistakes of the army command. I already wrote above about the Kuropatkin factor.
• Japan's superiority in military-technical equipment.

The last point is extremely important. He is often forgotten, but undeservedly. In terms of technical equipment, especially in the navy, Japan was far ahead of Russia.

Portsmouth World

To conclude peace between the countries, Japan demanded that Theodore Roosevelt, President of the United States, act as a mediator. Negotiations began and the Russian delegation was headed by Witte. Nicholas 2 returned him to his post and entrusted him with negotiations, knowing the talents of this man. And Witte really took a very tough position, not allowing Japan to gain significant gains from the war.

The terms of the Portsmouth Peace were as follows:

• Russia recognized Japan's right to rule in Korea.
• Russia ceded part of the territory of Sakhalin Island (the Japanese wanted to get the entire island, but Witte was against it).
• Russia transferred the Kwantung Peninsula to Japan along with Port Arthur.
• No one paid indemnities to anyone, but Russia had to pay compensation to the enemy for the maintenance of Russian prisoners of war.

Consequences of the war

During the war, Russia and Japan each lost approximately 300 thousand people, but in view of the population, these were almost catastrophic losses for Japan. The losses were due to the fact that it was the first major war, during which automatic weapons were used. At sea there was a big bias towards the use of mines.

An important fact that many people ignore is that it was after the Russo-Japanese War that the Entente (Russia, France and England) and the Triple Alliance (Germany, Italy and Austria-Hungary) were finally formed. The fact of the formation of the Entente is noteworthy. Before the war in Europe there was an alliance between Russia and France. The latter did not want its expansion. But the events of Russia's war against Japan showed that the Russian army had many problems (this really was the case), so France signed agreements with England.

Positions of world powers during the war

During the Russo-Japanese War, world powers occupied the following positions:

• England and USA. Traditionally, the interests of these countries were extremely similar. They supported Japan, but mostly financially. Approximately 40% of Japan's war costs were covered by Anglo-Saxon money.
• France declared neutrality. Although in fact it had an allied agreement with Russia, it did not fulfill its allied obligations.
• From the first days of the war, Germany declared its neutrality.

The Russo-Japanese War was practically not analyzed by tsarist historians, because they simply did not have enough time. After the end of the war Russian empire existed for almost 12 years, which included revolution, economic problems and world war. Therefore, the main study took place already in Soviet times. But it is important to understand that for Soviet historians it was a war against the backdrop of revolution. That is, “the tsarist regime sought aggression, and the people did their best to prevent this.” That is why it is written in Soviet textbooks that, for example, the Liaoyang operation ended in the defeat of Russia. Although formally it was a draw.

The end of the war is also seen as the complete defeat of the Russian army on land and in the navy. If at sea the situation was really close to defeat, then on land Japan stood on the brink of an abyss, since they no longer had the human resources to continue the war. I suggest looking at this question even a little more broadly. How did the wars of that era end after the unconditional defeat (and this is what Soviet historians often talked about) of one of the sides? Large indemnities, large territorial concessions, partial economic and political dependence of the loser on the winner. But in the Portsmouth world there is nothing like it. Russia paid nothing, lost only the southern part of Sakhalin (a small territory) and abandoned the lands leased from China. The argument is often made that Japan won the struggle for dominance in Korea. But Russia never seriously fought for this territory. She was only interested in Manchuria. And if we return to the origins of the war, we will see that the Japanese government would never have started the war if Nicholas 2 had recognized Japan’s dominance in Korea, just as the Japanese government would have recognized Russia’s position in Manchuria. Therefore, at the end of the war, Russia did what it should have done back in 1903, without bringing the matter to war. But this is a question about the personality of Nicholas 2, who today is extremely fashionable to call a martyr and hero of Russia, but it was his actions that provoked the war.

In the winter of 1945, the leaders of the Big Three met at the next conference in Yalta. The result of the meeting was the decision to enter the USSR into the war with Japan. For opposing Hitler's eastern ally, the Soviet Union was supposed to get back the Kuril Islands and Sakhalin, which became Japanese under the Portsmouth Peace of 1905. The exact date for the start of the war has not been established. It was planned that active fighting in the Far East would begin a few months after the defeat of the Third Reich and the complete end of the war in Europe.

The USSR began implementing the agreements reached at the end of the summer of 1945. On August 8, war on Japan was officially declared. So it began final stage Second World War.

Neutrality Pact

The Meiji Revolution of the second half of the 19th century made Japan a powerful and aggressive militaristic power. In the first half of the twentieth century, the Japanese repeatedly tried to establish their dominance on the mainland, primarily in China. However, the Japanese army had to confront Soviet troops here. After clashes on Lake Khasan and the Khalkhin Gol River, both sides signed a neutrality pact in the spring of 1941. According to this document, over the next five years, the USSR and Japan pledged not to go to war against each other if third countries started one. After this, Tokyo abandoned its claims in the Far East, and the main direction of Japanese foreign policy was to gain dominance in the waters of the Pacific Ocean.

Breakdown of the 1941 agreements

In 1941-1942, the neutrality agreement completely suited both the USSR and Japan. Thanks to him, each side could fully concentrate on fighting the more significant opponents at the moment. But, obviously, both powers considered the pact temporary and were preparing for a future war:

• On the one hand, Japanese diplomats (including Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka, who signed the 1941 treaty) more than once convinced the German side that they would provide any possible assistance to Germany in the war with the USSR. In the same year, Japanese military experts developed a plan for an attack on the USSR, and the number of soldiers in the Kwantung Army was also sharply increased.
• On the other hand, the Soviet Union was also preparing for conflict. After the end of the Battle of Stalingrad in 1943, construction began on an additional railway line in the Far East.

In addition, spies regularly crossed the Soviet-Japanese border on both sides.

Historians different countries They are still arguing whether it was legal to break previous agreements on the part of the Soviet Union, who should be considered the aggressor in this situation, and what were the real plans of each of the powers. One way or another, in April 1945, the neutrality treaty expired. People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR V.M. Molotov confronted the Japanese Ambassador Naotake Sato with a fact: the Soviet Union would under no circumstances conclude a new pact. The People's Commissar justified his decision by the fact that Japan had provided significant support to Nazi Germany all this time.

There was a split in the Japanese government: one part of the ministers was in favor of continuing the war, and the other was strongly against it. Another important argument of the anti-war party was the fall of the Third Reich. Emperor Hirohito understood that sooner or later he would have to sit down at the negotiating table. However, he hoped that Japan would act in dialogue with Western countries, not as a weak defeated state, but as a powerful adversary. Therefore, before the start of peace negotiations, Hirohito wanted to win at least a few major victories.

In July 1945, England, the USA and China demanded that Japan lay down their arms, but received a decisive refusal. From that moment on, all sides began to prepare for war.

Balance of power

Technically, the Soviet Union was far superior to Japan, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Soviet officers and the soldiers who fought such a formidable enemy as the Third Reich were much more experienced than the Japanese military, who on land had to deal only with a weak Chinese army and with individual small American detachments.

From April to August, about half a million Soviet soldiers were transferred to the Far East from the European Front. In May, the Far Eastern High Command appeared, headed by Marshal A. M. Vasilevsky. By mid-summer, the group of Soviet troops responsible for waging the war with Japan was put on full combat readiness. The structure of the armed forces in the Far East was as follows:

• Transbaikal Front;
• 1st Far Eastern Front;
• 2nd Far Eastern Front;
• Pacific Fleet;
• Amur flotilla.

The total number of Soviet soldiers was almost 1.7 million people.

The number of fighters in the Japanese army and the Manchukuo army reached 1 million people. The main force opposing the Soviet Union was to be the Kwantung Army. A separate group of troops was supposed to prevent landings on Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands. On the border with the USSR, the Japanese erected several thousand defensive fortifications. The advantage of the Japanese side was the natural and climatic features of the region. On the Soviet-Manchurian border, the path of the Soviet army had to be slowed down by difficult mountains and numerous rivers with marshy banks. And to get to the Kwantung Army from Mongolia, the enemy would have to cross the Gobi Desert. In addition, the beginning of the war coincided with the peak activity of the Far Eastern monsoon, which brought with it constant downpours. In such conditions it was extremely difficult to conduct an offensive.

At some point, the start of the war was almost postponed due to hesitation by the USSR's Western allies. If before the victory over Germany, England and the United States were interested in the speedy defeat of Japan at any cost, then after the fall of the Third Reich and the successful testing of the American nuclear bomb, this issue lost its urgency. Moreover, many Western military officers feared that the USSR's participation in the war would raise Stalin's already high international authority and strengthen Soviet influence in the Far East. However, American President Truman decided to remain faithful to the Yalta agreements.

It was originally planned that the Red Army would cross the border on August 10. But since the Japanese were thoroughly prepared for defense, at the last moment it was decided to start the war two days earlier in order to confuse the enemy. Some historians believe that the American bombing of Hiroshima could have accelerated the outbreak of hostilities. Stalin chose to immediately withdraw troops, without waiting for Japan's surrender. Contrary to popular belief, Japan did not stop resisting immediately after the nuclear bombs fell on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. For a full month after the bombing, the Japanese army continued to resist the Soviet advance.

Progress of hostilities

On the night of August 8-9, Soviet troops acted as a united front. The start of the war was a big surprise for the Japanese, therefore, despite the heavy rain and washed out roads, the Red Army soldiers managed to cover a considerable distance in the very first hours of the war.

According to strategic plan, The Kwantung Army should have been surrounded. The 6th Guards Tank Army, which was part of the Trans-Baikal Front, was tasked with going behind the Japanese rear. In a matter of days, Soviet tank crews overcame a huge section of the Gobi Desert and several difficult mountain passes and occupied the most important Manchurian strongholds. At this time, troops of the 1st Far Eastern Front fought their way to Harbin. In order to achieve the final goal, Soviet soldiers had to establish control over the well-defended Mudanjiang, which was done on the evening of August 16.

Soviet sailors also achieved great success. By mid-August, all major Korean ports were under Soviet control. After the Soviet Amur flotilla blocked the Japanese warships on the Amur, the rapid advance of the forces of the 2nd Far Eastern Front began towards Harbin. The same front, together with the Pacific Fleet, was to occupy Sakhalin.

During the war, not only Soviet soldiers, but also diplomats distinguished themselves. A week after the start of the war, an agreement on friendship and cooperation was signed with China. The agreement provided for joint ownership of some Far Eastern railways and the creation of a Soviet-Chinese naval base in Port Arthur, closed to military vessels of third countries. The Chinese side expressed its readiness to fully obey the Soviet commander-in-chief in matters of military operations and began to provide all possible assistance to the Red Army soldiers.

On August 17, the Kwantung Army received an order to surrender from Tokyo. However, not all areas received the order on time, and in some parts they decided to simply ignore it, so the war continued. The Japanese fighters demonstrated amazing masculinity. They more than compensated for the technical backwardness of their army with fearlessness, cruelty and perseverance. Lacking anti-tank weapons, the soldiers, hung with grenades, threw themselves under Soviet tanks; There were frequent attacks by small sabotage groups. On certain sections of the front, the Japanese even managed to launch serious counterattacks.

The heaviest and longest battles during the war were the battles for the Kuril Islands and Sakhalin. It was difficult to land troops on the steep rocky banks. Each of the islands was transformed Japanese engineers into a defended impregnable fortress. The battles for the Kuril Islands continued until August 30, and in some places the Japanese fighters held out until the beginning of September.

On August 22, Soviet paratroopers managed to occupy the port of Dalniy. During the successful operation, 10 thousand Japanese troops were captured. And already in the last days of summer, almost the entire territory of Korea, China and Manchuria was liberated from the Japanese occupiers.

By the beginning of September, all the tasks facing the Soviet command were completed. On September 2, 1945, Japan announced its surrender. In honor of the victory over the enemy, a solemn parade of Soviet troops was held in Harbin on September 8.

The question of the peace treaty

Although the USSR (and now the Russian Federation) and Japan did not have armed conflicts after 1945, and during the era of “perestroika” they even switched to cooperation, a peace treaty ending the war still does not exist. In fact, the Soviet-Japanese war ended in September 1945. Formally, it ended with the Moscow Declaration, signed only in 1956. Thanks to this document, the countries were able to re-establish diplomatic contacts and restore trade ties. As for the peace treaty, disputes about it continue to this day.

The cornerstone in Russian-Japanese relations was the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951, concluded between the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition and Japan. This document assumed the delimitation of spheres of influence in the Far East, in which the United States had the greatest weight in the region. Moreover, the agreement contradicted the agreements reached in Yalta, since it did not provide for the transfer of Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands to the Soviet Union. The Chinese authorities also suffered certain damage, as they also did not receive part of their occupied territories.

It should be noted that the first clashes related to the establishment of their influence between the USSR and the USA occurred in the summer of 1945, when the Americans tried to occupy Dalny, where Soviet soldiers and sailors had already arrived. In response, the USSR did not allow the American military to establish its bases on the islands of the Kuril archipelago.

To date, Moscow and Tokyo have not reached an agreement a single decision regarding control over Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands. The Japanese authorities believe that Russia owns the islands illegally, and the Russian Foreign Ministry refers to the decisions of the Yalta Conference and similar precedents (for example, the inclusion of the German Königsberg into the USSR).

"The Diplomat", Japan

From May to September 1939, the USSR and Japan fought an undeclared war against each other, in which more than 100,000 military personnel took part. Perhaps it was she who changed the course of world history

In September 1939, Soviet and Japanese armies collided on the Manchurian-Mongolian border, becoming participants in a little-known but far-reaching conflict. This was not just a border conflict - the undeclared war lasted from May to September 1939 and involved more than 100,000 soldiers and 1,000 tanks and aircraft. Between 30,000 and 50,000 people were killed or injured. In the decisive battle, which took place on August 20-31, 1939, the Japanese were defeated.

These events coincided with the conclusion of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact (August 23, 1939), which gave the green light to Hitler's aggression against Poland, undertaken a week later and which marked the beginning of World War II. These events are related to each other. The border conflict also influenced key decisions made in Tokyo and Moscow that determined the course of the war and, ultimately, its outcome.

The conflict itself (the Japanese call it the Nomonhan Incident, and the Russians call it the Battle of Khalkin Gol) was provoked by the notorious Japanese officer Tsuji Masanobu, the head of the group in the Japanese Kwantung Army that occupied Manchuria. On the opposite side, the Soviet troops were commanded by Georgy Zhukov, who would later lead the Red Army to victory over Nazi Germany. In the first major battle in May 1939, the Japanese punitive operation failed, and the Soviet-Mongolian forces drove back a Japanese detachment consisting of 200 people. Frustrated, the Kwantung Army intensified military operations in June-July and began launching forced bombing strikes deep into Mongolia. The Japanese also carried out operations along the entire border, involving entire divisions. Successive Japanese attacks were repulsed by the Red Army, however, the Japanese constantly raised the stakes in this game, hoping that they could force Moscow to retreat. However, Stalin tactically outmaneuvered the Japanese and, unexpectedly for them, launched both a military and diplomatic counteroffensive.

In August, when Stalin was secretly seeking an alliance with Hitler, Zhukov formed a powerful group near the front line. At the moment when the German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop flew to Moscow to sign the Nazi-Soviet Pact, Stalin threw Zhukov into battle. The future marshal demonstrated the tactics that he would later use with such stunning results at Stalingrad, in the Battle of Kursk, and also in other places: a combined arms offensive, during which infantry units, with active artillery support, tied up enemy forces in the central sector of the front - in as powerful armored formations attacked the flanks, encircled and ultimately routed the enemy in a battle of annihilation. More than 75% of Japanese ground forces on this front were killed in action. At the same time, Stalin concluded a pact with Hitler, Tokyo's nominal ally, and thus left Japan diplomatically isolated and militarily humiliated.

The coincidence in time of the Nomonhan incident and the signing of the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact was by no means accidental. While Stalin was openly negotiating with Britain and France to create an anti-fascist alliance and secretly trying to negotiate a possible alliance with Hitler, he was attacked by Japan, Germany's ally and partner in the Anti-Comintern Pact. By the summer of 1939, it became clear that Hitler intended to move east, against Poland. Stalin's nightmare, which had to be prevented at all costs, was a war on two fronts against Germany and Japan. His ideal outcome would be one in which the fascist-militarist capitalists (Germany, Italy and Japan) would fight the bourgeois-democratic capitalists (Britain, France and, possibly, the United States). In this situation, the Soviet Union would have remained on the sidelines and become the arbiter of the destinies of Europe after the capitalists had exhausted their strength. The Nazi-Soviet Pact was Stalin's attempt to achieve an optimal result. This treaty not only pitted Germany against Britain and France, but also left the Soviet Union out of the fray. He provided Stalin with the opportunity to decisively deal with isolated Japan, which was done in the Nomonhan area. And this is not just a hypothesis. The connection between the Nomonhan Incident and the Nazi-Soviet Pact is even reflected in German diplomatic documents published in Washington and London in 1948. Newly released Soviet-era documents provide supporting details.

Zhukov became famous in Nomonhan/Khalkin-Gol, and thus earned the trust of Stalin, who at the end of 1941 entrusted him with command of the troops - just in right moment in order to prevent a disaster. Zhukov managed to stop the German advance and turn the tide on the outskirts of Moscow in early December 1941 (probably the most important week of the Second World War). This was partly facilitated by the transfer of troops from the Far East. Many of these servicemen already had combat experience - it was they who defeated the Japanese in the Nomonhan area. The Soviet Far Eastern reserve - 15 infantry divisions, 3 cavalry divisions, 1,700 tanks and 1,500 aircraft were redeployed to the west in the fall of 1941, when Moscow learned that Japan would not attack the Soviet Far East, since it had made a final decision regarding expansion in the south direction, which ultimately led it to war with the United States.

The story regarding Japan's path to Pearl Harbor is well known. But some of these events are not so well covered, and Japan's decision to go to war with the United States is associated with Japanese memories of the defeat at the village of Nomongan. And the same Tsuji who played a central role in the Nomonhan Incident became an influential advocate for southern expansion and war with the United States.

In June 1941, Germany attacked Russia and inflicted crushing defeats on the Red Army in the first months of the war. Many at that moment believed that the Soviet Union was on the verge of defeat. Germany demanded that Japan invade the Soviet Far East, avenge the defeat at Nomonhan Village, and seize as much Soviet territory as it could chew. However, in July 1941, the United States and Britain imposed an oil embargo on Japan, which threatened to starve the Japanese war machine. In order to avoid such a situation, the Imperial Japanese Navy intended to seize the oil-rich Dutch East Indies. Holland itself had been occupied a year earlier. Britain was also struggling to survive. Only the American Pacific Fleet blocked the path of the Japanese. However, many in the Japanese army wanted to attack the USSR, as Germany demanded. They hoped to avenge Nomonhan at a time when the Red Army suffered heavy losses as a result of the German blitzkrieg. The leaders of the Japanese army and navy discussed this issue during a series of military conferences with the participation of the emperor.

In the summer of 1941, Colonel Tsuji was the senior operations planning staff officer at Imperial Headquarters. Tsuji was a charismatic man as well as a powerful speaker, and he was one of the Army officers who supported the Navy position that ultimately led to Pearl Harbor. Tanaka Ryukichi, who headed the Military Service Bureau of the Army Ministry in 1941, reported after the war that “the most determined supporter of war with the United States was Tsuji Masanobu.” Tsuji later wrote that what he saw of Soviet firepower at Nomonhan made him decide not to attack the Russians in 1941.

But what would have happened if there had been no Nomonhan Incident? And what would have happened if it had ended differently, for example, if it had not revealed a winner or if it had ended in a Japanese victory? In this case, Tokyo's decision to move south could look completely different. Less impressed by the military capabilities of the Soviet armed forces and forced to choose between war against Anglo-American forces and participation with Germany in the defeat of the USSR, the Japanese might have considered the northern direction a better choice.

If Japan had decided to move north in 1941, the course of the war and history itself might have been different. Many believe that the Soviet Union would not have survived a war on two fronts in 1941-1942. Victory in the battle of Moscow and a year later - at Stalingrad - were won with exceptionally great difficulty. A determined enemy in the east in the form of Japan at that moment could tip the scales in Hitler's favor. Moreover, if Japan had moved its troops against the Soviet Union, it would not have been able to attack the United States that same year. The United States would have entered the war a year later, under considerably less favorable circumstances than the grim reality of the winter of 1941. How, then, could Nazi rule in Europe be ended?

Nomonhan's shadow turned out to be very long.

Stuart Goldman is a Russia specialist and fellow at the National Council for Eurasian and East European Research. This article was prepared based on materials from his book “Nomonhan, 1939. The Red Army’s Victory That Shaped World War II".