Plan Barbarossa results. The beginning of the Great Patriotic War. Plan Barbarossa, Master Plan Ost

PLAN "BARBAROSSA" The victorious year 1945 will come, and many researchers will call the plan "Barbarossa" the biggest adventure and gross mistake of the military-political leadership of Hitler's Germany. Here it is necessary to separate two components: the political decision to attack

Directive No. 21. Plan "Barbarossa"

Fuhrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
Operations headquarters
National Defense Department
33408/40. Sov. secret

Fuhrer Headquarters 12/18/40
9 copies

The German armed forces must be prepared to defeat Soviet Russia in a short-term campaign even before the war against England (Plan Barbarossa) is over.

Ground forces must use for this purpose all units at their disposal, with the exception of those necessary to protect the occupied territories from any surprises.

The task of the air force is to release such forces to support the ground forces in the Eastern Campaign so that it can be counted on fast completion ground operations and at the same time limit to a minimum the destruction of the eastern regions of Germany by enemy aircraft. However, this concentration of Air Force efforts in the East must be limited by the requirement that all theaters of military operations and areas where our military industry is located are reliably protected from enemy air raids and offensive actions against England, especially against its sea communications, are by no means weakened.

Main forces navy should, of course, be directed against England during the Eastern campaign.

I will give the order for the strategic deployment of armed forces against Soviet Russia, if necessary, eight weeks before the scheduled start of operations.

Preparations that require a longer time, if they have not yet begun, should begin now and be completed by May 15, 1941.

It is critical that no one discovers the intention to carry out an attack.

Preparatory activities of the highest command authorities should be carried out based on the following basic provisions.

I. General concept

The main forces of the Russian ground forces located in the western part of Russia must be destroyed in bold operations through deep, rapid extension of tank wings. The retreat of combat-ready enemy troops into the wide expanses of Russian territory must be prevented.

By rapid pursuit a line must be reached from which the Russian air force will not be able to carry out raids on the territory of the German Reich. The ultimate goal operation is the creation of a barrier against the Asian part of Russia along the common Volga-Arkhangelsk line. Thus, if necessary, the last industrial region remaining in Russia in the Urals can be paralyzed with the help of aviation.

During these operations the Russian Baltic Fleet will quickly lose its base and thus be unable to continue the fight.

Effective actions of the Russian air force must be prevented by our powerful strikes at the very beginning of the operation.

II. Allies and their missions

1. In the war against Soviet Russia on the flanks of our front, we can count on the active participation of Romania and Finland.

The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces will, at the appropriate time, agree and determine in what form the armed forces of both countries will be subordinated to the German command upon their entry into the war.

2. The task of Romania will be to support with its selected forces the offensive of German troops on the southern flank, at least at the beginning of it, to pin down enemy forces where German troops are not deployed, and otherwise to carry out auxiliary service in the rear areas.

3. Finland must cover the concentration and deployment of a separate German northern group of forces (part of the 21st Army), coming from Norway, and conduct military operations together with them. In addition, Finland will be responsible for the capture of the Hanko Peninsula.

A) Ground forces (expressing agreement with the operational plans reported to me)

The theater of military operations is divided by the Pripyat swamps into northern and southern parts. The direction of the main attack should be prepared north of the Pripyat marshes. Two army groups should be concentrated here.

The southern of these groups, which is the center of the general front, has the task of attacking with especially strong tank and motorized formations from the Warsaw area and north of it and splitting up enemy forces in Belarus. In this way, the prerequisites will be created for the rotation of powerful units of mobile troops to the north in order to, in cooperation with the northern group of armies advancing from East Prussia in the general direction of Leningrad, destroy the enemy forces operating in the Baltic states. Only after ensuring the completion of this urgent task, which should be followed by the capture of Leningrad and Kronstadt, should operations begin to capture Moscow as an important center of communications and military industry.

Only the unexpectedly rapid failure of the Russian resistance could justify the formulation and implementation of these two tasks simultaneously.

The most important task of the 21st Army during the Eastern Campaign remains the defense of Norway. The forces available in addition (the mountain corps) should be used in the North primarily for the defense of the Petsamo (Pechenga) regions and its ore mines, as well as the Arctic Ocean route. Then these forces must, together with Finnish troops, advance to the Murmansk railway in order to paralyze the supply of the Murmansk region via land communications.

Will such an operation be carried out more large forces German troops (two or three divisions) from the Rovaniemi area and south of it, depends on Sweden’s readiness to provide its railways at our disposal for the transfer of troops.

The main forces of the Finnish army will be tasked, in accordance with the advance of the German northern flank, to pin down as many Russian troops as possible, advancing to the west or on both sides of Lake Ladoga and capture the Hanko Peninsula.

The armies operating in the south of the Pripyat marshes must further west of the Dnieper in the course of a circumferential operation and, with the help of strong flanks, completely defeat the Russian forces located in Ukraine. To this end, it is necessary to concentrate the main direction of the attack from the Lublin region in the general direction of Kyiv, while the forces located in Romania form a protective flank separated by a large distance through the lower reaches of the Prut. The Romanian army is given the task of pinning down the Russian forces located between them.

At the end of the battles to the south and north of the Pripyat swamps, pursue the enemy and ensure the achievement of the following goals:

In the south, timely occupy the militarily and economically important Donetsk basin,

In the north, quickly reach Moscow.

The capture of this city means not only a decisive political and economic success, but also the loss of an important railway junction.

B) Air Force

Their task will be to maximally paralyze and neutralize the opposition of the Russian air force and support the ground forces in their operations in decisive directions. This will be primarily necessary in the direction of the central army group and on the main wing of the southern army group. Russian railways and communications routes, depending on their importance for the operation, should be cut or disabled through the capture of important objects closest to the combat area (river crossings!) by bold actions of airborne troops.

In order to concentrate all forces to fight against enemy aircraft and to directly support ground forces, military industrial facilities should not be attacked during the operation. Such attacks, and primarily in the direction of the Urals, will be on the agenda only after the end of maneuver operations.

B) Navy

In the war against Soviet Russia, the navy is assigned the task of preventing the enemy's navy from breaking through from the Baltic Sea, while ensuring the defense of its coast. Considering that after reaching Leningrad, the Russian Baltic Fleet will lose its last stronghold and find itself in a hopeless position, major naval operations should be avoided until this point.

After the neutralization of the Russian fleet, the task will be to ensure complete freedom of maritime communications in the Baltic Sea, in particular the supply by sea of ​​the northern flank of the ground forces (mine sweeping!).

All orders to be given by the commanders-in-chief on the basis of this directive must clearly proceed from the fact that we're talking about about precautionary measures in case Russia changes its current position towards us. The number of officers involved in initial preparations should be as limited as possible. Other employees whose participation is required should be involved in the work as late as possible and familiarized with tasks only to the extent necessary for execution. official duties each of them separately. Otherwise, there is a danger of serious political and military complications arising from the disclosure of our preparations, the timing of which has not yet been determined.

I expect oral reports from the Commanders-in-Chief on their future intentions based on this directive.

Report to me through the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces about the planned preparatory activities of all types of armed forces and the progress of their implementation.

A. Hitler

Translation from German: L. Bönnemann. Translation editor: L. Antipova

The operation was supposed to ensure a quick and unconditional victory of Nazi Germany over the USSR thanks to the surprise factor. However, despite preparations in secrecy, the Barbarossa plan failed, and the war between the Germans and domestic troops dragged on and lasted from 1941 to 1945, after which it ended in the defeat of Germany.

The Barbarossa plan got its name in honor of the medieval King of Germany, Frederick 1, who was a glorious commander and, as was previously believed, planned raids on Rus' in the 12th century. Later, this myth was debunked.

Contents of the Barbarossa plan and its significance

The attack on the USSR was supposed to be Germany's next step towards world domination. The victory over Russia and the conquest of its territories should have opened up the opportunity for Hitler to enter into an open conflict with the United States for the right to redistribute the world. Having managed to conquer almost all of Europe, Hitler was confident of his unconditional victory over the USSR.

In order for the attack to go smoothly, it was necessary to develop a plan for a military attack. This plan became Barbarossa. Before planning the attack, Hitler ordered his intelligence officers to gather detailed information about Soviet army and its weapons. After analyzing the information received, Hitler decided that the German army was significantly superior to the Red Army of the USSR - based on this, they began to plan the attack.

The essence of the Barbarossa plan was to strike the Red Army suddenly, on its own territory and, taking advantage of the unpreparedness of the troops and the technical superiority of the German army, to conquer the USSR within two and a half months.

At first it was planned to conquer the front line located on the territory of Belarus by wedging German troops with different sides Soviet army. The disunited and unprepared Red Army had to quickly surrender. Then Hitler was going to move towards Kyiv in order to conquer the territory of Ukraine and, most importantly, its sea routes and cut off the paths of Soviet troops. Thus, he could give his troops the opportunity to further attack the USSR from the south and north. In parallel, Hitler's army was supposed to launch an offensive from Norway. Having surrounded the USSR on all sides, Hitler planned to move towards Moscow.

However, already at the very beginning of the war, the German command realized that the plans began to collapse.

Conducting Operation Barbarossa and its results

First and main mistake Hitler was that he underestimated the strength and weapons of the Soviet army, which, according to historians, was superior to the German in some areas. In addition, the war took place on the territory of the Russian army, so the fighters easily navigated the terrain and could fight in different natural conditions, which was not so easy for the Germans. Another distinctive feature of the Russian army, which greatly influenced the failure of Operation Barbarossa, was the ability of Russian soldiers to mobilize in the shortest possible time to fight back, which did not allow the army to be divided into disparate units.

Hitler set his troops the task of quickly penetrating deep into the Soviet army and dividing it, not allowing Russian soldiers to carry out major operations, as this may be dangerous. The plan was to split the Soviet army and force it to flee. However, everything turned out the other way around. Hitler's troops quickly penetrated deep into the Russian troops, but they were unable to conquer the flanks and defeat the army either. The Germans tried to follow the plan and encircled the Russian detachments, but this did not lead to any results - the Russians quickly emerged from the encirclement thanks to the surprisingly clear and competent leadership of their military leaders. As a result, despite the fact that Hitler’s army still won, it happened very slowly, which ruined the entire plan of rapid conquest.

On the approaches to Moscow, Hitler's army was no longer so strong. Exhausted by endless battles that dragged on for a long time, the army could not go on to conquer the capital, in addition, the bombing of Moscow never began, although according to Hitler’s plans, by that time the city should no longer be on the map. The same thing happened with Leningrad, which was besieged, but never surrendered and was not destroyed from the air.

The operation, which was planned as a swift, victorious attack, turned into a protracted war and stretched from two months to several years.

Reasons for the failure of Plan Barbarossa

The main reasons for the failure of the operation can be considered:

• Lack of accurate data on the combat power of the Russian army. Hitler and his command underestimated the capabilities of Soviet soldiers, which led to the creation of an incorrect offensive and battle plan. The Russians gave a strong resistance, which the Germans did not count on;
• Excellent counterintelligence. Unlike the Germans, the Russians were able to establish good reconnaissance, thanks to which the command was almost always aware of the enemy’s next move and could respond adequately to it. The Germans failed to exploit the effect of surprise;
• Difficult territories. It was difficult for Hitler's troops to get maps of the Soviet terrain, in addition, they were not used to fighting in such conditions (unlike the Russians), so very often impenetrable forests and swamps helped the Soviet army escape and deceive the enemy;
• Lack of control over the course of the war. The German command already in the first few months lost control over the course of military operations, the Barbarossa plan turned out to be impracticable, and the Red Army led a skillful counter-offensive.

Developing a large-scale secret military operation, codenamed “Plan Barbarossa”, General Staff Nazi Germany and Adolf Hitler personally set the main goal to defeat the army of the Soviet Union and capture Moscow as quickly as possible short time. It was planned that Operation Barbarossa should be successfully completed even before the onset of severe Russian frosts and be fully implemented in 2-2.5 months. But this ambitious plan was not destined to come true. On the contrary, it led to the complete collapse of Nazi Germany and dramatic geopolitical changes throughout the world.

Prerequisites for the emergence

Despite the fact that a non-aggression pact was concluded between Germany and the USSR, Hitler continued to hatch plans to seize the “eastern lands,” by which he meant the western half of the Soviet Union. This was a necessary means of achieving world domination and eliminating a strong competitor from the world map. Which, in turn, gave him a free hand in the fight against the USA and Great Britain.

The following circumstances allowed Hitler’s General Staff to hope for a quick conquest of the Russians:

• powerful German war machine;
• rich combat experience gained in the European theater of operations;
• advanced weapons technology and impeccable discipline among the troops.

Since powerful France and strong Poland very quickly fell under the blows of the steel German fist, Hitler was confident that the attack on the territory of the Soviet Union would also bring rapid success. Moreover, the constantly conducted in-depth multi-echelon reconnaissance at almost all levels showed that the USSR was significantly losing in the most important military aspects:

• quality of weapons, equipment and equipment;
• capabilities for strategic and operational-tactical command and control of troops and reserves;
• supply and logistics.

In addition, the German militarists also counted on a kind of “fifth column” - people dissatisfied with the Soviet regime, nationalists of various kinds, traitors, and so on. Another argument in favor of a speedy attack on the USSR was the long process of rearmament carried out at that time in the Red Army. Well-known repressions also played a role in Hitler’s decision, practically decapitating the top and middle command staff of the Red Army. So, Germany had all the prerequisites for developing a plan for an attack on the Soviet Union.

Plan Description

The essence

As Wikipedia quite rightly points out, the development of a large-scale operation to attack the Land of the Soviets began in 1940, in July. The main emphasis was placed on strength, speed and the effect of surprise. Using the massive use of aviation, tank and mechanized formations, it was planned to defeat and destroy the main backbone of the Russian army, then concentrated on the territory of Belarus.

Having defeated the border garrisons, high-speed tank wedges were supposed to systematically envelop, encircle and destroy large units and formations of Soviet troops, and then quickly move on according to the approved plan. Regular infantry units were supposed to finish off the remaining scattered groups that had not stopped resisting.

In order to gain undeniable air supremacy in the very first hours of the war, it was planned to destroy soviet planes still on the ground until confusion prevented them from taking off. Large fortified areas and garrisons offering resistance to advanced assault groups and divisions were simply to be bypassed, continuing fast promotion forward.

The German command was somewhat constrained in choosing the direction of attacks, since the network of high-quality roads in the USSR was poorly developed, and the railway infrastructure, due to the difference in standards, had to undergo a certain modernization in order for the Germans to use it. As a result, the choice was made on the following main general directions (of course, with the possibility of certain adjustments):

• northern, whose task was to attack from East Prussia through the Baltic states to Leningrad;
• central (the main and most powerful), designed to advance through Belarus to Moscow;
• southern, whose tasks included the capture of Right Bank Ukraine and further advancement towards the oil-rich Caucasus.

The initial implementation deadline was March 1941, with the end of the spring thaw in Russia. That's what the Barbarossa plan was in a nutshell. It was finally approved top level December 18, 1940 and went down in history under the name “Directive of the Supreme High Command No. 21.”

Preparation and implementation

Preparations for the attack began almost immediately. In addition to the gradual and well-disguised movement of a huge mass of troops to the common border between Germany and the USSR formed after the partition of Poland, it included many other steps and actions:

• constant disinformation about supposedly ongoing exercises, maneuvers, redeployments, and so on;
• diplomatic maneuvers in order to convince the top leadership of the USSR of the most peaceful and friendly intentions;
• the transfer to the territory of the Soviet Union, in addition to an additional army of spies and intelligence officers, sabotage groups.

All these and many other various events led to the attack being postponed several times. By May 1941, a group of troops incredible in number and power, unprecedented in the entire history of the world, had accumulated on the border with the Soviet Union. Its total number exceeded 4 million people (although Wikipedia indicates a figure twice as large). On June 22, Operation Barbarossa actually began. Due to the postponement of the start of full-scale hostilities deadline The end of the operation was scheduled for November, and the capture of Moscow was supposed to occur no later than the end of August.

It was smooth on paper, but they forgot about the ravines

The plan initially conceived by the German commanders-in-chief was implemented quite successfully. Superiority in the quality of equipment and weapons, advanced tactics and the notorious effect of surprise worked. The speed of the troops' advance, with rare exceptions, corresponded to the planned schedule and proceeded at the “Blitzkrieg” (lightning war) pace familiar to the Germans and discouraging the enemy.

However, very soon Operation Barbarossa began to noticeably slip and experience serious failures. Added to the fierce resistance of the Soviet army were unfamiliar difficult terrain, supply difficulties, partisan actions, muddy roads, impenetrable forests, exhaustion of forward units and formations that were constantly attacked and ambushed, as well as many other very diverse factors and reasons.

Almost after 2 months of hostilities, it became clear to most representatives of the German generals (and then to Hitler himself) that the Barbarossa plan was untenable. A brilliant operation, developed by armchair generals, ran into a cruel reality. And although the Germans tried to revive this plan, making various changes and amendments, by November 1941 it was almost completely abandoned.

The Germans actually reached Moscow, but in order to take it, they had neither the strength, nor the energy, nor the resources. Although Leningrad was under siege, it was not possible to bomb it or starve the inhabitants to death. In the south, German troops were bogged down in the endless steppes. As a result, the German army switched to winter defense, pinning its hopes on the summer campaign of 1942. As you know, instead of the “blitzkrieg” on which the “Barbarossa” plan was based, the Germans received a long, exhausting 4-year war, which ended in their complete defeat, a disaster for the country and almost a complete redrawing of the world map...

Main reasons for failure

Among other things, the reasons for the failure of the Barbarossa plan also lie in the arrogance and pomposity of the German generals and the Fuhrer himself. After a series of victories, they, like the entire army, believed in their own invincibility, which led to the complete fiasco of Nazi Germany.

An interesting fact: the medieval German king and Holy Roman Emperor Frederick I Barbarossa, after whom the operation to rapidly capture the USSR was named, became famous for his military exploits, but simply drowned in a river during one of the Crusades.

If Hitler and his inner circle knew even a little history, they would have thought once again whether it was worth calling such a fateful campaign after “Red Beard.” As a result, they all repeated the deplorable fate of the legendary character.

However, mysticism, of course, has nothing to do with it. Answering the question, what are the reasons for the failure of a plan? lightning war, it is necessary to highlight the following points:

And this is far from full list reasons that led to the absolute failure of the operation.

The Barbarossa plan, conceived as another victorious blitzkrieg with the aim of expanding “living space for the Germans,” turned into a fatal disaster for them. The Germans were unable to derive any benefit from this adventure, bringing death, grief and suffering to a huge number of peoples, including themselves. It was after the failure of the “blitzkrieg” that a wormhole of doubt about the imminent victory and the success of the campaign in general crept into the minds of some representatives of the German generals. However, real panic and moral decay of the German army and its leadership were still far away...