Lightning War. "white plan" - the first experience of blitzkrieg
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Option 1.
A 1. Main meaning Battle of Stalingrad is that during it:
For the first time, Hitler’s “blitzkrieg” plan was thwarted.
A radical turning point in the Great Patriotic War began
Hitler's army was finally defeated
The creation of the anti-Hitler coalition took place
Liberation of Orel and Belgorod
Defeat of the Nazis near Moscow
Beginning of the Battle of Stalingrad
Lifting the blockade of Leningrad
Defense of the Brest Fortress
Tehran Conference
Crossing of the Dnieper
Encirclement of German troops
Liberation of Kyiv by Soviet troops
The offensive of the Red Army at Stalingrad
Lifting the blockade of Leningrad
We, the President of the United States, the Prime Minister of Great Britain and the Premier of the Soviet
Union, met... in the capital of our ally Iran and... came to full agreement
regarding the scale and timing of the operations to be undertaken from the east, west and south.
5. A radical turning point during the Great Patriotic War IO - 9
Option 2.
A 1. The main significance of the Battle of Kursk is that during it:
Hitler's plan "Barbarossa" was foiled
The USSR temporarily seized the strategic initiative
Soviet troops reached the state border of the USSR
Breaking the blockade of Leningrad
Capture of Paulus' army
Beginning of the Battle of Stalingrad
Collapse of the Anti-Comintern Pact
Tehran Conference
Creation of the Road of Life
The largest tank battle
Surrender to the army of Field Marshal Paulus.
Opening of a second front
Occupation of Poland by Nazi troops
The beginning of the Red Army's counteroffensive near Moscow
Lifting the blockade of Leningrad
The Red Army crossed the largest water barrier... and liberated... the most important
industrial centers of the south of our country... Thus, our troops broke into all
enemy defense from Zaporozhye to the Sea of Azov...
Option 1.
A 1. What is collaborationism?
Forced exile, exile
Uniting all forces to repel the enemy
Guerrilla movement
Conscious and voluntary cooperation with the enemy in his interests and to the detriment of his state or countries allied with it
Lithuanians
Latvians
Jews
Germans of the Volga region
Accusations against entire peoples of complicity with the Nazi invaders
Decisions of the Tehran Conference
Mass uprisings against Soviet power
Severe harvest failure leading to casualties
Cultural ties between neighboring peoples have strengthened
Has sped up economic development displaced peoples
The authority of state power was undermined
A radical change in the course of the war began
I am reporting on the results of the operation to evict Chechens and Ingush... Evicted until February 29
and loaded into... wagons 478 479 people...Today a train with former executives was sent
6. The peoples of the USSR in the fight against German fascism IO – 9
Option 2.
A 1. What autonomy was eliminated during the Great Patriotic War?
Estonians 2. Kazakhs 3. Jews 4. Chechens and Ingush
We were brought to the Volga, where many Germans from the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic had already gathered. Then they loaded it onto the ship,
and we sailed on it to Guryev... Then we were transferred to freight cars, and we proceeded to
Aus railway station. Afterwards they were settled on the collective farm “Rostarbeiter” in the village.
Remenovka of Borodulikha district of Semipalatinsk region.
In 1939 2. In 1941 3. In 1944 4. In 1945
The unreliability of these peoples
The need to evacuate people to the rear
An impending natural disaster
The need to replenish the ranks of the Red Army
The economy of these areas has suffered
The combat effectiveness of the Red Army has increased
A radical turning point in the course of the war was completed
Friendship between the peoples of the USSR has strengthened
or another area?
5. A radical turning point during the Great Patriotic War IO - 9
Keys
Option 1. Option 2.
A 1.2 A 1.4
A 2.1 A 2.3
A 3.4 A 3.3
A 4.1 A 4.2
In 1. Tehran In 1. Crossing of the Dnieper
6. The peoples of the USSR in the fight against German fascism IO – 9
Keys
Option 1. Option 2.
A 1.4 A 1.4
A 2.4 A 2.2
A 3.1 A 3.1
A 4.3 A 4.1
In 1. 1944 In 1. Deportation
7. USSR at the final stage II world war IO – 9
Keys
Option 1. Option 2
A 1.2 A 1.3
A 2.2 A 2.3
A 3.4 A 3.3
A 4.1 A 4.4
B 1. 1 C 2 B 3 A C 1. 1 A 2 B 3 C
7. USSR at the final stage II world war IO – 9
Option 1.
A 1. What event occurred during Operation Bagration?
Defense of the Brest Fortress
Liberation of Belarus
Creation of the Road of Life
Crossing of the Dnieper
Creation of the Anti-Comintern Pact
Rising patriotic feelings Soviet people
The weakness of the German military machine
The allies provided significant financial assistance to the USSR
In Bulgaria 2. In Yugoslavia 3. In Italy 4. In France
A bipolar political system of the world has formed
The USA has become the world's only superpower
The world system of colonialism collapsed
The sphere of influence of the USSR in the world narrowed
Year Event
January 1944 A. End of World War II
July-August 1945 B. Potsdam Conference
September 1945 B. Complete liquidation of the siege of Leningrad
7. USSR at the final stage II world war IO – 9
Option 2.
A 1. Indicate the event that took place during the Berlin military operation:
Opening of the Second Front by the Allies
Surrender to the army of General Paulus
Meeting on the Elbe of the Anglo-American and Soviet armies
Exit of the Red Army to the state border of the USSR
Opening of the second front in 1944
Death of Hitler
The resilience and heroism of the Soviet people
Mistakes of the German command
Human:
12 2. 20 3. 27 4. 31
The borders of European states remain unchanged
The Versailles-Washington system of international relations was formed
The USSR became the world's only superpower
The authority of the USSR increased
Year Event
June 1944 A. Opening of the second front
February 1945 B. Yalta Conference
September 1945 B. Japanese Surrender
8. Final test on the topic: “The Great Patriotic War. 1941 – 1945.” IO - 9
Option 1.
A 1. Indicate the names of outstanding commanders of the Great Patriotic War:
Skobelev, Rumyantsev 2. Tukhachevsky, Frunze 3. Stalin, Budyonny 4. Zhukov, Vasilevsky
Headquarters of the Supreme High Command 2. Council of Fronts 3. Military Committee 4. Comintern
Near Moscow 2. Near Leningrad 3. Near Kursk 4. Near Smolensk
The Red Army was brilliantly completed.
A radical turning point during the Great Patriotic War
The final stage of the Second World War
The beginning of the Great Patriotic War
Brusilovsky breakthrough
All Gulag prisoners were sent to the front
The industry of the USSR was rebuilt on a war footing
The Allies opened a second front
Japan left the war
The offensive initiative finally passed to the Red Army
The radical turning point in the Great Patriotic War has ended
Hitler's "blitzkrieg" plan was foiled
The army of General Paulus was captured
“Citadel”, “Tiger”, Prokhorovka?
Moscow 2. Stalingrad 3. Kursk 4. In Belarus
Battle of Stalingrad 2. Battle of Kursk 3. Battle of Moscow 4. “ten Stalinist blows”
Denazification 2. Deportation 3. Demilitarization 4. Denunciation
Hitler's calculation for the collapse of the multinational Soviet state did not come true
The USSR created nuclear weapons
The second front opened only in 1944.
Italy and Romania refused to enter the war on the side of Germany.
Stalin's threat to send troops into Great Britain
The threat to Great Britain and the United States emanating from the countries participating in the Anti-Comintern Pact
The exit of the Red Army to the state border of the USSR
Japanese attack on the USSR
Germany lost its independence
The international authority of the USSR increased
Fascist regimes survived in Japan and Bulgaria
The USSR lost some territories in the east and west
The column corresponds to one element on the right:
Document title, Main content
military plan A. Implementation of the offensive of the German troops of the Center group
""Barbarossa in the direction of Orel-Tula-Moscow
"Ost" B. Plan for the colonization and Germanization of the occupied territories
"Typhoon" B. Conducting a strategic offensive operation of the Germans
D. Conducting a “lightning war” against the Soviet Union
B 2. Determine the sequence of events:
A. Soviet-Finnish War
B. Yalta Conference
B. attack of Nazi Germany on the USSR
D. Tehran Conference
8. Final test
On September 5, the high command of the German armed forces issued order No. 35 to prepare a strike on Moscow. It was planned to be applied after the implementation of the main previous steps. Blitz operations in Ukraine were of particular importance in Hitler's plans. Only after their successful completion at the end of September and beginning of October was it planned to move on to the most important thing - the attack on Moscow. It is no coincidence that in the summer of 1941 the Nazis concentrated their main forces on the southern front.
Careful preparation for a strike on the capital
According to Hitler’s initial assumptions, the capital of the USSR was supposed to fall in September, but subsequently no one chose to return to the goals loudly proclaimed at the beginning. Indeed, according to some of the most optimistic forecasts, Moscow was planned to be captured during July. In the second half of September, on the occasion of the three-month anniversary of the opening of the Eastern Front, the successes of the German army and its allies were actively recalled everywhere. However, the real situation at the front was by no means rosy. September was coming to an end, and the Wehrmacht soldiers never marched through the streets of Leningrad or the streets of Moscow. The July directives on a breakthrough through Rostov to the Caucasus and the Volga were not implemented either. Despite the initially rapid advance, the Nazis failed to break the spirit and combat effectiveness of the Red Army, and they failed to win the sympathy of the majority of the Soviet people. As it soon turned out, the estimates of the Red Army's reserves for further battles were also extremely erroneous. The sixth of September was a very important day in Hitler's Wolf's Lair. It was then that the adjutant handed Hitler a folder with order number 35. This was a detailed plan for further actions against the Soviet army, which was supposed to finally and irrevocably decide the outcome of the war on the Eastern Front in favor of Hitler’s army. Already on the same day, the commanders received orders to prepare for an operation against the army of General Timoshenko. Only after the defeat of the main part of the Soviet army was Army Group Center supposed to begin pursuing the retreating Soviet troops in the direction of Moscow. In preparation for the decisive clash, all aspects were worked out to the smallest detail, including plans for the delivery of ammunition, ammunition, transport, provisions and the formation of new divisions. All necessary tasks included a precise time plan for the strike on Moscow to be a real success. On the detailed map of the Eastern Front in Hitler's bunker, all events were marked with all the appropriate signs: the concentration of troops, their advance, the current situation, a review of reserves and expected new attacks as part of planned operations. Already at the beginning of September, Hitler also discussed among his closest associates the next plans for the occupied territory of the USSR. Then he literally said the following: “When the Russian territories are settled by the peasants of the Reich, they must live in the best, most beautiful houses. German institutions should be located in the most beautiful buildings, Reich Commissioners - in palaces. Around the cities at a distance of 30 - 40 kilometers there will be comfortable villages connected to each other by excellent roads. Next there will be a different world in which we will let the Russians live the way they want. The main thing is that we will control them. In the event of a revolution, it is enough to drop a few bombs on their cities, and everything will be fine. What India is for England, the eastern territories will be for us. We will send Norwegians, Danes, Swedes, and Dutch to Siberia to help. We will carry out the planned racial politics. We will no longer allow a single German to leave Europe for England. We will not drain the swamps, but will take only the best land. On marshy areas we will set up extensive military training grounds.”
Tremendous power at work
For the main attack on Moscow, Hitler attracted 1.6 million people and the most modern technology. A large-scale attack on the Soviet capital began on October 2, 1941. Subsequently, Soviet generals stated that on some days the advance of enemy forces was so rapid that even the General Staff did not believe it. At first glance, the situation in the central sector of the front was developing very favorably for the Wehrmacht. Already on the third of October Oryol was captured. A day later, Soviet units were surrounded near Bryansk. Over the next two days Yukhnov was busy. During this period, Hitler waited every day for Soviet surrender, but it never happened. In mid-October, the Wehrmacht reached the Moscow defense zone. However, each subsequent day proved that progress was slowing down. On the one hand, there was the influence of the weather, and on the other hand, there was also a deterioration in the supply of the advancing troops. On October 24, reports came from the front that part of the German troops were only 60 kilometers from Moscow. Off-road progress became increasingly difficult, and the number of soldiers who fell ill due to the cold and insufficient uniforms and food grew. So the Nazis were forced to quickly build underground bunkers to escape harsh weather and fire from Soviet positions. At the end of October, Marshal von Bock decided to launch the final offensive on the first day of November in order to enter Moscow on the seventh of November - the day of an important Soviet public holiday. However, the Supreme Command did not give the necessary consent, but on the contrary, ordered no offensive actions to be taken in the near future.
When the German Army Group Center launched an offensive on the defensive lines near Rzhev and Vyazma on October 2, the goal was to capture Moscow by October 12 (this deadline has changed more than once since the beginning of Hitler’s eastern campaign). To achieve this goal, the Germans brought in almost half the divisions from the entire Eastern Front, 75% of tanks and more than a thousand aircraft. This was a truly enormous force, and it was clear that Hitler had put everything on one card and was really going to take the Soviet capital at any cost. After three days of fierce fighting, German forces still managed to break through the defenses on both sides of Vyazma, but the Germans encountered more resistance than expected. Kaluga was taken on October 12, Kalinin fell two days later, and Maloyaroslavets fell four days later. The very next day a state of siege was declared in Moscow. The diplomatic corps and government were ordered to evacuate to Kuibyshev. The General Staff and Politburo remained reduced in strength in Moscow. Large factories that worked for defense, scientific and cultural institutes were also taken away. On the approaches to Moscow, barricades and anti-tank fortifications were built at a rapid pace. The German attack was stopped on October 22 near Mtsensk, but the very next day it resumed in the northwest of the city and advanced towards Tula. But the Nazis failed to take it. The last German success of this period was the capture of Volokolamsk. Further off-road advance against fortified defenses became impossible. The fascist high command became more and more nervous every day. The majority of German generals did not hide their opinion that in the current situation the Fuhrer's orders for a further offensive were impossible to carry out. Thus, at the end of October, the first battle for Moscow practically ends. Despite the fact that in the middle of the month the situation was developing more than favorably for the Wehrmacht, and was taking a critical turn for the defenders of Moscow, the German troops failed to achieve their goal. After the war, Marshal Zhukov stated that the most critical situation was in the period from October 6 to October 13.
Vain expectation of Soviet surrender
In Germany, mainly during October, optimism reigned. Fascist propaganda reported more and more successes on the Eastern Front. People were told that the USSR was teetering on the brink of an inevitable catastrophe, and that Stalin would soon capitulate. On October 2, in a daily address addressed to German soldiers On the Eastern Front, Hitler declared: “In just a few weeks, the three largest industrial areas of the Bolsheviks will be completely in our hands. We have finally created all the conditions for a powerful final blow that will destroy the enemy before the onset of winter. All the preparation that could have been done has already been completed. This time we carried it out systematically, step by step, in order to put the enemy in a position in which we could deal death blow. Today begins the final, great and decisive battle of this year.” Just a day later, Hitler again addressed his soldiers with these words: “Forty-eight hours ago new operations of gigantic proportions began. They will lead to the destruction of our enemy in the east. The enemy has already been completely defeated, and he will never regain his strength.” German authorities increasingly talked about the final defeat of the USSR. The imperial chief of the press, Dietrich, did not lag behind, and on October 9 he stated verbatim the following: “Gentlemen, any decision of the German High Command is always implemented, no matter what the resistance. The new successes of German weapons prove that the outcome of the military campaign to the east is already predetermined. In the military sense of the word Soviet Russia was already defeated. You cannot blame me for ever giving you erroneous information. Therefore, today I vouch with my good name for the veracity of this news.” Just on October 9, all Nazi radio stations and newspapers reported that the war in the east was almost over. On that day, Hitler also confidently declared that although the German troops still faced quite difficult battles, the peak had already been overcome, and the war in the east would be crowned with victory, which would soon become obvious. However, in the following days the opposite happened, and Hitler soon had to regret his words. In the weeks that followed, events no longer developed favorably for the German forces. Lack of preparation for harsh winter conditions and underestimation of Soviet combat capability and reserves played a fatal role for the Nazis. As early as October 10, the main Nazi newspaper published an article on the front page entitled “The Great Hour Has Come! The outcome of the war in the east is predetermined! Conveyed completely different information at the same time Soviet press. For example, on October 8, Red Star published an editorial in which the German offensive was called a last desperate attempt. Allegedly, Hitler threw all the forces he had at her, including outdated and small tanks that fell into the hands of the Germans after the capture of Belgium, Holland and France. The article also stated that the Soviet soldier must destroy these tanks at any cost, be they old or new, large or small. All the old armored vehicles from all over Europe, which have long been scrapped, are now sent to fight the Soviet Union.
Context
The Battle of Moscow: How Hitler Almost Defeated Stalin
Newsweek 09/05/2007What decided the outcome of the Battle of Moscow in 1941
Die Welt 12/14/2013Archives: The Germans suffered huge losses in the Battle of Moscow
The Times 12/22/2011The Forgotten Battle of Moscow
Kaleva 05/12/2005On October 13, news about the capture of Moscow and Stalin’s request for a truce spread around Germany. Film magazines competed to see who could best tell about the approaching victory over the USSR. Despite the unfavorable weather and ubiquitous mud, German troops are rapidly advancing towards Moscow, and its residents can already hear the noise of the approaching front. However, October, which started so well for the Nazis, was not marked by the declared successes, and therefore the victorious fanfare gradually quietly disappeared from the press and radio. In addition, in October the cold made itself known with certainty. There were frosts at night, and during the day the soil turned into an impassable mess. Back in mid-October, the situation for the Wehrmacht was quite favorable, but the advance began to noticeably stall until it finally stopped. The desire of the German generals to walk along Red Square on November 7 turned out to be too bold and far from reality.
Second Battle of Moscow
But the Nazis were not going to give up their goals so easily. Already at the beginning of November, they began a new regrouping of forces for another, as they themselves believed, this time the final striking blow on Moscow. In mid-November, Army Group Center prepared 73 divisions (14 tank divisions). Hitler's generals planned to surround the city from the north and south and defeat the Soviet forces west of Moscow. A new attack on the capital began on November 15. On November 19, the Germans captured the important city of Istra, and four days later - Klin and Solnechnogorsk. Stalinogorsk was occupied on November 20. But in this extremely difficult situation in Moscow there was no defeatist mood. On November 6, a ceremonial meeting of the Moscow Council was held in the lobby of the Moscow metro. Stalin acknowledged the Soviet defeats, but at the same time recalled the failure of Hitler's plans for a lightning war. Stalin attributed the military defeats, first of all, to an insufficient number of aircraft and tanks, and this in a situation where there was no second front. Territorial conquests, according to Stalin, were due to the fact that the Germans managed to seize the industrial bases of some European states, primarily Belgium, France, Holland and Czechoslovakia. According to Hitler at a speech in the Reichstag on April 29, 1939, having occupied Czechoslovakia, Germany received 1582 aircraft, 469 tanks, 501 anti-aircraft guns, 2175 guns of various calibers, 115 thousand rifles, 3 million artillery shells, 43 thousand machine guns, a billion infantry ammunition and other military materials: engineering, fastening, measuring devices, many cars, spotlights and other things. On November 7, on the day of an important public holiday, a parade took place on Red Square. Soldiers in winter uniforms and tanks, as well as other equipment, were buried in the snow. The units went from the parade straight to their combat positions.
November 17 was an important milestone in the battle for Moscow. Then Hitler’s favorite General Guderian received information that soldiers from Siberia had appeared at the Uzlovaya station, and that transport trains were bringing in new Soviet reinforcements along the Ryazan-Kolomna branch. According to other information, the German 112th Division retreated, and the number of soldiers with frostbite, unable to fight, was growing. The soldiers of this division were seized by panic, which spread along part of the front right up to Bogoroditsk. Mass desertion became a big warning for the German troops and their command. This was a clear signal that the German infantry was exhausted. However, the German command still did not take these signals seriously. After all, on the approaches to Moscow, the Germans still occupied a dangerous position. On November 28, they took the bridge near Yakhroma and made their way to the eastern bank of the Moscow-Volga canal. Long and incredibly brutal battles broke out for the key city - Tula. At the end of November, some German generals already understood the seriousness of the situation in which their forces found themselves in front of Moscow and in other parts of the front. Characteristic, for example, are the words of General Halder: “Field Marshal von Bock personally leads the battle of Moscow from his mobile command post. His energy propels the troops forward by all means... The troops have almost exhausted their strength. Von Bock compares this battle with the Battle of the Marne." First of all, the lack of winter equipment, according to the Germans, played a tragic role. Von Bock also asked to send the 12th division from the reserve, since there were no longer enough forces to encircle Moscow.
The last German offensive began on the second of December. Some German commanders firmly believed in success and the capture of Moscow. The fighting then took place in a situation where there was a lot of snow everywhere and there were severe frosts. By noon that day, several German units reached the Moscow suburb of Khimki, near the Sheremetyevo airfield that subsequently appeared. But they never managed to advance further. So only German prisoners of war were able to see the Kremlin with their own eyes. On the fourth of December, General Guderian's units again approached Tula and began to make their way to the Moscow River, but in the end, due to a lack of ammunition, they had to retreat with heavy losses. This was the very last German offensive near Moscow. A noticeable retreat soon followed on almost all sectors of the front near Moscow. All this was accompanied by further major losses, including in equipment that the Nazis did not have time to take out during the retreat. On the night of December 5-6, Guderian, on his own responsibility, led his units into retreat. He bases his decision on extremely unfavorable climatic conditions and exhaustion of the offensive capabilities of neighboring units. At the same time, for the same reasons, two armored units located 35 kilometers north of Moscow are abandoning the planned offensive.
The heavy defeat of the Nazis near Moscow was the beginning of their disaster on the Eastern Front
On December 5, the offensive of the Soviet troops of the Kalinin Front, the Western Front and the right wing of the Southwestern Front began. In a counteroffensive that was unexpected for the Germans, the Soviet command managed to involve more than a million soldiers, more than a thousand aircraft, more than 800 tanks and more than 7,500 guns. Just recently, very self-confident German troops were forced to rapidly retreat from Moscow, Tikhvin and Taganrog. German forces were retreating along almost the entire length of the front. A parallel is often drawn with 1812 and the rapid retreat of Napoleon’s troops from Moscow and Russia in general. By December 20, the Nazis were forced to leave Klin, Kalinin and the Tula region. “Our attack on Moscow failed. We suffered a heavy defeat, the consequences of which, as it became clear in the following weeks, were fatal, and the obstinacy of the high command in distant East Prussia was to blame,” General Guderian later said. After this failure, Hitler himself took charge of military operations and changed command almost everywhere. Later, General Halder admitted that the defeat near Moscow was a disaster and, in fact, the beginning of a great tragedy in the east. In December 1941, General von Bock wrote the following in his diary: “Now I no longer doubt that military operation near Moscow, in which I probably played the most important role, failed and marked a turning point in the war in general.” German military historian Reinhard wrote: "Hitler's plans, and with them the prospect of winning the war, failed in October 1941, especially after the launch of the Russian counter-offensive near Moscow in December 1941." Ludwik Svoboda, who was in the USSR at that time and was preparing conditions there for training our soldiers, wrote in his personal diary: “The offensive of the Red Army along the entire front was very successful. It seems that the German army is facing disaster near Moscow. Its defeat depends on how strong Hitler's government is in the Reich. From the German army, undoubtedly, only remnants will return home.”
The offensive of the Soviet army continued successfully in December 1941 and January 1942, and during it many cities and villages were liberated. For example, Volokolamsk was liberated on December 20, Naro-Fominsk on December 26, Maloyaroslavets on January 2, and Borovsk on January 4. Rzhev was recaptured on January 7, 1942. In January 1942, Soviet forces were almost equal to the 183 divisions of the Germans and their satellites, but the Soviet army had an advantage in the number of tanks and aircraft. In the period from December 6 to January 10 alone, the losses of Hitler’s troops amounted to more than 300 thousand killed and wounded. The German troops faced serious difficulties that were not easy to disguise, because by the first of January 1942 they were short of about 340 thousand people. During the counteroffensive near Moscow, the Red Army recaptured more than 11,000 towns and villages northwest of the capital and advanced 400 kilometers in some areas. Territories the size of the former Czechoslovakia, with a population of approximately five million people, were liberated. The first significant turning point occurred in the war. Goebbels, who appealed to the population to donate winter clothing and skis to the Wehrmacht, was forced to admit that “millions of our soldiers, after a year of fierce fighting, stand face to face with an enemy who has a great numerical and material advantage.” Some parts of the uniform made from surrogate raw materials did not protect against the harsh Russian winter. The British fleet undoubtedly made its contribution here, which kept a blockade of Germany for two years, so the Germans did not have enough wool for sewing quality clothes to the soldiers.
The Nazis retreating from Moscow left behind a huge desert. They did not disdain the barbaric seizure of valuables. Before retreating to Klin, they plundered Tchaikovsky’s house, in which they burned furniture and books of the famous composer. In Istra they burned the New Jerusalem Monastery. In Yasnaya Polyana, in Tolstoy's house, where Guderian's main headquarters was located, the museum was looted, and many objects were destroyed and burned.
After the start of a large-scale German offensive on Moscow in early October 1941, over the next two months the fate of the USSR capital hung in the balance. There were days when the Germans declared that their victory was very close, and that on the battlefield they were the masters of the situation. The whole world could more than once hear proclamations that the domes of the Kremlin can already be seen with good field binoculars. At certain moments, the Kremlin indeed seemed very close to the fascist invaders, but even then it was and will forever remain inaccessible to them. In mid-December 1941, the whole world learned about the German defeat near Moscow. This defeat lifted the spirits in our country. In the illegal newspaper Krasnoe Pravo, edited by Julius Fuček, the Christmas wish then was:
“Everyone will be delighted to receive a generous gift of peace and freedom under the Christmas tree on the Generous Evening, and Hitler on the Christmas tree.”
How did Czech television celebrate the anniversary of the start of the Great Patriotic War this year or the current anniversary of the Battle of Moscow? It did not disappoint this time either: from the fourth of September we are shown a 44-episode documentary film entitled “Heydrich. Last decision." I am confident that we have every right to demand that other important anniversaries related to the events of the Second World War receive adequate television time. The anniversary of the Battle of Moscow undoubtedly applies to them. But instead we continue to watch repeats of programs about the Wehrmacht or the “important” people of the Third Reich. True, this has long been very typical for Czech television.
Problematic aspects of the history of the initial period of the Great Patriotic War. On June 22, 1941, the troops of Nazi Germany invaded Soviet territory. Long years V national historiography It was generally accepted that for the Soviet leaders (as well as for the majority of the people) the attack by Nazi Germany was unexpected, sudden. Published at the end of the 20th century. previously top secret documents completely refute this view. INO OGPU (as Soviet intelligence was then called) repeatedly warned Stalin about a possible German attack on the USSR. However, in the pre-war years, intelligence, drained of blood by repression, made many mistakes and was repeatedly mistaken in its forecasts. In particular, she was unable to obtain information about the Munich Agreement, as well as details of the Barbarossa plan. It is important that by June 21, 1941, Stalin had at least six various options the timing of Germany's attack on our country, which could not but affect his decisions.
At 4 o'clock in the morning, German aircraft began to bomb Soviet cities - Smolensk, Kyiv, Zhitomir, Murmansk, Riga, Kaunas, Liepaja, military bases (Kronstadt, Sevastopol, Izmail), railway tracks and bridges. During the first day of the war, 66 airfields and 1,200 aircraft were destroyed, of which 800 were on the ground. By the end of June 22, enemy groups had advanced to a depth of 50-60 km.
Stalin's mistakes and miscalculations regarding the timing and location of the German invasion allowed the aggressor to gain significant advantages. According to the defense plan state border The USSR, developed and approved by the government in February 1941, began mobilization activities during May-June. About 2,500 reinforced concrete structures were built in the border areas, and the network of military airfields expanded. In the second half of May - early June, troops from the internal military districts were transferred to the western border. However, by the time the Germans attacked, the strategic deployment of troops was not completed. To the repeated proposals of the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army G.K. Zhukov to bring the border troops into combat readiness, Stalin stubbornly refused. Only on the evening of June 21, having received a message from a defector that at dawn German troops would launch an attack on the USSR, the High Command sent directive No. 1 to the border districts on putting troops on combat readiness, but it did not contain specific instructions and allowed ambiguous interpretation of individual points. In addition, the directive was received very late: it never reached some border districts that took the first blows from the enemy.
On the eve of the attack, Hitler's Germany and its allies concentrated 190 divisions (5.5 million people), more than 4 thousand tanks, 4.3 thousand combat aircraft, over 47 thousand guns and mortars, and 246 ships along the borders of the Soviet Union. Declassified materials indicate that by June 22, 1941, the Germans and their allies had superiority only in manpower, but were inferior to the Red Army in tanks by almost three times and in combat aircraft by more than two times. Thus, the military potential of the Red Army was not much lower compared to the potential of the German troops.
170 divisions (2.9 million people) and 11 thousand tanks were concentrated in the western border military districts of the USSR. True, a significant part of the tanks were of obsolete types, of which 3.8 thousand were in a state of combat readiness. New weapons were just entering the troops; many tank and aviation formations had not been formed. Of the 29 mechanized corps, only one was completed.
A similar situation was observed in aviation. Of the 9 thousand aircraft located in the western districts, 1200 did not have flight crews, and 13% were completely out of order. There were about 1.5 thousand new aircraft (IL-2, MiG-3, LaGG-3, Yak-1), and only 208 crews trained for them.
Having a quantitative advantage over the enemy in tanks and aircraft, the Red Army was significantly inferior to the enemy in the motorization of troops. In 1941, the German Wehrmacht had a twofold superiority in the number of vehicles (500 thousand versus 270 thousand for the Red Army). Preparing to launch a maneuver strike on the USSR, Germany created the necessary infrastructure. Tank and motorized formations were provided with fuel for 700-800 km of march.
In general, we can talk about the presence of a significant number of objective and subjective circumstances that did not allow the Red Army to use its quantitative superiority in technology. Among them is a shortage of command personnel, mainly due to repression (25% of commanders were missing in the ground forces, 30% in aviation, 73% completed only junior lieutenant courses or were called up from the reserves). The pilots' training was clearly insufficient. In the first quarter of 1941 alone, “due to laxity,” 71 disasters occurred, in which 141 people died and 138 planes crashed. The overestimation of the strength and capabilities of the Red Army by Soviet military leaders, who believed that “our divisions are stronger than the divisions of the Nazi army,” also played a negative role. The troops did not study the experience of Wehrmacht battles in Europe in 1939-1940. The shortcomings of leadership, tactics and organization that emerged during the Soviet-Finnish War also occurred at the first stage of the Great Patriotic War. Tank armies were created only in 1943.
The lack of understanding of the scale of the German invasion by the Soviet command, and primarily by Stalin, is evidenced, in particular, by the second directive sent to the troops at 7 a.m. on June 22: “...troops with all forces and means to attack enemy forces and destroy them in the areas where they violated the Soviet border."
1. What problems associated with the beginning of the Great Patriotic War are discussed by historians and concern modern society?
2. Why do you think they receive so much attention so many decades after the end of the war?
3. What is your opinion about the reasons that led to the retreat of the Red Army and the huge losses at the beginning of the war?
"Blitzkrieg": plans and realities. On June 22, V. M. Molotov made a call to repel the aggressor on the radio. JV Stalin’s speech took place only on July 3.
Working with a document
Read the speeches of V. M. Molotov and I. V. Stalin.
1. Why do contemporaries of the war remember these performances?
2. How did the Soviet people perceive the country’s leaders in those troubled days?
The fascist command organized an offensive in three strategic directions: Leningrad, Moscow and Kiev. The Soviet command was waiting main blow in the southwest, but Hitler struck it in the center. The advance of the Germans, contrary to their expectations, was accompanied by fierce fighting. From the very beginning of the war, Soviet troops put up serious resistance to the enemy. For the first time since 1939, the Germans began to suffer significant losses.
A striking manifestation of the heroism and courage of our soldiers and officers in initial stage war was the defense of the Brest Fortress. Its garrison under the command of Major Π. M. Gavrilova held back attacks from superior enemy forces for more than a month.
June 23rd soldiers of the 99th rifle division They drove the Germans out of Przemysl with a counterattack and held the city for 5 days. In the very first battles, the 1st Artillery Anti-Tank Brigade, which consisted mainly of young Muscovites, destroyed 42 tanks of General von Kleist’s group. On June 23, the division of Colonel I. D. Chernyakhovsky, commander of the fronts and later general of the army, completely destroyed the motorized regiment of the 4th Panzer Group of General Hepner. There were many such examples. But despite the massive heroism and self-sacrifice of Soviet soldiers, the results of the initial stage of the war turned out to be catastrophic for the Red Army. By mid-July 1941, fascist troops captured Latvia, Lithuania, a significant part of Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova, the cities of Pskov, Lvov, and a huge number of Soviet soldiers and officers were captured.
A terrible tragedy took place near Minsk. Here, by July 9, the Germans managed to encircle almost 30 Soviet divisions. Minsk was abandoned in battle, 323 thousand Soviet soldiers and officers were captured, the losses of the Western Front amounted to 418 thousand people. Stalin blamed the commander of the Western Front, D. G. Pavlov, and other military leaders for this defeat. All of them were shot by the Supreme Court on charges of cowardice (rehabilitated in 1956).
On August 16, 1941, during the retreat of the Soviet troops, Stalin issued order No. 270, according to which deserters from command personnel should be shot on the spot, and those who were surrounded should not surrender and fight to the last bullet.
The repressive policy also affected the civilian population. In August 1941, Soviet Germans (about 1.5 million people) were deported to Siberia and Kazakhstan and most of them were sent to the labor army.
In these difficult conditions, the Soviet people managed to unite against the common enemy - fascism and showed heroic character. The occupation of a significant part of Soviet territory was assessed by the Nazi command as a decisive success in the war, but the Red Army turned out to be much stronger than the fascist strategists had expected. Soviet troops not only defended themselves, but also struck back at the enemy. Advancing towards Moscow, the enemy encountered fierce resistance during the capture of Smolensk. The Battle of Smolensk lasted two months (from July 10 to September 10, 1941). During this battle, the Soviet command used the famous Katyushas for the first time. Rocket launchers under the command of Captain I. A. Flerov struck the enemy in the Orsha area, and then Rudnya and Yelnya. In bloody battles soviet soldiers and the commanders showed true heroism. On July 30, the Germans were forced to go on the defensive for the first time. On September 5, 1941, troops of the Reserve Front under the command of G.K. Zhukov, during a counteroffensive, broke through the enemy’s defenses and liberated Yelnya. The enemy lost several divisions (more than 50 thousand soldiers). For their differences in the Elninsky operation, the four best rifle divisions were the first in the Red Army to receive the rank of guards.
During the battles near Smolensk from August 9 to 10, 1941, the air division under the command of M.V. Vodopyanov on PE-8 aircraft, having made a heroic flight, bombed Berlin for the first time. The battle near Smolensk allowed the Soviet command to gain time to prepare the defense of Moscow. On September 10, the enemy was stopped 300 km from Moscow. Hitler's “blitzkrieg” was dealt a serious blow.
The initial stage of the Great Patriotic War are the most tragic pages of its history. By mid-July 1941, out of 170 Soviet divisions, 28 were completely defeated, 70 divisions lost over 50% of their personnel and equipment. The troops of the Western Front suffered especially heavy losses. German troops, having advanced 300-500 km deep into our country over several weeks of fighting in different directions, captured the territory where almost 2/3 of industrial and agricultural products were produced before the war. About 23 million Soviet people fell into the occupation. By the end of 1941, the total number of prisoners of war reached 3.9 million people.
Organizing resistance to the enemy. In the very first days of the war, the country's leadership took a number of measures to organize resistance to the enemy: general mobilization was announced, and the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of the Armed Forces of the USSR was created. The secret directive of June 29 contained a strict requirement to defend every inch of Soviet land; in case of a forced retreat, do not leave anything to the enemy; destroy valuable property that cannot be removed; create partisan detachments and sabotage groups in the occupied territory.
Mobilization opportunities Soviet system, strengthened by the patriotism and sacrifice of the Soviet people, played an important role in organizing resistance to the enemy. The call “Everything for the front, everything for victory!” was accepted by all the people. Hundreds of thousands of Soviet citizens voluntarily joined the active army. In the week since the start of the war, over 5 million people were mobilized.
On June 30, 1941, the State Defense Committee (GKO) was created - the extraordinary highest state body of the USSR, headed by I.V. Stalin. The State Defense Committee concentrated all power in the country during the war. Much attention was paid to military-economic work. A week after the start of the war, a mobilization plan for the third quarter of 1941 was adopted. By the Decree of the State Defense Committee of July 4, 1941, the development of a military economic plan for the use of resources and the development of enterprises evacuated to the eastern regions of the country began.
From the very first days of the war, all industrial and scientific institutions of the country began to restructure their work in accordance with the needs of defense. During the wartime period, the entire working population of cities was mobilized to work in production and construction. Decree “On the working hours of workers and employees in war time» of June 26, 1941, a working day of 11 hours was established, mandatory overtime was provided for, and vacations were abolished. A card system for distributing food among the population was reintroduced.
Muscovites at the TASS windows on Kuznetsky Most. 1941
Industrial enterprises, equipment, material and cultural values were transported to the rear. In just the first six months, over 1,500 large industrial enterprises, many educational institutions, research institutes, libraries, museums, and theaters were evacuated. More than 10 million people were taken to the east of the country (according to some sources - 17 million people). The creation of a military-industrial base in the eastern regions of the country took place under extremely difficult conditions. People in the rear worked around the clock, often under open air, in severe frosts. By mid-1942, the restructuring of the economy on a war footing was largely completed. The eastern regions of the country became the main arsenal of the front and the main production base of the country.
Western supplies played a significant role in the Soviet military economy, the production of which was reduced from 30 to 70%, especially at the initial stage.
In accordance with the first Moscow Protocol on military supplies to the USA and Great Britain in 1941-1942, signed on October 1, 1941. a significant amount of weapons, raw materials and military materials were sent monthly. The Red Army received 4,697 tanks. Since July 1942, the USSR was officially covered by the American Lend-Lease law, according to which the Soviet Union received in 1941-1945. cargo worth $11 billion, including more than 22 thousand aircraft, 12,700 tanks, 376 thousand trucks, 51 thousand jeeps, 4.5 million tons of food, 2.1 million tons of oil products, 2,000 steam locomotives, 281 warships .
Military operations in the fall of 1941 The outcome of the entire war was seriously influenced by the defensive battles that the Red Army waged in the summer and autumn of 1941. Hitler’s strategic failures near Smolensk forced him to change the direction of the main attack and reorient it from the center to the south - to Kyiv, Donbass, Rostov. Significant forces were concentrated near Kiev from both the German and Soviet sides. Together with the personnel units, militia residents of Kyiv heroically fought against the fascists. However, the Germans managed to enter the rear of the 6th and 12th armies and encircle them. For almost a whole week, Soviet soldiers and officers heroically resisted. Trying to save the troops, Cmdr. Southwestern Front Marshal Budyonny asked the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command for permission to leave Kyiv, but Stalin was against it. Only on September 18 was the order given to abandon Kyiv, but it was already too late - few managed to escape from the encirclement. In fact, both armies were lost. With the capture of Kyiv by the enemy, the road to Moscow through Bryansk and Orel opened.
At the same time, the Germans were attacking Odessa, an important base of the Black Sea Fleet. The legendary defense of Odessa lasted more than two months. The Red Army soldiers, sailors and city residents became a single combat garrison and successfully repelled the onslaught of several Romanian divisions. Only on October 16, in connection with the threat of the seizure of Crimea by order of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the defenders of Odessa left the city. A significant part of the participants in the defense of Odessa was transferred to Sevastopol. On its defensive lines, the warriors of the Primorsky Army (commander - General I. E. Petrov) and the sailors of the Black Sea Fleet (led by Vice Admiral F. S. Oktyabrsky) destroyed almost as much enemy manpower as the Nazi army lost in all theaters of combat actions before the attack on the USSR. The enemy tried more than once to take the city by storm, but Sevastopol stood unshakable.
Army Group North, having captured Pskov on July 9, advanced close to Leningrad. According to the plans of the German command, his fall should have preceded the capture of Moscow. However, despite repeated attempts, the Germans and the Finns working together with them failed to take the city. On September 8, 1941, the 900-day siege of Leningrad began. For 611 days the city was subjected to intense artillery shelling and bombing. The blockade put its defenders in an extremely difficult position. The daily bread quota in November-December 1941 was: workers - 250 g, employees and dependents - 125 g. About a million residents of Leningrad died from hunger, cold, bombing and shelling. To connect the city with the mainland, an ice track was built across Lake Ladoga, called the Road of Life by Leningraders.
Despite the occupation of a significant part of the western and southern regions of the country, the German army did not achieve decisive successes in any of the three main strategic directions of the offensive.
Battle of Moscow. On September 30, 1941, after some calm that occurred on the Central Front after the Battle of Smolensk, a new offensive by enemy troops began. The tank army of German General G. Guderian directed an attack along the Orel-Tula-Moscow line and captured Orel and Bryansk. In accordance with the Typhoon plan, the enemy concentrated 1.8 million soldiers and officers and a significant amount of military equipment in the Moscow direction, creating a numerical superiority over Soviet troops. The heroic resistance of the Red Army did not stop the Nazis; during the offensive, they managed to capture the cities of Vyazma, Mozhaisk, Kalinin and Maloyaroslavets and approach Moscow 80-100 km.
At the beginning of October the situation became critical: as a result of the encirclement of five Soviet armies the path to Moscow was practically open. The Soviet command took a number of urgent measures. On October 12, the Western Front was created under the command of General G.K. Zhukov, and the armies of the Reserve Front were also transferred to it. Particularly fierce fighting in the Moscow direction flared up in mid-October.
On October 15, 1941, the State Defense Committee decided to evacuate part of government and party institutions, the diplomatic corps to Kuibyshev (now Samara), and prepare for the destruction of 1,119 industrial enterprises and facilities in Moscow and the region. A state of siege was declared in Moscow.
Barrage balloon Bolshoi Theater. 1941
The whole country rose to defend the capital. Trains with reinforcements, weapons, and ammunition from Siberia, the Urals, the Far East, and Central Asia were rushing to Moscow. 50 thousand militia fighters came to the aid of the front.
The defenders of Tula made an invaluable contribution to the defense of Moscow. Their heroic actions prevented Guderian's army from taking the city. Moscow was also reliably protected from air attack. Defending the skies of the capital, pilot V.V. Talalikhin was one of the first to use a night air ram, for which he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
As a result of the measures taken at the end of October - beginning of November, the Nazi offensive was stopped. Operation Typhoon was disrupted. On November 6 in Moscow, in the hall of the Mayakovskaya metro station, a ceremonial meeting dedicated to the anniversary was held October revolution, at which I.V. Stalin gave a speech. On November 7, 1941, a traditional parade took place on Red Square, after which the troops immediately went to the front. All these events had great importance to maintain the morale of Soviet soldiers.
By mid-November, German troops launched a new offensive against Moscow. 51 divisions took part in it, including 13 tank and 7 motorized divisions, armed with 1.5 thousand tanks, 3 thousand guns, and supported by 700 aircraft.
As a result of the offensive, the Germans managed to capture Klin, Solnechnogorsk, Kryukovo, Yakhroma, Istra and approach Moscow within 25-30 km. The fighting was especially difficult in the defense zone of the 16th Army (commanded by General K.K. Rokossovsky) in the Istra region. A group of tank destroyers from the 316th Infantry Division of General I.V. Panfilov, who died in battle on November 18, stood to their death. Through the heroic efforts of the soldiers Nazi troops were stopped almost at the walls of the capital.
At the beginning of December 1941, the Soviet command, in secrecy, was preparing a counteroffensive near Moscow. Such an operation became possible after the formation of 10 reserve armies in the rear and a change in the balance of forces. The enemy retained superiority in the number of troops, artillery and tanks, but it was no longer overwhelming. At the beginning of December, the Germans launched another attack on Moscow, but during its course on December 5-6 Soviet troops launched a counteroffensive along the entire front - from Kalinin to Yelets. It was attended by troops of three fronts - Western (under the command of G. K. Zhukov), Kalinin (under the command of I. S. Konev) and South-Western (under the command of
S.K. Timoshenko). This offensive was a complete surprise for the German command, which was unable to repel the powerful attacks of the Red Army. By the beginning of January 1942, Soviet troops pushed the Nazis back from Moscow 100-250 km. The winter offensive of the Red Army continued until April 1942. As a result, the Moscow and Tula regions, many areas of the Smolensk, Kalinin, Ryazan and Oryol regions were completely liberated. Thus, the “blitzkrieg” strategy finally collapsed near Moscow. The failure of the attack on Moscow prevented Japan and Turkey from entering the war on the German side. The victory of the Red Army pushed the USA and England to create an anti-Hitler coalition.
Questions and tasks
1. (Work in groups.) Independently divide the text of the second paragraph of the paragraph into relatively complete parts so that their names reflect: a) the main events of June - December 1941; b) mobilizing the country to repel fascist aggressors; c) stages that can be distinguished in the development of military operations in the second half of 1941.
2. What did Hitler’s command count on during the “blitzkrieg” against the USSR and what were the reasons for the collapse of these plans?
3*. Try, based on documentary sources and the thematic map “The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union,” to compile reports from the Information Bureau on the situation on the fronts in July - December 1941. They usually began with the words: “During the day... our troops fought fierce battles with the enemy in the area ..." or "During... our troops... continue to successfully develop the offensive...".
In post-Soviet Russia, it has become fashionable to trample on old conclusions and opinions; the liberal fad also affected Soviet-Japanese relations during the Second World War.
Despite the conclusions of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, which summed up the foreign policy of Imperial Japan towards the USSR: “The Tribunal considers that an aggressive war against the USSR was envisaged and planned by Japan... that it was one of the main elements of the Japanese national policy and that its goal was to seize the territories of the USSR...", current liberal publicists and modern Japanese historians are trying to refute this conclusion.
Even the carefully developed and begun implementation of the plan of aggression against the Union - "Kantokuen" ("Special Maneuvers of the Kwantung Army") - is being tried to be presented as a purely defensive plan adopted to protect against attack by Soviet troops.
Although Japan has published a whole layer of previously secret documents of imperial meetings, the coordination committee of the imperial headquarters and the government, the General Staff and the Main Naval Staff, and other bodies of state and military leadership, which confirm the conclusions of the International Military Tribunal.
Lightning War in Japanese
At the meeting of the imperial conference held on July 2, 1941, the Japanese leadership took a course towards preparing a solution to the problem of the “North”: “Our attitude towards the German-Soviet war will be determined in accordance with the spirit Tripartite Pact(an alliance of three powers - Germany, Japan, Italy - S.A.). However, for now we will not interfere in this conflict. We will secretly strengthen our military preparations against the Soviet Union, maintaining an independent position. During this time, we will conduct diplomatic negotiations with great caution. If the German-Soviet war develops in a direction favorable to our empire, we, by resorting to armed force, will resolve the northern problem and ensure the security of the northern borders."
With the adoption of this course, the Army General Staff and the Japanese War Ministry planned a whole system of measures aimed at quickly preparing the Kwantung Army to wage an offensive war in the Far East and Siberia. This plan was called "Kantokuen" in secret documents.
On July 11, 1941, the imperial headquarters sent a special directive numbered 506 to the Kwantung Army and other Japanese armies in Northern China. It confirmed that the purpose of the “maneuvers” was to prepare for an attack on the USSR. This plan was based on the development of the Japanese General Staff in 1940.
Tojo, Hideki Minister of the Army from 1940 to 1944.
The essence of the strategic plan:
It was planned that a series of successive attacks by Japanese forces on the main directions would defeat the Red Army troops in Primorye, the Amur region and Transbaikalia and force them to capitulate; capture strategic military, industrial facilities, food bases and communications;
Much attention was paid to the Air Force; they were supposed to eliminate the Soviet Air Force in the first hours of the war with a surprise attack;
The task is to get to Baikal in 6 months and complete the main operation;
On July 5, they issued a directive from the high command, according to which they carried out the first stage of mobilization, increasing the Kwantung Army by 2 divisions (51st and 57th).
On July 7, the emperor allowed a secret conscription and conscription armed forces half a million people, ships with a tonnage of 800 thousand tons were also allocated for transporting military cargo to Northern China. All events were carried out in the strictest secrecy, under the legend of training camps for enlisted personnel, and was called an “extraordinary conscription.” Families were prohibited from seeing off, and in the documents the word “mobilization” was replaced with the term “extraordinary formations.”
On July 22, they began to concentrate troops near the Soviet border, but such large-scale events were difficult to keep secret. Up to 10 thousand soldiers and 3.5 thousand horses passed through points on Korean territory alone per day. The Ambassador of the Third Reich to Japan, Ott, and the military attache, Kretschmer, reported to Berlin on July 25 that 900 thousand people aged 24 to 45 were conscripted in Japan. Persons who spoke Russian were sent to Northern China.
3 fronts were formed - eastern, northern and western, 629 units and subunits were sent to them, a total of 20 divisions, then they planned to strengthen their numbers with another 5 divisions. Some units were transferred from the Sino-Japanese front. After the second stage of mobilization (order No. 102 of July 16, 1941), the number of Japanese troops near the borders of the USSR increased to 850 thousand people.
Military units on the Kuril Islands, South Sakhalin and Hokkaido were put on full combat readiness.
In total, it was planned to involve up to a million people in the attack; reserves of ammunition, fuel, food, and medicine were created in Korea and northern China to wage an intensive war for 2-3 months.
Auxiliary forces
In addition to the Japanese army itself, they planned to introduce the armed forces of puppet state formations into battle - Manchu Imperial Army State of Manchukuo. Its number was more than 100 thousand people (in 1944 - over 200 thousand), small arms were no worse than Japanese, there were sufficient machine guns, artillery was weak, and there was practically no air force or armored vehicles.
Mengjiang National Army– Mengjiang, a puppet state formed by the Japanese military administration in the central part of Inner Mongolia (Chahar, Zhehe and Suiyuan provinces). The size of the army ranged from 4 to 20 thousand people. The armament is weak, most of the personnel are cavalry.
They were under the command of the Kwantung Army headquarters and under the direct supervision of Japanese military advisers. Japanese officers prepared military-trained reserves from local residents. In 1940, a law on compulsory military service was introduced in Manchukuo. The Mengjiang Army was intended to join the Japanese forces in invading the Mongol Empire. People's Republic. According to the Kantokuen plan, it was envisaged to “create a situation in which the voluntary unification of Outer Mongolia with Inner Mongolia would occur.”
White emigrants, the Japanese did not forget about the White Guards; since 1938, units from Russians (who had extensive combat experience) were formed for the war with the USSR, for example: the brigade of Colonel of the Kwantung Army Makoto Asano, Cossack cavalry detachments under the command of Colonel Ivan Aleksandrovich Peshkov, united in the unit “ Peshkovsky detachment." Due to their vast combat experience, they were intended to carry out reconnaissance and sabotage operations: their tasks included damaging railways and other communications, communications, striking supply bases in the rear of Soviet troops, conducting reconnaissance, committing sabotage, and conducting anti-Soviet propaganda. According to the Kantokuen plan, by order of the commander of the Kwantung Army, special units were formed from them.
"Russian Fascist Organization", Harbin.
Missions of the Imperial Japanese Navy
The Japanese Navy was supposed to support the landing of amphibious forces in Kamchatka, support the operation from the sea to occupy Northern Sakhalin and capture Vladivostok, and destroy the Soviet Pacific Navy. On July 25, an order was given to form the 5th Fleet specifically for the war with the USSR.
Readiness for surgery
By August, the Japanese armed forces were ready for a blitzkrieg. By the beginning of the Soviet-German War, Japan had 14 personnel divisions in Korea and Northern China. At the beginning, they planned to increase their number to 34 divisions, transferring 6 divisions from Japan and 14 from the Chinese front. But the command of the Japanese Expeditionary Army in China opposed it.
At the end of July, the War Ministry and the General Staff decided to reduce the invasion force to 25 divisions, then to 20. On July 31, 1941, at a meeting between the Chief of Operations of the General Staff, Tanaka, and War Minister Tojo, the final decision was made: 24 divisions would be needed for the war against the Soviet Union. In reality, the Japanese concentrated a group of forces numbering 850 thousand “bayonets,” which is equal to 58-59 Japanese infantry divisions. The Japanese command believed that they would be opposed by up to 30 Soviet divisions, and created double superiority.
Doubts of the Japanese command
In the second half of July, the Japanese command began to doubt the success of the German Blitzkrieg. The Japanese began to analyze the course of military operations and made several comments:
The enormity of the tetra of military operations allows the Wehrmacht to wage a war of maneuver, but at the same time helps the Soviet troops to conduct a proper retreat, and the Red Army could not be destroyed in border battles.
Guerrilla warfare would seriously complicate life for the Wehrmacht.
Japan is trying to find out from Berlin the timing of the completion of the campaign. The Japanese ambassador in Berlin, Oshima, testified subsequently: “In July - early August it became known that the pace of the German army’s advance had slowed down. Moscow and Leningrad were not captured on time. In this regard, I met with Ribbentrop to get clarification. He invited me to meeting of Field Marshal Keitel, who stated that the slowdown in the pace of the German army’s offensive was due to the large length of communications, as a result of which the rear units were lagging behind. Therefore, the offensive was delayed by three weeks.” Tokyo increasingly doubts the possibility of a quick defeat of the USSR. Doubts are reinforced by Berlin's increasingly insistent demands to open a second front against the Soviet Union.
Japan had doubts that the Red Empire was a titan with feet of clay before. Thus, an employee of the Japanese embassy in Moscow, Yoshitani, warned in September 1940: “The idea that Russia will collapse from within when the war starts is completely absurd.” On July 22, 1941, Japanese generals were forced to admit in the “Secret Diary...” (it assessed the events and situation on the fronts of World War II): “Exactly a month has passed since the beginning of the war. Although the operations of the German army continue, the Stalinist regime, contrary to expectations, turned out to be durable."
By the beginning of August, the 5th Department of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (its area of activity is the USSR) concluded in the document “Assessment of the current situation in the Soviet Union” that: “Even if the Red Army leaves Moscow this year, it will not capitulate. Germany’s intention quickly the decisive battle will not be completed. The further development of the war will not be beneficial for the German side."
But the military command of the army and navy did not support the doubts of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and intelligence, military preparations were in full swing. Chief of the General Staff Sugiyama and War Minister Tojo said: “There is a high probability that the war will end with a quick German victory. It will be extremely difficult for the Soviets to continue the war. The statement that the German-Soviet war is dragging on is a hasty conclusion.” The Japanese army leadership did not want to miss the opportunity to strike at the Union together with Germany.
The military of the Kwantung Army especially insisted: its commander Umezu conveyed to the center: “A favorable moment will definitely come... Right now a rare opportunity has presented itself, which happens once in a thousand years, to implement the state policy towards the Soviet Union. It is necessary to seize on this... If there is an order to start military operations, I would like the leadership of operations to be given to the Kwantung Army... I repeat once again that the main thing is not to miss the moment to implement the state’s policy.” The Kwantung Army insisted on an immediate strike. Her chief of staff, Lieutenant General Yoshimoto, convinced Tanaka, chief of the operations department of the General Staff: “The beginning of the German-Soviet war is an opportunity sent down to us from above to resolve the northern problem. We need to discard the “ripe persimmon” theory and create a favorable moment ourselves... Even if the preparations are insufficient, speaking this fall , you can count on success."
Why didn't Japan strike?
The main sign of the emergence of a favorable moment - “ripe persimmon” - was considered to be the weakening of Soviet forces in the Far East and Siberia. The Japanese General Staff believed that “blitzkrieg” in Japanese style was possible only if the Russian group was reduced from 30 divisions to 15, and the number of armored vehicles, artillery and aircraft was reduced by two-thirds.
Intelligence reported that during the 3 weeks of the war, only 17% of the personnel and about a third of the armored vehicles were transferred from the Far East. In addition, the personnel were immediately replenished with reservists. They noted that they were mainly transferring the forces of the Trans-Baikal Military District, while other groups of the Red Army were almost not affected.
The Japanese General Staff also monitored Soviet aviation with great attention. According to him, the Soviet Air Force had 60 heavy bombers, 450 fighters, 60 attack aircraft, 80 bombers long range, 330 light bombers and 200 naval aircraft. One of the headquarters documents dated July 26, 1941 stated: “In the event of a war with the USSR, as a result of several bombing attacks at night by ten, and during the day by twenty to thirty aircraft, Tokyo could be turned into ashes.” After the German attack from the Far East, according to Japanese intelligence, no more than 30 squadrons were transferred. This was not enough to weaken the Soviet Air Force, especially its bomber potential.
The Soviet army in the Far East remained a formidable force, the Japanese perfectly learned the lesson of Khalkin Gol. A sudden blow to a defeated country is one thing, a blow to a well-trained and technically equipped army is another thing. Berlin's promise to capture Moscow in 3 weeks was not fulfilled.
On August 28, an entry full of pessimism was made in the “Secret War Diary”: “Even Hitler is mistaken in his assessment of the Soviet Union. Therefore, what can we say about our intelligence department. The war in Germany will continue until the end of the year... What is the future of the empire? The prospects are gloomy. Truly you can’t guess the future ..."
On September 3, at a meeting of the coordination council of the government and the imperial headquarters, the meeting participants came to the conclusion that “since Japan will not be able to launch large-scale operations in the north until February, it is necessary to quickly carry out operations in the south during this time.”
Thus, in the summer of 1941, the Red Army broke not only the plan of the German blitzkrieg, but also the plan of the Japanese “blitzkrieg war” against the USSR; Tokyo decided not to take risks and come to grips with the Southern strategic direction. On September 6, in the “Program for Implementing the State Policy of the Empire,” it was decided to seize the colonies of Western powers in the South, and, if necessary, go to war with the USA, Great Britain, and Holland. To do this, complete all military preparations by the end of October. The meeting participants came to the unanimous opinion that there would be no better time to attack England and the United States.
Military preparations against the USSR were postponed until the spring of 1942, and Soviet intelligence officer Richard Sorge reported this to Moscow.
In Berlin, Japanese Ambassador Oshima informed the Reich leadership: “At this time of year, military action against the Soviet Union can only be undertaken on a small scale. It will probably not be too difficult to occupy the northern (Russian) part of Sakhalin Island. Due to the fact that Soviet troops have suffered heavy losses in battles with German troops, they can probably also be pushed back from the border. However, an attack on Vladivostok, as well as any advance towards Lake Baikal, is impossible at this time of year, and due to the current circumstances it will have to be postponed until spring." The Japanese army had experience in invading the Far East and Siberia in 1918-1922, so in the Siberian winter it was even more dangerous to launch an invasion.
Results
Japan did not attack the USSR not because of strict implementation of the neutrality pact between the USSR and Japan, but because of failure German plan blitzkrieg and Moscow maintaining reliable cover for the Eastern regions of the country.
The main method of war of the Third Reich, due to the lack of resources and the fact that Germany began to form its military power relatively recently, due to the prohibitions of the Versailles Treaty, until 1933, its capabilities were limited, was “blitzkrieg”.
The Wehrmacht tried to crush the main enemy forces with the first blow, by achieving maximum concentration of forces in the main directions of attack. April 3, 1939 original plan war with Poland, Plan Weiss - The White Plan, developed by the headquarters of the German Armed Forces, was sent to the commanders of the ground forces, air force and navy. By May 1, the commanders had to provide their opinion regarding the war with Poland. The date for the attack on the Poles was also named - September 1, 1939. By April 11, the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (OKW) developed the “Directive on the unified preparation of the Armed Forces for war in 1939-1940”, it was signed by Adolf Hitler.
The basis of the White Plan was the plan for a “lightning war” - the Polish armed forces were supposed to dismember, encircle and destroy with swift deep blows. Armored units and the Luftwaffe were to play a major role in this. The main blows were to be delivered by Army Group “North” from Pomerania and East Prussia and “South” from the territory of Moravia and Silesia; they were supposed to defeat the main forces of the Polish army west of the Vistula and Narew rivers. The German Navy was supposed to blockade Polish bases from the sea, destroy the Polish Navy, and support ground forces.
The defeat and capture of Poland was planned not only with the aim of solving the problem of Danzig and connecting the territories of the two parts of the Reich (East Prussia was an enclave), but also as a stage in the struggle for world domination, the most important step in the implementation of the “Eastern program” of the Nazis, the expansion of “living space” Germans. So, on May 23, 1939, at a meeting with the military, Hitler said: “Danzig is by no means the object for which everything is being done. For us, we are talking about expanding living space in the East and providing food, as well as solving the Baltic problem.” That is, there was only talk about the defeat of Poland and solving the Danzig problem, there was no “Polish corridor”, from the very beginning they planned to deprive Poland of statehood, they were faced with a policy of genocide and plunder of resources in favor of Germany.
In addition, the territory of Poland was supposed to become an important springboard for a strike against Soviet Union. The defeat of Poland was supposed to be the first step in preparing a strike on France.
Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, Walter Brauchitsch.
Hitler and Brauchitsch at the parade on October 5, 1939.
Germany's capture of Czechoslovakia and Memel sharply complicated the military-strategic position of Poland; the Wehrmacht had the opportunity to strike from the north and south. With the capture of Czechoslovakia, the Wehrmacht strengthened its capabilities, capturing powerful Czech industry and a lot of equipment.
The main problem for the military-political leadership of Germany was the need to avoid a war on two fronts - an attack by the French army from the west, with the assistance of England. In Berlin it was believed that Paris and London would continue to adhere to the course of “appeasement”, the Munich course. Thus, Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces Halder wrote in his diary that Hitler is confident that England will threaten, stop trade for a while, maybe recall the ambassador, but will not enter the war. This is confirmed by General K. Tippelskirch: “Despite the existing Franco-Polish alliance and the guarantees that England gave Poland at the end of March... Hitler hoped that he had managed to limit himself to a military conflict with Poland alone.” Guderian: “Hitler and his Foreign Minister Ribbentrop were inclined to believe that the Western powers would not dare to start a war against Germany and therefore had a free hand to achieve their goals in Eastern Europe.”
In principle, Hitler turned out to be right, Paris and London “save face” by declaring war on Germany, but in reality they did nothing to help Poland - the so-called “Phantom War”. And the opportunity was left to settle the bloodless “war” between Germany and France and England.
Hitler also played on the anti-Soviet sentiments of the elite of France and England, presenting the attack on Poland as preparation for a strike on the Union, hiding his next stage on the path to dominance in Europe - the defeat of France. In addition, the quick, lightning defeat of Poland was supposed to prevent the real involvement of the Anglo-French forces in the war with Germany. Therefore, to cover the western border of Germany, a minimum of forces and resources were allocated, without tanks. Only 32 divisions were deployed there, with 800 aircraft - Army Group C, of which only 12 divisions were fully equipped, the rest were sharply inferior in their combat capabilities. They could only be used for positional warfare, and then only in secondary sectors. These divisions were supposed to hold the defense on a border with a length of about 1390 km, with Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, France; the fortified Siegfried Line was still under construction and could not be a reliable support.
By the beginning of the war in Poland, France alone on the eastern border had 78 divisions, more than 17 thousand guns and mortars, about 2 thousand tanks (excluding light armored vehicles), 1,400 first-line aircraft and 1,600 aircraft in reserve. In the very first days, this group could have been significantly strengthened. Plus support from the British Navy and Air Force.
The German generals were aware of all this and were very nervous, as Manstein wrote: “the risk that the German command took was very great... there is no doubt that from the very first day of the war the French army was many times superior to the German forces operating on the Western Front.” .
German soldiers on the Polish border.
The task of a crushing defeat of the Polish army, maximum concentration of forces and means
The task of the total defeat and destruction of the Polish troops was finally formulated by A. Hitler at a meeting with the highest generals on August 22, 1939: “Goal: Destruction of Poland, elimination of its manpower. This is not about reaching some milestone or new border, but about destroying the enemy, which should be steadily strived for by any means... The winner is never judged or questioned...” The Directive on the plan of attack on Poland by the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, Colonel General Brauchitsch, also begins with these words: “The purpose of the operation is the destruction of the Polish Armed Forces.”
To achieve this, the Wehrmacht concentrated its forces and resources against Poland as much as possible: all the most trained divisions, all tanks, and the 1st and 4th air fleets were sent against it. By September 1, 1939, 54 divisions were concentrated in full combat readiness (several more were in reserve - a total of 62 divisions were put up against the Poles): in Army Group North the 3rd and 4th armies, in Army Group South 8, 10 , 14th Army. The total number of invasion forces was 1.6 million people, 6 thousand. artillery pieces, 2,000 aircraft and 2,800 tanks. In addition, the Polish command made it easier for the Wehrmacht by dispersing its forces along the entire border, trying to cover the entire border, instead of trying to tightly close the main directions of possible attacks, concentrating on them the maximum possible number of forces and means.
Gerd von Rundstedt, commander of Army Group South, concentrated: 21 infantry divisions, 4 tank, 2 motorized, 4 light, 3 mountain rifle divisions; There are 9 more divisions and more than 1000 tanks in reserve. The commander of Army Group North, Theodor von Bock, had 14 infantry divisions, 2 tank, 2 motorized, 1 cavalry brigade, and 2 divisions in reserve. Both army groups attacked general direction the 10th Army was advancing on Warsaw, towards the Vistula, at Army Group South, the weaker 8th and 14th supported it with offensive actions. In the center, the Wehrmacht concentrated relatively small forces; they were supposed to distract the enemy, misleading him about the main directions of attack.
Gerd von Rundstedt, led Army Group South.
As a result, the Wehrmacht managed to concentrate overwhelming superiority in the directions of the main attacks: 8-fold in tanks, 4-fold in field artillery, 7-fold in anti-tank artillery. In addition, measures were successfully carried out to camouflage large forces, including mechanized ones.
The maximum pace of advance of the tank and motorized divisions was planned; they were instructed not to be distracted by the final destruction of the defeated Polish units, entrusting this task, as well as covering the flanks and rear, to the infantry divisions. They were supposed to prevent the Polish command from carrying out measures to mobilize, concentrate, and regroup troops and seize the most important economic regions intact. On August 14, Hitler set the task of defeating Poland in the shortest possible time - 8-14 days, after which the main forces were to be freed for possible actions on other fronts. On August 22, Hitler said: “A quick outcome of military operations is necessary... The main thing is speed. Persecution until complete destruction."
An important role in disrupting the enemy's mobilization activities was assigned to aviation; it was supposed to strike Polish mobilization centers, disrupt traffic on railways and highways, and prevent the Poles from concentrating a group of forces in the offensive zone of the 10th Army, in Western Galicia, west of the Vistula ; disrupt the organization of defense measures in the offensive zone of Army Group North at the Vistula-Drevenets line and on the Narew.
Destruction of the enemy by envelopment and encirclement: The White Plan was based on the idea of deep envelopment, encirclement, and destruction of the main forces of the Polish armed forces west of the Vistula and Narev rivers. This plan was brought to life by a successful strategic position - the opportunity to deploy troops on the territory of the former Czechoslovakia. By the way, Slovakia also allocated a couple of divisions for the war with Poland. The Poles angered them so much with their territorial claims.
As a result, the Wehrmacht attacked with two flank groups located far from each other, almost completely abandoning major operations in the center.
Theodor von Bock, commander of Army Group North.
Diplomatic cover, disinformation measures
In order to be able to deliver the most sudden blow possible, Berlin hid its intentions even from its allies, Rome and Tokyo. At the same time, secret negotiations were conducted with England, France, and Poland, declarations of commitment to the idea of peace were proclaimed, even the party congress scheduled for September was called the “peace congress.”
To intimidate the French in order to keep them from entering the war, Hitler at the end of July demonstratively visited the Siegfried Line, although the command and Hitler knew that it was not ready and made a fuss on the radio in the media about its complete readiness and “impregnability.” Even the photos of the “new” defensive structures were still of the old fortifications - until 1933. Rumors were spread about the concentration of large forces in the West. As a result, Warsaw “took the bait” and believed that if the war began, the main forces of Germany would fight in the West, there would be auxiliary forces against it, and that they would even be able to carry out offensive operation against East Prussia.
Pressuring Warsaw about Danzig and construction railway and the highway in the “Polish corridor”, Berlin simultaneously spoke about the general direction of the struggle - against the USSR, about a possible joint campaign to the East, the Poles were promised Ukraine and access to the Black Sea. Thus depriving Poland of its only opportunity to survive, it would agree to help the USSR, which it offered more than once, before concluding a pact with Germany.
The construction of defensive structures began on the border with Poland, lulling the vigilance of the Poles. This was one of the largest and most expensive measures to mislead Poland. Since the spring of 1939, the so-called “Eastern Wall” was built and the pace of construction was quite high; entire Wehrmacht divisions took part in the construction. At the same time, the construction also explained the high concentration of Wehrmacht forces on the border with Poland. The transfer of additional units to East Prussia was disguised as preparation for the celebration of the 25th anniversary of the victory over the Russian army at Tannenberg in August 1914.
Polish prisoners of war in a temporary German camp in Poland, September 1939.
Even covert mobilization began only on August 25; it was considered that the available forces were sufficient and therefore the full deployment of all forces could be neglected. Therefore, we decided to temporarily refrain from creating a reserve army. Territorial divisions of the Landwehr. The deployment of aviation was planned only on the very first day of the war.
As a result, even before the official mobilization, Berlin was able to transfer and deploy for the invasion 35% of the wartime ground forces, 85% of the tank, 100% of the motorized and light divisions, and only 63% of the forces allocated for the war with Poland. In the first operations against Poland, 100% of the motorized and 86% of the tank forces and only 80% of the forces planned for the entire military campaign against Poland were able to participate. This made it possible to carry out the first strike with the entire power of the main forces, while the Poles by September 1 completed only 60% of the mobilization plan, deploying 70% of the troops.
Tent camp of German troops near the border with Poland shortly before the German invasion. Time of shooting: 08/31/1939-09/01/1939.
German Junkers Ju-87 dive bombers in the skies of Poland, September 1939.
Bottom line
In general, the plan was carried out, but the reasons for this are not only that the Wehrmacht was magnificent, there are also other fundamental reasons: the weakness of Poland itself. The Polish elite completely failed the pre-war stage, both politically and diplomatically, and militarily. They did not seek an alliance with the USSR, they finally became its enemy, they did not make concessions on the issue of Danzig and the construction of a highway and railway to East Prussia - although there was a possibility that Berlin would limit itself to this and in the end Poland, as it wanted, would become a satellite of Germany , in the war with the USSR. They chose the wrong defense strategy - dispersing forces along the entire border; before the war they did not pay enough attention to aviation, air defense systems, and anti-tank artillery.
The Polish military-political leadership behaved disgustingly, not using all the possibilities for struggle, abandoning their people and army while they were still fighting, running away, thereby finally breaking the will to resist.
Berlin was lucky that there were people not like de Gaulle in Paris; a blow from the French army would have brought Germany to the brink of disaster; the path to Berlin was actually open. It would be necessary to urgently transfer forces to the West, stopping the advance of the French army, the Poles would continue to resist. Hitler would have gotten a real war on two fronts, a protracted one, for which Germany was not ready; she would have had to look for a way out in diplomacy.
German soldiers inspect an abandoned single-turret Polish Vickers tank; it is distinguished from a regular one by a large air intake casing with a grille.
Polish 7TP tanks captured by the Germans march past the main stands at the parade marking the first anniversary of the surrender of Polish troops on October 6, 1940. Governor Hans Frank and Field Marshal Wilhelm List are present in the high stands. Time taken: 10/06/1940. Filming location: Warsaw, Poland.
The German army marches through captured Warsaw, the capital of Poland.
Sources:
Documents and materials on the eve of the Second World War. 1937-1939. In 2 volumes. M., 1981.
Kurt von Tippelskirch. Second World War. Blitzkrieg. M., 2011.
Manstein E. Lost victories. Memoirs of a field marshal. M., 2007.
Solovyov B.G. Suddenness of attack is a weapon of aggression. M., 2002.
http://militera.lib.ru/db/halder/index.html
http://militera.lib.ru/h/tippelskirch/index.html
http://militera.lib.ru/memo/german/guderian/index.html
http://waralbum.ru/category/war/east/poland_1939/