Prince Igor Rurikovich. Panorama of the Russian-Byzantine War (941-944). Virtual tour of the Russian-Byzantine War (941-944). Sights, map, photo, video

The Drevlyans were indignant and thought to free themselves from tribute. Igor pacified them and forced them to pay more than before. He also made trips to foreign lands, but he did not have the same luck as Oleg. Under Igor Rurikovich, a raid was carried out on the Caspian residents. In 913, the Russians appeared in the Black Sea on five hundred boats, sailed to the Azov Sea, climbed the Don to the place where it comes close to the Volga, and sent to the Khazar Kagan to ask for passage through his possessions along the Volga to the Caspian Sea: they promised to give Khazars half of all the spoils that they capture. Kagan agreed. Prince Igor's warriors dragged their boats into the sea, scattered along its southern and western shores, began to mercilessly beat the inhabitants, and take women and children captive. The residents tried to resist, but the Russians defeated their army. The winners captured huge booty and sailed from the Caspian Sea back to the Volga. Here they gave, as agreed before, half of the looted booty to the Kagan, but the Khazars wanted to take the other half from the Russians. After a three-day terrible battle, most of the Russian army was exterminated, and its remnants, fleeing up the Volga, almost all died in the fight against Bulgarians.

Pechenegs and Russians

At the end of the 9th century, shortly before the beginning of the reign of Igor Rurikovich, hordes of a new tribe of nomads - the Pechenegs - appeared in the neighborhood of the Russians. They began to roam the steppes from the Danube to the Don. The Byzantine government, in order to save its possessions from their raids, tried to live in peace with them, sent rich gifts to their leaders, and sometimes the treacherous Greeks bribed the Pechenegs to attack the Russians. In peacetime, the Pechenegs sold horses, bulls, and sheep to the Russians, sometimes hired out to transport goods and thus helped trade relations with the Greeks. But for the most part, these nomads were at enmity with the Russians, unexpectedly burst into the Russian region in small detachments, plundered it, burned settlements, destroyed fields, and often attacked Russian merchant caravans, waiting for them at the Dnieper rapids.

The Pechenegs were tall, strong people wild, ferocious looking. They were excellent horsemen and excellent shooters. Arrows and spears were their main weapons, and chain mail and helmets protected them from enemy attacks. On their light steppe horses, with wild screams, they rushed at their enemies, showering them with arrows. Then, if they could not immediately break the enemy, they took a feigned flight, trying to lure the enemy into pursuit and, with the help of an ambush, surround him and destroy him. Igor Rurikovich, the first of the Russian princes, had to defend his region from these steppe predators.

Prince Igor's campaigns against Byzantium

Igor, following the example of Oleg, decided to make a big raid on Byzantium and provide himself and his squad with large booty. Gathering a huge army, he headed the usual way on boats to the shores of Byzantium. As soon as countless Russian ships appeared in the Black Sea, the Danube Bulgarians let the emperor know about this. This time the Russians attacked the Asian shores Byzantine Empire and here, according to Greek news, they began to rage terribly: they subjected prisoners to various tortures, burned villages, plundered churches and monasteries. Finally, the Greeks gathered their strength, equipped their ships and set out against their enemies. Igor Rurikovich was quite confident that the Russians would win, but he was mistaken. When the Byzantine ships met the Russians, suddenly the Byzantines began to throw fire at the Russian boats. If he gets on a boat, there is no escape! The flame engulfs it - the water does not extinguish it, the fire falls on the water - and it burns on the water!.. Horror took possession of everyone; the bravest ones, the fighting warriors, even wavered and all took to flight. Some of Prince Igor’s warriors threw themselves from the burning boats straight into the water and drowned; many Russians died here, many of them fell into the hands of the Byzantines.

Few escaped and later told with horror that during this battle the Greeks had heavenly lightning in their hands, that they threw it at the Russian boats and they died in the flames. The fact is that the Byzantines used a special composition of several flammable substances (oil, sulfur, resin, etc.) in war. When this composition was lit, the fire could not be extinguished by water; it even intensified the flame. This composition floated on the water and burned. On Byzantine ships, special copper pipes, with their help, the Greeks, coming close to the enemy ships, threw the burning train and set them on fire. This " greek fire", as he was called, terrified not only the Russians, but also other foreigners who attacked the Greeks.

Igor Rurikovich wanted at all costs to atone for the shame of his defeat and take revenge on the Greeks. He sent overseas to invite willing people from the Normans to a new campaign against Byzantium. Crowds of predatory warriors, greedy for prey, headed to Kyiv. Prince Igor spent three years getting ready, finally got ready, hired the Pechenegs, and so that they would not change, he took hostages from them and set off.

Prince Igor's campaign against Constantinople in 941. Miniature from the Radziwill Chronicle

A terrible message came to the Byzantine capital of Constantinople from Korsun (a Greek city on the Tauride Peninsula): “Rus is coming without number: their ships covered the entire sea!..” This news was followed by another from the Bulgarians: “Rus is coming and the Pechenegs are with them!”

The Byzantine emperor decided that it was better to somehow appease the enemies without entering into a new struggle with them, and sent several noble boyars to tell Igor: “Don’t come at us, take the tribute that Oleg took, we will also add to it.”

The Greeks and Pechenegs sent rich gifts - a lot of gold and expensive pavoloks (silk fabrics). The Russians had already reached the Danube at this time. Igor Rurikovich called his squad, told them about the proposal of the Byzantine emperor and began to consult what to do. We decided to accept the offer.

“When the emperor,” said the squad, “and so offers to pay tribute and we can take gold, silver and pavoloks from Byzantium without a fight, then what else do we need? Who knows who will win - us or them! And you can’t come to an agreement with the sea. We are not walking on land, but in the depths of the sea - death may be common to all of us.”

The prince accepted this advice, took gold and grass from the Greeks for himself and all his soldiers, and returned to Kyiv.

The next year, he and the Byzantine emperor exchanged embassies and concluded a new treaty, similar to the treaty between Oleg and the Greeks. Prince Igor Rurikovich came with his senior warriors (boyars) to the hill where the idol of Perun stood. Everyone laid down their weapons, spears, swords, shields and swore to the Byzantine ambassadors that they would respect the agreement. There were also Christians among the warriors, they swore allegiance in the church of St. Ilya.

Prince Igor presented the Greek ambassadors with furs, wax and servants (that is, slaves) and released them.

Treaties with the Byzantines of Igor Rurikovich and earlier - Oleg - show that the Russians did not just carry out wild raids, but also had trade benefits in mind. These agreements already stipulate various benefits for Russian traders; Both sides are obliged to provide assistance to merchants, castaways, it is fair to sort out and judge various quarrels that may arise during trade relations, etc. The fearful Greeks, apparently afraid of the warlike Russians, demand that more than 50 of them not enter the capital at once, and unarmed ones at that...

The Russian chronicles tell about the death of Igor Rurikovich as follows. In his old age he did not go to polyudye. The collection of tribute was called polyudye: the prince and his retinue usually walked through villages and towns “by people” and collected tribute, which he shared with the retinues. The prince began to entrust the collection of tribute to his boyar Sveneld. This was unprofitable for Igor’s squad, and they began to grumble:

“The youths (combatants) of Sveneld became rich in weapons and clothes, and we are naked, come, prince, with us for tribute, and you will get it, and we will!”

Prince Igor collects tribute from the Drevlyans in 945. Painting by K. Lebedev, 1901-1908

Prince Igor listened to them and went into the land Drevlyans collect tribute, and he and his squad resorted to violence. The prince was already returning to Kyiv with tribute, but he wanted to collect more. Igor Rurikovich released most of the squad, and with a small detachment returned again to the land of the Drevlyans to carry out exactions. The Drevlyans were indignant, gathered at a meeting and decided with Mal, their foreman, or prince, as they called him: “When a wolf gets into the habit of going into a flock of sheep, he will plunder the whole flock if they do not kill him; so this one (Igor), if we don’t put him to death, will destroy us all.”

Execution of Prince Igor by the Drevlyans. Drawing by F. Bruni

When Prince Igor again began to collect tribute by force, the Drevlyans from the city of Korosten killed small squad Igor and he himself were killed (945). There is news that they, having bent the trunks of two trees to one another, tied the unfortunate prince to them, then released them, and Igor Rurikovich died a terrible death - he was torn into two parts by the trees.

Before 912 Kievan Rus Prince Oleg ruled on behalf of Igor, since the latter was still very young. Being modest by nature and upbringing, Igor respected his elders and did not dare to lay claim to the throne during the life of Oleg, who surrounded his name with a halo of glory for his deeds. Prince Oleg approved the choice of wife for the future ruler. The Kiev prince Igor married in 903 a simple girl, Olga, who lived near Pskov.

Beginning of reign

After Oleg died, Igor became the full-fledged prince of Rus'. His reign began with war. At this time, the Drevlyan tribe decided to leave the power of Kyiv and the uprising began. New ruler brutally punished the rebels, inflicting a crushing defeat on them. This battle began numerous campaigns of Prince Igor. The result of the campaign against the Drevlyans was the unconditional victory of Rus', which, as a winner, demanded additional tribute from the rebels. The following campaigns were aimed at confronting the Pechenegs, who, having expelled the Ugor tribes from the Urals, continued their advance to the West. The Pechenegs, in the fight against Kievan Rus, occupied the lower reaches of the Dnieper River, thereby blocking the trade opportunities of Rus', since it was through the Dnieper that the route from the Varangians to the Greeks passed. The campaigns carried out by Prince Igor against the Polovtsians met with varying success.

Campaigns against Byzantium

Despite the ongoing confrontation with the Cumans, new war continue. In 941, Igor declares war on Byzantium, thereby continuing foreign policy predecessors. The reason for the new war was that after the death of Oleg, Byzantium considered itself free from previous obligations and ceased to fulfill the terms of the peace treaty. The campaign against Byzantium was truly outstanding. For the first time so big army was approaching the Greeks. The Kiev ruler took with him about 10,000 ships, according to the chroniclers, which was 5 times Furthermore troops with which Oleg won. But this time the Russians failed to take the Greeks by surprise; they managed to gather a large army and won the first battle on land. As a result, the Russians decided to win the war through naval battles. But this did not work out either. Byzantine ships, using a special incendiary mixture, began to burn Russian ships with oil. Russian warriors were simply amazed by these weapons and perceived them as heavenly. The army had to return to Kyiv.

Two years later, in 943, Prince Igor organized a new campaign against Byzantium. This time the army was even larger. In addition to the Russian army, mercenary detachments were invited, which consisted of Pechenegs and Varangians. The army moved towards Byzantium by sea and land. The new campaigns promised to be successful. But the surprise attack failed. Representatives of the city of Chersonesos managed to report to the Byzantine emperor that the new numerous Russian army is approaching Constantinople. This time the Greeks decided to avoid battle and proposed a new peace treaty. The Kiev prince Igor, after consulting with his squad, accepted the terms of the peace treaty, which were identical to the terms of the agreement signed by the Byzantines with Oleg. This completed the Byzantine campaigns.

End of the reign of Prince Igor

According to records in the chronicles, in November 945, Igor gathered a squad and moved to the Drevlyans to collect tribute. Having collected tribute, he released most of the army and with a small squad went to the city Iskorosten. The purpose of this visit was to demand tribute for himself personally. The Drevlyans were outraged and planned murder. Having armed the army, they set off to meet the prince and his retinue. This is how the murder of the Kyiv ruler took place. His body was buried not far from Iskorosten. According to legend, the murder was characterized by extreme cruelty. He was tied hand and foot to bent trees. Then the trees were released... Thus ended the reign of Prince Igor...

Russian-Byzantine War 941-944- Prince Igor’s unsuccessful campaign against Byzantium and a repeated campaign in , which ended in a peace treaty in .

N. Ya. Polovoy offers the following reconstruction of events: Khalga was one of Igor’s governors. While he was fighting Pesach, Igor decided to make peace with the Khazars, recalled Khalga from Tmutarakan and marched on Constantinople. That is why Khalga so firmly holds her promise to Pesach to fight Roman. Part of the Russian army with governor Khalga passed by ships past Chersonesus, and the other part with Igor along the coast of Bulgaria. From both places news came to Constantinople about the approaching enemy, so Igor did not manage to take the city by surprise, as happened with the first Rus raid in 860.

Igor's first trip. 941

Sources on the campaign of 941

Igor's second campaign. 943

The text of the Russian-Byzantine treaty, which has a military-commercial nature, is fully quoted in PVL. First of all, it regulates the conditions of stay and trade of Russian merchants in Byzantium, determines the exact amounts of monetary fines for various offenses, and establishes ransom amounts for captives. It also formulated a provision on mutual military assistance between the Russian Grand Duke and the Byzantine kings.

The next year after the conclusion of the contract Grand Duke Igor was killed by the Drevlyans.

Notes

Literature

• Polovoy N. Ya.// Byzantine timebook, volume XVIII, 1961, pp. 85-104.
• Polovoy N. Ya.

In 941, according to Greek sources - “The Life of Basil the New”, the chronicle of the successor George Amartol, the message of the Cremona bishop Liutprand, as well as Russian chronicles 1, which followed the Greek messages 2, a new Russian-Byzantine feud for a long time disrupted the course of peaceful relations between the two countries . New world was concluded only in 944.

The “Life of Basil the New” says that the Bulgarians and the strategist of Chersonesos reported to Constantinople about the movement of the Russian army, the Russians entered the empire, fought its lands all the way to Paphlagonia (Asia Minor), brutally ruining everything in their path. The 40,000-strong army of the domestique of Pamphira, the army of the patrician Phocas from Macedonia and the strategos Theodore from Thrace, who approached from the east, pushed back the Russians, and they, plunging into the boats, “ran away”. This was followed by a naval battle, in which the Greeks burned the Russian ships with “Greek fire.” Some of the Russians burned, some drowned in the sea, the survivors moved back, but along the way many of them fell ill “from a terrible relaxation of the stomach” and died. Those who reached Rus' told their relatives about the difficult trials that befell them 3 .

The successor of George Amartol narrates that the Russians in mid-June arrived on the Greek shores with 10 thousand ships and that the Russian fleet included “skedi, in the verb, from the Varangian family,” that is, ships of Varangian origin. The Russians entered the Bosphorus and here, on the closest approaches to the Byzantine capital, near the town of Hieron, they were met by Greek ships that used “fire.” Igor's fleet was defeated, after which the remaining Russian ships retreated towards Asia Minor. Only in September did the Greek commanders manage to oust the Russians from Asia Minor, and they were defeated in the second naval battle when they tried to escape from the Greeks pursuing them 4.

Liutprand is very brief in his report, but he also notes the difficult situation of Byzantium and the enormous efforts that the empire had to make to repel the Russian attack. The Byzantine fleet at this time went to fight the Arabs, and the Greeks had to practically form a fleet anew, reviving already abandoned ships. Everything was decided by a naval battle, where the Greeks used fire 5 .

“The Tale of Bygone Years” also reports that in 941, with 10 thousand ships, “Igor went to the Greeks.” The Bulgarians sent news to Constantinople about the movement of the Russian army. While Byzantium was gathering forces, the Russians fought the “Bithynian countries”, devastated and captured the lands along the “Pontus” right up to Paphlagonia, carried out the destruction of the suburbs of Constantinople, located on the banks of the Bosphorus, and brutally dealt with the overrun population. In fierce battles on land and sea, the Russians were defeated by troops arriving from the provinces and “returned to their own” 6 .

The Russian chronicle, softening the story of the defeat of Igor’s army, conveys it very close to the text of the life. However, both the “Tale of Bygone Years” and the “Novgorod First Chronicle” did not report the fact of the defeat of the Russians at Hieron immediately upon their arrival at Constantinople, they passed over in silence the history of the subsequent long and stubborn struggle of part of the Russian army against the Greeks in Asia Minor until September and presented the entire campaign in such a way that the defeat of Igor’s fleet from “Greek fire” was supposedly the end of the campaign.

N. Ya. Polova and especially Ya. N. Shchapov convincingly showed the meaning of the Russian chroniclers’ persistent defense of a different version of the campaign, different from that of the Greek chronicles. They included in the chronicles the official, princely concept of the campaign (Ya. N. Shchapov), which was probably created back in the 10th century. and within the framework of which the fact of Igor’s flight to his homeland with part of the troops did not fit, while a significant part of the Russian forces continued to fight in Asia Minor 7.

The subsequent account of events - the story of Igor’s second campaign against Byzantium - and the text of the Russian-Byzantine treaty of 944 were preserved only as part of the “Tale of Bygone Years” 8, although echoes of Igor’s two campaigns against the Greeks, as we wrote about above, are also found in “The First Novgorod Chronicle.” The treaty of 944, without causing such heated and uncompromising disputes in historiography as the previous diplomatic agreements between Rus' and Byzantium, nevertheless gave rise to many controversial problems, hypotheses, and conjectures in historical science.

In domestic historical works of the 18th - first half of the 19th century V. the history of Igor's two campaigns against Byzantium and the conclusion of the Russian-Byzantine treaty of 944 was presented mainly informatively, in full agreement with the chronicle data 9 . But already at that time, in some works there was a desire to take a research approach to solving unclear aspects of the events of 941-944. Thus, V.N. Tatishchev tried to substantiate the reason for the new Russian-Byzantine feud, noting that Igor moved against the Greeks because they “did not want to pay what was due to Olga.” M. M. Shcherbatov expressed the idea that the initiative for negotiations in 944 came from Igor, as evidenced by the sending of the Russian embassy to Constantinople; the articles of the treaty of 944 only confirmed “the previous ones, carried out under Oleg with additions.” I. N. Boltin did not agree with this interpretation of the treaty of 944 and noted that it was actually a different agreement, it contained many new articles.

IN early XIX V. A. A. Shletser, true to his “skeptical” concept Russian-Byzantine treaties X century, tried to cast a shadow of falsification on the treaty of 944. Schletser’s arguments are not new here either: silence about the agreed sources, except for the “Tale of Bygone Years,” and primarily the Byzantine chronicles; the strange disorder he found in the articles of agreement; “ dark text”, to which we owe “the stupidity and negligence of the scribes.”

However, Schletser's doubts did not find support among domestic historians XIX century N.M. Karamzin believed the chronicle and noted that relations between Byzantium and Russia broke down only after 935, since that year Russian soldiers still participated in the expedition of the Greek fleet to the West "2.

G. Evers considered the treaty of 944 (as well as 911) in terms of general development diplomatic norms of the 10th century. He noted that both agreements were preceded by preliminary agreements regarding them. Such negotiations with Igor in Kyiv were carried out by Greek ambassadors sent to Rus' by Romanus I Lecapinus, and already in Constantinople a “formal peace treaty” was concluded, the registration of which took place according to the same international scheme as the registration of the agreement of 911. However, in 944 “Only the Greeks are introduced speaking and proposing conditions,” it is they, as the victors, who prescribe the conditions, and the agreement of 944 reflects only the interests of Byzantium; it was an addition to the “main agreement” - 911. Repeating articles that remained in force were not included in the agreement of 944. 13

N.A. Lavrovsky, like G. Evers, believed that the treaty of 944 was a reflection of the development of international diplomatic practice of that time, but drew attention to some features of this charter. It is not as precise as the Act of 911: the Russian side speaks in the introduction and conclusion, and the entire article-by-article text comes on behalf of the Greeks.

Lavrovsky noted a smaller number of Greek words in the text of the agreement, and - unlike Schletser - a greater order of words in sentences, which, in his opinion, indicates either the richer experience of the drafters and translators of the agreement, or that it was an addition to the act 911, which was compiled hastily. That is why it does not contain the rigid formalities of strict translation; its language is simple and natural 14.

V.V. Sokolsky did not agree with G. Evers, noting that the agreement of 944 cannot be considered an addition to the act of 911, that it was completely independent in nature, since it included entirely the articles of previous agreements, but the articles did not included in the treaty of 944, should, in his opinion, be considered not to have retained force and canceled 15.

I.I. Sreznevsky also assessed the 944 treaty as a stereotypical international agreement. It was originally written in Greek and then translated into Russian, which to a certain extent limited the manifestation of the Russian linguistic element in the text of the treaty. I. I. Sreznevsky considered many terms of treaties to be translated, and classified as purely Russian only those that were repeated in other Russian monuments 16.

S. A. Gedeonov paid much attention to the document. Following G. Evers and N.A. Lavrovsky, he looked at it from the point of view of the international diplomatic system, but also revealed some features of the monument. The text reflected in the chronicle, believed S. A. Gedeonov, is a Greek copy from a copy coming from Rus' to the Greeks, and a Bulgarian translation of a copy coming from the Greeks to Rus'. The combination of two different letters by the chronicler constituted, in his opinion, the agreement of 944; This is evidenced by the fact that Rus' speaks at the beginning and end of the treaty, and the entire specific part of the act is stated on behalf of Byzantium 17.

D.I. Ilovaisky tried to determine the cause of the Russian-Byzantine conflict in 941, suggesting that it was the beginning of the struggle between Rus' and Byzantium for Bulgaria, where civil strife was taking place at that time. He believed that the cause of the clash could also arise from contradictions in Crimea. As for the treaty of 944, according to D.I. Ilovaisky, “confirmation of Oleg’s treaties” was combined with a number of new conditions, in particular about the “Korsun country.” “Obviously, the enterprising Igor,” notes the historian, “ managed to spread Russian domination in this region...” 18

S. M. Solovyov believed that the agreement only confirmed the brief, perhaps oral, conditions concluded on the Danube immediately after the end of the campaign. It was not as beneficial for Rus' as the treaty of 911: “... the advantage on the side of the Greeks is clearly visible; there are more restrictions and restrictions for Russians” 19.

V.I. Sergeevich agreed that the treaty of 944 was created on the model of other international diplomatic documents early Middle Ages. Using the comparative historical method, he compares the Russian-Byzantine treaties of 911, 944, 971. with the cross-kissing charters of Russian princes of a later time, as well as with the sacra of the Greco-Persian treaty of 562. He considers the charter of 944 to be the first such Russian document.

The principled position of A. Dimitriou on Russian-Byzantine treaties is stated above. He considered the agreement of 944 as a type of imperial chrisovul, but believed that chrisovul itself had not been preserved, and only a separate charter came to us, coming from the Russian side to the Greeks. The treaty of 944 was interpreted by A. Dimitriou as beneficial for the empire. He emphasized that the text of this document is simpler and clearer than the text of the 911 agreement, and explained this by a higher level of translation 21.

D. Ya. Samokvasov was the first to express an opinion about the treaty of 944 as equal and mutually beneficial, confirming and updating the agreement of 907. He saw this update as a number of additional ones - compared to the treaties of 907 and 911. - articles; the same articles, which were omitted in the document of 944, continued, in his opinion, to operate without change. One of the main arguments in favor of this assumption, D. Ya. Samokvasov considered the silence of the source about the resumption of Byzantium’s payment of the annual tribute - “ways” of Rus', as is clear from the chronicle text for 941: if the Article on the payment of tribute - “ways” continues to be in force , not indicated in the treaty of 944, this indicates the possible effect of other omitted articles 22.

A.V. Longinov believed that the agreement of 944 was built on the same principles as the agreement of 911: it was preceded by preliminary negotiations, as with the conclusion of the agreement of 911; two authentic charters were developed, coming from the Greek and Russian sides; there is a coincidence in the introductory and final parts of the documents, where the Russian side takes the floor; the final version of the agreement, as in 911, was carried out in Byzantium, which was the initiator of the agreement; the execution of treaties is the same: a duplicate of the charter coming from the Greeks was delivered to Kyiv for ratification, with its translation into Russian, and the original remained in Constantinople. The Russians swore an oath on the text coming from the Russian side, which was preserved in the princely archive. The treaty of 944 itself, according to A.V. Longinov, is a confirmation of the agreement of 907. This is a bilateral, equal treaty. Like D. Ya. Samokvasov, A. V. Longinov considered the articles of previous agreements that were not included in this agreement to be valid. Comparing the treaty of 944 with diplomatic acts XII-XIII centuries, he noted that some international stereotypes can be traced in it, indicating the commonality of this document with the monuments of Eastern European diplomacy of the early Middle Ages 2.

D. M. Meichik, analyzing the legal foundations of the treaties of 911 and 944, recognized that they expressed the synthesis of Russian and Byzantine law with the leading role of the Greek element, reflected mainly the guiding significance of Byzantine diplomacy and the range of its “moral feelings and legal concepts" In the treaties of 911 and 944. he saw the Russians' inept attempt to master diplomatic concepts and categories unfamiliar to them 24.

A. A. Shakhmatov examined the treaties of 911 and 944. as a result of the chronicler’s compilation work. And he transferred his method of analysis to the letter of 944 in connection with the study of the formula “Equal to another meeting...”, which comes at the beginning of the document. A. A. Shakhmatov believed that on the basis of these words the chronicler artificially created a version about the appearance of Byzantine ambassadors in Kyiv and the sending of a Russian embassy to Constantinople. “Conscious alteration” of the text about the events of 944 and the treaty itself - this is the conclusion of A. A. Shakhmatov. The dark places in the document, the confusion in the text with possessive pronouns, in his opinion, indicate that “the translators had difficulty coping with the editorial task that lay before them - to change the form of the contracts.” A. A. Shakhmatov also believed that the chronicler invented Igor’s second campaign against the Greeks in order to explain the subsequent appearance of the Russian-Byzantine treaty, and the second campaign itself was borrowed from the “Life of Basil the New” 25.

The treaty of 944 was assessed in general courses on Russian history by M. K. Lyubavsky (1916) and A. E. Presnyakov (1918). M.K. Lyubavsky considered the charter of 944 a trade agreement, which, with “some minor changes,” repeated Oleg’s agreement. The same idea was essentially expressed by A.E. Presnyakov 26 .

Soviet historiography to a certain extent reflected the different points of view on the treaty of 944 that existed in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Thus, V. M. Istrin in 1924 repeated the idea that the norms of Greco-Roman international law are not applicable to ancient Rus': the treaty of 944, like 911, was translated from Greek much later - already in the 11th century, and in the 10th century. it had no practical value for the Kyiv princes and was needed only by the Greeks. V. M. Istrin considered the charter of 944 to be a copy coming from Rus' to the Greeks; the Greek original, in his opinion, was irretrievably lost, which is also explained by the lack of interest among the Russians in these documents 27.

S.P. Obnorsky, having studied the linguistic basis of the treaties of 911 and 944, convincingly refuted the point of view of V.M. Istrin about the later translation of these documents and proved that the translations appeared simultaneously with the drawing up of the acts themselves. At the same time, he showed how the level of translation had changed over more than 30 years: the treaty of 944 was translated relatively well, the Russians of that time had already mastered many stereotypical international concepts and terms and the latter were no longer translated from Greek language; The Bulgarian linguistic element is less noticeable here, “but the Russian linguistic element noticeably makes itself felt in it.” M. A. Shangin, analyzing individual articles of the document, came to the conclusion that “almost every article of the Greek-Russian treaties finds justification in Byzantine law.” He showed how articles devoted to Kherson fishermen and issues of assistance during shipwrecks reflected international legal norms 28 .

B. D. Grekov in his book “Kievan Rus” outlined the chronicle version of two campaigns of Rus' against Byzantium in 941 and 944. And. Analyzing the agreement of 944, he came to the conclusion that it expressed “a new balance of power between the contracting parties.” Rus', in his opinion, was forced to abandon its previous advantages, had to henceforth pay trade duties and took on a number of obligations towards the Greeks: the defense of Byzantium from enemies, and in particular the defense of Crimea 29 . Thus, B.D. Grekov considered the agreement of 944 a diplomatic act beneficial only to Byzantium, a document reflecting the advantages of only one side.

A year later, in comments to the academic publication “The Tale of Bygone Years,” D. S. Likhachev approached the issue differently. Objecting to A. A. Shakhmatov in connection with his assumption that Igor’s second campaign against Byzantium was invented by the chronicler, D. S. Likhachev pointed out that the treaty of 944 testifies in favor of the reality of the second campaign, since it is “beneficial for the Russian side." As for the coincidence of individual phrases in the “Life of Basil the New” and the chronicle text about the events of 944, as pointed out by A. A. Shakhmatov, it, according to D. S. Likhachev, “does not indicate anything” 30.

Two years later, A. A. Zimin again supported the version that the treaty of 944 reflected the failure of the Russian campaign of 941. 31

A number of historians (A. Yu. Yakubovsky, V. V. Bartold, B. N. Zakhoder, N. Ya. Polovoy, M. I. Artamonov, A. P. Novoseltsev and some others), as noted above, considered the events of 941 -944 in close connection with the eastern policy of Rus', and in particular with the attitude of Kyiv towards the Khazar Kaganate, the peoples of the North Caucasus, the Muslim states of Transcaucasia and Iran. Thus, N. Ya. Polovoi believed that Igor organized “two grandiose campaigns” against the Greeks and “concluded an agreement with Byzantium that was beneficial for Rus'.” In combination with the aggressive campaign against Ber-daa, these events “set the stage Russian state at the center of all political life of Eastern Europe” 32 .

By the way, N. Ya. Polova not only, in our opinion, convincingly proved the reality of the message in the Russian chronicle about the second campaign against Byzantium, but also gave interesting considerations regarding the dating of this campaign, attributing it to 943. This year, N. believed. Ya. Polova, Byzantium suffered a grave diplomatic defeat, as it was forced to agree to the conclusion of an unfavorable and low-honorable peace. Since the campaign of 943 was not completed, in his opinion, it was not reflected in the Byzantine chronicles 33.

M.I. Artamonov, analyzing the same events and also through the prism of the eastern policy of Rus', came to a completely opposite conclusion. He believed that the military performance of Rus' against Byzantium in the 40s of the 10th century. was undertaken with the knowledge and sympathy of Khazaria, whose conflict with the empire began in the 30s of the 10th century. protracted nature; but this offensive ended in the complete defeat of Rus', and the treaty of 944 reflected the political advantage of the empire. In it, Byzantium dictated its terms to Rus'; the latter’s obligations are “unilateral”, and the very tone of the document is “directive” in relation to Kyiv. This is exactly how M.I. Artamonov assessed, in particular, the articles related to the fate of Chersonesus: they talk about Rus'’s obligations “to break the alliance with the Khazars and act against them on the side of Byzantium” 34 .

M.V. Levchenko tried to identify the causes of the new Russian-Byzantine conflict, pointing to the strengthening of the foreign policy positions of the empire in the 20-30s of the 10th century. and her possible desire to free herself from the heavy obligations of the treaty of 907, and above all providing the Russians with duty-free trade on the territory of Byzantium. He came to the strange, in our opinion, conclusion that the campaign of 941 “cannot be considered as an aggressive act on the part of Rus',” which was forced to take retaliatory measures “to protect vital economic interests.” M.V. Levchenko noted the large scale of the campaign of 941 (by sea and by land), the great strain of the Byzantine military machine to repel the invasion, but was skeptical about the version of the chronicle that the Russians eventually achieved Byzantium’s resumption of the payment of the annual tribute, since the treaty of 944 contains no information on this matter. M.V. Levchenko assessed the treaty of 944 as a completely independent document, only including a number of previous articles. It is less beneficial to Rus' than the treaty of 911, but does not at all have the character of unilateral Russian obligations, as A. Dimitriou and some other scientists argued; it also contains direct obligations of Byzantium: about receiving Russian ambassadors and merchants, allocating them a place to stay, providing food and monthly food, equipment for the return journey; This also includes Byzantium’s obligation to provide military assistance to Rus'. It cannot be said, notes M. V. Levchenko, that the Igor Treaty is limited only to trade subjects: “... it contains articles regulating foreign policy relations between Byzantium and Russia” 35 .

Detailed analysis events 941-944 and an analysis of the treaty of 944 was given by V. T. Pashuto. He believed that Igor had violated the previous allied relations. Based on the negotiations between the Greeks and Igor, the Byzantines’ proposal to pay more tribute than Oleg took, directions expensive gifts Pechenegs - allies of Igor V. T. Pashuto came to the conclusion that “Byzantium’s interest in maintaining peaceful trade and political ties with Russia is obvious.” He views the 944 agreement as “a treaty of perpetual peace, mutual assistance and trade.” The obligation of mutual assistance is formulated in the articles on providing the Russian prince with soldiers, “as great as he needs,” and, accordingly, assistance from the Russians to the emperor upon written request. V. T. Pashuto assessed the articles about the “Korsun Country” from the standpoint of the general strengthening of the influence of Rus' in Crimea, and saw the strengthening of relations between the two states, the further development of political and economic ties between them in the articles on the regulation of embassy and trade contacts. V. T. Pashuto assessed the 944 treaty as an independent, equal bilateral agreement 36 .

S. M. Kashtanov, based on the classification of F. Delger and I. Karayannopoulos, compares the act of 944 with the scheme of chrisovuls drawn up by Byzantium after negotiations between its ambassadors in another country. The first part of the charter of 944 is similar to S. M. Kashtanov’s definition of the powers of ambassadors of another country, which is typical for chrisovuls of this type. One piece of text in the initial part of the letter and one piece of text in its final part, containing the oath of baptized and unbaptized Rus' to keep and observe the agreement, S. M. Kashtanov interprets as an oath promise to comply with the terms of the agreement, which was given to the Byzantine emperor by the other side. The texts contained in the letter on behalf of the Russians, according to the observation of S. M. Kashtanov, together form the oath and credentials of the ambassadors. The text, coming from the Greeks, contains, first of all, the terms of the agreement and information about the methods of its approval. Thus, in the text of the oath and credentials there are no contractual clauses, which is typical for chrisovuls, where the terms of the agreement are outside the text of the oath record of foreign ambassadors. He also connects with this circumstance the nature of the exchange of copies of the treaty of 944. Since the ambassadors’ oath and credentials did not contain the terms of the treaty, it means that a copy of the treaty needed confirmation by the Russian government and was sent to Igor to take the oath on it. Further, S. M. Kashtanov suggests (and this, in our opinion, is the most important thing in the author’s construction), after the prince sealed this copy, “the Byzantine ambassadors took it and handed it to the Russians... Some kind of copy from the approved charter of the ambassadors could stay in Rus'” 37.

A.G. Kuzmin in one of his last works also touched upon the events of 941-945. and again skeptically assessed a number of news from the Russian chronicle. Thus, he noted: “The indication that the Greeks agreed to pay an even greater tribute than to Oleg clearly contradicts the content of the actual agreement.” Without questioning the authenticity and integrity of the agreement, A.G. Kuzmin believes that confusion with pronouns occurred in it because the chronicler “seemed to be unable to keep his sources under control.” At the same time, this very confusion of the Greek and Russian opposites of the treaty is, in his opinion, an indirect sign of the originality of the sources 38.

In Soviet generalizing works, the treaty of 944 also did not receive an unambiguous consideration. “Essays on the history of the USSR. The period of feudalism” reflected the point of view of B.D. Grekov. The “History of Byzantium” notes that the initiative to conclude an agreement belonged to Byzantium, whose ambassadors, having met Igor’s army on the Danube, managed to persuade the Russians to peace; that the content of the agreement of 944 is more favorable for the empire than the agreement of 911. The multi-volume “History of the SSSD” mentions two campaigns of Rus' against Byzantium in the 40s (941 and 944) and notes that in both cases Igor went to Greeks at the head of Russian troops, “reinforced by mercenary Pechenegs and Varangians.” It is said about the agreement of 944 that it provided for broad trade ties with the empire and was based, like the U11 agreement, on “Russian pokon”.

Foreign historiography has focused on the events of 941-944. incomparably less attention than the history of the Russian attacks on Constantinople in 860 and 907. In general courses and special works There are informative messages on this subject. The assessment of the Russian-Byzantine war of 941 and the treaty of 944 is devoted to articles or sections of articles by K. Bartova, A. Boak, I. Swiętsitsky, S. Mikutsky, A. Gregoire and P. Orgels, I. Sorlen, D. Miller, as well as sections in the books of D. Obolensky, articles by D. Shepard, F. Wozniak 40.

K. Bartova, who paid attention to the famous Jewish-Khazar correspondence of the 10th century, draws a connection between the data of the so-called Cambridge document and the events of 941-944, believing that the mysterious Helgu is one of Igor’s governors, who continued to fight after the prince returned to his homeland . A. Boak notes the grandeur of the campaign of 941, the secrecy of its preparation, the “specific” goal - the capture of Constantinople - and the elimination of the threat of a new invasion by Emperor Roman I Lecapinus through diplomatic means. He considers the 944 treaty to be a full-blooded, comprehensive agreement that “widely renewed earlier treaties.” It, according to A. Boak, reflected the interest of the Kyiv princes in trade with Byzantium 4 .

I. Swiętsitsky, comparing the treaties of 907, 911, 944, shows that the agreement of 944 was closely connected with previous acts, developed and supplemented the diplomatic norms of previous treaties. In his opinion, the Greek ambassadors brought a ready-made draft agreement to Kyiv, and Igor in response sent an embassy to Constantinople, which had the Russian draft agreement in its hands. I. Sventsitsky believes that we have before us an equal interstate agreement, in the development of which both parties took an active part

S. Mikutsky, analyzing the text of the agreement of 944, drew attention to the fact that the beginning of the document and its conclusion come on behalf of Rus', while the main text - the articles of the agreement - on behalf of Byzantium; that the text of the treaty at the same time mentions its drafting in two charters - Russian and Greek. In this regard, S. Mikutsky suggests that the Russian charter is essentially a reworking of the Greek original: the imperial formula at the beginning of the document and at its conclusion is omitted and replaced by text coming from the Russian side, a list of ambassadors and preamble by the Russian author. The main part - the articles of the agreement - remained unchanged, as did the confirmation of the imperial charter. And all this is tied together with Russian additions at the end - Igor's oath and sanctions. Since the articles, writes S. Mikutsky, reflect the interests of the Greeks, have the character of mercy on their part, do not give any rights to Rus', but only impose obligations on it, in its content the document is close to the imperial chrisovul. However, S. Mikutsky draws attention to the fact that the confirmation formula found in the treaty of 944 does not appear in the chrysovuli 43.

A. Gregoire and P. Orgels analyze the history of the campaign of 941 in accordance with data from Byzantine sources and show that after the defeat in the naval battle of Hieron, Russian troops retreated to the southwest of Asia Minor and continued military operations there. The authors noted the scale of the campaign and the stress that the empire had to endure to overcome the Russian invasion 44 .

I. Sorlen supports those scientists who are inclined to distrust the “Tale of Bygone Years” regarding the report of the second Russian campaign against Constantinople and consider it the fruit of a compilation of information from the chronicle of George Amartol about the Ugric campaign against the Byzantine capital in 943 and data from the “Life of Basil the New” . She is convinced of the authenticity of the treaty of 944 and notes that it is an undoubted translation from Greek, and more correct than in the case of the treaty of 911. In her opinion, both charters were drawn up in the imperial office, as evidenced by the mention of Russian Christians, who were allegedly given priority over the pagans, and the presence in the charter of obligations not only of Rus', but also of Byzantium (regarding the provision of trade rights to the Russians). The main part of the agreement - the obligations of Rus' - was taken from the imperial chrisovul, to which, at the request of the Russians, a preamble and a final part were added. Thus, I. Sorlen also holds the opinion of the artificial origin of the text of the agreement placed in the chronicle, its compilation from heterogeneous parts 45.

Based on an analysis of the articles of the treaty, I. Sorlen quite rightly asserts that they reflect the development of the Russian diplomatic tradition: mentions of Russian written documents indicate, in her opinion, that the Russian princes in the middle of the 10th century. “they began to create offices” and took control of trade with Byzantium. She believes that the new treaty canceled trade tariff benefits for the Russians and introduced some trade restrictions as a result of Igor's defeat. I. Sorlen considers the article of the 944 treaty on military assistance to Rus' from Byzantium to be the fruit of the negligence of the translator, who distorted the text, since here, according to the author, we should be talking about the obligations of Rus' not to attack the possessions of Byzantium in the Crimea and to help in this region of the empire . At the same time, she rightly points out that the treaty of 944 reflected a change in the nature of relations between Rus' and Byzantium compared to 911: Rus' becomes an “allied power” for the empire, I. Sorlen defends the very controversial thesis that in the treaty of 944 d. the parties pursued primarily economic goals 46 .

D. Miller in the general article “Byzantine treaties and their development: 500-1025.” considered Russian-Byzantine treaties, including the agreement of 944, on an equal basis with Byzantine-Arab, Bulgarian and other agreements of the early Middle Ages, defining them as “trade and political treaties of the 10th century.” He showed that Russian-Byzantine treaties include all the most significant components of diplomatic agreements concluded by Byzantium with other states, and some aspects of these agreements in Russian-Byzantine treaties are presented most clearly, and in particular they provide “the most complete description of trade rights ” as a means of Byzantine diplomacy to resolve relations with another power. D. Miller also highlights such features of these acts as precise definition the parties participating in the negotiations and their representatives, who are named; statement of intentions of the negotiators; their vows; detailed content of articles; information on the procedure for ratifying the agreement. In his opinion, only the Byzantine-Persian treaty of 562 can to some extent be compared in this sense with the Russian-Byzantine treaties.

Analyzing such an aspect of the diplomatic agreements of Byzantium with the “barbarian” states as an agreement on alliance and mutual assistance, D. Miller showed that the agreement of 944 made a step forward compared to the agreement of 911 and Rus' from a state that allowed the hiring of its people for military service in Byzantium, became a genuine and equal military ally of the empire. He notes the international nature of other articles included in the agreement of 944, and in particular the articles on the procedure for registering Russians coming to Byzantium. The procedure for ratifying the treaty of 944 reminds D. Miller of the procedure that accompanied the conclusion of the Byzantine-Arab treaty of 687: then two copies of treaty documents were also drawn up, they were exchanged, and the corresponding oaths of allegiance to the “concluded agreement” were given 48. No unilateral obligations Rus', there is no talk of any comparison with the chrysovuli in the work of D. Miller.

D. Obolensky, true to his idea of ​​the empire drawing neighboring countries and peoples into a kind of Byzantine community of states 49, also viewed Russian-Byzantine treaties through this prism. He considered the Russian campaign of 941 a Viking-style expedition, unexpected and treacherous, and is silent about the second campaign; Naturally, he also bypasses questions about negotiations on the Danube, about tribute, etc. D. Obolensky views the Treaty of 944 as a major success for Byzantium in eliminating the Russian danger, which had been growing since the 9th century. The empire gradually neutralized this danger with the help of skillful diplomacy. In his opinion, the treaty of 944 reflected Byzantium's concerns about its Crimean possessions and showed how the empire in its relations with Russia changed the balance of power in its favor.

Thus, a review of the literature concerning the events of 941-944. and the Russian-Byzantine treaty of 944, states serious and fundamental disagreements between historians on the key problems of this aspect of the history of ancient Rus'.

It is noteworthy that the study of the history of the campaign of 941 is carried out in isolation from the history of the development and content of the treaty of 944, which, as a rule, is associated only with the history of Igor’s second (in 944 or 943) campaign against Byzantium.

There is no unity on such questions as: is the 944 treaty just an addition to the 911 agreement, or is it a politically independent and integral diplomatic document? Does it represent a semblance of the imperial chrysobulus, or is it a bilateral, equal interstate treaty? Was this text deposited in the chronicle in its entirety, or was it put together by later scribes and editors who assembled from various documents what became part of the “Tale of Bygone Years” as the Russian-Byzantine treaty of 944?

It is also not clear who benefits from this agreement - Byzantium? Rus'? What “new balance of power” (“changed balance of power”) did this treaty reflect?

Some private questions related to the history of the document’s development also remain controversial: on whose initiative was it concluded - the Russians or the Greeks? Did the previous articles of the treaties of 907 and 911, not specified in the treaty of 944, continue to remain in force? Can Byzantium’s obligation to pay tribute to Rus' be included among these articles not included in the treaty?

Finally, researchers, as a rule, did not pose the following questions: what is the place of the treaty of 944 in the system of both Byzantine and Russian diplomacy? How does it relate to the Russian-Byzantine treaties of the 60s of the 9th century, 907, 911? What is the level of diplomacy of ancient Rus' in comparison with its sprouts in the 9th - early 10th centuries? reflected this diplomatic act?

It is these controversial or under-researched issues that this chapter is devoted to.

Per year 6449 (941). Igor went against the Greeks. And the Bulgarians sent news to the king that the Russians were coming to Constantinople: ten thousand ships. And they came and sailed and began to ravage the country of Bithynia, and captured the land along the Pontic Sea to Heraclius and to the Paphlagonian land, and they captured the entire country of Nicomedia, and they burned the entire court. And those who were captured - some were crucified, while others, setting them as a target, were shot with arrows, wringing their hands back, tied them up and drove iron nails into their heads. Many holy churches were set on fire and a lot of wealth was seized on both banks of the Court. When warriors came from the east - Panfir the Demestic with forty thousand, Phocas the Patrik with the Macedonians, Fedor the Stratelates with the Thracians, and with them the high-ranking boyars, they surrounded Rus'. The Russians, after consulting, came out against the Greeks with weapons, and in a fierce battle they barely defeated the Greeks. The Russians returned to their squad in the evening and at night, getting into the boats, sailed away. Theophanes met them in boats with fire and began to shoot fire at the Russian boats with pipes. And a terrible miracle was seen. The Russians, seeing the flames, threw themselves into the sea water, trying to escape, and so those who remained returned home. And, having come to their land, they told - each to their own - about what had happened and about the fire of the rooks. “It’s like the Greeks have lightning from heaven,” they said, “and by releasing it, they burned us; That’s why they didn’t overcome them.” Igor, having returned, began to gather many soldiers and sent them overseas to the Varangians, inviting them to attack the Greeks, again planning to go against them.

SOME WONDERFUL FIRE, JUST LIGHTNING OF THE HEAVEN

The chronicler knows the Russian legend and the Greek news about Igor’s campaign against Constantinople: in 941, the Russian prince went by sea to the shores of the Empire, the Bulgarians gave the news to Constantinople that Rus' was coming; The protovestiary Theophanes was sent against her, who burned Igor's boats with Greek fire. Having suffered defeat at sea, the Russians landed on the shores of Asia Minor and, as usual, greatly devastated them, but here they were caught and defeated by the patrician Barda and the domestic John, rushed into boats and set off for the shores of Thrace, were overtaken on the road, and again defeated by Theophanes and his small the remnants returned back to Rus'. At home, the fugitives justified themselves by saying that the Greeks had some kind of miraculous fire, like heavenly lightning, which they launched at the Russian boats and burned them.

But on the dry route, what was the reason for their defeat? This reason can be discovered in the legend itself, from which it is clear that Igor’s campaign was not similar to Oleg’s enterprise, carried out by the united forces of many tribes; It was more like a raid by a gang, a small squad. That there were few troops, and contemporaries attributed the reason for the failure to this circumstance, is shown by the words of the chronicler, who immediately after describing the campaign says that Igor, having come home, began to gather a large army, sent overseas to hire the Varangians to go again to the Empire.

The chronicler places Igor’s second campaign against the Greeks under the year 944; this time he says that Igor, like Oleg, gathered a lot of troops: Varangians, Rus, Polyans, Slavs, Krivichs, Tiverts, hired the Pechenegs, took hostages from them, and set out on a campaign on boats and horses to avenge the previous defeat . The Korsun people sent a message to Emperor Roman: “Rus is coming with countless ships, the ships have covered the entire sea.” The Bulgarians also sent the message: “Rus is coming; Pechenegs were also hired.” Then, according to legend, the emperor sent his best boyars to Igor with a request: “Do not go, but take the tribute that Oleg took, and I will add more to it.” The emperor sent expensive fabrics and a lot of gold to the Pechenegs. Igor, having reached the Danube, convened a squad and began to think with it about the imperial proposals; the squad said: “If the king says so, then what do we need even more? Without fighting, let's take the gold, silver and pavoloks! How do we know who will win, us or them? After all, it is impossible to come to an agreement with the sea in advance, we are not walking on land, but in the depths of the sea, one death for all.” Igor listened to the squad, ordered the Pechenegs to fight the Bulgarian land, took gold and pavoloks from the Greeks for himself and the entire army, and went back to Kyiv. In the next year, 945, an agreement was concluded with the Greeks, also, apparently, to confirm the brief and, perhaps, oral efforts concluded immediately after the end of the campaign.

Kyiv - CAPITAL, RULER - IGOR

In Igor’s treaty with the Greeks we read, among other things, that the Russian Grand Duke and his boyars can annually send as many ships as they want to the great Greek kings, with ambassadors and guests, that is, with their own clerks and free Russian merchants. This story of the Byzantine emperor clearly shows us the close connection between the annual turnover of political and economic life Rus'. The tribute that the Kiev prince collected as a ruler at the same time constituted the material of his trade turnover: having become a sovereign, like a horse, he, like a Varangian, did not cease to be an armed merchant. He shared the tribute with his squad, which served him as an instrument of control and constituted the government class. This class acted as the main lever in both directions, both political and economic: in the winter it ruled, visited people, begged, and in the summer it traded in what it collected during the winter. In the same story by Konstantin, the centralizing significance of Kyiv as the center of the political and economic life of the Russian land is vividly outlined. Rus', the government class with the prince at its head, with its overseas trade turnover supported the ship trade among the Slavic population of the entire Dnieper basin, which found sales at the spring fair of one-trees near Kiev, and every spring it attracted here from different angles countries along the Greco-Varangian route, merchant boats with goods from forest fur hunters and beekeepers. Through such a complex economic cycle, a silver Arab dirhem or a gold clasp of Byzantine work came from Baghdad or Constantinople to the banks of the Oka or Vazuza, where archaeologists find them.

SWORE BY PERUN

It is remarkable that Varangian (Germanic) mythology did not have any influence on Slavic, despite the political dominance of the Varangians; this was for the reason that the pagan beliefs of the Varangians were neither clearer nor stronger than the Slavic ones: the Varangians very easily changed their paganism for the Slavic cult if they did not accept Greek Christianity. Prince Igor, a Varangian by origin, and his Varangian squad already swore by the Slavic Perun and worshiped his idol.

"DON'T WALK, BUT TAKE TRIBUTE"

One of the reasons for the catastrophic defeat of “Tsar” Helga and Prince Igor in 941 was that they could not find allies for the war with Byzantium. Khazaria was absorbed in the fight against the Pechenegs and could not provide effective assistance to the Rus.

In 944, Prince Igor of Kiev launched a second campaign against Constantinople. The Kiev chronicler did not find any mention of this enterprise in Byzantine sources, and in order to describe the new military expedition, he had to “paraphrase” the story of the first campaign.

Igor failed to take the Greeks by surprise. The Korsuns and Bulgarians managed to warn Constantinople about the danger. The Emperor sent “the best boyars” to Igor, begging him: “Do not go, but take the tribute that Oleg received, and I will add more to that tribute.” Taking advantage of this, Igor accepted the tribute and went home. The chronicler was sure that the Greeks were frightened by the power of the Russian fleet, for Igor’s ships covered the entire sea of ​​“beschisla”. In fact, the Byzantines were worried not so much by the Russian fleet, the recent defeat of which they had not forgotten, but by Igor’s alliance with the Pecheneg horde. The nomadic camps of the Pechenezh Horde spread over a vast area from the Lower Don to the Dnieper. The Pechenegs became the dominant force in the Black Sea region. According to Constantine Porphyrogenitus, the attacks of the Pechenegs deprived the Rus of the opportunity to fight with Byzantium. The peace between the Pechenegs and the Rus was fraught with a threat to the empire.

In preparation for the war with Byzantium, the Kiev prince “hired” the Pechenegs, i.e. sent rich gifts to their leaders, and took hostages from them. Having received tribute from the emperor, the Rus sailed to the east, but first Igor “commanded the Pechenegs to fight the Bulgarian land.” The Pechenegs were pushed to war against the Bulgarians, perhaps, not only by the Rus, but also by the Greeks. Byzantium did not abandon its intention to weaken Bulgaria and once again bring it under its rule. Having completed hostilities, the Russians and Greeks exchanged embassies and concluded a peace treaty. It follows from the agreement that the area of ​​special interests of Byzantium and Rus' was Crimea. The situation on the Crimean peninsula was determined by two factors: the long-standing Byzantine-Khazar conflict and the emergence of a Norman principality at the junction of the Byzantine and Khazar possessions. Chersonesus (Korsun) remained the main stronghold of the empire in Crimea. The Russian prince was forbidden to “have volosts,” that is, to seize the possessions of the Khazars in the Crimea. Moreover, the treaty obliged the Russian prince to fight (“let him fight”) with the enemies of Byzantium in the Crimea. If “that country” (Khazar possessions) does not submit, in this case the emperor promised to send his troops to help the Rus. In fact, Byzantium set the goal of expelling the Khazars from Crimea by the hands of the Rus, and then dividing them from their possession. The agreement was implemented, although more than half a century late. Principality of Kyiv went to Tmutarakan with the cities of Tamatarcha and Kerch, and Byzantium conquered the last possessions of the Khazars around Surozh. In this case, King Sfeng, uncle, provided direct assistance to the Byzantines Prince of Kyiv…

Peace treaties with the Greeks were created favorable conditions for the development of trade and diplomatic relations between Kievan Rus and Byzantium. The Rus received the right to equip any number of ships and trade in the markets of Constantinople. Oleg had to agree that the Rus, no matter how many of them came to Byzantium, had the right to enlist in the imperial army without any permission from the Kyiv prince...

Peace treaties created conditions for the penetration of Christian ideas into Rus'. At the conclusion of the treaty of 911, there was not a single Christian among Oleg’s ambassadors. The Russians sealed the “harat” with an oath to Perun. In 944, in addition to the pagan Rus, Christian Rus also participated in negotiations with the Greeks. The Byzantines singled them out, giving them the right to be the first to take the oath and taking them to “ cathedral church" - Saint Sophia Cathedral.

A study of the text of the treaty allowed M.D. Priselkov to suggest that already under Igor, power in Kyiv actually belonged to the Christian party, to which the prince himself belonged, and that negotiations in Constantinople led to the development of conditions for the establishment new faith in Kyiv. This assumption cannot be reconciled with the source. One of the important articles of the treaty of 944 read: “If a Christian kills a Rusyn, or a Rusyn kills a Christian,” etc. The article certified that the Rusyns belonged to the pagan faith. The Russian ambassadors lived in Constantinople for quite a long time: they had to sell the goods they brought. The Greeks used this circumstance to convert some of them to Christianity... The treaty of 944, drawn up by experienced Byzantine diplomats, provided for the possibility of the adoption of Christianity by the “princes” who remained during the negotiations in Kyiv. The final formula read: “Whoever transgresses (the agreement - R.S.) from our country (Rus. - R.S.), whether a prince or anyone else, whether baptized or unbaptized, may not have help from God.. ."; who violated the agreement “let him be cursed by God and Perun.”

Skrynnikov R.G. Old Russian state

THE TOP OF ANCIENT RUSSIAN DIPLOMACY

But what is amazing! This time, Rus' insisted - and it’s hard to find another word here - on the appearance of Byzantine ambassadors in Kyiv. The period of discrimination against the northern “barbarians” ended, who, despite their resounding victories, obediently wandered to Constantinople for negotiations and here, under the watchful eyes of the Byzantine clerks, formulated their contractual demands, put their speeches on paper, carefully translated diplomatic stereotypes unfamiliar to them from Greek, and then they looked in fascination at the splendor of the Constantinople temples and palaces.

Now the Byzantine ambassadors had to appear for the first negotiations in Kyiv, and it is difficult to overestimate the importance and prestige of the agreement reached. ...

Essentially, the tangle of the entire Eastern European politics of those days unraveled here, in which Rus', Byzantium, Bulgaria, Hungary, the Pechenegs and, possibly, Khazaria were involved. Here negotiations took place, new diplomatic stereotypes were developed, the foundation was laid for a new long-term agreement with the empire, which was supposed to regulate relations between countries, reconcile or at least smooth out the contradictions between them...

And only then the Russian ambassadors moved to Constantinople.

It was a big embassy. Gone are the days when the five Russian ambassadors opposed the entire Byzantine diplomatic routine. Now a prestigious representative of a powerful state, consisting of 51 people - 25 ambassadors and 26 merchants, was sent to Constantinople. They were accompanied by armed guards and shipmen...

The title of Russian Grand Duke Igor sounded differently in the new treaty. The epithet “bright”, which the Byzantine clerks awarded Oleg with such far from naive calculation, got lost and disappeared somewhere. In Kyiv, apparently, they very quickly figured out what was what and realized what an unenviable position he was putting the Kyiv prince in. Now, in the treaty of 944, this title is not present, but Igor is called here as in his homeland - “Grand Duke of Russia.” True, sometimes in articles, so to speak, the concepts “grand duke” and “prince” are used in working order. And yet it is quite obvious that Rus' tried to achieve a change here too and insisted on a title that did not infringe on its state dignity, although, of course, it was still far from reaching such heights as “tsar” and emperor.”

Rus', step by step, slowly and persistently won diplomatic positions. But this was especially clearly reflected in the procedure for signing and approving the agreement, as stated in the agreement. This text is so remarkable that there is a temptation to quote it in its entirety...

For the first time we see that the treaty was signed by the Byzantine emperors, for the first time the Byzantine side was instructed by the treaty to again send its representatives to Kyiv in order to take an oath on the treaty on the part of the Russian Grand Duke and his husbands. For the first time, Rus' and Byzantium undertake equal obligations regarding the approval of the treaty. Thus, from the beginning of the development of a new diplomatic document until the very end of this work, Rus' stood on an equal footing with the empire, and this itself was already a remarkable phenomenon in the history of Eastern Europe.

And the agreement itself, which both sides worked out with such care, became an extraordinary event. Diplomacy of that time does not know of a document that was more ambitious, comprehensive, and embraced economic, political, and military-alliance relations between countries.