What did the defensive line consist of? Gorky defensive line. Army Group North
Judging by the photographs that have appeared on the Internet, Syrian army received T-62M tanks with additional armor at its disposal. This modification was created when the Soviet 40th Army provided international assistance to the DRA and was therefore nicknamed “Afghan”.
The T-62M differs from the basic version in that it has additional armor protection for the turret, the containers of which are nicknamed “Ilyich’s Eyebrows,” and enhanced hull protection.
Armor thickness, mm: hull front 300+120+102, turret front 60+230+242. Measures have been taken to strengthen mine protection. Rubber-fabric anti-cumulative screens are installed on the sides.
Combat weight is 41.5 tons. Crew: 3 people. Armament is a 115-mm U-5TS (2A20) smoothbore gun, paired with a 7.62-mm PKT machine gun. The turret is equipped with a 12.7 mm DShKM.
The tank uses tracks with a rubber-metal hinge. Additionally, two hydraulic shock absorbers are installed on the suspension units of the second road wheels.
Another new product was the Volna fire control system, which includes the KTD-2 (KTD-1) laser rangefinder, TShSM-41U sight, Meteor-M1 stabilizer, BV-62 ballistic computer, as well as the 9K116- guided weapon system 1 "Sheksna". The gun has a heat-protective casing. Thanks to these innovations, the T-62M's cannon firing accuracy while on the move has increased.
Engine power 620 hp (there are versions with a 690 hp engine). Power reserve - 450 km.
These tanks were withdrawn from service Russian army, but were located at storage bases.
A business trip to Syria will be the sixth war for the T-62M. In addition to Afghanistan, they fought in Tajikistan, in both Chechen campaigns, and repelled Georgian aggression in South Ossetia. Everywhere these tanks have proven themselves to be simple and reliable combat vehicles. As for the war in Syria, here too these modernized vehicles will surpass the T-72M1 available to the Syrians in a number of characteristics. They just need to be slightly modified, for example, installing lattice anti-cumulative screens. The Syrian military already has significant experience in such modifications to armored vehicles.
In Kachkanar in the Stroitel park on the site military equipment there is a copy of the T-62M tank. We examined it as part of the Second International Museum inventor of electric welding N.G. Slavyanov in August 2015. This is one of the few tanks of this type erected on a pedestal or serving as a museum exhibit. Apart from it and apart from purely museum exhibitions, I know of only one copy, erected on a pedestal on the lands of the Manych collective farm near the well-known Kuma-Manych depression (I will tell you about it soon).
What is this combat vehicle famous for?
T-62 (object 166) - Soviet medium tank. Created on the basis of the T-55 tank. Produced in the USSR from 1961 to 1975. The world's first production tank with a 115 mm smoothbore gun and the mass of a medium tank at high level reservations.
Despite the fact that the T-54 tank, which became the main one in the post-war years Soviet army, generally satisfied the military, the designers continued to modernize it and work on new models. In Nizhny Tagil in design bureau No. 183, headed by L.N. Kartsev developed modifications of the T-54. In 1958, the T-55 was put into service, which included improvements in anti-nuclear protection, increased ammunition and a number of other improvements. The armament of the T-55 remained the same - 100 mm gun
The appearance in NATO of powerful 105 mm tank guns, superior to the 100 mm gun, forced our designers in 1959 to engage in further development of the T-54 concept, which two years later went into service under the designation T-62.
The main innovation of the T-62 was the new 115 mm U5-TS “Molot” smoothbore gun, installed in a new turret with a shoulder strap increased to 2245 mm versus 1825 mm for the T-55.
The advantage of this gun over rifled guns was, first of all, its anti-tank qualities due to the use of feathered armor-piercing sub-caliber projectiles.
Finishing the tank did not take much difficulty, since it was created on the basis of the T-54 tank, already proven in production, created by A. A. Morozov.
The T-62 tank was exported to Bulgaria, East Germany, Hungary, Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Yemen, Libya, Syria, Afghanistan, North Korea, Mongolia, Angola, Vietnam, Ethiopia, Cuba and other countries. About 20,000 tanks were produced.
The installation of the 115-mm U5-TS Molot smoothbore gun required an increase in the volume of the fighting compartment and caused a number of design changes to the turret and hull.
The gun barrel is fastened with a casing, 52.6 caliber/6050 mm long and equipped with an ejector. The gun has a horizontal wedge breech, with semi-automatic spring type and electric and backup manual trigger mechanisms. Recoil devices consist of a hydraulic recoil mechanism and a hydropneumatic knurler located above the gun barrel; the normal rollback length is 350-415 mm, the maximum length is 430 mm. The maximum pressure in the barrel bore is 3730 kg/cm², and the maximum muzzle energy when firing a sabot projectile is 6.96 MJ / 709 tf m.
Despite the increase in the caliber of the gun, the barrel extension remained the same and amounted to 2.8 m. Unlike the T-54 and T-55 tanks, which had a cast turret with a welded roof, the new turret was solid cast. The diameter of the turret support was increased from 1825 mm to 2245 mm, and the tank hull was lengthened by 386 mm.
Due to the increased values of mass, moment of inertia and moment of unbalance of the gun, the Cyclone weapon stabilizer turned out to be insufficiently powerful, so the Meteor stabilizer was developed and the design of the turret rotation mechanism was changed.
The gun's ammunition capacity was 40 rounds. An automatically opening hatch for ejection was provided in the rear part of the tower. spent cartridges, which automatically ejects the cartridge through a hatch in the upper aft part of the turret.
The Meteor stabilizer is designed to ensure effective fire on the move from a cannon and a coaxial machine gun. The stabilizer is an electro-hydraulic system that provides:
- automatic retention of the gun and the coaxial machine gun in a given (stabilized) position in the vertical and horizontal guidance planes when the tank moves;
- pointing the cannon and the coaxial machine gun in the vertical and horizontal planes with smooth control of pointing speeds;
- target designation from the tank commander to the gunner in the horizontal plane.
Turret rotation is provided in both stabilized and semi-automatic (unstabilized) guidance modes. The commander's control system allowed him to turn the turret to the directional angle of rotation of the commander's periscope at the press of a button. The installation is equipped with a two-plane stabilizer 2E15 "Meteor", which ensures stabilization accuracy of ±1 thousand in the vertical plane and ±3 in the horizontal.
Comparison
In the 60s, the T-62 and M60A1 were the most common tanks in the USSR and the USA. By 1965, 4,500 T-62 tanks had already been produced.
In terms of protection, none of the tanks had any advantages; the armor was comparable. In terms of firepower, the T-62 had significant advantages, primarily due to the use of OBPS. The disadvantage of the T-62 was its low rate of fire - the mechanism for ejecting spent cartridges improved the working conditions of the crew, but somewhat lengthened the loading time.
The advantage of the T-62 was that it was equipped with a two-plane stabilizer, which ensured effective shooting immediately; on the M60A1 (Add-On Stabilization - AOS), the installation of the stabilizer began only in 1971. The mechanical connection between the gunner's sight and the gun on the M60A1 and T-62 made it difficult to fire immediately due to the gunner losing sight of the target when loading the gun.
The comparative probability of destruction, in the event of a hit by a T-62 tank, of an M60A1 tank when using OBPS at the most likely ranges of use in Europe is 71%, when using BKS - 75%.
For the M60A1 tank, the probability is 54 and 75%, respectively. Considering the complete superiority of OBPS and BKS of 115 mm caliber over the M60A1 armor, a hit with a high probability means the destruction of the M60A1. The accuracy of the 105 mm M60A1 cannon is 15% lower than that of the T-62 at a distance of up to 1500 m.
Some advantages of the M60A1 can be slightly larger angles, giving the gun descent angles of -9 degrees versus -6 degrees for the T-62. Considering the smaller silhouette of the T-62 tank, the visible projection of the turret when firing from the reverse slopes is comparable. Given the lack of laser rangefinders on the T-62 and M60A1, the low silhouette of the T-62 provided it with significant advantages in survivability on the battlefield.
From left to right: M60A1, Chieftain, T-62
For target designation, the tank commander must turn the commander's cupola so that the line of sight of the TKH-3 device is directed at the target. While holding the turret in this position, press the target designation button located in the left handle of the commander’s device. The tower in this case will rotate by maximum speed until the gun is aimed at the target (rough aiming). After the turret stops, the tank commander must release the target designation button. The gunner accurately aims the gun at the target and fires using a control panel.
Target designation is carried out only in the horizontal plane.
Protection
The tank had equal-strength armor on the upper frontal plate of the hull and the frontal part of the turret. Maximum thickness the armor of the frontal part of the turret was 211 mm at an angle of 17 degrees
The T-62 has differentiated anti-ballistic armor. The armored body of the T-62 is a rigid box-shaped welded structure, assembled from sheets of rolled armor steel with a thickness of 16, 30, 45, 80 and 100 mm.
The frontal part of the hull is formed by two converging wedges of 100 mm armor plates: the upper one, located at an angle of 60° to the vertical, and the lower one, which has an angle of 55°. The sides of the hull consist of solid vertical 80 mm sheets, and the stern consists of a vertical top sheet 45 mm thick and a 16 mm bottom sheet, slanted at 70°.
The photo clearly shows the additional armor installed on the modification with the letter "M"
The hull roof in the area of the turret box has a thickness of 30 mm, and above the engine-transmission compartment - 16 mm. The bottom of the case consists of four stamped 20 mm sheets and has cross section trough-shaped. The front and side plates of the hull are made of chrome-nickel-molybdenum steel 42SM, the stern and roof of the hull are made of 49C steel, and the bottom is made of chrome-molybdenum steel 43PSM.
Mobility
The T-62 tank has a V-55-V engine. The V-55-V engine is a modification of the V-54 engine and differs from it in higher power (580 hp at 2000 rpm). The increase in power was achieved by increasing the fuel supply, changing the fuel supply advance angle, and also by increasing the compression ratio to 15 ± 0.5.
Fuel system
There are four fuel tanks with a total capacity of 675 liters installed inside the tank hull, and three external tanks with a total capacity of 285 liters are installed outside the tank on the right fender. The total filling capacity of all tanks (internal and external) is 960 liters.
All fuel tanks are connected to each other in two groups. The first group consists of: the right rack tank, the middle tank and all external tanks; the second group combines the front (bow) tank and the left tank rack.
All fuel tanks, with the exception of external ones, are coated with bakelite varnish on the outside and inside to protect them from corrosion. External fuel tanks are coated with bakelite varnish only on the inside, and painted on the outside with protective paint.
The front fuel tank with a capacity of 280 liters is installed in the bow of the tank hull to the right of the driver’s seat and is attached to the bottom and hull on special brackets. The tank is welded from steel sheets with special stampings for wall rigidity. Inside the tank there are two vertical partitions that reduce the splashing of fuel when the tank moves and at the same time increase the rigidity of the tank.
Chassis
The T-62 chassis, with the exception of a slightly different location of the balancers due to the changed distribution of the load on them, is identical to the T-54 suspension and includes on each side five double rubber-coated cast road wheels with a diameter of 810 mm, a idler and a drive wheel; There are no support rollers. The suspension of the road wheels is individual, torsion bar; the first and last rollers are equipped with blade-type hydraulic shock absorbers. The suspension has a stiffness of 522 kg/cm, an oscillation period of 0.86 s with a full roller stroke of 224 mm and a specific potential energy of 430 mm.
Initially, the T-62 used tracks from the T-54 with a metal joint, and later more advanced tracks with a rubber-metal joint. Both tracks had a pinion engagement, a width of 580 mm and a track pitch of 137 mm, but the metal track consisted of 96 tracks and had a mass of 1,386 kg, and the track with a rubber-metal hinge had 97 tracks and weighed 1,655 kg.
Performance characteristics
Total weight, t. 37+1.5%
Crew, people 4
Specific power, hp/t 15.7
Engine 5TDF, hp 580
Specific ground pressure, kgf/cm2 0.75
Operating temperature, °C -40…+50
Length of tank with gun forward, mm 9335
housing, mm 6630
Tank width along the track, mm 3370
Tower roof height, mm 2280
Ground clearance, mm 430
Travel speed
Average on dry dirt road, km/h 22…27
Maximum on paved roads, km/h 32…35
Fuel consumption per 100 km
On a dry dirt road, l, up to 300…330
On paved roads, l, up to 190…210
Cruising range on main fuel tanks (on paved roads), km 450 (650)
with additional barrels (on paved roads), km 330 (450)
Ammunition, shots for the gun, pcs. 40
One of the modified tanks, the T-62M, which underwent deep modernization in 1983-1985, is located in the Stroitel park in Kachkanar. The tank was equipped with: additional armor protection for the turret, hull and bottom (turret protection level from BPS - 320 mm, from KS - 400-450 mm); rubber-fabric side anti-cumulative screens; antineutron lining on the tower; guided weapon complex 9K116-2 “Sheksna”; V-55U engine, 620 hp. With.; new system“Volna” fire control (KTD-2 laser rangefinder, BV-62 ballistic computer, TShSM-41U sight and “Meteor” M1 stabilizer); the 902B “Cloud” smoke grenade launch system and the “Soda” anti-napalm system. Some vehicles were equipped with an NSVT anti-aircraft machine gun instead of a DShKM, and the gun barrel was equipped with a heat-protective casing. The chassis was modernized and a caterpillar from the T-72 tank was introduced. The tank was equipped with an R-173 radio station and an R-173P radio receiver.
In the photo you can see in detail the additional armor protection of the turret in the form of shaped armor plates spaced apart from the main armor. The design of their fastening is good
Armor protection of surveillance devices
I still don’t understand what kind of box is attached above the gun
The front plate is also reinforced with additional armor
For some reason the external fuel tanks on the right fender are missing
Instead, only a box with spare parts and tools
Here's a close-up of this mysterious device above the gun barrel
The exhaust gas removal system is equipped with caps to seal it when overcoming water obstacles
In my review report about Kachkanar, I did not have enough space to describe in a nutshell the murky story associated with Kachkanar tanks.
All this equipment once stood at the Center for Children's Creativity "Alternative", in addition to it, the IS-3 tank was located there, allegedly even taking part in the battles of the Great Patriotic War. The IS-3 came to Kachkanar from the Chelyabinsk Tank School and, unlike other equipment, had the status of a historical and cultural monument. However, this did not help, and in 2006, cunning and fraudulent representatives of the museum in Verkhnyaya Pyshma took it away, supposedly for an exhibition. Needless to say, he never returned. Since its inception, the UMMC Museum of Military Equipment in Verkhnyaya Pyshma has had a bad reputation as a destroyer of monuments; it attracts everything that is bad, having patrons at the highest level.
In 2008, by order of the mayor of Kachkanar, a “restoration” of equipment was carried out at the Altenativa site. Initially, it was planned to put it on pedestals, but the mayor decided to save money and ordered the tracks and wheels to be simply filled with concrete.
The misadventures of the Kachkanar equipment ended in 2010 when, after 2 days of work, the equipment was freed from concrete and took its rightful place in Stroitel Park.
Original taken from history in Defensive lines around Moscow in 1942
70 years ago, on March 26, 1942, Resolution No. 1501ss “On the construction of new and restoration of defensive lines” was adopted. Although German troops were driven back from Moscow during the winter counteroffensive, the front line was very close - some 200 km. Therefore, the defense lines near Moscow continued to be improved and reconstructed.
Below the cut is a diagram of the development of the boundaries of the Moscow Defense Zone (MZO), which in 1942 covered several adjacent areas. The diagram is “cut” into separate pieces, some of which are explained. They may be of interest to both Moscow summer residents and residents of nearby regions, many of whom do not even imagine that in 1941-1942 they had built defense lines ready to meet the enemy.
The volume of work performed (in the shortest possible time, in difficult winter conditions) is striking.
So, decree No. 1501ss “On the construction of new and restoration of defensive lines” stated in particular:
4. The Military Councils of the 7th Army, Volkhov, North-Western, Kalinin, Western, Bryansk, South-Western and Southern Fronts and the Head of the Main Directorate for Defense of the NKO (Comrade Kotlyar) begin the construction and restoration of defensive lines along the line:
a) line along the left bank of the river. Svir from Voznesenye to Voronovo;
b) line along the line - st. Bol. Vishera, Krestsy, elev. 258, lake Seliger, Ostashkov, Selizharovo, Pashina, Struenya, Turginovo, along the eastern bank of the river. Lama, Yaropolets, Borodino, Linen Plant, along the eastern bank of the river. Ugra and Oka, to the mouth of the river. Upa, on the right bank of the river. Upa, Krapivna, Donskoy - further along the eastern bank of the river. Don to Donskaya Negochevka, Zemlyansk, Turovo, Koritskoye, Alekseevka, Rovenki, Novo-Pskov, elev. 189, Shulginka, Novo-Aidar, Slavyanoserbsk, Rovenki, B. Krepkaya and to the south Karpovsky 10 km. And contours of the cities of Tula, Voronezh, Voroshilovgrad and Rostov.
The construction of defensive lines should begin in the main directions determined by the General Staff of the Red Army.
The main forces and means should be directed primarily to the construction of borders within the borders of the Southern and Southwestern fronts and Moscow defense zone.
5. The construction of lines should be carried out by the forces of sapper armies and construction organizations GUOS NPO, for which purpose there are seven Defense Construction Directorates within the GUOS.
6. Stop construction of the following rear defensive lines:
contour of the mountains Kuibyshev;
Vladimir line with the outline of the city of Vladimir;
border of the Ryazan region And
line Boguchar, Tsymlyanskaya.
(full text)
The Moscow Defense Zone (MZO) was created on December 2, 1941 on the basis of the control and defense forces of Moscow as part of the 24th and 60th armies and air defense units. As we can see, this date practically coincides with the beginning of the counteroffensive near Moscow. However, as Zhukov himself later admitted, initially such a broad counter-offensive was not envisaged; it was necessary to eliminate the breakthroughs of the German troops. But further - more. It was possible not only to eliminate the breakthroughs, but also to develop the offensive, albeit not always successfully.
The construction of borders directly on the approaches to Moscow and in the city itself intensified in the fall of 1941. Until October 1941, the main forces were devoted to the construction of the Rzhev-Vyazemsky line and the Mozhaisk defense line. On October 9, 1941, the General Staff issued a directive to the commander of the Moscow Military District on the urgent construction of defensive lines in the deep rear east of Moscow. And although this directive of the General Staff was canceled on October 14, the construction of the rear lines continued in November-December 1941, and in some areas the work continued into January - it was necessary to finish what had been started.
The defensive line around Moscow, outside its then territory, and next to the current Moscow Ring Road, was practically built in the fall of 1941 and was already filled with troops from October, which were not touched until the end of December 1941. Only after this were they used as fresh reserves for the development of a counteroffensive.
However, in the spring and summer of 1942, construction began with new strength, and the already constructed lines were maintained in combat-ready condition (which was also very difficult). Some of the lines were rebuilt, some were rebuilt. For example, the Mozhaisk Fortified District underwent significant restructuring. Some of the bunkers that we now see on the Borodino field most likely did not take part in the October battles of 1941, but were built later, in the winter and spring of 1942.
Little is known about the non-combatant frontiers. They are not interesting to search engines, since there were no hostilities there; local historians are also not always interested in the events of 1941-1942, especially since during the war the structures were dismantled for the needs of National economy, and many of them were in hard-to-reach places. Swollen anti-tank ditches, pits for bunkers and dugouts remind us of once-existing boundaries. Sometimes you come across concrete anti-fragmentation caps (RCC), which can be used to trace the passage of the defensive line.
The Moscow defense zone was abolished in accordance with the order of the USSR NKO of October 15, 1943.
The proposed map is a copy that was made in August 1942 and which reflects the development of the defensive lines of the MZO. It would be an exaggeration to say that this unknown page The Great Patriotic War, rather, this is something that people have not liked to remember over the last 30-40 years.
A general map that shows the location of lines and fortified areas.
Moscow: Moscow defensive line.
This milestone was ready by December 1941. Its remains can still be found in Moscow parks, near the Moscow Ring Road and on the Pirogovskoye Reservoir. An anti-tank ditch was built along the line and numerous machine-gun bunkers with NPS-3 installations were installed.
In the south it rests on the Moscow River, where it joins the Kolomenskoye border, which runs along the eastern bank of the Moscow River. In the north, it is adjacent to the Dmitrovsky boundary. On the eastern side, the ring is closed by the projected boundary, traces of which have not yet been found.
Let me draw your attention to the fact that these borders were located outside the borders of Moscow; inside (actually along the borders) there was a border, beyond which there were also borders and barricades. , where it was added at my request. And look at the location.
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Rubezh (also known as Khlebnikovsky) was built before December, but practically did not take part in the hostilities. German troops almost reached it. They touched him in the Dedovsk area, but were quickly repulsed. In itself, this is a rather interesting milestone, which was equipped, among other things, with electric barriers. Traces of this line are found in the form of anti-tank ditches (one of them is included in the layout cottage village) and concrete machine gun caps. It was not possible to find more serious structures (pillboxes). those that exist (for example, in Novoivanovsky) belong to the Moscow defensive line. Also distinguished from the frontier is the Odintsovo Fortified Area No. 157. The “Kitezh” detachment is engaged in the search and registration of fortifications on the territory of the Odintsovo region.
Dmitrovsky Fortified Area No. 64
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The Dmitrovsky UR joins the Moscow defensive line in the Tarasovka area and along the Uchinskoye reservoir goes north along the Moscow-Volga canal, to Dubna. This line was well fortified by the winter of 1941; there were numerous bunkers along the eastern side of the canal. The bank of the canal itself was patrolled by “green caps”, who filtered the retreating ones in order to prevent sabotage groups from penetrating the rear.
True, in the Yakhroma area, at least one group managed to get through and capture the bridge over the canal. This ultimately led to a dramatic battle for the Peremilov Heights. Fortunately, there were large military reserves nearby (at the Khotkovo station), which pushed the Germans back across the canal, and then drove on.
From my point of view, the breakthrough in the area of Yakhroma and Peremilov was much more dangerous than the imaginary long-range guns in Krasnaya Polyana. Having pierced the defense line in Peremilovo, German troops could have cut the railway to Yaroslavl without interference, and then the Gorky direction, which put the MZO in an extremely difficult situation. But this is all from the realm of alternative history.
Let us pay attention to the two designed UR in the area of Kryukovo station and Krasnaya Polyana. Their meaning during new construction is not very clear. In November 1941, defensive lines were created in approximately these places, which played their role.
Kolomna fortified area UR No. 65
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Kolomna UR adjoins the Moscow defensive line in the Kapotnya area and runs along the Moscow River south to Kolomna. The border is not very well known and practically unexplored. There are tracing papers and map overlays on which the positions of anti-tank ditches and firing points are marked. Reinforced concrete caps for this line were manufactured at the reinforced concrete plant in Lytkarino, and the prefabricated reinforced concrete bunkers that can be found in Moscow were also manufactured there. Although after 1943 a command was received to dismantle them, it is possible that their remains can still be found on this defensive line.
To search, you can use the diagrams of this UR
A study of satellite images showed that there were still traces of anti-tank ditches along the Moscow River, although there were few of them - since the main obstacle was the river. In Kolomna, UR No. 65 was adjacent to the Ryazan defensive line and the Intermediate defensive line.
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Construction began in the fall of 1941, since there was real threat capture of Ryazan. Judging by the map, its readiness was 60 - 70%. Local historians have not yet been able to find any significant concrete structures. There are remains of anti-tank ditches, bunkers, and dugouts. Probably, even during the war or in the first years after, the lines passing through the fields were plowed. However, upon careful study of satellite images, some traces can still be detected. To create boundaries, they used rivers and wetlands, which were further complicated by ditches, while simultaneously making them more convenient for defense (flanking).
When studying satellite images, I came across this “ditch” structure, which is very reminiscent of an anti-tank ditch. The central part resembles similar fractures in the area of the border on Leningradskoe Highway.
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The Mikhailovsky defensive line adjoins the Ryazan line. So far I don't have any information about him additional information. It is marked on the map as proposed.
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Marked as recoverable.
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Stalinogorsk Fortified District (UR) No. 161
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This line, which includes the Stalinogorsk, Tula, and Khaninsky fortified areas, were actively built as rear lines in case of an unsuccessful development of events on Kursk Bulge. In some places you can still find ditches and perhaps concrete structures remain.
Tula fortified area (UR) No. 160
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There is a more detailed diagram along this line where you can look for anti-tank ditches and structures (although they are hardly preserved).
Khaninsky Fortified Area (UR) No. 119
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Kaluga fortified area (UR) No. 153
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Between the Kaluga UR and the Tula bypass. Along the Oka. In some places on the Oka you come across machine gun hoods. The presence of ditches has not yet been investigated.
Maloyaroslavetsky Fortified District No. 154
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It was built in the summer-autumn of 1941 (at that time it had number 35), although due to the fact that it was not sufficiently filled with troops (or rather, practically not filled), it could not play the proper role. The most famous defense center is the village of Ilyinskoye. In October 1941, it was there that cadets from Podolsk fought. Now in the Ilnsky Museum, one of the bunkers has been turned into a monument. However, one of the UR sections was sold for private construction and the new owners are determined to demolish several bunkers...
Mozhaisky Fortified District No. 152 (in 1941 No. 36)
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Perhaps the most famous fortified area near Moscow. Most of the well-known buildings are located on the historical Borodino field. Less known, but no less interesting, are located further south along the Moscow-Minsk highway. In particular, there you can see the bunker of Sergeant Kharintsev, who knocked out 6 German tanks on this road in early October 1941.
The fortifications themselves are a mixture of preserved bunkers built in the fall of 1941 and additions made during the reconstruction of 1942.
You can get an idea of what the line looked like in 1941 by watching German newsreels.
Volokolamsk Fortified District No. 155 (in 1941 No. 35)
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A lesser-known UR, there is no complete map of surviving structures yet; several pillboxes are known near the highway. So, summer residents living in the area of Yaropolets and Volokolamsk have a chance to become “pioneers” and study this SD armed GPS navigator and a camera.
The most famous defense center is the already mentioned Yaropolets. Kremlin cadets fought here.
Klinsky Fortified area No. 159
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Covered Moscow from the north, along the Moscow Sea and took place in the Zavidovo, Konakovo area.
Unfortunately, due to the closed status of these territories, it is unknown what remains there at the moment. If desired, you can see several ditches forming the bridgehead, but nothing more.
Intermediate defensive line
From Volokolamsk to Kolomna,
via Ruza and Dorokhovo 
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Borovsk
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Serpukhov and Kolomna
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It was built in the winter of 1941, from what is now Dubna and further along the Volga to the Rybinsk Reservoir. Near the Volga station (on the reservoir) the system of anti-tank ditches that covered railroad bridge.
Remains of structures and concrete caps are found throughout the border, for example in the city of Myshkin. In Dubna, several machine gun casings were cleared of debris and turned into monuments by local enthusiasts.
Rear defensive line
Adjacent to the Kalyazin line, just south of the city of Uglich, was the rear line, which had been under construction since the fall of 1941 and was completed in the winter of 1942. Its further development was considered inappropriate, but it was on a “siding route” until 1943. It passed through the territory of several regions. It is known that there was active construction in Yaroslavl region, Ivanovo, Vladimir and possibly Tambov regions.
This general form the rear line of the MVO (Moscow Military District), then I will give its individual parts.
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Rear line in the Yaroslavl region
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The most obvious milestone. It starts around the village of Maymery () and goes towards Rostov the Great, along the rivers. IN selected places, on the map you can see the passage of an anti-tank ditch. According to some reports, bunkers or remains of bunkers could remain in the forests. The places there are quite remote, sometimes swampy, local residents (Uglich) have not heard about the defensive line.
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It turned out to be quite difficult to trace the passage of the border through the territory of the Ivanovo region. “Ditches” were found on the maps, which, by their layout and location, could be a ditch. I managed to find quite a few “suspicious” areas, but I’m not very sure about them. You need to look at the area or look for a more detailed diagram.
These can also be ditches for draining swamps (peat extraction). However, it is known that a defensive perimeter was built around Ivanovo. Defense centers (or strong points) were also built in the direction of possible tank breakthroughs.
For example, near the village of Lezhnevo, the breaks in the PTR are clearly visible. It would be interesting to see it on the ground. 
Rear line in the Vladimir region
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Through Suzdal and Vladimir, along the rivers, the line went in the direction of the cities of Gus-Khrustalny and Gus-Zhelezny (Ryazan region).
There is information about the active construction of a line and a bypass around Vladimir, but I do not know about the existence of traces of anti-tank ditches or remains of structures on the ground. However, given that it passes through fairly remote places, there is hope that something will be discovered.
Rear line in the Ryazan region
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Here, from the Gus River, the line passes to the Oka.
And therefore he goes to the Tsna River in Tambov region approximately to Morshansk
Larger
Defense construction was not limited to these boundaries. There were borders north of Moscow (from the Rybinsk Reservoir, to Vologda and beyond), and they were also to the east - around Yaroslavl, Murom, Gorky, Kazan and generally throughout the Volga up to Astrakhan. Somewhere they remember them and erect monuments to the builders, where they don’t even know about their existence...
Long years one of the main pages in the history of Nizhny Novgorod did not exist. It was marked "Top Secret". This is a page about how forging was done in the city and region modern weapons. Today the secrecy stamp has been removed from the Nizhny Novgorod arsenal. This book is one of the first attempts to cover the history of the creation of weapons that became famous on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War and in peacetime.
The book contains unique materials from declassified archives and memories of those who created weapons and those who owned them.
Let’s not forget that after the end of the Great Patriotic War there was a military confrontation called “ cold war", which also required weapons. And this war was won. Nizhny Novgorod residents also contributed their labors to it.
You will learn much of what is described in this book for the first time.
Line of Defense
Line of Defense
Now we can firmly say that during the war, Gorky was a rear city. We know almost nothing about the fate that the Wehrmacht command determined for him, whose offensive impulse ended near Moscow. One can only guess that the enemy would not have limited himself to capturing Moscow. But how far would he get and what were his plans? We know very little about this. And could it be assumed that Gorky would remain a rear city?
December 18, 1940. Hitler's headquarters. Plan Barbarossa signed. Initially, however, the invasion operation had a different name - “Fritz”. Hitler considered him colorless and remembered the Kaiser of the Holy Roman Empire, Frederick I, nicknamed Barbarossa (“Red Beard”). He was one of the leaders of the Third Crusade to the Holy Land. True, he did not reach his goal: he fell from his horse at one of the crossings and drowned. The legend revived him and transported him to the Kuffhäuser Mountains, towering in the geographical center of Germany, where he remained waiting for the country to call him.
Every schoolchild in Germany was required to know Barbarossa. In the mountains, in the Cave of Barbarossa, where schoolchildren made a pilgrimage, there was a marble statue of him.
And so, the time of such languid waiting for the Kaiser ended eight centuries after his death. In choosing such a pompous title, Hitler assured General Franz Halder: “When Barbarossa begins, the world will hold its breath in silence.”
The introductory part of the plan stated:
"The German armed forces must be prepared to crush Soviet Russia... For this purpose, the army must use all available military units with the exception of those that remain in the occupied territory ...
Preparations must be completed by May 15, 1941. The greatest effort must be made to disguise the intent to launch an attack.
The ultimate goal The operation is to create a defensive line against Asian Russia along the Volga River to Arkhangelsk. Then Russia’s last remaining industrial area in the Urals could be destroyed by the Luftwaffe.”
The goal of the war has been determined. Many cities of the Soviet Union are doomed to destruction. But did the Barbarossa plan provide for the assault and capture of Gorky? Judging by the expected border of surrender, it was envisaged.
The diary of the Chief of the Wehrmacht General Staff, Franz Halder, records the first discussion of the invasion plan in July 1940. It is known that six variants of the plan were proposed for consideration, in which the direction of the main attack varied.
The third option, authored by Major General Erich Marx, involved delivering the main attack from East Prussia and Northern Poland to Moscow with access to Gorky, a secondary attack to Leningrad, and a secondary attack to the south.
Hitler intended to carry out the plan to attack the Soviet Union in five months. According to the third option, Erich Marx proposed ending the Soviets in 9-17 weeks.
The irony of history is that another Marx has appeared. And if the first called for the construction of mythical communism, then the second had aggressive views on the country in which they tried to build this communism.
The historical rank of Major General Erich Marx was, of course, lower than his namesake and served as chief of staff of the 18th Army. He saw the concept of his strike as “the defeat of the Soviet armed forces in order to make it impossible for Russia to revive as an enemy of Germany in the foreseeable future.”
The general saw the industrial power of the Soviet Union in Ukraine, the Donetsk basin, Moscow and Leningrad, and the industrial zone east of these areas “did not matter.”
The general's views largely determined the entire course of military operations in the East.
Along with the invasion plan, another plan was developed - “Ost”. The first branch of the Main Reich Security Directorate (“Gestapo”) expressed its views regarding the Soviet people. The original text of the plan was never found, but preliminary studies were preserved.
To solve the eastern problem, it was proposed “the complete destruction of the Russian people or the Germanization of that part of it that has obvious signs of the Nordic race.”
Hitler’s wishes, expressed more than once by him, were also taken into account: “If we teach the Russians, Ukrainians and Kyrgyz to read and write, then later this will turn against us. Education will give the developed ones the opportunity to study history, master historical experience, and from here develop political ideas that cannot but be destructive for our interests... It is impossible for them to know more than the meaning of road signs. Geography education can be limited to one single phrase: “The capital of the Reich is Berlin.” Mathematics and everything else like that are completely unnecessary.”
In preparation for the attack on the Soviet Union, the Nazis stocked up with one more plan - “Oldenburg”. It envisaged large-scale economic robbery of our country.
A month after the start of the war, Hitler became concerned: “...Now we are faced with the task of cutting up the territory of this huge pie as we need it, in order to be able to: firstly, dominate it, secondly, manage it, third, exploit it.”
The “pie” was divided in advance into commissariats. We had to live in the Muscovy commissariat, which included Tula, Kazan, Ufa, Sverdlovsk, Kirov and Gorky. It was one of the seven general commissariats. Hitler more than once said that the words “Russia”, “Russian”, “Russian” must be destroyed forever and their use prohibited, replacing them with the terms “Moscow”, “Muscovite”, “Moscow”. It was supposed to use the territory of “Muscovy” as a place for the accumulation of elements undesirable for Germany from various regions controlled by the Germans, and to put the entire economy of this region at the service of only the interests of Germany.
The “scientists” of the Nazis prepared and handed Hitler a “voluminous work”, which stated that it was the Germans, long before our era, traveling from Black to Baltic Sea, brought culture there and maintained order, Moreover, they allegedly founded Novgorod and Kyiv...
November 6, 1941. Moscow, metro station "Mayakovskaya". Trains approach the platform almost simultaneously from both sides. People come out of one and sit down in rows of chairs installed on the platform. On another train Stalin arrived with his Kremlin retinue.
The chairman opened the ceremonial meeting dedicated to the 24th anniversary of the October Revolution and gave the floor to the leader.
9 pm. The report began broadcasting on the radio. Stalin spoke calmly and restrainedly. He substantiated the inconsistency of the “lightning war” plan and expressed firm confidence in our final victory over the enemy. He called the German army "people with the morality of animals."
And, summing up his speech, he said: “If they want a war of destruction, they will get it.”
There were words in Stalin’s speech that were perceived as an order:
“There is only one means necessary to reduce the German superiority in tanks to zero and thereby radically improve the position of our army. It, this means, consists not only in sharply increasing the production of anti-tank aircraft, anti-tank rifles and guns, anti-tank guns and mortars, it is necessary to build more anti-tank ditches and all sorts of other anti-tank obstacles.
This is now the task.
We can complete this task, and we can complete it no matter what!”
The anti-tank ditches that Stalin spoke of were one of the most impressive obstacles in the path of Hitler's tank armadas. In the first days of the war, thousands of kilometers of defensive lines were erected along the Dnieper and Berezina. The rapid maneuver of German tanks was stopped by ditches on the way to the Donetsk basin. They surrounded Leningrad with a ditch. Work was carried out at an accelerated pace in the Stalingrad area.
The orders of the State Defense Committee included the cities of Yaroslavl, Ivanovo, Rybinsk, Gorky, Saratov.
But on October 16, the Gorky Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks adopted a resolution on the construction of defensive structures around the city. The address to residents of the city and region said:
“...The city of Gorky and the region, which is one of the largest industrial and cultural centers countries are now in the near rear. We are not in immediate danger, but Gorky residents must be prepared at any moment for any surprises and contingencies.
The construction of field fortifications, begun around the city of Gorky, has a huge national significance. It is the business of every worker in the region.
Comrade workers, office workers, collective farmers, students and housewives - participants in the construction of field fortifications!
You are making a most valuable contribution to strengthening the security of your beloved city, rich in heroic past and present, named after the glorious name of the immortal Gorky.
Invest all your energy and skill into the construction site, take an example from the heroic defenders of Odessa, Leningrad and Moscow!
Build fortifications at the front, so that the city of Gorky becomes an impregnable stronghold for the enemy.”
On one day alone, 11,022 Sormovich residents received mobilization notices to build a defense line.
Each mobilized person had to appear at the assembly point on time, warmly dressed and have with him a spare change of linen, a towel, mittens, a pot or bowl, a mug, a spoon, a mattress pillowcase, a blanket and food for three days. It was also desirable to have your own tool of choice: a shovel, a crowbar, a saw, an axe.
Carts came from villages and villages. We were going to the trenches.
And yet, was the capture of the city of Gorky by German troops real? Were the jobs that distracted thousands of people from more important matters just playing it safe?
Gorky did not appear often in the plans of Hitler’s command. In the diary of the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, Colonel General Franz Halder, mention of the city of Gorky first appears in an entry dated November 19, 1941.
“13.00. Report from the Fuhrer (Hitler's statement and wishes). Analysis of the situation at the front...
...Tasks for the next (1942) year. First of all - the Caucasus. The goal is access to the southern Russian border. Deadline: March-April. In the north - depending on the results of the operation this year. Mastering Vologda or Gorky. The deadline is the end of May.”
A strike by all types of troops was expected. Aviation is already actively bombing Gorky and is doing it very effectively. Several important workshops of the car plant were destroyed. Completely, from direct hit bombs, the management of the radiotelephone plant was killed. Bombers are still flying at the limit of what is possible - far. Returning, the crews of reconnaissance aircraft report that intense excavation An anti-tank ditch is presumably being built over a large area. The Russians are preparing to meet tanks...
One thing is striking: why the anti-tank ditch was built not from the side of Moscow, from where a breakthrough to Gorky was possible, but from the opposite side, from the side of Arzamas. Traces of this ditch are still visible today. It can be found in Tatinets on the Volga, in the Dalnekonstantinovsky and Sosnovsky districts, near the village of Oranok, Bogorodsky district. It went to the Oka at Gorbatov, continued on the other side of the river and came out again to the Volga at Katunki. In addition, from Murom he walked along the entire bank of the Oka. As a result, the total length of the ditch was 1134 kilometers.
Who was this ditch waiting for, whose tanks?
Now we can assume that the Soviet command knew about the plans of the German troops. And not even in general outline, but in subtleties, when mention of Arzamas appeared in the plans of Hitler’s command. At the same time, the direction of one of the main attacks was determined, even if Moscow was not taken: Ryazan - Murom - Gorky.
The person who was supposed to lead the troops in this direction is also known - the “tank king” Heinz Guderian. Your 2nd shock army he penetrated the defense Soviet troops from the border to Tula and unsuccessfully stormed the defending city.
Heinz Guderian visited our country before the war as an inspector of tank forces. He checked the combat readiness of German tank crews in... Kazan. Yes, that happened.
German tank crews were trained in Kazan when, after the First World War, Germany was prohibited from having armed forces.
Guderian was independent. Nevertheless, he was loved by Hitler. Both the direction of the attack and the candidacy of the commander of the troops were approved.
By mid-October 1941, it became clear to Hitler’s command that the goals outlined by the Barbarossa plan had not been achieved. The tank group of Colonel General Erich Gepner, which was ordered to bypass Moscow and block it along the Vladimir-Suzdal line, was forced to get involved in battles in the Kaluga direction.
The plans of Heinz Guderian's tank group also fell through. On October 10, his tanks were supposed to roll through the streets of Arzamas, and five days later they were supposed to enter Gorky, which had been battered by massive air strikes, and, without hesitation, rush to join Gepner. Thus, according to plan, the ring around Moscow was closed.
Meanwhile, Guderian was still standing near Tula. His tank army was melting under the blows of “selective raids” by Soviet troops. The victorious ardor of the “tank king” has noticeably diminished. He understood that the coming winter could be restless for him: he could be driven to the offensive.
He writes to his wife: “Only those who saw the endless expanses of Russian snow in this winter of our misfortune and felt the piercing icy wind burying everything in its path in the snow, who hour after hour drove cars along the no-man's land in order to arrive at a miserable dwelling together with insufficiently dressed, half-starved people, can fairly judge the events that took place.”
And this is just the beginning of the harshest of all military winters. The war according to the third option clearly did not work out.
Meanwhile, in this “space of Russian snow”, with a piercing icy wind, 350 thousand Gorky residents were digging a ditch that was supposed to stop Guderian’s tanks. The brochure “The Enemy Will Not Pass”, published following the construction of the defense line, noted that the volume of excavation work performed during the construction of the defense line “amounts to 60 percent of the excavation work of the White Sea-Baltic Canal named after Stalin and 75 percent of the volume of work of the Fergana Canal.”
For many years almost nothing was known about this construction. Yes, at the level of rumors. Until recently, all documents relating to these works were marked with the stamp: “Sov. secret."
The time has come to tell how the line of defense around Gorky was built, and let those who had this hard work do it.
“I got to the labor front, as they called digging an anti-tank ditch back in September 1941. School had just begun, and two weeks later our entire ninth grade class at the Naumovsky secondary school in the Buturlinsky district was mobilized.
The gathering was scheduled in Buturlin. Brigades were formed here and foremen were appointed. Providing food and all services fell on local collective farms.
And so the convoy, about two kilometers long, headed to Knyaginino, from there to Lyskovo, then there was a crossing across the Volga and we stopped in the village of Valki. That's where our work began.
The anti-tank ditch was dug perpendicular to the river. We worked until the Volga stood up.
During this time, a German plane arrived twice. He didn’t bomb or shoot, apparently he only photographed what we dug up.
Then we were transferred to Bolshoye Murashkino, where there was also an anti-tank ditch near the village of Rozhdestveno. Cold weather set in, the ground was frozen, picks, crowbars, and shovels couldn’t handle it. Then they began to blow up the frozen ground. They gave me a horse and sleigh, and I carried explosives - ammonal, which was packed in 40-kilogram paper bags.
Sappers did the explosion in the morning. We were forced to hide in dugouts, but how to calm our boyish curiosity: we managed to look at the explosions, risking being caught in a hail of clods of frozen earth. The explosions did not make our work easier. Pieces of fallen earth still had to be chiseled away.
When the severe cold set in, they began to give us 100 grams of vodka - “Narkomovskie”.
When the Nazis were driven away from Moscow, discipline at the site began to weaken.
One day the women persuaded me to take them home. We left at night. No one even missed us. We never returned to the trenches. Yes, it was already clear that the need for them had disappeared.”
Alexander Pavlovich Kochetov (village Inkino, Buturlinsky district).
“In 1941, I graduated from the 10th grade of the Bogorodsk secondary school. On June 19 we had prom, and three days later the war began...
We were given summonses to build a defense line or, as they said then, “to the trenches” at the end of October. I was only 17 years old.
70 people were mobilized from our village of Alisteev. In total, they equipped 12 carts and took us with our knapsacks to the village of Migalikha, Dalnekonstantinovsky district. We drove through Oranki, past Shoniha...
In Migalikha we were resettled in houses. I heard that they also lived in huts, so we were well accommodated. We worked here for about ten days, and then it was time to go again. We drove for a long time, all night. Nobody knew where they were taking them. By morning we found ourselves in the village of Arapikha. And again we were given housing in houses of 5-6 people. And the owners themselves have large families. It's cramped, but at least it's warm.
Winter was early that year. There was no snow, but frost had already struck. It's cold in the thirties in the morning.
They gave us bast shoes. They said these are the best shoes. Indeed, it was easy and warm to walk in them.
I never wore bast shoes; I couldn’t put them on correctly so that they wouldn’t come loose. Women put shoes on me for a week, but I never learned how to wrap onuchi and tie bast shoes. Then they gave me boots and galoshes. Then I immediately felt a weight on my legs. By evening I was rubbing my feet until they bled.
I had to walk three kilometers to work. They started working at exactly 7 o'clock in the morning and finished when it got dark. They returned barely alive. They slept on mattresses stuffed with straw.
We were digging an anti-tank ditch. One side of the ditch, the one from which the fascist tanks were waiting, was flat, and the opposite side was steep. The depth of the ditch was 4 meters. The tanks could easily drive into the ditch, but immediately ran into an earthen wall. They would no longer be able to climb the wall.
Along the entire line of the ditch, pillboxes, bunkers, machine gun nests, dugouts and dugouts were built. The roads were blocked with concrete gouges and iron hedgehogs.
I remember that they fed us normally. We didn't feel hungry. The first courses were almost always meat. They brought us food from our collective farm, and sent us some things from home.
And everything would have been fine, but we were overcome by lice. Our heads looked like heaps of ants, our hair was moving. We were not allowed to go home to fry our clothes in the bathhouse, but here nothing was done to fight this infection. They said we had to be patient. We endured...
But one day this patience came to an end. This was already in January 1942. That's how much they endured. We decided to leave our place of work without permission and go home. At night we took off and followed the lights from village to village. We were advised to go out to the railway and follow it. That's what we did. In the afternoon we were already at home.
Fearing that they would come for us, they quickly heated the bathhouse at home so that we had time to wash ourselves. But no one came for us and demanded that we return. A few days later the rest arrived. They reported that an order had arrived to stop the construction of the defense line. The need for it disappeared, the enemy was turned away from Moscow.
There are only three witnesses of those days left in our village. The boys who were with us then went to the front and never returned. Those who were older died long ago. And we were the youngest...
That's all that memory has retained. They say that youth does not notice difficulties. This probably happened to me too. I may have forgotten about the most difficult and bitter thing. I wrote that I remember.”
Maria Nikolaevna Topkova (village of Laksha, Bogorodsky district).
“My mother worked at the defensive structures for almost three months. She has been dead for a long time. And I was 14 years old then, I had just finished my seventh year, and my older sister had finished her tenth year.
In the fall, all childless men and women who were not drafted into the army received summons to build defensive lines. They also brought a summons to my older sister. Mom cried, and the next day she went to the collective farm board and asked to be sent to work.
We also had a sister in our family. She just turned two years old. It was hard for my mother to leave home.
How long this autumn and winter lasted! Our mothers sent notes with the drivers and asked them to send them new bast shoes. We went to the neighboring village, bought bast shoes there and sent them away.
I remember that my mother worked near the village of Shonikha.
In mid-January, there was a knock on the window at night. We didn’t have any light, I went out onto the porch and asked: “Who’s there?” It was our mom. We didn’t recognize her right away... Her face was black and frostbitten. Here she was tall and plump, but here she is thin, almost an old woman.
When they were told that the work was finished, they immediately went home, which was a hundred kilometers in the cold.
Later, in peacetime, I often asked my mother about that work, but she kept repeating only one thing: “Lord, let me forget about these trenches.”
Lidia Grigorievna Mukhina (Myshlyaeva) (Kostyanka village, Shatkovsky district).
“I will never forget the night of November 4-5, 1941. Several people came running to our brigadier’s apartment at once: “Come on, see how Gorky is burning!”
We ran out into the street and saw a terrible picture. The sky in the direction of Gorky was all crimson. Beams of searchlights were visible, snatching flying planes out of the darkness.
Someone said it was a car plant being bombed. We stood in a daze for a long time. Although we were building a line of defense, judging by the map, the war was far from us, and it was not believed that it would come to us. Over the nearby fields, wave after wave of German bombers approached Gorky. Our teacher Pyotr Ivanovich Kaistinen was evacuated from Petrozavodsk. He said that he had already seen and heard German bombers.
And on the morning of November 5, an emergency occurred. When the foremen and construction managers went to work after a short meeting, they found no one on the route of the defensive line... The ground, as if covered with snow, was covered with white leaflets. Having picked up several of them, we read: “If you come to dig trenches tomorrow, we will bomb you!”
The horror of the evening spectacle also affected. The teachers got scared and, taking the students, went home.
What to do? The representative of the district party committee, Konstantin Sergeevich Mishin, calmly said: “We won’t panic. The district party committee is probably already aware of the emergency. Now collect the leaflets and burn them.” That's what we did.
In the evening, the head of the district department of the NKVD arrived from Bolshoi Murashkino. As he walked, he ordered all brigadiers to report to headquarters. You were supposed to enter one at a time.
In the corridor, all the male foremen began to quietly beg me to go to the head of the first. You, they say, are a woman, a school director, and nothing will happen to you, and the boss will become softer.
What to do, maybe they are right. Trying to be calm, I walked in... I still can’t forget it.
Hello! Hello! Where are the students?
He listened to me without interrupting, looking straight at me. Then he ordered: “I give you 48 hours to return the students. If you don’t return it, I’ll shoot you.” And he took a revolver out of the desk drawer...
I walked to the door on wobbly legs, trying not to fall. The brigadiers surrounded me. I managed to tell them to promise to return people to the border.
Zoya Ivanovna Petrova (Sabanova) (b. Bolshoye Murashkino).
“We walked in silence. Everyone's soul was sad. We knew that the situation at the front was bad. Occupying and destroying our cities and villages, the enemy was getting closer and closer to Moscow.
Vityusha, you are literate. High school finished today. Tell me, will the Nazis defeat us? - Uncle Fyodor Salnikov, an elderly man who was part of the brigade along with his sons Evstafiy and Nikolai, asked me, breaking the general silence.
“No way and never,” I answered hotly. - There were many hunters before the Russian land. And they defeated them all. And German knights, and Swedes, and Poles, the invincible Napoleon. And the same awaits the fascists. There will be a holiday on our street.
Yes, God,” Uncle Fyodor sighed.
In the village where we arrived, we were billeted. The hostess brought us an armful of straw from the yard, spread it on the floor, covered it with some kind of sackcloth, and said bitterly:
There is nothing more. Sorry for my poor reception.
“Nothing, not bars,” they told her. - Thanks for that too. We leave the land, we’ll fall asleep and so on. If only it was warm.
Early in the morning, after a quick snack, we went to work. We had to walk three kilometers. Approaching the place, we saw from a steep slope: diggers were working everywhere as far as the eye could see. Our team immediately got to work. The ground froze to great depths. They even sawed the frozen soil with a saw.
Without holidays, without days off, in the bitter cold, people gave all their strength to work. They returned to the apartments, barely dragging their feet. We ate hot food only in the morning and evening. Lunch was replaced by a piece of rye bread frozen into ice in my pocket. It did not thaw even near the fire - the top burned, but ice remained inside.
When they learned about the defeat of the Germans near Moscow, there was no limit to the general rejoicing.
Well, Uncle Fyodor,” I said triumphantly, “the holiday begins on our street.”
Uncle Fyodor wiped his tears with his mitten.
But there was still a long way to go before general joy and celebration. In early January, summonses arrived at the track. I still had a whole war ahead of me..."
Viktor Nikolaevich Zimin (Kstovo).
On January 14, 1942, a special commission signed an act on the acceptance of defensive structures around Gorky, noting high quality executed works.
Returning from the line of defense, its builders issued an appeal to all workers of the region:
“Our construction site was a school of labor and courage. True heroes of the labor front have grown up in our ranks.
We are returning from the frontier to our regular work in the days when the heroic Red Army strikes blow after blow at the hated enemy, destroying his manpower and equipment, liberating his native land from dirty fascist invaders. But the enemy is not completely destroyed.
...We must... transfer our combat experience gained during the construction of a defensive line to workshops and collective farms, enterprises and institutions in order to help the front with even greater force, to help the Red Army exterminate the hated Nazi invaders, to liberate our cities and villages from the brown beasts."
In the summer of 1942, when Nazi troops launched an offensive in the Don bend, the danger of a strategic breakthrough to Penza - Saransk - Arzamas again arose. Excavation work at the line of defense continued, but was less significant.
In May 1943, the Military Council of the Leningrad Front decided to quickly build a new reinforced concrete defensive line on the second line of defense of the 42nd and 54th armies along the southern perimeter of the city, up to 25 kilometers long. The border received the code name "Izhora". The head of the front engineering troops, General B. Bychevsky, and his headquarters developed a plan and schedule of work. The work was headed by the 32nd Military Field Construction Directorate, whose chief was Colonel Engineer F. Grachev.
The Izhora line was supposed to consist of a system of long-term reinforced concrete firing points. The task before us was not easy. In the shortest possible time, it was necessary to build 119 fortifications at a distance from 800 meters to 5 kilometers from the enemy’s front line. About 40 kilometers of access roads were required to be built to future firing points. All work had to be carried out on a plain devoid of vegetation, which was clearly visible to the Nazis. The only shelter here could be isolated ruins of buildings and the remains of railway embankments.
Roads to the objects were built under continuous mortar and artillery fire from the Nazis. Almost all excavation work was done by hand.
The fittings, embedded parts, and formwork were manufactured by the central workshops, which were led by major engineer L. Belyaev. Concrete was prepared at the central concrete plant, headed by engineer major P. Gorodetsky. The site and surviving equipment of the Stroydetal plant that existed before the war were used for the concrete plant and workshops. The sawmill and woodworking shop were restored. The concrete plant was created anew: installed on wooden trestles concrete mixers with a total capacity of 800 cubic meters of concrete per day. But this was not enough. Then the command of the 29th Defense Construction Directorate turned to the Barrikada plant for help. Despite the fact that Barrikada provided concrete for the construction of another extremely important Neva facility, the plant workers found the strength and reserves to fulfill our requests. This was the case everywhere: Leningrad enterprises fulfilled front-line orders without delay.
Work at the central concrete plant went on around the clock, in two shifts.
Up to 500 people and 60 vehicles were employed in procurement work. All this had to be well hidden from the eyes of the enemy. The plant camouflage project was developed with the direct participation of engineer-captain S. Permut. Camouflage of the plant and objects under construction ( total area which amounted to 123,500 square meters) was carried out under the leadership of the energetic and knowledgeable commander of the camouflage company, engineer-captain I. Pozdnyakov; it was also carried out by special teams led by Leningrad decorative artists. In addition to the main objects, railway tracks, highways, warehouses for materials and finished products, overpasses, and mechanisms were also camouflaged. The main means of camouflage were camouflage coloring, vertical and horizontal nets, transverse screens, fences painted to match the surrounding area. The territory of the concrete plant was hidden by a mesh with burlap of different colors and shapes sewn onto it. From the tower that was at the plant, a panorama of a vast meadow, overgrown with flowers and small bushes, opened up. Behind this peaceful landscape, huge stacks of sand, gravel, warehouses and machinery were hidden from the eyes of the enemy.
We thought for a long time about how to build one of the firing points. The location for it was chosen against the backdrop of a new, light-colored building in a zone of constant shelling. One of the military scouts said that at sunset have a clear day The rays of the sun, reflected from the walls and windows of the building, blind the enemy, and the entire area adjacent to the building becomes invisible to him. The builders of the border took advantage of this.
Preliminarily, the sections of roads closest to the object in open places were masked with vertical and horizontal masks. On a hot July day, workers in small groups made their way to the building and began preparing the facility for concreting. Everyone was worried that clouds might roll in and the work would be disrupted. But then the sun sank to the horizon, and bright rays hit the windows and walls of the house. Trucks with concrete quickly began to approach one after another. Without making too much noise, people worked with all their might, and the object was completed by morning.
Another place, as flat as a table. Black brick pipes stick out here and there - wooden houses burned out. Here one of the targets of enemy artillery is a former boiler room with a 12-meter stone chimney, an excellent landmark for shelling. And according to the scheme, a reinforced concrete firing point should be built near the boiler room. And again, ingenuity came to the rescue: they decided to blow up the pipe during the next shelling. On the appointed day, as soon as the shells began to explode near the boiler room, there was an explosion, the pipe collapsed and, together with the boiler room, turned into a pile of rubble. A fence was immediately erected around them, painted to look like ruins. The shelling of the boiler room stopped. This is exactly what we needed! The firing point was built in a short time. Now she did not allow the Nazis to raise their heads from the trenches.
Some Izhora facilities were built directly in existing buildings, which in such cases served as a permanent camouflage for the facility. Open sections of roads leading to this building were masked with vertical and horizontal masks and screens. The supply of materials took place from the rear of the building; the people who worked in it were invisible to the enemy. Part of the general construction work was the installation of various false objects.
Trucks loaded with concrete were moving towards Izhora in a continuous stream. The work did not stop around the clock. On average, 3-4 objects with a total volume of up to 600 cubic meters were concreted every day, and this amount of concrete had to be transported over a distance of 4 to 20 kilometers. Accumulation of vehicles should not be allowed. To objects closest to leading edge enemy, trucks were released from the factory at significant intervals. On average, under normal conditions, cars departed at intervals of 10-15 minutes. In such conditions, vehicles had to operate extremely efficiently. Considerable credit for this belonged to technician-lieutenant M. Lurie, who was in charge vehicles construction sites
Day and night, work on the sites did not stop; not a single minute could be lost. The work schedule was extremely tight. At night, energy for illuminating the areas was provided by mobile power stations; engineer-major V. Konstantinov was responsible for their operation.
The blue light bulbs were hidden in deep reflector caps that did not scatter the light. In order not to give away the work sites by sound, false noise sources were placed at a distance from the objects.
Weak lights were installed on the overpass to mark its contours so that drivers could navigate when entering the overpass. On special difficult areas, where it was impossible to use lighting, the drivers studied the entrances to the objects in advance, during the day.
To deceive the enemy, not to allow him to discover a new reinforced concrete line ahead of time, to minimize losses among our builders - the high-speed construction method helped us in solving these primary issues. The most stringent schedules were completed ahead of schedule. The construction time for reinforced concrete firing points was reduced by 60 percent... And in the most difficult conditions of constant shelling, working literally under the nose of the enemy, the builders lost only about 30 people killed and wounded during the entire period of work.
Collectives of military builders and workers of the city of Lenin fulfilled the order of the command of the Leningrad Front with honor and on time. They created a long-term defensive line "Izhora", insurmountable for the enemy. The line was occupied by units of the 42nd Army.