Blessed memory of soldiers and commanders

2nd shock army, who fell in battles with the German

fascist invaders dedicated.

During the Great Patriotic War, seventy Soviet combined arms armies fought the enemy. In addition, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command formed five more shock troops - intended for operations in offensive operations in the directions of the main attack. At the beginning of 1942 there were four of them. The fate of the 2nd strike turned out to be tragic ...

The year two thousand was coming to an end. The clock impassively counted down the time remaining until the new millennium. TV channels and radio stations, newspapers and magazines squeezed out the theme of the millennium to the fullest. Predictions were made by politicians, scientists, writers, palmists, and sometimes outright charlatans.

The results were summed up. Lists of the "most-most" outstanding people and events of the past century, the millennium were widely circulated. All different. Yes, it could not be otherwise in a world where momentary conjunctures constantly prevail over historical objectivity.

Russia was acutely worried about the Kursk tragedy. The society wanted to receive full information about the tragedy. So far, only versions have been expressed, rumors have multiplied ...

And in this huge stream of messages about past and future disasters, accomplishments and anniversaries, the information about the opening on November 17 in the village of Myasnoy Bor, Novgorod Region, a monument-memorial to the soldiers of the 2nd shock army of the Volkhov front, was somehow lost, without being separated from a number of other news. Opened? Well, good. Thanks to the sponsors - they gave money for a holy cause.

Sounds cynical, doesn't it? But, nevertheless, life is life. World War II has long gone down in history. And there are fewer and fewer veterans of the Great Patriotic War on the streets. And more - quite young people with decorations for other wars - Afghan, Chechen. New time. New people. New Veterans.

So, the St. Petersburg authorities did not delegate anyone to the opening of the monument to the fighters of the 2nd shock. And again, from the point of view of modern bureaucratic formalism, it is true: a foreign region. And the fact that the army, by its actions, forced the Germans to finally abandon plans to capture Leningrad, played a crucial role in the operations to break through and completely lift the blockade, knocked out the last German units from the territory Leningrad region in the battles near Narva ... Well, let historians do this.

And historians did not deal with the combat path of the 2nd shock army separately. No, of course, in numerous monographs, memoirs, reference books, encyclopedias and other literature devoted to the Second World Army, it is mentioned repeatedly, its combat operations in specific operations are described. But there is no research on the 2nd shock accessible to a wide circle of readers. To rummage through a pile of literature in order to get a real idea of ​​\u200b\u200bher combat path will only be graduate students preparing a dissertation on a specialized topic.

It gets amazing. The whole world knows the name of the Tatar poet Musa Jalil. And in literary, and in any "general" thick Big and Small encyclopedic dictionaries, you will read that in 1942, being wounded, he was taken prisoner. In a fascist prison, he wrote the famous "Moabit Notebook" - a hymn to the fearlessness and resilience of man. But nowhere is it noted that Musa Jalil fought in the 2nd shock army.

However, writers still turned out to be more honest and persistent than historians. Pavel Luknitsky, a former special correspondent for TASS on the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts, in 1976 published a three-volume book "Leningrad is acting ..." in the Moscow publishing house "Soviet Writer". The author managed to overcome censorship obstacles, and from the pages of his most interesting book openly declared:

"The feats accomplished by the soldiers of the 2nd Shock, can not be counted!"

It would seem that in 1976 the ice broke. The writer, as far as he could, spoke in detail about the soldiers of the army, described their participation in operations. Now historians must pick up the baton! But... they were silent.

And the reason here is an ideological taboo. For a short time, the 2nd shock was commanded by Lieutenant General A.A. Vlasov, who later became a traitor to the Motherland. And although the term "Vlasovites", which is usually used to characterize the fighters of the "Russian Liberation Army" (ROA), can in no way refer to veterans of the 2nd shock, they are still (so that the name of the traitor does not pop up once again in memory) from the history of the Great Patriotic War , as far as possible, tried to cross out. And the collection "2nd Shock in the Battle for Leningrad" published in 1983 in Lenizdat could not fill this gap.

Strange, you will agree, there was a situation. Books have been written about the traitor Vlasov, historical documentary films have been made. A number of authors are seriously trying to present him as a fighter against Stalinism, communism, a bearer of some kind of "high ideas". The traitor has long been condemned and hanged, and the discussions around the personality of Vlasov do not subside. The last (!) veterans of the 2nd shock, thank God, are alive, and if they are remembered, then on Victory Day, along with other participants in the war.

There is a clear injustice, since the role of the 2nd shock and the role of Vlasov in the history of the Great Patriotic War are not comparable.

To see this, let's look at the facts.

... Army Group "North" was advancing towards Leningrad. Field Marshal Wilhelm von Leeb led to the city that Hitler so desired to destroy, the 16th and 18th armies of Colonel Generals Bush and von Küchler, the 4th Panzer Group of Colonel General Hoepner. Forty-two divisions in all. From the air, the army group was supported by over a thousand aircraft of the 1st Luftwaffe Fleet.

Oh, how the commander of the 18th Army, Colonel-General Karl-Friedrich-Wilhelm von Küchler, rushed forward! With his invincible fellows, he already passed in 1940 Holland, Belgium, marched under the triumphal arch in Paris. And now - Russia! Sixty-year-old Kühler dreamed of a field marshal's baton, which was waiting for him on the very first Leningrad street - it would be enough to bend down and pick it up. He will be the first of the foreign generals to enter this proud city with an army!

Let him dream. He will receive a field marshal's baton, but not for long. Kühler's military career would end ingloriously under the walls of Leningrad on January 31, 1944. Enraged by the victories of the soldiers of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts, Hitler will throw Kühler, who by that time commanded the entire North army group, into retirement. After that, the field marshal will be shown to the world only once - in Nuremberg. To be judged as a war criminal.

In the meantime, the 18th Army is advancing. She has already managed to become famous not only for military successes, but also for brutal reprisals against civilians. The soldiers of the "great Fuhrer" did not spare either the inhabitants of the occupied territories or the prisoners of war.

During the battles for Tallinn, not far from the city, the Germans discovered three reconnaissance sailors from a combined detachment of sailors and Estonian militias. During a short bloody battle, two scouts died, and a seriously wounded sailor from the destroyer "Minsk" Yevgeny Nikonov was taken prisoner in an unconscious state.

Yevgeny refused to answer all questions about the location of the detachment, and torture did not break him. Then the Nazis, angry at the stubbornness of the sailor, gouged out his eyes, tied Nikonov to a tree and burned him alive.

Having entered the territory of the Leningrad Region after the hardest fighting, the wards of von Küchler, whom Leeb called "a respected man, possessing fearlessness and composure," continued to commit atrocities. I will give just one example.

As the documents of the Trial in the case of the High Command of the Nazi Wehrmacht irrefutably testify, “in the area occupied by the 18th Army ... there was a hospital in which 230 mental patients and women suffering from other diseases were placed. After a discussion, during which the opinion was expressed that "according to German concepts" these unfortunates "were not worth living anymore", a proposal was made to liquidate them, an entry in the combat log of the XXVIII Army Corps for December 25-26, 1941 shows that "the commander agreed with such a decision" and ordered its implementation by the forces of the SD.

The prisoners in the army of the "respectable" and "fearless" Küchler were sent to clear the area, shot at the slightest suspicion of a desire to escape. Finally, simply starved. I will quote only one entry from the combat log of the head of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the 18th Army for November 4, 1941: "Every night 10 prisoners die from exhaustion."

On September 8, Shlisselburg fell forty-first. Leningrad was cut off from southeastern communications. The blockade has begun. The main forces of the 18th Army came close to the city, but could not take it. The strength clashed with the courage of the defenders. This was forced to admit even the enemy.

General of the Infantry Kurt von Tippelskirch, who at the beginning of the war served as Oberkvartmeister-IV (chief of the chief intelligence agency) of the General Staff of the German Ground Forces, wrote angrily:

"German troops reached the southern suburbs of the city, but due to the stubborn resistance of the defending troops, reinforced by fanatical Leningrad workers, the expected success was not. Due to a lack of forces, it was also not possible to oust the Russian troops from the mainland ...".

Continuing the offensive in other sectors of the front, units of the 18th Army came close to Volkhov in early December.

At this time, in the rear, on the territory of the Volga Military District, the 26th Army was formed anew - for the third time after the battles near Kyiv and in the Oryol-Tula direction. At the end of December, she will be transferred to the Volkhov Front. Here the 26th will receive a new name, with which it will pass from the banks of the Volkhov River to the Elbe, it will forever remain in the history of the Great Patriotic War - the 2nd shock!

I specifically described the methods of warfare by the 18th Army of the Nazis in such detail so that the reader understands what kind of enemy our 2nd shock army will have to meet. There was very little time left before the start of the most tragic operation in 1942 in the North-West of the country.

In the meantime, the results of the 1941 campaign were being assessed at headquarters on both sides of the front. Tippelskirch noted:

"In the course of heavy fighting, Army Group North, although it inflicted significant losses on the enemy, and partially destroyed its forces ... however, it did not achieve operational success. The planned timely support by strong formations of Army Group Center was not provided."

And in December 1941, Soviet troops launched a strong counterattack near Tikhvin, defeated and put to flight the Germans near Moscow. It was at this time that the defeat of the Nazis in the northwestern and Moscow directions was predetermined.

In military science there is such a concept - analytical strategy. It was developed by the Prussians - great experts in all kinds of teachings on how to kill better, faster and more people. It is no coincidence that all the wars with their participation, starting with the Battle of Grunwald, entered world history as the bloodiest. The essence of the analytical strategy, if we omit all the tricky and lengthy explanations, boils down to the following: get ready - and win.

The most important component of the analytical strategy is the doctrine of the operation. We will dwell on it in more detail, since without it the course of the described operations and battles, the reasons for successes and failures will be difficult to understand.

Do not be too lazy to take a sheet of paper and set aside on it the coordinate system known from school. Now, just below the X axis, start drawing an elongated Latin capital letter S so that its "neck" makes an acute angle with the axis. At the intersection point, put the number 1, and at the top, at the point where the letter starts to bend to the right - 2.

So. To point 1 is the preparatory stage military operation. At the very point it “starts” and begins to develop rapidly, at point 2 it loses pace and then fades. The attacking side seeks to go the way from the first to the second point as quickly as possible, attracting maximum forces and means. The defender, on the contrary, tries to stretch it out in time - the resources of any army are not unlimited - and, when the enemy runs out of steam, crushes him, taking advantage of the fact that at point 2 the saturation phase has begun. Looking ahead, I will say that this is exactly what happened during the Luban operation of 1942.

For the German divisions, the "neck" of the letter S on the way to Leningrad and Moscow turned out to be prohibitively long. The troops stopped at both capitals, unable to move on and - were beaten almost simultaneously - near Tikhvin and near Moscow

To wage the campaign of 1942 along the entire front of Germany, there were not enough forces. On December 11, 1941, German losses were estimated at 1 million 300 thousand people. As General Blumentritt recalled, in the autumn "... in the troops of the armies" Center "in most infantry companies, the number of personnel reached only 60-70 people."

However, the German command had the opportunity to transfer troops to the Eastern Front from the territories occupied by the Third Reich in the West (from June to December, outside the Soviet-German front, fascist losses amounted to about 9 thousand people). Thus, divisions from France and Denmark ended up in the location of the 18th Army of the Army Group "North".

Today it is difficult to say whether Stalin was counting on the opening of a second front in 1942 at a time when the Stavka was planning a number of upcoming operations, including the de-siege of Leningrad. At least the correspondence between the Supreme Commander and the President of the United States and the British Prime Minister about the need to open a second front was fairly lively. And on January 1, 1942, in Washington, representatives of the USSR, the USA, Britain, China and 22 other countries signed a United Nations declaration on an uncompromising struggle against the states of the fascist bloc. The US and British governments officially announced the opening of a second front in Europe in 1942.

Unlike Stalin, the more cynical Hitler was convinced that there would be no second front. And concentrated the best troops in the East.

"Summer is the decisive stage of the military dispute. The Bolsheviks will be driven back so far that they can never touch the cultural soil of Europe ... I will see to it that Moscow and Leningrad are destroyed."

Our Headquarters was not going to give Leningrad to the enemy. On December 17, 1941, the Volkhov Front was created. It included the 2nd shock, 4th, 52nd and 59th armies. Two of them - the 4th and 52nd - have already distinguished themselves during the counterattack near Tikhvin. The 4th was especially successful, as a result of a decisive attack on December 9, which captured the city and inflicted serious damage on enemy manpower. Nine of its formations and units were awarded the Order of the Red Banner. In total, 1179 people were awarded in the 4th and 52nd armies: 47 - the Order of Lenin, 406 - the Order of the Red Banner, 372 - the Order of the Red Star, 155 - the medal "For Courage" and 188 - the medal "For Military Merit". Eleven soldiers became Heroes of the Soviet Union.

The 4th Army was commanded by General of the Army K.A. Meretskov, the 52nd - by Lieutenant General N.K. Klykov. Now one army commander led the front, the other was to command the 2nd shock. The Headquarters set a strategic task for the front: to defeat the Nazi troops, with the help of units of the Leningrad Front, to break through and completely lift the blockade of Leningrad (this operation was called "Lyuban"). The Soviet troops did not cope with the task.

Let us give the floor to Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky, who traveled to the Volkhov Front and is well acquainted with the situation. In the book "The Work of All Life", the illustrious marshal recalls:

“Almost all winter, and then spring, we tried to break through the ring of the Leningrad blockade, striking at it from two sides: from the inside - by the troops of the Leningrad Front, from the outside - by the Volkhov Front in order to connect after an unsuccessful breakthrough of this ring in the Lyuban region. main role in the Luban operation played the 2nd shock army Volkhovites. She entered the breakthrough of the German defense line on the right bank of the Volkhov River, but failed to reach Lyuban, and got stuck in forests and swamps. The Leningraders, weakened by the blockade, were all the more unable to solve their part of the common task. Things barely moved. At the end of April, the Volkhov and Leningrad Fronts were merged into a single Leningrad Front, consisting of two groups: a group of troops of the Volkhov direction and a group of troops of the Leningrad direction. The first included the troops of the former Volkhov Front, as well as the 8th and 54th Army, formerly part of the Leningrad Front. The commander of the Leningrad Front, Lieutenant-General M.S. Khozin, got the opportunity to unite actions to eliminate the blockade of Leningrad. However, it soon became clear that it was extremely difficult to lead nine armies, three corps, two groups of troops, divided by the zone occupied by the enemy. The decision of the Headquarters to liquidate the Volkhov Front turned out to be erroneous.

On June 8, the Volkhov Front was restored; it was again headed by K.A. Meretskov. L.A. Govorov was appointed to command the Leningrad Front. "For failure to comply with the order of the Headquarters on the timely and rapid withdrawal of the troops of the 2nd shock army, for the paper-bureaucratic methods of command and control of the troops," the order of the Headquarters said, for separating from the troops, as a result of which the enemy cut the communications of the 2nd shock army and the latter was put in an exceptionally difficult position, remove Lieutenant General Khozin from the post of commander of the Leningrad Front" and appoint him commander of the 33rd Army Western Front. The situation here was complicated by the fact that the commander of the 2nd Army, Vlasov, turned out to be a vile traitor and went over to the side of the enemy.

Marshal Vasilevsky does not disclose the course of the Lyuban operation itself (there was little written about it at all), confining itself to stating the achieved negative result. But, mind you, neither he nor the Headquarters at their disposal make any accusations against the units of the 2nd shock. But the following quote is extremely far from objectivity. Although, to be honest, one cannot blame the authors of the capital work "Battle for Leningrad" for deliberate bias (and in our uncensored era, many people adhere to this point of view). I quote:

"In the first half of May 1942, fighting resumed on the western bank of the Volkhov River in the Luban direction. Our attempts to expand the breakthrough in the enemy's defenses in order to develop a subsequent attack on Lyuban were unsuccessful. The Nazi command managed to pull up to this sector large forces and, inflicting strong blows on the flanks of those who advanced forward Soviet troops created a real threat of their destruction. In mid-May 1942, the headquarters of the Supreme High Command ordered the troops of the 2nd shock army to be withdrawn to the eastern bank of the Volkhov River. However, as a result of the treacherous behavior of General Vlasov, who later surrendered, the army found itself in a catastrophic situation, and, with heavy fighting, it had to leave the encirclement.

So, from the above text it logically follows that the failure of the army is the result of Vlasov's betrayal. And in the book "On the Volkhov Front", published in 1982 (and, by the way, published by the Academy of Sciences of the USSR and the Institute of Military History), the following is generally categorically stated:

"Inaction and betrayal of the Motherland and the military duty of its former commander, Lieutenant General A.A. Vlasov, is one of the most important reasons that the army was surrounded and suffered huge losses."

But here is a clear overkill! The army was surrounded by no means through the fault of Vlasov, and the general was not going to surrender it to the enemy. Let's take a quick look at the operation.

The commander of the Volkhov Front, General of the Army K.A. Meretskov, made a well-founded decision to attack with two fresh armies - the 2nd shock and 59th. The offensive of the shock group had the task of breaking through the front of the German defense in the Spasskaya Polist area, reaching the line of Lyuban, Dubrovnik, Cholovo and, in cooperation with the 54th Army of the Leningrad Front, defeating the Luban-Chudov enemy group. Then, having developed success, break the blockade of Leningrad. Of course, who held the post of chief of the general staff before the war, Meretskov was aware that it would be extremely difficult to implement the decision of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, but he made every effort for this - an order is an order.

The offensive began on 7 January. For three days, our troops tried to break through the German defenses, but did not achieve success. On January 10, the front commander temporarily stopped the attacking actions of the units. On the same day, the 2nd shock received a new commander.

"Although a change of command is not an easy task ... we still dared to ask the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command to replace the commander of the 2nd shock army," recalled K.A. Meretskov. Kirill Afanasyevich spoke about G.G. Sokolov not in the best way:

"He got down to business ardently, made any promises. In practice, he did not succeed. It was clear that his approach to solving problems in a combat situation was based on long-obsolete concepts and dogmas."

It was not easy for Meretskov to apply to the Headquarters with a request to remove the commander. The former chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, who was repressed and only miraculously did not share the fate of many top military leaders, Kirill Afanasyevich suggested (before the start strategic operation!) remove from office not just General Sokolov, but, in the very recent past, Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Sokolov.

However, precisely because it was before the offensive, Meretskov asked to replace the commander. And ... a few days later, G.G. Sokolov was recalled to Moscow. Open the latest edition of the Military Encyclopedic Dictionary - there you will find articles about all the commanders of the 2nd shock. Besides Sokolov...

But back to 1942. Forces were regrouped on the Volkhov front, and reserves were concentrated. On January 13, after an hour and a half of artillery preparation, the offensive resumed throughout the entire area of ​​\u200b\u200bdeployment of front troops from the village of Podberezye to the city of Chudovo in a northwestern direction from the starting lines. Unfortunately, only the 2nd Shock Army, commanded by Lieutenant General N.K. Klykov from January 10, had the main and only success in this operation.

Here is what Pavel Luknitsky, an eyewitness, writes in the Leningrad Diary:

“In January, in February, the initial success of this operation was achieved under the command of ... G.G. ... front ...) and N.K. Klykov, who led it on the offensive ... The army had a lot of brave, selflessly devoted to the Motherland soldiers - Russians, Bashkirs, Tatars, Chuvashs (the 26th Army was formed in the Chuvash Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic ), Kazakhs and other nationalities".

The war correspondent did not sin against the truth. The pressure was really terrible. Reinforced with reserves transferred from other sectors of the front, the second shock troops wedged in a narrow strip into the location of the enemy 18th army.

Having broken through the defense in depth in the zone between the villages of Myasnoy Bor - Spasskaya Polist (about 50 kilometers north-west of Novgorod), by the end of January, the advanced units of the army - the 13th cavalry corps, the 101st separate cavalry regiment, as well as units of the 327th The 1st Infantry Division reached the city of Lyuban and engulfed the enemy grouping from the south. The remaining armies of the front practically remained at their starting lines and, supporting the development of the success of the 2nd shock army, fought heavy defensive battles. Thus, already then Klykov's army was left to itself. But it was coming!

In the diary of the Chief of the General Staff of the German Land Forces, Franz Halder, there were entries one more disturbing than the other:

January 27th. ... On the front of the Army Group "North" the enemy achieved tactical success on the Volkhov.

Feeling a serious threat of joining units of the 2nd shock with units of the 54th Army of the Leningrad Front, General I.I. Fedyuninsky, who was 30 kilometers northeast of Lyuban, the Germans strengthened their 18th Army. In the period from January to June 1942, 15 (!) Full-blooded divisions were transferred to the area of ​​​​operations of the Volkhov Front to eliminate the offensive of the troops of the 2nd shock army. As a result, the command of the Army Group "North" was forced to abandon plans to capture Leningrad forever. But the tragic fate of the 2nd shock was a foregone conclusion.

On February 27, the Germans attacked the open flanks of the Soviet troops. Our units, which reached Ryabovo, were cut off from the main forces of the front and only after many days of fighting broke out of the encirclement. Let's take another look at Halder's diary:

2nd of March. ... A meeting with the Fuhrer in the presence of the commander of the Army Group "North", the commanders of the armies and commanders of the corps. Decision: go on the offensive on the Volkhov on March 7 (until 13.03.). The Fuhrer demands a few days before the start of the offensive to carry out aviation training (bombing warehouses in the forests with super-heavy caliber bombs). Having completed the breakthrough on the Volkhov, one should not waste energy on destroying the enemy. If we throw him into the swamp, it will doom him to death."

And so, from March 1942 until the end of June, the troops of the 2nd shock army, being surrounded and cut off from their communications, fought fierce battles, holding the Germans in the southeast direction. It is enough to look at the map of the Novgorod region to make sure that the battles were fought in the conditions of a wooded and swampy area. In addition, in the summer of forty-second in the Leningrad region, the level of groundwater and rivers sharply increased. All bridges, even on small rivers, were demolished, swamps became impassable. Ammunition and food in extremely limited quantities were delivered by air. The army was starving, but the fighters and commanders honestly performed their duty.

Circumstances developed in such a way that in mid-April the commander N.K. became seriously ill. Klykov - he had to be urgently evacuated by plane across the front line. At that time, the deputy commander of the Volkhov Front, Lieutenant-General A.A. Vlasov (who, by the way, arrived at the front on March 9), was at the army’s location. And it was quite natural that he, who had proven himself well in the battles near Moscow, was appointed to act as commander of the encircled army.

The conditions under which they had to fight are evidenced by the veteran of the 2nd shock I. Levin in the notes "General Vlasov on this and that side of the front":

“There was a desperate situation with ammunition. When cars and carts could not get through the neck to us, the shells - two ropes over their shoulders - were carried by the soldiers on themselves. Junkers, Heinkels, Messers literally hung over their heads and in during daylight hours they hunted (I'm sure, with passion) for every moving target - whether it be a soldier or a wagon. There was nothing to cover the army from the air ... There was nothing to save our native Volkhov forest: it allowed us to play hide and seek with the Luftwaffe.

In May, the situation worsened. Here is how the commander of the 327th Infantry Division, Colonel (later Major General) I.M. Antyufeev:

"The situation on the line occupied by the division was clearly not in our favor. The forest roads had already dried up, and the enemy brought tanks and self-propelled guns here. He also used massive mortar fire. And yet, for about two weeks, the division fought on this line ... Finev Lug passed from hand to hand several times. Where did the physical strength and energy of our soldiers come from!... In the end, a critical moment came at this turn. To the left of us, between the lakes, a partisan detachment was defending, which was pushed back by the enemy. to be completely surrounded, we were forced to retreat. This time we had to part with almost all heavy weapons ... In the rifle regiments by that time there were no more than 200-300 people each. They were no longer capable of any maneuver. they were still fighting, literally clutching the ground with their teeth, but the movement was unbearably difficult for them.

In mid-May 1942, the command of the 2nd shock received a directive on the withdrawal of the army across the Volkhov River. This was more than difficult to accomplish. When the enemy closed the only corridor in the Myasny Bor area, the very possibility of an organized breakthrough became unlikely. As of June 1, in 7 divisions and 6 brigades of the army, there were 6777 commanding officers, 6369 junior officers and 22190 privates. A total of 35336 people - about three divisions. At the same time, it should be taken into account that the command lost operational control over the troops, the units were scattered. Nevertheless, the Soviet fighters offered heroic resistance to the enemy. The fighting continued.

On the night of June 24-25, 1942, as a result of the failed operation of the troops of the Volkhov Front and the remaining combat-ready units of the 2nd shock army to break through the encirclement from Myasnoy Bor and the withdrawal of the remaining groups of fighters and commanders, the army command decided to break through to its own, breaking into small groups (soldiers and officers of the army already did this).

When leaving the encirclement, the chief of staff of the 2nd strike colonel Vinogradov died under shelling. The head of the special department, major of state security Shashkov, was seriously wounded and shot himself. Surrounded by the Nazis, Zuev, a member of the Military Council, saved the last bullet for himself, and the head of the political department, Garus, also acted. The chief of communications of the army, Major General Afanasiev, went out to the partisans, who ferried him to the "mainland". The Germans captured the commander of the 327th division, General Antyufeev (who refused to cooperate with the enemies, the division commander was subsequently sent to a concentration camp). And General Vlasov ... surrendered to the patrol of the 28th Infantry Corps in the village of Tukhovezhi (together with the chef of the dining room of the military council of the army, M.I. Voronova, who accompanied him).

But they were looking for him, trying to save the commander! On the morning of June 25, officers who emerged from the encirclement reported: Vlasov and other senior officers were seen in the area of ​​the narrow gauge railway. Meretskov sent his adjutant there - Captain Mikhail Grigoryevich Boroda, a tank company with an infantry landing. Of the five tanks in the German rear, four were blown up by mines or were hit. M.G. Boroda on the last tank reached the headquarters of the 2nd shock - there was no one there. By the evening of June 25, several reconnaissance groups were sent to find the Army Military Council and withdraw it. Vlasov was never found.

After some time, a message was received from the partisans of the Oredezh detachment of F.I. Sazanov: Vlasov went over to the Nazis.

When, after many days, the surviving soldiers of the 2nd shock found out about this, they were simply shocked. “But how they believed this heroic general, scolder, joker, eloquent! The army commander turned out to be a contemptible coward, betrayed everyone who, not sparing his life, went into battle on his orders,” wrote Pavel Luknitsky.

“The question arises: how did it happen that Vlasov turned out to be a traitor?” Marshal Meretskov writes in his book “In the Service of the People”, “It seems to me that only one answer can be given. Vlasov was an unprincipled careerist. His behavior before that may well be considered a disguise behind which hid indifference to the motherland.His membership in the Communist Party is nothing more than a path to high positions.His actions at the front, for example, in 1941 near Kyiv and Moscow, are an attempt to distinguish himself in order to demonstrate professional abilities and quickly move out."

During the trial of the command of the ROA, to the question: why did he surrender, Vlasov answered briefly and clearly: "I was faint-hearted." And you can believe it. Surrendering on July 12, the general, who did not have the courage to shoot himself, was already a coward, but not yet a traitor. Vlasov betrayed his homeland a day later, when he ended up at the headquarters of the commander of the 18th German army, Colonel-General Gerhard Lindemann. It was to him that he described in detail the state of affairs on the Volkhov front. A photograph has been preserved: Vlasov bent over the map with a pointer, Lindemann standing next to him is carefully following his explanations.

Here we leave the traitor. He has nothing to do with the further fate of the 2nd shock.

Despite the betrayal of Vlasov, the whole army was not blamed for the failure of the Luban operation. And in those days, just the slightest suspicion of betrayal was enough for the very name "2nd shock" to disappear forever from the lists of the Red Army. In addition, none of the units of the army lost their battle flags.

This means that the Headquarters correctly assessed its role: despite the tragic outcome of the operation, the army buried the enemy's hopes of capturing Leningrad. The losses of the Nazi troops were too heavy. Pavel Luknitsky also reports this in the three-volume book "Leningrad is acting ...":

"... she destroyed a lot of enemy forces (2nd shock bus): six German divisions pulled from Leningrad to Volkhov were bled to death by her, the fascist legions "Netherlands" and "Flanders" were utterly defeated, many remained in the swamps enemy artillery, tanks, aircraft, tens of thousands of Nazis ... ".

And here is an excerpt from a leaflet issued by the political department of the Volkhov Front shortly after the 2nd shock fighters left the encirclement:

"Valiant warriors of the 2nd Shock Army!

In the fire and roar of guns, the clanging of tanks, the roar of aircraft, the fierce battles with the Nazi scoundrels, you won the glory of the valiant warriors of the Volkhov frontiers.

Courageously and fearlessly, during the harsh winter and spring, you fought against the fascist invaders.

The military glory of the soldiers of the 2nd shock army is imprinted in gold letters in the history of the Great Patriotic War ... "

However, Hitler, unlike his generals, did not leave an obsession with taking and destroying Leningrad, demanded that the representative of the Wehrmacht at the Finnish headquarters, General Erfurt, achieve an offensive by the ally units from the north. But the Finnish command gave the Nazi envoy a turn, declaring: since 1918, our country has been of the opinion that the existence of Finland should not pose a threat to Leningrad. Apparently, the Finns, who carefully assessed both the international and military situation, then groped for grounds for getting out of the war into which Germany had dragged them.

But Hitler did not let up. He took an unprecedented step: from the southern borders he transferred the victorious 11th Army of Field Marshal von Manstein to Leningrad. Manstein took Sevastopol! Manstein "figured out" the Kerch operation of the Russians! Let Manstein take Leningrad!.

Manstein has arrived. Leningrad did not take. In his memoirs he wrote:

"On August 27, the headquarters of the 11th Army arrived at the Leningrad Front, so that here, in the zone of the 18th Army, to find out the possibilities of striking and draw up a plan of attack on Leningrad. It was agreed that then the headquarters of the 11th Army would occupy part of the front of the 18th Army facing north, while the eastern part of the front along the Volkhov remained behind the 18th Army.

And the 11th Army entered into heavy fighting with the Soviet troops, which lasted until the beginning of October. Actually. Manstein had to solve the tasks of the 18th Army, which was badly beaten during the Luban operation by parts of the 2nd shock and already incapable of large-scale operations.

The field marshal managed to destroy a number of our formations, but there was not enough strength to take the city. Manstein later recalled these autumn battles of the forty-second year:

"If the task of restoring the situation on the eastern sector of the front of the 18th Army was completed, then nevertheless the divisions of our army suffered significant losses. At the same time, a significant part of the ammunition intended for the attack on Leningrad was used up. Therefore, there could not be an early offensive and speeches. Meanwhile, Hitler still did not want to part with the intention to capture Leningrad. True, he was ready to limit the tasks of the offensive, which, naturally, would not lead to the final liquidation of this front, and in the end everything came down to this liquidation (emphasis added by me On the contrary, the headquarters of the 11th Army believed that it was impossible to start an operation against Leningrad without replenishing our forces and generally not having a sufficient number of forces. October passed behind the discussion of these issues and the drawing up of new plans.

In November, the situation developed in such a way that the presence of the 11th Army was required in other sectors of the Eastern Front: the decisive battle for Stalingrad was approaching. Manstein's headquarters was transferred to Army Group Center. In addition to the unsuccessful attempt to take Leningrad, fate dealt the German commander another - terrible - blow. On October 29, the 19-year-old son of a field marshal, infantry lieutenant Gero von Manstein, who fought in the 16th Army, died on the Leningrad Front.

Many years after the events described, while working on his book "Lost Victories", the old field marshal, always stingy with praise to the enemy, will pay tribute to the heroic soldiers of the 2nd shock (the army at that time was only in name, fought the enemy with an eight thousandth rifle division and one infantry brigade). He will appreciate their courage in a military way clearly and concisely:

"The losses of the enemy killed many times exceeded the number captured."

And in the forty-second year, another important event took place on the Volkhov Front, which at first glance has no direct relation to the development of hostilities. A song was born, which soon became popularly known and loved. Because it sounded true and, most importantly, already victorious!

Songs that raise the morale of soldiers sometimes mean more than new weapons, plentiful food, warm clothes. The time of their appearance rightly occupies a worthy place in military chronology. In 1941, this became "Get up, the country is huge!", In 1942 - "Volkhov's table" to the words of the front-line poet Pavel Shubin.

They didn't sing then.

Let's drink for the Motherland, let's drink for Stalin,

Let's drink and drink again!

They did not sing, because there were no such lines yet. but, you see, it sounded great:

Let's drink to meet the living!

These words fully applied to all soldiers of the 2nd shock army.

At the end of 1942, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided at the beginning of the next year to carry out an operation to de-siege Leningrad, better known in history as Operation Iskra.

From the side of the Leningrad Front, the 67th Army stood out in the shock group. The Volkhov Front again entrusted this task to the 2nd shock. The almost completely renewed army (only about ten thousand people left the encirclement) included: 11 rifle divisions, 1 rifle, 4 tank and 2 engineering brigades, 37 artillery and mortar regiments and other units.

The fully equipped 2nd shock continued its combat path. And he was great!

On January 18, 1943, the 2nd Shock Army of the Volkhov Front, in cooperation with the 67th Army of the Leningrad Front, broke through the blockade of Leningrad. The course of this operation is described in detail both in fiction and in special military literature. Numerous documentaries and feature films have been shot about her. Every year, January 18 was celebrated in Leningrad, is celebrated and will be celebrated in St. Petersburg as one of the main city holidays!

Then, in the cold January days of 1943, the main thing happened: conditions were created for land and transport communications with the whole country.

For courage and bravery shown during the breaking of the blockade, about 22 thousand soldiers of the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts received state awards. The 122nd tank brigade, which interacted with units of the 2nd shock brigade, became Red Banner. And in the army itself, the 327th Rifle Division was transformed into the 64th Guards Rifle Division. The chest of the commander of the newly minted guards, Colonel N.A. Polyakov, was decorated with the Order of Suvorov II degree. The commander of the 2nd shock lieutenant general V.Z. Romanovsky was awarded one of the highest commander's insignia - the Order of Kutuzov, I degree.

Since April 1943, already acting as part of the Leningrad Front, the army participated in the Leningrad-Novgorod offensive operation, and with its active participation from the Oranienbaum bridgehead in January 1944 ensured the final liberation of Leningrad from the blockade.

In February-March, she liberated Lomonosovsky, Volosovsky, Kingiseppsky, Slantsevsky and Gdovsky districts of the Leningrad Region, went to the Narva River and Lake Peipsi. In April-August, she fought with German troops on the Narva Isthmus and successfully carried out an operation to liberate Narva. In September 1944, in the successful Tallinn operation, the territory of Estonia was liberated from the invaders.

And how were things with the no longer victorious 18th German Army? Tippelskirch writes:

"On January 18 (1944 - author), that is, a few days after the start of the Russian offensive on the northern sector of the front of the 18th Army, the troops of the Volkhov Front went on the offensive from a wide bridgehead north of Novgorod in order to strike at the flank of the 18th Army "It was impossible to prevent this breakthrough, and it led to the withdrawal of the entire army group. Novgorod had to be left the very next day."

But, true to its tradition of smashing and destroying everything, the 18th Army continued the practice of "scorched earth"!: only fifty people survived from the almost fifty thousand population of Novgorod, and only forty out of 2500 buildings. Colonel-General Lindemann, already familiar to us, ordered to dismantle and send to Germany the famous monument "Millennium of Russia", which is still located on the territory of the Novgorod Kremlin. They dismantled it, but they didn’t manage to take it out - they had to take their feet away from the rapidly advancing Soviet army.

Under the blows of the Soviet troops, the 18th Army rolled back farther and farther, until, together with the 16th Army, it was blocked as part of the Courland grouping. Together with her, the failed conquerors of Leningrad on the night of May 9 laid down their arms. And then a terrible panic began among the soldiers of the 16th and 18th armies. General Gilpert, who commanded the grouping, was also seriously cowardly. It turns out that the Nazis "miscalculated." Pavel Luknitsky tells in his narration:

“Before accepting the ultimatum, Gilpert did not know that Marshal Govorov was in command of the Leningrad Front, he believed that they would surrender to Marshal Govorov, “commander of the 2nd Baltic Front,” - this seemed to the Germans, who committed atrocities near Leningrad, not so terrible: “Baltic”, having not experienced the horror of the blockade, they have no reason to take such "merciless revenge" as the Leningraders allegedly do.

Previously, one had to think when they were butchering at the walls of the Neva stronghold, dying from hunger, but not surrendering!

On September 27, 1944, the Military Council of the Leningrad Front, transferring the 2nd shock to the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, addressed its troops with the words:

"The 2nd shock army, as part of the troops of the front, played a big role in lifting the blockade of Leningrad, winning the Great Victory near Leningrad, and in all the battles for the liberation of Soviet Estonia from the Nazi invaders.

The victorious path of the 2nd Shock Army on the Leningrad Front was marked by brilliant successes, and the battle banners of its units were fanned with unfading glory.

The working people of Leningrad and Soviet Estonia will always sacredly cherish in their memory the military merits of the 2nd Shock Army, its heroic soldiers - the faithful sons of the Fatherland.

At the final stage of the war, the 2nd shock as part of the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front under the command of Marshal of the Soviet Union K.K. Rokossovsky fought in East Prussia, participated in the East Pomeranian operation. In his memoirs, Konstantin Konstantinovich Rokossovsky noted her skillful actions more than once:

"The 2nd shock army with a fight overcame a strong defensive line on the outskirts of Marienburg, which in the old days was a fortress of the crusaders, and on January 25 reached the Vistula and Nogat rivers. Part of its forces crossed these rivers in several places and captured small bridgeheads. Capture Elbing the troops could not move on the move... I.I.

Together with the 65th Army and a separate tank brigade of the Polish Army, the 2nd Shock Brigade played a decisive role in the assault on Danzig - the Polish city of Gdansk.

"On March 26, the troops of the 2nd shock and 65th armies, having broken through the enemy defenses to their entire depth, approached Danzig," wrote K.K. Rokossovsky. if the ultimatum was not accepted, the residents were advised to leave the city.

The Hitlerite command did not respond to our proposal. The command was given to start the assault ... The struggle was for every house. The Nazis fought especially stubbornly in large buildings, factory and factory buildings ... On March 30, Gdansk was completely liberated. The remnants of the enemy troops fled to the swampy mouth of the Vistula, where they were soon taken prisoner. The Polish national flag hoisted over the ancient Polish city, which was hoisted by soldiers - representatives of the Polish Army.

From East Prussia, the path of the army lay in Pomerania. The Germans understood perfectly well that the Soviet soldiers had every right to take revenge. The memories of how the Nazis treated prisoners of war and civilians were too fresh. And in the May days of 1945, living examples almost constantly appeared before my eyes.

On May 7, units of the 46th division of the 2nd shock cleared the island of Rügen from the Germans. Our soldiers discovered a concentration camp in which compatriots languished. In his book "From the Neva to the Elbe", the division commander, General S.N. Borshchev, recalled the incident on the island:

“Our Soviet people, liberated from concentration camps, were walking along the road. Suddenly a girl ran out of the crowd, rushed to our illustrious intelligence officer Tupkalenko and, embracing him, shouted:

Vasil, you are my brother!

And our courageous, desperate intelligence officer, Vasily Yakovlevich Tupkalenko (full cavalier of the Order of Glory - author), on whose face, as they say, not a single muscle trembled, cried ... ".

But the winners, to the surprise of the local population, did not take revenge. On the contrary, they helped as much as they could. And when a column of young men in fascist soldier's uniforms came across towards the 90th Infantry Division, the divisional commander General N.G. Lyashchenko simply waved his hand to the teenagers:

Go to your mother, go to your mother!

Naturally, they happily ran home.

And the Great Patriotic War ended for the 2nd strike with participation in the famous Berlin operation. And our soldiers had their own "meeting on the Elbe" - with the 2nd British Army. Soviet and British fighters celebrated it solemnly: with a football match!

During the four years of the war, the troops of the 2nd shock army were thanked twenty-four times by the Supreme Commanders, and the sky over Moscow was lit up with victorious volleys of salutes. For heroism, courage and courage, 99 formations and units were given the honorary names of the liberated and captured cities. 101 formations and units attached orders of the Soviet Union to their banners, and 29 formations and units became guards. 103 soldiers of the 2nd shock were awarded the title of Heroes of the Soviet Union.

History has given everyone their due. Soldiers, officers and generals of the 2nd Shock Army found themselves on the heroic pages of the annals of the Victory. And General Vlasov - to the gallows. The execution took place on the night of August 1, 1946 in the Taganskaya prison by the verdict of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR. And on this we could part with the traitor, if not for some circumstances.

Our country entered the new millennium without a textbook on the history of Russia. Well - nothing surprising: too many idols in the previous decade were overthrown from their pedestals, not all heroes were taken out of oblivion. And the history of any state is made up of the actions of individuals.

But when scientists thoroughly shook the flask with the historical cocktail of the twentieth century, many strange, and sometimes terrible personalities appeared on the surface, whom, quick at hand, "independently thinking" pseudo-chroniclers, immediately began to present to us as heroes misunderstood by the people. A sort of Don Quixotes of modern history, not in the least caring that, unlike Mr. La Mancha, the knights are not a sad, but rather a bloody image.

General Vlasov was also included in the category of such "Don Quixotes". His defense is built mainly on two positions (everything else is verbal husk): the general is not a traitor, but a fighter against the regime that collapsed anyway, and Vlasov is the Soviet analogue of Stauffenberg.

It is dangerous not to notice such statements. Our country is rightly called the most reading in the world. But to this it must be added that for the most part the Russian people are accustomed to believing the printed word: once it is written, so it is. That is why expositions are so popular among us and refutations often go unnoticed.

Not intending to deal with the refutation of the arguments of Vlasov's supporters in this narrative, I suggest that readers consider only the factual side of the matter.

So, Vlasov and Stauffenberg. The German colonel never fought Prussian militarism - the main opponent of Stauffenberg and his associates was the Nazi elite. A competent officer of the general staff could not help but understand that preaching the idea of ​​the superiority of one nation, a "thousand-year Reich" cannot be built. It was planned to replace key figures with less odious ones, abandon the most unacceptable Nazi principles - and that's it. The world is in a certain period of time. More from a pupil of the German military school, initially accustomed to planning wars and offensive actions, could not be expected. Stauffenberg did not consider himself a traitor to Germany, as he ultimately acted in her interests.

Oath to the Fuhrer? But we should not forget: for the hereditary aristocrat Count Klaus Philipp Maria Schenck von Stauffenberg, son of the chief chamberlain of the Württemberg king and court lady of the queen, a descendant of the great Gneisenau, Hitler was a plebeian and an upstart.

Stauffenberg led the conspiracy of the military, being on the territory of his country, knowing full well the inevitability of death in case of failure. Vlasov - simply chickened out when the danger threatened him personally, surrendered. And the next day, he laid out to Colonel-General Gerhard Lindemann not plans to fight the communist regime, but military secrets that he owned as deputy commander of the Volkhov Front.

At the beginning of the war, Stauffenberg actively pushed through the General Staff his ideas for the creation of national volunteer armies. Consequently, Vlasov, who eventually led the ROA, was considered no more than the commander of one of these legions.

For the Germans, Vlasov was not a person; he was not assigned any serious role in military and political plans. Hitler repeated more than once: "The revolution is made only by those people who are inside the state, and not outside it." And at a meeting in the summer of 1943 he said:

"... I absolutely do not need this General Vlasov in our rear areas ... I only need him on the front line."

Leaders who are heavily staked on for a successful outcome of the war, as you know, are not sent there - it's dangerous. In the order of Field Marshal Keitel dated April 17, 1943, it was said:

"... in operations of a purely propaganda nature, the name of Vlasov may be required, but not his personality."

At the same time, in the order, Keitel calls Vlasov a "prisoner of war Russian general" - and no more. But that's what they called him on paper. In colloquial speech, harsher expressions were chosen, for example: "This Russian pig Vlasov" (Himmler, at a meeting with the Fuhrer).

Finally, Soviet historians, unwittingly, played a significant role in "perpetuating" the memory of A.A. Vlasov, calling all the fighters of the ROA "Vlasovites". In fact, they never were.

The "Russian Liberation Army" was formed from traitors and prisoners of war. But the soldiers surrendered and were captured by the enemy, and the traitors went to the service of the Germans, and not to Vlasov. Before the war, his name was not widely known in the USSR, and after the transition to the Germans, Vlasov was known only as a traitor. They did not go to him, as they went to Denikin or Kolchak, Petliura or Makhno - not the right figure.

Yes, and he did not behave like a leader. The same Denikin, at the end of the civil war, refused the English pension, rightly noting that only the Russian government could pay money to a Russian general. Vlasov - willingly ate in German kitchens, during his arrest in the forty-fifth, thirty thousand Reichsmarks were found hidden in him "for a rainy day." He lived comfortably - he even got a German wife - the widow of an SS officer Adele Billinberg (after the war she will try to get a pension for her husband who was hanged, like a general's widow).

One of the commanders of the White Guard corps, General Slashchev, did not wear shoulder straps during the civil war, believing that the volunteer army had dishonored them with robberies and violence. Vlasov did not wear shoulder straps with the Germans either, but he gladly put on a comfortable overcoat of a Wehrmacht general. "Just in case," he kept a book of the commanding staff of the Red Army and ... a party card.

Well, Vlasov was not a leader. But, perhaps, then a fighter for the happy lot of the people? Many refer to his so-called "Smolensk appeal" to the people, other propaganda speeches. But Vlasov himself subsequently explained that the texts of the appeals were composed by the Germans, and he only slightly edited them. The former general lamented:

"Until 1944, the Germans did everything themselves, and we were used only as an advantageous sign for them."

And, by the way, they did the right thing, because the unedited Vlasov would hardly have been perceived by Russian people as a patriot.

As already mentioned, in the spring of 1943 he made a "tour" in parts of Army Group North. One can judge by the incident at a banquet in Gatchina with what kind of "love for the Motherland" the speeches of the former army commander were imbued.

Believing in his own importance, the dispersed Vlasov assured the German command: if he was given two shock divisions now, he would quickly take Leningrad, as the inhabitants were exhausted by the blockade. And then he, Vlasov the winner, will arrange a luxurious banquet in the city, to which he invites the generals of the Wehrmacht in advance. As you already know, outraged by such impudence, Hitler recalled Vlasov from the front and even threatened death penalty.

As a result, the Fuhrer still had to put the ROA into action - there was not enough "cannon fodder" at the front, and in the Reich they formed units even from teenagers. But the ROA no longer had any "liberating" character. And the German command did not place special hopes on her. The same Tippelskirch after the war will write that the "Vlasov army", despite its large numbers, was a stillborn fetus.

And how the Soviet units perceived it - the memoirs of the veteran of the 2nd shock I. Levin clearly testify:

“On the site of our 2nd shock army, I remember only one battle with the Vlasovites. Somewhere in East Prussia, near Koenigsberg, our tank landing came across a large German unit, which included a Vlasov battalion.

After a fierce battle, the enemy was scattered. According to reports from the front line: they took many prisoners, Germans and Vlasovites. But only the Germans reached the army headquarters. Not a single person with the ROA sign was brought. You can say a lot of words about this ... But no matter what they say, no one has the right to condemn our paratroopers who have not cooled down from the battle, who have just lost their friends at the hands of traitors ... ".

The Vlasov army, in principle, had nothing to count on. In the thirties and forties of the twentieth century in our country, the power of personal example was of great importance for people. Hence - the Stakhanovite movement, the Voroshilov arrows. During the war years, the soldiers deliberately repeated the feat of Matrosov, the pilots - Talalikhin, snipers - the achievements of Smolyachkov. And an example of civic courage for people was the feat of Kosmodemyanskaya, and not the activities of Vlasov. He could not find a place in this row.

At that time, the word "SS man" was the worst curse - where there is sometimes a gentle Russian mat. And Vlasov conducted propaganda with the help of SS Obergruppenführer Goebbels, equipped and armed the ROA under the leadership of the Reichsführer SS Himmler, and chose an SS widow as his life partner. And, finally, the very service certificate of the commander of the "Russian (!) Liberation Army" Vlasov was signed by SS General (!) Kroeger. Isn't the attraction to the security detachments of the Nazi Party too strong for a "bearer of lofty ideas", a fighter for a "free Russia"?

In the historical period described, a person who had anything to do with the SS could at best count on a place in a prison cell. But not on the political Olympus. And this opinion was held not only in the USSR.

After the war, traitors were tried all over Europe. Quisling was shot in Norway, the Belgian King Leopold III, who signed the surrender to Germany, was forced to abdicate. Marshal Petain in France was sentenced to death, then commuted to life imprisonment. According to the verdict of the people's tribunal, Antonescu was executed as a war criminal in Romania. If such a punishment befell traitors of the first magnitude, then what could smaller fry like Vlasov count on? Only on a bullet or a noose.

And to present today an obvious traitor in the role of a martyr and "sufferer for the people" means deliberately engaging in false patriotic propaganda. This is much worse than trading from the stalls of Hitler's Mein Kampf. Because it has long been customary - the sufferers in Rus' are loved, pitied. But Vlasov is not a foolish cripple. And the scaffold instead of a tribune was erected for him according to his deserts.

Russia had other generals as well. During the Great Patriotic War, one of the leaders of the White Guard movement and the implacable enemy of the Soviet government, Lieutenant-General A.I. Denikin, urged the White emigrants to fight the Germans in order to support the Red Army. And the Soviet lieutenant general D.M. Karbyshev preferred martyrdom in a concentration camp to treason.

How did the fate of other commanders? Lieutenant-General Nikolai Kuzmich Klykov (1888-1968) after his recovery, from December 1942, was assistant commander of the Volkhov Front, participated in breaking the blockade of Leningrad. In June 1943, he was appointed to the post of deputy commander of the Moscow Military District. In 1944-1945 he commanded the troops of the North Caucasian Military District. Valery Zakharovich Romanovsky (1896-1967), who led the 2nd shock army before the operation to break through the blockade ring, later became deputy commander of the 4th Ukrainian Front, in 1945 he received the rank of colonel general. After the war, he commanded the troops of a number of military districts, worked in military schools.

Hero of the Soviet Union, Lieutenant-General Ivan Ivanovich Fedyuninsky (1900-1977), who replaced him as commander in December 1943, also commanded the troops of the districts in 1946-47 and 1954-65. He again had a chance to serve the Motherland on already peaceful German soil: in 1951-54, he was deputy and first deputy commander-in-chief of a group of Soviet troops in Germany. Since 1965, Army General Fedyuninsky worked in a group of inspectors general of the USSR Ministry of Defense. In 1969, as a participant in the battles in Mongolia, a veteran of the famous Khalkhin Gol, he was awarded the title of Hero of the Mongolian People's Republic.

Colonel General Gerhard Lindemann (1884-1963), who opposed the 2nd shock at the head of the 18th German army - the one who wanted to take the Millennium of Russia monument out of Novgorod - on March 1, 1944, led the North army group, but for military setbacks in early July of the same forty-fourth was removed from his post. Commanding the German troops in Denmark at the end of the war, on May 8, 1945, he surrendered to the British.

Field Marshals Wilhelm von Leeb and Karl von Küchler were tried by the Fifth American Military Tribunal in Nuremberg as war criminals. On October 28, 1948, the sentence was pronounced: von Leeb (1876-1956) received an unexpectedly mild sentence - three years in prison. Von Küchler (1881-1969) was treated more severely. No matter how he lied, no matter how he dodged, no matter how the “respected” and “fearless” field marshal referred to only the exact execution of orders, the tribunal turned out to be inexorable: twenty years in prison!

True, in February 1955, Küchler was released. From the beginning of the fifties, they began to release and amnesty many "fuhrer soldiers" - in 1954, the Federal Republic of Germany joined NATO and "experienced specialists" were required to form parts of the Bundeswehr.

Something, but "experience" they were not to occupy! Suffice it to say that soon after the formation of the Bundeswehr, the fascist General Ferch, one of the leaders of the artillery shelling of Leningrad, was appointed its commander. In 1960, Major General of the Wehrmacht became Chairman of the Standing Military Committee of NATO, former boss Department of the General Staff of the Ground Forces Adolf Heusinger. The same Heusinger, who calmly gave orders for punitive expeditions and reprisals against the civilian population of the occupied territories of the Soviet Union.

However, times are different now. But, you see, historical facts are a stubborn thing. And it is necessary to remember them - evidence of the bloodiest war of the twentieth century!

Every year on May 9, Moscow salutes the Winners. Alive and dead. Majestic monuments and modest obelisks with red stars remind of their exploits.

And in Myasny Bor there is a memorial in memory of the feat of the soldiers of the 2nd shock army, which cannot be deleted from History!

2002-2003

P. S. HIS MEAT POR

In memory of N.A. Shashkova

Businessmen are different. Some people love to shine in front of TV cameras, others - to support "high-profile" projects, consecrated by the patronage of statesmen. Still others are engaged in charity, receiving in return laureate signs of various awards - from literary to fence-building (the main thing is to hang a beautiful diploma in the office).

My old friend Leonid Ivanovich Kulikov, general director of the BUR mining company, did not belong to any of the above categories. But if there was a need to support an interesting and necessary undertaking, he helped. True, after first making sure that the money will go to a good cause, and not into the pocket of the initiator.

Therefore, in Kulikov's office one could often meet writers and poets, officials, generals, and scientists. And I was absolutely not surprised when, several years ago, on one of the hot June days, I found a tall, gray-haired old man in the uniform of a vice admiral at Leonid Ivanovich's. He was talking animatedly as he walked around the table. The star of the Hero of the Soviet Union swayed above the medal bars in time with the movements.

Shashkov. Nikolai Alexandrovich, - the admiral held out his hand. - It's good that he came. We are just discussing one important topic, - Leonid Ivanovich explained. - Of course, you have heard about the Second Shock Army?

Luban operation in 1942?

You see!” exclaimed Shashkov. “He knows. And he didn’t tell me how this idiot (the name of one official sounded): the Vlasov army.

Well, Vlasov is Vlasov, and the army is an army. In the end, she then broke through the blockade of Leningrad, participated in the East Prussian operation.

Because of Vlasov, little was written about her, but there was a lot to hear about the heroism of the fighters. Still, he worked as a city reporter for a long time. I met different people.

I know, for example, that the brother of the famous BDT artist Vladislav Strzhelchik fought in the Second Shock. The mother of the writer Boris Almazov, Evgenia Vissarionovna, was in 1942 the senior operating nurse of the army field hospital. In Yakutia - God bless him for long years- lives unique person- Sergeant Mikhail Bondarev. He was called up from Yakutia and went through the whole war as part of the Second Shock! A rare case, she was born again three times. And the son of Eduard Bagritsky - war correspondent Vsevolod - died during the Luban operation.

Just like my father - Alexander Georgievich. He was the head of a special department of the army, - interrupted Shashkov.

We talked for a long time that day. About heroes and traitors. Memory and unconsciousness. The fact that the recently opened memorial to the dead soldiers in Myasnoy Bor needs to be equipped, but there is no money. The surviving veterans are very old people. Businessmen are not interested in them, so they do not seek to help.

We'll help, we'll help," Kulikov reassured Admiral every time.

We also talked about the search engines, which are absolutely disinterestedly engaged in a holy cause - they search for and bury the remains of fighters. About officials giving vague answers to all proposals for perpetuating the memory of the fallen.

They firmly stuck in their heads: the Vlasov army, - Shashkov got excited. - When he was still an assistant to the Minister of Defense of the USSR, he spoke many times to the head of Glavpur (Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy- ed.) - it is necessary to prepare and publish a normal history of the Second shock. And this capercaillie old answered me: let's see, let's wait. We waited…

Listen. I have read some of your historical essays. Maybe you can take it. You see, it is necessary to briefly and clearly reflect the entire military path. Young people will not read the Talmud. And she definitely needs to know this page of history.

What happens: they write about Vlasov, this bastard, a traitor, they make films. And they forgot about the army, in fact, which saved Leningrad!

Since then, we have been seeing each other quite often.

In Nikolai Alexandrovich, they were struck, first of all, by irrepressible energy, purposefulness. He constantly dangled between St. Petersburg and Moscow. And not in the "SV" car - behind the wheel of your own "nine". He made his way to high offices - he persuaded, argued, signed the necessary papers. It seemed that, apart from perpetuating the memory of the fighters of the Second Shock, he no longer needed anything in this life. It was largely thanks to the efforts of Shashkov that a memorial appeared in Myasny Bor in the Novgorod region.

Many people wondered why a respected and honored person needs all this trouble. At such a venerable age, with such merits and, let's note in brackets, connections, you can safely rest on your laurels. And sometimes - to decorate the presidium of some important forum with your dress admiral's uniform.

But the fact of the matter is that Shashkov was not a "wedding general." In the full sense of the word, the combat commander (this was his submarine during the Arab-Israeli conflict of 1968 was ready to fire missiles at the Promised Land), he felt personally responsible for the return from oblivion of the names of his father's comrades-in-arms. With the help of the FSB, he installed a memorial plaque at the memorial. But how many nameless heroes still lie in the land of Novgorod! And Shashkov continued to act.

In Kulikov's office, which became our headquarters, Nikolai Alexandrovich prepared requests and letters, copied and sent out documents, and met with potential sponsors. Here we have made corrections to the manuscript of the story.

He came to this office on May 8, 2003, after a meeting with Valentina Ivanovna Matviyenko, who was then the presidential plenipotentiary in the North-West, joyfully excited:

Valentina Ivanovna took my suggestions more attentively than she expected. Now things are moving forward.

And indeed, it has moved. We were convinced of this a few months later, when we arrived on August 17 - the next anniversary of the opening of the memorial - in Myasnoy Bor.

Nikolai Alexandrovich told me what still needs to be done. And, knowing his ability to achieve his own, both I, and Kulikov, and everyone involved in this work by the admiral had no doubt: so be it.

Throughout the autumn, winter and spring, Shashkov was engaged in routine and, as he put it, bureaucratic work. On May 1, the phone rang in my apartment.

Just arrived from Moscow. Lots of interesting news about the memorial. As I said earlier, a film about the Second Shock will be shot. Vladimir Leonidovich Govorov (General of the Army, Hero of the Soviet Union, Deputy Chairman of the Pobeda Foundation - author) is actively pushing this idea. By the way, I brought you a letter from him thanking you for the story.

Yes. Remember when you scanned my photos? So…

And we delved into the discussion of technical issues. In parting, Nikolai Alexandrovich reminded: we meet on May 9, in Myasny Bor. But fate decreed otherwise.

... On May 7, I stood in the large mourning hall of the crematorium and looked at the portrait of the admiral, exhibited in front of closed coffin. The artificial light reflected dimly in the decorations resting on scarlet cushions.

The night after our conversation, a fire broke out in the Shashkovs' apartment. Nikolai Aleksandrovich and his wife Valentina Petrovna died in the fire. The apartment itself burned down completely.

... Volleys of farewell fireworks died down. The sailors removed the flag of the Navy from the coffin. Vice Admiral Shashkov has gone to eternity.

A man who fought all his life to preserve the names of fallen heroes in our history has left, leaving only a memory of himself. As about a real Patriot of the Motherland, a man of Honor and Duty.

How much it is, and not everyone is given ...

June 2004

___________________________

Musa Jalil (senior political instructor Musa Mustafievich Dzhalilov) was executed in the terrible Nazi prison Moabit on August 25, 1944. Shortly before his death, the poet wrote the following lines:

I'm leaving life

The world may forget me

But I'll leave the song

Which will live.

The motherland did not forget Musa Jalil: in 1956 - posthumously - he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, and the next year he was awarded the Lenin Prize. And today his poems are widely known in Russia.

After the war, one of the streets of Tallinn was named after the Hero of the Soviet Union Yevgeny Alexandrovich Nikonov. Now on the map of the city you will not find a street with this name. In recent years, in Estonia, on the territory of which the Nazis destroyed 125,000 local residents, history has been carefully rewritten...

One of the best commanders of the Great Patriotic War, Kirill Afanasyevich Meretskov (1897-1968) - later Marshal of the Soviet Union, holder of the highest military order "Victory". After the war - Assistant Minister of Defense of the USSR. Since 1964, Marshal K.A. Meretskov, Hero of the Soviet Union, worked in the group of general inspectors of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

As an example of Sokolov's "commander's skill" in his book "In the Service of the People", Marshal Meretskov cites an excerpt from the order of the commander N14 of November 19, 1941:

"1. Walking, like the crawling of flies in autumn, I cancel, and I order henceforth to walk in the army like this: a military step is a arshin, and they walk. Accelerated - one and a half, and press it.

2. Food is out of order. In the midst of the battle, they dine and the march is interrupted for breakfast. In war, the order is this: breakfast is dark, before dawn, and dinner is dark, in the evening. In the afternoon, it will be possible to chew bread or crackers with tea - good, but no - and thanks for that, since the day is not particularly long.

3. Remember to everyone - both the chiefs, and the privates, and the old and the young, that during the day it is impossible to walk in columns more than a company, but in general in a war for a campaign it is night, then march.

4. Do not be afraid of the cold, do not dress up as Ryazan women, be well done and do not succumb to frost. Rub your ears and hands with snow."

“Well, why not Suvorov?” comments K.A. Meretskov. “But it is known that Suvorov, in addition to issuing catchy orders that penetrate the soldier’s soul, took care of the troops ... Sokolov thought that the whole thing was a dashing piece of paper, and mostly limited to orders.

Of the 2100 people of the legion "Netherlands", 700 survived. As for the legion "Flanders", its strength was reduced by a factor of three in just a few days of fighting.

The war spares no one - neither marshals nor their children. In January 1942, the son of the famous Soviet commander Mikhail Vasilievich Frunze, Air Lieutenant Timur Frunze, died on the Leningrad Front. Pilot T.M. Frunze was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Here is the full text of "Volkhov's Table" written by Pavel Shubin in 1942:

Rarely, friends, we have to meet,

But when it happened

Let's remember what happened, and drink, as usual,

As it happened in Rus'!

Let's drink to those who for weeks long

In frozen dugouts lay,

Fought on Ladoga, fought on the Volkhov,

Didn't take a step back.

Let's drink to those who commanded the companies,

Who died in the snow

Who made his way to Leningrad by swamps,

Throat breaking the enemy.

Will forever be glorified in legends

Under a machine-gun blizzard

Our bayonets on the heights of Sinyavin,

Our regiments near Mga.

May the Leningrad family be with us

Sitting next to the table.

Let's remember how the Russian force of the soldiers

German for Tikhvin drove!

Let's get up and clink glasses, we're standing -

Brotherhood of combat friends,

Let's drink to the courage of the fallen heroes,

Let's drink to meet the living!

Around the same time, the traitor Vlasov, traveling around the German headquarters, visited Riga, Pskov, Gatchina. He spoke to the population with "patriotic" speeches. Hitler went berserk and ordered Vitya to be sent under house arrest: the 2nd shock strikes Wehrmacht units, and its former commander carries all sorts of nonsense about victory in the rear of the suffering Army Group North. By the way, the Fuhrer ordered the execution of Vlasov, if he allows something else like that. It is clear how "highly" he valued the traitor.

By May 14, 1945, 231,611 Germans with all weapons, including 436 tanks, 1,722 guns, and 136 aircraft, surrendered to the troops of the Leningrad Front in Courland.

All those who surrendered were guaranteed life, as well as the preservation of personal property.

About the tragedy of the 2nd Shock Army of the Volkhov Front, which was almost completely destroyed in the summer of 1942. The military security officers conducted their own investigation into the causes of the tragedy of the "Vlasov army".

In early January 1942, according to the plan of the Supreme High Command, the 2nd shock army was supposed to break through the blockade of Leningrad. Until January 6, 1942, she was supposed to advance to the firing lines, and from January 7, 1942, to begin military operations to break through the enemy’s defenses along the Volkhov River.

However, the Special Department informed the command of the Volkhov Front about serious shortcomings in the preparation of the offensive, about the insufficient supply of food, ammunition, fuel and lubricants to units and formations of the 2nd shock army. There was also no stable and reliable communication between headquarters at various levels. Let me remind you that at that time it was the most important task of the Chekists to track the real state of affairs in the troops. It is to monitor, not to influence. However, this has already been written about / /. Despite the objections of the counterintelligence officers, the army command stated that it could launch an offensive.

On January 7, units and formations of the 2nd shock army, having no connection with higher headquarters, launched a scattered and uncoordinated offensive. By 2 p.m., the military security officers in numerous reports from the field reported that the attackers were suffering huge losses, and the offensive itself had "bogged down." The leadership of the Volkhov Front hastily arrived at the command post of the 2nd Shock Army and, having convinced themselves of the veracity of the reports of the military Chekists, canceled the offensive. On that day, the army lost 2,118 servicemen killed. As soon it will become clear - only 2118!

The command of the Red Army did not always listen to the opinion of the military Chekists. It is a myth that the “specialists” could arrest and shoot any commander of the Red Army at their own will. Of course, they could use weapons if any of the servicemen tried to go over to the side of the enemy, but then all the same, every such fact was investigated. Few people know that according to the Decree of the State Defense Committee "On the procedure for the arrest of military personnel" of August 11, 1941, even "... Red Army soldiers and junior command personnel are arrested in agreement with the military prosecutor of the division ...". Only in "in case of emergency, special authorities can detain middle and senior officers with subsequent coordination of the arrest with the command and the prosecutor's office."

If the military leader poorly manages the units and formations entrusted to him, admits criminal negligence in organizing their supply of ammunition, food, fuel and lubricants, etc., in fact, partially or completely stepped aside from performing his duties, then here the military security officers could only report.

One more thing to take into account important fact. Employees of the bodies of the Special Departments, located directly at the front line or at the headquarters of the division, due to many objective reasons, could not see the full picture of what was happening. They fixed only separate facts. Let's explain this with a simple diagram. The detective of the Special Department, who was on the front line, reported to his superiors that the fighters had not received hot food for several days and there was no supply of ammunition. His colleague from the headquarters of the division reported where it should be that the division commander, instead of performing his official duties, was drinking alcohol for the second day and was going to shoot himself. On the basis of these facts, an employee of the Special Department of the Army may apply for the removal of the division commander from his post and replacing him with a combat-ready commander. In this case, two facts will be presented to the command: the poor organization of the supply of the division and the self-removal from the command of the commander of this formation.

The main weapon of military Chekists in situations similar to the January offensive of the 2nd shock army is reports and messages to their own leadership, front command and heads of political agencies.

As a result, the 2nd shock army perished, and the military security officers conducted their own investigation into the causes of this tragedy. For several decades, the results of their investigation were classified. One of the reasons is that the tragedy occurred through the fault or criminal negligence, let's call a spade a spade, of the command of the 2nd shock army. Of course, part of the blame lies with the higher command.

“According to the intelligence, interrogations of the commanders and fighters of the 2nd shock army who left the encirclement, and a personal visit to the place during the fighting of units and formations of the 2nd, 52nd and 59th armies, it was established: the encirclement of the 2nd shock army armies consisting of the 22nd, 23rd, 25th, 53rd, 57th, 59th rifle brigades and the 19th, 46th, 92nd, 259th, 267th, 327th, 282nd and 305th rifle divisions, the enemy managed to produce only because of the criminally negligent attitude of the front commander Lieutenant General Khozin, who did not ensure the implementation of the directive of the Headquarters on the timely withdrawal of army troops from Lyuban and the organization of military operations in the area of ​​Spasskaya Polist.

Taking command of the front, Khozin from the area of ​​​​the village of Olkhovka and the swamp of Gazhya Sopka brought the 4th, 24th and 378th rifle divisions to the reserve of the front.

The enemy, taking advantage of this, built a narrow-gauge railway in the forest west of Spasskaya Polist and began to accumulate troops without hindrance to strike at the communications of the 2nd [shock] army - Myasnoy Bor - Novaya Kerest (see maps No. 1 and No. 2).
The defense of communications of the 2nd [shock] army was not strengthened by the front command. The northern and southern roads of the 2nd [shock] army were covered by the weak 65th and 372nd rifle divisions, stretched out in a line without sufficient firepower on insufficiently prepared defensive lines.

The 372nd rifle division with a combat strength of 2,796 people by this time occupied a 12 km defense section from the village of Mostki to the level. 39.0, which is 2 km north of the narrow gauge railway.

The 65th Red Banner Rifle Division with a combat strength of 3,708 people occupied a 14 km defense area from the corner of the forest of the southern clearing of the flour [grinding] plant to the barn, 1 km from the village of Krutik.

The commander of the 59th Army, Major General Korovnikov, hastily approved the unfinished scheme of the division's defensive structures, presented by the commander of the 372nd Infantry Division, Colonel Sorokin, the defense headquarters did not check it.

As a result, out of the 11 bunkers built by the 8th company of the 3rd regiment of the same division, 7 turned out to be unusable.

The front commander Khozin, the chief of staff of the front, Major General Stelmakh, knew that the enemy was concentrating troops against this division and that they would not provide defense for the communications of the 2nd shock army, but they did not take measures to strengthen the defense of these sectors, having reserves at their disposal.

On May 30, the enemy, after artillery and aviation training with the help of tanks, launched an offensive on the right flank of the 311th regiment of the 65th rifle division.

The 2nd, 7th and 8th companies of this regiment, having lost 100 soldiers and four tanks, retreated.

To restore the situation, a company of machine gunners was thrown out, which, having suffered losses, retreated.

The Military Council of the 52nd Army threw into battle the last reserves - the 54th Guards Rifle Regiment with a reinforcement of 370 men. Replenishment was introduced into battle on the move, not knocked together, at the first contact with the enemy they fled and were stopped by detachments of special departments.

The Germans, pushing the units of the 65th division, came close to the village of Teremets-Kurlyandsky and cut off the 305th rifle division with their left flank.

At the same time, the enemy, advancing on the site of the 1236th [rifle] regiment of the 372nd rifle division, breaking through the weak defense, dismembered the second echelon of the reserve 191st rifle division, went to the narrow-gauge railway in the area of ​​elev. 40:5 and joined forces advancing from the south.

The commander of the 191st [rifle] division repeatedly raised the question before the commander of the 59th army, Major General Korovnikov, about the need and expediency of withdrawing the 191st rifle division to Myasny Bor in order to create a solid defense along the northern road.

Korovnikov took no action, and the 191st [rifle] division, inactive and not erecting defensive structures, remained standing in the swamp.

The front commander Khozin and the commander of the 59th army Korovnikov, being aware of the concentration of the enemy, still believed that the defense of the 372nd division had been broken through by a small group of machine gunners, so the reserves were not brought into battle, which made it possible for the enemy to cut off the 2nd shock army.

Only on June 1, 1942, the 165th Rifle Division was brought into battle without artillery support, which, having lost 50% of its fighters and commanders, did not rectify the situation.

Instead of organizing the battle, Khozin withdrew the division from the battle and transferred it to another sector, replacing it with the 374th Rifle Division, which, at the time of the change of units of the 165th Rifle Division, retreated somewhat back.

The available forces were not brought into battle in a timely manner, on the contrary, Khozin suspended the offensive and proceeded to move the division commanders: he removed the commander of the 165th rifle division, Colonel Solenov, appointed Colonel Morozov as the division commander, relieving him of the post of commander of the 58th rifle brigade.

Instead of the commander of the 58th [rifle] brigade, the commander of the 1st rifle battalion, Major Gusak, was appointed.

The chief of staff of the division, Major Nazarov, was also removed, and Major Dzyuba was appointed in his place, at the same time the commissar of the 165th [rifle] division, senior battalion commissar Ilish, was also removed.

In the 372nd Rifle Division, the division commander, Colonel Sorokin, was removed, and Colonel Sinegubko was appointed in his place.

The regrouping of troops and the replacement of commanders dragged on until June 10. During this time, the enemy managed to create bunkers and strengthen the defense.

By the time the enemy encircled the 2nd shock army, it found itself in an extremely difficult situation; there were from two to three thousand fighters in the divisions, exhausted due to malnutrition and overworked by continuous battles.

From June 12 to June 18, 1942, soldiers and commanders were given 400 g of horsemeat and 100 g of crackers, on the following days they were given from 10 g to 50 g of crackers, on some days the soldiers did not receive food at all, which increased the number of emaciated soldiers and there were cases mortality from starvation.

Deputy early The political department of the 46th division, Zubov, detained a soldier of the 57th rifle brigade, Afinogenov, who cut a piece of meat from the corpse of a murdered Red Army soldier for food. Being detained, Afinogenov died of exhaustion on the way.

Food and ammunition in the army went out, bringing them by air because of the white nights and the loss of the landing site near the village of Finev Lug, in essence, was impossible. Due to the negligence of the head of the rear of the army, Colonel Kresik, the ammunition and food delivered by aircraft to the army were not fully collected.

The position of the 2nd shock army became extremely complicated after the enemy broke through the defense line of the 327th division in the area of ​​Finev Lug.

The command of the 2nd Army - Lieutenant General Vlasov and the division commander, Major General Antyufeev - did not organize the defense of the swamp west of Finev Lug, which the enemy took advantage of by going to the flank of the division.

The retreat of the 327th division led to panic, the commander of the army, Lieutenant General Vlasov, was confused, did not take decisive measures to detain the enemy, who advanced to Novaya Kerest and subjected the rear of the army to artillery fire, cut off the 19th [Guards] and 305 from the main forces of the army th rifle divisions.

[In] a similar [th] position [and] [turned out] and parts of the 92nd division, where the Germans, with the support of aviation, captured the lines occupied by this division with a strike from Olkhovka by two infantry regiments with 20 tanks.

The commander of the 92nd Rifle Division, Colonel Zhiltsov, showed confusion and lost control at the very beginning of the battle for Olkhovka.

The withdrawal of our troops along the line of the Kerest River significantly worsened the entire position of the army. By this time, enemy artillery had already begun to shoot through the entire depth of the 2nd Army with fire.

The ring around the army closed. The enemy, having crossed the Kerest River, went into the flank, wedged into our battle formations and launched an offensive against the army command post in the Drovyanoe Pole area.

The command post of the army turned out to be unprotected, a company of the Special Department consisting of 150 people was introduced into the battle, which pushed the enemy back and fought with him for a day - 23 [June] of this year.

The military council and the army headquarters were forced to change their place of deployment, destroying the means of communication and, in essence, losing control of the troops.

The commander of the 2nd Army Vlasov, the chief of staff Vinogradov showed confusion, did not lead the battle, and subsequently lost all control of the troops.

This was used by the enemy, who freely penetrated the rear of our troops and caused panic.

June 24 this year Vlasov decides to withdraw the army headquarters and rear institutions in marching order. The whole column was a peaceful crowd with disorderly movement, unmasked and noisy.

The enemy subjected the marching column to artillery and mortar fire. The Military Council of the 2nd Army with a group of commanders lay down and did not leave the encirclement. The commanders, on their way to the exit, arrived safely at the location of the 59th Army.

Only in two days (June 22 and 23 of this year) 13,018 people left the encirclement, of which 7,000 were wounded.

The subsequent exit from the encirclement of the enemy by the military personnel of the 2nd Army took place in separate small groups.

It was established that Vlasov, Vinogradov and other leading employees of the army headquarters fled in a panic, removed themselves from the leadership of military operations and did not announce their location, they conspired.

The military council of the army, [in particular] in the person of Zuev and Lebedev, showed complacency and did not stop the panic actions of Vlasov and Vinogradov, broke away from them, this increased confusion in the troops.

On the part of the head of the Special Department of the Army, Major of State Security Shashkov, decisive measures were not taken in a timely manner to restore order and prevent betrayal at the army headquarters itself.

On June 2, 1942, during the most intense combat period, he betrayed the Motherland - he went over to the side of the enemy with [cipher] oval documents - pom. early 8th Department of the Army Headquarters, 2nd Rank Quartermaster Malyuk Semyon Ivanovich, who gave the enemy the location of the units of the 2nd Shock Army and the location of the army command post. (I'm attaching a leaflet).

On the part of individual unstable military personnel, cases of voluntary surrender to the enemy were noted.

On July 10, 1942, German intelligence agents Nabokov and Kadyrov, who were arrested by us, testified that during the interrogation of captured servicemen of the 2nd shock army, the German intelligence agencies were present: the commander of the 25th rifle brigade, Colonel Sheludko, assistant. early major Verstkin, quartermaster of the 1st rank Zhukovsky, deputy. Colonel Goryunov, commander of the 2nd [shock] army for ABTV, and a number of others who betrayed the command and political staff of the army to the German authorities.

Having taken command of the Volkhov Front, General of the Army Comrade. Meretskov led a group of troops of the 59th Army to link up with units of the 2nd Shock Army.

From 21 to 22 June this year units of the 59th Army broke through the enemy defenses in the area of ​​Myasny Bor and formed a corridor 800 meters wide.

To hold the corridor, parts of the army turned to the front to the south and north, occupied combat sectors along the narrow gauge railway.

By the time units of the 59th Army entered the Polist River, it became clear that the command of the 2nd [shock] Army, represented by Chief of Staff Vinogradov, had misinformed the front and did not occupy the defensive lines on the western bank of the Polist River.

Thus, the elbow connection between the armies did not happen.

A significant amount of food was delivered to the formed corridor on June 22 for units of the 2nd [shock] army, by people and on horseback.

The command of the 2nd [shock] army, organizing the exit of units from the encirclement, did not count on a fight, did not take measures to strengthen and expand the main communications near Spasskaya Polista and did not hold the gate.

Due to almost continuous enemy air raids and shelling of ground troops on a narrow sector of the front, the exit for units of the 2nd [shock] army became difficult.

The confusion and loss of control of the battle on the part of the command of the 2nd [shock] army finally aggravated the situation.

The enemy took advantage of this and closed the corridor.

Subsequently, the commander of the 2nd [shock] army, Lieutenant General Vlasov, was completely at a loss, the initiative was taken into his own hands by the chief of staff of the army, Major General Vinogradov.

He kept his last plan a secret and did not tell anyone about it. Vlasov was indifferent to this.

Both Vinogradov and Vlasov did not leave the encirclement. According to the head of communications of the 2nd shock army, Major General Afanasyev, delivered on July 11 on a U-2 aircraft from the rear of the enemy, they were heading through the forest in the Oredezhsky district in the direction of Staraya Russa.

The whereabouts of members of the Military Council Zuev and Lebedev are unknown.

Beginning About [special] department of the NKVD of the 2nd [shock] army, State Security Major Shashkov, being wounded, shot himself.

We continue the search for the Military Council of the 2nd Shock Army by sending agents behind enemy lines and partisan detachments.

What reaction will the country's leadership have after reading such a document?

The answer is obvious.

"…1. Red Army soldiers and junior command personnel are arrested in agreement with the military prosecutor of the division.

2. Arrests of persons of the middle command personnel are carried out in agreement with the command of the division and the divisional prosecutor.

3. Arrests of persons of senior command personnel are carried out in agreement with the Military Council of the army (military district).

4. The procedure for the arrest of senior officers remains the same (with the sanction of NPOs)."

And only in "in case of emergency, special bodies can detain middle and senior command personnel with subsequent coordination of the arrest with the command and the prosecutor's office" [**] .

Quotes from "Death to Spies!" Military counterintelligence SMERSH during the Great Patriotic War"

This summer, search groups, having a little money from the Ministry of Defense for their search, brought for a week to raise and bury a grandfather who fought in the 42nd in the 2nd Shock. He is 86 years old (God bless him) he is a former junior military technician of the 1102nd Infantry Regiment, who miraculously survived. At the burial he began to speak his mind:

""" If Vlasov had not appeared in April 42, we would all have died here. Our group took the banner of the regiment out of encirclement, several people from the headquarters of the regiment left us here, if not for Vlasov, Khozin would have rotted us here (general Khozin commanded the Leningrad Front and temporarily 2nd Shock) We stood here because Vlasov was with us We stood tight all spring, Vlasov every day, either in the artillery regiment, or with us, or with anti-aircraft gunners - always with us, if not for the general we would have surrendered back in May"""
The cameras were immediately turned off, the organizers began to make excuses that the grandfather was in captivity, etc. And the grandfather broke up, a little puny, almost no hair and began to spit: “we ate bark before Vlasov, and drank water from the swamp, we were animals, our 327 division was CLEARED from the production certificates of the Leningrad Front (Khrushchev later restored the Voronezh 327- Yu).

The death of the 1102 Infantry Regiment, the feat of these Voronezh guys, is not noted anywhere. They died (the regiment died, unlike other units that surrendered) in battle. In all the materials of TsAMO 1102, the regiment died the death of the brave. He is not in the reports of the Volkhov Front, not in the reports of the Leningrad, there is no 1102 rifle yet, there are no fighters. 1102 regiment is not.

On March 9, A. Vlasov flew to the headquarters of the Volkhov Front, on March 10, 1942 he was already at the CP 2 Ud. 22 and 53 osbr 14.03.42. Krasnaya Gorka is almost the farthest section of the ring, staff commanders almost did not come there, limiting themselves to control through an intermediate point in Ozerye, where there was a small task force of officers, medical battalions, a food warehouse, and the place was not swampy. Krasnaya Gorka didn't matter, but what a thorn it was. And then a whole lieutenant general appeared at her place and immediately established control and interaction between the formations, since they often thrashed each other, especially at night. Then the Germans for the first time blocked the corridor at Myasny Bor on March 16, 1942. The blame for this lies entirely with the commanders of 59 and 52 A (Galanin and Yakovlev) and commander Meretskov. He then personally led the clearing of the corridor, sending 376 rifle divisions there and pouring 3,000 non-Russian reinforcements into it 2 days before. Those who first came under the bombing, partly died (many), partly fled, not breaking through the corridor. One regimental commander Hatemkin (whatever he was called - both Kotenkin and Kotenochkin) shot himself after that. Meretskov was confused, he clearly speaks about this in his memoirs. The main action to break through the ring was carried out by 2 Ud.A herself from the inside. Who do you think led these efforts? That's right, A. Vlasov, personally commanding units of the 58th Special Brigade and the 7th Guards Brigade, as well as junior lieutenant courses, in the area east of Novaya Kerest.

Lieutenant-General A. Vlasov during his time in the 2nd Ud.A from March 9 to June 25, 1942 did everything he could, as a military man and as a person, including being surrounded by Myasny Bor. In a situation where fresh newspapers are thrown into the boiler instead of food and ammunition, hardly anyone would have done more. When, at the moment of the greatest concentration of encircled people (by the way, most of those who managed to put on clean clothes, going to the last battle, since they managed to bring stocks of new underwear and summer uniforms to complete encirclement) before the breakthrough on the night of 06/25/42 west of the Polist River in 20 minutes before the appointed hour, 2 regiments of guards mortars (28 and 30 guards minp) deliver a concentrated blow directly at them with four regimental volleys, there is no time for sentiment. Nevertheless, even on the night of 06/25/42, he made an attempt to exit the ring towards the bullet of Lavrenty Palych, trying to refuse the task assigned to him, but not fate ..

Thrice loyal general. The last secret of Andrei Vlasov.

http://www.epochtimes.ru/content/view/10243/34/

So - autumn 1941. The Germans attack Kyiv. However, they cannot take the city. The defense has been heavily fortified. And it is headed by the forty-year-old Major General of the Red Army, the commander of the 37th Army, Andrei Vlasov. The personality in the army is legendary. Passed all the way - from private to general. Passed the civil war, graduated from the Nizhny Novgorod Theological Seminary, studied at the Academy of the General Staff of the Red Army. Friend of Mikhail Blucher. Just before the war, Andrei Vlasov, then still a colonel, was sent to China as military advisers to Chai-kan-shi. He was awarded the Order of the Golden Dragon and a gold watch, which caused the envy of the entire generals of the Red Army. However, Vlasov did not rejoice for long. Upon returning home, at the Alma-Ata customs, the order itself, as well as other generous gifts from Generalissimo Chai-kan-shi, were confiscated by the NKVD ...

Even Soviet historians were forced to admit that the Germans "were hit in the face for the first time", precisely from the mechanized corps of General Vlasov.

This has never happened in the history of the Red Army, having only 15 tanks, General Vlasov stopped the tank army of Walter Model in the suburbs of Moscow - Solnechegorsk, and threw back the Germans, who were already preparing for a parade on Moscow's Red Square for 100 kilometers, while freeing three cities .. There was something to get the nickname "Moscow's savior" from. After the battle near Moscow, the general was appointed deputy commander of the Volkhov Front.

Andrei Vlasov understood that he was flying to his death. As a man who went through the crucible of this war near Kyiv and Moscow, he knew that the army was doomed, and no miracle would save it. Even if this is a miracle, he himself is General Andrei Vlasov, the savior of Moscow.

Troops 59 And already from 12/29/41 fought to break through the enemy fortifications on the river. Volkhov, suffering heavy losses in the strip from Lezno - Vodose to Sosninskaya Pristan.
The commissioning of 2 Ud.A only supplemented the almost continuous attacks of formations 52 and 59 A, the battles took place on January 7 and 8.
The goal of the offensive 2 Ud. And also on January 27 was not Lyuban, but the city of Tosno, on 10-12.02.42 a joint offensive was planned 2 Ud.A from the south, 55 A from the north, 54 A from the east, 4 and 59 A from southeast in the direction of Tosno, but did not happen for a number of reasons; only at the end of the 3rd decade of February did the redirection of strikes of 2 Ud.A to Lyuban take shape in order to at least cut off the Germans in the Chudovsky cauldron; 54 A also beat there in March.
59 A did not have any instructions to connect with 4 A, it carried out a breakthrough in the German defenses to connect with 2 Ud.A, advancing from the south-west and towards Lyuban, and towards Chudovo; 59 A, putting more than 60% of its original l / s, was assigned to the south in the breakthrough zone, and 4 A occupied its zone north of Gruzino; to connect with 4 And all the more there was no need due to the fact that both armies had the closest connection in the cubital connection in the Gruzino region.
The Germans blocked the corridor at Myasny Bor for the first time not on 03/16/42; the corridor was restored only from 03/28/42 with a narrow thread of 2 km.
General A. Vlasov flew out at 2 Ud.A already on 03/10/42, by 03/12/42 he was already in the Krasnaya Gorka area, which, under his leadership, on 03/14/42, units of 2 Ud.A managed to take; from 03/20/42 he was transferred to lead the breakthrough of the intercepted corridor from the inside of the boiler, which he did well - the corridor was broken through from the inside, not without help, of course, from the outside.
On May 13, 1942, not only I. Zuev flew to Malaya Vishera - how can one imagine a flight to report to the front commander M. Khozin, only a member of the Military Council without an army commander; All three flew to the report - Vlasov, Zuev, Vinogradov (NSH Army); there was no talk of any hopelessness in Vlasov's report; there was approved a plan for a counter offensive 2 Ud. and 59 And towards each other by cutting off the German "finger" hanging over the corridor - in TsAMO there are maps, sweepingly signed by Vlasov's hand (approximately as in the photo) with an offensive plan and dated around 13.05.42; the joint offensive plan appeared because before that, an attempt by only 59 A to break through the "finger" from the outside with the forces of the Arkhangelsk fresh 2nd SD towards its own 24 Guards, 259 and 267 SD inside ended in complete failure, while 2 SD lost on the battlefield in 14 days, 80% of their fighters, having fallen into an environment and barely jumped out of there with the remnants.
The withdrawal of the troops did not begin on May 23, 1942, and the headquarters near the village of Ogoreli fired out of place because of the news of the appearance of the Germans in the village of Dubovik in the rear of our troops (and this was just reconnaissance), the troops panicked behind the headquarters, but quickly recovered; the withdrawal was not massive, but planned, this is a more accurate word, since they retreated along lines that had previously been developed and approved in detail, and prepared.
The first time the corridor was pierced on 06/19/42, lasted until the evening of 06/22/42, during which time about 14,000 people came out.
On the night of 06/25/42, a decisive assault on the German was planned. positions, before that, our units received in their concentrated battle formations at 22.40-22.55 a massive blow with several regimental volleys of two regiments of our RS (28 guards and 30 guards minp); from 23.30, units went on a breakthrough, about 7000 people came out; fighting inside the ring actively went on for another 2 days.

The total number of our prisoners from units 2 Ud.A in the boiler ranged from 23,000 to 33,000 people. together with several parts 52 and 59 A; about 7000 people died in the boiler and during a breakthrough from the inside.
http://www.soldat.ru/forum/viewtopic.php?f=2&t=23515

Note to the head of the special department of the NKVD of the Volkhov Front

Senior Major of State Security Comrade MELNIKOV

In accordance with the tasks set by you for the period of your stay on a business trip in the 59th Army from 21 to 28.06.42, I report:

By the end of the day on June 21, 1942, units of the 59th Army broke through the enemy defenses in the Myasnoy Bor area and formed a corridor along the narrow gauge railway. about 700-800 meters wide.

In order to hold the corridor, units of the 59th Army turned their fronts to the south and north and occupied combat sectors parallel to the narrow gauge railway.

The group of troops covering the corridor from the north with its left flank, and the group covering the corridor from the south with its right flank, bordered for a while. Get fat...

By the time the units of the 59th Army entered the river. It turned out to gain weight that Shtarm-2's message about the allegedly occupied lines of the 2nd Shock Army along the river. Plump were wrong. (Reason: report of the commander of the 24th Infantry Brigade.)

Thus, there was no elbow communication between units of the 59th Army and the 2nd Shock Army. This connection was not there for the next time.

The formed corridor on the night from 21 to 22.06. food was delivered to the 2nd Shock Army by people and on horseback.

From 21.06. and until recently, the corridor was under fire from enemy mortar and artillery fire, at times individual submachine gunners and machine gunners leaked into it.

On the night of June 21-22, 1942, units of the 2nd Shock Army were advancing towards units of the 59th Army, approximately in the corridor zone with forces: the first echelon of 46 lines of divisions, the second echelon of 57 and 25 lines of br. Having reached the junction with units of the 59th Army, these formations went to the exit through the corridor to the rear of the 59th Army.

In total, on the day of June 22, 1942, 6018 wounded people and about 1000 people left the 2nd Shock Army. healthy fighters and commanders. Both among the wounded and among the healthy were people from most of the formations of the 2nd Shock Army.

From 06/22/42 to 06/25/42 no one left the 2nd UA. During this period, the corridor remained on the western bank of the river. Get fat. The enemy led a strong mortar and artillery. the fire. In the corridor itself, there was also seepage of submachine gunners. Thus, the exit of units of the 2nd Shock Army was possible with a fight.

On the night of June 24-25, 1942, a detachment under the general command of Colonel KORKIN, formed from Red Army soldiers and commanders of the 2nd Shock Army, who emerged from the encirclement on June 22, 1942, was sent to reinforce units of the 59th Army and secure the corridor. As a result, the measures taken by the enemy resistance in the corridor and on the western bank of the river. The plumpness was broken. Parts of the 2nd UA moved in a general stream from about 2.00 on 25.06.42.

Due to almost continuous enemy air raids during 06/25/42, the flow of people leaving the 2nd UA at 8.00 was stopped. About 6,000 people showed up that day. (according to the calculations of the counter standing at the exit), of which 1600 people were sent to hospitals.

From the surveys of commanders, Red Army soldiers and operational staff of the Special Divisions of formations, it is obvious that the leading commanders of units and formations of the 2nd UA, organizing the exit of units from the encirclement, did not count on going out in battle, this is evidenced by the following facts.

Operative officer of the 1st dept. OO NKVD front lieutenant state. security comrade. ISAEV was in the 2nd Shock Army. In a report addressed to me, he writes:

“On June 22, it was announced in hospitals and units that those who wish can go to Myasnaya Bor. Groups of 100-200 soldiers and commanders, slightly wounded, moved to M. Bor without orientation, without signs and without group leaders, getting to the front line of the enemy’s defense and captured by the Germans. In front of my eyes, a group of 50 people wandered into the Germans and were taken prisoner. Another group of 150 people walked towards the German front line of defense, and only by the intervention of the group of the Special Department of the 92nd division. defection to the side of the enemy was prevented.

At 8 pm on June 24, on the orders of the head of the rear of the division, Major BEGUNA, the entire personnel of the division, about 300 people, set off along the clearing of the central communication line to M. Bor. On the way, I observed the movement of the same columns from other brigades and divisions, numbering up to 3000 people.

The column, having passed from the Drovyanoe Pole glade up to 3 km, was met by a strong barrage of machine guns, mortars and artillery. enemy fire, after which the command was given to move back to a distance of 50 meters. When retreating, there was a mass panic and the flight of groups through the forest. They broke up into small groups and dispersed through the forest, not knowing what to do next. Each person or small group solved their further task independently. There was no unified leadership of the entire column.

Group 92 pp. div. in the amount of 100 people decided to go the other way, along the narrow gauge railway. As a result, with some losses, we went through a flurry of fire on Myasnaya Bor.

The security officer of the 25th rifle brigade, political instructor SHCHERBAKOV, writes in his report:

“June 24 this year. from the early morning a detachment was organized, which detained all military personnel who were able to carry weapons. Together with the remnants of units and subunits, the brigades were divided into three companies. In each company for service, an opera was attached, an employee of the NKVD NGO.

When reaching the starting line, the command did not take into account the fact that the first and second companies had not yet advanced to the starting line.

Pushing the third company forward, they put it under heavy mortar fire from the enemy.

The company command was confused and could not provide leadership to the company. The company, having reached the floor under enemy mortar fire, fled in different directions.

The group that moved to the right side of the flooring, where they were the detective KOROLKOV, the platoon commander - ml. lieutenant KU-ZOVLEV, several fighters of the OO platoon and other units of the brigade, ran into enemy bunkers and lay down under enemy mortar fire. The group consisted of only 18-20 people.

In such numbers, the group could not go to the enemy, then the platoon commander KUZOVLEV suggested returning to the starting line, joining other units and leaving the left side of the narrow gauge railway, where enemy fire is much weaker.

Focusing on the edge of the forest, the head of the OO comrade. PLAKHAT-NIK found Major KONONOV from the 59th rifle brigade, joined his group with his people, with whom they moved to the narrow gauge railway and left together with the 59th rifle brigade.

Operative officer of the 6th Guards. mortar division lieutenant of state security comrade LUKASHEVICH writes about the 2nd division:

- The entire personnel of the brigade, both ordinary and command personnel, were informed that the exit would begin by storm at exactly 23.00 on 06.24.42 from the starting line of the river. Get fat. The 3rd battalion moved in the first echelon, the second battalion moved in the second echelon. None of the brigade command, service chiefs, and battalion command left the encirclement due to the delay at the command post. Having broken away from the bulk of the brigade and, obviously, starting to move in a small group, it must be assumed that they died on the way.

The operational officer of the reserve of the OO front, Captain GORNOSTAYEV, while working at the concentration point of the 2nd Shock Army, had a conversation with those who had left the encirclement, about which he writes:

- Through our workers, commanders and fighters who left, it is established that all units and formations were given a specific task on the order and interaction of entering the formation in battle. However, in the course of this operation, an elemental disaster occurred, small units were confused, and instead of a fist there were small groups and even loners. The commanders, for the same reasons, could not control the battle. This happened as a result of heavy enemy fire.

There is no way to establish the actual position of all parts, because no one knows. They say that there is no food, many groups rush from place to place, and no one bothers to organize all these groups and come out with a fight to connect.

This is a brief description of the situation in the 2nd Shock Army, which had developed by the time it left and when it left the encirclement.

It was known that the Military Council of the 2nd Shock Army was supposed to leave on the morning of June 25 this year, but their exit did not take place.

From conversations with Deputy Head of the OO NKVD of the 2nd Shock Army Art. lieutenant of state security comrade. GORBOV, with the soldiers who accompanied the Military Council of the Army, with the driver of the Member of the Military Council Comrade. ZUEVA, from the beginning. Army chemical services, the Army Prosecutor and other persons who are more or less aware of the attempt to get out of the encirclement of the Military Council, the following is obvious:

The Military Council came out with security measures in front and from the rear. Having stumbled upon enemy fire resistance on the river. To gain weight, head guard under the command of Deputy. The head of the OO of the 2nd Shock Army, Comrade GORBOVA, burst forward and went to the exit, and the Military Council and rear guards remained on the western bank of the river. Get fat.

This fact is indicative in the sense that even when the Military Council left, there was no organization of the battle and command and control of the troops was lost.

Persons who went out alone and in small groups after June 25, 2009, do not know anything about the fate of the Military Council.

In summary, it should be concluded that the organization of the withdrawal of the 2nd Shock Army suffered from serious shortcomings. On the one hand, due to the lack of interaction between the 59th and 2nd Shock armies to secure the corridor, which to a large extent depended on the leadership of the Front headquarters, on the other hand, due to confusion and loss of control over the troops of the 2nd Shock Army headquarters and headquarters connections when leaving the environment.

As of June 30, 1942, 4,113 healthy soldiers and commanders were counted at the concentration point, among them there are people who came from the encirclement under very strange circumstances, for example: on June 27, 1942, one Red Army soldier came out, who said that he lay in the funnel and is now returning. When he was offered food, he refused, declaring that he was full. An unusual route for everyone told about the route to the exit.

It is possible that the German intelligence used the moment of the 2nd UA's exit from the encirclement to send in recruited Red Army soldiers and commanders who had previously been taken prisoner by them.

From a conversation with Deputy I know that in the 2nd UA there were facts of group betrayals, especially among Chernigov. Tov. Gorbov in the presence of Nach. The OO of the 59th Army Comrade NIKITINA said that 240 people from Chernigov had betrayed their Motherland.

In the first days of June, in the 2nd UA, an outrageous betrayal of the Motherland by pom. head of the cipher department of the Army headquarters - MALYUK and an attempt to betray the Motherland of two more employees of the cipher department.

All these circumstances suggest the need for a thorough check of the entire personnel of the 2nd UA by strengthening the KGB measures.

Beginning 1 branch of the NGO NKVD

Captain of State Security - KOLESNIKOV.

Top secret
ZAM. People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR to Commissar of State Security 1st rank Comrade ABAKUMOV

MEMORANDUM

About the disruption of the military operation

On the withdrawal of troops of the 2nd Shock Army

From the enemy environment
According to agents, interrogations of commanders and fighters of the 2nd Shock Army who left the encirclement, and personal visits to the place during the fighting, units and formations of the 2nd, 52nd and 59th armies established:

The encirclement of the 2nd shock army, consisting of the 22nd, 23rd, 25th, 53rd, 57th, 59th rifle brigades and 19th, 46. 93, 259, 267, 327, 282 and 305th rifle divisions, the enemy managed to produce only because the criminally negligent attitude of the commander of the front, Lieutenant-General Khozin, who did not ensure the implementation of the directive of the Headquarters on the timely withdrawal of army troops from Lyuban and the organization of military operations in the area of ​​Spasskaya Polisti.

Having taken command of the front, Khozin from the area of ​​vil. Olkhovki and the swamps of Gazhya Sopki brought the 4th, 24th and 378th rifle divisions to the reserve of the front.

The enemy, taking advantage of this, built a narrow-gauge railway through the forest to the west of Spasskaya Polist and began to accumulate troops without hindrance to strike at the communications of the 2nd shock army Myasnoy Bor - Novaya Kerest.

The defense of communications of the 2nd shock army was not strengthened by the front command. The northern and southern roads of the 2nd Shock Army were covered by the weak 65th and 372nd Rifle Divisions, drawn into a line without sufficient firepower on insufficiently prepared defensive lines.

By this time, the 372nd Rifle Division occupied a defense sector with a combat strength of 2,796 people, stretching 12 km from the village of Mostki to the mark of 39.0, which is 2 km north of the narrow gauge railway.

The 65th Red Banner Rifle Division occupied a 14-kilometer defense section with a combat strength of 3,708 men, stretching from the corner of the forest of the southern clearing of the flour mill to a barn 1 km from the village of Krutik.

The commander of the 59th Army, Major General Korovnikov, hastily approved the raw scheme of the division's defensive structures, presented by the commander of the 372nd Infantry Division, Colonel Sorokin, the defense headquarters did not check it.

As a result, of the 11 bunkers built by the 8th company of the 3rd regiment of the same division, seven turned out to be unusable.

The front commander Khozin, the chief of staff of the front, Major General Stelmakh, knew that the enemy was concentrating troops against this division and that they would not provide defense for the communications of the 2nd shock army, but they did not take measures to strengthen the defense of these sectors, having reserves at their disposal.

On May 30, the enemy, after artillery and aviation training with the help of tanks, launched an offensive on the right flank of the 311th regiment of the 65th rifle division.

The 2nd, 7th and 8th companies of this regiment, having lost 100 soldiers and four tanks, retreated.

To restore the situation, a company of machine gunners was thrown out, which, having suffered losses, retreated.

The Military Council of the 52nd Army threw into battle the last reserves - the 54th Guards Rifle Regiment with a reinforcement of 370 people. Replenishment was introduced into battle on the move, not knocked together, and at the first contact with the enemy fled and was stopped by barrage detachments of special departments.

The Germans, pushing the units of the 65th division, came close to the village of Teremets-Kurlyandsky and cut off the 305th rifle division with their left flank.

At the same time, the enemy, advancing on the sector of the 1236th Infantry Regiment of the 372nd Infantry Division, having broken through the weak defense, dismembered the second echelon of the reserve 191st Infantry Division, entered the narrow gauge railway in the area of ​​the 40.5 mark and connected with the advancing units from South.

The commander of the 191st Rifle Division repeatedly raised the question before the commander of the 59th Army, Major General Korovnikov, about the need and expediency of withdrawing the 191st Rifle Division to Myasny Bor in order to create a strong defense along the northern road.

Korovnikov took no action, and the 191st Rifle Division, inactive and not erecting defensive structures, remained standing in the swamp.

The front commander Khozin and the commander of the 59th army Korovnikov, being aware of the concentration of the enemy, still believed that the defense of the 372nd division had been broken through by a small group of machine gunners, and, therefore, the reserves were not brought into battle, which made it possible for the enemy to cut off the 2nd shock army.

Only on June 1, 1942, the 165th Rifle Division was brought into battle without artillery support, which, having lost 50 percent of its fighters and commanders, did not rectify the situation.

Instead of organizing the battle, Khozin withdrew the division from the battle and transferred it to another sector, replacing it with the 374th Infantry Division, which, at the time of the change of units of the 165th Rifle Division, retreated somewhat back.

The available forces were not brought into battle in a timely manner, on the contrary, Khozin suspended the offensive and proceeded to move the division commanders:

He removed the commander of the 165th Infantry Division, Colonel Solenov, appointed Colonel Morozov as the division commander, releasing him from the post of commander of the 58th Infantry Brigade.

Instead of the commander of the 58th rifle brigade, Major Gusak was appointed commander of the 1st rifle battalion.

The chief of staff of the division, Major Nazarov, was also removed and Major Dzyuba was appointed in his place, at the same time the commissar of the 165th Infantry Division, Senior Battalion Commissar Ilish, was also removed.

In the 372nd Infantry Division, the division commander, Colonel Sorokin, was removed and Colonel Sinegubko was appointed in his place.

The regrouping of troops and the replacement of commanders dragged on until June 10. During this time, the enemy managed to create bunkers and strengthen the defense.

By the time the enemy encircled the 2nd shock army, it found itself in an extremely difficult situation; there were from two to three thousand fighters in the divisions, exhausted due to malnutrition and overworked by continuous battles.

From 12. VI. to 18. VI. In 1942, soldiers and commanders were given 400 g of horsemeat and 100 g of crackers, on the following days they were given from 10 g to 50 g of crackers, on some days the soldiers did not receive food at all; which increased the number of emaciated fighters, and there were cases of death from starvation.

Deputy early The political department of the 46th division, Zubov, detained a soldier of the 57th rifle brigade, Afinogenov, who cut a piece of meat from the corpse of a murdered Red Army soldier for food. Being detained, Afinogenov died of exhaustion on the way.

Food and ammunition in the army went out, their delivery by air because of the white nights and the loss of the landing site near the village. Finev Meadow was essentially impossible. Due to the negligence of the head of the rear of the army, Colonel Kresik, the ammunition and food delivered by aircraft to the army were not fully collected.
Total Sent to Army Collected by Army 7.62mm rounds 1027820 682708 76mm rounds 2222 1416 14.5mm rounds 1792 No 37mm AA rounds received 1590 570 122mm rounds 288 136

The position of the 2nd shock army became extremely complicated after the enemy broke through the defense line of the 327th division in the area of ​​Finev Lug.

The command of the 2nd Army - Lieutenant General Vlasov and the division commander, Major General Antyufeev - did not organize the defense of the swamp west of Finev Lug, which the enemy took advantage of by going to the flank of the division.

The retreat of the 327th division led to panic, the army commander, Lieutenant General Vlasov, was confused, did not take decisive measures to detain the enemy, who advanced to Novaya Kerest and subjected the rear of the army to artillery fire, cut off the 19th Guards and 305th from the main forces of the army rifle divisions.

Units of the 92nd Division found themselves in a similar situation, where the Germans, with the support of aviation, captured the lines occupied by this division with a strike from Olkhovka by two infantry regiments with 20 tanks.

The commander of the 92nd Rifle Division, Colonel Zhiltsov, showed confusion and lost control at the very beginning of the battle for Olkhovka.

The withdrawal of our troops along the line of the Kerest River significantly worsened the entire position of the army. By this time, enemy artillery had already begun to shoot through the entire depth of the 2nd Army with fire.

The ring around the army closed. The enemy, having crossed the Kerest River, went into the flank, wedged into our battle formations and launched an offensive against the army command post in the Drovyanoe Pole area.

The command post of the army turned out to be unprotected, a company of a special department consisting of 150 people was introduced into the battle, which pushed the enemy back and fought with him for a day - June 23. The military council and the army headquarters were forced to change their place of deployment, destroying the means of communication and, in essence, losing control of the troops. The commander of the 2nd Army Vlasov, the chief of staff Vinogradov showed confusion, did not lead the battle, and subsequently lost all control of the troops.

This was used by the enemy, who freely penetrated the rear of our troops and caused panic.

On June 24, Vlasov decides to withdraw the army headquarters and rear institutions in marching order. The whole column was a peaceful crowd with disorderly movement, unmasked and noisy.

The enemy subjected the marching column to artillery and mortar fire. The Military Council of the 2nd Army with a group of commanders lay down and did not leave the encirclement. The commanders, on their way to the exit, arrived safely at the location of the 59th Army. In just two days, on June 22 and 23, 13,018 people left the encirclement, of which 7,000 were wounded.

The subsequent exit from the encirclement of the enemy by the military personnel of the 2nd Army took place in separate small groups.

It was established that Vlasov, Vinogradov and other leading employees of the army headquarters fled in a panic, removed themselves from the leadership of military operations and did not announce their location, they conspired.

The military council of the army, in particular in the person of Zuev and Lebedev, showed complacency and did not stop the panic actions of Vlasov and Vinogradov, broke away from them, this increased the confusion in the troops.

On the part of the head of the special department of the army, Major of State Security Shashkov, decisive measures were not taken in a timely manner to restore order and prevent betrayal at the army headquarters itself:

On June 2, 1942, during the most intense combat period, he betrayed the Motherland - went over to the side of the enemy with encrypted documents - pom. early 8th department of the army headquarters, quartermaster technician 2nd rank Malyuk Semyon Ivanovich, who gave the enemy the location of the units of the 2nd Shock Army and the location of the army command post. On the part of individual unstable military personnel, cases of voluntary surrender to the enemy were noted.

On July 10, 1942, German intelligence agents Nabokov and Kadyrov, who were arrested by us, testified that during the interrogation of captured servicemen of the 2nd shock army, the German intelligence agencies were present: the commander of the 25th rifle brigade, Colonel Sheludko, assistant chief of the operational department of the army, Major Verstkin, quartermaster of the 1st rank Zhukovsky, deputy commander of the 2nd shock army, Colonel Goryunov, and a number of others who betrayed the command and political staff of the army to the German authorities.

Having taken command of the Volkhov Front, General of the Army Comrade. Meretskov led a group of troops of the 59th Army to link up with units of the 2nd Shock Army. From 21 to 22 June this year units of the 59th Army broke through the enemy defenses in the area of ​​Myasny Bor and formed a corridor 800 meters wide.

To hold the corridor, parts of the army turned to the front to the south and north, occupied combat sectors along the narrow gauge railway.

By the time units of the 59th Army entered the Polnet River, it became clear that the command of the 2nd Shock Army, represented by Chief of Staff Vinogradov, misinformed the front and did not occupy the defensive lines on the western bank of the Polnet River. Thus, the elbow connection between the armies did not happen.

On June 22, a significant amount of food was delivered to the formed corridor for the units of the 2nd shock army by people and on horseback. The command of the 2nd shock army, organizing the exit of units from the encirclement, did not count on a fight, did not take measures to strengthen and expand the main communications near Spasskaya Polist and did not hold the gate.

Due to almost continuous enemy air raids and shelling of ground troops on a narrow sector of the front, the exit for units of the 2nd Shock Army became difficult.

The confusion and loss of control of the battle on the part of the command of the 2nd shock army finally aggravated the situation.

The enemy took advantage of this and closed the corridor.

Subsequently, the commander of the 2nd shock army, Lieutenant General Vlasov, was completely at a loss, the initiative was taken into his own hands by the chief of staff of the army, Major General Vinogradov.

He kept his last plan a secret and did not tell anyone about it. Vlasov was indifferent to this.

Both Vinogradov and Vlasov did not leave the encirclement. According to the head of communications of the 2nd shock army, Major General Afanasyev, delivered on July 11 by a U-2 plane from the rear of the enemy, they were walking through the forest in the Oredezhsky district towards Staraya Russa.

The whereabouts of members of the military council Zuev and Lebedev are unknown.

The head of the special department of the NKVD of the 2nd shock army, Major of State Security Shashkov, being wounded, shot himself.

We continue the search for the military council of the 2nd shock army by sending agents behind enemy lines and partisan detachments.

Head of the Special Department of the NKVD of the Volkhov Front Senior Major of State Security MELNIKOV

REFERENCE

on the position of the 2nd Shock Army of the Volkhov Front for the period JANUARY - JULY 1942

Army Commander - Major General VLASOV
Member of the Military Council - Divisional Commissar ZUEV
Chief of Staff of the Army - Colonel VINOGRADOV
Beginning Special Department of the Army - Major State. security checkers

In January 1942, the 2nd Shock Army was given the task of breaking through the enemy’s defense line in the Spasskaya Polist - Myasnoy Bor section, with the task of pushing the enemy to the north-west, jointly with the 54th Army to seize the Lyuban station, cut the October railway , completing his operation by participating in the general defeat of the Chudovskaya enemy grouping by the Volkhov Front.
Fulfilling the task, the 2nd Shock Army on January 20-22 of this year. broke through the front of the enemy’s defense in the area indicated to her with a length of 8–10 km, introduced all parts of the army into the breakthrough, and for 2 months in stubborn bloody battles with the enemy advanced to Luban, bypassing Luban from the southwest.
The indecisive actions of the 54th Army of the Leningrad Front, which was marching to link up with the 2nd Shock Army from the northeast, extremely slowed down its advance. By the end of February, the offensive impulse of the 2nd Shock Army had fizzled out and the advance stopped in the area of ​​the Krasnaya Gorka point, southwest of Lyuban.
The 2nd Shock Army, pushing the enemy back, drove into his defenses in a wedge stretching 60-70 km through a wooded and swampy area.
Despite repeated attempts to expand the original breakthrough line, which is a kind of corridor, no success has been achieved ...
March 20–21 this year the enemy managed to cut off the communications of the 2nd Shock Army, closing the corridor, with the intention of compressing the encirclement and complete destruction.
Through the efforts of the 2nd Shock Army, units of the 52nd and 59th armies on March 28, the corridor was opened.
May 25 this year Headquarters of the Supreme High Command gave the order from June 1 to begin the withdrawal of units of the 2nd Shock Army to the southeast, i.e. back through the corridor.
On June 2, the enemy closed the corridor for the second time by carrying out the complete encirclement of the army. Since that time, the supply of the army with ammunition and food began to be carried out by air.
On June 21, in a narrow section 1–2 km wide in the same corridor, the enemy front line was broken a second time and an organized withdrawal of units of the 2nd Shock Army began.
June 25 this year the enemy managed to close the corridor for the third time and stop exiting-our parts. From that time on, the enemy forced us to stop air supply to the army due to the heavy loss of our aircraft.
Headquarters of the Supreme High Command May 21 this year. ordered units of the 2nd Shock Army, retreating from the northwest to the southeast, firmly covering themselves at the Olkhovka-Lake Tigoda line from the west, with a strike by the main forces of the army from the west and at the same time by a strike by the 59th Army from the east, destroy the enemy in the ledge Priyutino - Spasskaya Polist...
Commander of the Leningrad Front Lieutenant General KHOZIN hesitated to carry out the order of the Headquarters, referring to the impossibility of taking equipment off-road and the need to build new roads. By the beginning of June this year. units did not begin to withdraw, however, to the General Staff of the Red Army signed by KHOZIN and the beginning. Stelmakh's headquarters sent a report about the beginning of the withdrawal of army units. As it was later established, KHOZIN and STELMAKH deceived the General Staff, by this time the 2nd Shock Army was only beginning to delay the rear of their formations.
The 59th Army acted very indecisively, made several unsuccessful attacks and did not complete the tasks set by the Headquarters.
Thus, by June 21 this year. formations of the 2nd Shock Army in the amount of 8 rifle divisions and 6 rifle brigades (35-37 thousand people), with three regiments of RGK 100 guns, as well as about 1000 vehicles, concentrated in the area a few kilometers south of N. Kerest on an area of ​​6x6 km.
According to the data available at the General Staff, as of July 1 this year, 9,600 people with personal weapons left the units of the 2nd Shock Army, including 32 people from division headquarters and army headquarters. According to unverified reports, the head of the Special Armed Forces came out.
According to data sent to the General Staff by an officer of the General Staff, commander VLASOV and a member of the Military Council ZUEV on 27.06. they reached the western bank of the Polist River under the protection of 4 submachine gunners, ran into the enemy and dispersed under his fire, allegedly no one else saw them.
Chief of Staff STELMAKH 25.06. VCh reported that VLASOV and ZUEV had reached the western bank of the Polist River. From the wrecked tank they controlled the withdrawal of troops. Their further fate is unknown.
According to the data of the Special Department of the NKVD of the Volkhov Front, as of June 26 this year, by the end of the day, 14 thousand people left the units of the 2nd Shock Army. There is no information about the actual position of the units and formations of the army at the front headquarters.
According to the commissar of a separate communications battalion PESKOV, commander VLASOV with the headquarters commanders moved to the exit in the 2nd echelon, the group led by VLASOV came under artillery and mortar fire. VLASOV ordered to destroy all radio stations by burning, which led to the loss of command and control of the troops.
According to the head of the Special Front Department, as early as June 17 the situation of the army units was extremely difficult, there were a large number of cases of exhaustion of fighters, diseases from hunger, and an acute need for ammunition. By this time, according to the General Staff, 7-8 tons of food were supplied by passenger aircraft daily for army units with a need of 17 tons, 1900-2000 shells with a minimum need of 40,000, 300,000 rounds of ammunition, a total of 5 rounds per person.
It should be noted that, according to the latest data received at the General Staff on 29.06. this year, a group of servicemen of units of the 2nd Shock Army went to the site of the 59th Army through the rear of the enemy to the area Mikhaleva, with absolutely no losses. Those who came out claim that in this area the enemy forces are few in number, while the passage corridor, now overwhelmed by a strong enemy grouping and shot down by dozens of batteries of mortars and artillery, with daily reinforced air strikes, is today almost inaccessible for a breakthrough of the 2nd Shock Army from the west, also the 59th Army from the east.

It is characteristic that the areas through which 40 servicemen who left the 2nd Shock Army passed were just indicated by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command for the units of the 2nd Shock Army to enter, but neither the Military Council of the 2nd Shock Army, nor the Military Council Volkhov Front did not ensure the implementation of the Directive of the Headquarters.

Introduction

Chapter I. Creation of the Volkhov Front

Chapter II. Luban offensive operation

Chapter III. Vlasov's appointment

Chapter IV. The tragedy of the 2nd Shock

Conclusion

Applications

Bibliography

Introduction

Cursed and killed.

Victor Astafiev

The Great Patriotic War... Only three words, but how much grief, adversity, pain, suffering and heroism are behind these words. War in any Fatherland gives birth to both its heroes and its traitors. War reveals the essence of events, the essence of each person. War poses a dilemma for everyone: to be or not to be? To die of hunger, but not to touch the sowing unique planting materials, as it was in besieged Leningrad, or for rations of bread and additional food to change the oath and cooperate with the enemy?

History is made by people. Ordinary people, not alien to human vices. It is they who exalt or belittle certain circumstances of life.

Victories and defeats... In what way, by what means were they achieved? How many destinies and lives have been ground by the meat grinder of war! There is no clear answer. It is only important how a person emerges from the crucible of trials, how he behaves, how his actions even influence the course of history. After all, history is made and written by people.

My choice of the topic of work was influenced by the fact that the history of the combat path of the 2nd Shock Army is interesting to study, especially in the period from January to June 1942. This topic is also interesting because it is inextricably linked with the name of the traitor A.A. Vlasov.

The theme of the 2nd Shock Army is relevant for our days. Only now, 60 years after the end of the Great Patriotic War, there is a rethinking of those distant events, when the political course of the country is changing, more and more archives and sources are being opened, more and more documents and memoirs of participants in those distant events are being made public, more and more books and articles are appearing. After all, it was not for nothing that a few weeks ago a monument to the fighters of the 2nd Shock Army was unveiled in Myasny Bor, Novgorod Region, at the opening of which the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation S.B. Ivanov.

The purpose of the work is to objectively show what happened to the 2nd Shock Army during the Lyuban operation, what caused it, what events influenced the further fate of Lieutenant General of the Red Army Vlasov Andrey Andreyevich. Try to understand how the "Stalinist general" could become not just a traitor, but the leader of the movement of the Russian Liberation Army. The task is based on the literature of the 2nd Shock Army, memoirs of veterans, research work about Vlasov, to draw generalizing conclusions.

Speaking about historiography, it must be said that even in recent times, almost everything related to the 2nd Shock Army and its commander was banned. In any case, there was little material and there was one officially accepted point of view - the general and the soldiers of his army - "Vlasov" - traitors. And there is no need to talk a lot about them, to study those distant events, to analyze them, objectively approaching all the details of that tragedy.

The process of studying the actions of the 2nd Shock, as well as the biography of A.A. Vlasov, began only in the first half of the 90s of the last century. Of course, you can find information about the 2nd Shock Army in the literature of the 1970s - 1980s, but this information is very scarce, and there is no mention of General Vlasov. For example, in the book “On the Volkhov Front” of 1982, the table on page 342 does not contain the name of Vlasov in the column of the commander of the 2nd Shock Army in the period from April 16 to July 24, 1942. In general, looking through this table, one gets the impression that during this period the 2nd Shock Army disappeared from the Volkhov Front. In the collection of articles "On the Volkhov Front" Vlasov is also not mentioned.

The most complete information about the hostilities and the formation of the 2nd Shock Army can be found in the collection “Luban Offensive Operation. January - June 1942. The compilers of the collection K.K. Krupitsa and I.A. Ivanova objectively described the combat operations of the Shock Army. But it's already 1994...

Works about the biography of A.A. Vlasov, about his career, as well as about his further activities began to appear only in recent years. All the authors of the works I have studied are unanimous in their opinion that Vlasov is a traitor. For example, in N. Konyaev’s book “Two Faces of General Vlasov: Life, Fate, Legends”, the author analyzes the activities of A. A. Vlasov, and also studies his biography in detail. The work of Yu.A. Kvitsinsky is also interesting. “General Vlasov: the path of betrayal”, where he describes in sufficient detail the capture and further activities of the general.

Books, memoirs, memoirs, diaries of other authors, whose names are indicated in the list of used literature, were important for writing the study.

Today's generation can give an objective assessment of those distant events in accordance with their honor and conscience, moral and ethical priorities.

Chapter I . Creation of the Volkhov Front

The defense of Leningrad occupies one of the most tragic and heroic pages in the history of the Great Patriotic War. The enemy expected to capture Leningrad two weeks after the attack on the USSR. But the steadfastness and courage of the Red Army and the people's militia frustrated the German plans. Instead of the planned two weeks, the enemy fought his way to Leningrad for 80 days.

From the second half of August until mid-September 1941, German troops tried to storm Leningrad, but did not achieve decisive success and proceeded to blockade and siege the city. October 16, 1941 eight German divisions crossed the river. Volkhov and rushed through Tikhvin to the river. Svir to connect with the Finnish army and close the second blockade ring east of Lake Ladoga. War 1941-1945. Facts and documents. M., 2001. S. 111 For Leningrad and the troops of the Leningrad Front, this meant certain death

The enemy, after linking up with the Finns, was going to attack Vologda and Yaroslavl, intending to form a new front north of Moscow and, at the same time, encircle our troops of the North-Western Front with a strike along the October Railway. Under these conditions, the Soviet Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, despite the critical situation near Moscow, found an opportunity to reinforce the reserves of the 4th, 52nd and 54th armies, which were defending in the Tikhvin direction. They launched a counteroffensive and by December 28 had driven the Germans back beyond the Volkhov. History of the Order of Lenin of the Leningrad Military District. M., 1974. S. 261.

During these battles, the Soviet Headquarters developed an operation to completely defeat the Germans near Leningrad. To accomplish the task on December 17, the Volkhov Front was formed. It included the 4th and 52nd armies and two new armies from the Headquarters reserve - the 2nd Shock (former 26th) and 59th. The front under the command of General of the Army K.A. Meretskov had to use the forces of the 2nd Shock, 59th and 4th armies, together with the 54th army of the Leningrad Front (which was outside the blockade ring), to destroy the Mginsky enemy grouping and thereby break through the blockade of Leningrad, and with a blow in a southerly direction by the forces of the 52nd armies to liberate Novgorod and cut off the enemy's retreat in front of the North-Western Front, which also went on the offensive. The weather conditions were favorable for the operation - in the wooded and swampy area, a harsh winter fettered swamps and rivers.

Even before the start of the operation, separate units and units of the 52nd Army, on December 24-25, crossed the Volkhov on their own initiative in order to prevent the enemy from gaining a foothold on the new line, and even captured small bridgeheads on the western coast. On the night of December 31, units of the newly arrived 376th Infantry Division of the 59th Army crossed the Volkhov, but no one managed to hold the bridgeheads. There. S. 275.

The reason was that just the day before, on December 23-24, the enemy had completed the withdrawal of his troops behind the Volkhov to pre-prepared positions, pulled up reserves of manpower and equipment. The Volkhov grouping of the 18th German Army consisted of 14 infantry divisions, 2 motorized and 2 tank divisions. With the advent of the 2nd Shock and 59th Armies and units of the Novgorod Army Group, the Volkhov Front received an advantage over the enemy in manpower by 1.5 times, in guns and mortars by 1.6 times, in aircraft by 1.3 times. Halder F. From Brest to Stalingrad: Military Diary. Smolensk, 2001, p. 567

On January 1, 1942, the Volkhov Front united 23 rifle divisions, 8 rifle brigades, 1 grenadier brigade (due to lack of small arms was armed with grenades), 18 separate ski battalions, 4 cavalry divisions, 1 tank division, 8 separate tank brigades, 5 separate artillery regiments, 2 high-power howitzer regiments, a separate anti-tank defense regiment, 4 guards mortar regiments of rocket artillery, an anti-aircraft artillery division, a separate bomber and a separate short-range bomber air regiment, 3 separate attack and 7 separate fighter air regiments and 1 reconnaissance squadron.

However, the Volkhov Front had a quarter of ammunition by the beginning of the operation, the 4th and 52nd armies were exhausted by battles, 3.5 - 4 thousand people remained in their divisions. instead of regular 10 - 12 thousand. Only the 2nd Shock and 59th armies had a complete set of personnel. But on the other hand, they almost completely lacked sights for guns, as well as telephone cable and radio stations, which made it very difficult to control military operations. The new armies also lacked warm clothing. In addition, on the entire Volkhov front there were not enough automatic weapons, tanks, shells, and transport. On the Volkhov front: Sat. L., 1973. S. 13

On December 17, 1941, the first echelons of the 2nd Shock Army began to arrive at the newly formed Volkhov Front. The army included: a rifle division, eight separate rifle brigades, two separate tank battalions, three guards mortar battalions and an artillery regiment of the RGK. The 2nd Shock Army began to form at the end of October 1941 on the territory of the Volga Military District. The main part of its personnel was called up from the southern and steppe regions and saw forests and swamps for the first time on the Volkhov front. The fighters cautiously walked around the forest thickets and crowded in the clearings, which made them an excellent target for the enemy. Many soldiers did not have time to undergo elementary combat training. The ski parts did not shine with their training either. Some skiers, for example, preferred to go through deep snow on foot, carrying their skis like an unnecessary load on their shoulders. It took a lot of effort to make skilled fighters out of these recruits. Battle of Leningrad 1941-1945: Sat. SPb., 1995. S. 104-105.

The formations had a staffed staff, which, however, as mentioned above, did not undergo a course of combat training and their units were not knocked together. The headquarters were not trained and had no means of communication. There were not enough mortars, machine guns and small arms. The troops did not have anti-aircraft defenses. Artillery had only a quarter of ammunition. Ammunition for small arms was extremely scarce.

Now I would like to turn to the memoirs of veterans of the 2nd shock army, in particular I. Venets, a retired colonel, former commissar of the 59th separate rifle brigade:

“The formation of the brigade began at the end of October 1941 in the Volga Military District with a base in the village of Dergachi, the regional center of the Saratov region. In addition to the school building, adapted for the headquarters of the brigade, there were no other buildings to accommodate the forming units and subunits, so the personnel settled down in the peasant houses of Dergachi and the surrounding villages, which undoubtedly had a negative effect on the preparation and formation of units.

I had to lead the formation, since the commander and chief of staff of the brigade arrived at the unit only on the 20th of December - a day or two before the departure of the first echelon.

Literally on the last day before departure, we managed to conduct the only brigade exercise on the topic “March and Encounter Battle”, and then, a sudden blizzard and a snow blizzard prevented a successful completion, as mass frostbite began.

Weapons and materiel were received very badly during the formation. So we received cannons and mortars, part of rifles and a few machine guns only in Yaroslavl at the Vspolye station, where we entered the 2UA in the last decade of December 1942. All this could not but affect the quality of the first combat operations of the brigade.

However, it should be noted that the brigade received excellent replenishment.

Suffice it to say that we received 500 Communists and Komsomol members, former middle and junior commanders and political workers, sent to the brigade as ordinary political fighters.

Having received equipment and weapons in Yaroslavl, we began to send trains that had accumulated at the station. Vspole. Progress was extremely slow. Our first echelon, in which I was also, arrived at st. Neboloch, the final destination, early at dawn on December 31st. Here we also received our first baptism of fire - a raid by German aircraft that fired at the train and dropped bombs. Fortunately there were almost no casualties.

Further, on foot, with deep snow drifts, clearing the way for transport, the units moved to Malaya Vishera and further along the route of the forward units of 2UA. Luban offensive operation. January-June 1942: Sat. SPb., 1994. S. 76-77.

On the example of the 59th separate rifle brigade, we see that the troops arriving at the front were either poorly trained or not trained at all. The fact that there were “500 people of communists and Komsomol members” in the replenishment does not mean anything - the front needs fighters who know military affairs firsthand, and love for the party did not protect against German bullets and shells.

Describing the 2nd Shock Army, it is useful to dwell on its commander, from January 10 to April 20, 1942, Lieutenant General G.G. Sokolov. He recently came to the Red Army from the NKVD, where he was one of Beria's deputies. This army commander was distinguished by complete military mediocrity and inability to lead troops. For example, I will quote excerpts from the order of this newly-minted commander dated November 19, 1941:

1. Walking, like the crawling of flies in autumn, I cancel and order to continue to walk in the army like this: a military step is a arshin, they should walk. Accelerated - one and a half, and press.

2. Food is out of order. In the midst of the battle, they dine and the march is interrupted for breakfast. In war, the order is this: breakfast is dark, before dawn, and dinner is dark, in the evening. During the day I will be able to chew bread and crackers with tea - good, but not - and thanks for that, since the day is not particularly long.

3. Remember to everyone - both bosses and privates, both old and young, that during the day you can’t walk in columns more than a company, but in general in a war for a campaign - it’s night, then march.

4. Do not be afraid of the cold, do not dress up as Ryazan women, be well done and do not succumb to frost. Rub your ears and hands with snow." Battle of Leningrad 1941-1945: Sat. SPb., 1995. S. 105-106.

According to the plan of the operation, the 2nd Shock Army was supposed to unload in Malaya Vishera as the echelons arrived and head on a forced march to the location of the 52nd Army of General N.K. Klykov (80-90 km in deep snow and off-road) and immediately join the battle. When Colonel Antyufeev drew Sokolov's attention to the poor organization of the march, the lack of ammunition and food, he shrugged carelessly and pointed pointedly at the ceiling: “This is what the master demands. Gotta do it!" There. S. 106.

But, as happened more than once, the iron "should" did not work. The 2nd Shock Army did not arrive at the combat positions in time, and this forced Meretskov to ask Moscow to postpone the start of the offensive. The headquarters, given the difficult situation in Leningrad, agreed to postpone the start of the offensive until January 7, 1942.

General Meretskov was recently released from the dungeons of the NKVD. Fear and the desire to prove his loyalty will lead to the fact that Meretskov will meekly carry out many insufficiently thought out orders from Moscow. In the event of difficulties at the front, Meretskov, instead of making bold decisions on his own, will be insured by the decisions of the Military Council of the front.

The notorious L.Z. was appointed to him as a representative of the Headquarters. Mehlis.

For all negative qualities Mekhlis, his capriciousness, suspicion, suspiciousness, the Stalinist envoy played a generally positive role in preparing the Volkhov Front for the offensive. So, having learned that the arriving armies were not at all provided with artillery, and the guns available at the front were dismantled, deprived of optical instruments and means of communication, Mekhlis informed Stalin about this, and soon N.N. Ravens with several wagons of missing equipment.

Mekhlis helped the Volkhov Front and that he could personally verify Sokolov's complete inability to lead the army. He supported the petition of the Military Council of the front for his removal. True, Sokolov was recalled to Moscow only on January 10, 1942, already in the course of the offensive that had begun. At the same time, on the recommendation of Mekhlis, Brigadier Commissar A.I. Mikhailov, a member of the military council of the army, was also replaced. And a few days earlier, reporting to Moscow, Mekhlis was very pleased with Meretskov, who promised Stalin, despite the unpreparedness of the front, to launch an offensive on January 7th. The Supreme Commander appreciated such zeal and sent a personal message to Meretskov with the following content: Dear Kirill Afanasyevich!

The task that has been entrusted to you is a historic task - the liberation of Leningrad, you understand - a great task. I would like the upcoming offensive of the Volkhov Front not to be exchanged for small skirmishes, but to result in a single powerful blow to the enemy. I have no doubt that you will try to turn this offensive precisely into a single and general blow against the enemy, upsetting all the calculations of the German invaders.

On January 6, the commander of the troops of the Volkhov Front, General of Artillery K.A. Meretskov signed the order to go on the offensive.

"To the troops of the Volkhov Front on January 7, 1942, by all means go on a decisive offensive against the enemy, break through his fortified positions, defeat his manpower, relentlessly pursue the remnants of the defeated units, surround and capture them." The order determined the direction of the front's main attack (Siverskaya - Volosovo) and the immediate task of breaking through the enemy's defensive lines on the Volkhov, Tigoda, Ravan River and reaching the Lyuban, Dubovik, Cholovo front. Konyaev N. Two faces of General Vlasov. M., 2003. S. 60.

Assessing the actions of the commander of the Volkhov Front, we can conclude that this letter from Comrade Stalin not only did not encourage Meretskov, but plunged him into a panic. He perfectly understood that it was impossible to carry out the plan proposed by the Headquarters with the front's cash resources. Meretskov should have explained this to Stalin, but, apparently, the memory of the interrogations in the NKVD was too fresh in Kirill Afanasyevich. He got scared. Most likely, it was here that the first fatal mistake was made.

By the beginning of the offensive in the 2nd Shock and 59th armies, a little more than half of the formations occupied their original position. The rest of the formations, army artillery and some of the reinforcements still followed in the railway echelons. The rear of the front did not create a system of bases with stocks of materiel, ammunition, communications, did not deploy medical facilities, did not form road maintenance and road construction services. The front and army rears were not provided in the required quantity either by motor transport or by horse-drawn vehicles.

Without completing the concentration and not completing the preparations, the troops of the front went on the offensive. But the defensive position of the enemy, not reconnoitered and, therefore, not suppressed by our artillery, allowed him to save the entire fire system. Our units, met by strong machine-gun, mortar and artillery fire, were forced to withdraw to their original lines. The Military Council of the front again turned to the Stavka with a request to postpone the start of the operation for three days, which again was not enough, and on January 10, Stavka, during a conversation on straight wire offered to postpone the start of the offensive once again.

A recording of a telephone conversation by K.A. Meretskov with Headquarters.

According to all reports, you are not ready to attack by the 11th. If this is true, it should be postponed for a day or two in order to advance and break through the enemy's defenses. The Russians say: if you hurry, you will make people laugh. You did just that, hurried with the offensive without preparing it, and made people laugh. If you remember, I suggested that you postpone the offensive if Sokolov's shock army is not ready, and now you are reaping the fruits of your haste ... "Konyaev N. Two faces of General Vlasov. M., 2003. S. 61.

Here I would like to make a small digression.

Reading the text of Stalin's personal letter to Meretskov and the recording of their telephone conversation, one involuntarily thinks about Stalin's perfidy. Having sent this letter to Meretskov two weeks ago, he provoked the commander of the Volkhov Front to launch an unprepared offensive, and now he is abdicating responsibility, shifting it entirely onto the shoulders of the front commander.

On the other hand, there is no hint in the letter of the need to speed up the start of the operation. On the contrary, Stalin emphasized that the offensive should not be exchanged for small skirmishes. Now he again holds back Meretskov, gives days to still prepare for a breakthrough.

But, it seems to me, out of fear, Kirill Afanasyevich was no longer able to adequately assess Stalin's words. It seems that he did not even understand that Stalin was expecting from him not a report on the start of the offensive, but a concrete result - a breakthrough in the blockade of Leningrad.

So, I.V. Stalin agreed to postpone the offensive of the front troops to January 13, although in reality it took at least another 15-20 days to prepare the offensive. But such terms were out of the question.

Before proceeding to the description of the battles of the Luban operation and the battles of the 2nd Shock Army in particular, I would like to describe the position of the armies at the front.

For the German troops, the impending offensive of the troops of the Volkhov Front was known. Intelligence accurately established the creation of an enemy strike force in front of the front of the 126th Infantry Division and in front of the right wing of the 215th Infantry Division. It was also established that the enemy was preparing attacks on the Gruzino and Kirishi bridgeheads, as well as on the northeastern front of the army on both sides of Pogostye.

The leading edge of the German defense mainly passed along the western bank of the Volkhov. The mirror of the river was shot through with dense oblique and flank fire. The second defensive line passed along the embankments of the railway and the Kirishi-Novgorod highway. It consisted of intermittent lines of strong points in populated areas and at heights with well-organized fire communications between them. From the water's edge of the Volkhov River to the embankment of the railway, the area is equipped with engineering barriers and barbed wire fences with minefields, forest debris and land mines. The steep western bank of the river was doused in places with water and its icy surface was a formidable obstacle for infantry without special equipment. Strongholds are saturated with machine guns and mortars. The defending troops were supported by strong artillery and fairly powerful aviation formations.

The Volkhov line from Lake Ilmen to the mouth of the Tigoda River was defended by divisions of the 38th Army Corps of the 16th Army, the 250th Spanish defended the strip from Lake. Ilmen to Teremets, 126th Infantry - from Teremets to Kuzino, 215th Infantry - from Kuzino to Gruzino, 61st Infantry - from Gruzino to Tigoda.

The 21st Infantry Division of the 28th Army Corps of the 18th Army defended on the Volkhov line from Tigoda to the embankment of the Kirishi-Volkhovstroy railway line, holding the Kirishi bridgehead on the eastern bank of the Volkhov.

The reserve of the northern grouping of the 16th Army consisted of one tank and one motorized division of the 39th Motorized Corps, which were being replenished after the retreat from Tikhvin. Halder F. From Brest to Stalingrad: Military Diary. Smolensk, 2001, p. 591.

When planning an offensive operation, the command of the Volkhov Front did not avoid a shortcoming characteristic of that period of the war - a violation of the principle of massing forces and means in a decisive direction. All four armies of the front were placed in the first echelon. The front had no second echelon. In the reserve of the front were the 25th and 87th cavalry divisions, the first of them weakened in previous battles and without artillery, four separate ski battalions. The front had no artillery or tank forces in reserve. In the armies of the strike force of the front there were: in the 59th Army - two army-type artillery regiments, three guards mortar divisions and two tank battalions of light tanks; in the 2nd Shock - one artillery regiment of the army type, three guards mortar divisions and two tank battalions of light tanks.

The aviation of the front consisted of only 118 aircraft, of which: fighters - 71, attack aircraft - 19, bombers - 6, reconnaissance aircraft - 4, U-2 - 18. True, in the first days of the operation, when almost a hundred U-2 aircraft arrived, front aviation already totaled 211 units. The dominance of enemy aircraft was overwhelming, which, of course, could not but have an extremely negative impact on the course of the offensive operation. The almost complete absence of bombers and attack aircraft in the front aviation did not make it possible to ensure the offensive of our troops and strike at the rear and communications of the enemy. Luban offensive operation. January-June 1942: Sat. SPb., 1994. S. 14.

On the right wing of the front, on the Kirishi-Lezno sector, the 4th Army of General P.A. Ivanova adopted an operational formation in two echelons. The 377th, 310th, 44th, 65th and 191st rifle divisions operated in the first echelon.

The shock group of the army (65th and 191st rifle divisions) advanced from a small bridgehead on the western bank of the Volkhov towards Zelentsy and Lezno. The 92nd Infantry Division was in the second echelon, and the 27th and 80th Cavalry Divisions were in reserve.

The task of the army is to advance in the general direction of Kirishi, Tosno and, in cooperation with the 54th Army of the Leningrad Front, to encircle and destroy the enemy who has advanced north of Mga to Lake Ladoga. To the left of the 4th Army, in the Zavizh, Dymno sector, the newly arrived 59th Army of General I.V. Galanina. There. P.15.

The directive of the commander of the troops of the Volkhov Front of the army set the task: to go on a decisive offensive from the Volkhov line (the border on the right is Oskuy, Lezno, Malaya Kunest; on the left - Dymno, Glushitsa, Isakovo tract), capture the city of Chudovo and go to the Karlovka line.

The 111th and 288th Rifle Divisions of the 4th Army, which had previously operated in this zone, were transferred to the 59th Army.

In his decision, the army commander determined the strike from the area north of Gruzino by the forces of four divisions (378th, 376th, 288th and 111th) in order to break through the enemy defenses in the Vodose, Pertechno sector and continue the offensive in the direction of the Kirov state farm, and part of the forces to bypass Chudovo from the north and north-west and take possession of it. An auxiliary strike should be delivered by the forces of the 372nd and 374th rifle divisions with the task of breaking through the enemy defenses in the Sosninskaya pier, Dymno sector and developing an offensive on Chudovo, bypassing it from the south and southwest.

In the second echelon - the 366th and 382nd rifle divisions. The 59th Army was reinforced by three tank battalions of light tanks, three Guards mortar battalions, and seven independent ski battalions.

The two army-type artillery regiments envisaged by the Headquarters Directive to reinforce the 59th Army did not arrive in the assembly area. The 78th and 87th cavalry divisions were withdrawn from the army and placed under the control of the front. (78th division did not arrive at the front).

To the south of the 59th Army on the right bank of the Volkhov, the 2nd Shock Army of General N.K. Klykova, who had just arrived from the Stavka reserve.

By the directive of the front commander on January 6, 1942, the troops of the 2nd Shock Army were tasked with breaking through the enemy’s defensive positions on the western bank of the river in the Peresvet Ostrov sector, the Krasny Drummer state farm and reaching the Kerest River with the main forces by the end of January 19, then advancing in in the direction of Finev Lug, Chascha station, Nizovsky junction, part of the forces to secure the left flank from Batepkaya station.

The army was reinforced by two separate tank battalions, three separate guards mortar battalions, one army-type artillery regiment (which arrived later) and six ski battalions.

The operational formation of the army was defined in two echelons: the first echelon - one rifle division (327th) and five rifle brigades (25th, 57th, 58th, 53rd and 22nd); the second echelon - three rifle brigades (59th, 23rd and 24th).

The army commander decided to strike the main blow with the forces of the 327th Infantry Division, operating in the Selishchensky barracks, Kolomno sector (4 km wide), break through the enemy defenses on the western bank of the Volkhov and reach the line of the Polist River.

52nd Army of General V.F. Yakovleva occupied the front to the left of the 2nd Shock Army from Russ to Lake. Ilmen, which cleared the territory east of the Volkhov River from the enemy.

The army included five rifle divisions (46th, 225th, 259th, 267th and 305th), 442nd, 561st ap, 448th pope. The formations of the army, waging tense battles for four months, suffered heavy losses in manpower and equipment.

The commander of the troops of the front set before the troops of the 52nd Army the task of capturing Novgorod and further advancing in the direction of Soltsy, thereby ensuring the offensive of the armies of the Volkhov Front to the northwest. The operational formation of the army is defined in two echelons: in the first echelon - four rifle divisions (267th, 46th, 305th and 225th), in the second - the 259th rifle division, the 25th cavalry division was reassigned to the front . There. pp.15-17.

The army commander decided to deliver the main blow on the right flank with the forces of three rifle divisions (267th, 46th and 305th). The division of the second echelon (259th Rifle) was also located behind the right flank.

The shock group of the army was ordered to break through the enemy’s defensive line on the western bank of the Volkhov on the front of B. and M. Bystritsakh, Kotovipy, seize his strongholds in B. and M. Bystrinakh, Zapolye, Lelyavino, Teremets and reach the Pitba River by the end of January 19, in the future, break through the second defensive line of the enemy on the embankments of the Chudovo-Novgorod railway and highway, seize his strongholds of Lyubtsy, Koppy, Tyutipy, and partly secure the left flank from Novgorod.

Before proceeding to a description of the course of hostilities, I would like to express my thoughts arising from the study of the Luban operation.

The Headquarters, in its Directive of December 17, 1941, determined the transition to the troops of the Volkhov Front general offensive against the enemy defending along the western bank of the river. Volkhov, smash it and go to the Lyuban front with the main forces, Art. Cholovo. In the future, developing the offensive in the direction of Siverskaya, Volosovo, encircle the enemy under

Leningrad and, together with the troops of the Leningrad Front, defeat its troops and free them from the blockade. With your left flank, liberate Novgorod and, in the further offensive against Soltsy, in cooperation with the troops of the North-Western Front, encircle the enemy troops west of Lake. Ilmen.

In this Directive, the Headquarters determined the operational formation of the front, the composition and tasks of the armies.

Setting before the troops of the front such a decisive goal as the defeat of the 18th German Army and the liberation of Leningrad from the blockade. The headquarters did not provide the front with either the necessary forces or material means for the successful conduct of such a major offensive operation.

The front, stretching for 150 km, consisted of 20 rifle divisions, 5 cavalry divisions, 8 rifle brigades with small aviation, artillery, tank, ski and engineering units. There was no strength to build up the initial blow in order to develop success in the depths of the enemy’s defense and deliver the final blow.

The main efforts of the front were assigned in the direction of the Moscow-Leningrad highway and railway, which would withdraw troops directly to Leningrad along good roads. But in this direction the enemy had the opportunity to provide the defending troops with engineering structures, to concentrate his artillery and tank forces.

“The front command took into account the problematic nature of the success of the offensive in this direction. Therefore, it intended to shift the main effort to the sector of action of the 2nd shock army in order to solve the problem with a strike on Lyuban, bypassing the heavily fortified positions of the enemy. But all our attempts to strengthen the 2nd shock army by transferring at least two rifle divisions from the 59th army were not supported by the Headquarters. There. S. 18.

The shock grouping of the front (59th and 2nd Shock armies) was placed on a 60-kilometer section.

The 59th Army, with six rifle divisions in the first echelon and two divisions in the second, was to advance in a 30-kilometer zone. Four rifle divisions were to operate in the army's main strike zone, 8 kilometers wide, i.e. each division was supposed to break through the enemy defenses in a 2-kilometer section. The army delivered an auxiliary strike with two rifle divisions in a 10-kilometer zone or in a 5-kilometer zone for each division.

The 2nd Shock Army, having one rifle division and five rifle brigades in the first echelon and three rifle brigades in the second echelon, was supposed to advance in a 27-kilometer zone. The 327th Rifle Division, operating in the main direction, received the task of breaking through a 4-kilometer-wide sector of the enemy's defense. Rifle brigades received 4.5-kilometer sections each for a breakthrough.

The 4th Army on the 55-kilometer front had five rifle divisions in the first echelon and one division in the second echelon. The main blow was delivered by two rifle divisions on a 5-kilometer section of the planned breakthrough of the enemy defenses, or 2.5 kilometers for each division.

The 52nd Army occupied a front of 35 kilometers with four rifle divisions in the first echelon, and had one division in the second echelon. The army dealt the main blow with the forces of three rifle divisions in a sector of 12 kilometers, i.e. each division broke through the enemy defenses on a 4-kilometer section. There. S. 19.

Consequently, nine rifle divisions and eight rifle brigades were concentrated in the shock grouping of the front, which amounted to about half of the forces of the entire front. But the main blows of the army of the shock group of the front were delivered in sectors at a distance of 40 kilometers from each other.

In addition, the Volkhov Front had not yet completed the organizational period, did not have rear services and the necessary warehouses with material resources. The almost roadless territory of the rear of the front did not make it possible to transport materiel to required quantity and at the right time.

But the tragic state of the population and troops in Leningrad forced both the Headquarters and the command of the Volkhov Front to launch an offensive without completing its preparation, without providing necessary forces and the means to achieve success, ignoring the well-known provision that an offensive launched before the end of the concentration of troops intended for it, and insufficiently prepared, will ultimately do more harm than delaying the start of the operation.

Chapter II .

At dawn on January 13, 1942, after a short artillery preparation, the troops of the formations of the armies of the Volkhov Front moved forward. The valley of the Volkhov River, 800-1000 meters wide, stretched to the front line of the enemy's defense. Deep snow, frost down to -30? Strong machine-gun and mortar fire from the enemy forced our soldiers, who had neither skis nor white coats, to move from throwing to crawling through the valley, burrowing into the snow. History of the Order of Lenin of the Leningrad Military District. M., 1974. S. 278.

In the sector of the 4th Army, the enemy himself attacked our positions before us, and the army was forced to fight defensive battles instead of an offensive.

The divisions of the 59th Army, unable to withstand the machine-gun and mortar fire of the enemy, especially artillery shelling with shrapnel shells, retreated to their original position. Only in the center of the formation of the 2nd Shock Army and the right flank of the 52nd Army was success indicated. By 14:00, the company of the first echelon of the 327th Infantry Division, Colonel I.M. Antyufeeva reached the western bank of the Volkhov, but could not go on the attack on the enemy's defensive positions on the high river bank. Only the introduction of the second echelon of the division into battle in cooperation with the 57th rifle brigade of Colonel P.N. Vedenicheva allowed a rapid attack to break through the enemy defenses in the Bor, Kostylevo sector. During the further battle, the division pushed the enemy back across the Polist River.

To the left of the 327th division, the 58th rifle brigade of Colonel F.M. Zhiltsov, who, interacting with the 53rd rifle brigade of General V.S. Rakovsky, took possession of Yamno.

The 59th Rifle Brigade of Lieutenant Colonel Chernik, located in the second echelon, on the order of the army on the morning of January 14 through the battle formations of the 327th division, entered the gap at the turn of the villages of Bor, Kostypevo and, acting behind German lines, moved to the second line of defense of the enemy, having the task on the section Myasnoy Bor, Spasskaya Polist, cut the Novgorod-Chudovo railway, take possession of Myasny Bor and Spasskaya Polist on the move. The brigade started unsuccessful battles with the defending enemy, but suffered heavy losses and could not complete the task. The brigade was withdrawn to the second echelon for replenishment. Colonel I.F. took command of the brigade. Glazunov.

In the 52nd Army, the right-flank 267th Rifle Division, having gone on the offensive, on the morning of January 13 broke through the enemy defenses in the St. and Nov. Bystritsy, Gorka and took possession of the pioneer camp and Gorka. Parts of the division, successfully advancing, reached the village of Koptsy on January 15 and started fighting to break through the second defensive line of the Germans. Stubborn bloody battles did not give success and the division went over to the defense of the occupied line.

To the left of the 267th division, the advancing 46th rifle division of General A.K. Okulichev and the 305th Infantry Division of Colonel D.I. Barabanshchikov broke through the enemy defenses in the Gorka, Teremets sector and captured his strongholds on the morning of January 15.

On January 15-19, the strike force of the 52nd Army reached the second defensive line in the area of ​​Lyubtsy, Tyutitsy.

259th Infantry Division Colonel A.V. Lapsheva crossed the Volkhov and took up defensive positions in the Gorka area. There. pp. 279-280.

The superiority of the Germans in aviation, technical means of combat, as well as the provision of artillery with ammunition, while our gunners counted each shot, led to increased losses of our advancing units and demanded a larger number of troops to continue the development of the offensive, since very often the outcome of the attack depended on the mass nature of the onslaught produced on a narrow section of the front. There have been cases where a successfully launched attack stalled for no apparent reason, without any tactical failure. Attacks simply died out due to too large losses in personnel.

The 2nd Shock Army, weak in its original composition, from the first days of the fighting required reinforcements with new formations in order to continue the offensive. On January 15, the command of the front was forced to transfer from the second echelon of the 59th Army the 382nd Rifle Division of Colonel G.P. Sokurov, 366th Rifle Division of Colonel S.I. Bulanova.

On January 19, after fierce fighting, the 327th Rifle Division, together with the 57th Separate Rifle Brigade, captured Kolomno. Until the end of January, the division fought offensive battles for Spasskaya Polist.

By January 21, the troops of the 2nd Shock Army reached the second defensive position of the enemy in the Spasskaya Polist, Myasnoy Bor sector. An attempt to break through the second position on the move was unsuccessful and the fighting took on a protracted character.

The front commander ordered that all possible forces and means be concentrated against Spasskaya Polist and Myasny Bor. Of particular danger was the enemy's stronghold in Spasskaya Polisti, located along the axis of the offensive direction of the 2nd Shock Army. As part of the army on January 20, the front commander organized a special task force of General I.T. Korovnikov. Initially, the 327th and 382nd rifle divisions, the 59th rifle brigade, the 162nd separate tank battalion, the 43rd and 39th ski battalions, the 105th and 6th guards mortar divisions were included. A few days later, the 382nd division was withdrawn from the group, and the 374th rifle division of Colonel A.D. was included instead. Vitoshkin and the 111th Infantry Division of Colonel S.V. Roginsky, 22nd separate rifle brigade of Colonel F.K. Pugachev.

The introduction of significant forces into the battle for Spasskaya Plump did not bring success. To reinforce the troops of the operational group, the front commander ordered 230 guns to be brought here. There. S. 281.

In the evening of January 25, divisions of the 18th artillery regiment of the army type, Major M.B., took up firing positions. Friedland (152 mm guns).

After artillery shelling on the morning of January 26, the stronghold was attacked by the 59th Infantry Brigade and the 374th Infantry Division, but they could not capture Spasskaya Polista. The highway and railway south of the stronghold were intercepted and the lumber station west of the roads was captured.

By order of the commander of the 2nd Shock Army, the 366th Infantry Division is concentrated by January 17 in the area of ​​​​Dubovitsy, Gorodok, a forest east of Dubovits, ready for action in a westerly direction.

On January 18, the division received a combat order from the army: “At dawn on January 19, 1942, advance along the eastern edge of the forest west of Arefino, Krasny Poselok, with the task, together with the 58th, 23rd and 24th rifle brigades, to destroy the enemy in the Borisovo area with subsequent exit to the Myasnoy Bor line. Luban offensive operation. January-June 1942: Sat. SPb., 1994. S. 22.

Destroying small groups of the enemy, on January 21, the division went to Myasnoy Bor and started a battle for mastering it. Parts of the division in fierce battles slowly wedged into the defensive positions of the enemy. On the night of January 23-24, units of the division, during a decisive attack, captured the stronghold of the enemy's second defensive line - Myasny Bor and completed the breakthrough of the line.

Intended for the development of a breakthrough, the 13th cavalry corps of brigade commander I.I. Gusev, concentrated in the forests of the Shevelevo, Yamno region.

Operational Directive No. 0021 on January 23, 1942, the commander of the Volkhov Front, General K.A. Meretskov determined the task of the corps as part of the 25th Cavalry Division, Lieutenant Colonel D.M.

Barinov, 87th Cavalry Division Colonel V.F. Trantin with the 366th Infantry Division of Colonel S.I. Bulanova: “To defeat the remnants of the enemy in the strip of the Leningrad Highway, preventing the formation of enemy defenses on the river. Tigoda and Kerest, by the end of January 25, reach the river. Trubitsa, pushing forward detachments to Sennaya Kerest, Novaya Derevnya, Finev Lug.

In the future, advance in the general direction of Olkhovka, Apraksin Bor and Lyuban, no later than January 27, intercept the highway and the Chudovo-Leningrad railway and take Lyubanyo. Do not get involved with the defense organization ... ”Ibid. S. 23.

On the morning of January 24, the cavalry corps was transferred from the front reserve to the 2nd shock army.

The 366th Rifle Division, developing the offensive along the clearing, by the morning of January 25 captured the villages of Krechno and Novaya Kerest.

By order of the corps commander, the 25th Cavalry Division withdrew from the Shevelevo area and by the morning of January 25 concentrated in the forest 1.5 km east of Myasnoy Bor. Throughout the day, the division was attacked by German aircraft and could not enter the gap.

With the onset of darkness, parts of the division began to advance along the clearing to the area of ​​\u200b\u200bNew Korost. During the evening and night, the cavalry moved on foot in deep snow above the knees, leading the horses by reins, constantly stopping to assist in advancing their combat convoy. Only by the morning of January 26, having overcome 15 km of the path along a forest clearing, did units of the division reach the forest area east of Novaya Kerest.

The 87th Cavalry Division, which undertook a march during daylight hours, in the area northwest of Myasny Bor, was subjected to air bombardment and lost several carts with machine guns and their crews.

The vanguard 236th cavalry regiment of the division was able to reach the Novaya Kerest region only in the evening, and the main forces of the division - by the morning of January 27th.

In pursuance of the directive of the front, the commander of the 13th Cavalry Corps decided by the end of January 26:

87th Cavalry Division to capture Olkhovka;

Z66th Rifle Division - Finev Lug;

25th Cavalry Division - Glukhaya Keresti Voskhod.

By the end of January 26, the 236th Cavalry Regiment of the 87th Cavalry Division captured Olkhovka, defeating the enemy garrison with a surprise attack. The division concentrated in the Olkhovka area, where it stayed until January 28, conducting reconnaissance in the directions of Olkhovskiye Khutor - Sennaya Kerest and Vdipko.

By the end of the day on January 28, the 240th cavalry regiment of the division captured Vdipko, and the 241st cavalry regiment captured Novaya Derevnya. The 236th Cavalry Regiment approached the outskirts of the Brooks, but could not take them. A joint attack with the approaching 241st regiment also ended unsuccessfully. The battles for the capture of Ruchi continued until February 3, when the cavalrymen, on the orders of the 2nd shock army, handed over this area to the approaching units of the 191st rifle division.

The 98th cavalry regiment of the 25th cavalry division in a dismounted formation at 9.00 on January 27 attacked Glukhaya Kerest on the move, but was repulsed, the 100th cavalry regiment of the division attacked in a hasty formation at 18.00 on January 27 Voskhod and in a stubborn battle with the assistance of 104- th cavalry regiment by the morning of 28 occupied Voskhod and Rogavka station.

On the morning of January 30, the corps commander set a new mission for the 25th Cavalry Division. At 18.00 on January 30, the division (without the 98th regiment) went along the route Finev Lug, Ogoreli, Tigoda. Chervino and further north, destroying small enemy garrisons on the move.

The 366th Rifle Division was ordered to change the 98th Cavalry Regiment and advance in the direction of Kleptsy, Chauni, Pyatilipy, Glukhaya Kerest.

The advance detachment of the 25th Cavalry Division, knocking down small groups of the enemy, marched 30 km at night and by the morning of January 31 reached Cherevinskaya Luka, where it was stopped by organized fire. The main forces of the 100th and 104th regiments of the division were drawn into protracted battles, which continued to no avail until February 3.

The 366th Rifle Division captured Kleptsy, Chauni, Glukhaya Keresti, but could not break the enemy's resistance in Pyatilipy.

The formations of the corps, having no artillery, were drawn into unsuccessful battles to capture the strongholds of the enemy's defenses in populated areas, lost their maneuverability and initiative, and were unable to fulfill their task - to capture Lyuban by January 27.

The battles of the 13th cavalry corps during the week-long offensive revealed the impossibility of moving cavalry columns off the roads. The dominance of enemy aircraft, with weak cover by our aircraft and the complete absence of anti-aircraft defenses, forced us to stop active operations during daylight hours. The almost complete absence of artillery and mortars in the 25th division and their completely insufficient number in the 87th division determined the possibility of capturing settlements with an enemy garrison only by sudden night attacks in a dismounted formation, which was ensured by the high fighting qualities of the cavalrymen.

The fighting was carried out along the existing roads by separate regiments. The movement of units at night, mainly in columns, the head regiment sent a separate patrol by force up to a platoon forward along the route of movement. Unfortunately, the cavalry divisions were not reinforced with ski battalions, which were indispensable for bypassing fortified settlements in deep snow covering numerous marshes and marshy forests.

Neither the front nor the army organized material support for the actions of the corps.

Simultaneously with the battles for Spassky Polist and Myasnoy Bor, formations of the 2nd Shock Army continued to clear the western bank of the Volkhov from small enemy groups. On January 22, the 57th Rifle Brigade of Colonel P.N. Vedenicheva cut the highway Selishchensky village, Spasskaya Polist and went to the southern and western outskirts of Kuzino. 23rd Infantry Brigade Colonel V.I. Shilova captured the settlement of Lobkovo, and the 24th rifle brigade of Colonel M.V. Romanovsky cleared Old and New Bystritsy from the enemy. There. pp. 24-25.

If the 2nd Shock Army was successful in the offensive, then in the 4th and 59th armies all efforts to break through the enemy defenses were unsuccessful.

The attacks of their formations became weaker, and then completely stopped. The 54th Army of the Leningrad Front, having used up ammunition, on January 17 also stopped the offensive. The troops of the army remained in their original positions.

In the current situation, it was necessary to make a decision to transfer the main direction of the offensive. The front command, having received permission from the Headquarters, stopped the attacks on the right wing of the front and transferred all the efforts of the front troops to the direction of Spasskaya Polist, Lyuban. The 59th Army received a new offensive zone within the borders: on the right - Pshenichishche. Tushin Ostrov, on the left - Kolyazhka, Isakov tract. The section Lezno, Pshenichishche with the 288th and 376th rifle divisions operating on it was transferred to the 4th Army.

The 59th Army took over the Krupicino and Bor sectors from the 2nd Shock Army, as well as the 25th and 53rd rifle brigades located in this sector. The 92nd and 377th Rifle Divisions were transferred from the 4th Army, making a 90-100 km march on foot.

The main goal of the operation of the 59th army - the defeat of the enemy's Chudov grouping - remained unchanged, but now the immediate task of the army was to, striking north of Spasskaya Polist, seize the line of Sosninskaya Pristan, Ant, Priyutino, Spasskaya Polist. In the future, bypassing Chudovo from the west, reach the line of the Kerest River and cut off the escape routes of the enemy's Chudovo grouping to Lyuban.

By his order dated January 27, the army commander of the 59th Army ordered the troops to complete the regrouping by the end of the day, on the morning of January 28 to go on the offensive, in cooperation with the 4th Army, to surround and destroy the Chudovskaya enemy grouping, inflicting the main blow with the forces of the 377th, 372nd and 92nd Rifle Divisions. The second shock in the battle for Leningrad: Sat. L., 1983. S. 14.

During the battles that began on the morning of January 28, the offensive troops of the army occupied the villages of Peresvet Ostrov and Kiprovo on the left bank of the Volkhov and, building on success, threw the enemy back to the Chudovo-Novgorod highway.

The troops, fighting for the capture of strongholds of the enemy's defense, without the support of aircraft and tanks, with limited support from artillery, with an acute shortage of ammunition for all types of weapons, suffered heavy losses. Continuous enemy counterattacks, accompanied by powerful artillery and mortar fire, often had to be beaten off with bayonets.

Fierce battles were fought unsuccessfully for the capture of strongholds of defense on the left bank of the Volkhov: Dymno, Vergezha, on the Chudovo-Novgorod highway: Mikhalevo, Ovinets, Kolyazhka. Only busy in February

Vergezha, and on February 8 Ovinets. Parts of the 92nd Infantry Division, Colonel A.N. Laricheva went to the river Polist. There. S. 16

In February, the 372nd Rifle Division reached the approaches to the village of Maloye Opochivalovo and started a battle to capture it. In the evening, the enemy launched counterattacks along the highway from the north and south against parts of the division that had not yet consolidated on the occupied line. While successfully advancing, the northern and southern enemy groupings connected and surrounded the 1236th and 1238th rifle regiments of the division. For eleven days the regiments fought in encirclement, and only on the night of February 18, by order of the division, did they break through the encirclement, having suffered heavy losses in personnel and heavy weapons, and went to the location of the division.

The 377th Rifle Division fought unsuccessful battles on the outskirts of Tregubovo and Mikhalevo. The troops of the 59th Army went on the defensive. On February 21, the task force of General P.F. Alferov with the task of pinning down the enemy at the turn of Dymno, Spasskaya Polist.

The 92nd Rifle Division transferred on February 21 from the operational group of General I.T. Korovnikov in the operational group of General P.F. Alferov.

The output of formations of the 2nd Shock Army on the line of the settlements of Sennaya Kerest, Ruchy, Chervinskaya Luka, standing 20-25 km from the iron

and the highway Moscow - Leningrad, created the preconditions for the encirclement and defeat of the miraculous Kirishi grouping of the enemy. In the event that our troops cut the railway and highway Chudovo - Leningrad, then the enemy troops could not fight without the supply of ammunition and food. But to solve such a complex task, appropriate forces and means were required, which the troops that penetrated the enemy’s defenses did not have.

Only by the end of February 2, the 58th separate rifle brigade of Colonel F.M. began to approach Chervinskaya Luka and Ruchi to change cavalrymen. Zhiltsov and the 57th separate brigade of Colonel P.N. Vedenicheva. Luban offensive operation. January-June 1942: Sat. SPb., 1994. S. 29.

Transferred on January 25 from the 4th Army to the 2nd Shock Army, the 191st Rifle Division of Colonel A.I. Starunina only on the night of February 2 went to Krivilo, the 4th Guards Rifle Division of General A.I. Andreeva advanced to Sennaya Kerest.

The commander of the front troops, in his directive of February 3, demanded that the commander of the 2nd shock army complete the liquidation of the enemy in the Ostrov, Spasskaya Polnet area and, no later than February 6, concentrate a group of troops consisting of the 327th, 374th in the area of ​​​​Sennaya Kerest, Krivino, Olkhovka , 382nd and 4th Guards Rifle Divisions to strike in the Friday area, Art. Babino (20 km northwest of Chudovo). At the same time, the 13th Cavalry Corps was ordered to go to the Krasnaya Gorka, Konechki area.

The prescription of this directive could be carried out on time only by formations of the 13th cavalry corps, which, having handed over their combat sectors on the night of February 3, set out for new directions of attack. To reinforce the corps, the 59th rifle brigade of Colonel I.F. Glazunov, concentrated by February 3 in the Yazvinka area. The 366th Rifle Division withdrew from the corps.

The corps commander decided to move the 98th cavalry regiment of the 25th division to Filippovichi, Frolevo to cover the flank and rear of the corps.

The 25th Cavalry Division was ordered by the main forces, together with the 59th Infantry Brigade, advancing along the Novgorod-Leningrad railway, to capture Dubovik, Bol. and Mal. Eglino, then advance in a northerly direction to the Leningrad-Chudovo railway.

The 87th cavalry division, concentrating in the Poddubie, Kubolovo region, was supposed to advance in the direction of Tolstoy, Veretye, Krnechki, and subsequently cut the Leningrad-Chudovo railway northwest of Lyuban.

On the night of February 2, the 98th Cavalry Regiment marched along two parallel roads along the river. Rydenka and, without encountering enemy resistance for 3 days, left the right detachment (1 and 2 squadrons) in Frolevo, the left detachment in Volkino. There. P. 29. Only in the area of ​​Pechkovo - Zapolye, the right detachment was counterattacked by the enemy with a force up to a battalion. The arriving detachment of German cadets-aviators pushed back the cavalrymen and occupied Frolyovo and Zagorye. Konyaev N. Two faces of General Vlasov. M., 2003. S. 71.

By order of the corps commander, on February 5, the 236th regiment of the 87th cavalry division arrived to reinforce the 98th regiment. The 104th cavalry regiment of the 25th division, replaced in the Chervino area by the 191st rifle division, was also sent to Filippovichi. Under the command of the commander of the 104th regiment, Colonel Trofimov, a combined detachment of three regiments successfully repelled enemy counterattacks and defeated him in battles on February 6, 7 and 8, captured prisoners, weapons and warehouses. There. S. 72.

Having restored the situation, on February 9, the consolidated detachment handed over this area to the approaching 23rd separate rifle brigade of Colonel V.I. Shilov. On the evening of February 9, a combined detachment of three cavalry regiments, on the orders of the corps commander, set out along the route Zaruchie, Ostrov, Abramov, Gdebovo, Porozhki, Konechki. The forward detachment - the 236th regiment, by the morning of February 10, entered Glebovo without encountering enemy resistance, only in the Savkino region in the equestrian formation the regiment destroyed the enemy garrison with a surprise attack, capturing rich trophies. Pursuing the hastily retreating Germans, the 236th Regiment went to Valyakka, where it was met with organized fire. The 104th regiment, following the 236th regiment, went to Valyakka, and the 98th regiment was located in Savkino-1 and Savkino-2, covering the rear of the consolidated detachment. Battle of Leningrad 1941-1944: Sat. SPb., 1995. S. 108.

The enemy took active actions against the 98th regiment from the Porozhek region with a ski battalion reinforced with artillery and mortars, and from the Ozereshno, Nesterkovo region with an infantry battalion, also with artillery reinforcement. Fights began for Porozhki and Nesterkovo.

The 100th regiment of the 25th cavalry division, moving along the Novgorod-Leningrad railway, occupied Gorki without a fight on the morning of February 4, advancing to the Radofinnikovo station, defeated the skiers from the 183rd Estonian battalion and attacked Dubovik in horseback formation and by the end of February 5 completely cleared it of the enemy.

Acting together with the 59th Rifle Brigade of Colonel I.F. Glazunov, reinforced by a ski battalion, the commander of the 100th regiment decided on the night of February 6 to attack the enemy in Bol. and Mal. Eglino. The attack was not successful, and only a second attack on the night of February 7 was occupied by Bol. and Mal. Eglino after a hard street fight. Rich trophies were captured here. Luban offensive operation. January-June 1942: Sat. SPb., 1994. S. 32.

The enemy withdrew to defensive positions in the Verkhovye sector, the Eglino platform, Konechki, equipped along the embankment of the Chudovo-Weimarn railway under construction. All attempts to break through the enemy defenses ended unsuccessfully due to the lack of artillery reinforcements.

The reinforced concrete overpass at the intersection of the existing railway with the embankment under construction was especially impregnable. Direct hits from the 76-mm cannons of the artillery battalion of the brigade could not cause noticeable damage, the cavalry and the brigade had no other artillery reinforcements. After several days of continuous unsuccessful attacks on enemy positions, the cavalry and the brigade went over to the defense of the captured line. All subsequent repeated attempts by the enemy to push back parts of the brigade with counterattacks were successfully repelled and the brigade occupied this line of defense until May 25, 1942 - until the order to withdraw was received.

The 87th cavalry division, replaced by rifle formations near Ruchi on February 5, without the 236th regiment, concentrated in the area of ​​Yazvinka, Poddubie, Kubolovo and put itself in order.

Fulfilling the order of the corps commander, the division commander, Colonel V.F. Trantin decided to move in regimental columns (240 and 241 regiments) along forest roads along the route Zhiloe Rydno, Tolstoy, Veretye ​​and reach the area southeast of Konechka. Complete lack of roads, deep snow made it difficult to move, and the division was late in reaching the area of ​​mark 62.5, which is 2.2 km southeast of Konechka. Joint actions of the united detachment of Colonel Trofimov and the 87th division to defeat the enemy garrison in Konechki did not work, and attacks at different times from the southwest of the detachment and the southeast of the division on the enemy garrison in Konechki did not bring success. There. S. 32

On February 12, the newly approached Finnish ski battalion knocked out a detachment of two squadrons of the 98th regiment from Porozhki.

On February 16, during the day, the enemy attacked the squadron of the 98th regiment, defending Nesterkovo, and by evening occupied Nesterkovo and pushed the squadron back to Savkino-1. By the end of the day, the 98th regiment retreated to a height with a mark of 76.1, where, together with the 104th regiment, they organized defenses and repelled the fierce attacks of the Germans and Finns during February 17-20. On February 20, under pressure from the enemy, the 98th and 104th regiments withdrew to an area 1 km southeast of Valyakka, where they established contact with the 87th division and organized a new line of defense in the Valyakka sector, Glebovskoye swamp.

By February 20, the cavalry corps lost its strike force and went over to the defensive along the entire front of the offensive.

The corps commander ordered to defend the line: the 59th separate rifle brigade, the Eglino platform, south of the embankment line of the Chudovo-Weimarn railway to the right flank of the defense of the 87th division.

The 87th division - in the area from the height with a mark of 58.0, which is 1 km east of Konechka, to the height with a mark of 64.8 in the Glebovsky swamp.

25th division - in the area from the height with a mark of 64.8 to a mark of 58.3 (west of Veretye) further along the river. Black.

The headquarters of the 87th division was located at a height of 62.5.

The headquarters of the 25th division is in Veretye.

Corps headquarters - in Dubovik. There. S. 33.

By mid-February, the following situation was determined for the armies of the Volkhov Front. In the center, deeply wedged into the enemy’s defenses, the troops of the 2nd shock army fought, on the right, with a ledge back, with the main forces concentrated at Chudovo and Spasskaya Polist, they fought fierce, but unsuccessful battles on the second defensive line of the enemy, the troops of the 59th army; to the right of this army, along the eastern bank of the Volkhov to Kirishi, the troops of the 4th Army fought the enemy; on the left flank of the front, with a ledge back to the 2nd shock army in the Myasnoy Bor, Teremets sector, the troops of the 52nd army were fighting. History of the Order of Lenin of the Leningrad Military District. M., 1974. S. 290.

The immediate goal of the shock grouping of the front (2nd Shock and 59th armies) was determined by Lyuban. The 4th Army, in cooperation with the 54th Army of the Leningrad Front, is fighting for Kirishi; The 52nd Army provides for the operations of the strike force from the direction of Novgorod.

Due to its initial success, the 2nd Shock Army secured the directions of the main attack, advanced deep into the enemy's defenses, but could not continue the offensive without significant reinforcement.

As the combat area expanded and the number of formations in the 2nd Shock Army increased, command and control of troops became more complicated. For sustainable and timely leadership of troops in the army, it was decided to create operational groups to lead troops in certain directions.

So, the group of General P.F. Privalova united the 53rd and 57th rifle brigades and the 191st rifle division, operating eastward along the line of Krivino, Ruchy, Chervinskaya Luka.

The 4th Guards Rifle Division and the 59th Rifle Brigade, operating in the direction of Sennaya Kerest, made up the task force of General A.I. Andreeva.

In the course of the fighting, other groups were created not only in the 2nd Shock, but also in the 59th Army. In the latter, the task force of General P.F. Alferova (deputy commander of the 59th Army) led the formations fighting for the expansion of the bridgehead on the Volkhov in the Dymno, Tregubovo sector towards Chudovo.

The task force of General Privalov fought unsuccessful battles for Krivino, Ruchi, Chervinskaya Luka, remaining in their previous positions. The task force of General Andreva fought defensive battles in Olkhovka.

In the neck of the breakthrough, the troops of the 2nd Shock Army fought incessant battles to widen the gap. Finally, on February 12, the 111th Infantry Division of Colonel S.V. Roginsky, 22nd Infantry Brigade Colonel R.K. Pugachev broke the resistance of the Germans and occupied the strongholds of the enemy's defense in Lyubino Pole and Mostki in the strip of the Moscow-Leningrad highway. Now the width of the opening of the breakthrough has reached 14 kilometers and the army's communications passed without machine-gun and real artillery fire.

Continuing the offensive, the formations came close to Spasskaya Polist, the 22nd brigade from the south, and the 111th division from the southwest and west.

Bypassing Spasskaya Polist from the west, the division, advancing in the direction of Chudovo, overcoming the fierce resistance of the enemy and repelling counterattacks, on February 17 cut the Spasskaya Polist - Olkhovka road. On March 2, the division cut the Glushitsa-Sennaya Kerest road and on March 6 reached the approaches to the village of Korpovo-2, where it was stopped by the enemy. Luban offensive operation. January-June 1942: Sat. SPb., 1994. S. 34.

The fighting did not subside on the southern face of the neck of the breakthrough. 267th division of Lieutenant Colonel P.A. Potapov. On January 25, she surrendered her defense line near Koptsy to the 259th Infantry Division of Colonel A.V. Lapshev and was introduced into the breach at Myasny Bor. The division became part of the 2nd Shock Army and received a combat order to break through the enemy defenses near the village of Teremets-Kurlyandsky, bypass its stronghold of defense and, advancing from the west on the village of Koptsy, capture the village with a sudden blow. On the march, paving the way in deep snow in a column, the division, bypassing Teremets-Kurlyandsky, came under massive air bombardment and suffered significant losses. The suddenness of the attack on Koptsy was lost; it was not possible to capture the village of Koptsy with a surprise attack. The enemy from Novgorod launched counterattacks, which were repulsed with heavy losses on both sides. The division went on the defensive On February 25, the 267th Rifle Division surrendered its line of defense in the area west of the village of Koptsy to the 259th Rifle Division, marched to the Olkhovka area, where it withstood a big battle for the Spasskaya Polist - Olkhovka road with a counterattacking enemy. The division was placed at the disposal of the group of General Korovnikov, who ordered to make a march through the Gazhya Sopka swamp and capture the villages of Glushitsa, Priyutino and be ready for an attack on Tregubovo. There. pp. 34-35.

Intense battles unfolded from 3 to 15 March on the outskirts of Priyutino, Glushitsa and Tregubovo, but the division did not capture these points and went on the defensive.

On February 23, the 259th Rifle Division, having surrendered its defense sector to the 46th Rifle Division, was introduced into the gap near Myasny Bor and on February 24 took over the defense from the 267th Rifle Division in the Bol sector. Zamoshye, Teremed-Kurlandsky, becoming part of the 2nd Shock Army. Waging defensive battles, the division conducted reconnaissance searches on its open right flank in the direction of Selo Gora. Having received information about the arrival of the fascist legion "Flanders" at the front, the division commander decided to organize a mobile detachment for a surprise attack on the Dutch in the Village of Gora, defeating the garrison and capturing prisoners. During the night attack, the Nazis were defeated.

On February 28, the division surrendered its defense sector to the 305th Infantry Division, Colonel D.I. Barabanshchikova and in marching order moved to the Olkhovka area. The 259th Rifle Division received the combat mission of capturing the Olkhovsky farms, which were located along the elevated ridge of the bank of the Kerest River. To the right and left of the Kerest River stretched huge swamps without bushes, covered with a thick layer of snow. The positions of the enemy, equipped on the farms, made it possible to have a good view and accurately fire at all the approaches to their defenses. The division, waging multi-day battles until March 10, did not achieve success and was transferred to a wooded area 2 kilometers south of Krasnaya Gorka.

Instead of the 267th and 259th divisions that left the 52nd Army, the 65th Rifle Division of Colonel P.K. arrived from the 4th Army. Koshevoy. The division took up defensive positions along the northern outskirts of Lyubtsy to the Polist River, covering the neck of the breakthrough from enemy attacks from Zemtitsa.

Bearing in mind the focus of the command and staff of the 2nd Shock Army only on the leadership of the troops advancing on the tip of the breakthrough, the commander of the front forces placed responsibility for maintaining the communications of the 2nd Shock Army and for expanding the mouth of the breakthrough to the north on the troops of the 59th Army, and to the south of the neck of the breakthrough on the troops of the 52nd Army. There. pp. 35-36.

An operational group of General I.T. was created in the 59th Army. Korovnikov to eliminate the node of resistance of the enemy defense in Spasskaya Polist and the entire ledge of his defense Tregubovo, Spasskaya Polist, Priyutino. This group included the 92nd, 11th, 327th, 374th and 378th rifle divisions.

From the end of January until March, the troops of the 59th Army tried to eliminate the enemy's defensive wedge up to 10 kilometers wide along the railway and highway from Tregubovo to Spasskaya Polist. Attacks on this wedge came from the south, east and west, but they could not break through the enemy's defensive positions and expand the neck of the breakthrough of the 2nd shock army. There. S. 36.

Troops of the operational group of troops of General I.T. Korovnikov, with continuous unsuccessful attacks of the enemy, they could not penetrate his defenses, but they suffered heavy losses and significantly lost their combat effectiveness. The commanders of units and formations, constantly organizing attacks, even gathered guards for them, could not devote the necessary attention, forces and means to create defensive structures on the captured lines and to re-equip the enemy's defensive structures. The commanders of all levels of the troops of the operational group of General I.T. Korovnikova, who were constantly urged to organize attacks, did not focus on the possibilities of the enemy's counterattack and did not prepare to repel them. There were no reserves, both in the operational group itself and in the formations. The 52nd Army also conducted continuous unsuccessful attacks in order to expand the neck of the breakthrough, using all its capabilities and did not erect defensive structures. The army did not have a reserve. Korovnikov I.T. On three fronts. M., 1974.

The 92nd Rifle Division, participating in the battles for breaking through the second defensive position of the enemy in the Mikhalevo, Ostrov sector, suffered heavy losses. To restore combat readiness, by order of the headquarters of the 59th Army, on March 2, the division transferred its combat sector to neighboring formations and moved to the replenishment area. Having made a 15-kilometer march, on March 3, the division concentrated in the area between Lyubino Pole and Myasny Bor in the center of the neck of the breakthrough of the 2nd shock army. The headquarters drew up plans for the defense and engineering equipment of the site, which provided for options for military operations, the duty of units, air defense, the adaptation of dugouts to defend a fragment of trenches, and the installation of barriers.

By order of the army headquarters, communication was established with the 65th Infantry Division and the headquarters of the 52nd Army for cooperation in the defense of the neck of the breakthrough.

During March 5 and 6, the division received 3,521 reinforcements, which were distributed among the divisions; on March 6, the division received news from the headquarters of the 59th Army that the division was transferred to the front reserve. By order of the front headquarters, on the night of March 7, the division left its area with the expectation of concentrating in the Ogoreli area by the morning of March 8 and becoming part of the 2nd Shock Army. On March 8, at a day trip in Ogoreli, an order was received from the headquarters of the 2nd Shock Army by the morning of March 10, the division to concentrate in the Chervino, Tigoda area. Along the route of movement, the division passed at a slow pace along virgin snow, while from Myasny Bor to Ogoreli the march was made along the cleared army road without delay. Luban offensive operation. January-June 1942: Sat. SPb., 1994. S. 37.

At the headquarters of the front and the army, it became clear that the troops of the army, greatly stretched along the front, having suffered heavy losses in offensive battles, not provided with a regular supply of ammunition, food and fodder, unprotected from enemy aircraft, could not attack.

The front did not have its own reserves, and the remaining three armies of the front transferred a significant part of their formations and the further transfer of their formations to the 2nd Shock Army can only be when a decision is made on the passive actions of these armies.

On February 15, the front commander clarified the task of the 2nd Shock Army and demanded a quick advance of its units to the west towards Lyuban, including the 13th Cavalry Corps was to advance in the direction of Ushaki for a quick exit to the Moscow-Leningrad railway. The operational group of General Privalov, having eliminated the enemy in Ruchy and Chervinskaya Luka, was supposed to go to the railway in the Pomeranian region. The task force of General Andreev was given the task of firmly holding Olkhovka.

Unfortunately, both the corps and the Privalov task force did not succeed and remained at their original lines.

Commander of the 2nd Shock Army, General N.K. Klykov reported to the front commander, General K.A. Meretskov: “In my sector, enemy aircraft dominate the air all the time and paralyze the actions of the troops. The road network is in poor condition, there is no one to keep it in a passable state. Due to the lack of a sufficient number of vehicles, the delivery of fodder, food, fuel and ammunition is far from meeting the existing needs. To develop a successful offensive, the army needs three fresh divisions, a rocket launcher division, at least two motor battalions, at least three road-building battalions, at least fifteen fuel trucks, hay, replenish the horse train and cover the army from the air. The second shock in the battle for Leningrad: Sat. L., 1983. S. 16.

To reinforce the group of General Privalov, advancing in the direction of Chervinskaya Luka, Lyuban, the 46th Infantry Division of General A.K. was transferred from the 52nd Army. Okulich and from the group of S.V. Roginsky 22nd Infantry Brigade Colonel F.K. Pugachev.

The 80th Cavalry Division of Colonel L.A. was transferred to the 13th Cavalry Corps from the 4th Army. Slanov and from the reserve of the front, the replenished 327th Rifle Division of Colonel I.M. Antyufeev. The commander of the front ordered: "The 80th cavalry division, in cooperation with the 327th rifle division, strike in the direction of Krasnaya Gorka, Kirkovo, go to the Lyuban region, cutting off the railway and highway Chudovo - Leningrad." Luban offensive operation. January-June 1942: Sat. SPb., 1994. S. 37. After the capture of Krasnaya Gorka, the 46th Rifle Division and the 22nd Separate Rifle Brigade were introduced into the breakthrough to enter the Lyuban region.

On February 16, the 80th Cavalry Division approached the combat area and began clearing the forest of small enemy groups. On February 18, the commander of the 1st squadron of the 205th cavalry regiment, Lieutenant Zhelobov, reconnoitred a weak spot in the enemy’s defense, with a dashing attack knocked the Germans off the embankment of the railway under construction and, pursuing them, broke into Krasnaya Gorka. The main forces of the regiment approached and secured the positions occupied by the squadron.

The capture of Krasnaya Gorka opened the way to Lyuban. It was necessary to urgently build on the success achieved, but the formations allocated by the front were still on the way.

Only on February 23 did the 46th Infantry Division reach Krasnaya Gorka and take over the line of defense from the cavalrymen. The 80th Cavalry Division began moving towards Lyuban and, having passed during the night along the river. Sichev about

15 kilometers, and by the morning of February 24 concentrated in the forests two kilometers northwest of Kirkovo. Only 6 kilometers remained to Lyuban ... But there were no additional forces. The 327th Rifle Division had only just approached Ogoreli, and it was still necessary to march 25 kilometers to Krasnaya Gorka, of which 10 kilometers were off-road, which the division overcame at a speed of 2 kilometers per hour with great effort. By the end of February 26, the advanced 1100th rifle regiment of the 327th rifle division arrived at the command post of the 13th cavalry corps in the forest 5-6 kilometers south of Krasnaya Gorka.

By order of the commander of the 13th cavalry corps, an advanced detachment of the corps was formed as part of the 80th cavalry division, the 1100th rifle regiment and two tank companies with the task of capturing Lyuban. While advancing, the forward detachment on the outskirts of Lyuban was met with the most severe artillery fire, air bombing and tank counterattack of the enemy and was driven back into the forest to its original position in the Kirkovo area, where it continued to be under artillery fire and bombing. There. pp. 37-38.

The main forces of the cavalry and the 327th division could not immediately enter the gap near Krasnaya Gorka due to continuous air bombing during daylight hours. The cavalrymen and the rifle division suffered heavy losses in personnel, and especially in the cavalry. There was nothing to pull artillery pieces and wagons. This led to a delay in the exit of the main forces for several hours.

The enemy, using this delay, pushed back the small units of the 46th Infantry Division from Krasnaya Gorka and on February 27 closed the breach. The forward detachment was surrounded without ammunition, food and fodder. The existing radio stations did not provide communication due to low power.

The command of the 2nd Shock Army took all measures to again break through the enemy defenses in the area of ​​Krasnaya Gorka and restore contact with the forward detachment. The 22nd rifle brigade and the 166th separate tank battalion were brought up to reinforce the 327th division. But all the attacks undertaken by the enemy positions were unsuccessful. The forward detachment was forced to destroy all heavy weapons and withdraw from the encirclement on the night of March 8-9.

The exit was organized 3-4 kilometers west of Krasnaya Gorka.

The breakthrough was carried out by two parallel groups: the 200th cavalry regiment and the reinforced battalion of the 1100th regiment with a surprise attack from the rear. The rest of the regiments of the 80th Cavalry Division, and the battalions of the 1110th Regiment with personal small arms, entered the breakthrough.

The fighting in the Krasnaya Gorka area, now weakening, now intensifying, continued until March 10, attracting significant forces of the 2nd Shock Army, but they did not bring success. The defensive position of the enemy, equipped along the embankment of the railway under construction for a breakthrough, required appropriate aviation, artillery and tank forces and a large number ammunition. The embankment, rising above the surrounding area, was equipped with artillery and machine-gun bunkers, dug-in tanks and shelters for personnel. In front of the embankment, two snow-and-ice ramparts with machine-gun nests were arranged, covering barbed wire and minefields with their fire. Behind the embankment, a road was laid from prefabricated metal elements of the airfield pavement, which ensured the maneuver of enemy forces and means, inaccessible to our observation.

General Privalov's group could not take Krivino, Ruchi, or Chervinskaya Luka. In search of a solution to the problem of reaching Lyuban, General Privalov found an opportunity, using the successful advance of the 80th Cavalry Division, to send the 191st Infantry Division behind enemy lines to capture the village and the Pomerania railway station

Moscow - Leningrad, 5 kilometers southeast of Lyuban. The 191st division, consisting of special units, the 546th and 552nd rifle regiments, without artillery, mortars and carts, was supposed to cross the front line behind enemy lines and, moving through the forest, go to Pomeranie station and capture the village and station with a night attack, organize a strong all-round defense and prevent enemy movement along the highway and the Chudovo-Leningrad railway. There. S. 39.

The division (without the 559th rifle and 484th artillery regiments, the 8th anti-tank destroyer battalion and the 15th medical battalion) withdrew from the front road section and on February 20 concentrated in the forest 1.5 kilometers northwest of the village of Dubove . Here the task was set and crackers were given out in 5 pieces and the same number of pieces of sugar. They carried 10 rounds of ammunition for a rifle, a disc for a light machine gun and a machine gun, and two hand grenades. The commandant's company had 10 anti-tank grenades. There was only one radio station. General Privalov promised to deliver ammunition and food to Pomerania with the help of aircraft. Konyaev N. Two faces of General Vlasov. M., 2003. S. 63.

At night, the division moved to the front line between the strongholds of the German defense, crossed the Apraksin Bor - Lyuban road and went deep into an old pine forest. After a rest on the night of February 22, the division moved to Pomerania, but when leaving the forest to a swampy area with rare stunted pines, an enemy “frame” reconnaissance aircraft was discovered, which patrolled over the forest in the morning. After 15 minutes, enemy artillery began to intensively fire at the area of ​​woodlands. The shelling caused heavy losses in killed and wounded. The radio operator was killed and the only radio station was destroyed. The division lost contact with our troops.

The division withdrew into the forest. On the fifth day, the command decided to go out to our troops in three groups: the headquarters of the division with special units, the 546th and 552nd regiments. Everyone independently. The chief of staff of the regiment, Mesnyaev, withdrew the men of his regiment that same night, and without loss. In the morning, the division headquarters approached the front line at the junction of the 559th Infantry Regiment with its neighbor south of Dubovoye towards Apraksin Bor. They settled in free dugouts and trenches of the enemy's second line of defense in readiness to break through to their own with the onset of darkness. But about an hour before dark, the division headquarters was covered with a volley of Katyushas and a battery of 76-mm guns. There were no casualties, but it was impossible to leave. The headquarters went deep into the forest to the northeast, where it wandered for 6 days. The commander of the commandant's company with five of his soldiers was ordered to cross the front line and inform General Privalov about the location of the division headquarters in order to organize its withdrawal. The group of the commandant's company crossed the front line, but General Ivanov, who replaced General Privalov, did not take measures to withdraw the division headquarters. A new division commander N.P. was appointed. Korkin, chief of staff - Major Arzumanov, who commanded the 559th Infantry Regiment.

The personnel of the command and headquarters of the division is still on the lists of the missing.

At the end of February, the front command turned to headquarters with a proposal to regroup within the armies and the front in order to free up forces to reinforce the troops of the 2nd Shock Army advancing on Lyuban and the troops of the 59th Army blocking the Chudovo-Novgorod highway and railroad. First of all, it was necessary to put in order the divisions advancing on Lyuban, replenishing them with personnel, weapons and ammunition, reinforcing the artillery grouping, and putting the roads in order. Battle of Leningrad 1941-1944: Sat. St. Petersburg, 1995, p. 111.

On February 26, the Headquarters responded to these proposals that it did not object to the proposed strengthening of the 2nd Shock and 59th armies, but spoke out against putting the advancing divisions in order, since for this it was necessary to suspend attacks for some time. The Headquarters categorically demanded that the Military Council of the front in no case stop the offensive operations of the 2nd Shock and 59th armies in the Luban and Chudov directions in anticipation of their strengthening, but, on the contrary, reach the Lyuban-Chudovo railway before March 1.

To assist in the capture of Lyuban, the Headquarters indicated to the Leningrad Front that the forces of the 54th Army would strike no later than March 1 against the troops of the 2nd Shock Army, so that then, by the efforts of the troops of two fronts, no later than March 5, liquidate the Luban-Chudov grouping of the enemy and liberate section of the railway Lyuban - Chudovo. Luban offensive operation. January-June 1942: Sat. SPb., 1994. S. 41.

In pursuance of this instruction, a strike force was created in the 2nd Shock Army, which included the formations of the cavalry corps and the group of General Privalov already operating at the edge of the offensive wedge. The strike force of the 59th Army, also as part of already operating formations, aimed at intercepting the highway and the Chudovo-Novgorod railway north of Spasskaya Polist.

Fulfilling the directive of the front to intercept the Chudovo-Novgorod highway and railway north of Spasskaya Polist, the commander of the 59th Army ordered on March 1 to break through the enemy defenses north of Tregubovo from the west from the area northwest of the village of Glushila with the forces of the 378th Infantry Division with the reinforced regiment 111- th Infantry Division and from the east, between Mal. Opochivalovo and Tregubovo by the forces of the 377th Infantry Division with a reinforced regiment of the 92nd Infantry Division. The main forces of the 111th Rifle Division from the west, the 92nd Rifle Division from the east to pin down the enemy south of Tregubovo. Korovnikov I.T. On three fronts. M., 1974. S. 23.

The 378th Rifle Division, leaving the 1256th Rifle and 944th Artillery Regiments in a defensive position southwest of Mostka, on February 28 went along the route east of the Gazhya Sopka swamp to the starting area for the offensive northwest of the village of Glushitsa. For the march of the division, it was necessary to continue the 15-kilometer column path through a wooded and swampy area with deep snow cover at 35 ° frost, as a result of which the division only reached the given area on March 11, having crossed the enemy’s road between his strongholds of the village of Sennaya Kerest and the village of Glushila. The surprise factor of the division's entry into the offensive area was lost.

The enemy quickly threw in additional forces and stopped the advance of the division to the intended area for a breakthrough. Defending on the western bank of the river. The regiment of the 111th Rifle Division, which had come under operational control of the 378th Rifle Division, was jamming, and could not proceed to active operations on its own.

The 377th Rifle Division, reinforced by the 317th Regiment of the 92nd Rifle Division, on March 1 went on the offensive from the east, north and south of Tregubovo, but was unable to break through the enemy defenses and did not reach the connection with the 378th Rifle Division. There. S. 29.

On March 24, the enemy intercepted the column path of the 378th Infantry Division in the area of ​​​​the intersection with the road of the village of Sennaya Kerest - the village of Glushila and firmly blocked the division's communication with the rear. The division was surrounded in the area north of the Skrebelsky stream, west of the Glushila and Polist rivers. With continuous counterattacks under heavy artillery fire and frequent air bombardments, the enemy forced the division to take up an all-round defense in a small swampy forest area 1.5x2.5 km in size. The swampy terrain did not give the soldiers the opportunity to burrow into the ground; shelters were built from wood, poles, and peat. Inevitably, the division suffered heavy losses in personnel and weapons from heavy artillery fire and air bombing. There. S. 31.

On April 24, units of the division, with the permission of the army command, began to exit the encirclement through the Skrebelsky stream, but the enemy firmly held the defense along the road from the village of Sennaya Kerest - the village of Glushila and blocked the exit to the south. On the night of April 25, the division, having a regiment of the 111th Infantry Division in the center of the breakthrough, fought its way to the south-west in the direction of Gazhya Sopka. Having overcome 8 km through the swamp, the remnants of the division went to the Olkhovsky farms to the location of the troops of the 2nd Shock Army.

The strike force of the 4th Army was to act towards the 2nd Shock Army in the direction of Babino. The attacks undertaken by the enemy positions by heavily weakened troops without the support of tanks, artillery and aviation did not bring the expected result.

For personal acquaintance with the situation, the front commander, General K.A. Meretskov with the commander of the 2nd Shock Army, General N.K. Klykov visited the 327th and 46th rifle divisions, as well as the cavalry corps. Konyaev N. Two faces of General Vlasov. M., 2003. S. 77.

The commanders and soldiers with whom the generals met complained about the very weak support of our aviation, the lack of anti-aircraft defenses, while the enemy aircraft continuously fired and bombed our battle formations, pressed the attackers to the ground and forbade any movement on the battlefield and on the roads . Especially heavy losses were suffered by cavalrymen, each of their movements was accompanied by an immediate impact of enemy aircraft. It was impossible to hide the horse train even in the forests.

Our artillery, having a quantitative and qualitative advantage over enemy artillery, was not provided with shells.

Due to the lack of tanks, infantry attacks were not accompanied by close support tanks, as a result of which the infantry suffered heavy losses from machine-gun and mortar fire from undestroyed firing structures and unsuppressed enemy firing positions.

The military headquarters, having no stable connection with the units, reacted untimely to events, not knowing the actual situation, and often gave incorrect information to higher authorities. The commander of the Volkhov Front established the absence of a clear and firm leadership of the troops. “I had to take extreme measures. On the proposal of the Military Council of the front, the Headquarters removed General A.V. Vizzhilin and the head of the operational department, Colonel N.P. Pakhomov. Accordingly, Colonel P.S. was appointed to their positions. Vinogradov and brigade commander I.N. Burenin. Luban offensive operation. January-June 1942: Sat. SPb., 1994. S. 44.

General P.F. Alferyev was appointed deputy commander of the army, and divisional commissar Zuev I.V. was appointed a member of the Military Council of the army.

On February 28, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command in its directive clarified the tasks of the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts, the 2nd Shock and 54th armies of which were to advance towards each other and unite in Lyuban with the aim of encircling and destroying the Luban-Chudov enemy grouping, and after completing this the task of advancing on Tosno and Siverskaya in order to eliminate the Mginsky group and lift the blockade of Leningrad.

The directive indicated the creation of shock groups in each army: in the 2nd Shock Army - from five rifle divisions, four rifle brigades and one cavalry division; in the 59th Army - from three rifle divisions and in the 4th Army - from two rifle divisions. There. S. 44.

On March 9, K.E. arrived at the front headquarters. Voroshilov, G.M. Malenkov, Deputy Commander of the Air Force of the Red Army, General Novikov A.A., as well as the newly appointed Deputy Commander of the Volkhov Front, General Vlasov A.A. the Leningrad Front with the aim of encircling and destroying the Chudovskaya enemy grouping. Konyaev N. Two faces of General Vlasov. M., 2003. S. 75.

Fulfilling the directive of the front, the commander of the 2nd Shock created on March 10 an attack group from the 92nd rifle division with the 24th rifle brigade, the 46th rifle division with the 53rd rifle brigade, the 327th rifle division with the 58th rifle and 7th Guards Tank Brigade, 259th and 382nd Rifle Divisions, 59th Rifle Brigade and 80th Cavalry Division. There. pp. 75-76.

On the morning of March 11, the shock group went on the offensive against the defensive positions of the Germans at the line of Chervinskaya Luka, Dubovik, Cow Creek, Krasnaya Gorka, Verkhovye, st. Etino with the aim of capturing Lyubanyo and intercepting sections of the Chudovo-Leningrad highway and railway to encircle the enemy's Chudovo grouping.

The 92nd Rifle Division, together with the 24th Rifle Brigade, only arrived on March 10 in the area of ​​​​concentration, located 6-8 kilometers from the starting position, and the 259th Rifle Division, 5-6 kilometers away, so the time to choose the routes of movement and carry out there was no reconnaissance of the area and no assignment of tasks to the commanders of units and subunits. In addition, the divisions did not receive information about the enemy, and there was no time for reconnaissance. The divisions of the shock group were not reinforced by artillery. There was less than one round of ammunition. Aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery cover for combat formations was not organized.

The divisions had offensive lines of 7-10 kilometers to continuous defensive positions with an artillery density of 8-10 barrels per kilometer of front, while in the 7-kilometer offensive zone of the 92nd division, the enemy had an infantry regiment in position, about 70 light and 30 heavy machine guns, 15 mortars, 20 separate guns, 10 tanks and was supported by four artillery batteries.

It is not surprising that as a result of many days of fighting, the 24th Rifle Brigade with the 93rd Separate Ski Battalion occupied the village of Dubovo, the 92nd Rifle Division only on March 17 captured the enemy’s resistance center in the village of Koroviy Ruchey and the 327th Rifle Division, jointly with 58 On March 15, the th rifle and 7th guards tank brigades captured the knot of resistance - Krasnaya Gorka. The rest of the formations were not successful and from March 15 to 20 they went on the defensive. The enemy began to probe for weaknesses in our defense with counterattacks.

The command of the front and the armies, completely absorbed in the continuous offensive operations of the troops, overlooked the measures being prepared by the enemy to eliminate the neck of the breakthrough.

Unexpectedly, on March 15, the enemy went on the offensive, inflicting counter blows of his troops from the Spasskaya Polist and Zemtitsa regions on Lyubino Pole. The attacks of his infantry with tanks were accompanied by massive air bombardments and artillery fire.

A critical situation immediately arose on the northern face of the mouth of the breakthrough. Parts of the 374th Rifle Division of Colonel Vitoshkin A.D., having fallen under strong air and artillery attacks, while suffering significant losses in people and equipment, could not hold back the onslaught of enemy tanks and infantry and retreated to Mostki.

To hold positions north of Mostkov, to reinforce the 374th division, a fighter detachment of the front was urgently advanced, then the 1238th rifle regiment of the 372nd rifle division. By joint efforts, the advance of the enemy to the south was stopped. The second shock in the battle for Leningrad: Sat. L., 1983. S. 83.

On the same day, on the southern face of the neck of the breakthrough, the enemy attacked the combat formations of the 65th Infantry Division of Colonel P.Koshevoy with infantry with tanks.

The division withstood aerial bombing and artillery fire and was able to repel attacks by infantry with tanks.

The 1347th Rifle Regiment of the 225th Rifle Division, adjacent to the 65th Division, also staunchly and bravely repelled enemy attacks.

The assessments of the situation that had arisen and the enemy's capabilities were recognized by the General Staff as dangerous and requiring immediate measures to be taken to counter the enemy offensive. The Stavka, believing that the front, with the available forces and means, can not only allow the interception of communications of the 2nd shock army, but also completely destroy the counter-attacking units of the enemy, without stopping the offensive operation to encircle and defeat his Chudovskaya group, which was indicated in the Stavka directive of March 17 1942.

The headquarters offered General Meretskov K.A. take the operation to eliminate the enemy's counterattack into their own hands. To accomplish this task, it was allowed to transfer the 376th Infantry Division from the 4th Army to the Myasny Bor area.

General Meretskov K.A. I had a clear idea of ​​what threatens the enemy’s exit on the communications of the 2nd Shock Army, having received a report about the enemy’s counterattack on the flanks of the breakthrough, he immediately went to the command post of the 52nd, then the 59th army. On the foreseeable battlefield, the enemy continuously attacked our units with infantry and tanks on the northern and southern faces of the mouth of the breakthrough. Enemy aircraft dominated the battlefield, fiercely bombing and firing at the battle formations of our troops. The troops hardly held back the attacking infantry and tanks of the enemy, but there were no reserves in the armies and the army commanders could not reinforce the defending troops by introducing reserves to defeat the enemy, who had struck at the neck of the breakthrough, reserves were needed. Therefore, as soon as the Headquarters allowed the 376th division to be taken from the 4th Army, General Meretskov K.A. throws it to the neck of the breakthrough, at the same time instructs the commander of the 2nd Shock to prepare from the west an attack on the enemy in the neck by the forces of the 58th rifle and 7th guards tank brigades, transferring them from near Krasnaya Gorka to the Novaya Keresti area. Konyaev N. Two faces of General Vlasov. M., 2003. S. 78.

The enemy, realizing that the attacks of his troops along the highway and railway are not successful, transfers the direction of the main attack to the area between the Polist and Glushitsa rivers. Having quickly concentrated infantry with tanks here with continuous support from aviation and artillery, the enemy breaks through the front of our defending units on the northern and southern faces of the mouth of the breakthrough, first establishing his front along the river. Polist, and then a few days later and along the river. Hlushice. The neck of our breakthrough with the communications of the 2nd Shock Army was blocked. The delivery of food, fodder and ammunition has stopped, without which the army cannot live and fight.

The front commander demanded that the army commanders of the 52nd and 59th armies clear the neck of the breakthrough from the enemy and restore the communications of the 2nd Shock Army.

General Yakovlev threw the army junior lieutenant courses into battle. The cadets with an energetic jerk, following the explosions of their army artillery, passed the enemy's defenses on the river. Polist and r. Glushitsa, joined with units of the 305th Infantry Division, defending on the western bank of the river. Glushica, but, having suffered losses, could not consolidate the success achieved. The enemy closed the gap again.

On March 21, the 376th Rifle Division of Lieutenant Colonel D. Ugorich approached. Reinforced by the 193rd tank battalion, the division attacked the enemy on March 23 in the direction of the Myasnoy Bor - Novaya Kerest road. The 1248th rifle regiment of the division followed two KV tanks and four T-34s in a chain and successfully advanced towards the river. Polist. But then the regiment was subjected to massive attacks by enemy aircraft and artillery and retreated to their original positions. There. S. 79.

On March 25, the 376th Rifle Division, reinforced by cadets of junior lieutenant courses of the 59th Army and a company of submachine gunners, supported by army artillery and three divisions of guards mortars, again went on the offensive in the same direction. To the right in the direction of Lyubino Pole, Novaya Kerest, the 372nd Rifle Division of Lieutenant Colonel D.S. Sorokin was advancing, to the left - the 305th Rifle Division of Colonel D.I. Barabanshchikov. and the 65th Infantry Division of Colonel Koshevoy P.K. The enemy was thrown back to the north and south of the Myasnoy Bor - Novaya Kerest road. The enemy introduced new forces and the struggle for communications of the 2nd shock army resumed again with varying success.

On March 26, the 24th Rifle and 7th Guards Tank Brigades approached, which immediately attacked the enemy and on March 27 connected with the 376th Rifle Division, which was advancing from the east.

The corridor cut along the road Myasnoy Bor - Novaya Kerest was only 600-700 meters wide and was shot through by all types of weapons. With great risk, a convoy of 30 vehicles, led by the commander of the 868th motor transport battalion, Captain Vvedensky V.G., went with food, fodder and ammunition for the 2nd shock army.

In order to expand the corridor on the morning of March 28, the 376th and 372nd rifle divisions from the east, and the 58th rifle and 7th guards tank brigades from the west resumed the offensive and expanded the corridor to 2 kilometers.

The fighting for the corridor did not subside for a single day. Attacks were replaced by counterattacks, but the corridor remained.

Starting from the first days of April, the fierce fighting in the corridor began to weaken, and during April and the first ten days of May, the northern and southern faces of the mouth of the breakthrough remained unchanged. The enemy switched to systematic air bombardment and artillery shelling of the only communications of the 2nd shock army, trying to stop the supply of food, fodder and ammunition, as well as the evacuation of the wounded. Despite the incredibly difficult conditions of transportation, the traffic flow was not interrupted.

The only road, and even being under the constant influence of bombing and artillery shelling, of course, could not even provide for the primary needs of the army. The approaching spring thaw jeopardized the movement of vehicles along the arranged winter road.

Here I would like to turn to the memoirs of the commissar of the 280th autobattalion L.K. Guyvman. He writes that the head of the rear of the Volkhov Front, General Anisimov, instructing the officers, said that if eighty out of two hundred vehicles arrive in the 2nd shock army - excellent. Sixty is good. Fifty is satisfactory. There. P. 74. That is, 75 percent losses were considered satisfactory. But after all, this is no longer the supply of the shock army. This is a breakthrough in the shock army.

In this regard, the Military Council of the 2nd Shock Army on April 16, 1942 discussed the problems of supplying the army and decided to build a narrow-gauge railway Myasnoy Bor - Novaya Kerest. The construction of the road was carried out day and night, despite the continuous bombing and shelling. Two weeks after the start of construction, platforms with food and ammunition went along the road, which were moved manually. On-duty units of builders restored the destroyed sections of the road by air bombing or artillery shelling.

A crossing was built in the Shevelevo area, and a floating bridge was built in Selishchi. The sappers of the 1243rd, 1244th and 1246th sapper battalions and the 34th bridge-pontoon battalion worked around the clock.

The enemy’s entry into the communications of the 2nd Shock Army and the approach of spring, with the violation of all winter roads, with floods in a wooded and swampy area with an abundance of rivers, streams and swampy lowlands, could not help but make the front command seriously think about the state of affairs at the front, how to complete the operation that had begun . As General K.A. Meretskov: “Three options for solving the problem arose: the first was to ask the Headquarters to strengthen the front with one army and, before the mudslide set in, solve the task; the second is to withdraw the 2nd Shock Army from the area occupied by it and, under favorable conditions, look for solutions to the operational problem in another direction; the third - to go over to a tough defense on the lines reached, wait out the mudslide, and then, having accumulated strength, resume the offensive.

We stuck with the first option. It made it possible to use the results already achieved and complete the operation before the end of the winter company. The Headquarters did not object to him either. Luban offensive operation. January-June 1942: Sat. SPb., 1994. S. 49.

“... The front command began preparing a new offensive against Lyuban. As a first step, by the decision of the Headquarters, we began the formation of the 6th Guards Rifle Corps on the basis of the 4th Guards Rifle Division, which had been withdrawn to the reserve of the front. Other formations and units came from the Stavka reserve. The corps was intended to reinforce the 2nd shock army. In terms of the number of troops and weapons, it was stronger than the 2nd shock army in its original composition.

The Volkhov Front was transformed by the decision of the Headquarters into the Volkhov Operational Group of the Leningrad Front. There. S. 49.

Chapter III . Vlasov's appointment

So, spring 1942, April. The Luban offensive operation has been going on for the fourth month already. The 2nd Shock Army is in a critical situation. This situation is critical not only in terms of the operational situation, but also in terms of providing the army with ammunition and food, terrible sanitary conditions for soldiers and officers. According to Ivan Dmitrievich Nikonov, lieutenant of the rifle regiment of the 382nd rifle division, people were swollen from hunger, all clothes were completely covered with lice and nits, all horses had long been eaten along with bones and skin. The soldiers ate literally everything, including grass and worms. Among the officers, cases of suicide have become more frequent. Konyaev N. Two faces of General Vlasov. M., 2003. S. 81-84. Meanwhile, orders were constantly coming from the Headquarters to continue the offensive ...

In early April, Vlasov, as deputy front commander, was sent by Meretskov to the 2nd Shock Army at the head of a special commission of the Volkhov Front.

“For three days the members of the commission talked with commanders of all ranks, with political workers, with fighters.” Ibid. S. 76., and on April 8, the act of the commission was read out, and by the evening she left the army.

All the next day, as colleagues recall, Commander Klykov did nothing, only sorted through the contents in the drawers of his desktop.

The presentiment did not deceive the commander: a few days later he was removed from his post as commander.

These testimonies somehow completely disagree with the letter to Klykov and Zuev sent by Meretskov on April 9, 1942: “The operational situation of our armies creates a mortal threat to the enemy grouping of about 75 thousand - the threat of extermination of his troops. The battle for Lyuban is the battle for Leningrad.” There. S. 77.

However, it seems to me that the contradiction was generated not by the mistakes of the documentarians, but by the quirkiness of the headquarters intrigue, which Kirill Afanasyevich himself was then implementing.

We need to try to understand why this letter was sent at all.

It is easy to see that it is, as it were, copied from the message of Stalin, received by Meretskov himself before the start of the offensive. And, of course, Meretskov could not but understand what impression his letter would make on N.K. Klykov.

Perhaps, on April 9, the shock army was still able to break out of the encirclement, but sending it on the offensive to surround the 75,000-strong German group was pure madness.

Meretskov could not but understand this. N.K. himself understood this. Klykov. The reaction of General Klykov is known.

Having received Meretskov's message, he immediately fell ill, and he was taken by plane to the rear: “In April 1942, I became seriously ill. I had to go to the hospital. A new commander was appointed in my place ”The second shock in the battle for Leningrad: Sat. L., 1983. S. 20. - this is how N.K. Klykov.

But here the question arises: isn’t this what Kirill Afanasyevich was striving for? Isn't his plan to "get sick" N.K. Klykova integral part intrigue directed against Vlasov?

Meretskov, of course, wanted to remove his deputy and possible successor as front commander. And, of course, when the opportunity presented itself to lock up a dangerous competitor in a surrounded army, far from the means of communication with the Headquarters, Meretskov did not miss him.

Moreover, the reason for the removal of Vlasov was quite valid - the shock army was in a critical situation, and the presence of the deputy commander there could be explained by this critical situation.

Meretskov carried out his plan to isolate Vlasov with his characteristic General Staff brilliance. Some researchers believe that Vlasov returned on April 8 with the commission to the headquarters of the front. Meanwhile, a tape of the Bodo apparatus has been preserved, which recorded Meretskov’s negotiations with members of the Military Council of the 2nd Shock Army, which testifies to something else.

Who do you nominate as a candidate for the post of commander? asked Meretskov.

“Member of the Military Council Zuev: We have no candidates for this position. I consider it necessary to report to you on the expediency of appointing Lieutenant General Vlasov as commander of the army.

Vlasov: The temporary execution of the post of commander of the army must be entrusted to the chief of staff of the army, Colonel Vinogradov.

Meretskov and Zaporozhets (to Vlasov): We consider Zuev's proposal correct. How do you, comrade Vlasov, feel about this proposal?

Vlasov: I think, judging by the situation, that, apparently, I will have to stay longer in this army. As for the appointment to a permanent position, if it is your decision, I will, of course, carry it out.

Meretskov: Well, after our conversation, an order will follow. Konyaev N. Two faces of General Vlasov. M., 2003. S. 77-78.

Pushing his competitor into the dying, surrounded army, K.A. Meretskov went to a serious violation of the order. Usually the appointment of a new commander took place in the presence of a representative of the Headquarters. The procedure is bureaucratic, but necessary.

The headquarters was supposed to represent which army the new commander would accept. Therefore, the order to appoint Vlasov as commander of the 2nd Shock Army never followed. Vlasov remained deputy front commander.

What such an appointment meant for Vlasov is also clear. He found himself in an army unable to fight, and he himself could neither call for additional reserves, as was usually done upon appointment, nor simply explain to the representative of the Headquarters that he was already like that and accepted the army.

It should be recalled that according to the reports of K.A. Meretskova, the 2nd Shock Army remained combat-ready, its supply was normal, and it was ready to continue the offensive on Lyuban ...

Vlasov’s former colleague in the 4th Mechanized Corps (Vlasov commanded this corps at the beginning of the war), Brigadier Commissar Zuev, who so imprudently “pleased” Vlasov with his current appointment, probably did not understand the tragedy of the situation both for the encircled army and for Vlasov himself, but Vlasov could not understand this. It was impossible to refuse the appointment, but Vlasov also could not do anything to save the army.

Carried away by the implementation of the combination associated with the elimination of his possible successor, Meretskov overlooked the danger that crept up from a completely different side.

General M.S. Khozin carried out a brilliant staff intrigue in Moscow. Reporting to Headquarters that the Luban operation had failed due to the lack of a unified command of the troops, he proposed to unite the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts, placing them in command of him, Khozin.

April 21, 1942 Battle of Leningrad 1941-1944: Sat. SPb, 1995. S. 117. This question was submitted to a meeting with I.V. Stalin. The meeting attended by V.M. Molotov, G.M. Malenkov, L.P. Beria, B.M. Shaposhnikov, A.M. Vasilevsky, P.I. Bodin, G.K. Zhukov, A.A. Novikov, N.G. Kuznetsov, S.I. Budyonny and M.S. Khozin, lasted seven hours.

Undoubtedly, M.S. Khozin himself understood how difficult it was to command nine armies, three separate corps and two groups of troops, divided by the territory occupied by the enemy.

But after all not for this purpose association was conceived.

Already arrived in Leningrad L.A. Govorov, and M.S. Khozin, who found himself in almost the same situation as K.A. Meretskov, the position, it was necessary to take care of creating for himself a worthy general's position.

This is what was done.

April 23, by decision of the Stavka, the Volkhov Front was transformed into the Volkhov Front special group Leningrad front. There. P. 118. Govorov remained in Leningrad, and Khozin went to command the armies of K.A. Meretskova.

Meretskov found out about this when General M.S. Khozin appeared at the front headquarters with the Headquarters directive in his pocket.

Meretskov, trying to save the front, reported to Headquarters about the need to bring the 6th Guards Rifle Corps into the breakthrough area - he had no success. Kirill Afanasyevich was coldly announced that the fate of the 2nd Shock Army should not worry him, since he was appointed deputy commander of the Southwestern Front. The new appointment for Meretskov was a demotion, and he was very worried.

And for the fate of Andrei Andreevich Vlasov, the reorganization of the fronts turned into a disaster.

The early spring of 1942, more reliable than the German divisions, locked the 2nd Shock in the swamps, and by the end of April its fate was irrevocably determined.

Frostbitten, starving, lice-ridden fighters spent weeks and months in swampy swamps, and only death could save them from torment.

Having reported to the Headquarters that the army's communications had been restored, K.A. Meretskov deceived Moscow. The supply of the 2nd shock did not improve, and already from mid-April, less than half of the norm was given out there, while there were no other products at all.

The shortage in divisions reached seventy percent. Konyaev N. Two faces of General Vlasov. M., 2003. S. 91.

Artillery was deprived of shells.

The most absurd thing is that Vlasov now formally did not have the right to bother about reinforcements and improving supplies. The headquarters never approved the general as commander of the 2nd Shock Army, and the post of deputy front commander disappeared along with the front itself.

Only victory could bring Vlasov out of the state of "forgetfulness", but the 2nd Shock was not able to win any, even imaginary victories.

"Stalin's commander" (this was the name of the book about Andrei Andreyevich, which Vlasov's personal biographer, Major K. Tokarev, had already written) turned out to be suspended in the air.

Vlasov was always lucky. He was lucky in China. Lucky during the big purges. Fabulous luck at the beginning of the war.

But phenomenal luck could no longer save him in the Second Shock Army, because the army itself was doomed.

“While at the Second Shock Army,” Major I. Kuzin said during interrogation, “Vlasov made it clear that he had a lot of weight, because he repeatedly said that he had a special assignment from Moscow and that he had a direct connection with Moscow. In the Second Shock Army, Vlasov was good friends with Zuev, a member of the Military Council, and Vinogradov, the chief of staff. With Zuev, they worked together before the war in the 4th building. In a conversation with Zuev and Vinogradov, Vlasov repeatedly said that the great strategists - this is him at the address of Comrade Meretskov - led the army to death. Vlasov addressed Meretskov as follows: the title is great, but the abilities ... - he kept silent further, but made it clear. Judging by Vlasov's conversation, he did not want to understand anyone and wanted to be the owner. Vlasov in the Second Shock Army did not like the head of the special department Shashkov. Vlasov expressed this to Zuev more than once, and once even ordered Shashkov to get out of the dugout ... ”Ibid. S. 88.

Vlasov's "biographer" Major K.A. Tokarev says that "Vlasov, without hesitation, hinted to us that in the event of a successful attack on Lyuban, Meretskov, as the former chief of the General Staff, would again be recalled to Headquarters, and he would remain in his place." There. S. 88.

Talking about the direct connection with Moscow, which he allegedly has, Vlasov, of course, was bluffing.

And he needed this bluff not so much to strengthen his authority - at the army headquarters, as we can see, Andrei Andreevich felt like a complete master, because he could speak openly about Meretskov’s military leadership talents, because he could expel the head of the Special Army Department from the dugout - but in order to convince himself.

The idea of ​​connection with Moscow becomes April days Vlasov is simply obsessive. Perhaps it seemed to Vlasov that his report to the Headquarters could change the situation, if not on the Volkhov front, then at least in his own destiny.

Perhaps he thought that in Moscow, having learned about the true state of affairs, they would take appropriate measures ...

Maybe he just wanted to remind himself...

Apparently, the implementation of the obsessive idea to establish a direct connection with the Headquarters through some influential patrons is partly connected with the business trip of Vlasov's adjutant, Major Kuzin, to Moscow.

All this suggests that Vlasov wanted, bypassing his immediate superiors, to convey to the Headquarters proposals related to the withdrawal of the 2nd Shock Army from the encirclement.

Perhaps, at that memorable meeting for Vlasov in the Kremlin on March 8, Stalin spoke about some reserves, about some, like near Moscow, fresh armies that would be used to liberate Leningrad, and now Vlasov proposed a plan for their use.

The goal was great. To liberate Leningrad, to save the city from starvation many hundreds of thousands of people.

A general who did this in January 1942 would have become a folk hero. But in January forty-second, for this, the commander had to be a folk hero.

Alas ... Neither Kirill Afanasyevich Meretskov, nor Mikhail Semenovich Khozin, nor Andrei Andreevich Vlasov himself was clearly suitable for this role. They were unable to rise above the concerns of their own careers, and as a result, what happened to them always happens to people who are placed on the crest of events and are not able to turn the tide.

On April 30, M.S. Khozin gave an order according to which the 59th Army was to drive the Germans out of the Spasskaya Polist area. After that, it was necessary to "prepare the 4th Guards and 372nd Rifle Divisions, as well as the 7th Separate Brigade, for withdrawal to the front reserve." There. S. 91.

Everything - what and where to withdraw - was provided for in the directive, but there was a small overlap - on the day this order was issued, the Germans began to liquidate the encircled 2nd Shock Army.

In early May, the Germans managed to break through the defenses along the road from Olkhovka to Spasskaya Polist. From the north they wedged almost to Myasny Bor. Already completely deprived of supplies, the soldiers of the 2nd Shock Army continued to fight.

“The assessment of the area by this time was very difficult ... All winter roads were flooded with water, impassable for horse-drawn vehicles and vehicles ... communications during this period of mudslides and enemy artillery fire were completely closed. The passage was at times only accessible to individuals.” There. S. 92.

This quote is taken from a memorandum to the Military Council of the Volkhov Front dated June 26, 1942 by Major General Afanasyev. It is clear that a memorandum is not a genre where stylistics is honed, but the expression "during the period of mudslides and artillery mortar fire" is worthy of being remembered.

This is not a stipulation. From April 30, the intense and destructive fire of German artillery became for the Shock Army as familiar a detail of the landscape as swamps swollen with water.

On May 20 and 21, Khozin and Zaporozhets (a member of the Military Council of the Volzovsky Front) were summoned to see Stalin. At meetings on May 20 and 21, it was decided to begin the withdrawal of the 2nd Shock Army. Both Khozin and Zaporozhets hid that by that time the 2nd Shock Army had already been practically destroyed.

But the Headquarters in the 2nd Shock Army received this directive too late.

Chapter IV . The tragedy of the 2nd Shock

Meanwhile, the 2nd Shock Army was making desperate attempts these days to break out of the bag. June 4, 1942. 00 hours 45 minutes.

We will strike from the Polist line at 20:00 on June 4. We don’t hear the actions of the troops of the 59th Army from the east, there is no long-range artillery fire. Vlasov. There. S. 92.

This breakthrough failed. Moreover ... Having crushed the almost unarmed strands of the 2nd Shock Army, the Germans occupied Finev Lug and went to the rear.

On June 6, M.S. Khozin was forced to report to Headquarters that the 2nd Shock Army was surrounded. The headquarters immediately removed him from his post.

As K.A. Meretskov recalls, on June 8, G.K. Zhukov rang unexpectedly: “Come urgently to the meeting of the Politburo.” There. S. 93.

“We made a big mistake, comrade Meretskov, by uniting the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts,” said Stalin. - General Khozin, although he was sitting on the Volkhov direction, he did things poorly. He did not comply with the directives of the Headquarters on the withdrawal of the 2nd Shock Army. You, Comrade Meretskov, know the Volkhov Front well. Therefore, we instruct you and Comrade Vasilevsky to go there and rescue the 2nd Shock Army from encirclement at all costs, even if without heavy weapons. You must immediately upon arrival at the place take command of the front. There. S. 93.

At 3.15 on June 8, 1942, K.A. Meretskov and A.M. Vasilevsky left Stalin's office. On the same day, in the evening, Meretskov flew to Malaya Vishera.

Colonel-General Franz Halder, Chief of the General Staff of the German Ground Forces, who scrupulously noted the change in the situation on the fronts, writes these days: “the situation is unchanged”, “no significant changes have occurred”, “serious attacks from the east have been repulsed”, “the offensive near Volkhov has been repelled ”, “attacks on the Volkhov were again repulsed”, “on the Volkhov, fierce attacks with the support of tanks were repulsed with great difficulty”, “on the Volkhov sector again heavy fighting. Enemy tanks entered the corridor. I believe that the enemy will withdraw his forces. Hunger begins to be felt in the cauldron. Halder F. From Brest to Stalingrad: Military Diary. Smolensk, 2001.S. 644-650.

"TO THE MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE VOLKHOV FRONT. I report: the troops of the army have been conducting tense fierce battles with the enemy for three weeks ... The personnel of the troops are exhausted to the limit, the number of deaths is increasing and the incidence of exhaustion is increasing every day. As a result of the cross-fire of the army area, the troops suffer heavy losses from artillery mortar fire and enemy aircraft ... The combat strength of the formations has sharply decreased. It is no longer possible to replenish it at the expense of rears and special units. Everything that was taken. On June 16, battalions, brigades, and rifle regiments had, on average, only a few dozen men left. All attempts by the eastern group of the army to break through the passage in the corridor from the west were unsuccessful. VLASOV. ZUEV. VINOGRADOV. Konyaev N. Two faces of General Vlasov. M., 2003. S. 93.

“JUNE 21, 1942. 8 HOURS 10 MINUTES. HEAD OF GSHKA. MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE FRONT. Army troops receive fifty grams of crackers for three weeks. The last days there was absolutely no food. We eat the last horses. People are extremely exhausted. Group mortality from starvation is observed. No ammunition... VLASOV. ZUEV. There. S. 93.

These days, Vlasov not only sent radio messages to various headquarters about the plight of the army, but also tried to find a solution, on his own, for his part, to break the encirclement. The soldiers of the 2nd Shock Army, staggering from hunger, nevertheless managed to accomplish the impossible - they broke through the German fortifications. According to the report of the captain of state security Kolesnikov, sent under the heading "Top Secret" to the Special Department of the Volkhov Front, on that day 6018 wounded and about 1000 healthy people left the encirclement. The wounded were more fortunate. They were sent to the hospital, from the rest a detachment of Colonel Korkin was formed, which was again driven into the "Valley of Death". Truly evil fate hung over the fighters of the 2nd Shock. No one was allowed to leave this hell in one piece.

But back to A.A. Vlasov. The column, in which the staff members of the army were marching, was met by the Germans with mortar fire, and she was forced to withdraw. “JUNE 23, 1942. 01 HOUR 02 MINUTES. ARMY TROOPS AFTER A BREAKTHROUGH WITH THE FORCES OF THE 46TH RIFLE DIVISION, Went TO THE LINE OF THE UNNAMED STREAM 900 METERS EAST OF MARK 37.1 AND ONLY IN THIS AREA MET THE UNITS OF THE 59TH ARMY. ALL REPORTS ABOUT THE APPROACH OF THE PARTS OF THE 59th ARMY TO THE POLYST RIVER FROM THE EAST ARE TREATABLE LIES. There. S. 105.

On the morning of June 23, the 2nd Shock Army, finally broken during the night assault, still held the defense along the Glukhaya Kerest - Novaya Kerest - Olkhovka line, but in the evening the Germans broke through to the area of ​​​​the landing site in Novaya Kerest, and by 16-00 leaked to the army command post. And although by eight o'clock in the evening the German submachine gunners had been recaptured from the command post, it was clear that the army was living out its last hours.

“JUNE 23, 1942. 22.15. THE ENEMY CONQUERED THE NEW KERES AND EASTERN. THE PASS EAST OF THE POLIST RIVER IS AGAIN CLOSED BY THE ENEMY... NO ACTIVE ACTION FROM THE EAST IS HEARD. ARTILLERY DOES NOT FIRE. ONCE AGAIN I PLEASE TAKE DECISIVE MEASURES TO CLEAR THE BREAKTHROUGH AND DRIVE THE 52nd AND 59TH ARMIES TO THE POLIST RIVER FROM THE EAST. OUR PARTS ON THE WEST SHORE OF POLISTI. VLASOV. ZUEV. VINOGRADOV. There. S. 106.

“JUNE 23, 1942. 23.35. COMBAT AT THE ARMY HEADQUARTERS POINT MARK 43.3. HELP NEEDED. VLASOV. There. S. 106.

Meretskov failed to organize an assault group of such force that was able to break through the German defenses. And as always in such cases, once again the bitter truth about failure was so abundantly bred with slyness that, in general, even insignificant exaggerations of success, adding up, turned into a real breakthrough, as ordered.

On the morning of June 24, German machine gunners broke through to the army headquarters, and all command was transferred to the command post of the 57th rifle brigade. From here the last radiogram went to the headquarters of the front ...

“JUNE 24, 1942. 19.45. WITH ALL THE ARMY TROOPS, WE ARE BREAKING FROM THE BORDER OF THE WESTERN BANK OF THE POLYST RIVER TO THE EAST, ALONG THE ROADS AND NORTH OF THE RAILWAYS. BEGINNING OF THE ATTACK AT 22.30 JUNE 24, 42. PLEASE FROM THE EAST TO ASSIST WITH MANPOWER, TANKS AND ARTILLERY OF THE 58TH AND 39TH ARMIES AND COVER THE TROOPS WITH AVIATION FROM 3.00 JUNE 25, 42. VLASOV. ZUEV. VINOGRADOV. There. pp. 106-107.

By 22.00. the column, in which Vlasov also left this time, moved to the area of ​​​​the command post of the 46th Infantry Division, from where at 24.00 they moved to the point of withdrawal. At the head of the column were two platoons of a company of the Special Department of the Army, armed with twelve light machine guns, a platoon of employees of the Special Department of the NKVD with machine guns. Then the head of the Special Department A.G. Shashkov, the Military Council of the Army, and departments of the Army Headquarters moved on. A platoon of a company of the Special Department brought up the rear.

According to the summary of the General Staff, compiled on the basis of the report of K.A. Meretskov, “On June 25, by 3 hours 15 minutes, by a coordinated strike by the 2nd and 59th armies, the enemy’s defenses in the corridor were broken, and from 1 hour 00 minutes, units of 2 th Army". There. S. 107.

Some of the soldiers and officers really managed to break through this time. They told how it happened.

“Everything became indifferent, often fell into half-asleep, oblivion. Therefore, it is completely unclear where the forces came from when ... we began to go out. Exit is not the right word. They crawled, fell into a swamp, climbed out into a dry clearing, saw their tankers - our tanks, deploying towers, hit the Nazis. But the Germans shot through this clearing - there was no living place on it. I even skipped one place. What led the direction - where to run - is also unclear, some kind of instinct, even a shrapnel wound in the shoulder seemed like a trifle in this sodom. There. S. 107.

The fate of the staff column was also unfortunate. At about two o'clock in the morning, the entire group, according to the testimony of Major General Afanasyev, came under artillery barrage fire.

Surgeon A.A. Vishnevsky was present these days at cutting edge where the encircled army tried to break through. Here are the entries from his front-line diary.

June 25th. At six o'clock in the evening we went to Myasny Bor. There are feeding and dressing stations along the way. People in winter uniforms, thin, with a sallow complexion, walk along the narrow gauge railway. We meet two, absolutely boys.

From the 2nd shock ....

We went to the command post of the 59th Army to General Korovnikov, met Meretskov, he was sitting on a stump, there were a lot of people around him. Korovnikov has swelling in both legs. EVERYONE IS WAITING FOR GENERAL VLASOV - Commander of the 2nd Shock Army. There are various rumors: some say that he has left, some say that he has not.

June 26th. At night there will be an attack again. He took out his machine gun and at 11 o'clock in the evening went to the neck of Myasny Bor, where the exit of units of the 2nd Army was again scheduled.

27th of June. Woke up from a strong cannonade. Artillery, mortars and Katyushas fired through us. It turned out that the Germans closed all the cracks in the ring, and today not a single person left the encirclement ...

June 28th. During the night, only six people left the 2nd Shock Army; three of them were lightly wounded. We go to the command post to Korovnikov. Arrived safely. They had a meeting of the Military Council, it soon ended, Meretskov came out and greeted us. You could tell by his appearance that he was very upset.” Vishnevsky A.A. Diary of a surgeon. M., 1967. S. 179-182.

Alas... Almost no one from the leadership of the 2nd Shock Army managed to get out of the encirclement.

Commissar Zuev will die in a few days, running into a German patrol near the railway.

Vinogradov, the chief of staff, who had just been promoted to the rank of major general, also died.

But Vlasov himself survived ...

One of the last to see General Vlasov was the head of the political department of the 46th Infantry Division, Major A.I. Zubov. “At 9 pm, the regimental commissar Shablovsky had his arm torn off. I dragged him into four pines, made a dressing, I hear the lieutenant screaming and asking for help to commander Vlasov, who, as the captain said, was dying. The commander of the 176th regiment, Sobol, and I indicated the place where he could find shelter. Commander Vlasov was also brought to this shelter. At 12 noon on June 25, the headquarters of the 2nd Shock Army and the headquarters of the 46th division were in the same place ... "Konyaev N. Two faces of General Vlasov. M., 2003. S. 111. In the overlay in the rank of this officer, the confusion that reigned then in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe army impulse is very accurately conveyed. And in this confusion, the news about Vlasov, starting from June 25, becomes more and more fragmentary, until it stops completely.

As is clear from the report filed in the name of the head of the Special Department of the NKVD of the Volkhov Front, the deputy head of the Special Department of the NKVD of the 2nd Shock Army, State Security Captain Sokolov tried on June 25 to find Vlasov, but he did not succeed.

Where the generals and officers went, we learn from the testimony of the same head of the political department of the 46th Infantry Division, Major A.I. Zubov.

“At 12 noon on June 25,” he said, “the headquarters of the 2nd Shock Army and the headquarters of the 46th division were in the forest in one place. The commander of the Cherny division informed me that we were now going behind enemy lines, but the commander Vlasov warned me not to take extra people and it was better to strive to remain alone. Thus, there were 28 of us left from the headquarters of the 2nd Shock Army, and at least there were from the headquarters of the 46th division. Having no food, we went to the Zamosze swamp and went on the twenty-fifth and twenty-sixth. In the evening we found a dead elk, had dinner, and on the morning of June 27, the chief of staff of the 2nd Shock Army, after consulting with Vlasov, decided to split into two groups, since it was impossible to walk in such a large number. At two o'clock in the afternoon we split into two groups and dispersed in different directions. There. S. 111.

The senior political instructor of a separate chemical defense company of the 25th Infantry Division, Viktor Iosifovich Kloniev, claimed that he had seen Vlasov "around June 29" ...

“Moving north with my group in the forest area, three kilometers southwest of Priyutin, I met the commander of the 2nd Shock Army, Lieutenant General Vlasov, with a group of commanders and fighters in the amount of 16 people. Among them was Major General Alferyev, several colonels and two women. He questioned me, checked the documents. He gave advice on how to get out of the environment. Here we spent the night together, and the next morning at three o'clock I left with my group to the north, and I was embarrassed to ask permission to join ... ”Ibid. S. 112.

This is the latest news about Andrei Andreevich Vlasov.

After that, Vlasov's trail is lost until July 12, when Vlasov was taken prisoner by the Germans in a peasant's hut in the village of Tukhovechi.

Conclusion

Starting to work on this topic, I knew little about General A.A. Vlasov, about the 2nd Shock Army. If something was written or said about this topic, then only - "Vlasov, the Vlasovites (meaning the soldiers of the 2nd Shock Army) are traitors." Everybody. Up to one. Peremptory. That is why I wanted to sort out this issue myself: who is General Vlasov - a traitor or was it a fatal combination of circumstances.

As mentioned above, I believe that the soldiers and officers who carried out orders that came "from above" are not guilty of anything, and calling them "Vlasovites", that is, traitors, is not even possible, it is criminal! These people died not in hundreds, not in thousands, but in tens of thousands! Being in these inhuman, I would even say hellish conditions, they still remained Soviet people, with all their strength, as best they could and as circumstances allowed them, they tried to follow orders and remain true to their oath.

Of course, individual soldiers and officers went over to the side of the enemy, but one cannot accuse everyone of betrayal. Therefore, I believe that these people are not traitors, not "Vlasovites", they are heroes. And those who survived, who managed to escape from the encirclement - they are holy people!

It seems to me that the 2nd Shock Army was forgotten by the Soviet authorities, the press, writers, not only because the name of General Vlasov is associated with this army, although this also took place, but because the 2nd Shock Army is one of the greatest shame of the Great Patriotic War. To what state it was necessary to bring people, fighters, so that, without fear for their lives, right on the battlefield, under a hail of bullets and mines, the first thing they looked at was what kind of food was in the knapsacks of the dead comrades!

People rejoiced at earthworms, which were torn off in the ground and swallowed whole, they ate frogs, various plants, and tree bark. Anything that was somehow fit for food. From hunger, people no longer understood anything. Here's an example: Medics on sledges arrived at the medical unit of the 382nd Infantry Division. A few minutes later, the fighters dissuaded this horse, killed it and prepared meat for food. On the one hand, they need to be condemned, but on the other hand, they did it not from a good life, not from hooligan motives! Konyaev N. Two faces of General Vlasov. M., 2003. S. 64.

There were cases when felt boots were removed from the dead, literally breaking off their legs. They took off the sheepskin coats of the fighters, with whom they were still talking just a few seconds ago. Often they died only because they tried to find food and get clothes under heavy fire. It is unlikely, I think, that they could write about all this openly in the Soviet press or publish books.

As for the personality of General A.A. Vlasov, then, I believe that if a person swore allegiance to the country to his state, then he must strictly fulfill it and follow it to the end. Rigorously. Whatever happened. And if so, then it turns out that General A.A. Vlasov is a traitor.

Studying the biography of Andrei Andreevich Vlasov, it seems strange that he decided in a critical situation to go over to the side of the enemy. Beautiful achievement list, a fantastic career growth for those years: Ibid. S.15, 17, 19.

1936 - commander of the 11th Infantry Regiment (LenVO);

1937 - commander of the 215th Infantry Regiment (KOVO);

1937-1938 - member of the military tribunal of the Leningrad and Kyiv military district (during this period, not a single acquittal was issued on his initiative);

1938-1939 - business trip of A.A. Vlasov to China. According to V. Filatov, Vlasov proved to be a good commander - the Chinese fought successfully for more than a month for the Kun-Lun Pass during his stay there as a military adviser.

In general, in less than two years of A.A. Vlasov’s stay in China, the Chinese fought as many battles with the Japanese and won as many victories over them as they did not have until the end of 1943. It is also reported that in China, a poster was allegedly released, which depicted Chinese General Yan Xinan and Vlasov leading troops to battle the Japanese.

According to various sources, before Comrade Volkov (under that name Vlasov served in China) was recalled to his homeland, Chiang Kai-shek awarded him either the Golden Order of the Dragon or the Order of the Moon.

It should also be noted that Andrei Andreyevich Vlasov was saved from the “Stalinist purges” by his love of love. His romance with a certain Yulia Osadchaya ended with the fact that this very Yulia gave birth to a daughter from him and filed for alimony ... By the way, at that time he was already married.

End of 1939. The position of commander of the 99th Infantry Division of the 6th Army, stationed in the city of Przemysl.

May 1940. A.A. Vlasov was elected a member of the Przemysl city committee of the CPSU (b).

September 25-27, 1940. At the inspection inspection exercise conducted by the People's Commissar of Defense - Marshal of the Soviet Union Comrade. S.K. Timoshenko, the division commanded by A.A. Vlasov, received a “good mark” and was awarded the challenge banner of the Red Army.

October 3, 1940. The newspaper "Krasnoe Znamya" published an article by A. A. Vlasov "New methods of study", where the author quotes Alexander Suvorov and emphasizes the usefulness of political studies.

November 9, 1940. The newspaper "Krasnaya Zvezda" published an article by P. Ogin and B. Krol "The commander of the advanced division" about A. A. Vlasov.

February 23, 1941. The newspaper "Red Star" reprinted the article by A.A. Vlasov "New methods of study".

This is the chronology of life.

And here are the characteristics of A.A. Vlasov: Kvitsinsky Yu.A. General Vlasov: the path of betrayal. M., 1999. S. 3-4.

"Being in especially difficult conditions, he showed himself as a worthy Bolshevik of our Motherland."

“Practically healthy and hardy in camping life. Has a desire to leave the service in the ranks.

"Energetic in decisions, proactive."

“Major General Vlasov directly supervises the training of divisional and regimental headquarters. He pays much attention to the state of accounting and storage of secret and mobilization documents and knows the technique of the headquarters service well.

“Major General Vlasov ... better and faster than others took personal instructions People's Commissar about the restructuring of combat training.

Under these characteristics are different signatures. There is also the signature of the commander of the KOVO, General of the Army Zhukov.

Also, Andrey Andreevich Vlasov showed himself from the best side during the defense of Kyiv. As commander of the 37th Army, he managed to organize the defense of Kyiv and hold the city from early August to September 18, 1941, when German troops had already surrounded Kyiv. Then Vlasov for the first time had to leave the encirclement.

When A.A. Vlasov was appointed commander of the 2nd Shock Army, he was already in the rank of lieutenant general. To the credit of the general, it must be said that he did everything in his power to save the army entrusted to him. But at that time he could not do much ...

The general constantly sent radio messages to the headquarters with the following content: “Please do not send more weapons. We will get weapons in battle. Please send food."

K.A. Meretskov writes in his memoirs that Vlasov did not think at all about saving the 2nd Shock Army. I don't agree with him. In my opinion, he just wants to forget that it was he who appointed Vlasov commander. That is, he simply disowns him. When the last plane left the 2nd Shock Army, A.A. Vlasov gave it to the wounded. Did the general already then decide to go over to the side of the Germans? I do not believe!

Of greatest interest is the two-week disappearance of Lieutenant-General A.A. Vlasov. The disappearance is surprising also because considerable forces were involved in the search for the general ...

From the report of the headquarters of the Volkhov Front "On the operation to withdraw the 2nd Shock Army from the encirclement" it is clear that at the end of June a large-scale and active search for Vlasov began.

“To search for the Military Council of the 2nd Shock Army, the intelligence department of the front sent radio-equipped AT groups on June 28, 1942 - two groups to the Glushitsa area, both were scattered by enemy fire, and communication with them was lost. In the period from July 2 to 13, 1942, 6 groups of three to four people each were dropped from the aircraft. Of these groups, one was dispersed during the reset and partly returned back, two groups that were successfully thrown out and established communications did not provide the necessary data, and three groups give regular reports on the movements of small groups of commanders and fighters of the 2nd Shock Army behind enemy lines. All attempts to search for traces of the Military Council have so far been unsuccessful. Konyaev N. Two faces of General Vlasov. M., 2003. S. 113.

If we add that the entire search area was actively combed by the Germans, then the disappearance of Vlasov becomes quite surprising.

The general disappears without a trace until July 12, 1942, when he was discovered in a peasant hut in the village of Tukhovechi by an intelligence officer of the German 38th Corps, Captain von Schwerdner and translator Klaus Pelhau.

On July 13, 1942, Lieutenant General Vlasov was taken to General Lindemann, commander of the 18th Army, at the headquarters in Siverskaya. On July 15, he was transferred to Letzen.

The partisans searched for Vlasov to the end, but found only Afanasyev. The wrong general was saved, which the Headquarters demanded.

So ... on July 12, as Ekaterina Andreeva writes in her book, guided by German sources, “Vlasov was discovered in a peasant hut in the village of Tukhovechi by an intelligence officer of the German 38th Corps, Captain von Schwerdner and translator Klaus Pelhau. Before that, they found a corpse that they mistook for the body of Vlasov and decided to check if anyone was hiding in the hut ... "

Ekaterina Andreeva writes that when Vlasov heard the steps of the Germans, he went out and said:

Don't shoot, I am Vlasov.

A similar version is presented by political instructor Khonimenko, who said that, wandering through the forests, he went to look for food in Sennaya Kerest. When they arrived there, one of the old women advised them to leave the village immediately. She said that there were many Germans in the village, who had captured Commander Vlasov yesterday.

“This old woman was invited to the edge of the forest, where she said that a woman came, asked for food, when she was fed, she asked to feed her friend. The owner of the house agreed. When Vlasov ate, at that time the house was already surrounded by the Germans. Going to the door and opening it, Vlasov was asked to raise his hands up. Vlasov said: "Do not shoot, I am the commander of the 2nd Shock Army of Vlasov." They were taken away and taken along with the woman. There. S. 117.

But not everything agrees in these stories ...

Events pile up, crawl on top of each other, not in accordance with common sense.

Captain von Schwerdner and translator Klaus Pelhau first find the corpse, which they mistook for General Vlasov, and then search the hut where Vlasov is hiding, and find Vlasov alive ...

A woman (probably Voronov) asks to feed her, then Vlasov ... Was he sitting on the street while she was having dinner? It is difficult to imagine that this is happening in a populated village. In addition, judging by the photograph taken at the Siverskaya station, where Vlasov stands in front of the porch of the headquarters of General Lindemann, he did not look very haggard during the two weeks he knew where he spent.

So, information about Vlasov’s wanderings through forests and swamps should be treated with caution, especially if you remember that Vlasov’s wanderings took place in a territory where a huge army was dying of hunger for two months.

According to researcher N. Konyaev, it seems that Vinogradov and Vlasov knew some kind of spare, unused command post of the 2nd Shock Army, where there was a supply of food. This command post became "their refuge" for General Vlasov.

And why Vlasov and Vinogradov (after the death of special officer Shashkov they were the only ones who knew for sure where the reserve command post was located) could not use it?

This version seems to me the most probable.

It was to such a shelter that the group of A.A. Vlasov broke through, since otherwise it is impossible to explain why they, instead of looking for cracks in the German ring - and in the conditions of a swampy area there certainly were such cracks! - made a forced march in the opposite direction from the front. Let me remind you once again how persistently Vlasov and Vinogradov sought to separate from their comrades in the environment.

Indirectly, the assumption of the existence of a shelter with a supply of food is confirmed by the very composition of the group with which Vlasov left. In addition to the “field wife”, Maria Ignatievna Voronova, the only group was the chief of staff of the army, Major General Vinogradov. Soldiers Kotov and Pogibko, as follows from the testimony, joined the group later.

In such a composition, it is difficult to get out of the environment. It is unlikely that Generals Vlasov and Vinogradov were suitable pathfinders. And the age is not suitable to go on reconnaissance, and the presence of a woman ... She alone, dressed in civilian clothes, it would be more convenient to get out of the encirclement. But, apparently, Vlasov was not going to break through the front line again. This was apparently his plan, in order, hiding in his shelter, to try, when the combing of the area was over, to contact the partisans and then cross the front line.

Maria Ignatyevna Voronova, during interrogation at the NKVD, also avoided the question of where they had been hiding for two weeks. There. pp. 120-121.

“About July 1942, near Novgorod, the Germans discovered us in the forest and imposed a battle, after which Vlasov, I, the soldier Kotov and the driver Pogibko escaped into the swamp, crossed it and went out to the villages. Deadly, with the wounded soldier Kotov, we went to one village, Vlasov and I to another. When we entered the village, I don’t know its name, we went into one house, where we were mistaken for partisans. The local "Samoohova" surrounded the house and arrested us. Here we were put in a collective farm barn, and the next day the Germans arrived, showed Vlasov a portrait of him, like a general, cut out of a newspaper, and Vlasov was forced to admit that he really was Lieutenant General Vlasov. Prior to that, he was recommended as a refugee teacher.

The Germans, making sure that they had caught Lieutenant General Vlasov, put us in a car and brought us to the Siverskaya station to the German headquarters. Here I was put in a prisoner of war camp located in the town of Malaya Vyra, and Vlasov was taken to Germany two days later.

All these testimonies still do not give an answer to the question, where did Lieutenant General A.A. Vlasov hide these two weeks - did he wander in the forest or did there exist some kind of secret command post. But still it is not so important. The important thing is that he was not going to surrender to the Germans. Although, seeing the horrors that took place in the 2nd Shock Army, perhaps having learned the true attitude of the High Command towards his army, realizing himself a victim of staff intrigues, he could have conceived the idea of ​​treason. And yet, I think it's unlikely.

I am not trying to whitewash Andrei Andreevich Vlasov. He is a traitor. But he can only be accused of collaborating with the Germans, only of this. And yet, I think it can be, if not justified, then understood. He had two options - cooperation or death. For me to choose? I don't know, despite the fact that I consider myself a patriot. Put a bullet in the forehead ... Die, as befits a Russian Soviet officer. Beautiful... You will be a hero... Posthumously... And so - a traitor...

I would like to finish my work with a poem by V. Bazhinov "Myasnoy Bor":

Under the machine guns, beating excitedly,

Above the swamp ripped open,

I got up and fell, scraping the ground,

An infantry regiment leaving the encirclement.

And he left, but not a regiment, but a platoon,

To say more correctly - some leftovers

Several soldiers from the mouths,

Not lost in mortal combat.

For them this June night is forever,

Like a measure on the scale of suffering,

As the highest that a man can

Worthy of both songs and legends.

Application No. 1 Luban offensive operation. January-June 1942: Sat. SPb., 1994. S. 119

LUBA OFFENSIVE OPERATION

January-June 1942

Command of the 2nd Shock Army:

Army Commander - Lieutenant General G.G. Sokolov, since January 10, Lieutenant General N.K. Klykov, from April 20 to June 25, Lieutenant General A.A. Vlasov, since June 26, Lieutenant General N.K. Klykov.

Members of the Military Council:

1st member - brigade commissar A. K MIKHAILOV, from February 11, 1942, divisional commissar M.N. ZELENKOV, since March 5 - divisional commissar K.V. ZUEV.

2nd member - Brigadier Commissar N.N. LEBEDEV

Head of political department:

since May - Brigadier Commissar I.P. WORSTED.

Artillery Commander - Major General of Artillery G.E. DEGTYAREV.

Chief of Engineering Troops - Lieutenant Colonel IL. MELNIKOV,

The combat composition of the 2nd Shock Army:

The army arrived at the Volkhov Front at the end of December 1941, consisting of:

22nd a separate rifle brigade of Colonel R, K, PUGACHEV.

23rd a separate rifle brigade of Colonel V-I, SHILOV,

24th a separate rifle brigade of Colonel M.V. ROMANOVSKY,

25th a separate rifle brigade of Colonel P.G. SHOLUDKO.

53rd a separate rifle brigade of major general V, S, RAKOVSKY,

57th a separate rifle brigade of Colonel P.K. VEPET "TICHEV,

58th a separate rifle brigade of Colonel F.M. ZHILTSOVA,

59th a separate rifle brigade of Colonel CHERNIK, from January 15, Colonel I.F. GLAZUNOV, and from April 3, Lieutenant Colonel S.A. PISARENKO,

160th and 162nd separate tank battalions,

18th artillery regiment RGK army type,

3rd guards mortar battalions.

In early January 1942, the army included:

39, 42, 43. 45, 46, 49 separate ski battalions,

839th howitzer artillery regiment,

121st bomber

522nd fighter,

704th light Bomber Aviation Regiments,

285th army separate communications battalion,

360th separate line communications battalion,

7 separate engineer battalions.

Z66th rifle division of Colonel S.N. BULANOV,

382nd rifle division of colonel G.P. SOKUROV, since March 22, Colonel N.E. Kartseva,

111th rifle division of Colonel S.V. Roginsky,

191st rifle division of Major General T.V. LEBEDEV, from January 27, Colonel A.I. STARUNIN, from May 16 - Lieutenant Colonel N.I. ARTEMENKO.

Arrived mid-January

46th rifle division of Major General A.K. OKULICHEVA, from March 21, Lieutenant Colonel, and from April 11, Colonel R.E. BLACK.

4th Guards Rifle Division Major General A.I. ANDREEV, since May 15, Colonel S.T. BIYAKOVA,

259th rifle division of the colonel, from May 13, Major General A.V. LANSHEV, from May 28, lieutenant colonel, from July 11, colonel P.N. LAVROV,

267th Rifle Division Commander Yad. ZELENKOV, from December 20, 1941, Colonel I.R. GLAZUNOV, from January 20, 1942 Lieutenant Colonel P.A.POTAPOV.

13th cavalry corps of Major General N.I. GUSEVA,

25th cavalry division of lieutenant colonel D.M. BARINOVA,

80th cavalry division of Colonel L.A. SLANOV, since March, Lieutenant Colonel N.A. POLYAKOV.

From the end of January to the end of February arrived:

40, 41, 44, 48. 50, 95.160,161,162, 163, 164, 165. 166, 167,168. 169, 170,

171, 172, 173 and 174th separate ski battalions,

166 -th separate tank battalion;

442nd and 445th artillery regiments;

1163rd cannon artillery regiment of the RGK;

60th howitzer artillery regiment R.G.K;

24th and 30th Guards mortar regiments R.A.

In late February - early March arrived:

305th rifle division of Colonel D.I. BARABANSCHIKOV, from May 15, Colonel N.N. NIKOLSKY,

374th Rifle Division Colonel AD. VITOSHKIN.

378th rifle division of Colonel I.P. DOROFEEV, from March 10, Colonel, from May 30, Major General G.P. LILENKOVA,

92nd rifle division of Colonel A.N. LARICHEVA,

7th Guards Tank Brigade Colonel V.A. KOPTSOV, since the end of March, Colonel B.I. SCHNEIDER.

29th tank brigade of Colonel M.I. KLIMENKO.

25, 80, 87 cavalry divisions 13th cavalry corps,

24 and 25th

4th and 24th guards, 378th rifle divisions,

7th guards and 29th tank brigades.

191st and 382nd rifle divisions, 18th army type artillery regiment.

The scheme for the directive of the front on May 22 to withdraw the troops of the 2nd Shock Army from the encirclement shows:

259th, 267th and 191st rifle divisions, 57th, 53rd, 22nd separate rifle brigades, 46th, 92nd, 327th and 382nd rifle divisions, 59th, 25th and 23rd separate rifle brigades, 19th guards and 305th rifle divisions.

By order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR No. 22 dated March 20, 1942, the 366th Rifle Division was transformed into the 19th Guards Rifle Division, the 111th Rifle Division was transformed into the 24th Guards Rifle Division.

Application No. 2 There. S. 123.

	The name of the operation, timing and attracted forces	population troops at the start of the operation
			irrevocable	sanitary		average daily
	Luban offensive operation Volkhov front, 54th Army of the Leningrad Front
	The operation to withdraw from the encirclement of the 2nd shock army of Volkhovsky front 1942) 2nd shock, 52nd and 59th Army Volkhov Front

Bibliography

Research.

1. Andreeva E. General Vlasov and the Russian Liberation Movement. / Per. from English. London: Overlease, 1990. 214 p.

2. Kvitsinsky Yu.A. General Vlasov: the path of betrayal. M.: Sovremennik, 1999. 320 p., ill.

3. Konyaev N. Two faces of General Vlasov: life, fate, legends. M.: Veche, 2003. 480 p., 8 sheets. ill.

4. Mitcham S. Hitler's field marshals and their battles. / Translated from English. Smolensk: Rusich, 1999. 576 p., 4 p. ill.

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Collections of articles and documents.

1. Aleksandrov K.M. Against Stalin.// Vlasovites and Eastern Volunteers in the Second World War. Sat. Art. and mat. St. Petersburg: Yuventa, 2003. 352 p., ill.

2. Aleksandrov K.M. The officer corps of the army of Lieutenant General A.A. Vlasov. 1944-1945. Sat. Art. and mat. SPb., 2001. 321 p.

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8. Luban offensive operation. January-June 1942. / Comp. Sat. K.K. Krupitsa, I.A. Ivanova. St. Petersburg: INKO, 1994. 128 p.

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11. Andreeva E. General Vlasov and the Russian Liberation Movement. / Per. from English. London: Overlease, 1990. 214 p.

12. Kvitsinsky Yu.A. General Vlasov: the path of betrayal. M.: Sovremennik, 1999. 320 p., ill.

13. Konyaev N. Two faces of General Vlasov: life, fate, legends. M.: Veche, 2003. 480 p., 8 sheets. ill.

14. Mitcham S. Hitler's field marshals and their battles. / Translated from English. Smolensk: Rusich, 1999. 576 p., 4 p. ill.

15. Smyslov O.S. Hitler's Fifth Column. From Kutepov to Vlasov. M.: Veche, 2004. 507 p., 7 sheets. ill.

Myasnoy Bor is a tragic page in the history of our Fatherland, the history of the Great Patriotic War. From the very beginning, as soon as Leningrad was under blockade, steps were taken to liberate the city on the Neva from the enemy siege. In January 1942, the troops of the Volkhov Front launched an offensive. The 2nd shock army operated most successfully. On January 17, she successfully broke through the defenses in the Myasnoy Bor area. At the time of the offensive, the forces were unequal. The attacks of our troops were driven back by the enemy's hurricane fire, which the artillery was unable to suppress. The coming spring thaw sharply disrupted the supply of the army. Headquarters did not allow the withdrawal of troops. The defense remained. The enemy sought to close the neck of the breakthrough and, having pulled in fresh forces, on March 19 blocked the road at Myasny Bor. The delivery of food and ammunition to the troops of the 2nd Shock Force completely stopped. The enemy fired incessantly at the breakthrough area with artillery and mortar fire. The breakthrough cost such victims that a narrow strip of tormented forest and swamps to the west of the village of Myasnoy Bor since March 1942 began to be called the “Valley of Death”. the array had turned into a mess by the time he arrived.

This Soviet general was in a special account with Stalin and was known as his favorite. In December 1941, together with Zhukov and Rokossovsky, he was called the "savior of Moscow." In 1942, the leader entrusted him with a new, responsible mission. No one could have imagined that soon the name of this general would become as common as the name of Judas. Andrei Vlasov forever remained in history as traitor No. 1, the commander of the so-called Russian Liberation Army, created by the Germans mainly from former Soviet prisoners of war. Alas, the ominous shadow of Vlasov's betrayal fell on a completely different army, which he commanded, but which never betrayed. The Second Shock was formed in early 1942 to break the blockade of Leningrad, when the Stavka planned to build on the success of the Battle of Moscow and on other sectors of the front. Hundreds of thousands of fighters were thrown into the January counteroffensive in the northwest. Unfortunately, the Soviet command did not take into account that the Germans were still very strong, and their pre-prepared defenses were exceptionally strong. After long bloody battles, the Second Shock was surrounded. General Vlasov was sent to her rescue.

Alexey Pivovarov, author of the film: “As in the story with Rzhev and Brest, we wanted to talk about those episodes of the Great Patriotic War, which, on the one hand, very clearly characterize this war, and on the other hand, were deliberately forgotten by official historians. The second Shock is one of them. For me, this is a story of desperate heroism, devotion to duty and mass self-sacrifice, which were never appreciated by the Motherland. Worse than that: after Vlasov's betrayal, all the surviving soldiers and commanders of the Second Shock Army were put on the "black list": some were repressed, others were forever branded as unreliable. And the most offensive: they, like those who fought in the ROA, also began to be called "Vlasovites". Unfortunately, unlike the defenders of the Brest Fortress, the fighters of the Second Shock did not find their own Sergei Smirnov, an influential intercessor who, with his publications, would return their honest name to them. In our film, we tried to correct this injustice by telling about the tragedy that took place in the Novgorod forests in 1942. “Second Impact. The Betrayed Army of Vlasov” includes many months of filming on the battlefields and in specially built scenery, dozens of hours of interviews with surviving participants in the events and the entire set of modern television special effects, computer graphics and complex reconstructions. Together with Alexei Pivovarov, the story of the Second Shock is told by Isolda Ivanova, the adopted daughter of one of the dead officers of this army, who, back in the years of stagnation, tracked down and interviewed hundreds of former colleagues of her stepfather. Their guide through the forest swamps was Alexander Orlov, a search engine that has been looking for and burying the remains of the forgotten heroes of the Second Shock for half a century.

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