Barrier detachments. Penal battalions and barrage detachments of the Red Army during the Great Patriotic War

The liberal media screams about the terrible and insidious barrage detachments in the Red Army, which shot retreating soldiers with machine guns. This situation is depicted in some films about the war. In fact, these are nothing more than myths created to discredit Stalin period in national history. In this analytical article you will find figures and facts from state archives, video chronicles of those years, as well as memories of the participants of past battles in the Second World War on the topic of the actions of barrage detachments in relation to their own army.

The famous order of NKO No. 227 of July 27, 1942, which immediately became known among soldiers as “Not a Step Back,” among other very strict measures to strengthen order and discipline at the front, also prescribed the creation of the so-called. barrage detachments. In this order, Stalin demanded:

B) form within the army 3 - 5 well-armed barrage detachments (up to 200 people in each), place them in the immediate rear of unstable divisions and oblige them, in the event of panic and disorderly withdrawal of division units, to shoot panickers and cowards on the spot and thereby help honest fighters divisions to fulfill their duty to the Motherland;...

And somehow information about these units immediately went into the shadows. Nothing was written about them in the press either during the war or in the post-war years. Even at the time of the “exposure of Stalin’s personality cult,” they tried to avoid the topic of barrage detachments. Information about them was either simply kept silent, or they were silently blamed on the Stalinist regime. And again, without any details.

After the fall of the communist regime in our country, a lot of speculation appeared in the democratic press on the topic of barrage detachments. Taking advantage of the fact that people do not have any information on this issue, a number of pseudo-historians, especially those who prefer to receive fees in dollars from various foreign “funds for supporting democracy,” began to prove that the people did not want to fight for the Stalinist regime, that the Red Army soldiers were driven into battle exclusively by commissars and machine guns of the detachments. That the barrier detachment members are responsible for hundreds of thousands of ruined lives, that, instead of fighting at the front themselves, the barrier detachment members mowed down entire divisions with machine gun fire, which in fact only helped the Germans.

Moreover, again, without any evidence, documents, and increasingly referring to the “memories” of very dubious personalities.

One of the most terrible myths of the Second World War is associated with the existence of barrier detachments in the Red Army. Often in modern TV series about the war you can see scenes with gloomy personalities in blue caps of NKVD troops shooting wounded soldiers leaving the battle with machine guns. By showing this, the authors take a great sin upon their souls. None of the researchers were able to find a single fact in the archives to confirm this.

What happened?

Barrage detachments appeared in the Red Army from the first days of the war. Such formations were created by military counterintelligence, first represented by the 3rd Directorate of the USSR NKO, and from July 17, 1941, by the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR and subordinate bodies in the troops.

As the main tasks of special departments during the war, the decree State Committee The defense was determined by “a decisive fight against espionage and betrayal in parts of the Red Army and the elimination of desertion in the immediate front line.” They received the right to arrest deserters, and, if necessary, shoot them on the spot.

To ensure operational activities in special departments in accordance with the order of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs L.P. Beria by July 25, 1941 were formed: in divisions and corps - separate rifle platoons, in armies - separate rifle companies, in the fronts - separate rifle battalions. Using them, special departments organized a barrage service, setting up ambushes, posts and patrols on roads, refugee routes and other communications. Every detained commander, Red Army soldier, and Red Navy man was checked. If he was recognized as having fled from the battlefield, then he was subject to immediate arrest, and a prompt (no more than 12-hour) investigation began on him to be tried by a military tribunal as a deserter. Special departments were entrusted with the responsibility of enforcing sentences of military tribunals, including before the formation. In “particularly exceptional cases, when the situation requires taking decisive measures to immediately restore order at the front,” the head of the special department had the right to shoot deserters on the spot, which he had to immediately report to the special department of the army and front (navy). Military personnel who fell behind the unit for an objective reason were sent in an organized manner, accompanied by a representative of a special department, to the headquarters of the nearest division.

The flow of military personnel who lagged behind their units in the kaleidoscope of battles, when leaving numerous encirclements, or even deliberately deserted, was enormous. From the beginning of the war until October 10, 1941 alone, the operational barriers of special departments and barrage detachments of the NKVD troops detained more than 650 thousand soldiers and commanders. German agents also easily dissolved in the general mass. Thus, a group of spies neutralized in the winter and spring of 1942 had the task of physically eliminating the command of the Western and Kalinin Fronts, including commanders Generals G.K. Zhukov and I.S. Koneva.

Special departments had difficulty coping with such a volume of cases. The situation required the creation of special units that would be directly involved in preventing unauthorized withdrawal of troops from occupied positions, returning lagging military personnel to their units and subunits, and detaining deserters.

The military command was the first to take this kind of initiative. After an appeal from the commander of the Bryansk Front, Lieutenant General A.I. Eremenko to Stalin on September 5, 1941, he was allowed to create barrage detachments in “unstable” divisions, where there were repeated cases of leaving combat positions without orders. A week later, this practice was extended to rifle divisions throughout the Red Army.

These barrage detachments (up to a battalion in number) had nothing to do with the NKVD troops; they operated as part of the rifle divisions of the Red Army, were staffed by their personnel and were subordinate to their commanders. At the same time, along with them, there were detachments formed either by special military departments or by territorial bodies of the NKVD. A typical example is the barrage detachments formed in October 1941 by the NKVD of the USSR, which, by decree of the State Defense Committee, took under special protection the zone adjacent to Moscow, from the west and south along the line Kalinin - Rzhev - Mozhaisk - Tula - Kolomna - Kashira. Already the first results showed how necessary these measures were. In just two weeks from October 15 to October 28, 1941, more than 75 thousand military personnel were detained in the Moscow zone.

From the very beginning, the barrage formations, regardless of their departmental subordination, were not guided by their leadership towards indiscriminate executions and arrests. Meanwhile, today we have to face similar accusations in the press; The barrier detachments are sometimes called punitive forces. But here are the numbers. Of the more than 650 thousand military personnel detained by October 10, 1941, after verification, about 26 thousand people were arrested, among whom the special departments included: spies - 1505, saboteurs - 308, traitors - 2621, cowards and alarmists - 2643, deserters - 8772, spreaders of provocative rumors - 3987, self-shooters - 1671, others - 4371 people. 10,201 people were shot, including 3,321 people in front of the line. The overwhelming number is more than 632 thousand people, i.e. more than 96% were returned to the front.

As the front line stabilized, the activities of the defensive formations were gradually curtailed. Order No. 227 gave it new impetus.

The barrier detachments created in accordance with it, numbering up to 200 people, consisted of soldiers and commanders of the Red Army, who did not differ in uniform or weapons from the rest of the Red Army military personnel. Each of them had the status of a separate military unit and was subordinate not to the command of the division behind whose battle formations it was located, but to the command of the army through the NKVD OO. The detachment was led by a state security officer.

In total, by October 15, 1942, 193 barrage detachments were functioning in units of the active army. First of all, Stalin's order was carried out, of course, on the southern flank of the Soviet-German front. Almost every fifth detachment - 41 units - was formed in the Stalingrad direction.

Initially, in accordance with the requirements of the People's Commissar of Defense, barrage detachments were entrusted with the responsibility of preventing the unauthorized withdrawal of linear units. However, in practice, the range of military affairs in which they were engaged turned out to be wider.

“The barrage detachments,” recalled Army General P. N. Lashchenko, who was the deputy chief of staff of the 60th Army in the days of the publication of order No. 227, “were located at a distance from the front line, covered the troops from the rear from saboteurs and enemy landings, detained deserters who , unfortunately, there were; they restored order at the crossings and sent soldiers who had strayed from their units to assembly points.”

Here is a document from the FSB archives. It is not able to illuminate the entire actual picture of the barrage detachments, but it can lead to certain thoughts. This is a summary report of the Directorate of Special Sections to the leadership of the NKVD. It is undated, but a number of indirect signs indicate that it was written no earlier than October 15, 1942. From this it is clear that these are only the first results of the actions of the detachments.

In accordance with the order of NKO No. 227 in units operating in the Red Army as of October 15 this year. 193 barrage detachments were formed.

Of these, 16 were formed in parts of the Stalingrad Front and 25 in the Don Front, and a total of 41 detachments, which are subordinate to the Special Departments of the NKVD armies.

Since the beginning of their formation (from August 1 to October 15 of this year), barrage detachments have detained 140,755 military personnel who escaped from the front line.

Of those detained: 3,980 people were arrested, 1,189 people were shot, 2,776 people were sent to penal companies, 185 people were sent to penal battalions, 131,094 people were returned to their units and transit points.

The largest number of detentions and arrests were made by the barrage detachments of the Don and Stalingrad fronts.

On the Don Front, 36,109 people were detained, 736 people were arrested, 433 people were shot, 1,056 people were sent to penal companies, 33 people were sent to penal battalions, 32,933 people were returned to their units and transit points.

On the Stalingrad Front, 15,649 people were detained, 244 people were arrested, 278 people were shot, 218 people were sent to penal companies, 42 to penal battalions, 14,833 people were returned to their units and transit points.

It should be noted that barrage detachments, and especially detachments on the Stalingrad and Don fronts (subordinate to special departments of the NKVD armies) during the period of fierce battles with the enemy, played a positive role in establishing order in units and preventing unorganized withdrawal from the lines they occupied, returning a significant number military personnel to the front line.

August 29 this year The headquarters of the 29th Division of the 64th Army of the Stalingrad Front was surrounded by enemy tanks that had broken through, and parts of the division, having lost control, retreated to the rear in panic. The barrier detachment operating behind the battle formations of the division units (the head of the detachment, State Security Lieutenant Filatov), ​​took decisive measures, stopped the soldiers retreating in disarray and returned them to the previously occupied defense lines.
In another sector of this division, the enemy tried to break into the depths of the defense. The barrier detachment entered the battle and delayed the enemy's advance.

September 14 this year The enemy launched an offensive against units of the 399th Division of the 62nd Army, which were defending the city of Stalingrad. The soldiers and commanders of the 396th and 472nd regiments began to retreat in panic, leaving the lines. The head of the barrier detachment (junior lieutenant of state security Yelman) ordered his detachment to open fire over the heads of the retreating people. As a result, the personnel of these regiments were stopped and after 2 hours the regiments occupied their previous lines of defense.

September 20 this year the enemy occupied the eastern outskirts of Melekhovskaya. The combined brigade, under enemy pressure, began an unauthorized retreat to another line. The actions of the barrier detachment of the 47th Army of the Black Sea Group of Forces restored order in the brigade. The brigade occupied its previous positions and, on the initiative of the political instructor of the company of the same detachment, Pestov, joint actions with the brigade, the enemy was driven back from Melekhovskaya.

At critical moments, when support was needed to hold occupied lines, the barrage detachments directly engaged the enemy, successfully holding back his onslaught and inflicting losses on him.
On September 13 of this year, the 112th division, under enemy pressure, withdrew from its occupied line. The barrier detachment of the 62nd Army, under the leadership of the detachment chief (state security lieutenant Khlystov), ​​took up defense on the approaches to an important height. For 4 days, the soldiers and commanders of the detachment repelled attacks by enemy machine gunners and inflicted heavy losses on them. The barrier detachment held the line until the military units arrived.

September 15-16 this year The barrier detachment of the 62nd Army successfully fought against superior enemy forces in the railway area for 2 days. station of Stalingrad. Despite its small numbers, the barrier detachment not only repelled enemy attacks, but also attacked him, causing him significant losses in manpower. The detachment left its line only when units of the 10th Infantry Division arrived to replace it.

A number of facts were noted when barrage detachments were used incorrectly by individual commanders of formations. A significant number of barrage detachments were sent into battle along with linear units, which suffered losses, as a result of which they were withdrawn for reorganization and barrage service was not carried out.
September 19th The command of the 240th division of the Voronezh Front, one of the companies of the barrier detachment of the 38th Army, gave a combat mission to clear the grove of a group of German machine gunners. In the battles for the grove, this company lost 31 people, of which 18 were killed.

Barrier detachment of the 29th Army Western Front, being operationally subordinate to the commander of the 246th division, was used as a combat unit. Taking part in one of the attacks, a detachment of 118 personnel lost 109 people killed and wounded, and therefore was re-formed.

According to the 6th Army of the Voronezh Front, according to the order of the Military Council of the Army, 2 barrage detachments were formed on September 4th. 174 troops were assigned to the division and brought into battle. As a result, the barrier detachments lost up to 70% of their personnel in battle; the remaining fighters of these barrier detachments were transferred to the named division and thus disbanded.
3rd detachment of the same army on September 10 this year. was put on the defensive.

In the 1st Guards Army of the Don Front, by order of army commander Chistyakov 59 and member of the Military Council Abramov 60, 2 barrage detachments were repeatedly sent into battle as ordinary units. As a result, the units lost more than 65% of their personnel and were subsequently disbanded. In this regard, the order of the Front Military Council to transfer 5 barrage detachments to the subordination of the 24th Army was not carried out.

Signature (Kazakevich)

Army General Hero Soviet Union P. N. Lashchenko:
Yes, there were barrage detachments. But I don’t know that any of them fired at their own people, at least on our sector of the front. I have already requested archival documents on this matter, but no such documents were found. The barrier detachments were located at a distance from the front line, covered the troops from the rear from saboteurs and enemy landings, detained deserters, who, unfortunately, were there; they restored order at the crossings and sent soldiers who had strayed from their units to assembly points. I will say more, the front received reinforcements, naturally, unfired, as they say, not having smelled gunpowder, and the barrage detachments, consisting exclusively of soldiers who had already been fired upon, the most persistent and courageous, were, as it were, the reliable and strong shoulder of the eldest. It often happened that the barrier detachments found themselves eye to eye with the same German tanks, chains of German machine gunners and suffered heavy losses in battles. This is an irrefutable fact.

First of all, from this eloquent document it becomes clear why the topic of barrage detachments was hushed up during the Soviet era. We were all brought up on the postulates of nationwide resistance to the enemy, selfless devotion Soviet people their homeland, the mass heroism of Soviet soldiers.

These ideological guidelines somehow begin to be eroded when you read in this document that within the Stalingrad Front alone, by mid-October 1942, more than 15 thousand fugitives from the front were detained by the detachment detachments, and along the entire line of the Soviet-German front more than 140 thousand, i.e. e. numbering more than ten full-blooded divisions. At the same time, it is quite clear that not everyone who fled from the front was detained. At best, half.

One can only be surprised that such detachments were not created back in 1941. After all, before our eyes there was an excellent example of the Wehrmacht, which had in its structure a field gendarmerie (Feldgendarmerie), which, having professionally trained officers and soldiers, was engaged in catching fugitives, identifying malingerers and crossbows, establishing order in the rear, and clearing rear units of surplus soldiers.

Getting acquainted with the figures in the report, you come to the inevitable conclusion that the creation of brigade detachments was a necessary and much belated measure. The liberalism of Stalin and his party circle, instead of harsh disciplinary measures, which were fully justified in war conditions, led to attempts to use ideological indoctrination and, in fact, persuasion of soldiers with the help of an outrageously bloated and extremely ineffective political apparatus, and led us to the banks of the Volga. Who knows, if instead of reviving the institution of military commissars in the summer of 1941, detachments had been created, then Stalingrad would have remained a distant rear city on the Volga.

Note that soon after the creation of the barrier detachments, the institution of military commissars was finally abolished.

Whatever one may say, associations suggest themselves: there are commissars - there are no victories, there are no commissars, but there are detachments - there are victories.

More interesting numbers. Of the 140,755 detained military personnel, only 3,980 people were arrested, 1,189 people were shot, 2,776 people (i.e., soldiers and sergeants) were sent to penal companies, 185 people (i.e., officers) were sent to penal battalions, 131,094 were returned to their units and to transit points. person. A very lenient attitude towards those fleeing from the front. In total, 9.5 thousand out of 141 thousand worthy of the most severe measures were repressed.

Well, if necessary, the barrage detachments themselves entered into battle with the Germans, often saving the situation.

As many war participants testify, barrier detachments did not exist everywhere. According to Marshal of the Soviet Union D.T. Yazov, they were completely absent on a number of fronts operating in the northern and northwestern directions.

The version that the barrier detachments were “guarding” the penal units also does not stand up to criticism. The company commander of the 8th separate penal battalion of the 1st Belorussian Front, retired Colonel A.V. Pyltsyn, who fought from 1943 until the Victory, states: “Under no circumstances were there any barrier detachments behind our battalion, nor were others used deterrent measures. There was just never such a need for it.”

Famous writer Hero of the Soviet Union V.V. Karpov, who fought in the 45th separate penal company on the Kalinin Front, also denies the presence of barrier detachments behind the battle formations of their unit.

In reality, the outposts of the army barrier detachment were located at a distance of 1.5–2 km from the front line, intercepting communications in the immediate rear. They did not specialize in penalties, but checked and detained everyone whose presence outside the military unit aroused suspicion.

Did the barrage detachments use weapons to prevent the unauthorized withdrawal of line units from their positions? This aspect of their military activity is sometimes covered in an extremely speculative manner.

The documents show how the combat practice of barrage detachments developed during one of the most intense periods of the war, in the summer and autumn of 1942. From August 1 (the moment of formation) to October 15, they detained 140,755 military personnel who “escaped from the front line.” Of these: 3980 were arrested, 1189 were shot, 2776 were sent to penal companies, 185 were sent to penal battalions, the overwhelming number of detainees was returned to their units and to transit points - 131,094 people. The statistics presented show that the absolute majority of military personnel were able to continue fighting without any loss of rights, previously various reasons those who left the front line - more than 91%.

War veteran Mikhail Borisovich Levin:
The order is extremely cruel, terrible in its essence, but to be honest, in my opinion, it was necessary...

This order “sobered up” many, forced them to come to their senses...
As for the barrier detachments, I only encountered their “activities” once at the front. In one of the battles in the Kuban, our right flank trembled and fled, so the barrier detachment opened fire, where across, where directly at those fleeing... After that, I never saw a barrier detachment near the front line. If a critical situation arose in battle, then in the rifle regiment the functions of barrier detachments - to stop those scurrying in panic - were performed by a reserve rifle company or a regimental company of machine gunners.

Book of memory. - Infantrymen. Levin Mikhail Borisovich. Hero of the Second World War. Project I Remember

War participant A. Dergaev:
Nowadays there is a lot of talk about barrier detachments. We stood in the immediate rear. Directly behind the infantry, but I didn't see them. That is, they were probably somewhere, perhaps even further behind us. But we haven't encountered them. Several years ago we were invited to a Rosenbaum concert at the Oktyabrsky Concert Hall. He sings a song in which the following words: “... we dug a trench in full height. The German is hitting us right in the forehead, and behind us is a barrage detachment...” I was sitting on the balcony and, unable to bear it, jumped up and shouted: “Shame! A shame!" And the whole audience swallowed it. During the break, I tell them: “They are making fun of you, but you are silent.” He still sings these songs. In general, we did not see women at the front, nor did the NKVD.

Book of memory. - Artillerymen. Dergaev Andrey Andreevich. Hero of the Second World War

As for the criminals, the most severe measures were applied to them. This applied to deserters, defectors, imaginary patients, and self-inflicted shooters. It happened - and they shot me in front of the line. But the decision to carry out this extreme measure was made not by the commander of the barrier detachment, but by the military tribunal of the division (no lower) or, in individual, pre-agreed cases, by the head of the special department of the army.

In exceptional situations, fighters of the barrage detachments could open fire over the heads of the retreating troops. We admit that individual cases of shooting at people in the heat of battle could have occurred: fighters and commanders of barrier detachments in difficult situation The shutter speed could have changed. But there is no basis to assert that this was everyday practice. Cowards and alarmists were shot individually in front of the line. Punishments, as a rule, are only the initiators of panic and flight.

Let us give several typical examples from the history of the Battle of the Volga. On September 14, 1942, the enemy launched an offensive against units of the 399th rifle division 62nd Army. When the soldiers and commanders of the 396th and 472nd rifle regiments began to retreat in panic, the head of the barrier detachment, junior lieutenant of state security Yelman, ordered his squad to open fire over the heads of the retreating people. This forced the personnel to stop, and two hours later the regiments occupied their previous defensive lines.

October 15 near Stalingrad tractor plant The enemy managed to reach the Volga and cut off from the main forces of the 62nd Army the remnants of the 112th Infantry Division, as well as three (115, 124 and 149th) separate rifle brigades. Succumbing to panic, a number of military personnel, including commanders of various levels, tried to abandon their units and, under various pretexts, cross to the eastern bank of the Volga. To prevent this, a task force under the leadership of senior intelligence officer Lieutenant of State Security Ignatenko, created by a special department of the 62nd Army, set up a barrier. In 15 days, up to 800 rank and file and command personnel were detained and returned to the battlefield, 15 alarmists, cowards and deserters were shot in front of the line. The barrier detachments acted similarly later.

The blocking detachments, as documents show, had to support the faltering, retreating units and units themselves, and intervene in the course of the battle in order to bring a turning point in it, more than once, as documents show. Reinforcements arriving at the front were, naturally, not fired upon, and in this situation, the barrage detachments, formed from persistent, fired upon, with strong front-line hardened commanders and fighters, provided a reliable shoulder for the linear units.

Thus, during the defense of Stalingrad on August 29, 1942, the headquarters of the 29th Infantry Division of the 64th Army was surrounded by enemy tanks that had broken through. The barrier detachment not only stopped the soldiers retreating in disarray and returned them to previously occupied defense lines, but also entered the battle itself. The enemy was driven back.

On September 13, when the 112th Rifle Division, under enemy pressure, retreated from the occupied line, the defense detachment of the 62nd Army under the command of State Security Lieutenant Khlystov took over the defense. For several days, the soldiers and commanders of the detachment repelled the attacks of enemy machine gunners until the approaching units took up defensive positions. This was the case in other sectors of the Soviet-German front.

With the turning point in the situation that came after the victory at Stalingrad, the participation of defensive formations in battles increasingly turned out to be not only spontaneous, dictated by a dynamically changing situation, but also the result of a pre-made decision of the command. The army commanders tried to use the units that were left without “work” with maximum benefit in matters not related to the protective service.

Facts of this kind were reported to Moscow by State Security Major V.M. in mid-October 1942. Kazakevich. For example, on the Voronezh Front, by order of the military council of the 6th Army, two defensive detachments were assigned to the 174th Infantry Division and brought into battle. As a result, they lost up to 70% of their personnel, the remaining soldiers were transferred to replenish the named division, and the units had to be disbanded. The barrier detachment of the 29th Army of the Western Front was used as a linear unit by the commander of the 246th Infantry Division, under whose operational subordination the detachment was. Taking part in one of the attacks, a detachment of 118 personnel lost 109 people killed and wounded, and therefore had to be re-formed.

The reasons for objections from special departments are clear. But, it seems, it was no coincidence that from the very beginning the barrage detachments were subordinated to the army command, and not to military counterintelligence agencies. The People's Commissar of Defense, of course, meant that barrage formations would and should be used not only as a barrier for retreating units, but also as the most important reserve for direct combat operations.

As the situation on the fronts changed, with the transfer of strategic initiative to the Red Army and the beginning of the mass expulsion of the occupiers from the territory of the USSR, the need for barrier detachments began to sharply decrease. The order “Not a step back!” completely lost its former meaning. On October 29, 1944, Stalin issued an order acknowledging that “due to the change in the general situation at the fronts, the need for further maintenance of barrage detachments has ceased.” By November 15, 1944, they were disbanded, and the personnel of the detachments were sent to replenish the rifle divisions.

Thus, the barrage detachments not only acted as a barrier that prevented deserters, alarmists, and German agents from penetrating into the rear; they not only returned military personnel who had lagged behind their units to the front line, but also led direct fighting with the enemy, making a contribution to achieving victory over Nazi Germany.

A new stage in the history of the barrier detachments began in the summer of 1942, when the Germans broke through to the Volga and the Caucasus. On July 28, the famous order No. 227 of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR I.V. Stalin was issued, which, in particular, prescribed:

"2. To the military councils of the armies and, above all, to the commanders of the armies:

[...] b) form within the army 3-5 well-armed barrage detachments (200 people each), place them in the immediate rear of unstable divisions and oblige them in the event of panic and disorderly withdrawal of division units to shoot panickers and cowards on the spot and thereby help honest division fighters fulfill their duty to the Motherland” (The Stalingrad epic: Materials of the NKVD of the USSR and military censorship from the Central Archive of the FSB of the Russian Federation. M., 2000. P. 445).

In pursuance of this order, the commander of the troops of the Stalingrad Front, Lieutenant General V.N. Gordov, issued his order No. 00162/op on August 1, 1942, which prescribed:

"5. The commanders of the 21st, 55th, 57th, 62nd, 63rd, 65th armies are to form five barrage detachments within two days, and the commanders of the 1st and 4th tank armies are to form three barrage detachments of 200 people each.

Subordinate the barrage detachments to the Military Councils of the armies through their special departments. Place the most combat-experienced special officers at the head of the barrage detachments.

The barrage detachments will be staffed with the best selected fighters and commanders from the Far Eastern divisions.

Provide barrier detachments with vehicles.

6. Within two days, restore in each rifle division the barrage battalions formed according to the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command No. 01919.

The defense battalions of the divisions will be equipped with the best worthy fighters and commanders. Report execution by August 4, 1942.” (TsAMO. F.345. Op.5487. D.5. L.706).

From the message of the Special Department of the NKVD of the Stalingrad Front to the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR dated August 14, 1942 “On the progress of the implementation of order No. 227 and the response of the personnel of the 4th Tank Army to it”:

“In total, 24 people were shot during the specified period of time. So, for example, the commanders of the 414th SP, 18th SD Styrkov and Dobrynin, during the battle, became cowardly, abandoned their squads and fled from the battlefield, both were detained by barriers. by detachment and by resolution of the Special Division they were shot in front of the formation.

A Red Army soldier from the same regiment and division, Ogorodnikov, self-injured his left hand and was convicted of the crime, for which he was put on trial by a military tribunal. [...]

Based on order No. 227, three army detachments were formed, each with 200 people. These units are fully armed with rifles, machine guns and light machine guns.

Operative workers of special departments were appointed heads of detachments.

As of August 7, 1942, the indicated barrier detachments and barrier battalions detained 363 people in units and formations in army sectors, of which: 93 people. escaped encirclement, 146 lagged behind their units, 52 lost their units, 12 came from captivity, 54 fled from the battlefield, 2 with dubious wounds.

As a result of a thorough check: 187 people were sent to their units, 43 to the staffing department, 73 to special NKVD camps, 27 to penal companies, 2 to a medical commission, 6 people. – arrested and, as stated above, 24 people. shot in front of the line"

(The Stalingrad epic: Materials of the NKVD of the USSR and military censorship from the Central Archive of the FSB of the Russian Federation. M., 2000. P. 181-182).

In accordance with NKO order No. 227, as of October 15, 1942, 193 army barrage detachments were formed, including 16 on the Stalingrad Front (the discrepancy between this figure and the order of Lieutenant General Gordov cited above is explained by a change in the composition of the Stalingrad Front, from which a number were withdrawn armies) and 25 on Donskoy.

Moreover, from August 1 to October 15, 1942, barrier detachments detained 140,755 military personnel who had escaped from the front line. Of those detained, 3,980 people were arrested, 1,189 people were shot, 2,776 people were sent to penal companies, 185 people were sent to penal battalions, 131,094 people were returned to their units and transit points.

The largest number of detentions and arrests were made by the barrage detachments of the Don and Stalingrad fronts. On the Don Front, 36,109 people were detained, 736 people were arrested, 433 people were shot, 1,056 people were sent to penal companies, 33 people were sent to penal battalions, 32,933 people were returned to their units and transit points. On the Stalingrad Front, 15,649 people were detained, 244 people were arrested, 278 people were shot, 218 people were sent to penal companies, 42 to penal battalions, 14,833 people were returned to their units and transit points.

During the defense of Stalingrad, barrage detachments played an important role in establishing order in units and preventing unorganized withdrawal from occupied lines, returning a significant number of military personnel to the front line.

Thus, on August 29, 1942, the headquarters of the 29th Infantry Division of the 64th Army of the Stalingrad Front was surrounded by enemy tanks that had broken through, and units of the division, having lost control, retreated to the rear in panic. The barrier detachment under the command of State Security Lieutenant Filatov, taking decisive measures, stopped the soldiers retreating in disarray and returned them to the previously occupied defense lines. In another sector of this division, the enemy tried to break through into the depths of the defense. The barrier detachment entered the battle and delayed the enemy's advance.

On September 14, the enemy launched an offensive against units of the 399th Infantry Division of the 62nd Army. The soldiers and commanders of the 396th and 472nd rifle regiments began to retreat in panic. The head of the barrier detachment, junior lieutenant of state security Yelman, ordered his detachment to open fire over the heads of the retreating people. As a result, the personnel of these regiments were stopped and two hours later the regiments occupied their previous lines of defense.

On September 20, the Germans occupied the eastern outskirts of Melekhovskaya. The combined brigade, under enemy pressure, began an unauthorized withdrawal. The actions of the barrier detachment of the 47th Army of the Black Sea Group of Forces brought order to the brigade. The brigade occupied its previous positions and, on the initiative of the political instructor of the company of the same barrier detachment, Pestov, through joint actions with the brigade, the enemy was driven back from Melekhovskaya.

At critical moments, the barrage detachments directly engaged the enemy and successfully held back their onslaught. Thus, on September 13, the 112th Rifle Division, under enemy pressure, withdrew from its occupied line. The barrier detachment of the 62nd Army, under the leadership of the detachment chief, State Security Lieutenant Khlystov, took up defense on the approaches to an important height. For four days, the soldiers and commanders of the detachment repelled attacks by enemy machine gunners, inflicting heavy losses on them. The barrier detachment held the line until the military units arrived.

On September 15-16, the barrier detachment of the 62nd Army successfully fought against superior enemy forces in the area of ​​the Stalingrad railway station for two days. Despite its small numbers, the barrier detachment not only repelled German attacks, but also counterattacked, inflicting significant losses in manpower on the enemy. The detachment left its line only when units of the 10th Infantry Division arrived to replace it.

In addition to the army barrier detachments created in accordance with Order No. 227 during Battle of Stalingrad Restored barrage battalions of divisions operated, as well as small barrage detachments staffed by NKVD soldiers under special departments of divisions and armies. At the same time, army barrage detachments and division barrage battalions carried out barrage duty directly behind the combat formations of units, preventing panic and mass flight of military personnel from the battlefield, while security platoons of special departments of divisions and companies under special army departments were used to perform barrage duty on the main communications of divisions and armies in order to detain cowards, alarmists, deserters and other criminal elements hiding in the army and front-line rear.

However, in a situation where the very concept of the rear was very conditional, this “division of labor” was often violated. Thus, on October 15, 1942, during fierce battles in the area of ​​the Stalingrad Tractor Plant, the enemy managed to reach the Volga and cut off the remnants of the 112th Infantry Division, as well as the 115th, 124th and 149th separate from the main forces of the 62nd Army. rifle brigades. At the same time, there were repeated attempts among the senior command staff to abandon their units and cross to the eastern bank of the Volga. Under these conditions, to combat cowards and alarmists, a special department of the 62nd Army created an operational group under the leadership of senior intelligence officer Lieutenant of State Security Ignatenko. Having united the remnants of the platoons of special departments with the personnel of the 3rd army barrier detachment, she did an exceptionally great job of restoring order, detaining deserters, cowards and alarmists who tried to cross to the left bank of the Volga under various pretexts. Within 15 days, the task force detained and returned to the battlefield up to 800 privates and command personnel, and 15 military personnel, by order of special authorities, were shot in front of the line.

In the memorandum of the Special Department of the NKVD of the Don Front, dated February 17, 1943, to the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR, “On the work of special agencies to combat cowards and alarmists in parts of the Don Front for the period from October 1, 1942 to February 1, 1943,” a number of examples of actions are given. barrage detachments:

“In the fight against cowards, alarmists and the restoration of order in units that showed instability in battles with the enemy, army barrier detachments and division barrier battalions played an exceptionally large role.

So, on October 2, 1942, during the offensive of our troops, separate units of the 138th infantry division, met by powerful artillery and mortar fire from the enemy, faltered and fled in panic back through the battle formations of the 1st battalion of the 706th joint venture, 204th infantry regiment, which were in the second echelon.

Thanks to the measures taken by the command and the division's barrage battalion, the situation was restored. 7 cowards and alarmists were shot in front of the line, and the rest were returned to the front line.

On October 16, 1942, during an enemy counterattack, a group of Red Army soldiers of the 781st and 124th divisions, numbering 30 people, showed cowardice and began to flee from the battlefield in panic, dragging other military personnel with them.

The army barrier detachment of the 21st Army, located in this area, eliminated the panic by force of arms and restored the previous situation.

November 19, 1942, during the offensive of units of the 293rd division, during an enemy counterattack, two mortar platoons of the 1306th joint venture, together with platoon commanders, ml. Lieutenants Bogatyrev and Egorov, without an order from the command, left the occupied line and, in panic, throwing away their weapons, began to flee from the battlefield.

A platoon of machine gunners from an army barrage detachment located in this area stopped the fleeing people and, having shot two panickers in front of the line, returned the rest to their previous lines, after which they successfully moved forward.

On November 20, 1942, during an enemy counterattack, one of the companies of the 38th Infantry Division, which was at a height, offering no resistance to the enemy, began to randomly retreat from the occupied area without orders from the command.

The 83rd barrage detachment of the 64th Army, serving as a barrage directly behind the battle formations of the 38th SD units, stopped the fleeing company in panic and returned it back to the previously occupied area of ​​the heights, after which the company personnel showed exceptional endurance and tenacity in battles with the enemy" (Stalingrad Epic. .. P.409-410).

End of the road

After the defeat Nazi troops near Stalingrad and victories at Kursk Bulge a turning point came in the war. The strategic initiative passed to the Red Army. In this situation, barrage detachments lost their former importance. On August 25, 1944, the head of the political department of the 3rd Baltic Front, Major General A. Lobachev, sent a memo to the head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, Colonel General Shcherbakov, “On the shortcomings of the activities of the front troops’ barrier detachments” with the following content:

“According to my instructions, workers of the front control department in August checked the activities of six barrier detachments (a total of 8 barrier detachments).

As a result of this work it was established:

1. Detachments do not perform their direct functions established by order of the People's Commissar of Defense. Most of the personnel of the barrier detachments are used to protect army headquarters, protect communication lines, roads, comb forests, etc. The activities of the 7th barrier detachment of the 54th Army are typical in this regard. According to the list, the detachment consists of 124 people. They are used like this: the 1st machine gun platoon guards the 2nd echelon of the army headquarters; The 2nd machine gun platoon is assigned to the 111th infantry regiment with the task of guarding communication lines from the corps to the army; a rifle platoon attached to the 7th infantry squadron with the same task; the machine gun platoon is in the reserve of the detachment commander; 9 people work in departments of the army headquarters, including platoon commander Art. Lieutenant GONCHAR is the commandant of the army logistics department; the remaining 37 people are used at the headquarters of the barrier detachment. Thus, the 7th barrier detachment is not involved in barrier service at all. The same situation is in other detachments (5, 6, 153, 21, 50)

In the 5th barrier detachment of the 54th Army of 189 people. There are only 90 people on staff. guard the army command post and barrage service, and the remaining 99 people. used on various works: 41 people – in the service of the army headquarters as cooks, shoemakers, tailors, storekeepers, clerks, etc.; 12 people – in departments of the army headquarters as liaison officers and orderlies; 5 people - at the disposal of the headquarters commandant and 41 people. serve the headquarters of the barrier detachment.

In the 6th detachment of 169 people. 90 soldiers and sergeants are used to protect the command post and communication lines, and the rest are on chores.

2. In a number of barrier detachments, the staffing levels of the headquarters were extremely swollen. Instead of the required staff of 15 people. The headquarters of the 5th barrier detachment numbers 41 officers, sergeants and privates; 7th barrier detachment - 37 people, 6th barrier detachment - 30 people, 153rd barrier detachment - 30 people. etc.

3. Army headquarters do not exercise control over the activities of the barrier detachments, left them to their own devices, and reduced the role of the barrier detachments to that of ordinary commandant companies. Meanwhile, the personnel of the barrier detachments were selected from the best, proven fighters and sergeants, participants in many battles, awarded orders and medals of the Soviet Union. In the 21st detachment of the 67th Army out of 199 people. 75% of the battle participants, many of them were awarded. In the 50th detachment, 52 people were awarded for military merits.

4. Lack of control on the part of the headquarters has led to the fact that in most of the detachments, military discipline is at a low level, people have disbanded. Over the past three months, 30 penalties have been imposed on soldiers and sergeants in the 6th Detachment for gross violations of military discipline. It's no better in other squads...

5. Political departments and deputy. The chiefs of staff of the armies, politically, forgot about the existence of the barrier detachments and do not lead party political work...

He reported to the Front Military Council about the discovered shortcomings in the activities of detachments 15.8. At the same time, he gave instructions to the heads of the political departments of the armies about the need to radically improve the party-political and educational work in detachments; revitalizing the internal party activities of party organizations, strengthening work with party and Komsomol activists, conducting lectures and reports for personnel, improving cultural services for soldiers, sergeants and officers of detachments.

Conclusion: The majority of the barrier detachments do not carry out the tasks specified by the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 227. Security of headquarters, roads, communication lines, performance of various economic works and assignments, servicing commanders-chiefs, supervision of internal order in the rear of the army is in no way included in the functions of the barrier detachments of the front troops.

I consider it necessary to raise the question before People's Commissar defense on the reorganization or disbandment of barrier detachments, as having lost their purpose in the present situation" (Military Historical Journal. 1988. No. 8. P. 79-80).

Two months later, the People’s Commissar of Defense I.V. Stalin’s order No. 0349 dated October 29, 1944 “On the disbandment of individual barrage detachments” was issued:

“Due to the change in the general situation at the fronts, the need for further maintenance of barrage detachments has disappeared.

I order:

The personnel of the disbanded detachments will be used to replenish rifle divisions.

So, the barrage detachments detained deserters and suspicious elements in the rear of the front, and stopped the retreating troops. In a critical situation, they often themselves entered into battle with the Germans, and when the military situation changed in our favor, they began to serve as commandant companies. While carrying out its direct tasks, the barrier detachment could open fire over the heads of fleeing units or shoot cowards and panickers in front of the formation - but certainly on an individual basis. However, none of the researchers have yet been able to find a single fact in the archives that would confirm that the barrage detachments fired to kill their own troops.

Such cases are not cited in the memoirs of front-line soldiers.

For example, in the Military Historical Journal, an article by Hero of the Soviet Union, Army General P.N. Lashchenko, says the following on this matter:

“Yes, there were barrage detachments. But I don’t know that any of them fired at their own people, at least on our sector of the front. I have already requested archival documents on this matter, but no such documents were found. The barrier detachments were located at a distance from the front line, covered the troops from the rear from saboteurs and enemy landings, detained deserters, who, unfortunately, were there; they restored order at the crossings and sent soldiers who had strayed from their units to assembly points.

I will say more, the front received reinforcements, naturally, unfired, as they say, not having smelled gunpowder, and the barrage detachments, consisting exclusively of soldiers who had already been fired upon, the most persistent and courageous, were, as it were, the reliable and strong shoulder of the eldest. It often happened that the barrier detachments found themselves eye to eye with the same German tanks, chains of German machine gunners and suffered heavy losses in battles. This is an irrefutable fact."

In almost the same words, A.G. Efremov, holder of the Order of Alexander Nevsky, described the activities of the barrier detachments in the Vladimirskie Vedomosti newspaper:

“Indeed, such detachments were deployed in threatening areas. These people are not some kind of monsters, but ordinary fighters and commanders. They played two roles. First of all, they prepared a defensive line so that the retreating forces could gain a foothold on it. Secondly, they stopped alarmism. When the turning point in the war came, I no longer saw these detachments.”

If you wish, you can bring dozens more memories of this kind, but those given along with the documents are quite enough to understand what the barrage detachments actually were.

Since the time of Khrushchev’s “thaw,” a myth was born about the NKVD barrage detachments, which allegedly shot retreating units of the Red Army with machine guns. After the collapse of the USSR, these nonsense flourished in full bloom.

In addition, supporters of this lie also claim that the majority of the population of the USSR allegedly did not want to fight, they were forced to defend the Stalinist regime “on pain of death.” By doing this they insult the memory of our valiant ancestors.

History of the creation of barrage detachments

The concept of a barrier detachment is quite vague - “a permanent or temporary military formation created to perform a combat or special mission.” It also fits the definition of “special forces”.

During the Great Patriotic War, the composition, functions, and departmental affiliation of the barrage detachments constantly changed.

At the beginning of February 1941, the NKVD was divided into the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs and the People's Commissariat. state security(NKGB).

Myths about barrage detachments

Military counterintelligence was separated from the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs and transferred to the People's Commissariat for Defense of the USSR Navy, where the Third Directorates of NPOs and the NKVMF of the USSR were created.

According to the directive, mobile control and barrage detachments were organized; they were supposed to detain deserters and suspicious elements near the front line. They received the right of preliminary investigation, after which the detainees were handed over to the judiciary.

In July 1941, the NKVD and NKGB were united again, the bodies of the Third Directorate of NGOs were transformed into special departments and became subordinate to the NKVD.

Special departments received the right to arrest deserters and, if necessary, shoot them.

Special departments had to fight spies, traitors, deserters, saboteurs, alarmists, and cowards.

By NKVD Order No. 00941 of July 19, 1941, separate rifle platoons were created at special departments of divisions and corps, and companies at special departments of armies, battalions at the fronts, they were staffed by NKVD troops.

These units became the so-called “barrage detachments.”

They had the right to organize a barricade service to prevent the escape of deserters, carefully check the documents of all military personnel, arrest deserters and conduct an investigation (within 12 hours) and transfer the case to a military tribunal. To send stragglers to their units, in exceptional cases, to immediately restore order at the front, the head of the special department received the right to shoot deserters.

In addition, the barrage detachments were supposed to identify and destroy enemy agents and check those who had escaped from German captivity.

Fight against bandits

Among the daily tasks of the barrage detachments was the fight against bandits. So, in June 1941, under the third department of the Baltic Fleet, a barrier detachment was formed - it was a maneuverable company on vehicles, reinforced by two armored cars. He operated on the territory of Estonia.

Since there were almost no cases of desertion in the area of ​​responsibility, the detachment with a group of operatives was sent to fight the Estonian Nazis. Their small gangs attacked individual military personnel and small units on the roads.

The actions of the barrier detachment significantly reduced the activity of Estonian bandits. The detachment also took part in the “cleansing” of the Virtsu Peninsula, which was liberated in mid-July 1941 by a counterattack by the 8th Army.

Along the way, the detachment met a German outpost and defeated it in battle. Conducted an operation to destroy bandits in Varla and the village. Tystamaa, Pärnov district, destroyed a counter-revolutionary organization in Tallinn.

In addition, the detachment participated in reconnaissance activities, sending three agents behind enemy lines. The two returned, they found out the location of German military installations, and they were attacked by Baltic Fleet aircraft.

During the battle for Tallinn, the detachment not only stopped and brought back those fleeing, but also held the defense itself. It was especially difficult on August 27, 1941, some units of the 8th Army fled, a barrier detachment stopped them, a counterattack was organized, the enemy was driven back - this played a decisive role in the successful evacuation of Tallinn.

During the battles for Tallinn, more than 60% of the detachment’s personnel and almost all the commanders were killed! And these are cowardly scum who shoot their own?

In Kronstadt the detachment was restored, and from September 7 it continued its service. Special departments of the Northern Front also fought against bandits.

By the beginning of September 1941, the military situation again became sharply complicated, so the Headquarters, at the request of the commander of the Bryansk Front, General A. I. Eremenko, allowed the creation of barrier detachments in those divisions that had proven themselves to be unstable.

A week later this practice was extended to all fronts.

The number of detachments was one battalion per division, one company per regiment. They were subordinate to the division commander and had vehicles for movement, several armored cars and tanks. Their task was to assist commanders and maintain discipline and order in units. They had the right to use weapons to stop the flight and eliminate the initiators of the panic.

That is, their difference from the barrier detachments under special departments of the NKVD, which were created to fight deserters and suspicious elements, is that army detachments were created in order to prevent the unauthorized escape of units.

They were larger (a battalion per division, not a platoon), and were staffed not by NKVD soldiers, but by Red Army soldiers. They had the right to shoot the initiators of panic and flight, and not to shoot those running.

As of October 10, 1941, special departments and detachments detained 657,364 people, 25,878 of them were arrested, 10,201 of them were shot. The rest were again sent to the front.

Barrage detachments also played a role in the defense of Moscow. In parallel with the defensive divisional battalions, there were detachments of special departments. Similar units were created by the territorial bodies of the NKVD, for example, in the Kalinin region.

Battle of Stalingrad

In connection with the breakthrough of the front and the Wehrmacht’s advance to the Volga and the Caucasus, on July 28, 1942, the famous order No. 227 of the NKO was issued.

According to it, it was prescribed to create 3-5 barrier detachments (200 soldiers in each) in the armies, placing them in the immediate rear of unstable units. They also received the right to shoot alarmists and cowards in order to restore order and discipline.

They were subordinate to the Military Councils of the armies, through their special departments. The most experienced commanders of special departments were placed at the head of the detachments, and the detachments were provided with transport. In addition, barrage battalions in each division were restored.

By order of the People's Commissariat of Defense No. 227, on October 15, 1942, 193 army detachments were created.

From August 1 to October 15, 1942, these detachments detained 140,755 Red Army soldiers. 3,980 people were arrested, 1,189 of them were shot, the rest were sent to penal units. Most of the arrests and detentions were on the Don and Stalingrad fronts.

The barrage detachments played an important role in restoring order and returned a significant number of military personnel to the front.

Myths about barrage detachments

For example: on August 29, 1942, the headquarters of the 29th Infantry Division was surrounded (due to a breakthrough by German tanks); the units, having lost control, retreated in panic. The barrage detachment of Lieutenant GB Filatov stopped the fleeing people and returned them to defensive positions. On another section of the division’s front, Filatov’s barrier detachment stopped the enemy’s breakthrough.

On September 20, the Wehrmacht occupied part of Melikhovskaya, and the combined brigade began an unauthorized retreat. The barrage detachment of the 47th Army of the Black Sea Group of Forces restored order in the brigade. The brigade returned to its position and, together with the barrier detachment, drove back the enemy.

That is, the barrier detachments did not panic in critical situations, but restored order and fought the enemy themselves.

On September 13, the 112th Rifle Division lost its positions under enemy attack. The barrier detachment of the 62nd Army under the command of State Security Lieutenant Khlystov repelled enemy attacks for four days and held the line until reinforcements arrived.

On September 15-16, the barrier detachment of the 62nd Army fought for two days in the area of ​​the Stalingrad railway station. The detachment, despite its small numbers, repulsed the enemy’s attacks and itself counterattacked and surrendered the line intact to units of the approaching 10th Infantry Division.

But there was also the use of barrier detachments for purposes other than their intended purpose; there were commanders who used them as linear units, because of this, some detachments lost most of their personnel and had to be formed anew.

During the Battle of Stalingrad, there were three types of barrage detachments: army ones, created by order No. 227, restored barrage battalions of divisions, and small detachments of special departments. As before, the overwhelming majority of detained fighters returned to their units.

Kursk Bulge

By decree of the Council of People's Commissars of April 19, 1943, the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD was again transferred to the NKO and the NKVMF and reorganized into the Main Counterintelligence Directorate "Smersh" ("Death to Spies") of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR and the Counterintelligence Directorate "Smersh" of the People's Commissariat of the Navy.

On July 5, 1943, the Wehrmacht began its offensive, some of our units wavered. The barrier detachments fulfilled their mission here too. From July 5 to July 10, barrier detachments of the Voronezh Front detained 1,870 people, 74 people were arrested, and the rest were returned to their units.

In total, the report of the head of the Counterintelligence Department of the Central Front, Major General A. Vadis, dated August 13, 1943, indicated that 4,501 people were detained, of which 3,303 were sent back to units.

On October 29, 1944, by order of the People's Commissar of Defense I.V. Stalin, the barrier detachments were disbanded due to changes in the situation at the front.

Personnel were replenished with rifle units. In the last period of their existence, they no longer acted according to their profile - there was no need. They were used to guard headquarters, communication lines, roads, to comb the forest; personnel were often used for logistical needs - as cooks, storekeepers, clerks, and so on, although the personnel of these detachments were selected from the best soldiers and sergeants, awarded medals and orders, who had extensive combat experience.

Let's summarize: the barrier detachments performed a very important function; they detained deserters and suspicious persons (among whom there were spies, saboteurs, and Nazi agents).

In critical situations, they themselves entered into battle with the enemy. After the situation at the front changed (after the Battle of Kursk), the barrage detachments actually began to serve as commandant companies.

To stop the fleeing, they had the right to shoot over the heads of the retreating, shoot the initiators and leaders in front of the line.

But these cases were not widespread, only individual. There is not a single fact that the fighters of the barrage detachments shot to kill their own people. There are no such examples in the memoirs of front-line soldiers. In addition, they could prepare an additional defensive line in the rear to stop the retreating ones and so that they could gain a foothold on it.

The truth about barrier detachments

The barrage detachments made their contribution to the overall Victory, honestly fulfilling their duty.

The barrage detachments of the Red Army became one of the darkest symbols of the Great Patriotic War. Songs in the spirit of “In 1943 this company was shot by a detachment,” films depicting bloody security officers driving soldiers into an attack, and similar cultural artifacts will be easily remembered by many fellow citizens. Meanwhile, the real history of the barrier detachments is much more dramatic...

The first detachments were created not by the sinister People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, but by army rear officers in the summer of 1941 in Belarus. Then the Soviet troops, defeated at the border, rolled back east of Minsk.
Confused soldiers and officers walked along the roads, often deprived of leadership and having lost their weapons. It was precisely in order to collect them and restore control that the first barrier detachments were created. Combat groups were put together from randomly retreating soldiers and commanders and sent to the front.
The experience of the first detachments was considered successful. In July 1941, such detachments began to be put together centrally. The defeated army of the Red Army was haunted by the same troubles that befell the vanquished at all times: panic, psychological breakdown and disorganization. Detaining deserters and collecting scattered units was dirty work, but it certainly had to be done.


Indicative, for example, is the report on the work of the barrier detachment of the 310th Infantry Division in the fall of 1941 near Leningrad:
“During this period, the barrage detachment of the 310th Infantry Division detained 740 soldiers and junior commanders who had left the battlefield and were following to the rear: 14 of them were sent to special departments of the divisions, the rest were returned to their units in an organized manner... The barrage detachments are being replenished random people. 310 sd. Soldiers detained in the rear of the division by the same detachment were sent to replenish the detachment.”
More than 600 thousand people passed through the barrier detachments during 1941, and it is easy to guess that they were usually not shot. Of the soldiers detained by the barrage detachments, more than 96% were simply sent back to their units. Those who remained were put under arrest, put on trial, and about a third of them were actually shot.
However, one should not think that the dead were sentenced to severe punishments just like that. Desertion flourished, and those who fled from the front line easily turned into robbers. The documents describe, for example, an incident that occurred in the rear of the Leningrad Front already during the blockade.
An armed deserter was captured during an attack on a grocery store. When detained, he actively fired back. On Volkhov Front in February 1942, a deserter was caught who had left with an entrusted car and a rifle. In the forest, he built himself a dugout and made a living by stealing livestock, and during his arrest he killed a man.


The image of an NKVD worker driving soldiers into an attack with a pistol is vivid, but factually incorrect. This stereotype is not without a real basis: often the core of the barrier detachment consisted of border guards who survived but were left without work. The border troops belonged specifically to the NKVD troops, and thus the stereotype about security officers with revolvers was born.
In reality, the barrier detachments were most often subordinated not to the NKVD, but to the army command. The People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs had its own barrier detachments that guarded communications, but never reached - either in number or in importance - the level of the army.
It should be noted that this measure is not at all unique to the Soviet Union. Back in 1915, during the Great Retreat of the Russian Army in the First World War, an order from General Brusilov was issued, which read:
“...You need to have especially reliable people and machine guns behind you, so that, if necessary, you can force the faint-hearted to go forward.” An order of a similar nature was published in his army by General Danilov of the old army: “It is the duty of every soldier loyal to Russia who notices an attempt to fraternize, to immediately shoot at the traitors.”


In the summer of 1942, the country came close to a total military disaster. One of the measures to restore order in the military rear was the withdrawal of barrier detachments to new level organizations. This is how the famous Order No. 227 appeared, popularly known as “Not a step back.”
Detachments, as we see, already existed and were operating, and the notorious order streamlined and spread more widely the already established practice. Their functions remained the same: catching deserters, returning those going to the rear to the front line and stopping uncontrolled retreats.
Has it ever happened that barrage detachments opened fire on their own? Yes, documents and memoirs record several cases when the escape of units from the battlefield was prevented by fire, and someone actually came under this fire.
Hero of the Soviet Union, General Pyotr Lashchenko, already in the 80s tried to clarify the issue of barrage detachments shooting at their troops. As a result, such cases, as expected, were not discovered, although the meticulous military leader requested documents from the then closed archives.


Much more often the barrier detachment could be found on the front line.
Despite their formally privileged status, during the campaigns of 1941 and 1942, the barrier detachments often had to engage in battle. The very structure of the barrier detachments - mobile units, well equipped with automatic weapons and vehicles - provoked their use as a mobile reserve. Let's say, the commander of the legendary 316th division Panfilov used his detachment of 150 people precisely as his own reserve.
In general, in practice, formation commanders often viewed the barrier detachment as an extra opportunity to strengthen units on the front line. This was seen as an undesirable but necessary practice in the absence of reserves.
For example, it was the barrier detachment of the 62nd Army in Stalingrad that fought for two days for the station at the critical moment of the first assault on the city on September 15–16. During the battles north of Stalingrad, two barrier detachments had to be disbanded altogether due to losses that reached 60–70% of their strength.


In the second half of the war, barrier detachments lost their former importance. There was less and less need to restore the rear of defeated units. In addition, the activities of the barrier detachments were duplicated by other formations, such as rear security units.
In 1944, the activities of the detachments lost their meaning. Their tasks were duplicated by other formations - including rear security troops belonging specifically to the NKVD, and commandant units. In the summer of 1944, the head of the Political Directorate of the 3rd Baltic Front, throwing up his hands, reported to the command:
“The barrier detachments do not fulfill their direct functions established by the order of the People's Commissar of Defense. Most of the personnel of the barrier detachments are used to protect army headquarters, protect communication lines, roads, comb forests, etc.
In a number of barrier detachments, the staffing levels of the headquarters were extremely swollen. Army headquarters do not exercise control over the activities of the barrier detachments, they left them to their own devices, and reduced the role of the barrier detachments to that of ordinary commandant companies. Meanwhile, the personnel of the barrier detachments were selected from the best, proven fighters and sergeants, participants in many battles, awarded orders and medals of the Soviet Union.”


The only truly useful function of the barrier detachments at this stage was clearing the rear from the remnants of the German encirclement, capturing former policemen and officials of the occupation administration who were trying to legalize or take refuge.
Of course, this situation did not suit the high command. Thousands of experienced, well-armed fighters would look much more at home on the front line. On October 29, 1944, the Red Army detachments were disbanded.
But the activity of the German field gendarmerie sharply increased. In the spring of 1945, people in Germany could be seen hanging with signs on their chests: “I am hanging here because I did not believe the Fuhrer” or “All traitors die like me.”
The most important terrible secret of the barrage detachments was that there was no terrible secret. Detachments are nothing more than the well-known military police; their functions throughout the war were exactly that.
Ultimately, the soldiers of the barrage detachments are ordinary soldiers of the most terrible war in the world, carrying out their combat missions. It makes no sense to idealize them, but demonizing these formations does not bring any benefit and, ultimately, only takes us away from the real idea of ​​the Great Patriotic War.

The army barrier detachment is a separate military unit with its own number, commander and headquarters. Their combat work is present in many documents of that war: reports, orders. reports....It seems easier to publish these documents stored in archives. They don't publish. Furthermore, research group G. Krivosheeva pretends to be hoses, writing in her “Book of Losses” only that “ None of the researchers have yet been able to find a single document in the archives that would confirm that the barrage detachments fired at their own." A precipitate remains: they didn’t shoot, but they were behind them?
It wasn’t like that, not like that at all (c). But as? Here's an example.
On March 22, 1942, G. Zhukov, in an order to the commanders of the 43rd, 49th, 50th and 5th Armies, noted that:
"The capture of each enemy stronghold should be entrusted to a special shock squad, specially selected, organized and put together"
and selection for these detachments is carried out personally by army commanders from
"the most trained and fired fighters and commanders."
In the 49th Army such detachments were created and they were called 166 and 167 separate army barrier detachments.
It was the capture of enemy strongholds that was the main goal of their combat work in the offensive, as can be seen from the order of Commander 49 I. Zakharkin No. 046 dated May 21, 1943, or more precisely from the appendices to it, Award sheets.
The website "Feat of the People" provides a link to this order, but, unfortunately, it does not work, so I give facts from these documents just below.
And in order to see this order, you need:
-go to the “Feat of the People” website and click the “Search for Awards” button;
-dial: Mityakin Semyon Mikhailovich 1913;
-on the list of awards that appears, click on the medal “For Courage”;
-click the "Line in order" button.
Order No. 046 will appear and by moving the cursor along the list (16 people) and pressing the “Award List” button you can read what these barrier detachments actually did in Rzhevsko-Vyazemskaya offensive operation Red Army in 1943.
Note: when on March 15, 1943, the 166th detachment attacked the German stronghold of Zavoron, Red Army soldier S. Mityakin, under enemy fire, carried 18 of his wounded comrades with their personal weapons from the battlefield, for which he was awarded the medal “For Courage.”
PS. And the facts from these documents are as follows:
1. The command of the barrier detachments are military officers, guardsmen, only the senior adjutant of the 167th barrier detachment is not a guardsman, but despite his youth - 21 years old and less than 2 years in the army, he is already a senior citizen. lieutenant, chief of staff, member of the CPSU (b) and 2 wounds in the battles of 41-42.
2. There is not a single abbreviation for NKVD.
3. 83% of the list have been fighting since the age of 41, have 9 wounds and personally killed 149 Germans in these battles, averaging 9:0 in favor of our fighters.
4. At the time of the 227th order in the 49th Army there was only one Guards formation - the 18th Guards. page division, former 133 Siberian page division. This is the division to whose personnel Stalin conveyed personal thanks for the battles in November 41 for Mednoye. So, the Siberian guards were at the head of the barrier detachments, at least in the 49th Army.
And the conclusion is simple: under the guise of Stalin’s menacing order, the command of the 49th Army received at its disposal 2 combat-strong detachments, but you never know for what purpose - this is not a shabby security company.
What about cowards and alarmists? Yes, it’s very simple - they were dealt with without leaving the cash register, using all available means. This is written very well in D. Loza’s memoirs “Tankman in a Foreign Car” in the chapter “Friendly Fire”.
By the way, D. Loza’s brigade operated in the same area as the 166th and 167th barrier detachments, only the brigade was south of Spas-Demensk, and those were to the north.