What time did Hitler actually attack the USSR? Plan Barbarossa German attack on the Soviet Union

On December 18, 1940, Hitler, in Directive No. 21, approved the final plan for the war against the USSR under the code name “Barbarossa”. To implement it, Germany and its allies in Europe - Finland, Romania and Hungary - created an invasion army unprecedented in history: 182 divisions and 20 brigades (up to 5 million people), 47.2 thousand guns and mortars, about 4.4 thousand . combat aircraft, 4.4 thousand tanks and assault guns, and 250 ships. The group of Soviet troops resisting the aggressors included 186 divisions (3 million people), about 39.4 guns and mortars, 11 thousand tanks and more than 9.1 thousand aircraft. These forces were not put on alert in advance. The directive of the Red Army General Staff on a possible German attack on June 22-23 was received in the western border districts only on the night of June 22, and already at dawn on June 22 the invasion began. After lengthy artillery preparation, at 4.00 in the morning, German troops, treacherously violating the non-aggression pact concluded with the USSR, attacked the Soviet-German border along its entire length from the Barents to the Black Sea. Soviet troops were taken by surprise. The organization of powerful counterattacks against the enemy was hampered by the fact that they were relatively evenly distributed along the entire front along the entire border and dispersed to great depths. With such a formation it was difficult to resist the enemy.

On June 22, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V.M. addressed the citizens of the Soviet Union on the radio. Molotov. He said, in particular: “This unheard-of attack on our country is a treachery unparalleled in the history of civilized peoples. The attack on our country was carried out despite the fact that a non-aggression treaty was concluded between the USSR and Germany.”

On June 23, 1941, the highest body of strategic leadership of the armed forces was created in Moscow - the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. All power in the country was concentrated in the hands of the State Defense Committee (GKO), formed on June 30. He was appointed Chairman of the State Defense Committee and Supreme Commander-in-Chief. The country began to implement a program of emergency measures under the motto: “Everything for the front! Everything for victory! The Red Army, however, continued to retreat. By mid-July 1941, German troops advanced 300-600 km deep into Soviet territory, capturing Lithuania, Latvia, almost all of Belarus, a significant part of Estonia, Ukraine and Moldova, creating a threat to Leningrad, Smolensk and Kyiv. A mortal danger loomed over the USSR.

OPERATIONAL REPORT No. 1 OF THE CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE RKKA ARMY GENERAL G.K. ZHUKOVA. 10.00, June 22, 1941

At 4.00 on June 22, 1941, the Germans, without any reason, raided our airfields and cities and crossed the border with ground troops...

1. Northern Front: the enemy, with a flight of bomber-type aircraft, violated the border and entered the region of Leningrad and Kronstadt...

2. Northwestern Front. At 4.00 the enemy opened artillery fire and at the same time began to bomb airfields and cities: Vindava, Libava, Kovno, Vilna and Shulyai...

W. Western Front. At 4.20, up to 60 enemy aircraft bombed Grodno and Brest. At the same time, the enemy opened artillery fire along the entire border of the Western Front... With ground forces, the enemy is developing an attack from the Suwalki area in the direction of Golynka, Dąbrowa and from the Stokołów area along the railway to Wolkowysk. The advancing enemy forces are being clarified. ...

4. Southwestern Front. At 4.20 the enemy began shelling our borders with machine-gun fire. From 4.30, enemy planes bombed the cities of Lyuboml, Kovel, Lutsk, Vladimir-Volynsky... At 4.35, after artillery fire in the Vladimir-Volynsky, Lyuboml area, enemy ground forces crossed the border developing an attack in the direction of Vladimir-Volynsky, Lyuboml and Krystynopol...

The front commanders have put into effect a cover plan and, through the active actions of mobile troops, are trying to destroy the enemy units that have crossed the border...

The enemy, having forestalled our troops in deployment, forced units of the Red Army to take battle in the process of occupying their initial position according to the cover plan. Using this advantage, the enemy managed to achieve partial success in certain areas.

Signature: Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army G.K. Zhukov

The Great Patriotic War - day after day: based on materials from declassified operational reports of the General Staff of the Red Army. M., 2008 .

RADIO SPEECH BY THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS OF THE USSR and PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR V.M. MOLOTOV June 22, 1941

Citizens and women of the Soviet Union!

The Soviet government and its head, Comrade Stalin, instructed me to make the following statement:

Today, at 4 o'clock in the morning, without presenting any claims to the Soviet Union, without declaring war, German troops attacked our country, attacked our borders in many places and bombed our cities from their planes - Zhitomir, Kyiv, Sevastopol, Kaunas and some others, and more than two hundred people were killed and wounded. Enemy aircraft raids and artillery shelling were also carried out from Romanian and Finnish territories.

This unheard-of attack on our country is a treachery unparalleled in the history of civilized nations. The attack on our country was carried out despite the fact that a non-aggression treaty was concluded between the USSR and Germany and the Soviet government fulfilled all the terms of this treaty in all good faith. The attack on our country was carried out despite the fact that during the entire duration of this treaty the German government could never make a single claim against the USSR regarding the implementation of the treaty. All responsibility for this predatory attack on the Soviet Union falls entirely on the German fascist rulers (...)

The government calls on you, citizens of the Soviet Union, to rally your ranks even more closely around our glorious Bolshevik Party, around our Soviet government, around our great leader Comrade. Stalin.

Our cause is just. The enemy will be defeated. Victory will be ours.

Foreign policy documents. T.24. M., 2000.

J. STALIN'S SPEECH ON RADIO, July 3, 1941

Comrades! Citizens!

Brothers and sisters!

Soldiers of our army and navy!

I am addressing you, my friends!

The treacherous military attack of Nazi Germany on our Motherland, which began on June 22, continues. Despite the heroic resistance of the Red Army, despite the fact that the enemy’s best divisions and the best units of his aviation have already been defeated and found their grave on the battlefield, the enemy continues to push forward, throwing new forces to the front (...)

History shows that there are no invincible armies and never have been. Napoleon's army was considered invincible, but it was defeated alternately by Russian, English, and German troops. Wilhelm's German army during the first imperialist war was also considered an invincible army, but it was defeated several times by Russian and Anglo-French troops and was finally defeated by Anglo-French troops. The same needs to be said about the current Nazi German army of Hitler. This army has not yet encountered serious resistance on the continent of Europe. Only on our territory did it encounter serious resistance (...)

It may be asked: how could it happen that the Soviet government agreed to conclude a non-aggression pact with such treacherous people and monsters as Hitler and Ribbentrop? Was there a mistake made here by the Soviet government? Of course not! A non-aggression pact is a peace pact between two states. This is exactly the kind of pact Germany offered us in 1939. Could the Soviet government refuse such a proposal? I think that not a single peace-loving state can refuse a peace agreement with a neighboring power, if at the head of this power are even such monsters and cannibals as Hitler and Ribbentrop. And this, of course, is subject to one indispensable condition - if the peace agreement does not affect either directly or indirectly the territorial integrity, independence and honor of the peace-loving state. As you know, the non-aggression pact between Germany and the USSR is just such a pact(...)

In the event of a forced withdrawal of units of the Red Army, it is necessary to hijack all rolling stock, not to leave the enemy a single locomotive, not a single carriage, not to leave the enemy a kilogram of bread or a liter of fuel (...) In areas occupied by the enemy, it is necessary to create partisan detachments, horse and foot, create sabotage groups to fight units of the enemy army, to incite partisan warfare anywhere, to blow up bridges, roads, damage telephone and telegraph communications, set fire to forests, warehouses, and carts. In occupied areas, create unbearable conditions for the enemy and all his accomplices, pursue and destroy them at every step, disrupt all their activities (...)

In this great war, we will have faithful allies in the people of Europe and America, including the German people, enslaved by Hitler’s bosses. Our war for the freedom of our Fatherland will merge with the struggle of the peoples of Europe and America for their independence, for democratic freedoms (...)

In order to quickly mobilize all the forces of the peoples of the USSR, to repel the enemy who treacherously attacked our Motherland, the State Defense Committee was created, in whose hands all power in the state is now concentrated. The State Defense Committee has begun its work and calls on all the people to rally around the party of Lenin - Stalin, around the Soviet government for selfless support of the Red Army and Red Navy, for the defeat of the enemy, for victory.

All our strength is in support of our heroic Red Army, our glorious Red Navy!

All the forces of the people are to defeat the enemy!

Forward, for our victory!

Stalin I. About the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union. M., 1947.

The art of war is a science in which nothing succeeds except what has been calculated and thought out.

Napoleon

Plan Barbarossa is a plan for a German attack on the USSR, based on the principle of lightning war, blitzkrieg. The plan began to be developed in the summer of 1940, and on December 18, 1940, Hitler approved a plan according to which the war was to end in November 1941 at the latest.

Plan Barbarossa was named after Frederick Barbarossa, the 12th century emperor who became famous for his campaigns of conquest. This contained elements of symbolism, to which Hitler himself and his entourage paid so much attention. The plan received its name on January 31, 1941.

Number of troops to implement the plan

Germany was preparing 190 divisions to fight the war and 24 divisions as reserves. 19 tank and 14 motorized divisions were allocated for the war. The total number of troops that Germany sent to the USSR, according to various estimates, ranges from 5 to 5.5 million people.

The apparent superiority in USSR technology is not worth taking into account, since by the beginning of the war, Germany's technical tanks and aircraft were superior to those of the Soviet Union, and the army itself was much more trained. Suffice it to recall the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940, where the Red Army demonstrated weakness in literally everything.

Direction of the main attack

Barbarossa's plan determined 3 main directions for attack:

• Army Group "South". A blow to Moldova, Ukraine, Crimea and access to the Caucasus. Further movement to the line Astrakhan - Stalingrad (Volgograd).
• Army Group "Center". Line "Minsk - Smolensk - Moscow". Advance to Nizhny Novgorod, aligning the Volna - Northern Dvina line.
• Army Group "North". Attack on the Baltic states, Leningrad and further advance to Arkhangelsk and Murmansk. At the same time, the “Norway” army was supposed to fight in the north together with the Finnish army.

Around the end of October 1941, the German command planned to reach the Volga - Northern Dvina line, thereby capturing the entire European part of the USSR. This was the plan for the lightning war. After the blitzkrieg, there should have been lands beyond the Urals, which, without the support of the center, would have quickly surrendered to the winner.

Until about mid-August 1941, the Germans believed that the war was going according to plan, but in September there were already entries in the diaries of officers that the Barbarossa plan had failed and the war would be lost. The best proof that Germany in August 1941 believed that there were only a few weeks left before the end of the war with the USSR was Goebbels’ speech. The Minister of Propaganda suggested that the Germans collect additional warm clothes for the needs of the army. The government decided that this step was not necessary, since there would be no war in the winter.

Implementation of the plan

The first three weeks of the war assured Hitler that everything was going according to plan. The army rapidly moved forward, winning victories, but the Soviet army suffered huge losses:

• 28 divisions out of 170 were put out of action.
• 70 divisions lost about 50% of their personnel.
• 72 divisions remained combat-ready (43% of those available at the start of the war).

Over the same 3 weeks, the average rate of advance of German troops deep into the country was 30 km per day.

By July 11, the Army Group “North” occupied almost the entire Baltic territory, providing access to Leningrad, the Army Group “Center” reached Smolensk, and the Army Group “South” reached Kyiv. These were the latest achievements that were fully consistent with the plan of the German command. After this, failures began (still local, but already indicative). Nevertheless, the initiative in the war until the end of 1941 was on the side of Germany.

Germany's failures in the North

Army “North” occupied the Baltic states without any problems, especially since there was practically no partisan movement there. The next strategic point to be captured was Leningrad. Here it turned out that the Wehrmacht was beyond its strength. The city did not capitulate to the enemy and until the end of the war, despite all efforts, Germany was unable to capture it.

Army Failures Center

Army "Center" reached Smolensk without problems, but was stuck near the city until September 10. Smolensk resisted for almost a month. The German command demanded a decisive victory and the advancement of troops, since such a delay near the city, which was planned to be taken without large losses, was unacceptable and called into question the implementation of the Barbarossa plan. As a result, the Germans took Smolensk, but their troops were pretty battered.

Historians today evaluate the Battle of Smolensk as a tactical victory for Germany, but a strategic victory for Russia, since it was possible to stop the advance of troops towards Moscow, which allowed the capital to prepare for defense.

The advance of the German army deep into the country was complicated by the partisan movement of Belarus.

Failures of the Army South

Army “South” reached Kyiv in 3.5 weeks and, like Army “Center” near Smolensk, was stuck in battle. Ultimately, it was possible to take the city due to the clear superiority of the army, but Kyiv held out almost until the end of September, which also hampered the advance of the German army and made a significant contribution to the disruption of Barbarossa’s plan.

Map of the German advance plan

Above is a map showing the German command's offensive plan. The map shows: in green – the borders of the USSR, in red – the border to which Germany planned to reach, in blue – the deployment and plan for the advancement of German troops.

General state of affairs

• In the North, it was not possible to capture Leningrad and Murmansk. The advance of the troops stopped.
• It was with great difficulty that the Center managed to reach Moscow. At the time the German army reached the Soviet capital, it was already clear that no blitzkrieg had happened.
• In the South it was not possible to take Odessa and seize the Caucasus. By the end of September, Hitler's troops had just captured Kyiv and launched an attack on Kharkov and Donbass.

Why Germany's blitzkrieg failed

Germany's blitzkrieg failed because the Wehrmacht prepared the Barbarossa plan, as it later turned out, based on false intelligence data. Hitler admitted this by the end of 1941, saying that if he had known the real state of affairs in the USSR, he would not have started the war on June 22.

The tactics of lightning war were based on the fact that the country has one line of defense on the western border, all large army units are located on the western border, and aviation is located on the border. Since Hitler was confident that all Soviet troops were located on the border, this formed the basis of the blitzkrieg - to destroy the enemy army in the first weeks of the war, and then quickly move deeper into the country without encountering serious resistance.

In fact, there were several lines of defense, the army was not located with all its forces on the western border, there were reserves. Germany did not expect this, and by August 1941 it became clear that the lightning war had failed and Germany could not win the war. The fact that the Second World War lasted right up to 1945 only proves that the Germans fought in a very organized and brave manner. Thanks to the fact that they had the economy of the whole of Europe behind them (speaking of the war between Germany and the USSR, many for some reason forget that the German army included units from almost all European countries) they were able to fight successfully.

Did Barbarossa's plan fail?

I propose to evaluate the Barbarossa plan according to 2 criteria: global and local. Global(reference point - the Great Patriotic War) - the plan was thwarted, since the lightning war did not work out, the German troops were bogged down in battles. Local(landmark – intelligence data) – the plan was carried out. The German command drew up the Barbarossa plan based on the assumption that the USSR had 170 divisions on the country’s border and there were no additional echelons of defense. There are no reserves or reinforcements. The army was preparing for this. In 3 weeks, 28 Soviet divisions were completely destroyed, and in 70, approximately 50% of the personnel and equipment were disabled. At this stage, the blitzkrieg worked and, in the absence of reinforcements from the USSR, gave the desired results. But it turned out that the Soviet command had reserves, not all troops were located on the border, mobilization brought high-quality soldiers into the army, there were additional lines of defense, the “charm” of which Germany felt near Smolensk and Kiev.

Therefore, the failure of the Barbarossa plan should be considered as a huge strategic mistake of German intelligence, led by Wilhelm Canaris. Today, some historians connect this man with English agents, but there is no evidence of this. But if we assume that this is really the case, then it becomes clear why Canaris palmed Hitler off with the absolute lie that the USSR was not ready for war and all the troops were located on the border.

The celebration of Victory Day has ended, but another, mourning date, this time, lies ahead - June 22, 1941. On the eve of the next anniversary of Hitler's Germany's attack on the Soviet Union, it would be useful to recall the circumstances of Adolf Hitler's decision to make this decision. This article was written by me as a continuation of the article by A.V. Ognev - front-line soldier, professor, honored worker of science - "Exposing the falsifiers. The Barbarossa plan was signed", in which the author proves that "Germany began to prepare for aggression against the USSR immediately after the surrender of France." In my opinion, this conclusion of A.V. Ogneva requires clarification - Hitler made the decision to attack the USSR not immediately AFTER the surrender of France, but immediately after the start of the evacuation of the Allies from Dunkirk, almost a month BEFORE the surrender of France.

My constructions are based on the opinion of former Wehrmacht Major General B. Müller-Hillebrand, who in his fundamental work “German Land Army 1933-1945.” says, verbatim: “the second stage of the Western campaign had not yet begun when Hitler, on May 28, 1940, began to discuss with the commanders-in-chief of the ground forces the future organization of the peacetime army.... In addition, Hitler already on June 15 ordered a reduction in the size of the peacetime army up to 120 divisions, which included 30 mobile formations provided for peacetime."

It would seem that a completely logical picture emerges - Hitler attacked France on May 10, 1940 with 156 divisions, and for peacetime he decided on June 15, 1940 to reduce the wartime army to 120 divisions. To carry out Operation Sea Lion, on July 13, 1940, it was decided, instead of liquidating 35 divisions, to disband 17 divisions, and send the personnel of 18 divisions “on long-term leave so that at any time these formations could be easily restored to their previous form... On July 31, 1940, Hitler announced his determination to conduct a campaign against the Soviet Union in the spring of 1941 with the goal of defeating it, he said, by the target date, it was necessary to increase the size of the ground army to 180 divisions. On the eve of the defeat of Greece and Yugoslavia, the Wehrmacht was reinforced with divisions intended for occupation service in these countries, as a result of which the German ground army before the attack on the USSR, which included both the Wehrmacht and the SS troops, numbered 209 divisions, including the battle group Nord ".

The harmony of this picture is violated by the composition of the peacetime army - “120 divisions, which included 30 mobile formations.” After all, the increase of 10 tank divisions, 4 motorized divisions, 2 motorized SS divisions and 1 motorized rifle brigade of the wartime army to 20 tank and 10 motorized divisions of the peacetime army was necessary for Germany, according to Müller-Hillebrand, for a war exclusively in the vast regions of the Soviet Union. “The accumulated experience, as well as the radical change in the military-political situation that occurred as a result of the acquisition of vast new territories in the East and as a result of the fact that the Soviet Union became Germany’s immediate neighbor, spoke of the need for a significant increase in the future in the number of motorized rifle troops, and especially armored forces ". It turns out illogical - they created a peacetime army, but were preparing for war with the Soviet Union, and not in the distant future, but literally in the fall of 1940.

The apparent paradox of the situation is easily eliminated by reading the diary entry of the Chief of the General Staff of the German Ground Forces, Colonel General F. Halder, for July 31, 1940, which shows the distribution of the group of 180 divisions:

"7 divisions - Norway (make independent)
50 divisions - France
3 divisions - Holland and Belgium
Total: 60 divisions
120 divisions - to the East
Total: 180 divisions."

It turns out that 120 divisions are the army of invasion of the Soviet Union. Hitler needed an additional 60 divisions to carry out occupation service in the West only after England abandoned peace with Germany. 120 divisions are, on the one hand, a peacetime army for England and France, and on the other, a wartime army for the Soviet Union. In light of new circumstances, the generally accepted picture of A. Hitler’s decision to attack the Soviet Union is changing radically.

On May 10, 1940, the day of N. Chamberlain's resignation, Germany attacked France, Holland and Belgium. Relying on the conclusion of peace with England after the defeat of France and the organization of a joint campaign against the USSR, on May 24, 1940, Hitler stopped the tank offensive of his troops against the Allies defending Dunkirk. Thus, he made it possible for British troops to evacuate from the northern “pocket”, and for his own to avoid a frontal collision with a doomed and desperately resisting enemy driven into a corner, thus preserving the lives of both British and German soldiers for the upcoming campaign against the USSR. The “stop order” surprised not only the German generals, to whom Hitler “explained the stop of tank units... by the desire to save tanks for the war in Russia.” Even Hitler's closest associate, R. Hess, convinced him that the defeat of British troops in France would speed up peace with England.

However, Hitler did not succumb to anyone’s persuasion and remained adamant - the defeat of the 200,000-strong British group undoubtedly increased the chances of peace between England and Germany, but at the same time reduced England’s potential in the fight against the Soviet Union, which was completely unacceptable for Hitler. On May 27, the number of evacuees was small - only 7,669 people, but subsequently the pace of evacuation increased sharply, and a total of 338 thousand people were evacuated from Dunkirk, including 110 thousand French. The British Expeditionary Force abandoned a large amount of military equipment and heavy weapons. Meanwhile, "at 4:00 on May 28, the Belgian troops were ordered to fold, since Belgium agreed to unconditional surrender."

On May 28, 1940, having made sure that the British had begun to be evacuated from Dunkirk, Hitler began discussing an army to invade the USSR, subject to England's non-intervention in the German-Soviet conflict. On June 2, during the days of the attack on Dunkirk, he expressed “the hope that now England will be ready to “conclude a reasonable peace” and then he will have a free hand to carry out his “great and immediate task - the confrontation with Bolshevism,” and 15 June gave the order to create an army of invasion of the Soviet Union consisting of 120 divisions with a simultaneous increase in the number of mobile formations to 30. An increase in the number of mobile formations, according to B. Müller-Hillebrand, was necessary for Hitler for the war in the vast expanses of Russia.

On June 16, 1940, the French government refused to conclude the Anglo-French alliance proposed by W. Churchill with the provision of dual citizenship to all British and French, the creation of a single government in London and the unification of the armed forces. By the night of June 16, 1940, having led the defeatist group, “Marshal Petain... formed a government with the main goal of achieving an immediate truce from Germany.” On June 22, 1940, France surrendered. E. Halifax, had he come to power on May 10, 1940, would undoubtedly have followed France in making peace with Germany, but events took a completely different turn.

The very next day, W. Churchill refused to recognize the Vichy government and began active cooperation with General de Gaulle’s Free France organization, and on June 27, 1940, he stated that if Hitler fails to defeat the British on the Island, he “will probably rush to East. In fact, he will probably do this without even attempting an invasion." Fearing that the Nazis would use the French fleet against England, Churchill gave the order to destroy it. During Operation Catapult, from July 3 to July 8, 1940, the British fleet sank, damaged and captured 7 battleships, 4 cruisers, 14 destroyers, 8 submarines and a number of other ships and vessels.

In order to put pressure on Churchill, on July 13, 1940, Hitler gave the order to prepare an amphibious operation against England by the beginning of September, and therefore decided to disband only 17 of the planned 35 divisions, with the personnel of the remaining 18 divisions being sent on long-term leave. On July 19, 1940, Hitler offered peace to England for the sake of either participation or neutrality in Germany’s fight against the Soviet Union, and “on July 21, ... demanded that von Brauchitsch begin “preparations” for war with Russia and in the victorious frenzy of those days even thought about carrying out this campaign already in the fall of 1940."

On July 22, 1940, Churchill renounced peace with Germany, and on July 24, 1940, he agreed to transfer old American destroyers to England to counter German submarines in exchange for the right to organize US naval bases in a number of English locations, which completely confused Hitler’s plans. In a desperate attempt to turn the tide, Hitler urged Edward to return to England. However, on July 28, Edward, who fled to Spain in May 1940 from the headquarters of the joint allied command from the advancing German divisions, told Hess in Lisbon that “at the moment he is not ready to risk a civil war in Britain for the sake of returning the throne, but bombing may bring Britain to its senses and ", perhaps, will prepare the country for his imminent return from the Bahamas, the management of which he at that moment took over at the suggestion of Churchill."

Thus Churchill remained in his post. Since Germany's action against the Soviet Union was now under threat from British and French troops, Hitler decided to increase the army to 180 divisions. It was planned to leave 7 divisions in Norway, 50 divisions in France and 3 divisions in Holland and Belgium. Total: 60 divisions. As before, 120 divisions were allocated for operations in the East. Total: 180 divisions. Since the Wehrmacht was faced with the need to increase its numbers, on July 31, 1940, Hitler announced his intention to defeat the USSR no earlier than the spring of 1941. “On August 1, 1940, the Windsors boarded a liner in Lisbon bound for the Caribbean Sea and finally left the political scene.”

As we see, Hitler thought about an attack on the Soviet Union on May 24-28, 1940, even during the hostilities in France, directly linking it with the decision to allow British troops to evacuate from the “sack” at Dunkirk. The final decision to attack the Soviet Union was made by Hitler no later than June 15, 1940, when he ordered the creation of an army of invasion of the Soviet Union consisting of 120 divisions with a simultaneous increase in the number of mobile units to 30. The attack on the USSR was supposed to be subject to non-interference in Germany -Soviet conflict between England and Vichy France.

Meanwhile, this plan was upset by Winston Churchill, who undertook to force Germany to attack the Soviet Union without any assistance from England. Hitler's attempt, by either intimidating England with a Wehrmacht invasion or returning Edward to the throne, to achieve England's neutrality in the German-Soviet conflict did not bring success. Hitler was forced to obediently, in addition to the 120 divisions of the invasion group in the Soviet Union, create 60 divisions to occupy Western Europe and cover it from the threat from England. The date of the attack on the Soviet Union was postponed from the autumn of 1940 to the spring of 1941.

And his allies launched a swift attack on several points at once, thereby catching the Soviet army by surprise. The attack occurred at night and became the beginning of a protracted and very difficult Great Patriotic War for the USSR.

Prerequisites for the German attack on the USSR

The German attack on the USSR was an inevitable part of World War II and Hitler's struggle for power. Hitler came to power in Germany during the economic and political crisis caused by defeat in the First World War, he quickly managed to improve the economy, thanks to which Hitler became the head of state. The main idea of ​​his policy was the destruction of all races and peoples except the “correct” (Aryan), as well as the seizure of power over most of Europe. Hitler wanted to turn Germany into a leading world power, and for this he needed to take revenge for the defeat in the First World War.

Hitler quickly created a fascist military state on German territory and soon, in 1939, invaded neighboring Czechoslovakia and Poland with the aim of seizing territories and exterminating the Jewish population. The Second World War began, in which the USSR remained neutral until a certain time. A non-aggression pact was signed with Germany.

However, Hitler needed to capture the USSR if he wanted to continue his victorious march around the world, therefore, despite the agreement, the German command developed a plan for a sudden and rapid attack and capture of the USSR. The resulting territories and resources made it possible to continue the war with the USA and Great Britain.

The implementation of Plan Barbarossa began on the night of June 22, 1941.

Germany's goals

• Military and ideological. Germany was a state built on the idea of ​​​​the superiority of one people over others, so Hitler pursued the goal of establishing his policy in all dissident territories. In the case of the USSR, Hitler sought to destroy the communist ideology and the Bolsheviks.
• Imperialist. Hitler dreamed of building his own Empire, which would include a huge number of territories.
• Economic. The seizure of economic resources and lands of the USSR gave Hitler the opportunity to significantly improve the German economy, re-equip the army and continue to wage war with good financial security.
• Nationalist. Hitler did not recognize races other than the Aryan, and sought to destroy everyone who did not fit the description of a “correct” person.

The implementation of Plan Barbarossa and the German attack on the USSR

Despite the fact that Hitler sought to keep his intention to attack the USSR secret, the Soviet command had some information regarding the outbreak of war, and therefore had the opportunity to prepare. On June 18, part of the army was put on combat readiness, and the rest were drawn to the front line, ostensibly for the purpose of conducting exercises. Unfortunately, the Soviet command did not know when the attack was planned (it was assumed that Germany would attack on the 22nd-23rd), so by the time the German troops approached, the Soviet soldiers were not in full combat readiness.

On June 22 at 4 o'clock in the morning, the German Foreign Minister turned to the Soviet ambassador and handed him a note declaring war. Just a few minutes later, German troops entered the Gulf of Finland and began an attack on the Baltic Fleet. A little later, the German ambassador arrived in the USSR to meet with People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Molotov and once again officially announced the declaration of war. The ambassador’s address said that Germany opposes the Bolshevik propaganda that the USSR is actively conducting on its territory and intends to defend its state. That same morning, Italy, Romania and Slovakia declared war on the USSR.

At 12 o'clock on June 22, Molotov made an appeal to the citizens of the USSR, in which he announced that the USSR had entered the war with Germany.

Consequences of the German attack on the USSR

Even though Plan Barbarossa failed and Hitler failed to conquer the USSR within a few months, the first stage of the war was extremely unsuccessful for the Soviet Union. Many territories were lost, and the Germans managed to come close to Moscow and blockade Leningrad. Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine were occupied, and the bombing of Moscow began. The reason for the defeat was the unpreparedness of the Soviet army and poor equipment.

The German attack on the USSR ended in a protracted war that greatly affected the USSR economy and claimed a huge number of lives. However, the correct decisions of the country's leadership ultimately led to the fact that Soviet troops launched a counteroffensive and reached Berlin, completely destroying the fascist army and breaking Hitler's plans for world domination.

Part 1.

Seventy-six years ago, on June 22, 1941, the peaceful life of the Soviet people was interrupted, Germany treacherously attacked our country.
Speaking on the radio on July 3, 1941, J.V. Stalin called the war that had begun with Nazi Germany the Patriotic War.
In 1942, after the establishment of the Order of the Patriotic War, this name was officially established. And the name “Great Patriotic War” appeared later.
The war claimed about 30 million lives (now they are already talking about 40 million) of Soviet people, brought grief and suffering to almost every family, cities and villages were in ruins.
The question of who is responsible for the tragic beginning of the Great Patriotic War, for the colossal defeats that our army suffered at the beginning and for the fact that the Nazis ended up at the walls of Moscow and Leningrad are still being debated. Who was right, who was wrong, who did not do what they were obliged to do because they took the oath of allegiance to the Motherland. You need to know the historical truth.
As almost all veterans recall, in the spring of 1941, the approach of war was felt. Informed people knew about its preparation; ordinary people were wary of rumors and gossip.
But even with the declaration of war, many believed that “our indestructible and best army in the world,” which was constantly repeated in newspapers and on the radio, would immediately defeat the aggressor, and on his own territory, who had encroached on our borders.

The existing main version about the beginning of the War of 1941-1945, born during the time of N.S. Khrushchev, decisions of the 20th Congress and the memoirs of Marshal G.K. Zhukov, reads:
- “The tragedy of June 22 occurred because Stalin, who “feared” Hitler and at the same time “believed” him, forbade the generals to put the troops of the western districts on combat readiness before June 22, thanks to which, as a result, the Red Army soldiers met the war sleeping in their barracks ";
“The main thing, of course, that weighed on him, on all his activities, which also affected us, was the fear of Hitler. He was afraid of the German armed forces" (From the speech of G.K. Zhukov in the editorial office of the Military Historical Journal on August 13, 1966. Published in the Ogonyok magazine No. 25, 1989);
- “Stalin made an irreparable mistake by trusting false information that came from the relevant authorities.....” (G.K. Zhukov, “Memories and Reflections.” M. Olma -Press. 2003.);
- “…. Unfortunately, it must be noted that I.V. Stalin, on the eve and at the beginning of the war, underestimated the role and importance of the General Staff.... took little interest in the activities of the General Staff. Neither my predecessors nor I had the opportunity to comprehensively report to I. Stalin on the state of the country’s defense and on the capabilities of our potential enemy...” (G.K. Zhukov “Memories and Reflections”. M. Olma - Press. 2003).

It still sounds in different interpretations that “the main culprit,” of course, was Stalin, since “he was a tyrant and despot,” “everyone was afraid of him,” and “nothing happened without his will,” “he did not allow the troops to be brought into combat.” readiness in advance,” and “forced” the generals to leave soldiers in “sleeping” barracks before June 22, etc.
In a conversation that took place in early December 1943 with the commander of long-range aviation, later Chief Marshal of Aviation A.E. Golovanov, unexpectedly for the interlocutor, Stalin said:
“I know that when I’m gone, more than one bucket of dirt will be poured on my head, a heap of garbage will be placed on my grave. But I’m sure that the winds of history will blow all this away!”
This is also confirmed by the words of A.M. Kollontai, written in her diary, back in November 1939 (on the eve of the Soviet-Finnish war). According to this evidence, even then Stalin clearly foresaw the slander that would fall on him as soon as he passed away.
A. M. Kollontai recorded his words: “And my name will also be slandered, slandered. Many atrocities will be attributed to me.”
In this sense, the position of Marshal of Artillery I.D. Yakovlev, who was repressed at one time, is characteristic, who, speaking about the war, considered it most honest to say this:
“When we undertake to talk about June 22, 1941, which covered our entire people with a black wing, then we need to abstract ourselves from everything personal and follow only the truth; it is unacceptable to try to place all the blame for the surprise attack of Nazi Germany only on I.V. Stalin.
In the endless complaints of our military leaders about “suddenness,” one can see an attempt to absolve themselves of all responsibility for failures in the combat training of troops and in their command and control during the first period of the war. They forget the main thing: having taken the oath, commanders of all levels - from front commanders to platoon commanders - are obliged to keep their troops in a state of combat readiness. This is their professional duty, and explaining failure to fulfill it with references to I.V. Stalin does not suit the soldiers.”
Stalin, by the way, just like them, took a military oath of allegiance to the Fatherland - below is a photocopy of the military oath given in writing by him as a member of the Main Military Council of the Red Army on February 23, 1939.

The paradox is that it was precisely those who suffered under Stalin, but even under him, the rehabilitated people subsequently showed exceptional decency towards him.
Here, for example, is what former People’s Commissar of the USSR Aviation Industry A.I. Shakhurin said:
“You can’t blame everything on Stalin! The minister must also be responsible for something... For example, I did something wrong in aviation, so I certainly bear responsibility for this. Otherwise it’s all about Stalin...”
The same were the great Commander Marshal K.K. Rokossovsky and the Chief Marshal of Aviation A.E. Golovanov.

Konstantin Konstantinovich Rokossovsky, one might say, “sent” Khrushchev very far with his proposal to write something nasty about Stalin! He suffered for this - he was very quickly sent into retirement, removed from his post as Deputy Minister of Defense, but he did not renounce the Supreme. Although he had many reasons to be offended by I. Stalin.
I think that the main one is that he, as the Commander of the 1st Belorussian Front, who was the first to reach the distant approaches to Berlin and was already preparing for its future assault, was deprived of this honorable opportunity. I. Stalin removed him from the Command of the 1st Belorussian Front and assigned him to the 2nd Belorussian Front.
As many said and wrote, he did not want Polyak to take Berlin, and G.K. became Marshal of Victory. Zhukov.
But K.K. Rokossovsky showed his nobility here too, leaving G.K. Zhukov received almost all of his Front Headquarters officers, although he had every right to take them with him to the new front. And the staff officers at K.K. Rokossovsky was always distinguished, as all military historians note, by the highest staff training.
The troops led by K.K. Rokossovsky, unlike those led by G.K. Zhukov, were not defeated in a single battle during the entire war.
A. E. Golovanov was proud that he had the honor of serving the Motherland under the command of Stalin personally. He also suffered under Khrushchev, but did not renounce Stalin!
Many other military leaders and historians talk about the same thing.

This is what General N.F. Chervov writes in his book “Provocations against Russia” Moscow, 2003:

“... there was no surprise of the attack in the usual sense, and Zhukov’s formulation was invented at one time in order to blame Stalin for the defeat at the beginning of the war and justify the miscalculations of the high military command, including their own during this period... "

According to the long-term head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff, Army General P. I. Ivashutin, “neither in strategic nor in tactical terms was Nazi Germany’s attack on the Soviet Union sudden” (VIZH 1990, No. 5).

In the pre-war years, the Red Army was significantly inferior to the Wehrmacht in mobilization and training.
Hitler announced universal conscription on March 1, 1935, and the USSR, based on the state of the economy, was able to do this only on September 1, 1939.
As we see, Stalin first thought about what to feed, what to dress and how to arm the conscripts, and only then, if calculations proved this, he conscripted into the army exactly as many as, according to calculations, we could feed, clothe and arm.
On September 2, 1939, the Resolution of the Council of People's Commissars No. 1355-279ss approved the “Plan for the Reorganization of the Ground Forces for 1939 - 1940,” developed by its leader since 1937. General Staff of the Red Army Marshal B.M. Shaposhnikov.

In 1939, the Wehrmacht numbered 4.7 million people, the Red Army had only 1.9 million people. But by January 1941. the number of the Red Army increased to 4 million 200 thousand people.

It was simply impossible to train an army of such size and rearm it in a short time to wage a modern war against an experienced enemy.

J.V. Stalin understood this very well, and very soberly assessing the capabilities of the Red Army, he believed that it would be ready to fully fight the Wehrmacht no earlier than the middle of 1942-43. That is why he tried to delay the start of the war.
He had no illusions about Hitler.

I. Stalin knew very well that the Non-Aggression Pact, which we concluded in August 1939 with Hitler, was considered by him as a disguise and a means to achieve the goal - the defeat of the USSR, but he continued to play a diplomatic game, trying to delay time.
All this is a lie that I. Stalin trusted and feared Hitler.

Back in November 1939, before the Soviet-Finnish War, an entry appeared in the personal diary of the USSR Ambassador to Sweden A.M. Kollontai, which recorded the following words of Stalin that she personally heard during an audience in the Kremlin:

“The time for persuasion and negotiations is over. We must practically prepare for resistance, for war with Hitler.”

As for whether Stalin “trusted” Hitler, his speech at a Politburo meeting on November 18, 1940, summing up the results of Molotov’s visit to Berlin, is very clear:

“….As we know, Hitler, immediately after our delegation left Berlin, loudly declared that “German-Soviet relations have been finally established.”
But we know the value of these statements well! It was clear to us even before meeting Hitler that he would not want to take into account the legitimate interests of the Soviet Union, dictated by the security requirements of our country...
We viewed the Berlin meeting as a real opportunity to test the position of the German government....
Hitler's position during these negotiations, in particular his persistent reluctance to take into account the natural security interests of the Soviet Union, his categorical refusal to end the actual occupation of Finland and Romania - all this indicates that, despite demagogic assurances about the non-infringement of the "global interests" of the Soviet Union, in fact, preparations are underway for an attack on our country. In seeking the Berlin meeting, the Nazi Fuhrer sought to disguise his true intentions...
One thing is clear: Hitler is playing a double game. While preparing aggression against the USSR, he is at the same time trying to gain time, trying to give the Soviet government the impression that he is ready to discuss the issue of further peaceful development of Soviet-German relations...
It was at this time that we managed to prevent an attack by Nazi Germany. And in this matter, the Non-Aggression Pact concluded with her played a big role...

But, of course, this is only a temporary respite; the immediate threat of armed aggression against us has only been somewhat weakened, but has not been completely eliminated.

But by concluding a non-aggression pact with Germany, we have already gained more than a year to prepare for a decisive and deadly struggle against Hitlerism.
Of course, we cannot consider the Soviet-German Pact as the basis for creating reliable security for us.
Issues of state security are now becoming even more acute.
Now that our borders have been pushed to the west, we need a powerful barrier along them, with operational groupings of troops brought into combat readiness in the near, but... not in the immediate rear.”
(The final words of I. Stalin are very important for understanding who is to blame for the fact that our troops of the Western Front were taken by surprise on June 22, 1941).

On May 5, 1941, at a reception in the Kremlin for graduates of military academies, I. Stalin said in his speech:

“….Germany wants to destroy our socialist state: exterminate millions of Soviet people, and turn the survivors into slaves. Only a war with Nazi Germany and victory in this war can save our Motherland. I propose to drink to the war, to the offensive in the war, to our victory in this war...."

Some saw in these words of I. Stalin his intention to attack Germany in the summer of 1941. But this is not so. When Marshall S.K. Tymoshenko reminded him of the statement about the transition to offensive actions, then he explained: “I said this in order to encourage those present, so that they think about victory, and not about the invincibility of the German army, which newspapers around the world are trumpeting.”
On January 15, 1941, speaking at a meeting in the Kremlin, Stalin spoke to the commanders of the district troops:

“War creeps up unnoticed and will begin with a sudden attack without declaring war” (A.I. Eremenko “Diaries”).
V.M. In the mid-1970s, Molotov recalled the beginning of the war as follows:

“We knew that war was just around the corner, that we were weaker than Germany, that we would have to retreat. The whole question was where we would have to retreat - to Smolensk or to Moscow, we discussed this before the war... We did everything to delay the war. And we succeeded in this for a year and ten months... Even before the war, Stalin believed that only by 1943 could we meet the Germans on equal terms. …. Air Chief Marshal A.E. Golovanov told me that after the defeat of the Germans near Moscow, Stalin said: “God grant that we end this war in 1946.
Yes, no one could be prepared for the hour of attack, not even the Lord God!
We were expecting an attack, and we had a main goal: not to give Hitler a reason to attack. He would have said: “Soviet troops are already gathering on the border, they are forcing me to act!”
The TASS message of June 14, 1941 was sent to not give the Germans any reason to justify their attack... It was needed as a last resort... It turned out that Hitler became the aggressor on June 22 in front of the whole world. And we had allies.... Already in 1939, he was determined to start a war. When will he untie her? The delay was so desirable for us, for another year or several months. Of course, we knew that we had to be prepared for this war at any moment, but how to ensure this in practice? It’s very difficult...” (F. Chuev. “One Hundred and Forty Conversations with Molotov.”

They say and write a lot about the fact that I. Stalin ignored and did not trust the mass of information on Germany’s preparation for an attack on the USSR, which was presented by our foreign intelligence, military intelligence and other sources.
But this is far from the truth.

As one of the heads of foreign intelligence at that time, General P.A., recalled. Sudoplatov, “although Stalin was irritated by intelligence materials (why will be shown below - sad39), nevertheless, he sought to use all the intelligence information that was reported to Stalin to prevent war in secret diplomatic negotiations, and our intelligence was entrusted with bringing it to the German military circles of information about the inevitability of a long war with Russia for Germany, emphasizing the fact that we have created a military-industrial base in the Urals that is invulnerable to German attack.”

For example, J. Stalin ordered that the German military attache in Moscow be acquainted with the industrial and military power of Siberia.
At the beginning of April 1941, he was allowed to tour new military factories that were producing tanks and aircraft of the latest designs.
And about. German attaché in Moscow G. Krebs reported on April 9, 1941 to Berlin:
“Our representatives were allowed to see everything. Obviously, Russia wants to intimidate possible aggressors in this way.”

Foreign intelligence of the People's Commissariat of State Security, on the instructions of Stalin, specifically provided the Harbin station of German intelligence in China with the opportunity to “intercept and decipher” a certain “circular from Moscow”, which ordered all Soviet representatives abroad to warn Germany that the Soviet Union had prepared to defend its interests.” (Vishlev O.V. “On the eve of June 22, 1941.” M., 2001).

Foreign intelligence received the most complete information about Germany's aggressive intentions against the USSR through its agents (the "magnificent five" - ​​Philby, Cairncross, Maclean and their comrades) in London.

Intelligence obtained the most secret information about the negotiations conducted with Hitler by the British Foreign Ministers Simon and Halifax in 1935 and 1938, respectively, and by Prime Minister Chamberlain in 1938.
We learned that England agreed with Hitler’s demand to lift part of the military restrictions imposed on Germany by the Treaty of Versailles, that Germany’s expansion to the East was encouraged in the hope that access to the borders of the USSR would remove the threat of aggression from Western countries.
At the beginning of 1937, information was received about a meeting of senior representatives of the Wehrmacht, at which issues of war with the USSR were discussed.
In the same year, data was received on the operational-strategic games of the Wehrmacht, conducted under the leadership of General Hans von Seeckt, which resulted in the conclusion (“Seekckt’s testament”) that Germany would not be able to win the war with Russia if the fighting dragged on for a period of time more than two months and if during the first month of the war it is not possible to capture Leningrad, Kyiv, Moscow and defeat the main forces of the Red Army, simultaneously occupying the main centers of military industry and raw materials production in the European part of the USSR.”
The conclusion, as we see, was completely justified.
According to General P.A. Sudoplatov, who oversaw the German intelligence department, the results of these games were one of the reasons that prompted Hitler to take the initiative to conclude the 1939 non-aggression pact.
In 1935, data was received from one of the sources of our Berlin residency, agent Breitenbach, about testing a liquid-propellant ballistic missile with a flight range of up to 200 km, developed by engineer von Braun.

But the objective, full-fledged description of Germany’s intentions towards the USSR, specific goals, timing, and the direction of its military aspirations remained unclear.

The obvious inevitability of our military clash was combined in our intelligence reports with information about a possible German armistice agreement with England, as well as Hitler’s proposals for delimiting the spheres of influence of Germany, Japan, Italy and the USSR. This naturally caused a certain distrust in the reliability of the intelligence data received.
We must also not forget that the repressions that took place in 1937-1938 did not escape intelligence. Our residency in Germany and other countries was greatly weakened. In 1940, People's Commissar Yezhov said that he “purged 14 thousand security officers”

On July 22, 1940, Hitler decides to begin aggression against the USSR even before the end of the war with England.
On the same day, he instructs the Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht ground forces to develop a plan for war with the USSR, completing all preparations by May 15, 1941, in order to begin military operations no later than mid-June 1941.
Hitler's contemporaries claim that he, as a very superstitious person, considered the date of June 22, 1940 - the surrender of France - to be very happy for himself and then set June 22, 1941 as the date of the attack on the USSR.

On July 31, 1940, a meeting was held at Wehrmacht headquarters, at which Hitler justified the need to start a war with the USSR, without waiting for the end of the war with England.
On December 18, 1940, Hitler signed Directive No. 21 - Plan Barbarossa.

“For a long time it was believed that the USSR did not have the text of Directive No. 21 - “Plan Barbarossa”, and it was indicated that American intelligence had it, but did not share it with Moscow. American intelligence did have information, including a copy of Directive No. 21 “Plan Barbarossa”.

In January 1941, it was obtained by the commercial attache of the US Embassy in Berlin, Sam Edison Woods, through his connections in government and military circles in Germany.
US President Roosevelt ordered that the Soviet Ambassador in Washington, K. Umansky, be familiarized with the materials of S. Woods, which was carried out on March 1, 1941.
At the direction of Secretary of State Cordell Hull, his deputy, Semner Welles, handed over these materials to our Ambassador Umansky, indicating the source.

The information from the Americans was a very significant, but nevertheless an addition to the information from the intelligence department of the NKGB and military intelligence, which at that time had much more powerful intelligence networks in order to independently be aware of the German plans of aggression and inform the Kremlin about it.” (Sudoplatov P.A. “Different days of the secret war and diplomacy. 1941.” M., 2001).

But the date - June 22nd - is not and never was in the text of Directive No. 21.
It contained only the date of completion of all preparations for the attack - May 15, 1941.

First page of Directive No. 21 - Plan Barbarossa

The long-time head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (GRU GSH), Army General Ivashutin, said:
“The texts of almost all documents and radiograms concerning Germany’s military preparations and the timing of the attack were reported regularly according to the following list: Stalin (two copies), Molotov, Beria, Voroshilov, People’s Commissar of Defense and Chief of the General Staff.”

Therefore, G.K.’s statement looks very strange. Zhukov that “... there is a version that on the eve of the war we allegedly knew the Barbarossa plan... Let me declare with full responsibility that this is pure fiction. As far as I know, neither the Soviet government, nor the People’s Commissar of Defense, nor the General Staff had any such data” (G.K. Zhukov “Memories and Reflections” M. APN 1975 pp. vol. 1, p. 259.).

It is permissible to ask what data did the Chief of the General Staff G.K. have at his disposal then? Zhukov, if he did not have this information, and also was not even familiar with the memorandum of the head of the Intelligence Directorate (from February 16, 1942, the Intelligence Directorate was transformed into the Main Intelligence Directorate - GRU) of the General Staff, Lieutenant General F.I. Golikov, who was subordinate to directly G.K. Zhukov, dated March 20, 1941 - “Options for military operations of the German army against the USSR,” compiled on the basis of all the intelligence information obtained through military intelligence and which was reported to the country’s leadership.

This document outlined options for possible directions of attacks by German troops, and one of the options essentially reflected the essence of the “Barbarossa Plan” and the direction of the main attacks of German troops.

So G.K. Zhukov answered a question asked to him by Colonel Anfilov many years after the war. Colonel Anfilov subsequently cited this answer in his article in Krasnaya Zvezda dated March 26, 1996
(It is characteristic that in his most “truthful book about the war” G.K. Zhukov described this report and criticized the incorrect conclusions of the report).

When Lieutenant General N.G. Pavlenko, whom G.K. Zhukov insisted that on the eve of the war he knew nothing about the “Barbarossa plan,” G.K. testified. Zhukov received copies of these German documents, which bore the signatures of Timoshenko, Beria, Zhukov and Abakumov, then according to Pavlenko - G.K. Zhukov was amazed and shocked. Strange forgetfulness.
But F.I. Golikov quickly corrected the mistake he made in his conclusions of the report dated March 20, 1941 and began to present irrefutable evidence of the Germans preparing for an attack on the USSR:
- 4, 16. April 26, 1941 the head of the RU General Staff F.I. Golikov sends special messages to I. Stalin, S.K. Tymoshenko and other leaders on strengthening the grouping of German troops on the border of the USSR;
- May 9, 1941, head of the RU F.I. Golikov introduced I.V. Stalin, V.M. To Molotov, the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff, a report “On plans for a German attack on the USSR,” which assessed the grouping of German troops, indicated the directions of attacks and the number of concentrated German divisions;
-On May 15, 1941, the RU message “On the distribution of the German armed forces across theaters and fronts as of May 15, 1941” was presented;
- On June 5 and 7, 1941, Golikov presented a special report on Romania’s military preparations. Until June 22, a number of more messages were submitted.

As stated above, G.K. Zhukov complained that he did not have the opportunity to report to I. Stalin about the enemy’s potential capabilities.
What capabilities of a potential enemy could the Chief of the General Staff G. Zhukov report on if, according to him, he was not familiar with the main intelligence report on this issue?
Regarding the fact that his predecessors did not have the opportunity to make a detailed report to I. Stalin, this is also a complete lie in “the most truthful book about the war.”
For example, only in June 1940, People's Commissar of Defense S.K. Timoshenko spent 22 hours and 35 minutes in I. Stalin’s office, Chief of the General Staff B.M. Shaposhnikov 17 hours 20 minutes.
G.K. Zhukov, from the moment of his appointment to the post of Chief of the General Staff, i.e. from January 13, 1941 to June 21, 1941, spent 70 hours and 35 minutes in I. Stalin’s office.
This is evidenced by the entries in the log of visits to I. Stalin’s office.
(“At Stalin’s reception. Notebooks (journals) of records of persons received by I.V. Stalin (1924-1953)” Moscow. New chronograph, 2008. The records of the duty secretaries of I.V.’s reception, stored in the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, are published. Stalin for 1924-1953, in which every day the time spent in Stalin’s Kremlin office of all his visitors was recorded with an accuracy of up to a minute).

During the same period, in addition to the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of Staff, they visited Stalin's office several times. General Staff, Marshalov K.E. Voroshilova, S.M. Budyonny, Deputy People's Commissar Marshal Kulik, Army General Meretskov, Aviation Lieutenant Generals Rychagov, Zhigarev, General N.F. Vatutin and many other military leaders.

On January 31, 1941, the Wehrmacht High Command issued Directive No. 050/41 on the strategic concentration and deployment of troops in order to implement Plan Barbarossa.

The directive defined “Day B” - the day the offensive began - no later than June 21, 1941.
On April 30, 1941, at a meeting of senior military leadership, Hitler finally announced the date of the attack on the USSR - June 22, 1941, writing it on his copy of the plan.
On June 10, 1941, Order No. 1170/41 of the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces Halder “On setting a date for the start of the offensive against the Soviet Union” was determined;
"1. The D-Day of Operation Barbarossa is proposed to be June 22, 1941.
2. If this deadline is postponed, the corresponding decision will be made no later than June 18. Data on the direction of the main attack will continue to remain secret.
3. At 13.00 on June 21, one of the following signals will be transmitted to the troops:
a) Dortmund signal. It means that the offensive will begin on June 22 as planned and that open execution of the order can begin.
b) Alton signal. It means that the offensive is postponed to another date. But in this case, it will be necessary to fully disclose the goals of the concentration of German troops, since the latter will be in full combat readiness.
4. June 22, 3 hours 30 minutes: the beginning of the offensive and the flight of aircraft across the border. If meteorological conditions delay the departure of aviation, the ground forces will launch an offensive on their own.”

Unfortunately, our foreign, military and political intelligence, as Sudoplatov said, “having intercepted data on the timing of the attack and correctly determining the inevitability of war, did not predict the Wehrmacht’s rate of blitzkrieg. This was a fatal mistake, because the reliance on blitzkrieg indicated that the Germans were planning their attack regardless of the end of the war with England.”

Foreign intelligence reports about Germany's military preparations came from various stations: England, Germany, France, Poland, Romania, Finland, etc.

Already in September 1940, one of the most valuable sources of the Berlin residency “Corsican” (Arvid Harnak. One of the leaders of the Red Chapel organization. Began collaborating with the USSR in 1935. Arrested and executed in 1942) conveyed information that “at the beginning of the future Germany will start a war against the Soviet Union." There were similar reports from other sources.

In December 1940, a message was received from the Berlin station that on December 18, Hitler, speaking on the occasion of the graduation of 5 thousand German officers from schools, sharply spoke out against “the injustice on earth, when the Great Russians own one-sixth of the land, and 90 million Germans huddle on piece of land" and called on the Germans to eliminate this "injustice."

“In those pre-war years, there was a procedure for reporting to the country’s leadership each material received through foreign intelligence separately, as a rule, in the form in which it was received, without an analytical assessment. Only the degree of reliability of the source was determined.

The information reported to the leadership in this form did not create a unified picture of the events taking place, did not answer the question for what purpose these or other measures were being carried out, whether a political decision had been made to attack, etc.
No summary materials were prepared, with an in-depth analysis of all information received from sources and conclusions for consideration by the country’s leadership.” (“Hitler’s secrets on Stalin’s table”, published by Moscow City Archives, 1995).

In other words, before the war, I. Stalin was simply “inundated” with various intelligence information, in a number of cases contradictory and sometimes false.
Only in 1943 did an analytical service appear in foreign intelligence and counterintelligence.
It should also be taken into account that in preparation for the war against the USSR, the Germans began to carry out very powerful camouflage and disinformation measures at the level of state policy, in the development of which the highest ranks of the Third Reich took part.

At the beginning of 1941, the German command began to implement a whole system of measures to falsely explain the military preparations being carried out on the borders with the USSR.
On February 15, 1941, document No. 44142/41 “Guidelines of the Supreme High Command for camouflaging the preparation of aggression against the Soviet Union” was introduced, signed by Keitel, which provided for concealing from the enemy preparations for the operation under the Barbarossa plan.
The document prescribed, at the first stage, “until April to maintain uncertainty about one’s intentions. At subsequent stages, when it is no longer possible to hide the preparations for the operation, it will be necessary to explain all our actions as disinformation, aimed at diverting attention from the preparations for the invasion of England.”

On May 12, 1941, the second document was adopted - 44699/41 “Order of the Chief of Staff of the Supreme High Command of the Armed Forces dated May 12, 1941 on the second phase of disinformation of the enemy in order to maintain the secrecy of the concentration of forces against the Soviet Union.”
This document provided:

“...from May 22, with the introduction of a maximum condensed schedule for the movement of military echelons, all efforts of disinformation agencies should be aimed at presenting the concentration of forces for Operation Barbarossa as a maneuver in order to confuse the Western enemy.
For the same reason, it is necessary to continue preparations for an attack on England with particular energy...
Among the formations located in the East, rumors about rear cover against Russia and a “distractive concentration of forces in the East” should circulate, and troops located on the English Channel should believe in real preparations for the invasion of England...
To spread the thesis that the action to capture the island of Crete (Operation Mercury) was a dress rehearsal for the landing in England...”
(During Operation Mercury, the Germans airlifted more than 23,000 soldiers and officers, more than 300 artillery pieces, about 5,000 containers with weapons and ammunition and other cargo to the island of Crete. This was the largest airborne operation in the history of wars) .

Our Berlin station was exposed to the agent provocateur “Lyceumist” (O. Berlinks, 1913-1978 Latvian. Recruited in Berlin on August 15, 1940).
Abwehr Major Siegfried Müller, who was in Soviet captivity, testified during interrogation in May 1947 that in August 1940, Amayak Kobulov (resident of our foreign intelligence in Berlin) was set up by a German intelligence agent, Latvian Berlings (“Lyceumist”), who, on the instructions of the Abwehr supplied him with disinformation materials for a long time.).
The results of the meeting between the Lyceum Student and Kobulov were reported to Hitler. Information for this agent was prepared and coordinated with Hitler and Ribentrop.
There were reports from “Lyceumist” about the low probability of war between Germany and the USSR, reports that the concentration of German troops on the border was a response to the movement of USSR troops to the border, etc.
However, Moscow knew about the “double day” of “Lyceumist”. Foreign policy intelligence and military intelligence of the USSR had such strong agent positions in the German Foreign Ministry that quickly determining the true identity of the “Lyceum Student” left no difficulty.
The game began and, in turn, our resident in Berlin Kobulov supplied the “Lyceumist” with relevant information during meetings.

In German disinformation campaigns, information began to appear that German preparations at our borders are aimed at putting pressure on the USSR and forcing it to accept demands of an economic and territorial nature, a kind of ultimatum that Berlin allegedly intends to put forward.

Information was spread that Germany was experiencing an acute shortage of food and raw materials, and that without solving this problem through supplies from Ukraine and oil from the Caucasus, it would not be able to defeat England.
All this disinformation was reflected in their messages not only by the sources of the Berlin station, but it also came to the attention of other foreign intelligence services, from where our intelligence received it through its agents in these countries.
Thus, there was multiple overlap of the obtained information, which seemed to confirm its “reliability” - and they had one source - disinformation prepared in Germany.
On April 30, 1941, information came from the Corsican that Germany wanted to solve its problems by presenting an ultimatum to the USSR on a significant increase in supplies of raw materials.
On May 5, the same “Corsican” gives information that the concentration of German troops is a “war of nerves” so that the USSR accepts Germany’s conditions: the USSR must give guarantees of entering the war on the side of the Axis powers.
Similar information comes from the English station.
On May 8, 1941, a message from the “Starshina” (Harro Schulze-Boysen) said that an attack on the USSR was not off the agenda, but the Germans would first present us with an ultimatum demanding increased exports to Germany.

And so all this mass of foreign intelligence information, as they say, in its original form, fell out, as mentioned above, without carrying out a generalized analysis and conclusions, onto the table of Stalin, who himself had to analyze it and draw conclusions..

Here it will become clear why, according to Sudoplatov, Stalin felt some irritation towards intelligence materials, but not all materials.
This is what V.M. recalled. Molotov:
“When I was Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars, I spent half a day every day reading intelligence reports. What was there, what deadlines were mentioned! And if we had succumbed, the war could have started much earlier. The intelligence officer’s task is not to be late, to have time to report...”

Many researchers, speaking about I. Stalin’s “distrust” of intelligence materials, cite his resolution on the special message of the People’s Commissar of State Security V.N. Merkulov No. 2279/M dated June 17, 1941, containing information received from the “Sergeant Major” (Schulze-Boysen) and “The Corsican” (Arvid Harnak):
“Comrade Merkulov. Your source from the German headquarters may send it. aviation to your fucking mother. This is not a source, but a disinformer. I.St."

In fact, those who spoke about Stalin’s distrust of intelligence apparently did not read the text of this message, but drew a conclusion only based on I. Stalin’s resolution.
Although a certain amount of distrust in intelligence data, especially in the numerous dates of a possible German attack, since more than ten of them were reported through military intelligence alone, Stalin apparently developed it.

Hitler, for example, during the war on the Western Front, issued an order for an offensive, and on the planned day of the offensive he canceled it. Hitler issued an order for an offensive on the Western Front 27 times and canceled it 26 times.

If we read the message of the “Starshina” itself, then I. Stalin’s irritation and resolution will become understandable.
Here is the text of the Chief's message:
"1. All military measures to prepare an armed uprising against the USSR have been completely completed and a strike can be expected at any time.
2. In the circles of the aviation headquarters, the TASS message of June 6 was perceived very ironically. They emphasize that this statement cannot have any significance.
3.The targets of German air raids will primarily be the Svir-3 power plant, Moscow factories that produce individual parts for aircraft, as well as car repair shops...”
(The following is a message from The Corsican on issues of economics and industry in Germany).
.
“Starshina” (Harro Schulze-Boysen 09/2/1909 - 12/22/1942. German. Born in Kiel in the family of a captain of the 2nd rank. Studied at the Faculty of Law of the University of Berlin. Was appointed to one of the departments of the communications department of the Reich Ministry of Aviation, Before the outbreak of World War II, Schulze-Boysen established a relationship with Dr. Arvid Harnack ("The Corsican") on August 31, 1942. Harro Schulze-Boysen was arrested and posthumously awarded the Order of the Red Banner in 1969. He was always honest. agent who gave us a lot of valuable information.

But his report of June 17 looks quite frivolous simply because the date of the TASS report is mixed up (not June 14, but June 6), and the priority targets of German air raids are the second-rate Svirskaya hydroelectric power station, Moscow factories “producing individual parts for aircraft, as well as auto repair shops.”

So Stalin had every reason to doubt such information.
At the same time, we see that I. Stalin’s resolution applies only to “Starshina” - an agent working at the headquarters of German aviation, but not to “Corsican”.
But after such a resolution, Stalin then summoned V.N. Merkulov and the head of foreign intelligence P.M. Fitina.
Stalin was interested in the smallest details about the Sources. After Fitin explained why intelligence trusted “Starshina,” Stalin said: “Go double-check everything and report to me.”

A huge amount of intelligence information also came through military intelligence.
Only from London, where a group of military intelligence officers was led by military attache Major General I.Ya. Sklyarov, in one pre-war year, 1,638 sheets of telegraph messages were sent to the Center, most of which contained information about Germany’s preparations for war against the USSR.
A telegram from Richard Sorge, who worked in Japan through the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff, became widely known:

In reality, there was never a message with such a text from Sorge.
On June 6, 2001, “Red Star” published materials from a round table dedicated to the 60th anniversary of the start of the war, in which SVR Colonel Karpov quite definitely said that, unfortunately, this was a fake.

The same fake and “resolution” of L. Beria dated June 21, 1941:
“Many workers are sowing panic... The secret employees of “Yastreb”, “Carmen”, “Almaz”, “Verny” will be erased into camp dust as accomplices of international provocateurs who want to embroil us with Germany.”
These lines are circulating in the press, but their falsity has long been established.

After all, since February 3, 1941, Beria had no foreign intelligence subordinate to him, because the NKVD was divided that day into Beria’s NKVD and Merkulov’s NKGB, and foreign intelligence came completely under the subordination of Merkulov.

Here are a few actual reports from R. Sorge (Ramsay):

- “May 2: “I talked with the German Ambassador Ott and the naval attache about the relationship between Germany and the USSR... The decision to start a war against the USSR will be made only by Hitler, either in May or after the war with England.”
- May 30: “Berlin informed Ott that the German offensive against the USSR would begin in the second half of June. Ott is 95% sure that war will start.”
- June 1: “The expectation of the outbreak of the German-Soviet war around June 15 is based solely on information that Lieutenant Colonel Scholl brought with him from Berlin, from where he left on May 6 for Bangkok. In Bangkok he will take up the post of military attaché.”
- June 20 “The German ambassador in Tokyo, Ott, told me that war between Germany and the USSR is inevitable.”

According to military intelligence alone, there have been more than 10 messages about the start date of the war with Germany since 1940.
Here they are:
- December 27, 1940 - from Berlin: the war will begin in the second half of next year;
- December 31, 1940 - from Bucharest: the war will begin in the spring of next year;
- February 22, 1941 - from Belgrade: the Germans will advance in May - June 1941;
- March 15, 1941 - from Bucharest: war should be expected in 3 months;
- March 19, 1941 - from Berlin: the attack is planned between May 15 and June 15, 1941;
- May 4, 1941 - from Bucharest: the start of the war is scheduled for mid-June;
- May 22, 1941 - from Berlin: an attack on the USSR is expected on June 15;
- June 1, 1941 - from Tokyo: the beginning of the war - around June 15;
- June 7, 1941 - from Bucharest: the war will begin on June 15 - 20;
- June 16, 1941 - from Berlin and from France: German attack on the USSR on June 22 - 25;
June 21, 1941 - from the German Embassy in Moscow, the attack was scheduled for 3 - 4 o'clock in the morning on June 22.

As you can see, the latest information from a source at the German Embassy in Moscow contains the exact date and time of the attack.
This information was received from an agent of the Intelligence Agency - "HVC" (aka Gerhard Kegel), an employee of the German embassy in Moscow, who early in the morning of June 21. “KhVC” itself summoned its curator, RU Colonel K.B. Leontva, to an urgent meeting.
On the evening of June 21, Leontiev once again had a meeting with an HVC agent.
The information from "HVC" was immediately reported to I.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotov, S.K. Timoshenko and G.K. Zhukov.

Very extensive information was received from various sources about the concentration of German troops near our borders.
As a result of intelligence activities, the Soviet leadership knew and represented a real threat from Germany, its desire to provoke the USSR into military action, which would compromise us in the eyes of the world community as the culprit of aggression, thereby depriving the USSR of allies in the fight against the true aggressor.

How extensive the intelligence network of Soviet intelligence was is also evidenced by the fact that such celebrities as film actresses Olga Chekhova and Marika Rekk were agents of our military intelligence.

An illegal intelligence officer, operating under the pseudonym "Merlin", aka Olga Konstantinovna Chekhova, worked for Soviet intelligence from 1922 to 1945. The scale of her intelligence activities, volumes and especially the level and quality of information she sent to Moscow is clearly evidenced by the fact that the connection between O.K. Chekhova and Moscow were supported by three radio operators in Berlin and its environs.
Hitler awarded Olga Chekhova the specially established title of State Artist of the Third Reich, invited her to the most prestigious events, during which he demonstratively showed her signs of the highest attention, and invariably seated her next to him. (A.B. Martirosyan “Tragedy of June 22: Blitzkrieg or Treason.”)

OK. Chekhov at one of the receptions next to Hitler.

Marika Rekk belonged to an intelligence group of Soviet military intelligence, code-named “Krona”. Its creator was one of the most prominent Soviet military intelligence officers, Jan Chernyak.
The group was created back in the mid-20s. XX century and it operated for about 18 years, but not one of its members was discovered by the enemy.
And it included over 30 people, most of whom became important Wehrmacht officers and major industrialists of the Reich.

Marika Rekk
(Known to our viewers from captured German
movie "The Girl of My Dreams")

But G.K. Zhukov still did not miss the opportunity to spoil our intelligence and accused the Intelligence Department of insolvency, writing in a letter to the writer V.D. Sokolov dated March 2, 1964 the following:

“Our human intelligence service, which was led by Golikov before the war, worked poorly and failed to reveal the true intentions of the Hitlerite high command. Our human intelligence was unable to refute Hitler’s false version of his lack of intention to fight with the Soviet Union.”

Hitler continued to play his disinformation game, hoping to outplay I. Stalin in it.

So on May 15, 1941, the off-flight Yu-52 aircraft (Junkers-52 aircraft were used by Hitler as personal transport), flying unhindered over Bialystok, Minsk and Smolensk, landed in Moscow at 11.30 on the Khodynskoe field, without encountering opposition from Soviet means Air defense.
After this landing, many leaders of the Soviet air defense and aviation forces had very “serious troubles.”
The plane brought a personal message from Hitler to I. Stalin.
Here is part of the text of this message:
“During the formation of the invasion force away from the eyes and aircraft of the enemy, as well as in connection with recent operations in the Balkans, a large number of my troops accumulated along the border with the Soviet Union, about 88 divisions, which may have given rise to rumors currently circulating about a possible military conflict between us. I assure you with the honor of the head of state that this is not so.
For my part, I also understand that you cannot completely ignore these rumors and have also concentrated a sufficient number of your troops on the border.
In such a situation, I do not at all exclude the possibility of an accidental outbreak of an armed conflict, which, in conditions of such a concentration of troops, could take on very large proportions, when it would be difficult or simply impossible to determine what was its root cause. It will be no less difficult to stop this conflict.
I want to be completely frank with you. I fear that one of my generals will deliberately enter into such a conflict in order to save England from her fate and thwart my plans.
We are talking about just one month. Around June 15-20, I plan to begin a massive transfer of troops to the West from your border.
At the same time, I earnestly ask you not to succumb to any provocations that may occur on the part of my generals who have forgotten their duty. And, of course, try not to give them any reason.
If provocation from one of my generals cannot be avoided, I ask you to show restraint, do not take retaliatory actions and immediately report what happened through a communication channel known to you. Only in this way will we be able to achieve our common goals, which, it seems to me, you and I have clearly agreed upon. I thank you for meeting me halfway on an issue known to you, and I ask you to forgive me for the method that I chose to deliver this letter to you as quickly as possible. I continue to hope for our meeting in July. Sincerely yours, Adolf Hitler. May 14, 1941."

(As we see in this letter, Hitler practically himself “names” the approximate date of the attack on the USSR on June 15-20, covering it up with the transfer of troops to the West.)

But J. Stalin always had a clear position regarding Hitler’s intentions and trust in him.
The question of whether he believed or not believed simply should not exist, he never believed.

And all subsequent actions of I. Stalin show that he really did not believe Hitler’s “sincerity” and continued to take measures to “bring into combat readiness operational groupings of troops in the near, but ... not in the immediate rear,” which he spoke about in his speech from November 18, 1940 at a meeting of the Politburo so that the German attack would not take us by surprise.
So directly according to his instructions:

On May 14, 1941, General Staff directives No. 503859, 303862, 303874, 503913 and 503920 were sent (for the Western, Kyiv, Odessa, Leningrad and Baltic districts, respectively) on the preparation of border defense and air defense plans.
However, the command of all military districts, instead of the deadline indicated in them for submitting plans by May 20 - 25, 1941, submitted them by June 10 - 20. Therefore, these plans were not approved by either the General Staff or the People's Commissar of Defense.
This is the direct fault of the district commanders, as well as the General Staff, who did not demand the submission of plans by the specified deadline.
As a result, thousands of soldiers and officers responded with their lives at the start of the war;

- “...In February - April 1941, commanders of troops, members of military councils, chiefs of staff and operational departments of the Baltic, Western, Kyiv special and Leningrad military districts were called to the General Staff. Together with them, the procedure for covering the border, the allocation of the necessary forces for this purpose and the form of their use were outlined..” (Vasilevsky A.M. “The Work of a Whole Life.” M., 1974);

From March 25 to April 5, 1941, a partial conscription into the Red Army was carried out, thanks to which it was possible to additionally conscript about 300 thousand people;

On January 20, 1941, the order of the People's Commissar of Defense was announced on the enrollment of reserve command personnel, called up upon mobilization on the eve of the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940, who were detained in the army after the end of this war until special tension;

On May 24, 1941, at an extended meeting of the Politburo, J. Stalin openly warned all senior Soviet and military leadership that in the very near future the USSR could be subject to a surprise attack by Germany;

During May-June 1941. as a result of “hidden mobilization”, about a million “assignees” from the internal districts were raised and sent to the western districts.
This made it possible to bring almost 50% of the divisions to their normal wartime strength (12-14 thousand people).
Thus, the actual deployment and reinforcement of troops in the western districts began long before June 22.
This hidden mobilization could not be carried out without the instructions of I. Stalin, but it was carried out secretly in order to prevent Hitler and the entire West from accusing the USSR of aggressive intentions.
After all, this has already happened in our history, when in 1914 Nicholas II announced mobilization in the Russian Empire, which was regarded as a declaration of war;

On June 10, 1941, at the direction of I. Stalin, Directive of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 503859/SS/OV was sent to ZapOVO, which provided: “To increase the combat readiness of the district troops, all deep rifle divisions ... be withdrawn to the areas provided for by the cover plan,” which meant the actual bringing troops to increased combat readiness;
- On June 11, 1941, a Directive from the People's Commissar of Defense was sent to immediately bring the defensive structures of the first line of fortified areas of the Western OVO to proper condition and full combat readiness, first of all, strengthening their firepower.
“General Pavlov was obliged to report the execution by June 15, 1941. But no report was received on the implementation of this directive.” (Anfilov V.A. “The failure of the Blitzkrieg.” M., 1975).
And as it turned out later, this directive was not implemented.
Again the question is, where were the General Staff and its chief, who should have demanded its implementation, or should J. Stalin control these issues for them?;

On June 12, 1941, directives from the People's Commissariat of Defense signed by Timoshenko and Zhukov were sent on the implementation of Cover Plans for all western districts;

On June 13, 1941, at the direction of I. Stalin, a General Staff directive was issued on the deployment of troops located in the depths of the district, closer to the state border (Vasilevsky A.M. “The Work of a Whole Life”).
In three out of four districts, this directive was implemented, except for the Western OVO (District Commander, Army General D.F. Pavlov).
As military historian A. Isaev writes, “since June 18, the following units of the Kyiv OVO moved closer to the border from their places of deployment:
31 sk (200, 193, 195 sd); 36 sk (228, 140, 146 sd); 37 sk (141,80,139 sd); 55 sk (169,130,189 sd); 49 sk (190,197 sd).
Total - 5 rifle corps (rk), comprising 14 rifle divisions (rf), which is about 200 thousand people.”
In total, 28 divisions were moved closer to the state border;

In the memoirs of G.K. Zhukov we also find the following message:
“People's Commissar of Defense S.K. Already in June 1941, Timoshenko recommended that district commanders conduct tactical exercises of formations towards the state border in order to pull troops closer to deployment areas according to cover plans (i.e., to defense areas in the event of an attack).
This recommendation of the People's Commissar of Defense was implemented by the districts, however, with one significant caveat: a significant part of the artillery did not take part in the movement (to the border, to the line of defense)....
...The reason for this was that the commanders of the districts (Western OVO-Pavlov and Kiev OVO-Kirponos), without coordination with Moscow, decided to send most of the artillery to the firing ranges.”
Again the question: Where was the General Staff, its chief, if such events are carried out without their knowledge by the district commanders when war with Germany is on the threshold?
As a result, some corps and divisions of covering troops during the attack of Nazi Germany found themselves without a significant part of their artillery.
K.K. Rokossovsky writes in his book that “back in May 1941, for example, an order was issued from the district headquarters, the expediency of which was difficult to explain in that alarming situation. The troops were ordered to send artillery to the training grounds located in the border zone.
Our corps managed to defend its artillery.”
Thus, large-caliber artillery, the striking force of the troops, was practically absent from the battle formations. And most of the anti-aircraft weapons of the Western OVO were generally located near Minsk, far from the border, and could not cover units and airfields attacked from the air in the first hours and days of the war.
The district command provided this “invaluable service” to the invading German troops.
This is what German General Blumentritt, chief of staff of the 4th Army of Army Group Center, writes in his memoirs (the 2nd Tank Group of this army, commanded by Guderian, advanced on June 22, 1941 in the Brest area against the 4th Army of the Western OVO - army commander, Major General M.A. Korobkov):
“At 3 hours 30 minutes, all of our artillery opened fire... And then something happened that seemed like a miracle: the Russian artillery did not respond... A few hours later, the first echelon divisions were on the other side of the river. Bug. Tanks were crossed, pontoon bridges were built, and all this with almost no resistance from the enemy... There was no doubt that the Russians were taken by surprise... Our tanks almost immediately broke through the Russian border fortifications and rushed east along the flat terrain" ("Fatal Decisions" Moscow. Voenizdat 1958).
To this we must add that the bridges in the Brest area were not blown up, along which German tanks were moving. Guderian was even surprised by this;

On December 27, 1940, People's Commissar of Defense Timoshenko issued order No. 0367 on the mandatory camouflage of the entire Air Force airfield network within a 500-km strip from the border with completion of work by July 1, 1941.
Neither the Air Force Main Directorate nor the districts complied with this order.
The direct fault is that of the Air Force Inspector General, Assistant Chief of the Red Army General Staff for Aviation Smushkevich (in accordance with the order, he was entrusted with control and a monthly report on this to the General Staff) and the Air Force command;

On June 19, 1941, Order No. 0042 of the People's Commissar of Defense was issued.
It states that “nothing significant has yet been done to camouflage airfields and the most important military installations”, that aircraft with “the complete absence of their camouflage” are crowded at airfields, etc.
The same order states that “... Artillery and mechanized units show similar carelessness towards camouflage: the crowded and linear arrangement of their parks provides not only excellent observation objects, but also targets advantageous for hitting from the air. Tanks, armored vehicles, command and other special vehicles of motorized and other troops are painted with paints that give a bright reflection and are clearly visible not only from the air, but also from the ground. Nothing has been done to camouflage warehouses and other important military facilities...”
What was the result of this carelessness of the command of the districts, primarily the Western OVO, was shown on June 22, when about 738 aircraft were destroyed at its airfields, including 528 lost on the ground, as well as a large number of military equipment.
Who is to blame for this? Again I. Stalin, or the command of the military districts and the General Staff, who failed to exercise strict control over the implementation of their orders and directives? I think the answer is clear.
The commander of the Air Force of the Western Front, Hero of the Soviet Union, Major General I.I. Kopets, upon learning of these losses, shot himself on the same day, June 22.

Here I will quote the words of the People's Commissar of the Navy N.G. Kuznetsova:
“Analyzing the events of the last peaceful days, I assume: I.V. Stalin imagined the combat readiness of our armed forces to be higher than it actually was... He believed that at any moment, upon a combat alarm signal, they could reliably repel the enemy... Knowing absolutely exactly the number of aircraft stationed on his orders at border airfields , he believed that at any moment, upon a combat alarm signal, they could fly into the air and reliably repel the enemy. And I was simply stunned by the news that our planes did not have time to take off, but died right at the airfields.”
Naturally, I. Stalin’s idea of ​​the state of combat readiness of our Armed Forces was based on the reports, first of all, of the People’s Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff, as well as other military commanders, whom he regularly listened to in his office;

On June 21, I. Stalin decided to deploy 5 fronts:
Western, Southwestern. South, North-West, North.
By this time, the front command posts were already equipped, because Back on June 13, a decision was made to separate the command structures in the military districts and transform the military district directorates into front-line ones.
Command post of the Western Front (The front commander, Army General D.G. Pavlov, was deployed in the area of ​​the Obuz-Lesnaya station. But Pavlov never appeared there before the start of the war).
The front command post of the Southwestern Front was located in the city of Ternopil (the front commander, Colonel General M.P. Kirponos, died on September 20, 1941).

Thus, we see that before the war, on the instructions of I. Stalin, a number of measures were taken to strengthen the readiness of the Red Army to repel aggression from Germany. And he had every reason to believe, as the People’s Commissar of the Navy N.G. wrote. Kuznetsov, “the combat readiness of our armed forces is higher than it actually turned out to be....”
It should be noted that I. Stalin, receiving information about the approaching war from the foreign intelligence stations of Merkulov from the NKGB, from the military intelligence of General Golikov of the General Staff, through diplomatic channels, apparently could not be completely sure that all this was not a strategic provocation of Germany or Western countries that see their own salvation in the clash between the USSR and Germany.
But there was also intelligence of the border troops, subordinate to L. Beria, which provided information about the concentration of German troops directly at the borders of the USSR, and its reliability was ensured by the constant observation of border guards, a large number of informants in the border areas who directly observed the concentration of German troops - these were residents of the border areas, train drivers , switchmen, oilers, etc.
Information from this intelligence is integral information from such an extensive peripheral intelligence network that it cannot be unreliable. This information, generalized and collected together, gave the most objective picture of the concentration of German troops.
Beria regularly reported this information to I. Stalin:
- In information No. 1196/B on April 21, 1941, Stalin, Molotov, Timoshenko were given specific data on the arrival of German troops at points adjacent to the state border.
- On June 2, 1941, Beria sent note No. 1798/B personally to Stalin with information about the concentration of two German army groups, the increased movement of troops mainly at night, reconnaissance carried out by German generals near the border, etc.
- On June 5, Beria sends Stalin another note No. 1868/B on the concentration of troops on the Soviet-German, Soviet-Hungarian, Soviet-Romanian border.
In June 1941, more than 10 such information messages from border troops intelligence were presented.

But this is what Air Chief Marshal A.E. Golovanov recalls, who in June 1941, commanding the separate 212th Long-Range Aviation Bomber Regiment, subordinate directly to Moscow, arrived from Smolensk to Minsk to present to the Air Force Commander of the Western Special Military District I.I. Kopts and then to the Commander of the ZapOVO D. G. Pavlov himself.

During the conversation with Golovanov, Pavlov contacted Stalin via HF. And he began to ask the general questions, to which the District Commander answered the following:

“No, Comrade Stalin, this is not true! I just returned from the defensive lines. There is no concentration of German troops on the border, and my scouts are working well. I’ll check it again, but I think it’s just a provocation...”
And then, turning to him, he said:
“Boss is not in a good mood. Some bastard is trying to prove to him that the Germans are concentrating troops on our border...” Apparently, by this “bastard” he meant L. Beria, who was in charge of the border troops.
And many historians continue to insist that Stalin allegedly did not believe “Pavlov’s warnings” about the concentration of German troops....
The situation was heating up every day.

On June 14, 1941, a TASS message was published. It was a kind of trial balloon to test the reaction of the German leadership.
The TASS message, intended not so much for the population of the USSR as for official Berlin, refuted rumors about the “proximity of war between the USSR and Germany.”
There was no official reaction from Berlin to this message.
It apparently became clear to I. Stalin and the Soviet leadership that Germany’s military preparations for an attack on the USSR had entered the final stage.

June 15 came, then June 16, 17, but no “withdrawal” or “transfer” of German troops, as Hitler assured in his letter dated May 14, 1941, from the Soviet border “towards England” occurred.
On the contrary, an increased accumulation of Wehrmacht troops began on our border.

On June 17, 1941, a message was received from Berlin from the USSR naval attache, Captain 1st Rank M.A. Vorontsov, that a German attack on the USSR would occur on June 22 at 3.30 am. (Captain 1st Rank Vorontsov was summoned by I. Stalin to Moscow and, according to some information, on the evening of June 21, he attended a meeting in his office. This meeting will be discussed below).

And then a reconnaissance flight over the border was made with an “inspection” of German units near our border.
This is what Major General of Aviation, Hero of the Soviet Union G. N. Zakharov writes in his book “I am a fighter.” Before the war, he was a colonel and commanded the 43rd Fighter Division of the Western Special Military District:
“Somewhere in the middle of the last pre-war week - it was either the seventeenth or eighteenth of June forty-one - I received an order from the aviation commander of the Western Special Military District to fly over the western border. The length of the route was four hundred kilometers, and we had to fly from south to north – to Bialystok.
I flew out on a U-2 together with the navigator of the 43rd Fighter Aviation Division, Major Rumyantsev. The border areas west of the state border were filled with troops. In villages, farmsteads, and groves there were poorly camouflaged, or even completely uncamouflaged tanks, armored vehicles, and guns. Motorcycles and passenger cars, apparently staff cars, were darting along the roads. Somewhere in the depths of the vast territory a movement was born, which here, right at our border, was slowing down, resting against it... and ready to overflow across it.
We flew then for a little over three hours. I often landed the plane at any suitable site, which might seem random if the border guard did not immediately approach the plane. The border guard appeared silently, silently took his visor (as we see, he knew in advance that a plane with urgent information would soon land -sad39) and waited for several minutes while I wrote a report on the wing. Having received the report, the border guard disappeared, and we again took to the air and, having traveled 30–50 kilometers, landed again. And I wrote the report again, and the other border guard waited silently and then, saluting, silently disappeared. In the evening, in this way we flew to Bialystok.
After landing, the district air force commander, General Kopec, took me after the report to the district commander.
D. G. Pavlov looked at me as if he was seeing me for the first time. I felt dissatisfied when, at the end of my message, he smiled and asked if I was exaggerating. The commander’s intonation openly replaced the word “exaggerate” with “panic” - he clearly did not fully accept everything I said... And with that we left.”
D.G. Pavlov did not believe this information either...