Tatishchev Russian history volume 1 1962. Russian history from the most ancient times with tireless labors, thirty years later collected and described by the late Privy Councilor and Astrakhan governor, Vasily Nikitich Tatishchev. History of the 17th century

It is hardly necessary to prove that the vast majority of the command staff was completely loyal to the idea of ​​monarchism and to the personality of the sovereign. The later evolutions of senior monarchist military commanders were more often caused by career considerations, cowardice, or the desire, putting on a “guise,” to stay in power to carry out their plans. Less often - the collapse of ideals, a change in worldview, or motives of state expediency. It was naive, for example, to believe the statements of General Brusilov that from a young age he had been a “socialist and republican.” He is brought up in the traditions of the old guard, close to court circles, imbued through and through with their worldview, a “master” in habits, tastes, sympathies and surroundings. You can’t lie to yourself and others like that for the rest of your life.

The majority of Russian career officers shared monarchist beliefs and for the most part were, in any case, loyal.

Despite this, after the Japanese War, as a consequence of the first revolution, for some reason the officer corps was placed under the special supervision of the police department, and black lists were periodically sent to regiment commanders, the whole tragedy of which was that it was almost useless to challenge “unreliability” and conducting one’s own, even secret, investigation was not allowed. I personally had to wage a long struggle with the Kyiv headquarters over the small appointments (company commander and head of the machine gun team) of two officers of the 17th Arkhangelsk Regiment, which I commanded before the last war. The obvious injustice of their bypass would have placed a heavy burden on the conscience and authority of the regiment commander, and it was not possible to explain it. With great difficulty it was possible to defend these officers, and subsequently both of them died a glorious death in battle. This detective system created an unhealthy atmosphere in the army.

Not limiting himself to this, Sukhomlinov also created his own espionage (counterintelligence) network, headed by Colonel Myasoedov, who was later unofficially executed for spying for Germany. At each district headquarters, a body was established, headed by a gendarmerie officer dressed in a staff uniform. The scope of his activities was officially defined by the fight against foreign espionage - a very useful goal; unofficially - it was a typical reproduction of Arakcheev’s “profosts”. Before the war, the late Dukhonin, while still the head of the intelligence department of the Kyiv headquarters, complained bitterly to me about the difficult atmosphere introduced into the headquarters service by the new body, which, officially subordinate to the quartermaster general, actually held suspicion and monitored not only the headquarters, but also its own bosses.

Indeed, life seemed to push the officers to protest in one form or another against the “existing system.” For a long time, among service people there was no element so disadvantaged, so insecure and powerless as the ordinary Russian officers. Literally a miserable life, trampling on rights and pride from above; The crowning achievement of a career for most is the rank of lieutenant colonel and a painful, half-starved old age. Since the middle of the 19th century, the officer corps has completely lost its class-caste character. Since the introduction of compulsory military service and the impoverishment of the nobility, military schools have opened their doors wide to "commoners" and young men who came from the people and graduated from civilian educational institutions. There were a majority of these in the army. The mobilizations, in turn, brought into the officer corps a large number of people from liberal professions, who brought with them a new worldview. Finally, the enormous loss of career officers forced the command to give up somewhat the requirements of military education and training, introducing widespread promotion of soldiers to officers, both for military distinctions and by passing them through schools for warrant officers with a low educational qualification.

The last two circumstances, inevitably inherent in people's armies, caused two phenomena: they undoubtedly lowered the combat value of the officer corps and introduced some differentiation into its political appearance, bringing the Russian intelligentsia and democracy even closer to the average mass. The leaders of revolutionary democracy during the days of the revolution did not understand this, or rather, did not want to understand this.

Everywhere in the following presentation I contrast “revolutionary democracy” with a conglomeration of socialist parties to true Russian democracy, to which, without a doubt, the middle intelligentsia and the service element belong.

But the career officers gradually changed their appearance. The Japanese War, which revealed the deep illnesses that plagued the country and the army, The State Duma and a somewhat freer press after 1905 played a particularly serious role in the political education of the officers. The mystical “adoration” of the monarch began to gradually fade. Among the junior generals and officers, everything appeared more people who knew how to distinguish the idea of ​​monarchism from individuals, the happiness of the homeland from the form of government. Among wide circles of officers there was analysis, criticism, and sometimes severe condemnation. Rumors appeared - and not entirely unfounded - about secret officer organizations. True, such organizations, as alien to the entire structure of the army, did not and could not acquire any special influence or significance. However, they greatly worried the War Ministry, and Sukhomlinov, in 1908 or 1909, secretly informed his superiors about the need to take measures against a secret society formed from officers dissatisfied with the slow and unsystematic progress of the reorganization of the army and who allegedly wanted to speed it up by violent measures. ..

The mood in the officer corps, caused by various reasons, did not escape the consciousness of the highest military authorities. In 1907, issues of improving the combat training of the army and meeting its urgent needs, including the officer issue, were discussed in the “Special Preparatory Commission under the Council of State Defense,” which included, among other things, such major generals of the old school as N. I. Ivanov, Evert, Myshlaevsky, Hasenkampf and others... Their attitude to this issue is interesting (2).

On March 31, 1918, a Russian grenade, directed by the hand of a Russian man, killed the great Russian patriot. His corpse was burned and his ashes were scattered to the wind.

For what? Is it because in the days of great upheaval, when recent slaves bowed before the new rulers, he told them proudly and boldly: leave, you are destroying the Russian land.

Was it because, not sparing his life, with a handful of troops devoted to him, he began to fight against the elemental madness that gripped the country, and fell defeated, but did not betray his duty to the Motherland?

Was it because he deeply and painfully loved the people who betrayed him by crucifying him?

Years will pass, and thousands of people will flock to the high bank of the Kuban to worship the ashes of the martyr and creator of the idea of ​​​​the revival of Russia. His executioners will come too.

And he will forgive the executioners.

But he will never forgive one.

When the Supreme Commander-in-Chief was languishing in the Bykhov prison awaiting Shemyakin's trial, one of the destroyers of the Russian temple said: “Kornilov must be executed; but when this happens, I will come to the grave, bring flowers and kneel before the Russian patriot.”

Curse them - adulterers of words and thoughts! Away with their flowers! They desecrate the holy grave

I appeal to those who, both during Kornilov’s life and after his death, gave him the flowers of their souls and hearts, who once entrusted him with their fate and life:

In the midst of terrible storms and bloody battles, we will remain faithful to his covenants. Eternal memory to him

Brussels 1922

Essays on the Russian Time of Troubles

Chapter I
The divergence of the paths of the revolution. The inevitability of a coup

A broad generalization of the components of the forces of revolution into two resultants - the Provisional Government and the Council - is permissible in to a certain extent only in relation to the first months of the revolution. In its further course, a sharp stratification occurs among the ruling and leading circles, and the months of July and August already give a picture of a multilateral internecine struggle. At the top, this struggle is still going on within fairly clear boundaries separating the fighting sides, but its reflection among the masses reveals an image of complete confusion of concepts, instability political views and chaos in thoughts, feelings and movements. Sometimes only, in days of serious upheaval, differentiation occurs again, and the most heterogeneous and often politically and socially hostile elements gather around the two fighting sides. This happened on July 3 (Bolshevik uprising) and August 27 (Kornilov’s speech). But immediately after the acute crisis has passed, the external unity caused by tactical considerations disintegrates, and the paths of the leaders of the revolution diverge.

Sharp lines were drawn between the three main institutions: the Provisional Government, the Council (Central Executive Committee) and the High Command.

As a result of the long-term government crisis caused by the events of July 3–5, the defeat at the front and the irreconcilable position taken by liberal democracy, in particular the Kadet Party, on the issue of the formation of power, 1
The Cadets demanded the creation of a government resting on a national basis and represented by individuals not responsible to any organizations or committees.

The Council was forced to formally release the socialist ministers from responsibility to themselves and give Kerensky the right to individually form the government.

The joint central committees, by a resolution of July 24, conditioned the support of the councils on the government on its compliance with the July 8 program and reserved the right to recall socialist ministers if their activities deviated from the democratic tasks outlined in the program. But, nevertheless, the fact of a certain emancipation of the government from the influence of the soviets, as a result of the confusion and weakening of the leading bodies of revolutionary democracy in the July days, is beyond doubt. Moreover, the 3rd government included socialists who were either of little influence or, like Avksentyev (Minister of Internal Affairs), Chernov (Minister of Agriculture), Skobelev (Minister of Labor), who were not knowledgeable in the affairs of their department. F. Kokoshkin in the Moscow committee of the pariah k.d. said “during the month of our work in the government, the influence of the Council of Deputies on him was not noticeable at all... The decisions of the Council of Deputies were never mentioned, government resolutions were not applied to them”... And outwardly the relationship changed: the minister - the chairman either avoided or ignored the Council and the Central Committee, not appearing at their meetings and not giving them a report, as before. 2
Was there once in 1 month.

But the struggle, silent and intense, continued, with immediate causes being the divergence of the government and the central bodies of revolutionary democracy on issues of the beginning of the persecution of the Bolsheviks, repressions in the army, the organization of administrative power, etc.

The High Command took a negative position in relation to both the Council and the Government. How such relationships gradually matured was discussed in Volume 1. Leaving aside the details and reasons that aggravated them, let us dwell on the main reason: General Kornilov clearly sought to return power in the army to the military leaders and introduce military judicial repression throughout the country, which was largely directed against the Soviets and especially their left sector . Therefore, not to mention the deep political divergence, the struggle of the Soviets against Kornilov was, at the same time, their struggle for self-preservation. Moreover, it has long been governing bodies revolutionary democracy, the most fundamental issue of the country’s defense lost its self-sufficient significance and, according to Stankevich, if sometimes it was brought to the fore in the Executive Committee, “it was only as a means for settling other political scores.” The Council and the Executive Committee therefore demanded that the government change the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and destroy the “counter-revolutionary nest”, which in their eyes represented Headquarters.

Kerensky, who had actually concentrated government power in his hands, found himself in a particularly difficult position: he could not help but understand that only the measures of severe coercion proposed by Kornilov could perhaps save the army, finally free the government from Soviet dependence and establish internal order in the country. Undoubtedly, liberation from the Soviets, carried out by someone else's hands or accomplished as a result of spontaneous events that removed responsibility from the Provisional Government and the Kerenskagr, seemed to him to be useful and desirable for the state. But the voluntary acceptance of the measures prescribed by the command would have caused a complete break with revolutionary democracy, which gave Kerensky his name, position and power and which, despite the opposition it offered, nevertheless, strangely enough, served him, albeit shaky, but the only one support. On the other hand, the restoration of the power of the military command threatened not with a reaction - Kerensky often spoke about this, although he hardly seriously believed in it - but, in any case, with a shift in the center of influence from socialist to liberal democracy, the collapse of the social-revolutionary party policy and the loss of the prevailing , perhaps any influence on the course of events. Added to this was the personal antipathy between Kerensky and General Kornilov, each of whom did not hesitate to express, sometimes in a very sharp form, their negative attitude towards each other and expected to encounter not only opposition, but also a direct attempt on the part of the other side. Thus, General Kornilov was afraid to go to Petrograd on August 10th for a meeting of the Provisional Government, expecting for some reason removal from his post and even personal detention... And when, nevertheless, on the advice of Savinkov and Filonenko, he went, he was accompanied by a detachment of Tekinites who placed machine guns near entrances to the Winter Palace during the stay of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. In turn, Kerensky, back on August 13–14 in Moscow during the days of the state meeting, expected active action from Kornilov’s adherents and took precautions. Several times Kerensky raised the issue of removing Kornilov, but, not meeting sympathy for this decision either in the War Ministry or among the government itself, he anxiously awaited the development of events. As early as August 7, the assistant commissioner under the Supreme Commander-in-Chief warned Kornilov that the issue of his resignation had been finally resolved in Petrograd. Kornilov replied: “Personally, the question of remaining in office is of little interest to me, but I ask that it be brought to the attention of those who need to know that such a measure is unlikely to be useful in the interests of the cause, since it could cause unrest in the army”...

The split was not limited to the heights of power: it went deeper and wider, affecting its organs with impotence.

The Provisional Government was a mechanical combination of three groups, not connected with each other either by a commonality of tasks and goals, or by a unity of tactics: ministers - socialists, 3
Avksentyev (s.-r.), Skobelev (s.-r.), Pashekhonov (s.-s.), Chernov (s.-r.), Zarudny (s.-r.), Prokopovich (s.-d.) , Nikitin (S.-D.).

Liberal ministers 4
Oldenburg, Yurenev, Kokoshkin, Kartashov (K. d-ty), Efremov (r.-d.).

And separately - a triumvirate, consisting of Kerensky (S.-R.), Nekrasov (R.-D.) and Tereshchenko (S.-R.). If some of the representatives of the first group often found a common language and the same state understanding with the liberal ministers, then Avksentyev, Chernov and Skobelev, who concentrated all the most important departments in their hands, were separated from them by an abyss. However, the significance of both groups was quite insignificant, since the triumvirate “independently resolved all the most important issues outside the government, and sometimes even their decisions were not reported to the latter.” 5
Report by F. Kokoshkin on August 31.

The ministers' protests against this order of government, which represented a completely undisguised dictatorship, remained in vain. In particular, Kerensky tried in every possible way to remove his disagreement with Kornilov and the question of the measures he proposed almost as an ultimatum from the government’s discussion.

Somewhat apart from these three groups, arousing the sympathy of the liberal, the socialist opposition and the poorly hidden irritation of the triumvirate, stood Savinkov’s War Ministry. 6
The manager is Savinkov, the head of the political department is Stepun, the commissioner at Headquarters is Filonenko.

Savinkov broke with the party and the Soviets. He sharply and decisively supported Kornilov’s measures, putting constant and strong pressure on Kerensky, which, perhaps, would have been successful if the issue concerned only the ideology of the new course, and did not threaten Kerensky with the prospect of self-abolishing... At the same time, Savinkov did not go all the way and with Kornilov, not only dressing his simple and harsh provisions in conditional external forms“gains of the revolution”, but also defending broad rights to military-revolutionary institutions - commissars and committees. Although he recognized the foreignness of these bodies in the military environment and their inadmissibility in a normal organization, he ... apparently hoped that after coming to power, “faithful” people could be appointed as commissars, and committees could be taken over. At the same time, the existence of these bodies served as a certain insurance against the command staff, without whose help Savinkov could not achieve his goal, but in whose loyalty to himself he had little faith. The nature of the “commonwealth” and cooperation between General Kornilov and Savinkov is determined by the not uninteresting fact that Kornilov’s entourage considered it necessary to take certain precautions during Savinkov’s visits to Headquarters and especially during their face-to-face conversations... This happened not only at the end of August in Mogilev, but also in early July in Kamenets-Podolsk.

Savinkov could go with Kerensky against Kornilov and with Kornilov against Kerensky, coldly weighing the balance of forces and the degree to which they corresponded to the goal that he was pursuing. He called this goal the salvation of the Motherland; others saw it as his personal desire for power. Last opinion Both Kornilov and Kerensky adhered to this.

A split has also matured in the leading bodies of revolutionary democracy. The Central Executive Committee of the Soviets was increasingly at odds with the Petrograd Soviet, both on issues of principle, especially on the structure of the supreme power, and due to the claim of both to the role of the highest representative of democracy. The more moderate Central Committee could no longer compete with the Petrograd Soviet, which was irresistibly moving towards Bolshevism, with slogans that captivated the masses. Among the council itself, on major political issues, a strong coalition of Mensheviks - internationalists, left social revolutionaries and Bolsheviks was increasingly emerging. If the boundaries between the two main divisions of Social Democracy were sharply aggravated, then the disintegration of the other dominant party - the Social Revolutionaries - became even more pronounced, from which, after the July days, without completely breaking the formal connection with the old party, its left wing emerged, the most prominent representative of which was Spiridonova. During August, the left s. - the ry., having increased numerically in the Soviet faction to almost half of its composition, become in sharp opposition to both the party and circles of the same mind with the Central Executive Committee, demanding a complete break with the government, the abolition of exceptional laws, immediate socialization of the land and separate truce with the Central Powers.

The entire month of July and August passed in such a nervous, tense atmosphere. It is difficult to take into account and differentiate the dependence of two similar phenomena of complete confusion - among the ruling and leading elites on the one hand and the masses of the people on the other: was the confusion at the top a direct reflection of the state of fermentation of the country, in which the final goals, aspirations and will of the people could not yet be determined , or vice versa - the disease of the upper parts supported and deepened the fermentation process. As a result, however, not only did not the slightest signs of recovery appear, but on the contrary, all aspects of people's life quickly and invariably moved towards complete disorder.

The external manifestations this disorder, especially in the field of national defense. On August 20, the Riga disaster broke out, and the Germans clearly began to prepare for a large landing operation that threatened Revel and Petrograd. At a time when the productivity of the military industry was falling at an alarming rate (shell production by 60 percent), on August 14, a grandiose explosion of gunpowder factories and artillery warehouses in Kazan, undoubtedly caused by malicious intent, occurred, which destroyed up to a million shells and up to 12 thousand machine guns. In the second half of August, a general railway strike was brewing, threatening paralysis of our transport, hunger at the front and all the fatal consequences associated with this phenomenon. Cases of lynching and disobedience have become more frequent in the army. That verbiage that flowed continuously from Petrograd and there poisoned and intoxicated the thought and conscience of the leaders of revolutionary democracy, in the broad arena of people's life turned into direct action. Entire regions, provinces, cities severed administrative ties with the center, turning Russian state into a series of self-sufficient and self-governing territories connected with the center almost exclusively... by the incredibly increased need for state banknotes. In these “new formations,” the interest in political issues caused by the first upsurge of the revolution gradually disappeared, and flared up social struggle, taking on increasingly chaotic, cruel, non-state forms.

And against the background of this devastation, a new shock was approaching - the Bolshevik uprising was again and clearly being prepared. It was timed for the end of August. If then there could have been doubts and hesitations in assessing the situation and the threatening danger, in choosing the “resultant” and in the agonizing search for a viable coalition, now, when August 1917 is already a distant past that has become part of history, there can be no doubt at least in one thing: that only the government, inspired by the determination of a merciless fight against Bolshevism, could save a country that was almost doomed.

This could not be done by the Council, organically connected with its left wing. It could not and did not want to, “not allowing a fight against the entire political movement” and hypocritically demanding from the government an end to “illegal arrests and persecution” applied to “representatives of the extreme currents of socialist parties.” 7
Resolutions July 24 and August 20.

Kerensky, a comrade of the Chairman of the Council, who once threatened the Bolsheviks with “iron and blood,” could not and did not want to do this. Even on October 24, that is, on the eve of the decisive Bolshevik uprising, finally recognizing “the actions of the Russian political party(Bolsheviks) betrayal and treason To the Russian state", Kerensky, speaking about the seizure of power in the Petrograd garrison by the military revolutionary committee, explains: "but here too there is military power according to me it is indicated, although there was all the data available in order to take decisive and energetic measures, I considered it necessary to first give people the opportunity to realize their conscious or unconscious mistake”... 8
Speech in the “Council of the Republic”.

Thus, the country was faced with an alternative: to fall under the rule of the Bolsheviks without a fight and in a very short time, or to put forward a force willing and able to enter into a decisive struggle with them.

Chapter II
The beginning of the struggle: General Kornilov, Kerensky and Savinkov. Kornilov’s “note” on the reorganization of the army

In the struggle between Kerensky and Kornilov, which led to such fatal results for Russia, it is remarkable that there were no direct political and social slogans that would separate the fighting parties. Never, either before or during the speech, either officially or in private information, Kornilov set a specific “political program.” He didn't have it. The document that is known by this name, as we will see below, is the fruit of the later collective creativity of the Bykhov prisoners. Exactly the same in the field practical activities Supreme Commander-in-Chief, vested with unabated rights in the field of civil administration in the war zone, he avoided any interference in government policy. His only order in this area had in mind land anarchy and, without touching on the legal relations of landowners, established only judicial reprisals for violent actions that threatened the systematic supply of the army, as a result of “arbitrary theft of state property in the theater of military operations.” Kornilov’s answer to the Podolsk landowners who came to him is worthy of attention: 9
At the beginning of July on the Southwestern Front.

– I will provide armed forces to protect the harvest necessary for the army. I will not hesitate to use this armed force against those madmen who, for the sake of satisfying base instincts, are destroying the army. But I will not think of shooting any of you in the same way if negligence or malice is discovered during the harvest of the current harvest.

The lack of a bright political face on the part of the leader, who was supposed to temporarily take the helm of the Russian ship of state into his own hands, is somewhat unexpected. But given the disintegration of the Russian public and the confusion of political trends that had developed by the fall of 1917, it seemed that only this kind of neutral force, in the presence of some favorable conditions could have a chance of success in a numerically huge, but intellectually loose combination of popular strata that stood outside the framework of “revolutionary democracy.” Kornilov was a soldier and commander. He was proud of this title and always put it in the forefront. We cannot read souls. But in deed and word, sometimes frank, not intended for the ears of others, he sufficiently defined his view of the role ahead of him, without claiming political infallibility, he looked at himself as a mighty battering ram that was supposed to make a hole in the vicious circle of forces , who surrounded the authorities, depersonalized and bled it dry. He had to clear this power of non-state and non-national elements and, fully armed with force, relying on the restored army, support and carry this power until the expression of genuine popular will.

But, perhaps too tolerant, trusting and poorly versed in people, he did not notice how, from the very inception of his idea, it was also surrounded on all sides by small-state elements, sometimes simply unprincipled. This was a deep tragedy in Kornilov’s activities.

Kornilov’s political image remains unclear to many even now, more than three years after his death. Legends are woven around this issue, drawing their justification from the nature of that environment, which more than once created its will in his name.

On this shaky and too elastic basis, presented in a wide range from a peaceful terrorist through a repentant Trudovik to a friend of Illiodor, one can draw any patterns you like, with the same probability of a complete distortion of the truth. A monarchist is a republican. A reactionary is a socialist. Bonaparte - Pozharsky. "Rebel" is a folk hero. Reviews of the late leader are full of such contrasts. And, if the “village minister” Chernov once, in his outrageous appeal, explained Kornilov’s plans with the desire to “stifle freedom and deprive the peasants of land and freedom,” then Metropolitan Anthony, in a word dedicated to the memory of Kornilov, shortly before the Russian army abandoned Crimea, reproached the deceased ... for “hobby revolutionary ideas."

One thing is true: Kornilov was neither a socialist nor a reactionary. But it would be in vain to look within this broad framework for any party stamp. Like the overwhelming majority of officers and command personnel, he was distant and alien to any party dogmatism; in his views and convictions he belonged to broad strata of liberal democracy; perhaps he did not deepen in his consciousness the motives for her political and social differences and did not attach of great importance those of them that went beyond the professional interests of the army.

Denikin A I

Essays on the Russian Troubles (Volume 2)

Preface

On March 31, 1918, a Russian grenade, directed by the hand of a Russian man, killed the great Russian patriot. His corpse was burned and his ashes were scattered to the wind.

For what? Is it because in the days of great upheaval, when recent slaves bowed before the new rulers, he told them proudly and boldly: leave, you are destroying the Russian land.

Was it because, not sparing his life, with a handful of troops devoted to him, he began to fight against the elemental madness that gripped the country, and fell defeated, but did not betray his duty to the Motherland?

Is it because he deeply and painfully loved the people who betrayed him and crucified him? Years will pass, and thousands of people will flow to the high bank of the Kuban to worship the ashes of the martyr and creator of the idea of ​​​​the revival of Russia. His executioners will come too.

And he will forgive the executioners.

But he will never forgive one.

When the Supreme Commander-in-Chief was languishing in the Bykhov prison awaiting Shemyakin's trial, one of the destroyers of the Russian temple said: “Kornilov must be executed; but when this happens, I will come to the grave, bring flowers and kneel before the Russian patriot.”

Curse them - adulterers of words and thoughts! Away with their flowers! They desecrate the holy grave. I appeal to those who, both during Kornilov’s life and after his death, gave him the flowers of their souls and hearts, who once entrusted him with their fate and life:

In the midst of terrible storms and bloody battles, we will remain faithful to his covenants. Eternal memory to him. Speech delivered by the author in Ekaterinodar in 1919.

Brussels 1922

Essays on the Russian Time of Troubles

The divergence of the paths of the revolution. The inevitability of a revolution.

A broad generalization of the constituent forces of the revolution into two resultants, the Provisional Government and the Council, is permissible to a certain extent only in relation to the first months of the revolution. In its further course, a sharp stratification occurs among the ruling and leading circles, and the months of July and August already give a picture of a multilateral internecine struggle. At the top, this struggle is still going on within fairly clear boundaries separating the fighting parties, but its reflection among the masses reveals an image of complete confusion of concepts, instability of political views and chaos in thoughts, feelings and movements. Sometimes only, in days of serious upheaval, differentiation occurs again, and the most heterogeneous and often politically and socially hostile elements gather around the two fighting sides.

This happened on July 3 (Bolshevik uprising) and August 27 (Kornilov’s speech). But immediately after the acute crisis has passed, the external unity caused by tactical considerations disintegrates, and the paths of the leaders of the revolution diverge.

Sharp lines were drawn between the three main institutions: the Provisional Government, the Council (Central Executive Committee) and the High Command.

As a result of a long government crisis caused by the events of July 3-5, the defeat at the front and the irreconcilable position taken by liberal democracy, in particular the Cadet Party, on the issue of forming power, the Council was forced to formally release the socialist ministers from responsibility to itself and give the right to Kerensky single-handedly form a government. The joint central committees, by a resolution of July 24, conditioned the support of the councils on the government on its compliance with the July 8 program and reserved the right to recall socialist ministers if their activities deviated from the democratic tasks outlined in the program. But, nevertheless, the fact of a certain emancipation of the government from the influence of the soviets, as a result of the confusion and weakening of the leading bodies of revolutionary democracy in the July days, is beyond doubt. Moreover, the 3rd government included socialists who were either of little influence or, like Avksentyev (Minister of Internal Affairs), Chernov (Minister of Agriculture), Skobelev (Minister of Labor), who were not knowledgeable in the affairs of their department. F. Kokoshkin in the Moscow committee of the pariah k.d.

said “during the month of our work in the government, the influence of the Council of Deputies on him was not noticeable at all... The decisions of the Council of Deputies were never mentioned, government decrees were not applied to them”... And outwardly the relationship changed: the minister-chairman either avoided or sometimes he ignored the Council and the Central Committee, not appearing at their meetings and not giving them a report, as before. But the struggle, silent and intense, continued, with immediate causes being the divergence of the government and the central bodies of revolutionary democracy on issues of the beginning of the persecution of the Bolsheviks, repressions in the army, the organization of administrative power, etc.

The High Command took a negative position in relation to both the Council and the Government. How such relationships gradually matured was discussed in Volume 1. Leaving aside the details and reasons that aggravated them, let us dwell on the main reason: General Kornilov clearly sought to return power in the army to the military leaders and introduce military judicial repression throughout the country, which was largely directed against the Soviets and especially their left sector . Therefore, not to mention the deep political divergence, the struggle of the Soviets against Kornilov was, at the same time, their struggle for self-preservation. Moreover, long ago in the leading bodies of revolutionary democracy the most fundamental issue of the country’s defense lost its self-sufficient importance and, according to Stankevich, if it was sometimes brought to the fore in the Executive Committee, “it was only as a means for settling other political scores.” The Council and the Executive Committee therefore demanded that the government change the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and destroy the “counter-revolutionary nest”, which in their eyes represented Headquarters.

Kerensky, who had actually concentrated government power in his hands, found himself in a particularly difficult position: he could not help but understand that only the measures of severe coercion proposed by Kornilov could perhaps save the army, finally free the government from Soviet dependence and establish internal order in the country. Undoubtedly, liberation from the Soviets, carried out by someone else's hands or accomplished as a result of spontaneous events that removed responsibility from the Provisional Government and the Kerenskagr, seemed to him to be useful and desirable for the state. But the voluntary adoption of the measures prescribed by the command would have caused a complete break with revolutionary democracy, which gave Kerensky his name, position and power and which, despite the opposition it offered, nevertheless, strangely enough, served him, albeit shaky, as his only support. On the other hand, the restoration of the power of the military command threatened not with a reaction - Kerensky often spoke about this, although he hardly seriously believed in it - but, in any case, with a shift in the center of influence from socialist to liberal democracy, the collapse of the social-revolutionary party policy and the loss of the prevailing , perhaps any influence on the course of events. Added to this was the personal antipathy between Kerensky and General Kornilov, each of whom did not hesitate to express, sometimes in a very sharp form, their negative attitude towards each other and expected to encounter not only opposition, but also a direct attempt on the part of the other side. So General Kornilov was afraid to go to Petrograd on August 10th for a meeting of the Provisional Government, expecting for some reason removal from his post and even personal detention... And when, nevertheless, on the advice of Savinkov and Filonenko, he went, he was accompanied by a detachment of Tekinites who set up machine guns at the entrances to the Winter Palace during the stay of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. In turn, Kerensky, back on August 13-14 in Moscow during the days of the state meeting, expected active action from Kornilov’s adherents and took precautions.

Several times Kerensky raised the issue of removing Kornilov, but, not meeting sympathy for this decision either in the War Ministry or among the government itself, he anxiously awaited the development of events. As early as August 7, the assistant commissioner under the Supreme Commander-in-Chief warned Kornilov that the question

Denikin Anton Ivanovich

Essays on the Russian Troubles. Volume 1

Preface

Chapter I. Foundations of the old army: faith, king and fatherland

Chapter II. The state of the old army before the revolution

Chapter III. The old army and the sovereign

Chapter IV. Revolution in Petrograd

Chapter V. Revolution and the royal family

Chapter VI. Revolution and the army. Order No. 1

Chapter VII. Impressions from Petrograd at the end of March 1917

Chapter VIII. Bid; her role and position

Chapter IX. Little things in life at Headquarters

Chapter X. General Markov

Chapter XI. Power: Duma, Provisional Government, command, Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies

Chapter XII. Power: the struggle for power of the Bolsheviks; the power of the army, the idea of ​​dictatorship

Chapter XIII. Activities of the Provisional Government: domestic politics, civil administration; city ​​and countryside, agrarian question

Chapter XIV. Activities of the Provisional Government: food, industry, transport, finance

Chapter XV. The position of the Central Powers in the spring of 1917

Chapter XVI. The strategic position of the Russian front in the spring of 1917

Chapter XVII. The question of the Russian army going on the offensive

Chapter XVIII. Military reforms: generals and expulsion of senior officers

Chapter XIX. "Democratization of the Army": management, service, life

Chapter XX. "Democratization of the Army": committees

Chapter XXI. "Democratization of the Army": Commissars

Chapter XXII. "Democratization of the Army": the history of the "Declaration of the Rights of the Soldier"

Chapter XXIII. Press and propaganda from outside

Chapter XXIV. Press and propaganda from within

Chapter XXV. State of the army at the time of the June offensive

Chapter XXVI. Officer organizations

Chapter XXVII. Revolution and Cossacks

Chapter XXVIII. National units

Chapter XXIX. Army surrogates: “revolutionary”, women's battalions etc.

Chapter XXX. The end of May and the beginning of June in the field of military management. The departure of Guchkov and General Alekseev. My departure from Headquarters. Office of Kerensky and General Brusilov

Chapter XXXI. My service as Commander-in-Chief of the armies of the Western Front

Chapter XXXII. The offensive of the Russian armies in the summer of 1917. Defeat.

Chapter XXXIV. General Kornilov

Chapter XXXV. My service as commander-in-chief of the armies Southwestern Front. Moscow meeting. Fall of Riga

Chapter XXXVI. Kornilov's speech and its echoes on the Southwestern Front

Chapter XXXVII. In Berdichev prison. Moving of the "Berdichev group of arrested" to Bykhov

Chapter XXXVIII. Some results of the first period of the revolution

Notes

Preface

In the bloody fog of the Russian Troubles, people are dying and the real boundaries of historical events are being erased.

Therefore, despite the difficulty and incompleteness of working in a refugee situation without archives, without materials and without the possibility of exchanging living words with participants in the events, I decided to publish my essays.

The first book talks mainly about the Russian army, with which my life is inextricably linked. Political, social, and economic issues are touched upon only to the extent that it is necessary to outline their influence on the course of the struggle.

The army in 1917 played a decisive role in the fate of Russia. Her participation in the course of the revolution, her life, corruption and death should serve as a great and cautionary lesson for the new builders of Russian life.

And not only in the fight against the country’s current enslavers. After the overthrow of Bolshevism, along with enormous work in the field of reviving the moral and material forces of the Russian people, before the latter, with unprecedented national history The question of preserving its sovereign existence will become acute.

For beyond the borders of the Russian land, gravediggers are already knocking with their spades and jackals are baring their teeth, in anticipation of her death.

They won't wait. From blood, dirt, spiritual and physical poverty, the Russian people will rise in strength and intelligence.

A. Denikin

Brussels.

Chapter I. Foundations of the old government: faith, king and fatherland

An inevitable historical process that has ended February revolution, led to the collapse of Russian statehood. But, if philosophers, historians, sociologists, studying the course of Russian life, could foresee the coming upheavals, no one expected that the element of the people would so easily and quickly sweep away all the foundations on which life rested: the supreme power and the ruling classes - without any struggle gone aside; the intelligentsia - gifted, but weak, groundless, weak-willed, at first, amid a merciless struggle, resisting with words alone, then obediently putting their necks under the knife of the victors; finally a strong, ten-million-strong army with a huge historical past, which collapsed within 3 - 4 months.

The last phenomenon, however, was not so unexpected, having a terrible and warning prototype in the epilogue of the Manchurian War and subsequent events in Moscow, Kronstadt and Sevastopol... Having lived for two weeks in Harbin at the end of November 1905 and traveled along the Siberian route for 31 days ( December 1907) through a whole series of “republics” from Harbin to Petrograd, I formed a clear idea of ​​what can be expected from the unbridled, uninhibited soldier mob. And all the rallies, resolutions, councils and, in general, all manifestations of the military revolt of that time - with greater force, on an incomparably wider scale, but with photographic precision - were repeated in 1917.

It should be noted that the possibility of such a rapid psychological degeneration was by no means inherent in the Russian army alone. Undoubtedly, fatigue from the 3-year war played a significant role in all these phenomena, to one degree or another affecting all the armies of the world and making them more susceptible to the corrupting influences of extreme socialist teachings. In the fall of 1918, the German corps that occupied the Don and Little Russia disintegrated in one week, repeating to a certain extent the history we had gone through of rallies, councils, committees, the overthrow of officers, and in some parts the sale of military property, horses and weapons... Only then did the Germans understood the tragedy of the Russian officers. And our volunteers had to see more than once the humiliation and bitter tears of German officers - once arrogant and impassive.

Tatishchev came to the main work of his life as a result of a confluence of a number of circumstances. Realizing the harm caused by the lack of a detailed geography of Russia and seeing the connection between geography and history, he found it necessary to first collect and consider all historical information about Russia. Since foreign leadership turned out to be full of mistakes, Tatishchev turned to primary sources and began to study chronicles and other materials. At first he had in mind to write a historical work (“in a historical order” - that is, an author’s analytical work in the style of the New Age), but then, finding that it was inconvenient to refer to chronicles that had not yet been published, he decided to write in a purely “chronicle order” ( on the model of chronicles: in the form of a chronicle of dated events, the connections between which are outlined implicitly).

As Tatishchev writes, he collected more than a thousand books in his library, but he could not use most of them, because he spoke only German and Polish. At the same time, with the help of the Academy of Sciences, he used translations of some ancient authors made by Kondratovich.

• Excerpts from Herodotus' "History" (chapter 12).
• Excerpts from the book. VII “Geography” of Strabo (chapter 13).
• From Pliny the Elder (chap. 14).
• From Claudius Ptolemy (ch. 15).
• From Constantine Porphyrogenitus (chap. 16).
• From the books of northern writers, Bayer's work (chapter 17).

The Sarmatian theory occupies a special place in Tatishchev’s ethnogeographical ideas. Tatishchev’s etymological “method” illustrates the reasoning from Chapter 28: the historian notes that in Finnish the Russians are called Venelain, the Finns - Sumalain, the Germans - Saxolain, the Swedes - Roxolain, and identifies the common element “Alain”, that is, the people. He identifies the same common element in the names of the tribes known from ancient sources: Alans, Roxalans, Raklans, Alanors, and concludes that the language of the Finns is close to the language of the Sarmatians. The idea of ​​the kinship of the Finno-Ugric peoples already existed by the time of Tatishchev.

Another group of etymologies is associated with the search for Slavic tribes in ancient sources. In particular, only Ptolemy, according to Tatishchev’s assumptions (chap. 20), mentions the following Slavic names: agorites and pagorites - from the mountains; demons, that is, barefoot; sunsets - from sunset; zenkhs, that is, grooms; hemp - from hemp; tolistobogs, that is, thick-sided; tolistosagi, that is, thick-bottomed; maters, that is, seasoned; plesii, that is, bald; sabos, or dog sabos; defense, that is, harrow; sapotrenes - prudent; svardeni, that is, svarodei (making swaras), etc.

Tatishchevskie news

A special source study problem is posed by the so-called “Tatishchev news”, which contains information that is not in the chronicles known to us. These are texts of varying length, from one or two added words to large integral stories, including lengthy speeches of princes and boyars. Sometimes Tatishchev comments on this news in notes, refers to chronicles, unknown modern science or reliably not identifiable (“Rostovskaya”, “Golitsynskaya”, “Raskolnichya”, “Chronicle of Simon the Bishop”). In most cases, the source of original news is not indicated by Tatishchev at all.

A special place in the array of “Tatishchev news” is occupied by the Joachim Chronicle - an inserted text, equipped with a special introduction by Tatishchev and representing brief retelling a special chronicle telling about the most ancient period of the history of Rus' (IX-X centuries). Tatishchev considered the author of the Joachim Chronicle to be the first Novgorod bishop Joachim Korsunyanin, a contemporary of the Baptism of Rus.

In historiography, the attitude towards Tatishchev's news has always been different. Historians of the second half of the 18th century (Shcherbatov, Boltin) reproduced his information without checking the chronicles. A skeptical attitude towards them is associated with the names of Schlözer and especially Karamzin. This latter considered the Joachim Chronicle to be Tatishchev’s “joke” (that is, a clumsy hoax), and resolutely declared the Raskolnichy Chronicle “imaginary.” Based critical analysis Karamzin highlighted a whole series of specific Tatishchev news and quite consistently refuted them in the notes, without using the “History of the Russian State” in the main text (the exception is the news of the papal embassy to Roman Galitsky in 1204, which penetrated into the main text of the second volume due to a special coincidence).

It is interesting that many skeptics (Peshtic, Lurie, Tolochko) do not at all accuse Tatishchev of scientific dishonesty and invariably emphasize that during Tatishchev’s time there was no modern concepts about scientific ethics and strict rules of registration historical research. “Tatishchevskie News”, no matter how one treats it, does not represent a conscious mystification of the reader, but rather reflects the outstanding independent research, by no means simple-minded “chronicle-writing” activity of the historian. Additional news is, as a rule, logical links missing from the sources, reconstructed by the author, illustrations of his political and educational concepts. The discussion around the “Tatishchev news” continues.

The problem of “minus text” of Tatishchev’s work

The formulation of the problem, as well as the term itself, belong to A.V. Gorovenko. This researcher calls “minus-text” news that Tatishchev does not have, although it is available in the Ipatiev and Khlebnikov Chronicles (in this terminology, additional Tatishchev news, respectively, represents “plus-text”). The main body of the Tatishchev text between 1113 and 1198. goes back to the chronicle of the same type as the well-known Ipatievskaya and Khlebnikovskaya. If Tatishchev's source was best quality than the two chronicles of the same type that have come down to us, then why does Tatishchev’s text contain not only additions, but also large gaps, as well as a huge number of defective readings, including a number of rather comic ones? There is no answer to this question yet from supporters of the reliability of Tatishchev’s news.

Sources for parts two to four of the History

Tatishchev's chronicle sources are characterized by him in Chapter. 7 parts of the first “History”.

The first edition of this text has also been preserved, which has a number of differences, as well as characteristics of the sources, preserved only in the German translation.

Armchair manuscript

In the first edition, the list of sources is not mentioned at all. According to Tatishchev’s description, he received it in 1720 from the library of Peter I and became the basis of the entire collection, this is a chronicle “with faces”, brought to 1239, but the ending is lost. Briefly outlines the events before Yuri Dolgoruky, then in more detail.

According to Tikhomirov, this chronicle is lost. According to Peshtic and V.A. Petrov, this is the Laptev volume of the Face Vault, brought up to 1252. It was also assumed that we are talking about the same illustrated copy of the Radzivilov Chronicle (see below).

Tolochko is inclined to doubt its existence or suggest that the phrase “with faces” does not mean that the vault is illustrated, but the presence in it of descriptions of the appearance of the characters included by Tatishchev in “History”.

Schismatic Chronicle

According to Tatishchev, he received it in Siberia from a schismatic in 1721; it was a copy of an ancient manuscript on parchment, ending in 1197 and containing the name of Nestor in the title. Taking into account modern terminology, in 1721 Tatishchev was not actually in Siberia, but in the Urals. The manuscript, if it existed at all, is lost.

According to optimists, this is an unknown edition of the Kyiv Chronicle. In particular, B. A. Rybakov identified many unique news from this chronicle (186 news for the 12th century) and traced them mainly to the “Chronicle of Peter Borislavich.”

According to A.P. Tolochko, the proportionality of the volumes of Tatishchev’s additional news and the text of the Ipatiev Chronicle is deeply logical and is explained by the peculiarity of Tatishchev’s creative manner: his additions recreated the causal relationship between events.

Tolochko argues that a number of readings of “Russian History” for the 12th century cannot go back to Ermolaev’s list, but reflect another list of the Ipatiev Chronicle, close to Khlebnikov’s. Tolochko declares this hypothetical list to be the Schismatic Chronicle, claiming that all Tatishchev’s information indicating the antiquity of this manuscript is a hoax. According to Tolochko, the second chronicle of the Khlebnikov type, actually used by Tatishchev and passed off as “Raskolnicha,” was actually in the library of Prince D. M. Golitsyn along with the Ermolaev Chronicle and the “Chronicle” of Feodosius Sofonovich, and all these three manuscripts were Ukrainian origin and contained in the title the name of Nestor as a chronicler. However, without exception, all textual observations of Tolochko, which allegedly pointed to Tatishchev’s use of the “second chronicle of the Khdebnikov type,” were consistently refuted

Königsberg Manuscript

A copy of the Königsberg Chronicle, now known as the Radzivilov Chronicle, was made for Peter I. This copy is kept in the NA Library (7/31/22).

Continues until 1206, but the end is mixed. This description is quite consistent with the original.

According to A.P. Tolochko, even in cases where Tatishchev refers to clearly identifiable chronicles (for example, the Radzivilovskaya), he makes obvious mistakes.

Golitsyn manuscript

According to the textual analysis of S. L. Peshtich and A. Tolochko, this is the Ermolaev copy of the Ipatiev Chronicle, which in the 1720s was in the library of D. M. Golitsyn, where Tatishchev met him. According to another opinion (M. N. Tikhomirov, B. A. Rybakov), this is a special edition of the Kyiv Chronicle, close to the Raskolnichi and different from the edition of all copies of the Ipatiev Chronicle.

An important argument in favor of Tatishchev’s integrity is the fact that all known manuscripts of the Ipatiev Chronicle contain both the Kyiv and Galician-Volyn Chronicles. However, as N.M. Karamzin noted, Tatishchev knew only the Kiev, but not the Galician-Volyn chronicle.

Tatishchev notes that the Golitsyn manuscript was completed in 1198, and 19 years later some additions were made out of order. In the first surviving version of the description of the chronicles, Tatishchev says that this manuscript contained something from Stryikovsky. This phrase was removed from the final version.

According to modern ideas, the gap between the end of the Kyiv and the beginning of the Galician-Volyn chronicle was 5-6 years. However, in the margins of the Ermolaevsky list there is an indication of a gap of 19 years, and a reference to the similarity with the text of Stryikovsky.

According to Tolochko, Tatishchev accepted the text of the Galicia-Volyn Chronicle in the Ermolaevsky list as a work dependent on the Polish historian Stryikovsky (for both texts contained praise for Roman Mstislavich), and did not consider it necessary to get acquainted with it in detail and make a copy. Later, he did not have the opportunity to turn to D. M. Golitsyn’s library.

Kirillovsky manuscript

Started with the translation of the Chronograph from the creation of the world, continued until Ivan the Terrible.

According to Tikhomirov, this is the Degree Book, according to Peshtic, accepted by Tolochko - the second part of the Lviv Chronicle.

Novgorod manuscript

According to Tatishchev, it is called Vremnik, includes the Law of the Yaroslavs and has an inscription about its composition in 1444; taken by a historian from a schismatic in the forest and given to the Academy of Sciences Library. Now known as the Academic copy of the Novgorod First Chronicle, junior edition, which actually contains the Russian Truth. According to B. M. Kloss, the Tolstoy copy of the same chronicle was created by a scribe in the library of D. M. Golitsyn in the late 1720s.

Pskov manuscript

This manuscript combines the texts of the Novgorod Fifth (with some additions) and the Pskov First Chronicle and was preserved in the Library of AN 31.4.22 with Tatishchev’s notes; the Pskov text ends in 1547. . According to Tatishchev, it ends in 1468. The Pskov news was not used by Tatishchev.

Krekshinsky manuscript

According to Tatishchev’s description, it continues until 1525, includes genealogies, and differs from the Novgorod one in the composition of news and in dating.

According to Peshtic, this is a list of the Russian Vremennik and the Resurrection Chronicle. According to Ya. S. Lurie, this is the Novgorod edition of the Degree Book. According to Tolochko, this is the Chronicle of Krivoborsky, known as the Chertkovsky list of the Vladimir chronicler and published in volume XXX PSRL.

Nikon's manuscript

According to Tatishchev, this is the “Chronicle of the Resurrection Monastery,” signed by the hand of Patriarch Nikon and continued until 1630. Its beginning is similar to Raskolnichy and Koenigsberg, and before 1180 it is close to Golitsyn.

It is known that the texts of parts 3 and 4 of the “History” were based on the Academic XV copy of the Nikon Chronicle (entered into the Library of the Academy of Sciences from the collection of Feofan Prokopovich in 1741), a copy of which, on behalf of Tatishchev, was made between 1739 and 1741, while the manuscript was divided into two volumes, it contains notes from Tatishchev.

Nizhny Novgorod manuscript

According to Tatishchev’s description, it ends in 1347, and is at least 300 years old. Tatishchev reported about his discovery in a letter dated September 12, 1741.

According to M. N. Tikhomirov, this is the Alatyr list of the Resurrection Chronicle, which is incomplete her text. According to modern data, the manuscript dates back to the third quarter of the 16th century and was actually completed before 1347.

Yaroslavl manuscript

Bought from a peddler in the square, given to the English Royal Society. Has many additions from the death of Dmitry Donskoy. According to Tolochko, identical to Rostovsky, who is mentioned in the notes.

Manuscripts of Volynsky, Khrushchev and Eropkin

According to A.P. Tolochko, several manuscripts from Volynsky’s library have survived, including a number of chronicles of the 17th-18th centuries, but the required texts are not there. The texts of the Eropkin Chronicle are close to “Tales of the Beginning of Moscow”. The Khrushchev Manuscript is a copy of the Khrushchev Degree Book with a number of additions from the 17th century.

History of the 17th century

In the “Pre-Notice” to the first part, Tatishchev mentions a number of other sources dating back to the history of the 17th century, most of which have been preserved and are identified. However, among them are:

Editions

The first two parts of volume I of “History” were published for the first time in - . in Moscow by G.F. Miller (volume I part, facsimile in pdf and volume I part II, facsimile in pdf). Volume II was published in the city (volume II, facsimile in pdf), volume III - in 1774 (volume III, facsimile in pdf) (volumes II-III of this edition include the second part of the “History”), volume IV (third part of the “History”) - in 1784 (Volume IV, facsimile in pdf), and the manuscript of the fourth part of the “History” was found by M.P. Pogodin only in 1843 and published as Volume V of the General. ist. and other Russians. in 1848 (Volume V, facsimile in pdf).

Moreover, only the first and second parts were basically completed by the author. The third and fourth parts underwent only initial processing and were based primarily on the Nikon Chronicle with individual additions.

Even before publication, Tatishchev’s work was known to a number of contemporary historians. Some of Tatishchev’s preparatory work was kept in Miller’s briefcases after his death. In addition, a number of Tatishchev’s materials were used by the publishers of the Radzivilov Chronicle in 1767 to supplement its text.

The complete academic edition of Tatishchev's History (including the previously unpublished first edition) was published in 1962-1968 and republished in 1994. In this edition, volume I included the first part, volumes II-III - the second published edition of the second part, volume IV - the first edition of the second part, volume V - the third part, volume VI - the fourth part, volume VII - some preparatory materials. The volumes contain discrepancies, commentaries, as well as an archaeographic review of Tatishchev’s manuscripts, prepared by S. N. Valk.

Published in 2003 by AST Publishing House and available online (Volume 1 Volume 2 Volume 3), the three-volume edition of “History” was prepared in a spelling close to modern. Preparatory materials(previously published in volume VII) in this edition are called the fifth part of the “History”.

• Tatishchev V. N. Collected works. In 8 vols. M.-L., Science. 1962-1979. (reprint: M., Ladomir. 1994)
  • T.1. Part 1. 1962. 500 pp. (includes articles by A. I. Andreev “Works of V. N. Tatishchev on the history of Russia”, pp. 5-38; M. N. Tikhomirov “On Russian sources of “Russian History”, pp. 39-53 ; S. N. Valka “On the manuscripts of the first part of “Russian History” by V. N. Tatishchev, pp. 54-75)
  • T.2. Part 2. Ch. 1-18. 1963. 352 pp.
  • T.3. Part 2. Ch.19-37. 1964. 340 pp.
  • T.4. First edition of part 2 of “Russian History”. 1964. 556 pp.
  • T.5. Part 3. Ch.38-56. 1965. 344 pp.
  • T.6. Part 4. 1966. 438 pp.
  • T.7. 1968. 484 pp.
  • T.8. Small works. 1979.
• Tatishchev V. N. Notes. Letters. (Series “Scientific Heritage”. Vol. 14). M., Science. 1990. 440 pp. ( includes correspondence related to work on the History)

Notes

1. Gorovenko A.V. Sword of Roman Galitsky. Prince Roman Mstislavich in history, epic and legends. - St. Petersburg: “Dmitry Bulanin”, 2011. "P. 294-303.
2. Y. S. Lurie. The history of Russia in chronicles and the perception of modern times
3. Tolochko A. “Russian History” by Vasily Tatishchev: sources and news. - Moscow: New Literary Review; Kyiv: Kritika, 2005. 544 p. Series: Historia Rossica. ISBN 5-86793-346-6, ISBN 966-7679-62-4. Discussion of the book: http://magazines.russ.ru/km/2005/1/gri37.html Magazine room | Critical Mass, 2005 N1 | Faina Grimberg - Alexey Tolochko. “Russian History” by Vasily Tatishchev
4. Gorovenko A.V. Sword of Roman Galitsky. Prince Roman Mstislavich in history, epic and legends. - St. Petersburg: “Dmitry Bulanin”, 2011. “Tatishchevsky News” is dedicated to the four final chapters of the second part: p. 261-332.
5. Gorovenko A.V. Sword of Roman Galitsky. Prince Roman Mstislavich in history, epic and legends. - St. Petersburg: “Dmitry Bulanin”, 2011. P. 421-426 (Addendum 6. Did Tatishchev have a “second list” of the Ipatiev Chronicle? The origin of articles 6652 and 6654 of Tatishchev’s “chronicle code”). pp. 426-434 (Addendum 7. Farewell to the Raskolnichy Chronicle. On textual evidence of Tatishchev’s use of the second chronicle of the Khlebnikov type, presented by A.P. Tolochko).
6. A. V. Zhuravel. “A liar, a chatterbox and a laugher,” or Another murder of Tatishchev
7. See, for example: S. L. Peshtic. Russian historiography of the 18th century. L., 1965. Part 1. P. 261.
8. Gorovenko A.V. Sword of Roman Galitsky. Prince Roman Mstislavich in history, epic and legends. - St. Petersburg: “Dmitry Bulanin”, 2011. P. 313-320
9. Tolochko 2005, p.53; Tatishchev V.N. Collection. Op. T.1. M.-L., 1962. P.47, 446
10. Gorovenko A.V. Sword of Roman Galitsky. Prince Roman Mstislavich in history, epic and legends. - St. Petersburg: “Dmitry Bulanin”, 2011. - p. 307.
11. Tolochko 2005, p.285-286
12. Tolochko 2005, pp. 166-169
13. Tolochko 2005, p.153
14. Tolochko 2005, p. 103, 142-143, 159-166
15. however, A.P. Tolochko discovered a Polish translation of the Ipatiev Chronicle (“Annales S. Nestoris”), made at the beginning of the 18th century by Metropolitan Lev Kishka, where the Galicia-Volyn Chronicle is also missing (Tolochko 2005, pp. 116-134)
16. Tatishchev V.N. Collection. Op. T.7. M., 1968. P.58
17. PSRL, vol. II. M., 1998. Discrepancies from the Ermolaevsky list, p. 83 of separate pagination
18. Tolochko 2005, p.108, 115
19. Tatishchev V.N. Collection. Op. T.1. M., 1962. P.47
20. Tolochko 2005, p.58
21. Tolochko 2005, p.60; for a description of the manuscript, see Pskov Chronicles. PSRL. T. V. Issue. 1. M., 2003. P. XX, L-LI
22. Tatishchev V.N. Collection. Op. In 8 volumes. T.3. M., 1964. P.309
23. Tolochko 2005, p.65-68
24. Tatishchev V.N. Notes. Letters. M., 1990. P.281
25. Tolochko 2005, p.170-177
26. Tolochko 2005, p.180-182
27. Tolochko 2005, p.185-190