Stalin and the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. "treacherous attack" about which Stalin knew everything

Chapter from the book by I.I. Garin “The Double Murder of Stalin”, Kyiv, Master class, 2006, 272 p.
Notes and citations appear in the text of the book.

History should be looked at from the sky - then Waterloo looks like a street fight, and Hitler or Stalin - like the leaders of street gangs. There is a persistent myth about the greatness, almost divinity, of the two most terrible flayers and bonebreakers in human history. This is utter nonsense of idiots, because the scale of violence does not indicate greatness, but exclusively inhumanity: all states built on the bones of millions are direct evidence of grandiose cannibalism and nothing more. The Russian and German peoples, literally and figuratively “pissing themselves” from the happiness of Hitler’s and Stalin’s “victories”, are nothing more than visual evidence of stupidity and debasement, but not of greatness. Also, suppliers of bones for the construction of the most sinister and infernal empires in human history... If you look at history from the skies, then Stalinism and Hitlerism are only the dark, sinister nights of history, giving birth and multiplying monsters...

I have already touched on the hidden springs of the relationship between Stalin and Hitler. This topic needs to be continued, because to understand Stalin’s personality it is important to comprehensively consider and understand the deep sources of his trust in Hitler, trust that he did not even hide until June 1941. For example, Stalin believed that Hitler was much better than Western democracies and repeated many times that he completely trusted this man *. I'm not even talking about the alliance of two fanatics who divided Europe in 1939-1941.

It is impossible not to mention the strange relationship between the two Fuhrers of the twentieth century, between whom there was much in common. Both came from the lower classes, both were humiliated by their fathers, both suffered ridicule and practical jokes from their comrades, both were characterized by unbridled outbursts of anger, impatience with objections, sadistic, megalomaniacal and psychopathological complexes, projection of their own failures onto political opponents, etc. Hitler’s Armadas were already ready to invade the East, and Pravda wrote on June 14, 1941: “... according to the USSR, Germany is steadily observing the terms of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact, like the Soviet Union, which is why there are rumors about Germany’s intention to break the pact and launch an attack on The USSR is deprived of any basis... The friendship between the peoples of Germany and the Soviet Union, sealed with blood (?), has every reason to be long and strong.”

A week before Hitler’s attack, Stalin personally authorized TASS to publish the quoted communique regarding “gossip about the imminence of war between the USSR and Germany.” This communiqué also contains the following words: “...The transfer of German troops, freed from operations in the Balkans, to the eastern and northeastern regions of Germany (troops were already stationed on the borders of the USSR), presumably, is connected with other motives that do not have regarding Soviet-German relations" **.

“TASS states that: according to the USSR, Germany also steadily complies with the terms of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact, like the Soviet Union, which is why, according to Soviet circles, rumors about Germany’s intention to break the pact and launch an attack on the USSR are devoid of any basis, and the recent transfer of German troops, freed from operations in the Balkans, to the eastern and northeastern regions of Germany is connected, presumably, with other motives that have nothing to do with Soviet-German relations.”

Just a few hours before Hitler's invasion, the "great strategist" assured members of the Politburo that "Hitler will not attack in the near future" ***. Let me remind you once again that on June 14, that is, 8 days before the attack of Nazi Germany, a TASS message was published about the need for all alarmists and those who talk about the inevitability of war to be arrested, shot and severely punished, because they are provocative speech. Such “brilliant foresights”...

Stalin's behavior before the start of the war, his refusal to heed the huge stream of warnings about the impending danger that was obvious to everyone, is explained not only by his special relationship with Hitler - completely trusting his instincts, Stalin believed in the impending conspiracy between Germany and England. Stalin feared Britain much more than Germany. Stalin considered the May 10 flight to England of Rudolf Hess, Hitler’s deputy in the Nazi Party, to be direct evidence of the preparation of such a conspiracy. Nevertheless, Stalin’s trust in his “brother” was so deep and comprehensive that the “great seer” ignored not only the huge number of warnings about the impending war coming to him in a stormy stream, including the warnings of Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill *, but and the plans of Lebensraum in the East, unconcealed by Hitler himself **.

The most amazing thing about the war is the total concealment of historical documents about the most important moments of the war, giving rise to the most extravagant versions of its beginning. The situation here is literally as if World War II began before the new era.

Serving and engaged historians to this day squirm and grind out Stalin’s crap about the military and technical superiority of the Wehrmacht over the Red Army on the eve of the war. Why crap? - Because according to the Treaty of Versailles, Germany's armed forces were limited to a 100,000-strong land army, compulsory military service was abolished, the bulk of the remaining navy was to be transferred to the victors, and Germany was prohibited from having many modern types of weapons. Mobilization into the army and rearmament of the country by Hitler began not even after Hitler came to power, but only 3-4 years (!!!) before the start of World War II. There really was superiority, but - the Red Army over the Wehrmacht...

By the way, the USSR largely contributed to the restoration of the German army: to train German military personnel, training and research centers “Lipetsk” (aviators), “Kama” (tankers), and “Tomka” (chemical weapons) were organized in the country. Future military commanders of the Third Reich and SS troops underwent training in the USSR. In 1939, Stalin categorically rejected attempts to organize an anti-Hitler coalition with the participation of the USSR, demanding that he be given the opportunity to occupy the eastern regions of Poland in exchange for participation in an alliance with France and Great Britain. Such a condition was unacceptable for these countries.

How, in this case, can we explain its crushing defeat, one might say, the defeat of 1941 and early 1942? The fact is that Hitler fooled Stalin like a wretched sucker: he cheated him not only with a non-aggression pact, but with the deeply instilled idea that Germany’s main enemy is England and that it is necessary to unite to defeat it. And the “great commander” not only believed his “brother,” but even on the day of the German attack on June 22, he forbade his soldiers to shoot at the enemy. Until June 12, Stalin generally believed that there was not a war going on on the country’s western border, but a distracting conflict and hoped to resolve it through negotiations.

On the eve of the war, our troops were not on the border. They were concentrated in a zone from 30 to 300 kilometers from it, while the Wehrmacht before the attack was at a distance of 800 meters... How could such military savagery even occur in an atmosphere when only the blind and deaf could not know about the approaching war? Not to mention the fact that on the eve of the war, German specialists were taken around our military factories, showing in detail the production lines for creating the latest weapons. The historian testifies: “Here are the registers of the German aviation delegation, which tours our aircraft factories, and they are shown only two aircraft, their full cycle, the Pe-2, our best, so to speak, dive bomber, and the MiG-3, the highest altitude, which can reach planes flying at altitudes where the Germans do not fly, but the British fly. They are allowed everywhere.”

Realizing that Germany alone could not defeat England, Hitler tricked Stalin ahead of time by offering to participate in the war against the British. The Berlin negotiations in November 1940, which supposedly ended in nothing, most likely ended in a secret agreement between the Soviet and German leadership to jointly conduct this operation. From that moment on, the main idea for Stalin was to bring his armies to the shores of the North Sea with the help of the Germans, and then decide where to strike: London - together with the Germans, or Berlin - together with the British.

It doesn’t hurt to remind people suffering from amnesia that it’s not even a matter of a non-aggression treaty and secret protocols: besides them, the Soviet Union signed a friendship and border treaty with Hitler’s Germany and, together with Hitler, sent troops into Poland.

On the eve of the invasion of the USSR, Hitler, through Ambassador Dekanozov, conveyed to Stalin the plan for Operation Barbarossa, inspiring his “friend” that this plan was just a distracting fake created to deceive the British. And the “ally” took the hook, perceiving all the data from his own intelligence about the preparations for war as English sabotage. He believed Hitler, but not his own agents!

This was the dictatorial style of leadership: the leader knows everything, the “false” plan for Operation Barbarossa is on his desk, a friend-ally will not let him down, and everyone else is traitors and saboteurs. Even Lavrentiy Beria did not know then what Stalin’s plans were for ’41...

The historian testifies:
And something happened that had never happened in history: the Russians were completely defeated. During the 41st year, 3.8 million people were captured, a million died, that’s 4.8. Our entire army at the beginning of the war was 5.2 million. That is, the entire army was actually destroyed... The second most striking thing is that Germany, starting in 1919, did not have an army. She was forbidden to have an army, and she became... Hitler issued a law on conscription in 1935 only. And therefore, Germany in 1939, in 4 years, could not create an army superior to the colossal army of the USSR, in principle.
If you put it on two palms, on one on June 22, and what happened, well, of course, with the consequences, on that day, and on the second - all the other days of the war, I’m still not sure which hand will win. Because 50% of all our supplies that were brought to the border were captured or undermined, blown up, or disappeared. That is, it was an unheard of defeat... A thousand planes on the first day, in two days - two and a half thousand planes. This is completely unheard of in history.

The personal sympathy and trust of the “brilliant” Stalin in his “foster brother” outweighed all the facts, arguments, logic and general premonitions of impending disaster. This unnatural sympathy led to the USSR's unpreparedness for war, to the tragic irreparable defeats and losses of 1941-42 and to the unnecessary death of millions of people. Just two months before Hitler’s invasion of the USSR, when all the blind had already seen, Stalin hugged Baron Werner von Schulenburg *** at the send-off of Japanese Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka.

The trust in the “brother” was so fantastic and transcendental that even on the day of Hitler’s blow, Stalin’s first reaction was to deny what had happened. Don't believe me? Here's a fact: Combat General Boldin calls Marshal Timoshenko and reports the situation: the enemy has crossed the border, is bombing Soviet cities, soldiers are dying. And what does he hear from the marshal? Here's what:
- No retaliatory actions without our consent!
- What? Our troops are retreating, cities are burning, people are dying...
- Joseph Vissarionovich believes that perhaps this is a provocation on the part of some German generals ****.

Psychologists believe that this also became possible as a result of Stalin’s psychological self-identification with the aggressor, the ideological “transfer” of the threatening danger emanating from Germany to “world imperialism” (Britain and the USA), and also because of the exaggerated faith of the “brilliant leader” in his infallibility and his extreme suspicion of his own agents, whose reports about the impending war were completely ignored by him. It was found that instead of concentrating on the growth of Hitler’s militaristic machine, Stalin, by the way, supported in this regard by such “mongrels” as Malenkov and Khrushchev, exaggerated the hostile intentions not of Hitler, but... of Churchill.

Stalin's brain, as well as Hitler's, had a dangerous ability to accept chimeras harmoniously constructed by his own consciousness as reality. Pathological narrow-mindedness, one might say, a radical deformation of reality by a painful consciousness, ultimately brought the two “geniuses” to the grave.

Almost everyone around Stalin knew that he was greatly impressed by some of Hitler's traits and actions. The process of self-identification of the two dictators went so far that in almost all their actions they were practically indistinguishable: both had ambitions of total domination, implanted geopolitical ideas of “victory throughout the world,” ruthlessly destroyed opponents, introduced absolute censorship, demanded iron discipline, relied on militarization of the economy, were anti-Semites, controlled not only the import of goods, but also the import of ideas and lifestyles, and persecuted the same cultural figures. The music of Schoenberg, Webern, Berg, the prose of Kafka and Joyce, the philosophical works of Spengler and Ortega (the list is endless!) were equally ostracized by fascism and communism. The fascists saw in them a symbol of anti-German art, the communists saw them as a symbol of degenerate art... There they removed newcomers from the Prussian Academy of Arts, here they persecuted Shostakovich and Prokofiev, there they expelled Einstein and Fermi, here they smashed the theory of relativity, genetics and cybernetics. In both cases, entire areas of knowledge were subjected to “flogging”; relevant research was stopped or falsified.

Stalin copied even the bloodiest “purge” of the Red Army from Hitler’s “Night of the Long Knives,” except by increasing the scale many times over. The following confession of the “great leader” has been preserved: “I must deal with my opponents in the same way as Hitler did.” The list goes on and on. It is highly significant that the book “Fascism” by the Bulgarian dissident philosopher Zhelyu Zhelev was banned immediately after publication, because the parallels between regimes and leaders were so striking that replacing the title with the word “Bolshevism” did not change the content of the book.

It is curious that Bukharin's attacks on the fascist regime in Germany were perceived by many as an Aesopian polemic directed against Stalin himself. Time magazine, which in 1939 named Stalin “man of the year” (!) (doesn’t mean anything to you in the light of recent history?), time after time returned to the Stalin-Hitler parallels. The idea of ​​cooperation and agreement with a “friend” gradually became the guiding principle in Stalin’s policy: the Russians courted the Germans, signed non-aggression pacts and secret agreements of joint annexation, and until the day the war began they supplied Germany with strategic goods and food, so Trotsky had every reason to call Stalin “ Hitler's quartermaster."

After the end of the most destructive war in Russian history, Stalin repeatedly regretted his lost ally. Svetlana Alliluyeva recalls her father’s often repeated phrase: “Oh, with the Germans we would be invincible!”, and Stalin admitted to the writer V. Nekrasov: “If we had fought all these allies together, the Churchills, the Roosevelts, we would have conquered the whole world, you know, the whole world!

Many explain Stalin's pre-war repressions not only by the elimination of personal enemies, but also by opponents who opposed the union with Germany. This, in particular, can explain the purge of the army - generals and senior officers who disagreed with the policy of the alliance with the fascists, with the Moscow-Berlin axis created by Stalin, aimed at the joint annexation of Europe, were removed. Stalin systematically eliminated his own and other communists who did not agree with his expansionist plans, especially since the latter increasingly came down to a planned alliance with the fascists. Stalin's "purges" were carried out according to fascist scenarios so much that in 1938 Mussolini even wondered whether "Stalin had slowly become a fascist?" *.

All that has been said is one extended evidence of Stalin’s constant and deep self-identification with two dictators - Hitler and Lenin at the same time, with the merciless idols by which he always measured life. The name Lenin in this context was used not because of the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty, but because of the latter’s ability to endlessly maneuver in achieving government goals. Isn’t this where the pretentious slogan comes from: “Stalin is Lenin today”? Both Stalinist idols at one time committed acts of aggression against him, Lenin in the Testament, Hitler in the European conquests, so the psychoanalytic basis for self-identification with “strong personalities” was more than sufficient.

According to many researchers of Stalin’s personality, the tendency to self-identify with potential aggressors was fully consistent with Stalin’s “divide and conquer” policy. He perfectly mastered the technology of uniting with some to destroy others and, perhaps, saw in Hitler a temporary ally during the next round of total destruction of “enemies.” Stalin was let down by a miscalculation: he underestimated the enemy’s cunning and mastery of the same technology. In a sense, Hitler, even dead, outplayed him - not to mention the fact that this self-identification did not prevent Hitler from attacking Russia, bled white by Stalin.

Our people have written a lot about the “historical victory” of the Soviet people in World War II, but in insights I often see this victory as the last historical defeat of Russia in a series of centuries-long incorrect responses to the challenges of history. Even if I am mistaken and my vision fails me, look around: how the defeated Germans live today and how the Russians live - 5 million street children, children's drug addiction, prostitution, drunkenness, record crime, poverty, morbidity threatening the existence of the people, including AIDS, which have reached alarming proportions , high mortality rate, blatant disregard of the modern authorities for the country’s slide into the abyss?..

The beginning of the war was accompanied by Stalin's nervous breakdown, confusion and deep depression: strange love played a cruel joke on him, an outcast. Avtorkhanov called Stalin an actual “deserter,” but this is an unsuccessful symbol - Stalin did not leave the battlefield, but, like an abandoned woman, panicked, showed nervousness and hysteria - what in such conditions is called a “nervous crisis”, “nervous prostration.” A pragmatist and utilitarian, he lost the ability to understand what happened and cope with what happened. The blow to my own narcissism was crushing.

Despite the latest justifications of the apologists, there is no escaping the fact that there was a moment at the very beginning of the war when he feared that his comrades-in-arms might rebel for his mistakes or even arrest the leader who had screwed up. I see a man in a state of shock with an abyss opening at his feet. His behavior at that moment, according to eyewitnesses, fully corresponded to a mental breakdown: “Stalin spoke in a kind of dull and colorless voice, often stopped and breathed heavily... It seemed that Stalin was sick and spoke through force” *.

There are reconstructions of Stalin’s consciousness precisely at the moment when he was informed about the fascist invasion. Among the incredible confusion of thoughts, wild leaps, in the stream of consciousness one can recognize a passionate desire to “preserve the image”, one’s own confidence in Hitler’s inability to be deceitful: “What really happened? Probably just the panic of the coward generals. The usual hysteria of weaklings who are unable to understand the essence of the phenomenon, this shit that has been floating on the surface all its life... No, this is a common provocation. Or maybe the usual political game of brother Hitler? Yes, of course, this is an ordinary game - you can’t fool me with chaff! But why so many warnings from all these brainless lackeys? They all sought to pass off lies as truth, they all had a secret goal of letting me down. Could the clever Adolf make such a mistake - attack without solving the problem with England? No, the bombings are only a provocation and precisely on such a scale as to plunge the faint of heart into panic. But you can’t fool me! What if they did? What if everyone around you conspires?”

After the fall of Minsk, Stalin felt terrible fear. Yes, of course everyone conspired behind his back. In general, everything that happened was a conspiracy, a conspiracy, a conspiracy. Now they will come and arrest you. What to do? What to do? To hell with it, with the war. How to survive yourself, save your skin?..

It happened that time! But we definitely need to learn lessons from what happened, we need to tie the filthy overfed dogs even tighter. And now it’s time to throw them a bone - eat, yours took it.

In the first days of the war, Stalin experienced a nervous breakdown, but did not lose his composure. This is completely impossible for critical moments, and now was one of the most critical in his life. According to the records of Y. Chadayev, the manager of the affairs of the Council of People's Commissars, whom Stalin instructed to keep brief notes of all meetings of the Government and the Politburo that took place in his office, at dawn on June 22, 1941, members of the Politburo plus Timoshenko and Zhukov were gathered at Stalin's house. Timoshenko reported: “The German attack should be considered a fait accompli, the enemy bombed the main airfields, ports, large railway communication centers...”. Then Stalin began to speak, speaking slowly, searching for words, sometimes his voice was interrupted by a spasm. When he finished, everyone was silent and he was silent. Finally he approached Molotov: “We need to contact Berlin again and call the embassy.”
Stalin still clung to hope: maybe, after all, the provocation will carry through?

“Molotov called the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs from his office, everyone was waiting, he said to someone, stuttering slightly: “Let him go.” And he explained: “Schulenburg wants to see me.” Stalin said briefly: “Go.”

Molotov went out to talk with the German ambassador. His staggering shadow returned. He didn’t say, but whispered: “The German government has declared war on us.” Stalin, too, could barely stay on his feet and literally collapsed onto the chair next to him. There was a painful pause, even though you could hang yourself in this silence. Nobody knew what to do or how to react.

“I took the risk,” Zhukov later recalled, “to break the prolonged silence and proposed to immediately attack the enemy units that had broken through with all the forces available in the border districts and delay their further advance...
“Give me a directive,” the dead leader squeezed out for the second time in 24 hours...

That day there was a lot of criticism and threats - Vatutin, Timoshenko, Malyshev, the former ambassador to Germany Dekanozov... Everyone consoled themselves with the hope that the enemy was about to be stopped and defeated, but he continued to move, roll forward... In the end Finally Stalin fell silent, he looked pale and upset...

Then, after Minsk, the great director staged a play: the leader disappeared for several days. How did you disappear? Which disappeared? Yes, he disappeared - he didn’t go to work, didn’t answer calls. The comrades panicked: is everything okay? What game did Stalin decide to play? Having weighed everything and calculated everything, assessing his own miscalculations, Stalin decided to leave the “boyars” alone - let them, instead of shifting the blame onto him, feel fear and their own insignificance, and I will play cat and mouse with them. When Molotov arranged for members of the Politburo to go to the dacha, the great actor played a familiar performance, the “retirement game.”

Bulganin testifies: “We were all struck then by the sight of Stalin. He looked emaciated, haggard... his sallow face, covered with pockmarks... he was gloomy.”
Stalin said: “Yes, there is no great Lenin... He left us a great empire, and we screwed it up... There is a stream of letters from the Soviet people in which they rightly reproach us: is it really impossible to stop the enemy, to fight back. There are probably some among you who would not mind shifting the blame, of course, to me.”

Molotov: “Thank you for your frankness, but I declare: if someone tried to direct me against you, I would send this fool to hell... We ask you to return to business, for our part we will actively help.”
Stalin: “But still think: can I continue to justify hopes, to bring the country to a victorious end. Maybe there are more worthy candidates?
Voroshilov: “I think I can unanimously express my opinion: there is no one more worthy.”
And immediately friendly voices were heard: “That’s right!”

Stalin won once again: now that they themselves begged him to remain their Leader, he seemed to be invested with power again.

Recently, documents were published in Germany showing that already in July 1941, at a meeting with Hitler, the question of what to do with hundreds of thousands of Russian prisoners of war was decided. For the Germans themselves it was a shock: they were expecting a blitzkrieg, but could not calculate the scale of the defeat of the Red Army and the number of those who surrendered...

Meanwhile, Stalin recovered from the shock only after two weeks and only spoke on the radio on July 3. It was a colossal lie: “Despite the fact that the enemy’s best divisions and the best parts of his army have already been defeated and have found their graves on the battlefields, the enemy continues to push forward.” His own army was crushed, and Stalin brazenly lies about the defeated enemy army... And he continues to lie even more brazenly: “The enemy sets as his goal the restoration of the power of the landowners and the restoration of tsarism.” And in addition to this idiotic lie, the person who botched the start of the war blames his compatriots - what do you think? - In carefreeness: “So that the Soviet people understand this and stop being carefree.” It turns out that Soviet people were carefree...

Victory in the war, which cost the Soviet people 26 million victims (according to Western estimates - 43 million...), further strengthened the power and glory of the “great leader”. Now, even outside the USSR, the oppressed peoples saw light and hope for themselves. The ominous shadow cast by the figure standing on the Kremlin wall has almost faded - you have to be crazy yourself to remember the “enemies of the people” in the days of the greatest historical triumph.

But four years of a grueling and bloody war, carried out according to the same principles as before - according to the principles of dumping enemies with their own corpses, were not in vain. Nothing ever goes for free. It would seem that you are a triumphant, but the “ashes of Klaas” still “knock” in your soul, you cannot hide from yourself even in your own underground, spiritual destructiveness cannot be drowned out even by the fanfare of continuous victories.

Stalin gave up, weakened physically and mentally. It would seem that we could rest on our laurels, but it turned out that this was not the case. The higher you go into the sky, the more painful the fall. It seemed that there could be no greater glory, but the cats were scratching at their souls: the marshals and generals gained strength, the soldiers had seen enough of a “different life”, the people believed in freedom, and their henchmen felt a weakened grip.

“At the height of his power he was all alone. His comrades - these future dead - annoyed him. The daughter has become a stranger...” *.

“In the last years of his life he became even more lonely than before. After the great task that fell to his lot was completed, Stalin's life seemed empty. He spent almost all his time at one of his dachas, most often in Kuntsevo. On his trips he was accompanied by strong security, special trains moved non-stop. The connection with reality, with the real life of ordinary people, had ceased; he judged it from films. His daughter, Svetlana Alliluyeva, says in her memoirs that her father had no idea about the purchasing power of money. The simple joys of life did not excite him; he lived like a Spartan, occupying only one room at the dacha. He still has three hobbies: a pipe, Georgian wines and films.

Current affairs were decided in the “secretariat of Comrade Stalin,” headed for many years by the faithful executor of his orders, A. N. Poskrebyshev. Individual members of the top party leadership were invited to Stalin's dacha, usually in the evening. During a leisurely dinner that lasted until dawn, business was discussed. Those present, of course, only assisted in Stalin’s decision-making” **.

Reviews

A few questions:
1. If Stalin did not believe in Hitler’s attack so much that even on the day of the German attack on June 22 he forbade his soldiers to shoot at the enemy (I wonder what this ban looked like?), then how to understand the pre-war actions in the USSR, such as the hidden mobilization of 800 thousand reservists, the transfer in the western districts of dozens of divisions, orders to put troops on combat readiness on the 10th of June 1941?

2. How to understand: the Germans were expecting a blitzkrieg, but could not calculate the scale of the defeat of the Red Army and the number of those who surrendered? What did the Germans count on when they started the blitzkrieg? That the Red Army will suffer partial failures, and there will be few captured Red Army soldiers?

3. If the mobilization into the army and the rearmament of the country by Hitler began only 3-4 years before the start of World War II, what explains the DEFEAT of ALL (except perhaps Great Britain) of Hitler’s European opponents, including France, which was considered the strongest power in the world before the war? And only Hitler failed to defeat the Soviet Union. Even in 1941, the Germans did not at all feel that the Russians had been completely defeated. Why?
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The text of the Barbarossa plan, signed by the Fuhrer on December 18, 1940, began with the words: “The German armed forces must be prepared to defeat Soviet Russia as soon as possible.” This plan was kept in the strictest confidence. Even to his ambassador in Moscow, Count Schulenburg (Friedrich-Werner Graf von der Schulenburg), when he appeared in Berlin in April 1941, Hitler lied: “I do not intend to wage war against Russia.” The Moscow Center set the task for Soviet agents in different countries to take measures to ascertain as accurately as possible the plans of the German leadership and the timing of their implementation.

From "The Corsican" to "Ramsay"

Even during the development of the German plan for war against the USSR, information of a very definite nature began to arrive in Moscow. Here, for example, is a message (without number) to the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR S.K. Timoshenko, dated October 1940:

"Owl" Secret. The NKVD of the USSR reports the following intelligence data received from Berlin:

Our agent “Corsican”, working in the German Ministry of Economy as an assistant in the trade policy department, in a conversation with an officer of the headquarters of the High Command, learned that at the beginning of next year Germany would start a war against the USSR. The preliminary step to the start of military operations will be the military occupation of Romania by the Germans...”

On October 24, 1940, a note from the NKVD of the USSR No. 4577/6 was sent to I.V. Stalin: “The NKVD of the USSR is sending you a summary of political plans in the field of German foreign policy, compiled by our agent, who has connections in the press department of the German Foreign Ministry... Ribbentrop Bureau 20 October completed the development of a large political plan in the field of German foreign policy and began its implementation on October 25... We are talking about the isolation of the United States and the possibility of a compromise in the event of war between Germany and England.” Signed: “Correct, Deputy. beginning 5th Department of the GUGB NKVD USSR Sudoplatov."

The fact that the war against the USSR would begin after the victory over England or the conclusion of peace with it was reported by Soviet residents “Alta” (Ilse Stöbe) from Germany, “Ramsay” (Richard Sorge) from Japan and “Sif” (Nikolai Lyakhterov) from Hungary. Looking ahead, let's say that none of them was able to find out the exact date of Germany's attack on the USSR. The “Ramsay” telegram published in the 60s of the last century that Germany would attack the USSR on the morning of June 22, according to V.N. Karpov, an employee of the press bureau of the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation, expressed at the “Round Table” in the newspaper “Krasnaya” star,” is a fake, concocted during Khrushchev’s times.

Forewarned is forearmed

Soviet counterintelligence also obtained information about what the enemy knew about Soviet preparations. One of the main sources of this information was Orest Berlings, a former correspondent for the Latvian newspaper Briva Zeme, recruited in Berlin in August 1940 by the adviser to the Soviet embassy Amayak Kobulov and the head of the TASS department Ivan Fillipov. “The Lyceum Student,” as Berlings was dubbed, immediately offered his services to the Germans, who coded him under the name “Peter.”

“Although neither the Russian nor the German sides completely trusted Burlings,” writes historian O.V. Vishlev, “nevertheless, the information coming from him went to the very top: in Moscow it was provided to Stalin and Molotov, in Berlin to Hitler and Ribbentrop."

On May 27, 1941, the “Lyceum Student” informed Filippov, who was in touch with him: “The Imperial Foreign Minister is of the opinion that the policy of cooperation with the Soviet Union should continue...”. This was pure misinformation.

Around the same time, Hitler suspected Burlings of playing a double game, noting in his report dated June 17, 1941 the phrase: “Phillipov showed no interest in the visit of Tsar Boris and General Antonescu.” The Fuhrer called this message “illogical and childish”, since “the interest of the Russians in the visit of General Antonescu should be great...”. Hitler added in his own hand: “...what does the agent tell the Russians if they have placed such high trust in him for so long?” And he ordered to establish “strict surveillance” over him, and with the outbreak of war, “be sure to take him under arrest.”

It was believed that disinformation of the enemy was no less important than protecting one's own secrets. “The secret... of the Fuhrer’s true plans... was kept virtually until the last day,” the head of the Ribbentrop Bureau (foreign policy department of the NSDAP) summed up the results of his work on June 22, 1941. And he turned out to be wrong.

Last signal

On June 19, 1941, in the office of the attache of the Soviet embassy in Berlin, Boris Zhuravlev, which was located at house number 63 on Unter den Linden, two telephone calls rang out one after another. As soon as the caller got connected, he hung up. An outsider would not have paid attention to these calls, but for an employee of the Berlin station of the NKVD, who was actually Boris Zhuravlev, this was a conditioned signal. The signal meant that agent A-201 with the operational pseudonym “Breitenbach” was calling Zhuravlev for an unscheduled meeting.

The Soviet resident and the German officer met in a public garden at the end of the Charlottenburg Highway (now 17 June Street). The strongly built German, who knows how to control himself in any circumstances, was clearly alarmed this time.

- War!

- When?

- On Sunday, the 22nd. With dawn at three in the morning. Along the entire border line, from south to north...

Within an hour the information was sent to Moscow.

Convinced anti-fascist Willy Lehman

In 1929, an employee of the political department of the Berlin police, Willy Lehmann, himself offered his services to the Foreign Department of the OGPU. Different authors put forward different explanations for this. According to one version, Lehman sympathized with the Russians. This sympathy allegedly arose during his service in his youth on a German warship in the Far East: he witnessed the bloody Tsushima battle for the Russians. And the pictures of the death of Russian battleships that sank to the bottom without lowering St. Andrew’s flag were imprinted in his memory for the rest of his life.

Another version cannot be ruled out: Lehman needed money, and a lot of it: his beloved wife Margaret and beautiful mistress Florentina required large expenses. The Soviet agent's fees were comparable to his earnings in the Berlin police.

Lehmann was named “Breitenbach” and assigned a number starting with the first letter of the Russian alphabet.

It should be noted that he was a cheerful, always smiling person. At work he was known only as “Uncle Willie”; everyone knew that if necessary, Willy would always lend a dozen or two Reichsmarks before payday. His innate charm more than once contributed to success during operations.

In addition to his mistress, Lehman had another weakness: he loved to gamble at the races. But he managed to turn even this to benefit the cause. When the Center allocated a significant amount of money for treatment to Lehmann, who suffered from kidney disease and diabetes, the agent told his Berlin police colleagues that he had successfully bet on the race and won.

Over 12 years of cooperation, he passed on secret information to Soviet intelligence about the development of 14 new types of German weapons. There is reason to believe that the Soviet Katyusha and rockets for the Il-2 attack aircraft were developed in the USSR based on data transmitted by agent A-201.

No less important was Breitenbach's information about the secret codes used in Gestapo official correspondence. This more than once saved Soviet “illegals” and career intelligence officers working in Germany from failure.

Agent A-201 is waiting for contact

Unforeseen circumstances also happen to scouts. In 1938, Lehmann's curator Alexander Agayants died of a stomach ulcer in Berlin. There was no one to replace him: 12 of the 15 OGPU employees who knew about the existence of agent A-201 were shot during Stalin’s purges. The agent's contact with the Soviet intelligence services was interrupted for many months.

Leman had the courage to remind himself. At the risk of being exposed, he threw a letter into the mailbox of the Soviet diplomatic mission in Berlin, where he said in plain text: “I am in the same position that is well known in the Center, and I think that I am again able to work in such a way that my bosses will are happy with me... I consider this period of time so important and full of events that one cannot remain inactive.”

The Center's connection with Breitenbach was restored. How Lehmann was valued in Moscow is evidenced by a telegram with personal instructions from People's Commissar Beria, which was received by the Berlin station on September 9, 1940: “No special assignments should be given to Breitenbach. It is necessary to take for now everything that is within his immediate capabilities, and, in addition, everything that he will know about the work of various intelligence services against the USSR, in the form of documents and personal reports from the source.”

In addition to the information already mentioned, Lehman managed to report several more strategically important data, for example, about the preparation of the invasion of German units into Yugoslavia.

With the outbreak of the war against the USSR, after all Soviet diplomats left Berlin, communication with the agent was interrupted again. The message about the impending attack on the Soviet Union turned out to be the last.

The mission ended prematurely

To restore ties with pre-war agents, several German anti-fascists trained in Moscow were sent to Germany in 1942. Parachuted over East Prussia, they had to make their way to the center of the country and establish contacts with former Soviet agents. But the organizers of the operation made a grave mistake. Assuming that some of the agents would refuse to renew contact, the paratroopers, in order to blackmail the “refuseniks,” were provided with copies of payment documents certifying their past cooperation with the Soviets. Some paratroopers were arrested by the Gestapo while working on the Red Chapel, and the documents fell into the hands of counterintelligence officers. Willy Lehman was exposed - along with other agents.

The news that “Uncle Willy” was a Soviet spy was like a lightning strike for the leadership of the Main Directorate of Imperial Security. If those at the top had found out about this, displacements and even arrests could not have been avoided. Therefore, Himmler (Heinrich Himmler) did not report the existence of agent A-201 to anyone. On Christmas Eve 1942, Willie Lehman was urgently called to work, where he was arrested and shot without trial. The places of execution and burial are unknown.

Information about agent A-201 was classified by the Soviet side for a long time and was published only in 2009. There was also little information in the German archives, and it was also kept silent. And although Lehman’s widow Margaret received a gold watch from the Soviet command after the war in memory of her husband’s services, any perpetuation of the memory of one of the most successful Soviet agents did not occur. The circumstances of his death as a result of a gross mistake by the Soviet authorities, and the fact that he served as an agent in the Gestapo, and post-war ideology implied that there could be no “good” Gestapo men, also played a role in such oblivion.

Faktrum I decided to find out more about the situation Stalin was in in the difficult year of 1941. Tells Alexey Kilichenkov, Associate Professor of the Department of Contemporary Russian History at the Russian State University for the Humanities, specialist in the field of military history of Russia in the twentieth century, the history of the Cold War.

These questions will be relevant as long as we study the history of our Fatherland. A huge country has been preparing for war for a decade and a half, sacrificing millions of its lives and a very large share of its national wealth in order to be ready for this war. At the same time, the war began completely unexpectedly for the Soviet people, with a sudden attack by Germany. The contradiction between sacrificial preparation and the catastrophic outbreak of war raises questions that still concern both researchers and ordinary citizens.

Whether Stalin knew about the impending attack is a difficult question. Stalin, of course, proceeded from the fact that war with Germany was inevitable - we can assert this based on historical sources and documents. This became clear soon after the Nazis came to power and was stated more than once by both Stalin himself and other Soviet leaders. Did Stalin admit that the war would start in 1941? Until a certain point, no. Beginning with the signing of the non-aggression pact of 1939, he built his foreign policy on the basis that the war in Europe (with England and France) would be protracted and would last at least two to three years. After the defeat of France in the summer of 1940, the situation changed - from that moment on, Stalin received more and more information that Germany was preparing for war with the Soviet Union. A number of measures taken by the Soviet leadership in May 1941 indicated that Stalin accepted the possibility of a German attack in the near future. But still he considered such a scenario unlikely.

This was explained by pragmatic reasons. Stalin was sure that the start of the war with the USSR in the summer of 1941 was not beneficial for Hitler, repeating more than once that Hitler was not such an idiot as to be the first to start a war on two fronts. In addition, if we evaluate the amount of information that Germany had at the time of the attack on the USSR, nothing allowed us to say that the USSR was preparing for a preemptive strike. Neither the state of the armed forces, nor the deployment of troops, nor documents known to Germany - nothing gave grounds for such a conclusion, although the idea later became the basis of a propaganda myth justifying a surprise attack by Germany.

Could Stalin allow such a start to the war, based on the prospects of a military alliance with England and the USA? I completely rule out this possibility. The model of relations with Western countries that Stalin followed in 1940-41 does not provide grounds for such a statement. The USSR's reaction to Germany's actions in 1939-1940 was complete approval and support. Stalin ignored Churchill's attempts to warn him about the accumulation of German military forces near the Soviet border. Thus, it was not that he closed the door to relations with England, but he did not even open it. My hypothesis is that Stalin was not afraid of the possibility of starting a war with Germany in a situation of complete diplomatic isolation, that is, a one-on-one war. Otherwise, he would have tried to establish contacts with England in 1940, but there were no such attempts.

The USSR can win this war alone, without allies- Stalin’s actions on the eve of June 22 were dictated by this conviction.

Of course he knew about this. Intelligence has repeatedly reported on impending military actions against Russia. At the beginning of June 1941, Stalin was very nervous and often took out his anger on the military. He did not want to take on faith the obvious information about the upcoming thunderstorm. People's Commissar of Defense Marshal Timoshenko and Chief of the General Staff Zhukov found themselves between Hitler's hammer and Stalin's anvil. On June 6, the NKGB provided Stalin with information about the concentration of the German army on the border of the USSR, numbering 4 million soldiers. On June 11, Stalin was informed that the German embassy in Moscow had received orders from Berlin to prepare for evacuation, and documents were being burned in the basements. What else was left to wait? It was necessary to somehow react to all these facts of the inevitable approaching war...
On June 14, Molotov invited the German ambassador Schulenburg to the Kremlin and pointed out to him that the English and other European press were reporting that Germany was planning to attack the USSR. To which the German ambassador stated that Germany does not intend to attack the USSR and is interested in strengthening friendly relations. But it was pure sounding regarding Germany's intentions.

German commanders-in-chief 15 minutes before the start of the Wehrmacht invasion of the USSR. June 22, 1941, 03.45 AM.

And the pre-war situation in the world was very confusing, probably more confusing than we imagine. And intelligence reports were extremely contradictory. From all this data they even compiled a mythology. For example: as if Richard Sorge from Tokyo reported the exact date of the German attack on Russia.

The truth was that Sorge did not report any exact dates; he wrote about the imminent war as a strategic inevitability. But the false exact date was repeatedly brought to Stalin’s attention. And how could he react when intelligence informed him that the war was about to begin: May 15, May 22, May 25, June 12, June 15... but each time the attack did not happen. Maybe Stalin was tired of waiting for war. Half of these false dates were planted by the German intelligence Abwehr itself, of course, as disinformation. The main fault of the leadership of the USSR and Stalin was that they did not understand the nature of this information, did not understand the experience of the war that had been raging in Europe for almost two years, and therefore neglected the only tactics and did not settle on the method of strategic defense. Defense is not on the borders but in the depths of the country (100-150 km from the border).
Many people ask a rhetorical question: was there any possibility on the part of the USSR to prevent German aggression in the last week before the outbreak of hostilities on June 22? Answering this question can be based on various facts. Various events can be analyzed. But the answer will be definite: the USSR did not have such an opportunity. Even if Stalin had taken any unprecedented measures immediately before the war to stop Hitler. Stop the Wehrmacht. For example: bring troops and armored vehicles into combat readiness, disperse troops along the border. Disperse aviation. And all this could not prevent Hitler’s decision. And according to Stalin, the war should have started in 1942.

Not all marshals and military leaders believed that they would have to fight on foreign territories. Throughout June 1941, People's Commissar of the Navy Kuznetsov worked to ensure that the entire USSR fleet was put on combat readiness. For this he could get the label “Alarmist”. But on June 19, Kuznetsov achieved his goal, and all fleet personnel received the cancellation of vacations and switched to darkening naval bases at night. Now every warship was preparing for an imminent war.

In mid-June, the USSR border was literally swarming with German saboteurs. Immediately before the start of the war, German soldiers killed Soviet signalmen and cut communication wires. The German Luftwaffe received an order to shoot down a Douglas plane taking off on a Berlin-Moscow flight (by the way, not a single German was on this plane). But the Germans were never able to detect this plane.
On the day before the start of the war, defectors from German soldiers appeared more and more often, reporting the beginning of the war. In the evening, at 19.00, People's Commissar Timoshenko announced the approaching start of German military operations against the USSR. But to Stalin’s question “What should I do?” answered: we must immediately allow the troops in the border zones to put themselves on combat readiness. Moreover, the General Staff has already drawn up such a directive.

On the evening of June 21, Beria, Voroshilov, Molotov discussed in the Leader’s office until 23.00, after the meeting everyone dispersed. After some time, Stalin went to rest at his dacha in Kuntsevo. In Stalin's desk drawer lay a military report from the attache of the Russian embassy in Vichy France. It reported that the attack on the USSR would begin in the early morning of June 22, 1941. Stalin read this military report and wrote in the margins: “This information is a British provocation. Find out who is the author of this provocation and punish him.". But they won’t have time to punish anyone.

The theory that Joseph Stalin, the Secretary General of the USSR, knew that Nazi Germany was preparing to attack our lands is quite popular. It is often assumed that the Secretary General specifically allowed Hitler to attack first in order to attract Great Britain and the United States to his side...

The story is told by Alexey Kilichenkov, associate professor at the Department of Contemporary Russian History at the Russian State University for the Humanities, a specialist in the field of military history of Russia in the 20th century and the history of the Cold War.

These questions will be relevant as long as we study the history of our Fatherland. A huge country has been preparing for war for a decade and a half, sacrificing millions of its lives and a very large share of its national wealth in order to be ready for this war. At the same time, the war began completely unexpectedly for the Soviet people, with a sudden attack by Germany. The contradiction between sacrificial preparation and the catastrophic outbreak of war raises questions that still concern both researchers and ordinary citizens.

Whether Stalin knew about the impending attack is a difficult question. Stalin, of course, proceeded from the fact that war with Germany was inevitable - we can assert this based on historical sources and documents. This became clear soon after the Nazis came to power and was stated more than once by both Stalin himself and other Soviet leaders. Did Stalin admit that the war would start in 1941? Until a certain point, no. Beginning with the signing of the non-aggression pact of 1939, he built his foreign policy on the basis that the war in Europe (with England and France) would be protracted and would last at least two to three years. After the defeat of France in the summer of 1940, the situation changed - from that moment on, Stalin received more and more information that Germany was preparing for war with the Soviet Union. A number of measures taken by the Soviet leadership in May 1941 indicated that Stalin accepted the possibility of a German attack in the near future. But still he considered such a scenario unlikely.

This was explained by pragmatic reasons. Stalin was sure that the start of the war with the USSR in the summer of 1941 was not beneficial for Hitler, repeating more than once that Hitler was not such an idiot as to be the first to start a war on two fronts. In addition, if we evaluate the amount of information that Germany had at the time of the attack on the USSR, nothing allowed us to say that the USSR was preparing for a preemptive strike. Neither the state of the armed forces, nor the deployment of troops, nor documents known to Germany - nothing gave grounds for such a conclusion, although the idea later became the basis of a propaganda myth justifying a surprise attack by Germany.

Could Stalin allow such a start to the war, based on the prospects of a military alliance with England and the USA? I completely rule out this possibility. The model of relations with Western countries that Stalin followed in 1940-41 does not provide grounds for such a statement. The USSR's reaction to Germany's actions in 1939-1940 was complete approval and support. Stalin ignored Churchill's attempts to warn him about the accumulation of German military forces near the Soviet border. Thus, it was not that he closed the door to relations with England, but he did not even open it. My hypothesis is that Stalin was not afraid of the possibility of starting a war with Germany in a situation of complete diplomatic isolation, that is, a one-on-one war. Otherwise, he would have tried to establish contacts with England in 1940, but there were no such attempts.

The USSR can win this war alone, without allies - this conviction was dictated by Stalin’s actions on the eve of June 22.