Soviet tanks in Budapest. Anti-Soviet revolt in Hungary (1956) Police department suppressed the uprising in 1956

Events in Hungary in 1956 led to a large-scale rebellion, for the suppression of which the Soviet army was involved. The Hungarian autumn became one of the largest regional conflicts of the Cold War, in which the special services of both the USSR and the USA took part. Today we will try to understand the events of those days, and also try to understand the reasons.

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Role of Yugoslavia

The beginning of events should be attributed back to 1948, when relations between Stalin and Tito (the leader of Yugoslavia) finally deteriorated. The reason is that Tito demanded complete political independence. As a result, the countries began to prepare for a possible war, and the Soviet command developed a plan to enter the war from the territory of Hungary.

In May 1956, Yuri Andropov received information (immediately forwarded it to Moscow) that in Hungary the agents and intelligence of Yugoslavia were actively working against the USSR.

The Yugoslav embassy played a significant role against the Soviet Union and the current government of Hungary.

Dmitry Kapranov, cryptographer of the Special Corps of the USSR Army in Hungary

If back in 1948 there was a confrontation between Tito and Stalin, then in 1953 Stalin died and Tito began to aim for the role of leader of the Soviet bloc. Behind him was a very strong army of Yugoslavia, agreements on military assistance with NATO and agreements on economic assistance with the United States. Realizing this, in the summer of 1956 Khrushchev traveled to Belgrade, where Marshal Tito set the following conditions for the normalization of relations between countries:

• Yugoslavia pursues an independent policy.
• Yugoslavia continues its partnership with the US and NATO.
• The USSR stops criticizing the Tito regime.

Formally, this is where the controversy ended.

The role of the Hungarian communists

The peculiarity of the development of post-war Hungary lies in the complete copying of the USSR, starting from 1948. This copying was so stupid and massive that it literally applied to everything: from the model of building an economy to the uniform of soldiers in the army. Moreover, the Hungarian communists began to carry out absolutely extreme measures (this is generally a characteristic feature of the communists at the beginning of their rule) - mass Russification: flag, coat of arms, language, and so on. This is how, for example, the coat of arms of the Hungarian People's Republic (HPR) looked like in 1956.

Of course, the coat of arms, the flag, the language, the clothes themselves did not cause discontent, but all together they significantly beat the pride of the Hungarians. Moreover, the problem was worsened by economic reasons. Rakosi's party simply copied the model of economic development of the USSR, completely ignoring the peculiarities of Hungary. As a result, the post-war economic crisis is getting stronger every year. Only the constant financial assistance of the USSR saves from economic chaos and collapse.

In fact, in the period 1950-1956 in Hungary there was a struggle between the communists: Rakosi against Nagy. Moreover, Imre Nagy was much more popular.

Nuclear race and its role

In June 1950, the United States knows for sure that the USSR has an atomic bomb, but very little uranium. Based on this information, US President Truman issues directive NSC-68, demanding to cause and support unrest in the satellite countries of the USSR. Countries defined:

• German Democratic Republic.
• Hungarian People's Republic.
• Czechoslovakia.

What do these countries have in common? There are two such features: first, they were geographically located on the border of the western zone of influence; secondly, all three countries had fairly large uranium mines. Therefore, the destabilization and separation of these countries from Soviet patronage is the US plan to curb the nuclear development of the USSR.

US role

The active stage of work on the creation of the rebellion began after March 5, 1953 (the date of Stalin's death). Already in June, the CIA approved the “Day X” plan, according to which uprisings began in a number of large cities of the GDR and in the city of Gera (uranium mines). The plan failed, and the uprising was quickly crushed, but this was only preparation for more "grand" events.

The National Security Council (NSC) of the United States passes Directive No. 158 of June 29, 1953. This document was declassified quite recently, and its main meaning is as follows - to support the resistance to communism by all means so that no one doubts the spontaneity of these speeches. The second important assignment under this directive is to organize, supply everything necessary and train underground organizations capable of conducting long-term military operations. These are 2 directions that were reflected in the events in Hungary in 1956, and which operate to this day. Suffice it to recall the recent events in Kyiv.

An important detail - in the summer of 1956, Eisenhower issued a statement that the post-war division of the world was no longer relevant, and it needed to be divided in a new way.

Operation Focus and Prospero

"Focus" and "Prospero" are secret operations of American intelligence agencies during the Cold War. In many ways, it was these operations that gave birth to Hungary in 1956. These operations were directed to Poland and Hungary with the aim of inciting the local population against the USSR and providing the local population with everything necessary for the struggle for "independence".

In May 1956, a new radio station (Radio Free Europe) began operating near Munich, aimed exclusively at Hungary. The radio station was funded by the CIA and broadcast continuously to Hungary, reporting the following things:

• America is the most powerful country in the world in all components.
• Communism is the worst form of government, which is the source of all ills. Hence - the source of the problems of the USSR.
• America has always supported the peoples fighting for independence.

It was the preparation of the population. With the beginning of the revolution in Hungary (October - November 1956), the radio station began broadcasting the program "Special Armed Forces", which told the Hungarians exactly how to fight against the Soviet army.

Together with the beginning of radio broadcasting, agitation leaflets and radios were transported by balloons from the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany and Austria to Hungary. The flow of balloons was great, which confirms the following fact. On February 8 and July 28, Endre Sack sends notes of protest to the US Embassy. The last note says that since February 1956, 293 balloons have been seized, and because of their flights, 1 plane crashed and its crew died. In this regard, the Hungarians even warned international companies about the danger of flights over the country. The answer of the US embassy is indicative - “private companies” are to blame for everything, and the US authorities have nothing to do with it. The logic is wild and today, by the way, it is also often used (private organizations do the dirty work, including the military), but why is no one investigating the funding of these organizations? Mystery. After all, no private company will use its own money to buy balloons, print leaflets, buy radios, open a radio station and send all this to Hungary. Profit is important for a private company, that is, someone must finance all this. This funding leads to Operation Prospero.

The goal of Operation Focus was to overthrow socialism in Eastern Europe. The operation in the final stage begins on October 1, 1956 on the basis of Radio Free Europe. Propaganda is intensifying in the programs and the main motive of all speeches is the time to start a movement against the USSR. Several times a day, the phrase is heard: “The regime is not as dangerous as you think. The people have hope!

Internal political struggle in the USSR

After Stalin's death, a struggle for power began, which was won by Khrushchev. The further steps of this man, and not directly, provoked anti-Soviet sentiments. It was related to the following:

• Criticism of Stalin's personality cult. This immediately weakened the international position of the USSR, which was recognized, including in the United States, which, on the one hand, announced a respite in the Cold War, and on the other hand, even more intensified covert operations.
• The shooting of Beria. This is not the most obvious reason for the Hungarian events of 1956, but a very important one. Together with the execution of Beria, thousands of state security agents were fired (arrested, shot). These were people who had been stabilizing the situation for years and had their own agents. After they were removed, the state security positions became noticeably weaker, including in terms of counter-revolutionary and counter-terrorist activities. Returning to the personality of Beria - it was he who was the patron of "Volodya" Imre Nagy. After the execution of Beria, Nagy was expelled from the party and removed from all posts. This is important to remember in order to understand future events. In fact, because of this, starting from 1955, Nagy ceased to be controlled by the USSR and began to look towards the West.

Chronology of events

Above, we examined in sufficient detail what preceded the events in Hungary in 1956. Now let's focus on the events of October-November 1956, since this is the most important thing, and it was at this time that the armed uprising took place.

In October, numerous rallies begin, the main driving force of which were students. This is generally a characteristic feature of many rebellions and revolutions of recent decades, when everything starts with peaceful demonstrations of students and ends in bloodshed. At the rallies, there are 3 main demands:

• Appoint Imre Nagy head of government.
• Introduce political freedoms in the country.
• Withdraw Soviet troops from Hungary.
• Stop the supply of uranium to the USSR.

Even before the start of active rallies, numerous journalists from different countries come to Hungary. This is a big problem, because it is often impossible to draw a line between who is a journalist in reality and who is a professional revolutionary. There are many indirect facts indicating that at the end of the summer of 1956, a large number of revolutionaries entered Hungary with journalists, who took an active part in further events. The state security of Hungary launched everyone into the country.

On October 23, 1956, at 15:00, a demonstration begins in Budapest, the main driving force of which was students. Almost immediately, an idea arises to go to the radio station so that the demands of the protesters are announced on the radio. As soon as the crowd approached the building of the radio station, the situation moved from the stage of a rally to the stage of a revolution - armed people appeared in the crowd. The key role in this was played by Sandor Kopacz, the head of the Budapest police, who goes over to the side of the rebels and opens military warehouses for them. Further, the Hungarians begin to attack in an organized manner and seize radio stations, printing houses, and telephone exchanges. That is, they began to take control of all means of communication and the mass media.

Late in the evening of October 23, an emergency meeting of the Central Committee of the party takes place in Moscow. Zhukov reports that a 100,000th demonstration is taking place in Budapest, the building of the radio station is on fire, and shots are fired. Khrushchev proposes to send troops to Hungary. The plan was as follows:

• Returned to the government of Imre Nagy. This was important, because the protesters demanded it, and in this way they could be calmed down (as Khrushchev mistakenly thought).
• 1 tank division must be brought into Hungary. This division will not even need to enter the events, as the Hungarians will get scared and scatter.
• Control was assigned to Mikoyan.

The reconnaissance of Colonel Grigory Dobrunov is ordered to send tanks to Budapest. It has already been said above that in Moscow they expected a rapid advance of the army and the absence of resistance. Therefore, the order to the tank company was given "Do not shoot." But events in Hungary in October 1956 developed rapidly. Already at the entrance to the city, the Soviet army encountered active resistance. The rebellion, which they say arose spontaneously and from students, lasted less than a day, but fortified areas were already organized, and well-organized groups of armed people were created. This is a clear sign that events in Hungary were being prepared. Actually, for this, analytical reports and CIA programs are carried out in the article.

Here is what Colonel Dobrunov himself tells about entering the city.

When we entered the city we soon drank our first tank. The wounded driver jumped out of the tank, but they caught him and wanted to burn him alive. Then he took out f-1, pulled out the pin and blew himself and them up.

Colonel Dobrunov

It became clear that the order "do not shoot" could not be carried out. Tank troops are moving with difficulty. By the way, the use of tanks in the city is a huge mistake of the Soviet military command. This mistake was also in Hungary, and in Czechoslovakia, and much later in Grozny. Tanks in the city are an ideal target. As a result, the Soviet army loses about 50 people every day.

Aggravation of the situation

October 24 Imre Nagy speaks on the radio and calls on the fascist provocateurs to lay down their arms. In particular, declassified documents report this.

On October 24, 1956, Nagy was already head of the Hungarian government. And this man calls armed people in Budapest and other regions of the country fascist provocateurs. In the same speech, Nagy stated that Soviet troops were brought into the Hungarian People's Republic at the request of the government. That is, by the end of the day, the position of the Hungarian leadership was clear: the army was brought in at the request - civilians with weapons were fascists.

At the same time, another strong figure appeared in Hungary - Colonel Pal Maleter. During World War II, he fought against the USSR, was captured and collaborated with Soviet intelligence, for which he was later awarded the Order of the Red Star. On October 25, this man with 5 tanks arrived at the "Kilian barracks" to crush the uprising near the Corvin cinema (one of the main strongholds of the rebels), but instead joined the rebels. At the same time, Western intelligence agents are stepping up their work in Hungary. Here is one example, according to declassified documents.

On October 26, a group of Colonel Dobrunov approaches the Hungarian cinema Korvin, where they capture the “language”. According to testimony, the headquarters of the rebels is located in the cinema. Dobrunov asks the command for permission to storm the building in order to destroy the main center of resistance and suppress the rebellion. The command is silent. The real chance to end the Hungarian events of the autumn of 1956 was lost.

By the end of October, it becomes clear that the current troops are not able to cope with the rebellion. Moreover, Imre Nagy's position is becoming more and more revolutionary. He no longer speaks of the rebels as fascists. He forbids the power structures of Hungary to shoot at the rebels. It facilitates the transfer of weapons to the civilian population. Against this background, the Soviet leadership decides to withdraw troops from Budapest. On October 30, the Hungarian special corps of the Soviet army returned to their positions. During this time, only 350 people were killed.

On the same day, Nagy speaks to the Hungarians, declaring that the withdrawal of the USSR troops from Budapest is his merit and the victory of the Hungarian revolution. The tone has already changed completely - Imre Nagy is on the side of the rebels. Pal Maleter is appointed Minister of Defense of Hungary, but there is no order in the country. It would seem that the revolution, albeit temporarily, but won, the Soviet troops were withdrawn, Nagy leads the country. All the demands of the “people” have been met. But even after the withdrawal of troops from Budapest, the revolution continues, and people continue to kill each other. Moreover, Hungary is splitting. Almost all army units refuse to follow the orders of Nagy and Maleter. Between the leaders of the revolution there is a confrontation in the struggle for power. Labor movements are being formed throughout the country, directed against fascism in the country. Hungary plunges into chaos.

An important nuance - on October 29, Nagy, by his order, dissolves the state security service of Hungary.

religious question

The question of religion in the events of the Hungarian autumn of 1956 is little discussed, but it is very revealing. In particular, the position of the Vatican, voiced by Pope Pius-12, is indicative. He declared that the events in Hungary were a religious issue and called on the revolutionaries to fight for religion to the last drop of blood.

The United States takes a similar position. Eisenhower expresses his full support for the rebels as they fight for "freedoms" and calls for the appointment of Cardinal Mincenti as Prime Minister of the country.

Events of November 1956

November 1, 1956 in Hungary, in fact, there is a civil war. Bela Kiraly with detachments destroys all those who disagree with the regime, people kill each other. Imre Nagy understands that it is unrealistic to retain power in such conditions and that bloodshed must be stopped. Then he comes out with a statement guaranteeing:

• The withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of Hungary.
• Reorientation of the economy towards Western countries.
• Withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact.

Nagy's announcement changed everything. The first point did not arouse Khrushchev's fears, but Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact changed everything. Under the conditions of the Cold War, the loss of a zone of influence, also with the help of a rebellion, undermined the prestige of the USSR and the country's international position. It became clear that now the introduction of Soviet troops into Hungary is a matter of several days.

Operation Whirlwind

Operation "Whirlwind" to introduce the Soviet army into Hungary begins on November 4, 1956 at 6:00 on the signal "Thunder". The troops are commanded by the hero of the Second World War, Marshal Konev. The USSR army is advancing from three directions: from Romania in the south, from the USSR in the east and Czechoslovakia in the north. At dawn on November 4, units began to enter Budapest. Then something happened that actually revealed the cards of the rebellion and the interests of its leaders. Here, for example, how the Hungarian leaders behaved after the entry of Soviet troops:

• Imre Nagy - took refuge in the Yugoslav embassy. Let's remember the role of Yugoslavia. It should also be added that Khrushchev consulted with Tito about the 4 November offensive against Budapest.
• Cardinal Mincenti - took refuge in the US Embassy.
• Belai Kirai gives the order to the rebels to hold out to the bitter end, and he himself goes to Austria.

On November 5, the USSR and the USA find common ground on the issue of the conflict on the Suez Canal, and Eisenhower assures Khrushchev that he does not consider the Hungarians as an ally and NATO troops will not be introduced into the region. In fact, this was the end of the Hungarian revolt in the autumn of 1956, and the Soviet troops cleared the country from armed fascists.

Why the second entry of troops was more successful than the first

The basis of the resistance of the Hungarians was the belief that NATO troops were about to enter and protect them. On November 4, when it became known that England and France were sending troops to Egypt, Hungary realized that they could not expect any help. Therefore, as soon as the Soviet troops entered, the leaders began to scatter. The rebels began to run out of ammunition, with which the army depots ceased to supply them, the counter-revolution in Hungary began to fade.

Mh2>Totals

On November 22, 1956, Soviet troops carried out special operations and captured Nagy in the Yugoslav embassy. Imre Nagy and Pal Maleter were later convicted and sentenced to death by hanging. Janasz Kadar, one of Tito's closest associates, became the leader of Hungary. Kadar led Hungary for 30 years, making it one of the most developed countries in the socialist camp. In 1968, the Hungarians took part in the suppression of the rebellion in Czechoslovakia.

On November 6, the fighting in Budapest ended. Only a few centers of resistance remained in the city, which were destroyed on November 8. By November 11, the capital and most of the country's territory were liberated. Events in Hungary developed until January 1957, when the last rebel groups were destroyed.

Side losses

Official data on losses among the soldiers of the Soviet army and the civilian population of Hungary for 1956 are presented in the table below.

It is very important to make reservations here. When we talk about losses in the USSR army, these are people who suffered precisely from the Hungarian population. When we talk about the losses of the civilian population of Hungary, then only a minority of them suffered from the soldiers of the USSR. Why? The fact is that in fact there was a civil war in the country, where the fascists and communists destroyed each other. Proving this is easy enough. In the period between the withdrawal and re-entry of Soviet troops (this is 5 days, and the rebellion itself lasted 15 days), the victims continued. Another example is the capture of a radio tower by the rebels. Then it was not that there were no Soviet troops in Budapest, even the Hungarian corps were not alerted. However, there are human casualties. Therefore, it is not necessary to blame Soviet soldiers for all sins. By the way, this is a big hello to Mr. Mironov, who in 2006 apologized to the Hungarians for the events of 1956. A person, apparently, has no idea at all what happened in those days in reality.

Let me reiterate the numbers:

• 500 thousand Hungarians at the time of the rebellion had almost 4 years of experience in the war against the USSR on the side of Germany.
• 5 thousand Hungarians returned from a prison in the USSR. These are the people who were convicted of real atrocities against Soviet citizens.
• 13 thousand people were released by the rebels from Hungarian prisons.

The number of victims of the Hungarian events of 1956 includes those who were killed and wounded by the rebels themselves! And the last argument - along with the Soviet army in the storming of Bucharest on November 4, 1956, the police and the Hungarian communists participated.

Who were the Hungarian "students"

Increasingly, one hears that the events in Hungary in 1956 are the will of the people against communism, de main driving force were students. The problem is that in our country, in principle, history is known quite poorly, and the Hungarian events remain a complete mystery for the vast majority of citizens. Therefore, let's look into the details and the position of Hungary in relation to the USSR. To do this, we will need to go back to 1941.

June 27, 1941 Hungary declares war on the USSR and enters the 2nd World War as an ally of Germany. The Hungarian army was little remembered on the battlefields, but it went down in history forever in connection with its atrocities against the Soviet people. Basically, the Hungarians "worked" in three regions: Chernihiv, Voronezh and Bryansk. There are hundreds of historical documents testifying to the cruelty of the Hungarians against the local, Russian, population. Therefore, we must clearly understand - Hungary from 1941 to 1945 was a fascist country even more than Germany! During the war years, 1.5 million Hungarians took part in it. Approximately 700,000 returned home after the end of the war. This was the foundation of the rebellion - well-trained fascists who were waiting for any opportunity to oppose their enemy - the USSR.

In the summer of 1956, Khrushchev makes a huge mistake - he releases Hungarian prisoners from Soviet prisons. The problem was that he freed people who had been convicted of real crimes against Soviet citizens. Thus, about 5 thousand people of convinced Nazis returned to Hungary, who went through the war, are ideologically opposed to communism and know how to fight well.

Much can be said about the atrocities of the Hungarian Nazis. They killed a lot of people, but their favorite "fun" was hanging people by their feet from lampposts and trees. I do not want to go into these details, just give a couple of historical photos.

Main characters

Imre Nagy - since October 23, 1956, head of the Hungarian government. Soviet agent under the pseudonym "Volodya". June 15, 1958 sentenced to death.

Matthias Rakosi is the head of the Hungarian Communist Party.

Endre Sik is the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Hungary.

Bela Kiraly is a Hungarian major general who fought against the USSR. One of the leaders of the rebels in 1956. Sentenced in absentia to death. Since 1991 lives in Budapest.

Pal Maleter - Minister of Defense of Hungary, Colonel. He went over to the side of the rebels. June 15, 1958 sentenced to death.

Vladimir Kryuchkov - press attache of the Soviet embassy in Hungary in 1956. Formerly the head of the KGB.

Yuri Andropov - Soviet Ambassador to Hungary.

In 1956, an uprising against the communist regime took place in Hungary, which in the USSR was called a "counter-revolutionary rebellion." At that time, Matyas Rakosi, a big admirer of Stalin and a fan of persecuting people for any dissent and sending them to camps, was in power in Hungary. His draconian policy was very unpopular among the Hungarians (but generally suited the Soviet authorities). Therefore, an attempt to overthrow him turned into the intervention of Soviet troops and the bloody suppression of the rebellion. Among the Hungarians, 2,652 insurgents died that year, 348 civilians, and 19,226 were wounded.

I found a good material for you about how it was. Under the cut, only official documents and archival photographs.

Information of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR in the Central Committee of the CPSU on the situation in Hungary as of 12.00 November 4, 1956

Special folder. Owls. secret. Ex. No. 1

At 6 o'clock 15 min. November 4 p. Soviet troops began an operation to restore order and restore people's democratic power in Hungary.

Acting according to a predetermined plan, our units captured the main strongholds of the reaction in the province, which were Gyor, Miskolc, Gyongyes, Debrecen, as well as other regional centers of Hungary.

During the operation, Soviet troops occupied the most important communication centers, including a powerful broadcast radio station in the city of Szolnok, ammunition and weapons depots, and other important military installations.
Soviet troops operating in the city of Budapest, having broken the resistance of the rebels, occupied the parliament buildings, the TsR VPT, as well as a radio station in the parliament area.

Captured three bridges across the river. Danube, linking the eastern and western parts of the city, and an arsenal with weapons and ammunition. The entire composition of the counter-revolutionary government of Imre Nagy went into hiding. Searches are underway.

In Budapest, there was one large center of rebel resistance in the area of ​​the Korvin cinema (south-eastern part of the city). The rebels defending this stronghold were presented with an ultimatum to surrender, in connection with the refusal of the rebels to surrender, the troops began the assault.

The main garrisons of the Hungarian troops are blocked. Many of them laid down their arms without serious resistance. Our troops have been instructed to return to command the Hungarian officers removed by the rebels, and to arrest the officers appointed to replace those removed.

In order to prevent the penetration of enemy agents into Hungary and the flight of the leaders of the rebels from Hungary, our troops occupied the Hungarian airfields and firmly blocked all roads on the Austro-Hungarian border. The troops, continuing to carry out their tasks, clear the territory of Hungary from the rebels.

APRF. F. 3. Op. 64. D. 485.

Information of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR in the Central Committee of the CPSU on the situation in Hungary as of 9.00 on November 7, 1956

During the night of November 7, Soviet troops continued to liquidate small groups of rebels in the city of Budapest. In the western part of the city, our troops fought to destroy the center of resistance in the area of ​​the former Horthy Palace.

During the night, there was a regrouping of the rebel forces in Budapest. Small groups tried to leave the city in a westerly direction. At the same time, a large center of resistance was discovered in the area of ​​the city theater, the park to the east of this theater and in the neighborhoods adjacent to them.

On the territory of Hungary at night it was calm. Our troops carried out activities to identify and disarm groups of rebels and individual Hungarian units.

The government of the Hungarian People's Republic left Szolnok and arrived in Budapest at 6:10 am on November 7. The troops continue to carry out their assigned tasks.

Note: "Comrade Khrushchev familiarized. Archive. 9.XI.56. Dolud".

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 64. D. 486.

Information of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR in the Central Committee of the CPSU on the situation in Hungary as of 9.00 on November 9, 1956

Special folder Owls. secret. Ex. No. 1

During November 8, our troops restored order in Budapest, combed the forests in certain parts of the country, caught and disarmed scattered small groups of rebels, and also seized weapons from the local population.

District military commandant's offices have been set up in Budapest. A normal life is gradually being established in the country, a number of enterprises, urban transport, hospitals and schools have started to work. Local authorities are expanding their activities.

According to preliminary data, the losses of the Soviet troops during the period of hostilities in Hungary from October 24 to November 6 this year. 377 people are killed, 881 people are wounded. Including 37 killed and 74 wounded officers.

About 35,000 Hungarians have been disarmed by our troops. A large number of weapons, military equipment and ammunition were captured during the fighting and taken under guard as a result of disarmament, the accounting of which continues.

Note: "Comrade Khrushchev familiarized. Archive. 10.IX.56. Doluda".

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 64. D. 486. L. 43.

Information of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR in the Central Committee of the CPSU on the situation in Hungary as of 9.00 on November 10, 1956

Special folder Owls. secret. Ex. No. 1

During November 9, our troops continued to eliminate small groups of rebels, disarmed former Hungarian army soldiers, and also seized weapons from the local population.

A group of rebels offered stubborn resistance in the suburbs of Budapest - on the northern outskirts of Csepel Island. Three of our tanks were hit and burned in this area.

The political situation in the country continues to improve. However, in some places, hostile elements are still trying to prevent the establishment of order and the normalization of life in the country.

The situation continues to be difficult in Budapest, where the population lacks food and fuel. The government of Janos Kadar, together with the Command of the Soviet Forces, is taking measures to provide the population of Budapest with food.

Note: "Comrade Khrushchev reported. Archive. 10.XI.56. Dolud".

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 64. D. 486. L. 96.

Telephone message I.A. Serov from Budapest N.S. Khrushchev on the operational work carried out by the Soviet and Hungarian state security agencies

Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU comrade. Khrushchev N.S.

Yesterday the Minister of Public Security, Comrade Münnich, sent an order to the regional organizations, in which he pointed out that in the localities, contrary to the prohibition of the government, state security organs were being created. Therefore, he orders all employees of the state security organs to stop their work on the formation of organs and go home.

Considering that the special departments of the divisions carry out all the work on the removal of counter-revolutionary rebels through the Hungarian employees of the state security organs who appeared after the occupation of the cities by parts of the Soviet Army, today I talked with Comrade Münnich and asked how he further had in mind to carry out work to identify and arrest the counter-revolutionary element after such an order.

Tov. Münnich answered me that he issued the directive on the basis of instructions from the government, as provided for by the Government's Declaration.

Some time later, Comrade Kadar came to Comrade Münnich's office and said that he would also like to talk to me. During the conversation, Comrade Kadar focused on the following questions:

1. He had representatives of some regions, in particular the region of Salnok, who informed Kadar that the officers of the Soviet Army were arresting a lot and, along with the arrest of the counter-revolutionary element, they were also arresting ordinary participants in the insurrectionary movement.

He believes that this should not be done, since the people who participated in the insurgency are very afraid of revenge from the government, while the Declaration of the government said that those who lay down their arms and stop resisting will not be punished. The Hungarian government should not take revenge and show cruelty against such persons.

The representative of the Salnok region told Comrade Kadar that when 40 people were arrested in the region, representatives from the workers came and said that they would not start working until the arrested were released. In other regions, there were rumors that 6,000 people had been arrested in Salnok.

Tov. Kadar pointed out that the arrests of the reactionaries were former employees of the state security organs, whom the government had dismissed. It is not to our advantage before the people that Hungarian state security officers participate in arrests. You must bear in mind that in our country the mood of the masses is of great importance. The Soviet comrades and our members of the state security organs may arouse the indignation of the masses with arrests.

I said that the members of the state security organs in Hungary are now doing positive work in the removal of counter-revolutionary rebels. In a few days, when those who pose a threat to the current government are isolated, then these employees should be transferred to another job. Tov. Kadar and comrade Munnich agreed with this.

I explained to Comrade Kadar that the special departments of the divisions were instructed to arrest all the organizers of the rebellion, persons who resisted units of the Soviet Army with weapons in their hands, as well as citizens who incited and kindled the hatred of the people (during the Nagy government) towards the Communists and employees of the state security, as a result of which some of them were shot, hanged and burned.

As for the rank and file participants in the uprising, they are not arrested. Tov. Kadar and comrade Munnich agreed that this indication was correct.

I further added that it was possible that individuals not belonging to the listed categories could be arrested. Therefore, all those arrested are carefully filtered and those who did not play an active role in the rebellion are released.

Taking into account the liberal attitude shown by the leading workers of Hungary towards the enemies, I instructed the special departments to send all those arrested as soon as possible from the regions and cities to the Chop station, and also explained the organization of the political department in the regions.

2. Further, Comrade Kadar said that in the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Budapest), where a large number of state security officers are concentrated, an unhealthy situation has created, since among the employees of the bodies there are persons who worked in the bodies under Rakosi and played a negative role.

Therefore, he believes that these employees should be immediately removed and given other jobs. In addition, he considers it appropriate to disband the security department, as these are dishonest people.

I expressed the wish that Comrade Münnich quickly issue an order, as we agreed, on the organization of the people's police and staffed it with the most dedicated honest employees, and also formed a "political department" (department of state security), which could begin work. Then this issue will be removed.

At the same time, we agreed with Comrade Münnich that there would be no more than 20-25 people in the political department of the center with an open staff, and the rest of the employees would work in a secret staff.

The political department will include: foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, secret political service, investigation and a special service of operational equipment. Tov. Munnich said that he would sign such an order tomorrow. I will report on the number of those arrested by regions and the seized weapons in a separate note.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 64. D. 487. L. 78-80.

Telephone message I.A. Serov and Yu.V. Andropov from Budapest to the Central Committee of the CPSU about sending the arrested Hungarians to the territory of the USSR

Today, throughout the day, Comrades Kadar and Münnich (each separately) called us repeatedly, who informed us that the Soviet military authorities had sent a train of Hungarian youth to the Soviet Union (Siberia) who had taken part in an armed rebellion.

Kadar and Münnich declared in this connection that they did not approve of such actions on our part, since these actions caused an alleged general strike of the Hungarian railway workers and worsened the internal political situation in the country as a whole.

Tonight, the Budapest radio them. Kossuth conveyed a tendentious message about the deportation of Hungarian youth to Siberia. Tov. Munnich requested that the command of the Soviet troops make an official statement in the press that it did not and would not export anyone from Hungary to the USSR. On our part, Comrade Munnich was told that we would clarify this issue and tomorrow we would inform him of the answer.

In fact, today, November 14, a small train with arrested people was sent to the Chop station, the investigative files on which were registered as active participants and organizers of the armed rebellion. The echelon followed the border.

When the echelon was moving, the prisoners at two stations threw notes out the window, in which they said that they were being sent to Siberia. These notes were picked up by Hungarian railroad workers who reported it to the government. On our line, instructions have been given to send those arrested in the future in closed vehicles under reinforced escort.

Tomorrow, at a meeting with Comrade Münnich, Comrade Serov intends to tell him that in view of the absence in Hungary of a prison sufficiently prepared for keeping prisoners, where it would be possible to conduct an objective investigation, we had in mind to place a small group of arrested people in a room close to Soviet-Hungarian border. Comrades Suslov and Aristov have been informed of this.

Andropov

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 64. D. 486. L. 143-144.

Reference

According to statistics, in connection with the uprising and hostilities in the period from October 23 to December 31, 1956, 2,652 Hungarian rebels died, 348 civilians, and 19,226 people were injured.

The losses of the Soviet army, according to official figures, amounted to 669 people killed, 51 missing and 1251 wounded.

The losses of the Hungarian People's Army were, according to official figures, 53 killed and 289 wounded soldiers.

The total number of lost military equipment is unknown.

2nd Guards MD, the first to enter the rebellious Budapest, lost 4 tanks on October 24, 1956.
The 33rd MD during the operation "Whirlwind" lost 14 tanks and self-propelled guns, 9 armored personnel carriers, 13 guns, 4 MLRS, 6 anti-aircraft guns and other equipment, as well as 111 military personnel.

According to Hungarian communist sources, after the liquidation of the armed groups, a large number of Western-made weapons fell into the hands of the troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the police: German MP-44 assault rifles and American Thompson submachine guns.

Budapest suffered as a result of street fighting between Soviet troops and rebels, 4,000 houses were completely destroyed in the city and another 40,000 were damaged.

HUNGARY. 1956

Brief historical and geographical reference

Hungary - a country in the middle reaches of the Danube. In ancient times, its territory was part of the Roman provinces of Pannonia and Dacia. After the fall of the Western Roman Empire, the Avar Khaganate was formed there, defeated in the 8th century. Charlemagne, and in the ninth century. the Great Moravian state of the Western Slavs arose. In 896, tribes of Hungarians (Magyars) migrated to these lands from the southern Russian steppes under the leadership of Prince Arpad, who founded the dynasty. This year is considered the date of "finding the motherland" by the Hungarians and the beginning of their statehood, recognized by the King of Germany and Italy, Arnulf. In 1241, the Mongols devastated the country, then a threat arose from the Ottoman Empire. The death in the battle with the Turks at Mohacs of the Hungarian king Louis (Lajos) II in 1526 led to the division of the kingdom between the Holy Roman Empire of the Habsburgs and the Ottoman Sultanate. By 1711, the entire country was under the rule of the Habsburgs, which remained part of their empire until the beginning of the 20th century. The defeat in the First World War led to the establishment in November 1918 of an independent democratic republic, which in 1919 was briefly replaced by the communist regime of Bela Kun. From 1920 to 1944, Hungary (nominally a monarchy) was ruled by regent Miklós Horthy, who received dictatorial powers. During World War II, Hungary took the side of Germany and its allies, after the defeat of which it was occupied by the USSR. In 1946 it was proclaimed a republic, and in 1949 it became a one-party communist state.

The dramatic events of the autumn of 1956 in Hungary left a deep mark on the history of post-war Europe. They were a reflection of the most complex problems and contradictions that developed during the Cold War era and caused a wide resonance throughout the world.

As you know, at the final stage of World War II, not without the help of I.V. Stalin, at the head of the Hungarian Working People's Party (VPT) and the country was a group of former Comintern leaders, led by the "orthodox Stalinist" Matthias Rakosi, who returned to their homeland from Moscow emigration. According to Henry A. Kissinger, foreign policy adviser to American presidents in the 1950s and 1960s, back in the 1930s, Rákosi was literally bought out of a Budapest prison by Stalin in exchange for Hungarian banners taken as trophies by tsarist troops in 1849 .

After a few years of their leadership of the country, serious signs of a socio-political crisis appeared in Hungary, expressed in dissatisfaction with the authorities, methods of government, copying the experience of the USSR without taking into account national characteristics.

The political situation in the country was also aggravated by economic problems - wage cuts, rising prices and, against this background, a drop in the living standards of the population. The forced industrialization launched by the country's leadership and the campaign to create agricultural cooperatives provoked a popular protest against socialist forms of management. The Soviet leadership, closely following the developments in Hungary, assessing the catastrophic consequences of M. Rakosi's rule, took urgent measures to normalize the situation in the country. The Hungarian leaders, summoned to Moscow, at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU held on June 13, 1953, were subjected to harsh criticism - for the mistakes made, the usurpation of power, repressions and the difficult socio-economic situation.

The meeting resulted in the appointment of Imre Nagy as Prime Minister of the People's Republic of Hungary (HPR), who was instructed to proclaim changes that included a number of changes to mitigate totalitarian pressure on society, reforms in the economy and democratization of the existing political system.

Here, in our opinion, it is important to briefly characterize Imre Nagy, who became the main figure in the events that followed soon after.

Imre Nagy was born on June 7, 1896 in the city of Kaposvár to Jozsef Nagy, a storekeeper, and Rosalia Scharinger, a housekeeper. He studied at the Higher Commercial School, from where he joined the Austro-Hungarian army in 1915. In July 1916, during the Brusilov breakthrough, he was wounded and taken prisoner by the Russians. He was in camps in the Verkhneudinsk region (Ulan-Ude), doing auxiliary work in the Baikal villages, in Irkutsk. In March 1918 he joined the international Red Guard detachment, in which he served until September of the same year. Here he was admitted to the Hungarian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) (VKP(b). According to some reports, he took part in the suppression of the rebellion by the White Cossacks in Verkhneudinsk, battles with whites near Irkutsk. The scale of this participation and Nagy's personal contribution are unknown. In September 1918, the detachment , in which he was, laid down his arms, and Nagy, along with other former prisoners of war, was returned to their former places of residence, where he worked until Kolchak's defeat. years to March 1921 served in a special department of the Irkutsk Cheka. In those years, with a shortage of competent personnel, "internationalist fighters" were considered "reliable comrades" ready to fulfill any order. They were not connected by national ties with the local population, did not differ in relation to them with excessive sentimentality and therefore were willingly enrolled in ordinary work in the Chekist bodies. period in the life of Imre Nagy.

In 1921, after a brief stay in Moscow, Nagy was sent by the Hungarian section of the Comintern to work underground in Hungary. There is little information about this period of his life in the Russian archives. Nevertheless, several interesting facts are known. In particular, about the patronage in the Comintern, after his return to Moscow in 1929, of his closest associates in the underground struggle in Hungary, N. Tiriner and A. Molnar. In fact, they turned out to be provocateurs and agents of the Hungarian police, who "surrendered" their comrades in the revolutionary movement. Nagy survived, which gave rise to unkind rumors in the circles of the Hungarian emigration. Perhaps these rumors were the reason for Nadia's refusal to be admitted to the staff of the GPU. In addition, there are documents in archival materials that testify that the Chekists were unpleasantly impressed by "Nady's persistent attempts to get a job as a staff member of the GPU." Instead of enrolling in the cadres, Nadia was offered to become an unspoken agent (secret informant), to which he agreed on January 17, 1933. Quite a lot of materials have been preserved about his work on the organs. There is, for example, a document showing that in 1939 Nagy proposed to the NKVD for the "development" of 38 Hungarian political emigrants, including F. Munnich. In another list, he names 150 Hungarians, Bulgarians, Russians, Germans, Italians he knows, with whom, if necessary, he could "work."

According to the reports of Nagy (pseudonym - "Volodya"), several groups of political emigrants, consisting of members of the Hungarian, German and other communist parties, were convicted. All of them were accused of "anti-Soviet", "terrorist" and "counter-revolutionary" activities (cases "Agrarians", "Incorrigible", "Agony of the Doomed" and others). Another document (June 1940) indicates that Nagy "gave materials" on 15 arrested "enemies of the people" who worked in the International Agrarian Institute, the Comintern, and the All-Union Radio Committee. The activities of "Volodya" led to the arrest of the famous scientist E. Varga, a number of leaders of the Communist Party of Hungary (B. Varga-Vago, G. Farkas, E. Neumann, F. Gabor and others). Some of them were shot, some were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment and exile. In a letter from the chairman of the KGB of the USSR V. Kryuchkov to the Central Committee of the CPSU "On archival materials on the activities of Imre Nagy in the USSR", prepared in June 1989, it was noted: "From the available archival materials it does not follow that Nagy collaborated with the NKVD under duress. Moreover , the documents directly indicate that "Volodya" shows great interest and initiative in the work, is a qualified agent ".

But back to the events of the 1950s.

As a result of the decisions of the June (1953) plenum of the CR of the VPT, the first signs of a "thaw" appeared in the public life of Hungary. Actions for the rehabilitation of illegally convicted people began, and the activities of public organizations became more active. However, the process of democratization could not unfold in full force. Taking advantage of the economic difficulties on the just begun path of transition to market forms of management, Rakosi, who remained the first secretary of the CR HTP, and his entourage undertook a counter-manoeuvre. The Prime Minister was accused of "serious violation of the principle of collegiality." The government crisis provoked a split in society, which resulted in a confrontation between reformers and conservatives, in a confrontation between supporters of the "modernization" of the socialist system and dictatorship, in a rivalry between Nagy and Rakosi. As a result, Nagy was removed from the post of prime minister in April 1955 and expelled from the party in December. A new "cold snap" has come. However, attempts to restore the old methods of governing the country gave rise to new resistance. The intelligentsia came out actively in support of the reforms. The first publications of Hungarian writers appeared in the press criticizing the principles of party spirit in literature, the interference of party functionaries in the creative activities of writers and artists. Various public associations began to form, acquiring an increasingly pronounced political character. The Union of Hungarian Writers became the center of discontent and resistance to the regime. In the "Petofi" circle created in the summer of 1956, under the guise of literary discussions, criticism of the socio-political system that existed in the country was carried out. This happened against the background of intensified Western ideological campaigns: radio stations Free Europe and Voice of America were engaged in active propaganda, calling on Hungarians to openly oppose the ruling regime.

All this contributed to the formation of government opposition around Nagy, who was expelled from the party, but who was seeking his political rehabilitation.

"Oils on the fire" were added by external factors.

In May-June 1955, a significant event took place: the Soviet leaders arrived in Belgrade on an official visit, including to meet with I. Tito. The reconciliation with Tito had far-reaching political implications. Moscow's rehabilitation of the Yugoslav "apostate" automatically removed the blame from many people who were repressed during the campaign against "Titoism". This had a strong impact even on those who sincerely believed in the ideals of socialism in Eastern Europe. In these states, including Hungary, a campaign has begun to rehabilitate those who suffered for "Titoism".

And, finally, an important reason for the development of the movement for "liberal reforms" was N.S. Khrushchev at the XX Congress of the CPSU (February 14-25, 1956). Despite its "secrecy", in a matter of weeks, thanks to the operational work of American intelligence agencies, it became widely known in Eastern European countries. Criticism of the recent past, condemnation of the cult of personality, mistakes and crimes caused rather strong, overt or covert, anti-Soviet sentiments in the socialist countries of Eastern Europe.

The consequence of this was a large-scale demonstration on June 28-29, 1956 in Poland in Poznan with calls for "Freedom!", "Bread!", "God!", "Down with communism!". The demonstration escalated into street clashes, the troops of the voivodeship security department intervened, opened fire on the demonstrators, and then the army. As a result, more than 70 people died, about 500 were injured.

In Hungary, anti-Soviet sentiments began to manifest themselves at first in seemingly insignificant episodes - refusals in stores to sell goods to Soviet military personnel and members of their families, insults on the streets of cities. Then they became more and more aggressive. In the dormitory of Soviet officers in Szombathely, windows were smashed with stones at night. At one of the railway crossings, a group of Soviet soldiers were thrown from a passing train with pieces of coal. Commandant of Budapest Colonel M.Ya. Kuzminov reported that unknown persons telephoned the commandant's office, threatened and warned that the Russians would face bloody retribution for everything they had done. Incidents like this are getting worse and worse.

The events in Poland met with enthusiastic support in Hungary. The situation was not alleviated by the forced castling in the leadership of the Hungarian People's Republic: on July 18, 1956, at the plenum of the Central Committee of the VPT, the resignation of Rakosi was accepted, who immediately, together with his wife, a Soviet citizen F.F. Kornilova, went to the USSR for "treatment". Erne Gehre, his faithful comrade-in-arms, was elected the first secretary of the Central Committee of the VPT. Four new members were nominated to the central leadership, including Janos Kadar and two candidates, and 14 members and candidates were co-opted to the Central Committee. However, these changes, as it turned out later, resulted only in a tactical combination that changed little in essence.

In mid-October, student unrest began in Hungary. In Budapest, Debrecen, Miskolc, Szeged, Szombathely and Pec, they demanded to abandon the Stalinist methods of governing the country, to stop the study of Marxism-Leninism in universities and institutes.

On October 22, 16-point demands were formulated at the Budapest Polytechnic University - convening a party congress, removing the Stalinists from the leadership, expanding socialist democracy, returning I. Nagy to the post of prime minister, and reducing taxes on peasants. They were supplemented by calls for a multi-party system, holding free elections, restoring the old state symbols, canceling military training and Russian language lessons, and withdrawing Soviet troops from Hungary.

On October 23, at 15:00, a large student demonstration began in Budapest, which was gradually joined by representatives of all segments of the population. The number of demonstrators reached 200 thousand. The authorities were confused. The Minister of the Interior, L. Pirosh, first banned it, then, when the demonstration assumed an unprecedented mass character, he allowed it. However, already during the first clashes with law enforcement forces, the nature of the demonstration changed, anti-government slogans appeared. According to eyewitnesses, well-organized groups of people began to stand out in the crowd. At 19:00, the first secretary of the HTP CR, Erne Gere, spoke on the radio. But instead of trying to find some kind of compromise, he branded the performance as "counter-revolutionary" and "nationalist" and threatened reprisals. According to. V. Musatov, who worked for a long time in the Soviet embassy in Budapest, and then in the apparatus of the Central Committee, where he dealt with issues of relations with the socialist countries of Eastern Europe, he did this on purpose, "wanting to suppress the uprising in one fell swoop" . One way or another, Gera's statement only aggravated the situation even more. I. Nagy, who spoke at the request of the demonstrators at a rally in front of the parliament, could not calm the passions either. The unrest continued to escalate. Shouts began to be heard in the crowd: "We do not need tunics!", "Down with the red star!", "Down with the communists!" The demonstrators tore off the images of the state emblem from the national flags of the Hungarian People's Republic, burned red flags. The apotheosis of the riots was the dismantling of a giant statue of Stalin, which was then smashed into small pieces, taken apart for souvenirs. Not the last place was occupied by anti-Semitic slogans. A significant number of Jews in the leadership of the country, which, according to the demonstrators, bore the main blame for the problems of Hungary, caused popular discontent throughout the country.

By evening, the situation in the capital was tense to the limit. The uprising began. The rebels were opposed by parts of the state security and the army. Even with the beginning of armed uprisings, parts of the Budapest garrison were ordered to occupy the most important objects in the city. But there were few troops in the city. So, in a report addressed to the Minister of Defense of the USSR, Marshal Zhukov, it was reported that the total number of troops involved was only about 2,500 people. At the same time, the Hungarian government did not give permission to open fire, so the units and subunits came out without ammunition. As a result, they were unable to resist. Some units were disarmed by the rebels, who by the evening seized the editorial office and printing house of the central party newspaper, the weapons depot and cartridge factory, the Western Station and threatened to seize the buildings of the Central Committee of the party, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Railways.

Serious events unfolded near the building of the Hungarian Radio Center, where a crowd of demonstrators arrived, demanding access to the radio and for the time being held back by the police and state security forces (ABH). The delegation of students was let into the building to negotiate with the director. However, a false rumor soon spread among the demonstrators who remained on the street that one of the delegates had allegedly been killed. The crowd became agitated, there were calls to storm the building. As to how subsequent events developed, the opinions of contemporaries were divided.

According to one version, shortly after 21:00, some of the guards threw tear gas from the window of the radio center, and after one or two minutes, state security officers opened fire on the crowd. Then came the white ambulances. But instead of doctors, state security officers dressed in white coats jumped out of the cars. The angry mob attacked them and took away their weapons. Parts of the Hungarian army were sent to help the ABH, but the soldiers, after some hesitation, went over to the side of the crowd.

According to another version, at 9:00 pm the rebels began shelling the building of the Radio Center, and only when several of its guards were killed and wounded did the state security officers receive permission to open fire.

Here is how one of the commanders of the radio guard describes the siege of the Center:

“At about 6-6.30, groups of demonstrators appeared on Shandor Brody Street. The crowd continuously grew and behaved more and more aggressively. It did not follow the call to disperse, therefore, in order to disperse it, we “wedge” crashed into the crowd and used tear gas grenades.

Figure 141

Rebels on the streets of Budapest

Later, we began to fire warning shots, as a result of which we managed to clear Shandor Brody Street twice. But, since the crowd saw that we were shooting only into the air, they returned and did not disperse any more.

The first single shots with live ammunition were fired by demonstrators from Shandor Brody Street and almost simultaneously from the side of the National Museum - through the Palace Garden - at 19:30. They shot at the windows, near which there were then a lot of people.

Several people were immediately killed by the first shots. By the time we received the order to open fire, there were over twenty dead among the guards.

When we opened fire, the street was empty again for a while, but by this time the rebels had occupied the houses and roofs opposite and were firing from there. Shooting was carried out from machine guns not only from Shandor Brody Street, but also from the roofs of houses located on Sentkirai Street ... ".

One way or another, but shortly after midnight, the Radio Center was captured by the attackers.

At noon on October 24, Hungarian radio announced the introduction of a state of emergency in Budapest and the establishment of a curfew. Residents of the city were forbidden to take to the streets at night until 7 am, to hold rallies and meetings. The rebels were asked to stop the armed struggle and lay down their arms. And the day before that, on the afternoon of October 23, Gera telephoned Moscow with a request to bring Soviet troops into Budapest, who were in Hungary under the Warsaw Pact. At night, the plenum of the Central Committee of the VPT formed a new government headed by Imre Nagy, who, being present at the meeting of the Central Committee, did not object to the invitation of the Soviet troops. Moreover, speaking on the radio on October 25, he recognized their inevitability of intervention in the current situation. However, when the troops had already entered the capital, he rejected the request of the USSR ambassador to sign the corresponding letter. The former head of government, Hegedüs, did it instead. The text of the appeal read: "On behalf of the Council of Ministers of the Hungarian People's Republic, I ask the government of the Soviet Union to send Soviet troops to Budapest to help to eliminate the unrest that has arisen in Budapest, to quickly restore order and create conditions for peaceful creative labor." The letter was dated backdated - October 24, it arrived in Moscow on October 28.

At this time, rather strange events were taking place in Budapest. Some researchers explain them by the confusion of the authorities and the confusion that reigned in various government departments, including law enforcement agencies. Others are convinced that these were planned provocations, betrayal and direct intervention by Western intelligence agencies. We are talking primarily about weapons that ended up in large quantities in the hands of the rebels. The Western media claimed that all of it was captured in battles with the regular units of the Hungarian and Soviet armies or taken from the police. At the same time, according to many eyewitnesses of the events, already on the first day of the rebellion, trucks appeared on the streets and squares of the city, from which machine guns and rifles were distributed to everyone. Looking ahead, we note that during the period of fighting and after they ended in November 1956, more than 44 thousand small arms were seized from the rebels and the population, including 11 thousand 500 machine guns and about 2 thousand machine guns, 62 guns, of which 47 anti-aircraft guns. Moreover, about 2 thousand units of small arms were foreign-made in the post-war period.

How did the rebels get these weapons? Indeed, some of the small arms were taken away from the Hungarian military, and some were seized from the weapons depots captured by the rebels. But there were other sources as well. So, for example, it is known that I. Nagy, immediately after he headed the government, demanded to arm the party activists. The weapons were delivered to district committees, to the police and to large enterprises. However, from there it somehow fell into the hands of the rebels. The same thing happened when the Hungarian government decided to arm the workers.

At first, the Ministry of Defense searched for weapons for a long time, but when it was found, it again fell into the hands of the rebels in considerable quantities.

Yes, and "miracles" happened to the rebels. So, during the fighting, about 300 people were captured and disarmed. They were handed over to the Hungarian police. But a few days later, the detainees were again captured with weapons in their hands.

Figure 142

A tank captured by the rebels. 1956

Later it became known that all the detainees were released on the orders of the chief of police in Budapest, Sandor Kopacha, and the weapons were returned to them.

October 23 at 23.00, having received an order from the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal V.D. Sokolovsky, parts of the Special Corps were alerted and moved to Budapest. They had to make a 75-120-kilometer march. The calculation was for a show of force. The task force of the headquarters of the Special Corps, headed by Lieutenant General P.N. Leshchenko also went to the capital, where with great difficulty she got to the Ministry of Defense of the Hungarian People's Republic.

It should be said that the plan of action for the troops of the Special Corps to maintain and restore order in Budapest and on the territory of Hungary was developed by the headquarters of the corps and worked out on the map as early as July 1956. He received the code name "Compass".

According to the plan, the restoration of order in Budapest was assigned to the 2nd Guards Mechanized Division, Major General S.V. Lebedev. She was supposed to move out of Kecskemét and take under protection the main objects of the Hungarian capital. She determined the priority objects, as well as the forces and means to hold them.

17th Guards Mechanized Division Major General A.V. Krivosheeva was supposed to cover the border with Austria and ensure public order at the points of permanent deployment - in the cities of Gyor, Koszeg, Kermend, Szombathely. Parts of the division stationed in Khaimashkar formed a reserve and were intended for use in Budapest.

The rest of the formations and parts of the corps were ordered to ensure public order at their permanent deployment points, as well as to hold and defend military camps, airfields, warehouses and other critical facilities.

The special instructions indicated: the procedure for the operation of units and subunits in the city, the tasks of guarding and defending objects, the procedure for interacting with units of the VNA, and some other issues. The procedure for the use of weapons was especially stipulated.

After completion on July 20, 1956, the corps commander, Lieutenant General P.N. Leshchenko approved a new version of the action plan of the Special Corps, according to which parts of the corps were given from 3 to 6 hours to establish control over the most important objects of the country and Budapest. After coordination with Moscow, the new plan was codenamed "Volna".

At a time when parts of the Special Corps advanced to the capital, confusion and confusion reigned in the Hungarian Ministry of Defense. The information about the actions of the rebels, the Hungarian units and the police was the most contradictory. Defense Minister I. Bata and Chief of the General Staff L. Toth were in a panic. By that time, there were about 7 thousand Hungarian soldiers and 50 tanks in Budapest, dispersed over many objects. At the same time, no one knew the location and number of forces in a particular area, how reliable they were, and how many military personnel went over to the side of the rebels. In such a situation, the Soviet command did not have to rely on the interaction and assistance of the Hungarian army.

The first to enter Budapest at 4 am on October 24 were the 37th Tank Regiment, headed by the deputy commander of the 2nd Guards Mechanized Division, Colonel Bichan, and the motorcycle battalion of Lieutenant Colonel G. Dobrunov. The regiment received the task of guarding the buildings of the Central Committee of the VPT, the parliament, the Soviet embassy, ​​bridges across the Danube and freeing the Radio House captured by the rebels. However, even at the entrance to the city, the Soviet units were subjected to unexpected fire from the rebels. As a result of the attack, several people died, including the company commander of the motorcycle battalion, Captain Petrochenkov. Despite the losses, our soldiers, in obedience to the order, did not open fire.

The main forces of the division (the 5th mechanized regiment of Colonel Pilipenko, the 6th mechanized regiment of Colonel Mayakov, the 87th heavy self-propelled tank regiment of Colonel Nikovsky) approached Budapest only at 5 o'clock. The regiments immediately entered the battle and in a short time cleared a number of important objects from armed groups, including railway stations, bridges, and, together with the regiments that had arrived earlier, began to protect the buildings of the Central Committee of the VPT, parliament, ministries of defense and foreign affairs, the Soviet embassy, ​​banks , warehouses and airfield . By this time, the grouping of Soviet troops in Budapest consisted of about 6 thousand people, 290 tanks, 1236 armored personnel carriers and 156 guns.

In the afternoon of the same day, the 83rd tank and 56th mechanized regiments of the 17th Guards Mechanized Division, Major General A. Krivosheev, approached the city, who were tasked with maintaining order in the western part of the city - Buda and guarding the bridge across the Danube .

Figure 143

The crew of the armored personnel carrier BTR-152 from the 33rd Guards Mechanized Division, which participated in the suppression of the rebellion. Hungary, November 1956 (AVL archive)

Together with the Soviet units, four VNA divisions began to operate in the city (7th mechanized division, 8th, 27th rifle and 5th mechanized division of the 3rd rifle corps). On October 24-26, on the orders of General Durko, a 340-man rebel detachment was destroyed in Kuchkemet by Hungarian units. During the operation in Sabadsalash, 7 rebels were killed and 40 wounded. At the same time, a number of units of the 8th mechanized regiment of the Hungarian army, construction and anti-aircraft units of the capital's garrison, individual officers and cadets of the military academy and schools went over to the side of the rebels.

By the end of October 24, the troops of the Special Corps had largely succeeded in completing their assigned tasks. However, as subsequent events showed, the forceful action taken led to the toughening of the resistance of the rebels. The situation became more complicated the very next day, October 25. According to Mikoyan and Suslov, who arrived in Budapest on October 24 to clarify the situation in the country, two events shook the Hungarian capital. The first is an incident near the parliament, when during a rally from the roofs and attics of nearby houses, unarmed demonstrators and Soviet soldiers were fired at, one tank was burned. Among the dead was the regiment commander, Major V.P. Bachurin. He was killed by a burst from a heavy machine gun during a peaceful conversation with demonstrators. In response to the provocation, Soviet units and Hungarian state security officers also responded with fire. To this day, there is no exact answer as to who organized this provocation. According to one version, employees of the Hungarian State Security Service started shooting from the roofs. According to others - a group of armed rebels. One way or another, but as a result of the shootout, more than 60 Hungarians were killed (according to later data - over 200 people).

Lieutenant General E.I. Malashenko recalls this incident in the following way:

“Many approached the tanks standing here, climbed on them and stuck banners into the gun barrels.

Figure 144

Member of Operation Whirlwind. Hungary, November 1956

From the attics of the buildings located on the square opposite the parliament, fire was opened on the demonstrators and Soviet soldiers. Two Hungarian tanks escorting the demonstrators fired several shots and disappeared. The commander of one of our units was killed.

Soviet soldiers and state security officers guarding the parliament returned fire on the roofs of the buildings from which they fired. There was a panic in Lajos Kossuth Square. People with the first shots began to scatter in search of shelter. When the firefight subsided, many hurried to leave the square. Twenty-two demonstrators were killed and many wounded. Several of our military personnel and Hungarian policemen were killed ... ".

It is not known, as noted above, who was the instigator of this provocation, but it is certain that it was the result of I. Nagy's decision to lift the curfew. It was adopted a few hours before the incident at the Parliament, without the consent of the Soviet command.

The second event - a shootout near the Central Committee building - the Soviet tankmen, covering the building, mistakenly opened fire on a suitable Hungarian guard company, mistaking it for a rebel detachment; 10 Hungarians were killed.

Perhaps this incident was the reason for the publications, which claimed that many Soviet soldiers sympathized with the rebels and even provided them with armed assistance. So, for example, the Austrian newspaper "Bild Telegraph" dated October 31, 1956 wrote:

“Members of the AVO (Hungarian Chekists) began to shoot at unarmed demonstrators ... Suddenly, the towers of three Soviet tanks turned from 12 to 3 - as they say in the language of the tankers, and three tank commanders commanded in Russian: “Fire!” - but not at the demonstrators, but in the Chekists of Hungary. The communist security officials fell under the shells of tanks of the Soviet army. It was the greatest heroism in the history of this Soviet military unit and the complete collapse of the official communist ideology ... ".

Reacting to the aggravation of the situation, the Soviet command took measures to build up the grouping of troops in the Hungarian capital.

On October 25, the 33rd Guards Mechanized Division of Major General G.I. approached Budapest. Obaturov (from the Separate Mechanized Army stationed in Romania) and the 128th Guards Rifle Division of Colonel N.A. Gorbunov (from the Carpathian military district). Both divisions became part of the Special Corps. Thus, the total number of troops operating in Budapest was brought up to 20 thousand people.

Nevertheless, the resistance of the rebels, especially in the center of the capital, continued to grow. In this regard, the 33rd division was given the task of "clearing from armed detachments" the central part of the city, where the rebels created strongholds (in the Kebanya sector, Yllei Street, areas adjacent to the Danube, the Kilian barracks and the cinema area " Corwin"). By this time, the rebels were already armed with not only small arms, but also anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns, grenade launchers, anti-tank grenades and bottles of combustible mixture.

It should be noted that some parts of the 33rd division suffered losses immediately upon entering the city. A tank and an armored personnel carrier were hit, in which the commanders of two regiments were located, and headquarters radio stations were destroyed. The artillery regiment of the division on Ferenczi Avenue was ambushed and almost completely lost the second division. Regiment commander E.N. Khanovich was mortally wounded. How this happened, the former instructor of the political department of the Special Corps, Colonel V.I., told in his memoirs. Fomin:

"The head of her column (33rd division, - BUT. O.), following in marching order, according to the Hungarians, appeared on the outskirts of the city at about six o'clock in the evening. The division commander, Major General Obaturov, arrived at General Lashchenko for instructions much earlier. He arrived in a staff "gas truck", dressed, like the driver, in a soldier's uniform: a raincoat, a cap on his head. The Hungarian guard asked me to help check the documents of a soldier who claimed to be a general, but did not show his identity. I escorted the division commander to the corps commander. And in the evening it became known about the attack on the convoy of armed groups in the area of ​​​​Prater Square and on Yllei Street. Having missed the tanks, the rebels took the division's artillery, which was moving with uncovered gun barrels, and rear units under crossfire. Many soldiers and officers died, including the commander of the artillery regiment. He did not have time to give the command "to fight." The division got lost in the city and lost control. General Obaturov, as I was later told by the Hero of the Soviet Union, retired colonel G.D. Dobrunov, then the commander of the reconnaissance battalion of the 2nd mechanized division, found himself in a very difficult situation. An experienced intelligence officer, who knew Budapest well, had to help the divisional commander in drawing the location of his units on the city plan, issued in 1945! But such plans were provided in 1956 to all the troops of the Special Corps, which, in the absence of officers who knew the language and the Hungarian capital, created great difficulties in orienting on its streets: in eleven years, not only the names of many streets and squares changed, but also their configuration".

Already in the city, a tank of the regiment commander Litovtsev (number "072") was knocked out by a direct hit of a shell. Of the entire crew of the car, only Colonel Litovtsev managed to escape.

In total, on October 25-26, the 33rd mechanized division lost 130 servicemen on the streets of Budapest, without taking part in any of the actions against the armed groups of the rebels. Other units also suffered losses, in particular, on October 24 alone, more than 40 soldiers and officers of the 2nd Guards Mechanized Division died at the hands of militants. At the same time, not isolated cases of abuse of the bodies of the dead, as well as atrocities and bullying by the rebels in relation to the captured Soviet soldiers, were recorded. So, according to the memoirs of L.V. Petukhov, in the village of Dunakesi, 20 km north of Budapest, the rebels attacked a convoy of Soviet fuel trucks. Fuel trucks slipped through, two drivers were injured, and a shell hit the security car. Senior group captain G.I. Miseenkov and ten guards were shell-shocked and taken prisoner. The guards were immediately shot, and the captain was demanded that he voluntarily go over to the side of the rebels. G.I. Miseenkov refused. Then, while alive, they cut off his arm to the elbow, his leg to the knee, doused him with diesel fuel and set him on fire.

According to the former senior instructor of the political department of the OK for special propaganda, retired colonel Vitaly Fomin, in many respects the large losses of the first days were due to the morale of the personnel of the Soviet troops. “Brought up on respect for the sovereignty and independence of the fraternal people,” V. Fomin recalled, “our soldiers found themselves in an extremely difficult situation. Yesterday they were welcome guests at industrial enterprises, in production cooperatives and state farms. Now they had to meet with the people of Budapest far from in a friendly atmosphere. They were clearly not ready for this, as well as for opening fire first. And in this case, the instruction of the corps command not to do this was superfluous.

Figure 145

The crew of the T-34/85 tank from the 33rd GMD after the suppression of the rebellion. Hungary, November 1956 (AVL archive)

As for the order to avoid provocation, it proved even more difficult to carry it out. As subsequent events showed, extremists and terrorists of all stripes widely used the friendly feelings of Soviet military personnel for Hungarian citizens for their insidious purposes.

On the morning of October 28, an assault on the center of the capital was planned together with units of the 5th and 6th Hungarian mechanized regiments. However, just before the start of the assault, the Hungarian units received an order from their command not to participate in hostilities. This was explained by the fact that the rebels were allegedly ready to lay down their arms. Indeed, Imre Nagy negotiated with the leaders of the armed detachments Laszlo Ivankovich, Gergely Pogranats and others and accepted their demands. Following this, he phoned the Ministry of Defense and warned that if the Corvina was stormed, he would resign. As a result, the operation was cancelled. From that moment on, units of the VNA, at the request of the government of I. Nagy, did not show resistance to the rebels, they did not receive orders to conduct actions against the rebels. A Revolutionary Military Council was created in Budapest, consisting of Major General B. Kiraly, L. Kahn, I. Kovacs, Colonel P. Maleter, and others.

On the same day at 17:00. 20 minutes. according to Budapest time, I. Nagy spoke on the radio with a declaration of the new government. The Hungarian leadership condemned the previous assessment of the uprising as a counter-revolution, recognizing it as a "broad national-democratic movement" that rallied the entire Hungarian people in the struggle for national independence and sovereignty. The declaration outlined a program for the speedy satisfaction of the just social demands of the working people, announced the dissolution of the troops and state security agencies, and an agreement reached between the Hungarian and Soviet governments on the beginning of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Budapest. On the presence of Soviet troops in Hungary, the declaration said: "The Hungarian government will take the initiative of negotiations on relations between the Hungarian People's Republic and the Soviet Union - in particular, on the withdrawal of the Soviet Armed Forces located on the territory of Hungary - in the spirit of Hungarian-Soviet friendship, on the basis of the principles equal rights of the socialist countries and national independence".

Figure 146

Soviet tank on the street in Budapest. 1956

The Soviet representatives Mikoyan and Suslov drew the following conclusion about the behavior of Nagy and his supporters: "The most dangerous thing is that, having morally decomposed the state security cadres - the most persistent fighters - with their declaration, they have not yet been able to do anything in return, which is used by the reaction." In the West, on the contrary, the text of the Declaration evoked positive responses.

I. Nagy's statement of October 28 was a turning point in the development of the October events. The defenders of the constitutional order were demoralized. The party activist, who defended public buildings, ministries and district committees, received an order from the Hungarian government to immediately surrender all available weapons. The most disciplined communists carried it out, and later many of them paid for it with their lives.

The decision of the government to abolish the state security agencies actually placed all employees of the Hungarian special services outside the law. So, the head of the internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Orban, told the Soviet adviser that "he will gather officers and will make his way into the USSR." The former Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs Dean, fearing the massacre of employees of the bodies and their families, decided to "create a detachment of employees and move to the Soviet border with weapons," and if he fails, then "partisan underground and beat the enemies." The regional department of state security in the city of Sabolch went to Romania, and employees of the Debrecen department approached the Soviet border in the Uzhgorod region and turned to the border guards with a request to let them into the USSR. Large groups of state security workers also concentrated on the border with Czechoslovakia, waiting for permission to enter this country.

A reassessment of the nature of the events also put an end to the stay of Soviet troops in the Hungarian capital. The consequence of this was a fierce campaign against the Soviet military.

On October 30, the Nagy government demanded the immediate withdrawal of the Soviet military contingent from Budapest.

At this time, an active search for a way out of the worsening situation continued in Moscow. On October 28, at a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Marshal Zhukov proposed to refrain from suppressing the center of resistance in the Budapest barracks "Kilian" and in the cinema "Korvin", located in residential areas, called for political flexibility.

Figure 147

Officers of the 128th Guards Rifle Division in positions near Budapest. November 1956

Khrushchev offered to support the new Hungarian government, to help him in the provinces. He was supported by Kaganovich, Malenkov, Saburov. Voroshilov, Molotov and Bulganin had a different opinion.

As a result of this meeting, the "Declaration of the Government of the USSR on the Foundations of the Development and Further Strengthening of Friendship and Cooperation between the Soviet Union and Other Socialist Countries" was adopted. The Declaration stated: "As recent events have shown, it became necessary to make an appropriate statement about the position of the Soviet Union in relations between the USSR and other socialist countries, primarily in the economic and military fields." This Declaration was already broadcast on the radio on October 30, and the next day it was published in the press.

On the evening of October 30, the withdrawal of troops from the city began. In connection with the continued attacks on Soviet military personnel, the withdrawal of troops was carried out under the protection of tanks. They were "interspersed" in transport columns with guns deployed to the right and left. This kind of "herringbone" made it possible at any moment to suppress the machine-gun nest of the rebels. And they did not spare even the ambulances that took out the wounded from the Soviet hospital in Budapest. In one of them, a paramedic died and the soldiers he accompanied were wounded again.

Nevertheless, by the end of the day, all Soviet formations and units were withdrawn from the city and concentrated 15-20 kilometers from Budapest. The headquarters of the Special Corps deployed at the airfield in Tekel, at the base of one of its aviation units. In the areas of concentration of troops, they put equipment and weapons in order, stocked up on ammunition, fuel and food.

It would seem that political methods of getting out of the conflict arose.

However, by this moment the situation in Moscow had changed one hundred and eighty degrees. The documents known to date do not allow a definitive answer to the question of the reasons that forced N.S. Khrushchev sharply reconsider his views on the Hungarian events. Obviously there are several.

The main role, in our opinion, was played by external factors. The Suez crisis at the end of October (October 30-31, Israeli, British and French troops began military operations against Egypt) was perceived in the Kremlin as a symptom of the unacceptable weakening of Soviet influence in the world. This prompted the Soviet leadership to demonstrate military power in Hungary. If we withdraw from Hungary, it will cheer up the Americans, the British and the French. They will regard this as our weakness and will attack ..., N.S. Khrushchev. Moreover, the anti-Egyptian action of the three countries, which, by the way, was not supported by the United States and condemned by many Western, and not only left-wing, politicians, became the external background against which the Soviet action in Hungary could have aroused a more condescending attitude. In addition, the states of Eastern Europe were, following the results of the Second World War, a recognized zone of influence of the USSR and members of the Warsaw Pact Organization. Therefore, a direct confrontation there with the West seemed unlikely. The United States and NATO, considering the events in Hungary to be a purely internal affair of the Soviet bloc, did not make any serious efforts to put pressure on the USSR. According to the former Minister of Defense of Germany F.-I. Strauss, "there was no question of NATO military intervention." Moreover, the US government, using various diplomatic channels, managed to convey to the Kremlin its determination to maintain complete neutrality with regard to possible Soviet actions in Hungary. Yes, and the American President Eisenhower was busy with the election campaign.

No less significant, in our opinion, reasons lay in the unbalanced, impulsive nature of N.S. Khrushchev, as well as the struggle for power in the Central Committee of the CPSU that began after Stalin's death. Thus, the Yugoslav ambassador to the USSR V. Michunovich said that during a meeting with Tito, which took place incognito on November 2-3, 1956 on the island of Brioni, Khrushchev said that the USSR could not allow the restoration of capitalism in Hungary. This is due to the fact that in the Soviet Union there are quite a few people who would take it all in the following way: under Stalin, everyone was obedient and there were no unrest. And since these ... (here Khrushchev used a strong expression in relation to Soviet leaders) came to power, the collapse began, Hungary leaves ... And everything happens at the very moment when the Soviet leadership began a campaign to condemn Stalin.

According to Khrushchev, as V. Michunovich recalled, this would be the first to be spoken of in the Soviet army.

The course of events in Hungary also had a certain influence on the uncompromising position of the Soviet leaders: the intensified rampant terror and, in particular, the defeat of the Budapest city party committee, as a result of which the secretary of the city committee, Imre Meze, was mortally wounded and 24 Hungarian soldiers who defended him were brutally killed.

On November 1, Prime Minister Imre Nagy handed a note to Andropov demanding that he begin the withdrawal of Soviet troops. On the same day, at 4 pm, an emergency meeting of the Hungarian Council of Ministers was held, which unanimously adopted a resolution on the country's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and a Declaration of Hungary's neutrality. I. Nagy addressed the United Nations with a message in which he asked for the help of the four great powers to protect Hungarian neutrality. In the evening at 7:45 pm, Imre Nagy addressed the Hungarian people on the radio with a speech in which he announced the Declaration of Neutrality. He concluded his speech with the words:

“We call on our neighbors, both near and far, to respect the unchanging decision of the Hungarian people. There is no doubt that our people are as united in this decision as, perhaps, never before in their entire history.

Millions of Hungarian workers! Preserve and strengthen with revolutionary determination, selfless labor and the restoration of order a free, independent, democratic and neutral Hungary."

The appeal of I. Nagy was perceived by the rebels as a call to intensify the struggle. On November 3, a renewed Hungarian government was formed, in which the communists got only three minor ministerial portfolios.

The declaration of neutrality, the appeal to Western countries for help, and the deprivation of the Communists of power left no doubt in Moscow that it was literally about the loss of Hungary. This was already a blow to the entire socialist camp. Hungary's withdrawal from the eastern military alliance would mean the collapse of its entire defense system. And the reaction was immediate.

The leadership of the Soviet troops in Hungary was entrusted to the Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the States Parties to the Warsaw Pact, Marshal of the Soviet Union I. Konev. Preparations began for a military operation to restore order in the Hungarian People's Republic under the code name "Whirlwind".

Meanwhile, around Budapest, the rebels hastily created a defensive belt, reinforced by hundreds of anti-aircraft guns. Outposts with tanks and artillery appeared in the settlements adjacent to the city.

Figure 148

Soviet officers from the 33rd GMD who distinguished themselves during Operation Whirlwind. Hungary, November 1956 (AVL archive)

The most important objects were occupied by armed detachments, the streets were patrolled by military personnel and the National Guard. The number of personnel of the Hungarian units in Budapest reached 50 thousand people. In addition, more than 10 thousand people were part of the "national guard", armed groups and detachments. The rebels had about 100 tanks.

Meanwhile, negotiations on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary, begun on November 3, continued in the parliament building. The USSR delegation was headed by First Deputy Chief of the General Staff General of the Army M.S. Mlinin, Hungarian - General P. Maleter. The Soviet side conducted them formally, trying to gain time and misinform the Hungarian leadership.

The discussion of specific issues related to the withdrawal of units of the Soviet army, late in the evening of November 3, at the suggestion of the Soviet side, was transferred to the Soviet military base Tekel. Members of the Hungarian delegation took part here in a gala dinner arranged for them by Soviet military representatives. It was almost midnight when the reception was interrupted by the arrival of the head of the Soviet state security, General I.A. Serov. Accompanied by NKVD officers, he entered the hall and ordered the entire Hungarian delegation to be detained. The military leadership of the Nagy government was beheaded. The Minister of Defense, General Pal Meleter, the Chief of the General Staff, General Istvan Kovacs, the Chief of Operations, Colonel Miklos Syuch and Ferenc Erdei, were arrested.

At 5:15 am on November 4, on the waves of Szolnok radio (according to some information, the transmission was conducted from the Soviet city of Uzhgorod), an appeal was made by the new Revolutionary Workers 'and Peasants' Government, allegedly created in Szolnok, headed by J. Kadar. This communication was in the form of an open letter signed by Kadar and three other former members of Imre Nagy's government. They declared that on November 1 they withdrew from the government of Imre Nagy because the government was unable to deal with the "counter-revolutionary danger". To "suppress fascism and reaction" they formed the Hungarian Revolutionary Workers' and Peasants' Government.

At 6 o'clock in the morning, on the same waves, Kadar announced the new composition of the government. He argued that "the reactionary elements wanted to overthrow the socialist social system in Hungary and restore the rule of the landowners and capitalists." Kadar went on to say that the new government turned to the command of the Soviet troops to "help our people defeat the black forces of reaction and counter-revolution, restore the people's socialist system, restore order and tranquility in our country."

All political formalities were observed, and the Soviet troops began to carry out an operation to restore order in Budapest and other cities of Hungary. It should be noted here that the decision to provide "joint military assistance" to Hungary was supported by the highest political leadership of the Warsaw Pact countries. Nevertheless, the defeat of the forces of the armed opposition was completely entrusted to the Soviet troops.

In accordance with the plan of the operation, called "Whirlwind", the Soviet divisions had to solve the following tasks:

2nd Guards Mechanized Division to capture the north-eastern and central part of Budapest, capture the bridges across the Danube River, the parliament buildings, the Central Committee of the VPT, the Ministry of Defense, the Nyugati station, the police department and block the military camps of the Hungarian units, prevent the rebels from approaching Budapest by roads from the north and east.

33rd Guards Mechanized Division to capture the southeastern and central parts of Budapest, capture the bridges across the Danube River, the Central Telephone Exchange, the Korvin stronghold, the Keleti station, the Kossuth radio station, the Csepel plant, the arsenal, block the barracks of the Hungarian military units and to prevent the approach of the rebels to Budapest along the roads from the southeast.

128th Guards Rifle Division to capture the western part of Budapest (Buda), capture the Central Air Defense Command Post, Moscow Square, Gellert Hill and the fortress, block the barracks and prevent the rebels from approaching the city from the west.

Disarm the Hungarian units. At the same time, the disarmament of units that do not offer resistance should be carried out directly in military camps.

To capture the most important objects in all divisions, one was created - two special forward detachments as part of an infantry battalion, as well as 150 paratroopers of the 108th Guards. PDP on armored personnel carriers reinforced with 10-12 tanks. These detachments included senior officials of the KGB of the USSR K.E. Grebennik, P.I. Zyryanov, A.M. Korotkov and others. They were to capture the members of Imre Nagy's government and the leaders of the armed uprising.

In addition, to capture the bridges across the Danube River and other important objects in the regiments, detachments were formed as part of a rifle company, reinforced with tanks, guns and sapper units.

The heavy self-propelled tank regiment of the 11th mechanized division was attached to the 33rd mechanized division of General G.I. Obaturov, who had to perform the most difficult tasks.

In total, the operation to restore order in Hungary was attended by: formations of the Special Corps (2nd Nicholas Veko-Budapest Red Banner Order of Suvorov and 17th Yenakievo-Danube Red Banner Order of Suvorov Guards Mechanized Divisions, 177th and 195th Guards Aviation Divisions); 8th Mechanized Army (31st Panzer Vistula Red Banner Orders of Suvorov and Kutuzov, 11th Rivne Red Banner Orders of Suvorov and 32nd Berdichev Orders of Bohdan Khmelnitsky Guards Mechanized, 61st Anti-Aircraft Artillery Divisions); 38th Combined Arms Army (70th Glukhov Order of Lenin twice Red Banner Orders of Suvorov, Kutuzov, Bogdan Khmelnitsky and 128th Turkestan Red Banner Guards Rifles, 27th Cherkasy Order of Lenin Red Banner Orders of Suvorov, Kutuzov and Bogdan Khmelnitsky and 390th Guards Poltava orders of Lenin and twice Red Banner orders of Suvorov and Kutuzov mechanized, 60th anti-aircraft artillery division); Separate Mechanized Army (33rd Guards Kherson Red Banner Twice Orders of Suvorov Mechanized Division); 35th Guards Kharkiv Twice Red Banner Orders of Suvorov and Kutuzov Mechanized Division of the Odessa Military District; 7th and 31st Guards Airborne Divisions; 1st Guards Railway Brigade and other units. They were armed with more than 3,000 tanks.

Before the start of the operation, Order No. 1 of the Commander-in-Chief of the United Armed Forces was communicated to the entire personnel of the Soviet troops in Hungary.

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE JOINT ARMED FORCES

Comrade soldiers and sergeants, officers and generals! At the end of October, in fraternal Hungary, the forces of reaction and counter-revolution rose in revolt with the aim of destroying the people's democratic system, liquidating the revolutionary gains of the working people and restoring in it the old landowner-capitalist order.

Events have shown that the active participation in this adventure of the former Horthys leads to the revival of fascism in Hungary and creates a direct threat to our Fatherland and the entire socialist camp. It must not be forgotten that in the last war Horthy Hungary opposed our homeland together with Hitlerite Germany.

In accordance with the request of the government of the Hungarian People's Republic on the basis of the Warsaw Pact concluded between the countries of the socialist camp, obliging us to take "concerted measures necessary to strengthen their defense capability in order to protect the peaceful labor of their peoples, guarantee the inviolability of their borders and territories and ensure protection from possible aggression", the Soviet troops began to fulfill their allied obligations.

There is no doubt that the working class and working peasantry of the Hungarian People's Republic will support us in this just struggle.

The task of the Soviet troops is to render fraternal assistance to the Hungarian people in defending their socialist gains, in crushing the counter-revolution and eliminating the threat of the revival of fascism.

I ORDER:

To all the personnel of the Soviet troops, with full consciousness of their military duty, to show perseverance and firmness in the fulfillment of the tasks set by the command. To assist local authorities in their activities to restore public order and establish normal life in the country.

Hold high the honor and dignity of the Soviet soldier, strengthen fraternal friendship with the working people of Hungary, and respect their national traditions and customs.

I express my firm conviction that the soldiers, sergeants, officers and generals of the Soviet troops will honorably fulfill their military duty.

Commander-in-Chief of the United Armed Forces Marshal of the Soviet Union I. Konev

The text of the order is unusual and therefore requires some clarification. Its content does not meet the most elementary requirements for combat orders.

Documents of this kind reflect the conclusions from the assessment of the situation and the enemy, the concept of actions and combat missions for formations and units, indicate the lines of demarcation between the active forces, issues of interaction, ammunition consumption, the time of readiness of troops, and more. In order No. 1, these components are completely absent. What's the matter? Obviously, it is a purely propaganda document aimed mainly at the world community. The troops acted according to the rules prescribed by the combat regulations in accordance with another order of Marshal I.S. Konev. Its real content was brought to the attention of a narrow circle of people in the strictest confidence. This is also confirmed by archival documents - reports from commanders to higher authorities on the work done to fulfill the order of Marshal I.S. Konev No. 01.

Retired Lieutenant-General E. I. Malashenko told about how the operation "Whirlwind" went on:

"October 4 at 6 o'clock at the signal" Thunder ", which meant the beginning of the operation" Whirlwind ", the formed detachments to capture objects and the main forces of the three divisions of the Special Corps in columns along their routes rushed to the city simultaneously from different directions and, having overcome resistance on the outskirts of the Hungarian capital, by 7 o'clock on the move broke into Budapest.

The formations of the armies of Generals A. Babadzhanyan and Kh. Mamsurov began active operations to restore order and restore the authorities in Debrecen, Miskolc, Gyor and other cities.

The airborne units disarmed the Hungarian anti-aircraft batteries blocking the airfields of the Soviet aviation units in Veszprem and Tekel.

Imre Nagy, with part of his entourage, left the parliament, having previously announced on the radio that "the government is in its place," and took refuge in the Yugoslav embassy. General Bela Kiraly gave the order to conduct hostilities, moved his headquarters to Mount Janos, from where he tried to control the Hungarian units and armed detachments of the "national guard".

Parts of the 2nd Guards Division by 7 hours 30 minutes. captured the bridges across the Danube, the parliament, the buildings of the Central Committee of the party, the ministries of the interior and foreign affairs, the city council and the Nyugati station. In the parliament area, a security battalion was disarmed and three tanks were captured.

Colonel Lipinskiy's 37th Tank Regiment disarmed approximately 250 officers and "national guards" during the seizure of the building of the Ministry of Defense.

The 87th heavy self-propelled tank regiment captured the arsenal in the Fot area, and also disarmed the Hungarian tank regiment.

During the day of the battle, parts of the division disarmed up to 600 people, captured about 100 tanks, two artillery depots, 15 anti-aircraft guns and a large amount of small arms.

Parts of the 33rd Guards Mechanized Division, without meeting resistance at first, took possession of the artillery depot in Pestszentlerinc, three bridges across the Danube, and also disarmed units of the Hungarian rifle regiment, which had gone over to the side of the rebels.

The 108th Airborne Regiment of the 7th Guards Airborne Division disarmed five Hungarian anti-aircraft batteries, which blocked the airfield in Tekel, by surprise actions.

Figure 149

Soviet soldier killed on the street in Budapest. 1956

128th Guards Rifle Division Colonel N.A. Gorbunova, by the actions of forward detachments in the western part of the city, by 7 o’clock captured the Budaers airfield, capturing 22 aircraft, as well as the barracks of the communications school, and disarmed the mechanized regiment of the 7th mechanized division, which was trying to resist.

For the fastest defeat of the armed detachments in Budapest, on the instructions of Marshal I.S. Konev, the Special Corps additionally received two tank regiments (100 tp 31td and 128 tsp 66th guards division), the 80th and 381st airborne regiments of the 7th and 31st guards. airborne division, a rifle regiment, a mechanized regiment, an artillery regiment, as well as two divisions of a heavy mortar and jet brigades.

Most of these units were attached to reinforce the 33rd Mechanized and 128th Guards Rifle Divisions.

Particularly difficult operations in Budapest were the battles to capture the strongholds of the rebels in the center of the capital: the Corvin district, the University campus, Moscow Square and the Royal Fortress. To suppress these centers of resistance, significant forces of infantry, artillery and tanks were involved, incendiary shells, flamethrowers, smoke grenades and bombs were used. The attack on a strong resistance center in Korvin Lane, which began on November 5 at 15:00, was preceded by a massive artillery preparation, in which 11 artillery battalions took part, which included about 170 guns and mortars, as well as several dozen tanks. By evening, Colonel Litovtsev's 71st Guards Tank Regiment and Colonel Yanbakhtin's 104th Guards Mechanized Regiment captured the ruins of the former city block. During their assault, the crew of the tank "765" of the 71st Tank Regiment, 33rd Guards Motor Rifle Division under the command of Guards Senior Sergeant A.M. Balyasnikov. In the midst of the battle, his thirty-four at full speed broke into the enemy positions, in the area where the rebel headquarters was located. Despite the damage to the vehicle (shells hit the caterpillar and engine), the tank crew continued to fight, throwing hand grenades at the enemy and shooting from personal weapons. These minutes allowed the infantry to support the attack and soon capture the fortification. For courage and heroism shown during the battle, the commander of the guard tank, senior sergeant A.M. Balyasnikov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Ordinary members of the crew also received high awards: the gunner Latyshev and the loader Tokarev were awarded the Order of Glory III degree, the driver R. Guk was awarded the Order of the Red Star.

Figure 150

Destroyed Soviet self-propelled artillery mount ISU-152K from the 128th self-propelled tank regiment. Budapest, November 1956

The "Gold Star" medal was also awarded to the commander of a tank platoon, Lieutenant S.S. Tsik, who led the assault group. For battles in the Hungarian capital, he received his Order of Alexander Nevsky and the company commander of the 114th Guards Airborne Regiment of the 31st Guards Airborne Division (commander - General: Major P. Ryabov) Captain Sharip Migulov. This was the first and only award of such an order to officers after the end of the Great Patriotic War.

“In Budapest, I was wounded four times,” recalls Migulov, “the leg was shot through, a shrapnel in the head, in the shoulder and in the side. The company went forward. They missed the company. And I was in the rear guard. groans ... Around all the guys were killed, and I fell with a shot in my leg, but noticed that they were shooting from the fourth floor. Next to me, the grenade launcher lies lifeless. I reached for the grenade launcher, crawled behind a large tree. Shot. And about two floors collapsed on them. The fire has ceased from there ... ".

And there were many such heroic episodes. For example, the feat of Lieutenant F.I. Shipitsyn, described in the newspaper "Red Star" for 1957.

"... It was November 6, 1956, on Zsigmond Moritz Square in Budapest. A group of fascist rebels, led by the Horthy general Bela Kiraly, hiding in the basements and attics of buildings, fired on Hungarian workers and soldiers of the Hungarian People's Army, who decided to drive the rebels out of their Soviet soldiers took part in the battle along with the Hungarian patriots ... In the tanks, as escorts, there were Hungarian officers who knew the location of the city well. Major Hafiek Laszlo was in the car with Lieutenant Fyodor Shipitsyn. This crew included a driver, senior sergeant Gross, gunner sergeant Melin, charging private Ormankulov ...

The counter-revolutionaries managed to set fire to the tank... The Hungarian officer was wounded by a tracer bullet in the shoulder. His clothes were on fire. Such a situation was created that it was necessary to immediately leave the burning tank. But Laszlo had no strength. Lieutenant Shipitsyn and Private Ormankulov hurried to help the Hungarian friend. With the assistance of Sergeant Melin, they opened the hatch of the tank and helped Hafiek Laszlo to get out of the burning car. At this moment, the Hungarian comrade received several more wounds. Lieutenant Shipitsyn was also wounded. Private Ormankulov was struck to death by a machine-gun fire. Overcoming excruciating pain, Lieutenant Shipitsyn dragged the Hungarian officer to the ditch with water and extinguished the burning clothes on him. Then he picked up a seriously wounded Hungarian officer and wanted to shelter him in the nearest house. However, Shipitsyn was able to take only a few steps - he received new injuries, and his strength left him. Bleeding, the Soviet officer fell dead to the ground. Hafiek Laszlo was left alone. Having regained consciousness for a minute, having gathered the last of his strength, he crawled under the gates of the house and buried his face in the cold earth. So Laszlo lay until dawn the next day. On the morning of November 7, two Hungarian workers picked him up unconscious and sent him to a safe place ...

For courage and courage, Lieutenant Fedor Ivanovich Shipitsyn was posthumously awarded the Order of Lenin ... ".

Despite the stubborn resistance of the rebels, on November 7, parts of the division of General G.I. Obaturov captured the Kossuth radio station. In the pier area, units of the 2nd Guards Mechanized Division captured the boats of the Danube Flotilla. Regiments of the 128th Guards Rifle Division stormed the Royal Fortress and Horthy Palace on Castle Hill. More than 1,000 people were active in the area of ​​the fortress; during their capture, 350 machine guns, the same number of rifles, several mortars, a large number of pistols and grenades were seized. No less successfully operated in other cities and towns of Hungary and the troops of Generals A.Kh. Babajanyan and H.U. Mamsurova.

On the same day, the new leadership of Hungary, led by J. Kadar, was delivered to Budapest in a Soviet armored vehicle, accompanied by tanks.

Several pockets of resistance inside Budapest held out until November 8, and on the outskirts for several more days. On November 8, in the area of ​​the suburban working settlement of Chepel, where up to 700 people operated, armed with heavy machine guns, anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns, the rebels managed to shoot down a Soviet Il-28R reconnaissance aircraft from the 880th Guards Regiment of the 177th Guards Bomber Air Division. His entire crew died: squadron commander captain A. Bobrovsky, squadron navigator captain D. Karmishin, squadron communications chief senior lieutenant V. Yartsev. Each crew member was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. The fact that during the assault on Chepel, the Soviet troops lost only three tanks, is the undoubted merit of the heroic crew.

With the defeat of the armed detachments in Csepel and Buda, the fighting in Budapest was essentially completed.

By November 11, armed resistance was broken not only in the Hungarian capital, but throughout the country. The rest of the armed groups went underground. In order to eliminate groups that had taken refuge in the forests adjacent to Budapest, these areas were combed. The final liquidation of the remaining small groups and the maintenance of public order were carried out jointly with the created Hungarian officer regiments.

Following the results of the hostilities on December 18, 1956, by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, more than 10 thousand Soviet military personnel were awarded orders and medals, 26 people were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Of these, 14 posthumously: Captain AA. Bobrovsky, private Yu.V. Burmistrov, Senior Lieutenant P.G. Volokitin, Sergeant I.M. Goryachev, Senior Lieutenant G.M. Gromnitsky, Senior Lieutenant M.S. Zinukov, captain D.D. Karmishin, senior lieutenant M.P. Karpov, Colonel S.N. Kokhanovich, junior sergeant A.I. Kuzmin, captain G.P. Moiseenkov, captain N.V. Mura-lev, Sergeant A.D. Solovyov, Senior Lieutenant V. Yartsev.

The total losses of the Soviet troops during the hostilities in Hungary amounted to 706 people killed (75 officers and 631 soldiers and sergeants of military service), 1540 wounded, 51 people were missing. A large number of tanks, armored personnel carriers and other military equipment were destroyed and damaged. Only units of the 33rd Guards Mechanized Division lost 14 tanks and self-propelled guns, nine armored personnel carriers, 13 guns, four BM-13s, six anti-aircraft guns, 45 machine guns, 31 cars and five motorcycles in Budapest.

The losses of the Hungarian side were also significant. According to the official Budapest, from October 23, 1956 to January 1957, until separate armed skirmishes between the rebels and the Hungarian authorities and Soviet troops ceased, 2,502 Hungarians were killed and 19,226 people were injured. Other figures are given by the West German magazine "Stern" (1998. No. 9). According to him, during the Hungarian events, 2,700 local residents were killed, thousands were injured. The Soviet side lost 2170 people, including 669 killed. In the first months after the suppression of the uprising, more than 200 thousand people left Hungary (out of a total population of 10 million people), mainly young people of the most active and able-bodied age. As a result of subsequent trials (22 thousand cases), 400 people were sentenced to death and 20 thousand were interned. The fate of Imre Nagy was also tragic.

Figure 151

A soldier of the 128th Guards Rifle Division on a street in Budapest. November 1956

Even at the height of hostilities in Budapest, on November 4, he, with the ministers who remained loyal to him and members of their families, took refuge in the Yugoslav embassy. According to an agreement with the new government of Janos Kadar, everyone who wished to stay in Hungary was allowed to return home without hindrance, the rest could leave the country. Everyone was guaranteed immunity.

On the evening of November 22, Nagy and his associates agreed to leave the Yugoslav embassy. But Janos Kadar did not keep his word. When leaving the embassy, ​​the former Hungarian leaders were arrested by Soviet servicemen and taken to Romania a day later with the consent of his government. The entire action was agreed in advance with Moscow and Bucharest. Kadar claimed that the Yugoslavs were aware of the agreement, although they later protested why Nagy was taken to Romania.

At the end of March 1957 in Moscow, Kadar reached an agreement with the Soviet leadership that Nagy and his group could not escape responsibility. In April 1957, they were arrested in Romania, where they enjoyed the right of "temporary asylum", and secretly transferred to the Hungarian People's Republic. The investigation dragged on until the autumn of 1957. By this time, 74 more "active participants in the counter-revolutionary rebellion" had been detained in the "Nagya case." From among them, at the suggestion of the Soviet competent authorities, a "leading core of the conspirators" was singled out in the amount of 11 people. In June 1958, a closed trial took place. Imre Nagy and several of his associates, including Minister of Defense P. Maleter, well-known publicist M. Gimes and J. Siladi, received capital punishment by hanging. On June 16 at 5 o'clock in the morning the sentence was carried out. It should be noted that the Soviet leadership opposed the execution of I. Nagy. N. Khrushchev advised J. Kadar to conduct the case of the former Hungarian leader "in soft gloves" (put him in prison for 5-6 years, and then arrange a teacher at some agricultural institute in the province). Kadar didn't listen. According to some researchers, behind this lay "personal grievances" and Magyar stubbornness.

More than 50 years have passed since the October events in Hungary. In December 1991, the President of the USSR M.S. Gorbachev, in a speech on the occasion of the reception of Hungarian Prime Minister J. Antall, condemned the 1956 invasion. Nevertheless, to this day, the question remains, who was the main armed force of the "popular uprising", how did the Western media characterize the rebellion?

According to experts of various political views, the number of those who took part in the armed battles in Budapest was 15-20 thousand (with a total population of the capital - about 1.9 million people). Moreover, the "revolutionary vanguard" - workers and peasants, apparently occupied the smallest percentage in this series, although many "revolutionary committees" were called workers' and peasants'. Probably, individually, a significant number of workers nevertheless took a direct part in the demonstration and armed struggle. This is confirmed by the materials of the trials. However, what is significant, on October 23, work was not stopped at any factory, there were no strikes anywhere in support of the demonstration, and then an uprising, and armed centers were not organized at any factory. The same can be said about agricultural cooperatives and state farms.

In connection with the question raised, it is important to cite the observations of the Hungarian philosopher, Lieutenant Colonel, Dr. Jozsef Foriz. In the article “On the Counter-Revolution in Hungary in 1956,” he notes: “Armed centers were organized in such squares, in such public buildings, which from a military point of view were well defended and made it possible to conduct armed activities covertly and with impunity.” Competent and skillful actions of the rebels during the assaults and defense of various objects are noted by many eyewitnesses of the events. An analysis of the hostilities also suggests that their leaders had good professional military skills. And also in a number of cases, clearly special training - for the conduct of hostilities in urban conditions. Proof of this is the professional choice of positions for organizing firing points, the use of snipers and more.

Many sources mention the participation in the struggle of a large number of military personnel of the Hungarian People's Army and internal troops. On the radio even the facts of the transition to the side of the insurgent individual military units were transmitted. For example, Andras Hegedyush speaks about the transition to the side of the rebels of the personnel of the Military Academy named after Miklos Zrini in his autobiographical work. But J. Forizh refutes this information. In particular, he writes that on October 28, 1956, the Military Academy, with its full complement, went out to suppress the rebels in Corvin Kez, which was thwarted by the performance of Imre Nagy. A little later, on the basis of the personnel of the academy, the 2nd revolutionary regiment of internal troops was formed. “This,” as Forizh emphasizes, “meant to speak out for socialism.”

Laszlo Dyurko, a well-known Hungarian writer, in his book mentions only one such part - the construction, located in the Kilian barracks. In it, as he writes, "children of class alien families were called up, but not for armed service."

Former Chief of Staff of the Special Corps, Colonel E.I. Malashenko writes that an insignificant part of the Hungarian army went over to the side of the rebels. So, in Budapest, the rebels were supported and offered armed resistance by units of two mechanized and one rifle regiments, several construction battalions, and about ten anti-aircraft batteries. At the same time, most researchers note that, in general, the army did not take the side of the rebels and did not oppose the Soviet troops. Moreover, a significant number of Hungarian military personnel took part in the fight against armed insurgent groups and helped the Soviet troops.

Here, in our opinion, it is important to touch upon the issue of armed assistance from external forces, namely Western countries interested in destabilizing relations in the socialist bloc. First of all the USA. This assistance was not provided at the state level. An analysis of the documents of the National Security Council suggests that the swiftness of the Hungarian events caught American leaders by surprise. To provide military assistance to Hungary, the United States had to obtain the consent of its allies, but they were busy with the war in Egypt. Under these conditions, the US Security Council removed the issue of military assistance to Hungary from the agenda. Moreover, Austria would hardly risk its neutrality in order to allow military transport aircraft to pass through its airspace.

Nevertheless, it is known that during the Hungarian events in Austria, the "legend" of American intelligence, the former head of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), General William D. Donovan, was in charge of the "International Relief Committee" as the head of the "International Relief Committee". According to the Washington Daily News, in late November he returned to Washington from Hungary, the border of which, according to the newspaper, he repeatedly crossed during his stay in Austria. In Washington, Donovan told the press that "arming those still fighting" was the best opportunity to "help" the Hungarians. When asked if the United States should "facilitate the continuation of the fighting", Donovan replied: "Of course!" . With the beginning of the rebellion, Austria was visited by the then US Vice President R. Nixon. He also traveled to the Hungarian border and even spoke with the rebels. During the trial of I. Nagy and his associates in February and June 1958, the names of the British military attache, Colonel D. Cowley and a member of the West German parliament, Prince X. Von Lowenstein, were mentioned. The first of them was accused of direct participation in the leadership of the uprising, the second was called a link with the "big imperialist capitalists in West Germany."

To a greater extent, Western intelligence services were ready for the Hungarian events. Thanks to their direct assistance, active work was launched to form and prepare combat detachments and sabotage groups for being sent to Hungary. Moreover, it began long before the October events. Popular American journalist Drew Pearson reported interesting facts on November 8, 1956. As early as 1950, he heard from the Hungarian émigré Dr. Bela Fabian about "underground preparations" in Hungary, with which Fabian was closely associated.

“The Hungarian people want to revolt,” Fabian told Pearson. “Hungary wants to be the first to oppose its Soviet masters ... I know about the unrest among the peasants ... If you help a little, a fire will break out in Hungary.”

Pearson asked Fabian how the United States government could help.

"Nothing can be won in this life if you do not risk anything," Fabian replied. "Let them risk shedding a little blood!" .

Pearson's memoirs are consistent with the words of D. Angleton, who in 1956 was in charge of counterintelligence and subversive operations in the CIA. A conversation with him was published in The New York Times on the eve of the twentieth anniversary of the October events. Here is how the newspaper reported Angleton's story:

“By the mid-1950s, we had brought into line the task forces that had been created by order from above in 1950,” Angleton said, referring to the directive establishing the OPC (Office of Policy Coordination. – Auth.), the concept of which included the use of quasi-military task forces in order "to not in any way agree with the status quo of Soviet hegemony." Mr. Wisner, recommended by General J. Marshall (then US Secretary of Defense. – Auth.) to lead the subversion program, and Mr. Angleton "did extensive training" ... Eastern Europeans, partly members of pre-war peasant parties in Hungary, Poland; Romania and Czechoslovakia, were trained in secret CIA centers in West Germany under the guidance of CIA experts. Mr. Angleton added that these units were led by "a born leader from Yugoslavia, who at one time received military training in Austria-Hungary under the Habsburgs."

One of the "freedom fighters" training camps was located near Traunstein in Upper Bavaria. It is known that in October 1956 a group of Hungarian Germans arrived there, many of whom had previously served in the SS. They formed close-knit core groups of rebellious detachments, which were then transferred by planes to Austria, and from there, on ambulance planes and cars already to Hungary.

It should be noted that the basis of the Hungarian combat detachments were mainly the Horthys who fled to the west in 1945.

The former OSS officer, and since 1950 the CIA officer William Colby, also mentions special CIA detachments trained to participate in hostilities in socialist countries, including Hungary. In his memoir, My Life in the CIA, he writes:

“Since the creation of the CMO under the leadership of Frank Wiesner, the CIA has had, or thought it had, the task of providing OSS-style military support to resistance groups seeking to overthrow totalitarian communist regimes. In Hungary, we called such groups freedom fighters ... As soon as the uprising in Hungary, Wiesner and the top leadership of the plans department (as the CIA was called since 1952, merged with other divisions of the CIA. - Auth.), especially those who were involved in subversive work, were fully prepared for action - to come to the aid of the freedom fighters with weapons, communications and air transport. This is exactly what the CIA's quasi-military units were designed to do."

Thanks to the support of Western intelligence services, underground paramilitary groups were also created in Hungary itself. Such as "White Partisans", "National Resistance Movement", "Association of Junkers", youth organization "Lux" and others. By the mid-1950s, their activities had intensified sharply. In 1956 alone, 45 underground organizations were uncovered by security agencies, a number of agents of West German intelligence and the US CIA were detained.

Emigrant organizations, in particular the Hungarian Bureau (Austria), Caritas (Austria) and the Legion of Hungarian Freedom (Canada), were also actively involved in the formation of combat detachments to be sent to Hungary. The latter, according to the newspaper "Neyes Deutschland" on October 31, planned the transfer of three thousand volunteers - former officers and soldiers of the Horthy army.

Emigrant recruiting centers supported by Western intelligence agencies operated in Salzburg, Kematen, Hungerburg and Reichenau. In Munich, on Lockerstrasse, there was a recruiting office headed by a captain in the American army. From here, former Nazi supporters were heading to the scene. On October 27, one of the groups (about 30 people) was transferred to Hungary with the help of border neutral Austria. More than 500 "volunteers" were transferred from England. From the French Fontainebleau, where the headquarters of NATO was then located, several dozen groups were sent.

In total, according to some reports, during the period of active armed resistance, more than 20 thousand emigrants were thrown into the country with the help of Western intelligence services. About 11 thousand people who were part of the "expeditionary corps" were waiting for an order to speak near the Hungarian border. And the border restaurant in Nikkelsdorf (Austro-Hungarian border), as Osterreichische Volksstimme wrote, was "like a staging post where people from West Germany arrived, speaking Hungarian and dressed in American uniforms ... each of them had camping equipment" .

Other national anti-communist organizations of the world, including Russians, did not remain indifferent to the events in Hungary. The author does not have any facts about the participation of Russian emigrants in hostilities on the side of the rebels. Nevertheless, there is information about a sabotage group of about 200 people, which was planned to be sent to Hungary from the territory of Austria. The saboteurs were led by a member of the NTS since 1942, Nikolai Rutchenko. Information about this group was given in the documentary "The Hungarian Trap", shown on November 9, 2006 on the Rossiya TV channel.

More is known about the activities of representatives of Russian organizations in the field of propaganda. NTS and RNO were especially active in this direction. Here is a sample of one of the RNO's appeals to Soviet soldiers and officers, broadcast over the radio.

"RUSSIAN SOLDIERS.

Like a terrible spider, the Soviet Union keeps in its web the countries of the so-called Eastern bloc. Many of you have visited and seen there the remnants of those freedoms and prosperity that were created before the war under the conditions of a democratic regime, which our Motherland has been deprived of for almost forty years.

The Soviet government, with the help of its agents, enslaved these states, deprived their peoples of any rights whatsoever, and introduced a communist regime of terror and lawlessness into them.

The first outbreak of popular anger was the Poznan uprising of Polish workers. At a recent trial, it was definitely revealed that the Poles were fighting for bread and freedom. The cruel and inhuman actions of the communist police, with their provocation, lack of legality and mockery of the population, were also revealed.

Then genuine popular indignation broke out in Poland. Soviet troops were moved to Poland, but at the last moment the collective leadership gave in, and the regime of freedom began to be restored in Poland.

Poland was immediately followed by Hungary. Driven to despair by poverty and lack of rights, the Hungarian people rose up and overthrew the despicable and corrupt communist government. AND THE MOST TERRIBLE HAPPENED IN HUNGARY. By order of the collective leadership, the Soviet troops were sent to suppress the PEOPLE'S UPRISING. Soviet aircraft began to bombard Hungarian cities, Soviet tanks shoot Hungarian freedom fighters.

We know of gratifying cases when Russian officers and soldiers refused to fire on the Hungarians. Moreover, in certain cases they helped the rebels, expressed their sympathy to the Hungarian patriots and fraternized with them. But the general impression for the entire free world is terrible: on the orders of the Soviet government, which falsely and hypocritically declares itself to be the defender of the working people, Russian soldiers found themselves in the role of suppressors of the popular uprising.

RUSSIAN SOLDIERS.

Tomorrow other countries enslaved by communism will follow the example of Poland and Hungary. You will be sent to put down popular uprisings in Romania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia. Fulfilling the order of despotic power, you will shoot at crowds of people just because they want freedom.

The Russian soldier, a centuries-old synonym for heroism, sacrifice and humanity, will become in the eyes of other peoples the executioner of freedom. This will affect the future relations of the countries liberated from the communist yoke with the coming free Russia.

RUSSIAN SOLDIERS.

Do not follow the inhuman and illegal orders of the communist government, which has been holding our people in terrible slavery for 39 years.

Help the rebellious peoples who are fighting for their and YOUR freedom.

Show these peoples all the generosity that the RUSSIAN is capable of.

Turn your bayonets, machine guns and tanks against the communist tyrants who hold our people and other peoples in terrible slavery and dishonor the name of our motherland.

RUSSIAN GENERALS AND OFFICERS. Set an example for your soldiers. The fate of Russia and its people is in your hands. Overthrow the communist regime. Create a people's government, responsible to the people and caring only for the interests of our Fatherland.

Down with the dishonest, slave-owning, communist regime.

LONG LIVE FREE RUSSIA.

LONG LIVE THE UNION AND FRIENDSHIP OF FREE RUSSIA WITH OTHER FREE PEOPLES".

A special role in the events in Hungary in October-November 1956 was played by the Western services of "psychological warfare". First of all, the radio stations "Voice of America" ​​and "Free Europe". The latter, as G. A. Kissinger noted in his book Diplomacy, was under the special patronage of John F. Dulles. These radio stations not only called for open action against the ruling regime, promising support for NATO countries, but were actually the coordinating body of the uprising. Moreover, even the Western mass media were forced to admit that many radio broadcasts of "Free Europe" grossly distort the real state of affairs. "Radio Free Europe," said an article in the American magazine "News Week," "specialized in putting the communist order in the worst possible light."

Hungarian programs were compiled with the most active participation of Hungarian emigrants, most of whom collaborated with the Germans during the Second World War. For example, the Free Europe radio broadcasts specially organized for Hungary under the title "Voice of a Free Hungary" were opened on October 6, 1951 by Count D. Dageffy, a participant in the anti-republican conspiracy in Hungary. The former Horthy diplomat A. Gellert participated in the radio broadcasts. One of the leading commentators on Radio Free Europe's Hungarian section was former Horthy army captain J. Borsany, who spoke under the pseudonym "Colonel Bell."

At the end of October 1956, a secret meeting of representatives of American intelligence and leaders of Hungarian émigré organizations took place in Munich. At this meeting, the question of how the propaganda of "Free Europe" should contribute to the unfolding of the "revolutionary situation" in Hungary was considered. A "two-stage" tactic was adopted: the first was the defeat of the state security organs, the prohibition of the Communist Party, the declaration of "neutrality", economic and later military accession to the Western bloc; the second is the overthrow of the socialist system, the bourgeois revolution. From that moment on, Radio Free Europe became, in essence, the governing body and organizer of the rebellions. Having switched to round-the-clock broadcasting, she began to broadcast, along with general propaganda statements, specific combat instructions. Advice was given to illegal radio stations on what wavelength and how to broadcast. Those who did not surrender their weapons were urged to continue the resistance. For example, when Imre Nagy's government issued a call for a ceasefire, Free Europe immediately urged its listeners to disrupt the truce. The already mentioned military expert and Free Europe commentator "Colonel Bell" believed that the ceasefire was "as dangerous as a Trojan horse."

"Imre Nagy and his friends," he said on October 29, "want insidiously, in a modern way, to repeat the story of the Trojan horse. A ceasefire, like a Trojan horse, is necessary so that the Budapest government, which is still at the moment in power, could hold its positions as long as possible ... Those who fight for freedom must not for a moment forget about the plan of the government opposing them, otherwise the tragedy with the Trojan horse will be repeated.

As is known, it was under the active influence of the propaganda of Radio Free Europe and as a result of the intervention of some Western missions that the truce was indeed disrupted. The next day, just a few hours after the above radio broadcast, an attack began on the city committee of the party on Republic Square and other organizations, as well as mass attacks on the communists, which resulted in numerous casualties.

On October 31, "Colonel Bell" demanded that the portfolio of the Minister of Defense be transferred to the "freedom fighters", and soon, on November 3, this post was taken by Colonel Pal Maleter. On the same day, Radio Free Europe issued new instructions: "Let them liquidate the Warsaw Pact and declare that Hungary is no longer a party to the agreement." The next day, November 1, Imre Nagy announced his withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact. And there are many such examples.

The leading role of "Free Europe" in fomenting the armed conflict in Hungary was recognized even by representatives of the Western press. Here, for example, is how the Parisian correspondent of the newspaper "France Soir" Michel Gorde, who was in Hungary during the uprising, described the transmissions of this radio station. “We could listen to foreign radio broadcasts, which were our only source of information from the outside world. We heard many false reports about what was happening in Hungary.

We listened to broadcasts from Radio Free Europe in Munich intended for the satellite countries. Her impatient tone and excited calls for rebellion, no doubt, did a lot of harm.

Over the past few days, many Hungarians have told us that these broadcasts have led to great bloodshed. " A correspondent of another French publication, the weekly Expresse, wrote the following about his Budapest impressions: "Everywhere in Budapest I met Hungarians of the most diverse social status, who bitterly and even spoke with hatred about the Americans, about Radio Free Europe, about balloons being sent in with propaganda leaflets." And one more piece of evidence. The West German newspaper "Freies Wort" wrote: "We are convinced that, above all, the aggressive propaganda of the Free Europe transmitter" largely responsible for the bloodshed in Hungary... Propaganda, which is ultimately paid for with the blood of misguided people, is a crime against humanity."

Speaking of the "psychological warfare" launched by Western propaganda services, it is important to touch on two mythological plots that have become widespread on the pages of many "free" media. Echoes of these stories are heard to this day.

First myth. According to the Western media, during the Hungarian events, a large number of Soviet military personnel went over to the side of the rebels. Thus, in particular, in the Parisian emigrant magazine Vozrozhdenie, it was noted that already in the first days, among the wounded rebels who were evacuated to Austria, there were many Russian officers and soldiers. All in all, according to Pastor, a member of the Budapest Revolutionary Committee, "3,000 Russians with 60 tanks went over to the side of the "revolution." The same figures are given in some other émigré publications. At the same time, A.N. Pestov, a Russian White émigré, writing about his stay in Hungary in the pages of the authoritative émigré magazine Chasovoy, writes that the rumors about large armed detachments that supposedly went to the mountains were "extremely exaggerated." Although he mentions "one Soviet unit that joined the Hungarian detachment." True, and this is not true. In any case, there is no data on the transition of any groups of Soviet military personnel to the rebels. Only about five cases of escape to Austria are known. The Soviet servicemen who went over to the side of the Hungarian rebels did not "surface" on the pages of propaganda publications in subsequent years either.

Nevertheless, even special committees were organized to help "Russian heroes who joined the Hungarians in their struggle for freedom." The collection of donations was initiated by a number of Russian emigrant organizations, including the Tolstov Foundation, the Union of Russian Corps Officials, and the Russian National Association (RNO).

"Russian people!

According to the latest information received, many officers and soldiers of the Soviet army went over to the side of the Hungarian freedom fighters and fought in their ranks. Russian soldiers have already arrived in Austria.

Seven Russian organizations have already applied with a special memorandum to the International Red Cross, drawing its attention to the exceptionally difficult legal situation of the Russians who rebelled against the usurper Soviet power, and demanding that the legitimate norms of international law be applied to them.

But at the same time, urgent sanitary and material assistance is needed. Germany is already organizing the dispatch of sanitary and food aid to Hungary. A special Russian Relief Committee was formed in Munich.

We appeal to all Russian people in Belgium with a request for urgent assistance in cash contributions in favor of Russian officers and soldiers who raised the banner of struggle against communism in Hungary.

Each, the most insignificant contribution will be accepted with gratitude.

All the sums collected will be urgently sent to the disposal of the Russian Committee in Munich, in whose hands this assistance will be centralized.

Please send all contributions to the SSR - 60.039 to the address: de I "Union Nationule Russe, 4, rue Paul-Emile Janson, Bruxelles, or collect them according to subscription lists, transferring them to the Office of the Russian National Association" .

According to the magazine Nashi Vesti, over the course of ten days alone, more than 200 Russian émigré families in Corinthia and Styria donated about 13,000 shillings to the needs of the new refugees.

True, where the funds collected by Russian emigrants went "for the thousands of compatriots who left the" communist paradise ", the author could not find on the pages of the same emigrant newspapers and magazines.

The second myth is connected with alleged "atrocities of the Soviet soldiers". These "facts" were devoted to many pages of the Western media of those years. According to an eyewitness of the events, a Russian white émigré A. Pestov, who can hardly be suspected of sympathy for the Soviet Union, this is not true. In the essay "I was in Hungary" he notes the strict discipline in the Soviet units, which are under the complete control of their commanders. A former officer of the Volunteer Army describes his impressions of Soviet soldiers as follows:

“When I looked at these Russian guys and saw them every day and in the most diverse situations, I did not find in them those “Bolsheviks” who were drawn to me and are drawn to thousands of my comrades-in-arms abroad. We imagine an unbridled robber, with a whirlwind of hair, with with brutal eyes and an evil grimace, such as we remember the "Bolsheviks" in the civil war. Now these are the same Russian guys with shaved heads, with kind faces, with a desire to joke and laugh, like the soldiers of that company, which I, a young ensign, first led to battle in the August forests at the beginning of the war. My guys shed their blood for the Faith, the Tsar and the Fatherland. And they shed selflessly. These, too, perhaps a few of the "armed peoples" of the civilized world, will go into battle, even without a supply of crackers, without any canned chickens, without field cinemas and lupanars, and without artillery preparation sweeping away everything and everyone in front of them.

In addition, he notes the "truly human attitude" on the part of Soviet military personnel to local residents, especially women and children. And not only in the first days, but also after the suppression of the rebellion. Despite the often emphasized hostility towards the soldiers of the population of Budapest, A. Pestov claims that there was neither a thirst for revenge, nor reprisals, he emphasizes the respect of the Soviet military personnel for the church and the execution of orders so that the population suffers the least.

In conclusion, the essay should be said about the consequences of the Hungarian events. They influenced not only the aggravation of relations with Western countries, but also caused a negative reaction in some states of the socialist bloc. Thus, one of the professors of the University in the city of Brno, in an article published in the newspaper Literaturny Novyny, noted:

“Our youth is also infected with the “Hungarian disease”. We have young people before us and do not really know who we have in front of us. seminar…"

Some leaders of countries "friendly" to the USSR also condemned the Soviet policy in Hungary. The prime ministers of India, Burma, Ceylon and Indonesia, in a joint declaration adopted on November 14, condemned the armed solution to the political crisis in Hungary. In their declaration, they wrote that "the Soviet armed forces must be withdrawn from Hungary as soon as possible" and that "the Hungarian people must be given complete freedom in deciding their future and the form of government."

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Hungarian uprising of 1956(October 23 - November 9, 1956) (in the post-communist period of Hungary it is known as Hungarian Revolution of 1956, in Soviet sources as Hungarian counter-revolutionary rebellion of 1956) - an armed uprising against the pro-Soviet regime of the people's republic in Hungary in October - November 1956, suppressed by Soviet troops.

The Hungarian uprising became one of the important events of the Cold War period, demonstrating that the USSR was ready to keep the communist regimes in the Warsaw Pact countries by military force.

November 4, 1945 in Hungary were held. On them, 57% of the votes were received by the Independent Party of Smallholders and only 17% by the Communists. In 1947, the communist HTP (Hungarian Workers' Party) took first place in the elections with 22% of the vote, and in 1949 it already became the only legal political force by holding uncontested elections. The occupying Soviet troops became the force on which the Hungarian communists relied in their struggle against opponents. So, on February 25, 1947, the Soviet command arrested a popular member of parliament, after which he was taken to the USSR and convicted of espionage.

The leader of the HTP and chairman of the government Matthias Rakosi, nicknamed "Stalin's best student", established a personal dictatorship, copying the Stalinist model of government in the USSR: he carried out forced industrialization and collectivization, suppressed any dissent, fought the Catholic Church. The State Security Administration (AVH), headed by Gabor Peter in 1948-1952, consisted of 28 thousand people in the state. They were assisted by 40,000 informants. On a million inhabitants of Hungary, ABH opened a dossier - more than 10% of the total population, including the elderly and children. Of these, 650,000 were persecuted. About 400 thousand Hungarians received various terms of imprisonment or camps, working them out mainly in mines and quarries.

The economic situation in the country was further complicated by the fact that Hungary, as an ally of Germany in World War II, was obliged to pay reparations to the USSR, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia for several years, sometimes reaching a quarter of the national product. In 1952, the real wages of workers and employees were 20% lower, and the incomes of the peasants, one-third lower than in 1949. In 1953, the measures taken by the government brought noticeable relief, but only for a short time. The failure of industrialization plans and changes in the USSR after Stalin's death (in Moscow they decided that Rakosi was too fanatical, that he did not contribute to the popularity of the new Hungarian authorities) led to the fact that Mathias Rakosi was criticized at the plenum of the Central leadership of the VPT on June 27-28, 1953 and was replaced as head of government by another Hungarian communist, Imre Nagy. The post of general secretary was replaced by the post of first secretary of the VPT, which was retained by Rakosi. Serious positions in the party were taken by the new head of government Imre Nagy and his supporters. An amnesty was carried out, internment was stopped and eviction from cities was prohibited on social grounds. Imre Nagy stopped the construction of many large industrial facilities. Investments were directed to the development of light and food industries, the pressure on agriculture was eased, food prices and tariffs for the population were reduced.

As head of government, this Hungarian politician carried out a number of measures aimed at improving the life of the people (taxes were reduced, salaries were increased, principles of land use were liberalized), and he stopped political repressions. This made him popular among ordinary Hungarians. The curtailment of industrialization and cooperation in agriculture caused sharp criticism from Rakosi and his followers. In addition, the removal in the USSR of the head of government G. M. Malenkov, who advocated the priority development of light industry, weakened Nagy's position. In the end, Mathias Rakosi, using the usual means of behind-the-scenes struggle, managed to defeat a rival whom a considerable part of the working people already considered the symbol of the new policy, the guarantor of a better life. As a result, on April 18, 1955, Imre Nagy was removed from the post of prime minister and expelled from the HTP.

In May 1955, a peace treaty was signed between the USSR and Austria, according to which the Soviet troops, who were in Austria as part of the Central Group of Forces, would be withdrawn to the territory of the USSR during the summer. On May 14, 1955, the socialist countries signed the Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, which extended the stay of Soviet troops in Hungary.

The dismissal of Rakosi, as well as the Poznań uprising of 1956, which caused great resonance in Poland, led to an increase in critical sentiment among students and the writing intelligentsia. From the middle of the year, the "Petőfi Circle" began to operate actively, in which the most pressing problems facing Hungary were discussed. Student activists demanded, in particular, open public trials of the organizers of the repressions, primarily the former Defense Minister Mihai Farkas and his son, lieutenant colonel of the Hungarian state security Vladimir Farkas (both were arrested in October 1956).

On October 16, 1956, part of the students of the University of Szeged organizedly left the pro-communist “Democratic Youth Union” (the Hungarian analogue of the Komsomol) and revived the “Union of students of Hungarian universities and academies”, which existed after the war and dispersed by the government. Within a few days, branches of the Union appeared in Pec, Miskolc and other cities.

On October 22, this movement was joined by students from the Budapest Technical University (at that time the Budapest University of the Construction Industry), who formulated a list of 16 demands on the authorities (immediate convening of an extraordinary party congress, appointment of Imre Nagy as prime minister, withdrawal of Soviet troops from the country, demolition monument to Stalin, etc.) and planned for October 23 a protest march from the monument to Bem (Polish general, hero of the Hungarian revolution of 1848) to the monument to Petőfi.

At noon, when the demonstration was already being prepared, the 42-year-old Soviet Ambassador to Hungary, Yuri Andropov, sent his last telegram on the eve of the events to the Foreign Ministry, in which he wrote that “the opposition and the reaction ... are actively preparing to ‘transfer the struggle to the streets’.” Based on the conversations of Soviet diplomats and advisers with a number of party functionaries that took place in the previous days, the ambassador noted: “In all these statements, the confusion of the Hungarian comrades is visible and, it seems to us, a certain loss of confidence that it is still possible to get out of the difficulties that have arisen. It seems to us that in the current situation, the Hungarian comrades are unlikely to be able to begin to act boldly and decisively without help in this matter. Andropov's telegram was received in Moscow at 12:30, transcribed and sent to members and candidate members of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

At 3 p.m. a demonstration began in Budapest, in which 200,000 people took part. At 20 o'clock on the radio, the first secretary of the Central Committee of the VPT, Ernö Görö, delivered a speech sharply condemning the demonstrators.

In response, a large group of demonstrators stormed into the Dom radio broadcasting studio demanding that the demonstrators' program demands be broadcast. This attempt led to a clash with the Hungarian state security units defending the Radio House, during which, after 21 hours, the first dead and wounded appeared. The insurgents received or confiscated weapons from reinforcements sent to help protect the radio, as well as from civil defense depots and captured police stations. A group of insurgents entered the territory of the Kilian barracks, where three construction battalions were located, and seized their weapons. Many construction battalions joined the rebels. Historian Laszlo Kontler writes that the rebels enjoyed almost popular support.

The rebels were opposed by parts of the state security and armies [ ] . Even with the beginning of armed uprisings, parts of the Budapest garrison were ordered to occupy the most important objects in the city. But there were few troops in the city. So, in a report addressed to the Minister of Defense of the USSR, Marshal Zhukov, it was reported that the total number of troops involved was only about 2,500 people. At the same time, the Hungarian government did not give permission to open fire, so the units and subunits came out without ammunition. As a result, they were unable to resist. Some units were disarmed by the rebels, who by the evening seized the editorial office and printing house of the central party newspaper, the weapons depot and cartridge factory, the Western Station and threatened to seize the buildings of the Central Committee of the VPT, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Railways.

The fierce fighting in and around the Radio House continued throughout the night. The head of the Budapest Police Headquarters, Lieutenant Colonel Sandor Kopachi, ordered not to shoot at the rebels, not to interfere in their actions. He unconditionally complied with the demands of the crowd gathered in front of the office for the release of prisoners and the removal of red stars from the facade of the building.

At 23:00, on the basis of the decision of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR Marshal V. D. Sokolovsky ordered the commander of the Special Corps to begin advancing to Budapest to assist the Hungarian troops "in restoring order and creating conditions for peaceful creative labor." Formations and units of the Special Corps arrived in Budapest by 6 o'clock in the morning and entered into battle with the rebels.

On the night of October 23, 1956, the leadership of the Hungarian Workers' Party decided to appoint Prime Minister Imre Nagy, who already held this post in 1953-1955, was distinguished by reformist views, for which he was repressed, but shortly before the uprising was rehabilitated.

On the night of October 23, the first secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Erno Geryo, in a telephone conversation, made a request for the introduction of Soviet troops into Hungary. A few hours later, on October 24, former Prime Minister Andras Hegedus, in writing on behalf of the Hungarian government, made an official request to the USSR for the introduction of Soviet troops.

Imre Nagy's address on the radio on October 25 to the people: "It is absolutely necessary to immediately stop the struggle, restore order and tranquility and continue production."

On the night of October 24, about 6,000 servicemen of the Soviet army, 290 tanks, 120 armored personnel carriers, 156 guns were brought into Budapest. Part of the Hungarian military and police went over to the side of the rebels.

All over Budapest, receivers appeared in open windows - at 12:10, without warning, the Prime Minister spoke: “This is Imre Nagy, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Hungarian People's Republic. Citizens of Budapest! I inform you that all those who, in order to avoid further bloodshed, stop fighting and lay down their arms today before 14:00, will not be brought to an emergency court.” Calling on the population to calm, the Prime Minister continued: “The first and foremost task now is to urgently normalize the situation. After that, we will discuss all the issues with you. After all, the government and the majority of the Hungarian people want the same thing. Counting on a high sense of responsibility for the fate of the nation common to all, I call on you, all Hungarians and Hungarians - youth, workers, peasants, intellectuals - to remain courageous and calm, to resist provocations, to provide assistance and support to law enforcement agencies. In conclusion, Imre Nagy said: “Rally ranks around the party and the government! Believe that, having got rid of the mistakes of the past, we will find the right path to the prosperity of our country.”

Members of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU A. I. Mikoyan and M. A. Suslov, chairman of the KGB I. A. Serov, and Deputy Chief of the General Staff General of the Army M. S. Malinin arrived in Budapest. During the uprising, the MHBC and other exile organizations worked closely with Western intelligence services to send arms and armed groups into Hungary. On October 24, 1956, an emergency meeting of the executive committee of the "Hungarian National Committee" adopted an appeal to the President of the United States calling for assistance to the "Hungarian revolution." [ ] [ ] .

Destroyed heavy Soviet tank IS-3 near the Budapest cinema "Korvin", 1956

Lieutenant General E. I. Malashenko recalls this incident like this:

Many approached the tanks stationed here, climbed on them and stuck banners into the gun barrels.

From the attics of buildings located on the square opposite the parliament, fire was opened on demonstrators and Soviet soldiers. Two Hungarian tanks escorting the demonstrators fired several shots and disappeared. The commander of one of our units was killed.

Soviet soldiers and state security officers guarding the parliament returned fire on the roofs of the buildings from which they fired. There was a panic in Lajos Kossuth Square. People with the first shots began to scatter in search of shelter. When the firefight subsided, many hurried to leave the square.

Information about this massacre hardened people: murders of state security officers began in the country - with torture and lynching [Note. one] .

On October 26, 1956, the Hungarian government announced an amnesty to all participants in anti-government protests who lay down their arms before 22:00, but the rebels rejected this offer.

The clashes continued throughout the day. On October 26, the UGB, referring to Article 34 of the UN Charter, sent a request to US Secretary of State Dulles that the US government urgently intervene in the Hungarian events. A similar request for UN intervention was sent to its Secretary General.

Communist authors Hollosh and Laitai have argued that since 25 October weapons have been heavily imported into Hungary, with Red Cross shipments being used for the delivery. In particular, they write that on October 26 such a cargo arrived from the territory of Austria, which partially contained weapons and ammunition. On the same day, officers of the Szombathely police department found two cases of German battle rifles and a case of ammunition for them in a truck with Red Cross markings. [ ]

On the morning of October 28, an assault was planned by Soviet troops together with units of the 5th and 6th Hungarian mechanized regiments of the center of the capital. However, just before the start of the assault, the Hungarian units received an order from their command not to participate in hostilities. This was explained by the fact that the rebels were allegedly ready to lay down their arms.

Indeed, Imre Nagy negotiated with the leaders of the armed detachments Laszlo Ivan Kovacs, Gergely Pongratz and others and accepted their demands. After that, he telephoned the Ministry of Defense and warned that if the Corvina cinema, where the center of the uprising was located, was stormed, he would resign. As a result, the capture operation was thwarted. From that moment on, units of the VNA, at the request of the government of I. Nagy, did not show resistance to the rebels, they did not receive orders to conduct actions against the rebels.

A Revolutionary Military Council was created in Budapest, consisting of Major General B. Kiraly, L. Kahn, I. Kovacs, Colonel P. Maleter and others. Imre Nagy spoke on the radio, during his speech he called the events in Hungary a "revolution" and declared that "the government condemns the views according to which the current popular movement is regarded as a counter-revolution." The government announced a ceasefire, the dissolution of the Hungarian People's Army and the creation of new armed forces, the termination of the HTP, as well as the start of negotiations with the USSR on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary.

I. Nagy's statement of October 28 was a turning point in the development of the October events. The party activist, who defended public buildings, ministries and district committees, received an order from the Hungarian government to immediately surrender all available weapons. The most disciplined communists carried it out, and later many of them paid for it with their lives, being killed by the rebels and not having weapons for self-defense.

The main thing is to decide in Hungary. Anti-Soviet sentiments are widespread. Withdraw troops from Budapest, if necessary - withdraw from Hungary. For us in the military-political sense - a lesson.

Under these conditions, it was decided to withdraw all Soviet units from Budapest. By order of October 30, Soviet servicemen were forbidden to return fire, "succumb to provocations" and go beyond the location of the unit.

In the morning, all Soviet troops were taken to their places of deployment. The streets of Hungarian cities were left with little or no power.

Some prisons associated with the repressive Hungarian state security were taken over by the rebels. The guards offered practically no resistance and partly fled.

Political prisoners and criminals who were there were released from prisons, including those convicted of crimes during the war years. By November 4, about 13,000 of them had been released from prisons and colonies, including 10,000 criminals. On the ground, trade unions began to create workers' and local councils, not subordinate to the authorities and not controlled by the Communist Party.

The uprising, having achieved some temporary success, quickly became radicalized - there were murders of communists, employees of the Hungarian state security and the Hungarian Ministry of Internal Affairs, shelling of Soviet military camps. Bela Kiraly's guards and Dudash's squads killed members of the VPT, AVH employees, and Hungarian military who refused to obey them. In total, 37 people died as a result of lynching.

However, correspondents from foreign publications (Mond, The Times, Welt, etc.) wrote about 20 members of the Budapest city committee of the HWP and about 100 killed AVH workers.

The insurgents captured the Budapest city committee of the VPT, and over 20 communists were hanged by the mob. Photos of hanged Communists with signs of torture, with faces disfigured by acid, went around the world. This massacre was, however, condemned by representatives of the political forces of Hungary [ what?] .

On October 30, the government of Imre Nagy decided to restore a multi-party system in Hungary and create a coalition government from representatives of the HTP, the Independent Party of Smallholders, as well as the re-established National Peasant Party (Petőfi Party) and the Social Democratic Party. Free elections were announced to be held. The Presidium of the Central Leadership of the HTP decided to dissolve the Hungarian Labor Party. The primate of Hungary, Cardinal Jozsef Mindszenty, was released from arrest.

The will of the people, the national revolution won! This will was expressed in the heroic struggle of young people, writers, hundreds of thousands of workers, peasants, and the whole country. This will could not be broken neither by violence - in whatever forms it may manifest itself, nor by resistance. Deeply shocked, I stand in front of the microphone. I did not write my speech in advance, so perhaps not everything will be said in a coherent way, but with love and joy that overwhelms my heart, I greet our dear Hungarian youth, with whose combat representatives I met these days. I greet them and announce to all Hungarians, I declare to the whole world that these youth, that the workers and soldiers who fought with them, are not only worthy of the March youth, but with their endurance, heroic struggle and the results of this struggle have surpassed March 15, 1848. And the only thing left for the Hungarian government is to immediately proclaim the day you started your struggle as a national holiday...

... I announce further that from today we are abolishing the system of compulsory food supplies, which was such a heavy burden for the peasantry. I am sure that now the peasants will provide the city and the working people with food better than before. The government will consider other fair demands of the peasantry today and announce its decision ...

... We are a small nation, but we want to live freely in our country, to live our own national life. To live in mutual respect with peoples and nations that respect their national characteristics, their culture, their national will. We want to live in peace with the whole world, especially with neighboring democracies. I am convinced that if the peoples and leaders of the Soviet Union see that they are negotiating not with a humiliated, but with a free nation, with representatives of a free nation, then the attitude will be different - there will be more mutual understanding, respect and love between us. Now you all have a huge responsibility. We must erect all the buildings of a new national life. We must begin our free life, and it is up to you to guard our freedom. Freedom is threatened not only by violence, but also by chaos. Be vigilant, protect everything that we and you have achieved, everything that we fought for - this is our most valuable asset.

The government, or rather, the members of a narrow cabinet, decided to put an end to the dominance of the one-party system in Hungary; thus they declare that the people of the country must themselves, freely, without interference, determine the future of the country. That is, we need to prepare free elections. This requires order and peace. Elections can be jeopardized only by the fact that the country will not be able to restore internal peace; the world will preserve everything that is already in our hands. The world will preserve the future, and here, with a sense of deep responsibility, I call on every Hungarian, every person in whose chest a Hungarian heart beats, who is full of patriotic feelings: let's unite and establish peace and order in our country! Let there be no more victims, no more destruction!

We call on student youth, who showed a brilliant example in these difficult days of fighting and struggle, to come and help establish order in the country! Those young people who, even in the course of bloody battles, did not allow marauders to penetrate their ranks, who were able to preserve everything that makes up the wealth of the country, now, together with the patriotic army and police, will be able to preserve what they have won. Let there be peace in the country, peace, which is the guarantee of the future, the guarantee of freedom, the guarantee of free elections!

On October 30, the Declaration of the Government of the USSR on the Fundamentals of Relations with the Socialist Countries was announced. The declaration, broadcast on the radio in the evening of the same day and published in the press on October 31, in particular, said: "". The events in Hungary were assessed in the document as "a just and progressive movement of the working people", which was joined by reactionary forces. " Soviet government, - it was stated in the declaration, - ".

In order to ensure the mutual security of the socialist countries, the Soviet Government is ready to consider with other socialist countries participating in the Warsaw Pact the question of Soviet troops stationed on the territories of the above countries.ready to enter into appropriate negotiations with the government of the Hungarian People's Republic and other participants in the Warsaw Pact on the question of the presence of Soviet troops on the territory of Hungary

The development of events in Hungary coincided with the Suez Crisis - on October 29, Israel, and then NATO members Great Britain and France, attacked Egypt supported by the USSR in order to capture the Suez Canal, next to which they landed their troops.

At first, the Americans give hope to the Hungarians, but when things get serious, they leave the Hungarian people to their fate. There could be no talk of military intervention by NATO. The suppression of the Hungarian popular uprising by the Red Army was not seen as an action affecting the interests of NATO...

Moreover, the US government, using various diplomatic channels, managed to convey to the Kremlin its determination to maintain complete neutrality with regard to possible Soviet actions in Hungary [ ] . Fear of a final break with the principles of the Yalta and Potsdam agreements (especially since Washington knew about the impending invasion of Egypt by the Anglo-French-Israeli forces) and the unwillingness of a possible conflict with the USSR led the Washington administration to proclaim a policy of non-intervention on October 27, about which US Ambassador to Moscow C. Bohlen on October 29-30 additionally notified the Soviet leadership.

Reconsider the assessment, not to withdraw troops from Hungary and Budapest and take the initiative in restoring order in Hungary. If we withdraw from Hungary, this will cheer up the Americans, British and French imperialists. They will understand [this] as our weakness and will attack.

It was decided to create a "revolutionary workers' and peasants' government" headed by J. Kadar and conduct a military operation to overthrow the government of Imre Nagy. The plan of the operation, called "Vortex", was developed under the leadership of the Minister of Defense of the USSR G.K. Zhukov.

On November 1, when the Soviet troops were ordered not to leave the location of the units, the Hungarian government decided to withdraw Hungary from the Warsaw Pact and handed the appropriate note to the USSR embassy. At the same time, Hungary asked the UN for help in protecting sovereignty. Measures were also taken to protect Budapest in the event of a "possible external attack."

On November 1-3, representatives of the governments of the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and a delegation of the CPC Central Committee spoke out in support of the military operation in Hungary. On November 1, Soviet leaders met in Poland with the Polish and East German, and in Romania with the Romanian, Czechoslovak and Bulgarian leadership. A special commissioner from China was in Moscow. On November 2, the delegation flew to Yugoslavia. Khrushchev had already informed Tito here that Kadar and Ferenc Münnich had established contact with the Soviet Union. The leaders of all states, including Poland, Yugoslavia, and China, who at first welcomed the Hungarian events, agreed that the system in Hungary could be saved only through armed intervention.

In total, 15 tank, mechanized, rifle and air divisions, the 7th and 31st airborne divisions, and a railway brigade with a total strength of more than 60 thousand people participated in Operation Whirlwind. They were armed with over 3,000 tanks, mostly modern T-54s.

On November 2, a multi-party government of Hungary was formed, P. Maleter was appointed Minister of Defense, and B. Kiraly was appointed commander-in-chief of the National Guard, which was to become the core of the new Hungarian army.

In Tököl near Budapest, right during the negotiations, with the assistance of the Soviet KGB, the new Minister of Defense of Hungary, Major General Pal Maleter, was arrested. On November 3, at night, the commander of the Special Corps, Lieutenant General P. N. Lashchenko, in accordance with the order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the States Parties to the Warsaw Pact Marshal of the Soviet Union I. S. Konev and the plan of operation "Whirlwind", gave the order to the commanders of the 2nd and 33rd Guards Mechanized Division, 128th Guards Rifle Division, attached and supporting units about the beginning of the assault on Budapest on November 4 at 05:50. Around the same time, the commander of the 8th mechanized army, Lieutenant-General A.Kh. A similar order was given to the commanders of formations and units subordinate to him and the commander of the 38th combined arms army, Lieutenant General Kh. M. Mamsurov.

Early in the morning of November 4, the introduction of new Soviet military units into Hungary under the overall command of Marshal G.K. Zhukov began, and the Soviet operation "Whirlwind" began. Before the start of the operation, Order No. 1 of the Commander-in-Chief of the United Armed Forces was brought to the entire personnel of the Soviet troops in Hungary.

Comrade soldiers and sergeants, officers and generals! At the end of October, in fraternal Hungary, the forces of reaction and counter-revolution rose in revolt with the aim of destroying the people's democratic system, liquidating the revolutionary gains of the working people and restoring in it the old landowner-capitalist order.

Events have shown that the active participation in this adventure of the former Horthys leads to the revival of fascism in Hungary and creates a direct threat to our Fatherland and the entire socialist camp. It must not be forgotten that in the last war Horthy Hungary opposed our homeland together with Hitlerite Germany.

In accordance with the request of the government of the Hungarian People's Republic on the basis of the Warsaw Pact concluded between the countries of the socialist camp, obliging us to take "concerted measures necessary to strengthen their defense capability in order to protect the peaceful labor of their peoples, guarantee the inviolability of their borders and territories and ensure protection from possible aggression", the Soviet troops began to fulfill their allied obligations.

There is no doubt that the working class and working peasantry of the Hungarian People's Republic will support us in this just struggle.

The task of the Soviet troops is to render fraternal assistance to the Hungarian people in defending their socialist gains, in crushing the counter-revolution and eliminating the threat of the revival of fascism.

To all the personnel of the Soviet troops, with full consciousness of their military duty, to show perseverance and firmness in the fulfillment of the tasks set by the command. To assist local authorities in their activities to restore public order and establish normal life in the country.

Hold high the honor and dignity of the Soviet soldier, strengthen fraternal friendship with the working people of Hungary, and respect their national traditions and customs.

I express my firm conviction that the soldiers, sergeants, officers and generals of the Soviet troops will honorably fulfill their military duty.

Commander-in-Chief of the United Armed Forces Marshal of the Soviet Union I. Konev.

According to the "Whirlwind" plan, the Special Corps under the command of Lieutenant General P. N. Lashchenko, consisting of 2 Guards. MD Major General S. V. Lebedev, 33 Guards. MD Major General G. I. Obaturov and 128 Guards. sd colonel N. A. Gorbunov was supposed to, on the signal "Thunder", using the October combat experience and knowledge of the city, to seize the bridges across the Danube, Mount Gellert and the Buda Fortress, the parliament buildings, the Central Committee of the VPT, the Ministry of Defense, the police department, take Nyugati stations and Keleti, Moscow Square, resistance headquarters in the Korvin cinema, Kossuth radio station. To capture these objects in all divisions, special detachments were created as part of an infantry battalion, they were given 150 paratroopers in armored personnel carriers, reinforced by 10-12 tanks. These detachments included senior officials of the state security agencies: Major General K. E. Grebennik, later appointed military commandant of the city, Major General P. I. Zyryanov, the famous Soviet illegal immigrant A. M. Korotkov. They were to organize the capture and arrest of members of the Nagy government and the leaders of the "mutiny". Officially, Soviet troops invaded Hungary at the invitation of the government hastily created by Janos Kadar. The main facilities in Budapest were captured. A radiogram is sent over the captured Hungarian radio station: "".

Negotiations are ongoing. In accordance with the agreement, Soviet troops began redeployment. Do not open fire. Maleter

At the same time, units of the 8th mechanized and 38th combined arms armies were successfully operating in the rest of Hungary.

Having captured the cities of Szolnok, Gyor, Debrecen, Miskolc, they disarmed 5 Hungarian divisions and 5 separate regiments (more than 25 thousand military personnel) and captured all Hungarian aviation at airfields. This was facilitated by the fact that the personnel of the Hungarian army remained mostly neutral, for example, in Budapest, only 3 regiments, 10 anti-aircraft batteries, and several construction battalions resisted the Soviet troops. An important role was played by the voluntary surrender of 13 generals and more than 300 officers in the building of the Hungarian Ministry of Defense.

Detachments of the "Hungarian National Guard" and individual army units unsuccessfully tried to resist the Soviet troops.

According to modern Hungarian data, in terms of social composition, the majority of victims from the insurgent side were workers - 46.4%. Military and police - 16.3%. Representatives of the intelligentsia - 9.4%, students - 7.4%. Peasants, artisans, pensioners, other socio-professional groups - 6.6%. At the same time, 44% were under 25 years old. These data are given, in particular, in an essay about Erika Seles, a 15-year-old rebel nurse who was killed in battle on November 8, 1956.

According to the statements of Hungarian communist sources, which were subsequently documented, after the liquidation of the armed groups, a large number of Western-made weapons fell into the hands of the troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the police, including German MP-44 assault rifles and American Thompson submachine guns.

Budapest suffered as a result of street fighting between Soviet troops and rebels, 4,000 houses were completely destroyed in the city and another 40,000 were damaged.

According to the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of December 18, 1956 - "For the successful completion of combat missions of the Government of the USSR", awards were made [ ] :

Subsequently, six more Decrees of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR were issued on awarding orders and medals "for participation in the Hungarian events": from 03/07/1957, 07/11/1957, 07/17/1957, 10/31/1957, 01/27 .1958 and 22.11.1958

For participation in the suppression of the anti-government rebellion, 40 officers of the Hungarian People's Army were awarded orders of the Hungarian People's Republic, over 9 thousand military personnel of the VNA were awarded medals. The 37th Infantry Regiment, which distinguished itself during the fighting, commanded by Major Imre Hodoshan, was transformed into the Budapest Revolutionary Regiment.

According to UN Security Council Resolution 120 (not backed by the Soviet Union), the 2nd Emergency Special Session of the UN General Assembly was convened on November 4-10, 1956. She adopted a number of resolutions calling on the USSR, in particular, to immediately stop "armed attacks on the people of Hungary" and "any form of interference, especially armed interference, in the internal affairs of Hungary."

On December 12, 1956, the UN General Assembly adopted, in which it condemned "the violation of the Charter by the government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, depriving Hungary of its freedom and independence, and the Hungarian people of the enjoyment of their fundamental rights", and called on the Soviet government "to take immediate measures to withdraw from Hungary , under the supervision of the United Nations, its armed forces and allow the restoration of the political independence of Hungary. 55 countries voted in favor of the resolution, 8 voted against, and 13 abstained.

In protest against the actions of the Soviet Union in Hungary, three countries (Spain, the Netherlands, Switzerland) refused to participate in the XVI Summer Olympic Games, which opened on November 22 in Melbourne.

The truth is that the international community, which, after many years of delay, suddenly found the strength to intervene in the Middle East, on the contrary, allowed Hungary to be shot. Even 20 years ago we allowed the armies of a foreign dictatorship to crush the Spanish revolution. This wonderful diligence was rewarded in the Second World War. The weakness of the UN and its split are leading us gradually to the third, which is knocking at our door.

After the suppression of the Hungarian uprising, about 7 thousand people left the British Communist Party; Party Secretary General Harry Pollit resigned.

Immediately after the suppression of the uprising, mass arrests began: in total, the Hungarian special services and their Soviet curators arrested about 5,000 Hungarians (846 of them were sent to Soviet prisons), including "a significant number of members of the VPT, military personnel and student youth" .

"... vigilantly stand guard over the interests of our socialist state, be vigilant against the intrigues of hostile elements and, in accordance with the laws of Soviet power, stop criminal acts in a timely manner"

A direct consequence of this letter was a significant increase in 1957 in the number of those convicted "for counter-revolutionary crimes" (2948 people, which is 4 times more than in 1956). Students for any critical statements regarding Soviet actions in Hungary were expelled from the institutes.

About 200 North Korean students were involved in the maelstrom of events in the fall of 1956 in Hungary. Among them were many veterans of the Korean War, who taught Hungarian students who had no combat experience how to handle weapons. Several medical students worked in district hospitals and helped the wounded - both the Hungarian rebels and the Soviet military. Some North Koreans have been involved in the fighting themselves, mostly on the streets of Budapest and Veszprem. Despite rumors that some students from the DPRK died in battle, this has not been confirmed to date.

After the defeat of the uprising, the state security organs of the USSR and Hungary gathered North Korean students (they were easily distinguished by their appearance) and in December 1956 they were sent back to the DPRK.

According to the author of the book “From North Korea to Budapest. North Korean Students During the Hungarian Revolution of 1956,” the Hungarian orientalist Mozes Choma, none of the North Korean students harbored anti-Soviet feelings that forced them to take up arms. Most of them just wanted to help their friends and classmates. There were certainly disagreements among the North Koreans themselves, as some were unhappy with the precarious situation they were in and were relieved when they were ordered to return to their homeland. Probably, neither the Soviet nor the North Korean authorities had detailed information about the participation of the North Koreans in the uprising.

One of the North Korean students, who studied at the Lajos Kossuth University in Debrecen, decided to stay in Hungary and married a Hungarian girl. According to Magyar Nemzet, the DPRK embassy "mercilessly persecuted" the couple, who resisted the pressure. As of May 2017, the couple continued to live in Hungary. They have two adult children.

According to American journalist Barry Farber, four North Koreans fled to Yugoslavia, four more to Austria. One of them, Jang Ki Hong, received refugee status in the United States and became the first North Korean in history to naturalize in the United States and receive American citizenship. Employees of the US embassy in Vienna initially refused to help Jang Ki Hong get refugee status, citing the fact that he was not a citizen of Hungary, the quota for accepting Hungarian refugees had been exhausted, and the DPRK was at war with the United States. (The McCarren-Walter Act) abolished quotas for immigrants on a racial basis, but retained the quota system by country. It also provided for the deportation and ban on re-entry into the United States of persons identified as members (including former) of "subversive" communist organizations and other "total groups".

Columbine II ("Air Force One", Air Force One) or Columbine III ("Air Force Two"). The first North Korean to naturalize in the US received a scholarship to Syracuse University, graduating with honors, becoming an architect and a millionaire.

Chan Ki Hong's (or his full namesake) roommate in a dorm room in Budapest was Gyula Varalai, a student at the Technical University, an activist in the student association. In 1957, he met Zbigniew Brzezinski in Boston and maintained friendly relations with him until his death in 2017. In 1959, Brzezinski and Varalai attended the 7th World Festival of Youth and Students in Vienna.

In 2018, Gyula Varalai told Tom Szigeti, a correspondent for the Hungarian English-language portal "Hungary Today", that on November 3, 1956 (when the Soviet troops were already preparing to storm Budapest), a certain Stuart Kellogg, an American student who studied in Bonn, came to their hostel. It came from the Kelenföld railway station on Bartok Bela. Varalai did not know English then and spoke German with Kellogg. During the conversation, it suddenly turned out that Chang Ki Hong and Stuart Kellogg both participated in the Korean War, although on opposite sides. Both veterans shared their memories with each other.

The students who lived in the dormitory were members of the National Guard, were armed with machine guns and were preparing to fight the Soviet troops. On the advice of his new acquaintances, Stuart Kellogg crossed the Freedom Bridge, which was still open to pedestrians at the time, to a safe place - the US Embassy. Gyula Varalai never heard of the mysterious American again and never saw him again.

"Soviet troops drowned the Hungarian uprising in blood." Option - "Soviet troops brutally suppressed the Hungarian uprising."

To understand how "bloody" or "brutal" the suppression of the "rebellion" was, let's turn to the numbers.

According to the results of the hostilities, the Soviet troops lost 720 people killed. Hungarians - 2500. It would seem that the significant losses of the Hungarian side clearly speak of the cruelty of the Soviet troops.

However, as always, the devil is in the details.

The fact is that 2,500 people are Hungarians who were killed from October 23 to December 1957 throughout Hungary. Including as a result of clashes between parts of the Hungarian army, police and security forces with the rebels; as a result of the "White Terror" in Budapest and other cities from October 30 (the day the Soviet troops were withdrawn from Budapest) to November 4 (the large-scale offensive of the Soviet troops, the beginning of Operation Whirlwind to suppress the rebellion); as a result of fighting between various detachments of the rebels and, finally, as a result of clashes between the rebels and the Soviet units. In mass literature and newspaper articles, the fact is usually overlooked that the Hungarian army, police and state security forces took an active part in the first phase of the rebellion (23-28.10). And it is completely unknown that there were battles between various detachments of the rebels.

Now more about what the losses of the Hungarian side consist of. So. Army battles with the rebels. It is difficult to say for sure how many Hungarians were killed by the Hungarian soldiers themselves, the police and the state security forces during the suppression of the rebellion. Although, for example, the only surviving leader of the rebellion, General Bela Kiraly, testifies that at least 12 “revolutionaries” from among the defenders of the Corvin cinema were killed on the orders of Colonel Pal Maleter. But the losses of the Hungarian army can be approximately calculated. The fact is that the losses in Budapest of the 2nd Guards Mechanized Division of the Special Corps of the Soviet Army in the period from October 24 to October 29 can be taken as a basis. For 6 days of fighting, the division lost 350 people killed. That is, on average, the loss of the dead was more than 50 people per day. Such high losses are explained not so much by the fierceness of the fighting itself, but by the tactics chosen by the corps command: covering especially important objects and defense (do not open fire first). Moreover, Colonel Grigory Dobrunov, who at that time was the commander of the reconnaissance battalion of the 2nd Guards Mechanized Division, testifies that there were no clear instructions and instructions for bringing troops into Budapest. But there was a clear order "Do not shoot." Dobrunov’s words are also confirmed by the cryptographer of the Special Department of the Special Corps Dmitry Kapranov. Moreover, the participants in the rebellion - in particular, the current member of the Hungarian Parliament, Imre Mech - confirm this thesis. As a result, the rebels had the opportunity to throw Molotov cocktails at tanks with impunity, then shooting crews that jumped out, shoot from the windows of houses and throw grenades at open armored personnel carriers-152, in which soldiers moved around the city, shoot them from rifles and machine guns. The defensive tactics of the Soviet troops led to unreasonably high losses. But the fact is that exactly the same tactics were chosen by the leadership of the Hungarian People's Army (VNA), the police, and the state security. They, with rare exceptions, did not conduct offensive operations, which naturally irritated the Soviet military, who believed that the Hungarians themselves should play the first violin. Therefore, it is quite reasonable to assume that the losses of the less protected and less armed VNA soldiers were at least not lower than the losses of the Soviet troops. That is at least 50 people per day on average.

But this is Budapest. There were fights in other cities as well. In Miskolc, Györda, Pec, the army and police tried to fight. In Miskolc, the losses among the rebels on the first day alone amounted to at least 45 people. In some places, the rebels were bombed. Finally, in his speech on October 24, Prime Minister Imre Nagy already stated that as a result of the actions of the Nazis (this is exactly what the national hero of Hungary Imre Nagy said - this document is stored in the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History, RGASPI) many military personnel, civil servants died and mined citizens. That's it - a lot! And this is only for a day of rebellion.

After the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Budapest on October 30, fighting broke out in the city between various groups of rebels. The deputy of Ivan Kovacs - the commander of one of the most significant rebel groups in the Korovin cinema - Gabor Dilinki testifies that already on October 30, even within the Korovinians themselves, skirmishes began. In particular, the beloved girl of Gabor himself was killed. Western correspondents noted the beginning of incessant skirmishes in Budapest after October 30 - at a time when Soviet troops were simply not there.

Particular attention is paid in Western correspondence from "free Budapest" to the actions of the detachments of Jozsef Dudas, who, for a start, decided to expropriate the assets of the National Bank. Naturally, this all happened with shooting.

Finally, in Budapest itself, after the departure of the Soviet troops, the so-called “White Terror” began, when the Bela Kiraly guards and the Dudash detachments destroyed the communists, state security officers and military personnel who refused to obey them. Photos and newsreels of hanged people with traces of torture, with faces covered in acid, have spread all over the world and are well known to everyone.

On October 30, the Kiraly guards shot the state security soldiers guarding the building of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Communist Party. The assault on the building was carried out on a large scale: with the involvement of infantry and tanks. Surrendered soldiers and officers were simply shot. A photo report by Life magazine correspondent John Sadzhova spread around the world. Like his story about it:

« Six young officers came out, one very handsome. Their shoulder straps were torn off. Quick dispute. We are not as bad as you think, give us a chance, they said. I was within three feet of this group. Suddenly one began to bend. They must have fired very close, right in their ribs. They all fell like cut corn. Very graceful. And when they were already on the ground, the rebels were still pouring lead on them. I've been to war three times, but I've never seen anything more terrible. ».

Finally, the actual brutality of the Soviet troops during the suppression of the uprising. Let's remember the total number of dead Hungarians: 2500 people. Interestingly, at the time of the assault on Budapest on November 4, the city was defended, according to various estimates, from 30 to 50 thousand people. This is just Budapest. In the city of Pec, a group of 2,000 people put up very stubborn resistance. Miskolc resisted very stubbornly. And with so many rebels resisting, 2,500 dead, including those who died in the intra-Hungarian civil conflict all over Hungary??? Amazing. Still, even if you roughly estimate how many Hungarians died in clashes with the Soviet troops themselves, then there will be hardly a thousand people. And this is a loss that is quite comparable to ours.

For all that, the Soviet army did not use aviation and artillery for combat purposes. Tank shelling was rare - in any case, the chronicle with the tanks of the rebels firing at the building of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Communist Party is known to the whole world, but for some reason there are no newsreels or photos of firing Soviet tanks.

The "cruelty" of the Soviet troops is also evidenced by the report on the hostilities in Hungary of the 12th separate Rymnik SME of the Order of Bohdan Khmelnitsky of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR. For the uninitiated, this is special forces. Before the events in Hungary, his fighters were actively and really tough fight against the UPA units in Ukraine. They were sent to Hungary on November 6, arrived in 3 days. I was on a business trip for 2 months. Their task included: covering the Hungarian-Austrian border, destroying the rebels, arresting the rebels, guarding important objects. So, according to a report for two months on a business trip, the special forces soldiers, who were not particularly scrupulous in their activities, killed ... one Hungarian. In two months! And this is not a press release. This is a top secret document for internal use. The classification was lifted just recently, and the document is stored in the Russian State Military Archive (RGVA).

Thus, it is clear that during the battles with the Soviet troops, a quite comparable number of Hungarians died - within a thousand people. The rest are victims of the internal Hungarian conflict itself.

Myth 2

"Imre Nagy and Pal Maleter - Hungarian freedom fighters."

To deal with this myth, it is worth familiarizing yourself with the biographies of these heroes. Pal Malether. At the time of the mutiny - Colonel VNA. During World War II, he fought in the army of fascist Hungary against the USSR. It is worth recalling here the obvious fact that the Hungarian soldiers on the Eastern Front were inferior in cruelty only to the SS. And that is not always the case. In the villages of Voronezh, the Magyars are well remembered and are by no means commemorated with kind words.

Maleter was taken prisoner and immediately began to re-educate. After some time, he was already conducting propaganda work among the Hungarian prisoners. Then he cooperates with Soviet intelligence. The trust in him is so great that in 1944 he takes part in partisan actions against the Hungarians and the Germans. In fact, it is worth dwelling on this point in more detail. The fact is that during the war there were many defectors and those who surrendered, but literally a few were given such confidence. It had to be earned. Unfortunately, the GRU archives, which could shed light on the secret of such trust in Maleter and his merits, are, alas, classified. But it would be naive to think that a person who once connected his fate with the intelligence of some country can easily resign his service.

For his actions, Maleter was awarded the Order of the Red Star. He then studied at the Military Academy under Bela Kirai. Kiraly remembers Maleter as an extremely fanatical cadet who even fainted from overwork. It even required an order to go to the hospital, as the doctors feared for his health. Bela Kiraly characterizes Maleter as follows:

"He changed his mind very often."

Knowing his military biography and his behavior during the rebellion, it's hard to disagree with Kirai. On October 23-24, Maleter resolutely opposed the rebels, declared his loyalty to the government and devotion to the cause of communism. Maleter decisively fights the rebels, which General Bela Kiraly still cannot forgive him. On October 25, with five tanks, according to Kiraly, he went to the Kilian barracks to suppress a rebellion in one of the military units. And went over to the side of the rebels.

Imre Nagy. Also a hero. Fought in the Austro-Hungarian army during the First World War. He was taken prisoner by the Russians. Member of the civil war in Russia. Became a communist. Until 1945, he lived in the USSR with short trips abroad on assignments from the Comintern (Soviet intelligence, to put it simply). Snitch NKVD. It should be noted that when deciding on the issue of granting Nagy Soviet citizenship, accepting him into the leadership of the Comintern, his candidacy was met with sharp rejection by the leaders of the Hungarian Communist Party, headed by Bela Kun. All of them were shot in 1937-1938. Except for Nadia. In 1990, the chairman of the KGB, Vladimir Kryuchkov, at the request of the Hungarian side, sent copies of the Nagy case to Hungary. With his denunciations, slander against fellow workers... For political purposes, these documents were hidden and have not been made public until now. Some part, however, was leaked to the Italian press in the early 90s.

Nagy then served for some time as Minister of the Interior. In this post, he achieved the return to Hungary of the majority of Hungarian prisoners from the USSR, and also carried out repressions against fascists and nationalists. At the same time, Nagy was a creature of Beria himself. The same Beria in 1953 forced Rakosi to appoint Nagy as prime minister. True, - the irony of fate - three days later Nadia was appointed prime minister, and Beria was arrested in Moscow. By 1955, Nagy was relieved of his post and expelled from the Communist Party "for his right-wing deviationist views." Simply put, Nagy, before all the Hungarian communists, caught the trend towards a “thaw” common to the countries of the socialist camp. Being a man resented by the Rakosi regime, in this capacity he was popular among the masses. It is characteristic that he was popular for a reason, but at the suggestion of Radio Free Europe, which presented the communist Nagy as a kind of lamb. Why did the West stake on Nadia? Yes, everything is simple: political spinelessness and personal lack of will made his figure very convenient for the planned transition period. And, finally, Nagy must have hated his Soviet curators, who, as he knew, had powerful compromising evidence on him. But one way or another, Nagy gradually became the leader of the Hungarian opposition. And in this capacity, he speaks on October 23 before the demonstrators on Parliament Square. According to an eyewitness, US Marine Corps Sergeant James Bolek from the Embassy Guard Corps, Nagy begged people to ... disperse, but in response to his appeal, “comrades,” the crowd roared:

"No more comrades, no more communism."

And on October 24, having already been appointed prime minister by order from the USSR, Nagy, in a radio speech, called on, as he put it, the fascist provocateurs to lay down their arms. He calls the participants in the uprising none other than "fascists" and "reactionaries." At the same time, Nagy assures that the Soviet troops are in Budapest solely at the request of the government.

Probably, Nagy realized that the power on the streets no longer belongs to those who demanded to appoint him as prime minister just a day ago.

As events unfold, Nagy gradually begins to do more and more strange things. For example, it prohibits the VNA from conducting active offensive operations. That is, he imposes on the army the same disastrous tactics that the Soviet Army has - to defend. On October 28, Soviet and Hungarian troops almost completely blocked the main groups of rebels in Budapest, preparing to storm and destroy them, but ... Nadia managed to convince Mikoyan, and that Khrushchev, to withdraw troops from Budapest.

After that, Nagy began to call yesterday's fascists revolutionaries. But Nagy had a hard time. The country already had a military revolutionary council headed by Maleter. The country created the National Guard, headed by Bela Kiraj and former Horthy officers. Jozsef Dudas demanded a place in the government for himself and refused to disband his troops. Nagy tried to dissolve all the armed forces and start building them again, on the basis of the National Guard, but Maleter sharply opposed with part of the Budapest garrison, Bela Kiraly opposed Maleter, for which Maleter gave the order to arrest him, Dudash refused to obey anyone at all . In addition, the United States made a bet in general on Cardinal Mindszenty, an active anti-communist who called on all Hungarian Catholics to fight for freedom of belief. Mindszenty also called for denationalization, the rejection of all social gains, the return of property to the former owners. Most of the army refused to obey both Maleter and Kirai, and even more so Mindszenty. After all, Nagy was nothing but a communist. But on October 30, an anti-communist coup took place in Budapest. The building of the Central Committee of the Party was stormed, the guards were shot, some of the Communists were killed, and some were arrested. Nagy understood that the same awaited him. And he made an almost unmistakable move. He announced Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and the establishment of "new relations" with the West. Maybe all this would have worked, since the West began to exert powerful pressure on the USSR, so powerful that even Zhukov and Khrushchev were inclined to revise relations with Hungary. But ... the Suez crisis broke out and the West was not up to Hungary. As a result, on November 4, SA units entered Hungary from three countries, and Nagy, calling for resistance ... fled to the Yugoslav embassy. It is very important that it was in Yugoslavia: since 1948, Tito has been active in splitting the socialist camp, and Hungary was one of the priorities. It was from her that Stalin planned to start a war against Yugoslavia. In fact, history knows examples of how leaders of states fought for their beliefs, either proving their case or paying for mistakes. An example similar to Nadia is Salvador Allende. Having called for resistance, he did not flee, but died with a weapon in his hands, defending his views and paying for his mistakes. Nagy acted differently. Well, each country has its own heroes. Here among the Hungarians, for example, General Bela Kiraly is also a hero. Yes, the same one, commander of the National Guard. He also gave his guardsmen (most of whom, according to Kiraly himself, were "teenagers") the order to hold out to the end and fled to Austria, and from there to the United States. Here is such a general, such a hero. In our country, other generals are considered heroes.

What is more interesting, Imre Nagy until the end of his days formally remained ... a Soviet citizen. In the RGASPI, in the files of the Hungarian communist leaders Rakosi and Gera, there are documents confirming that they were deprived of Soviet citizenship when they left for Hungary in 1945. But in Nadia's case, there are no such documents. As far as I know, researchers also did not find such documents regarding Nagy in other archives.

Myth 3

the work of the Soviet soldiers and the Hungarian state security.

The situation looks like this. On the morning of October 25, a crowd gathered in the square near the Parliament. Mostly women and students. Opposite were Soviet tanks and armored personnel carriers with soldiers. All were quite peaceful. The Hungarians did not bully the Soviets, did not throw stones, but tried to communicate. Further, the common outline of events is as follows: shots were fired from somewhere on the roofs, Soviet soldiers opened heavy fire from all types of weapons, bullets hit the fleeing people, in total about 200 (according to various options, and more) people died.

Well, actually, a different number of deaths is more common - 20 people. But let it be 200, if there are not enough corpses for someone. Let's try to look at the problem from a different angle.

First, evidence is required. But whose? Hungarians, like Russians, are interested and biased people. But we do have one important third-party testimony: USMC Sgt. James Bolek. He saw everything that happened and later described it:

“At 10 o’clock in the morning, two sailors and I were standing on the balcony of our apartment on the second floor, looking at the Soviet soldiers, when someone dropped explosives from the roof of our building onto Soviet tanks and their crews on the street in front of our building. When the explosives detonated, the Soviet soldiers began to fire their machine guns at our building, starting from the first floor and ending with the roof. .

So, it all started with the fact that someone threw explosives from the roof of a house or the top floor onto a Soviet tank. Pay attention to one more detail: the Soviet soldiers opened fire on the house from where the explosives were dropped. This is also important.

Simultaneously with the shots of Soviet soldiers from the rooftops, automatic and machine-gun bursts hit the tankers and the crowd, people fleeing in panic. There are photos of these moments. The crowd is very scattered, not running tightly. That is, there could not be a crush and there could not be a dense defeat. Who did the Soviet tankers shoot at? Hardly in a crowd. Since soldiers usually very clearly determine where the shooting comes from, and return fire to fire, and not generally in all directions. Moreover, from the very beginning they reacted correctly, opening fire on a very specific building. If ours fired at the crowd (which there is no evidence even from the side of the Hungarians), it was only because they were fired at from the crowd.

But who started throwing explosives and shooting from rooftops? The Hungarians are sure that this is a provocation of state security. But there are objections to this version.

First, by October 25, the Hungarian state security was completely demoralized. Having its own troops, a huge operational apparatus, it, in fact, did nothing either to prevent the rebellion or to eliminate it in the bud. State security units fought only in the provinces - and then only defending themselves. In Budapest itself, the Hungarian security officers did not show themselves in any way. In addition, by October 25, almost all the district departments of the AVH (KGB) were defeated. Yes, and why did the KGB officers arrange this? The Soviet troops, at the very least, conducted operations against the rebels, the VNA too. The task of the security guards is to seize and destroy. But even under the cover of Soviet tanks, they did not do this. This provocation was beneficial just to the organizers of the rebellion: by the evening, all of Hungary knew that in front of the parliament in Budapest, Soviet soldiers and the State Security Service had killed more than 200 Hungarians. The rebellion, which had almost died down by October 25, flared up with renewed vigor, and the ranks of the rebels were replenished with sincere volunteers. Part of the Hungarian garrison hesitated. All the agreements that had been reached by that time were buried. Tellingly, supporters of the version that the execution in front of the parliament was organized by state security cannot imagine a single corpse of an employee of the Hungarian special services at the battlefield or on the roofs of the houses around. Although the Soviet soldiers were just hurricane fire from all types of weapons.

Myth 4

"There was a popular uprising in Hungary."

This myth does not stand up to scrutiny if you look at the documents, moreover, the documents are declassified and in open use.

The fact remains: there was no uprising. There were several phases of a well-organized armed rebellion.

It is well known that the events began on October 23 at 3 p.m. with a peaceful demonstration of students, which was joined by significant sections of the population of Budapest. Three hours later, the demonstration ended, and an armed rebellion began.

But traces of a conspiracy, if there was one, must be looked for a little earlier. They are. And not so much hidden. In such an archive as the RGANI, one can find documents such as reports from the USSR ambassador to Hungary, Andropov, or KGB chairman Serov, in which they indicate that an armed rebellion is being prepared in the country. It is characteristic that these reports were sent in the summer of 1956. By the summer of 1956, the testimony of the detective of the special department under the Soviet military candidacy in Budapest, Alexander Goryunov, also refers. It was during this period that the Hungarian colleagues informed our counterintelligence officers about the existence of a conspiracy and about the preparation of a putsch.

There are other documents as well. U.S. Army intelligence report, January 6, 1956. In particular, it points to information from a Hungarian officer, recruited back in 1954, about the existence of a conspiracy in the army. This officer reports that although the underground movement consists of a relatively small number of officers, there are cells in almost every Hungarian unit. Meanwhile, according to the British correspondent Sherman (The Observer), a certain VNA colonel played a significant role in the radicalization of the events of October 23rd. On the night before the events, he met with students at the Polytechnic University and persuaded them to come out to demonstrate. Moreover, under his influence, an appeal was drawn up to the government with radical and clearly impossible conditions, such as a ban on the export of uranium to the USSR, which, in fact, no one exported. Sherman writes that under the influence of the colonel, the demands became as radical as possible. A little later, the captured rebels pointed to the identity of the colonel. His surname is Nodar. During the rebellion, he became Bela Kirai's assistant. Characteristically, during the interrogation, Nodar named Kiraly as one of the organizers of the rebellion. Considering that Nodar, who did not lead an underground struggle at the risk of his life, but seemed to remain out of work until October 30, became the head of the National Guard, his testimony deserves attention. By the way, it was Nodar who was approached by the American military attache with a request to help him in acquiring and sending to the United States a new Soviet MIG-17 fighter. Documents about this are again declassified and are in the RGANI and the Central Archive of the FSB of the Russian Federation.

There is also other evidence of the existence of a conspiracy and of the preparation of a rebellion. The same Alexander Goryunov testifies that shortly before the mutiny, they received information that waybills for vehicles had already been prepared, that it was already known who would be transporting what - people, weapons .., their routes were outlined.

Literally shortly before the start of the rebellion, members of the Hungarian youth-sports-military organization (an analogue of our DOSAAF) were gathered in the city from all over Hungary. At first, they became the striking force of the rebellion.

Another point is interesting. The situation was swinging long before the events. In particular, dissatisfaction with the presence of Soviet troops in Hungary was growing throughout the country. True, not because the troops are in the country at all, but because the Soviet army in Hungary lives off the Hungarian budget, thereby devouring the not so well-fed Hungarians. That this is nonsense is understandable. Soviet troops were on the budget of the USSR, for purchases in Hungary they paid with cash. But after all, someone introduced these ideas to the masses, who immediately thought the same way. How could it be otherwise: Hungary was in a state of economic crisis all the time, it was necessary to find extreme ones. Rumors spread and picked up that it was cold in the houses in winter, because there was nothing to heat with: all coal was sent to the USSR. Tellingly, during this period, coal was exported from the USSR to Hungary due to its acute shortage in Hungary itself. We helped them, in general.

The uranium issue is separate. After Hiroshima and Nagasaki, literally uranium fever began. The United States has managed to lay its paw on uranium deposits almost all over the world, except for Eastern Europe. On “our” territory, there were deposits in East Germany (Gera), Czechoslovakia (Jachimov), Hungary (Pecs) and Bulgaria. We made the first atomic bombs from German and Bulgarian materials. It is clear that uranium developments were under the strict control of the USSR and were guarded by Soviet units. Serious counterintelligence work was carried out, including disinformation. By 1956, in the strictest secrecy, developments were started on Soviet territory - in Kazakhstan. But the United States did not know this. But they knew about the deposits in the countries of Eastern Europe from the Soviet high-ranking KGB officer Iskanderov, who defected to the West and settled in the United States in 1950 (by the way, Iskanderov's escape became one of the additional factors in the fall of the once all-powerful Abakumov). From Hungary (as well as from Czechoslovakia) uranium was not exported to the USSR. However, the “masses” thought differently for some reason. And the "uranium" item in the historical document "14 requirements" was number 6. Who inspired people with this stupidity? The answer is obvious. Those with whom the USSR in those years was in a state of nuclear confrontation. Although this moment is not hidden. All the demands of the "masses" to the government were first voiced on the air of Radio Free Europe, or, to be more precise, within the framework of the CIA's Operation Focus, which began in 1954.

But back to the popular uprising. As you know, the events began on October 23 at 15:00. Soviet tanks entered Budapest at 5-6 am on 24 October. And they were already waiting for well-organized mobile groups of militants with commanders, communications, intelligence, weapons and clear coordination of actions. Soviet troops began to suffer losses from the very first hours of participation in the Hungarian events. It is known about the good military training of the Hungarian reservists and pre-conscripts. However, any military man will say that the distance from training to the creation of full-fledged combat units is very long. Soviet troops were not faced with teenagers, but with well-trained detachments. In addition, in addition to Budapest, the rebellion began almost all over the country at the same time. And everywhere according to the same scheme: the seizure of government bodies, radio stations, armories, police departments and AVH. It is characteristic that the events in the city of Miskolc became the second largest and most intense rebellion. The already mentioned US Army intelligence report indicated that it was precisely around Miskolc that there were at least 10 partisan camps, each of which had from 40 to 50 partisans with radio stations, weapons and food depots. By the way, the area around Miskolc is the only one in Hungary where partisans can be located - forests and difficult terrain.

In Budapest itself, the production and transportation of nitroglycerin were even established. For information: for sabotage, you can only use the so-called pure nitroglycerin, which cannot be made at home. Homemade, dirty nitroglycerin will explode either during manufacture or, at best, during transportation. At the latest, as soon as you bring your hand with a bottle of dirty nitroglycerin to throw. However, in Budapest, these issues were resolved in the shortest possible time, which only speaks of the work done in advance.

How could the ubiquitous Hungarian state security miss the plot? Everything is simple. By 1956, state security was paralyzed by internal purges. Something similar happened a little earlier with us - after the arrest and execution of Beria, when the most professional intelligence and counterintelligence personnel were dispersed in subsequent purges. In addition, in his memoirs, Alexander Goryunov shows that he and his colleagues had the impression that there were supporters of a change in the country's course in the AVH leadership itself.

The directives of the US National Security Council also speak in favor of the version of the uprising. For example, in the directive NSC-158.

« Aims and Actions of the United States to Take Advantage of the Unrest in the Satellite States, June 29, 1953, says: “To fuel resistance to communist oppression in such a way that the spontaneous character is not questioned.

Organize, train and equip underground organizations capable of sustained warfare ».

The satellite countries are the countries of the socialist camp.

Another directive, NSC-68, states: “ intensify operations by clandestine means to cause and support unrest and uprisings in selected strategically important satellite countries.

Oleg Filimonov

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Modern bourgeois Hungary, which drove out the communists, became a member of the EU, finally gained the long-awaited "freedom" by some » live in a capitalist "paradise" » . What kind of freedom? To become unemployed, homeless, hungry and sick, to work for someone else's uncle who is a capitalist to the point of complete exhaustion instead of contributing one's labor to social production, to be useful to the whole society - i.e. be a respected person in society, and not a "loser » , not a marginal, powerlessly watching the death of loved ones, for the treatment of which there is no money?

In 10 million Hungary, 40% of the population are on the verge of poverty, 15% are beyond. Many political parties and religious denominations, from ultranationalists to socialists, from Hare Krishnas to Baptists, took part in the charitable food distribution in Hungary. But everyone knows that a person needs to eat daily ...

Photo by Nepszava _________________________________________________________________________________