Battle of Dubno - Lutsk - Brody(also known as Battle of Brody, tank battle near Dubno - Lutsk - Rivne, mechanized corps counterattack Southwestern Front etc.) - one of the largest tank battles in history, which took place from June 23 to June 30, 1941. It was attended by five mechanized corps of the Red Army (2803 tanks) of the Southwestern Front against four German tank divisions (585 tanks) of the Wehrmacht Army Group "South", combined into First tank group. Subsequently, another tank division of the Red Army (325 tanks) and one tank division of the Wehrmacht (143 tanks) entered the battle. Thus, 3,128 Soviet and 728 German tanks (+ 71 German assault gun) . [ ]

The Red Army formations, which had overwhelming technical superiority in this section of the front, were unable to inflict significant losses on the enemy in manpower and equipment, and were also unable to seize the strategic offensive initiative and change the course of hostilities in their favor. The tactical superiority of the Wehrmacht and the problems in the Red Army (poorly organized supply system for tank corps, lack of air cover and complete loss of operational control) allowed the German troops to win the battle, as a result of which the Red Army lost a huge number of tanks.

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On June 22, 1941, the entire German Army Group South, in the offensive area of ​​which this battle took place, had 728 tanks, including at least 115 unarmed “command tanks” Sd.Kfz.  265 and about 150 tanks armed with 20 mm cannons and/or machine guns and (T-I and T-II). Thus, the Germans actually had 455 tanks (T-38(t), T-III and T-IV) in the generally accepted sense of the word.

The total listed number of tanks in the mechanized corps of the Soviet Southwestern Front was 3,429 (in addition, a certain number of tanks were in the rifle divisions of the front). However, three of the six corps were practically at the stage of formation, and only the 4th, 8th and 9th mechanized corps could be considered as fully combat-ready formations. They included 1,515 tanks, which was more than three times the number of German cannon-armed tanks opposing them. In addition, these three combat-ready corps included 271 tanks of the T-34 and KV types, which were not only far superior in armament and armor to the best German tanks at that time, but were also almost invulnerable to standard Wehrmacht anti-tank weapons.

Previous Events

June 22, 1941 g. after a breakthrough in the strip 5th Army general Potapova at the junction with 6th army Muzychenko 1st Tank Group Kleist moved towards Radekhov And Berestechko. The General Staff decided to encircle the main enemy grouping on the Southwestern Front with strikes in the direction of Rava-Russkaya - Lublin and Kovel - Lublin and subsequently provide assistance to the Western Front.

In the Directive of the NGOs of the USSR dated June 22, 1941 No. 3, endorsed G. K. Zhukov, it read:

d) The armies of the Southwestern Front, firmly holding the border with Hungary, with concentric attacks in the general direction of Lublin with forces 5A and 6A, at least five mechanized corps and all front aviation, encircle and destroy the enemy group advancing on the Vladimir-Volynsky, Krystynopol front, by the end of June 26, capture the Lublin region. Safely provide for yourself from the Krakow direction.

During the discussion of the directive at the headquarters of the Southwestern Front, it was considered that an encirclement operation with access to Lublin was impossible.

The proposal of the chief of staff of the Southwestern Front, General Purkaev, to withdraw troops and create a continuous line of defense along the old border, and then counterattack, was also rejected.

We decided to strike with three mechanized corps (15th, 4th, 8th mechanized corps) from the Radzekhov - Rava-Russkaya front to Krasnostav and one mechanized corps (22nd mechanized corps) from the Verba - Vladimir-Volynsky front to Krasnostav. The purpose of the strike was not encirclement (as the directive required), but the defeat of the main enemy forces in a counter battle.

In pursuance of the decisions made, on June 23, the 15th mechanized corps of Karpezo moved from the south to Radzekhov without the 212th motorized rifle division, which was left to cover Brod. During clashes with the German 11th Panzer Division, units reported the destruction of 20 German tanks and armored vehicles and 16 anti-tank guns. The Radzekhs could not be held; in the afternoon the Germans captured the crossings on the Styr River near Berestechko.

The breakthrough to Berestechko forced the headquarters of the Southwestern Front to abandon its previous decision; the 8th Mechanized Corps from near Yavorov received an order to move to Brody at 15:30 on June 23.

During June 24, the front headquarters, together with the representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief G.K. Zhukov, decided to launch a counterattack on the German group with the forces of four mechanized corps, while simultaneously creating a rear line of defense with rifle corps of front-line subordination - 31st , 36th And 37th. In reality, these units were in the process of moving to the front and entered into battle as they arrived without mutual coordination. Some units did not take part in the counterattack. The goal of the counterattack of the mechanized corps of the Southwestern Front was to defeat the 1st Panzer Group of Kleist. During the subsequent battle, the German troops of the 1st Tgr and 6th Army were counterattacked by the Soviet 22nd, 9th and 19th mechanized corps from the north, and the 8th and 15th mechanized corps from the south, entering an oncoming tank battle with the Germans 11th , 13th , 14th And 16th tank divisions.

Actions of the parties in counterattacks from June 24 to 27

June 24 19th Tank and 215th Motorized Rifle Divisions 22nd mechanized corps went on the offensive north of the highway Vladimir-Volynsky - Lutsk from the Voinitsa - Boguslavskaya line. The attack was unsuccessful; the division's light tanks ran into anti-tank guns deployed by the Germans. The 19th TD lost more than 50% of its tanks and began to retreat to the Torchin area. The 1st anti-tank artillery brigade also moved here. Moskalenko. 41st Tank Division On the 22nd MK did not participate in the counterattack. The defense on the Styr River near Lutsk was occupied by the advanced 131st Motorized Division of the 9th Mechanized Corps of General Rokossovsky.

19th Mechanized Corps Major General Feklenko from the evening of June 22, he advanced to the border, reaching the advanced units on the evening of June 24 to the Ikva River in the Mlynov area. On the morning of June 25, the reconnaissance battalion of the German 11th Panzer Division attacked the forward company of the 40th Panzer Division, which was guarding the crossing at Mlynov, and pushed it back. The 43rd Tank Division of the Mechanized Corps was approaching the Rivne area, subject to air attacks.

By the morning of June 26, the situation was as follows. The 131st Infantry Division, having retreated from Lutsk at night, occupied the front from Rozhishche to Lutsk; troops of the 19th Tank Division, 135th Infantry Division and 1st Artillery Brigade retreated behind its positions through Rozhishche. Lutsk was occupied by the German 13th TD, the 14th TD was located at Torchin. Further from Lutsk to Torgovitsa there was no defense; during the day the defense was to be occupied by the tank divisions of the 9th MK, which were located in the Olyka-Klevan area in the morning. The Germans brought the 299th Infantry Division to Merchant. From Torgovitsa to Mlynov, the motorized rifle regiment of the 40th TD of the 19th MK Red Army occupied the defense along the river. The rifle regiment of the 228th Infantry Division of the 36th Infantry Division of the Red Army took up defense near Mlynov, and the German 111th Infantry Division acted against it. The tank regiments of the 40th TD and the infantry regiment of the 228th Infantry Division were in the forest near Radov in reserve. In the Pogoreltsy area the motorized rifle regiment of the 43rd TD operated, in the Mladechny area the rifle regiment of the 228th infantry regiment operated. The German 11th Tank Division occupied the Dubno-Verba area against them. Further from Surmichi to Sudobichi there was no defense; the 140th Infantry Division of the 36th Infantry Division had not yet reached this line. Further, from Sudobichi to Kremenets, the 146th Infantry Division of the 36th Infantry Division defended. In the Kremenets area the defense was held by the 14th cavalry division of the 5th cavalry division.

On the morning of June 26, German divisions continued their offensive. In the morning, the German 13th TD threw back units of the 131st Infantry Division beyond the intersection of the Lutsk-Rivne and Rozhishche-Mlynov roads, and turned towards Mlynov. The positions near Lutsk were transferred to the 14th TD. Rokossovsky's tank divisions were supposed to reach the area of ​​the breakthrough of the German 13th TD in the afternoon, and before that the road was open. Moving along it, the 13th TD in the afternoon reached the rear of the Soviet 40th TD, which was fighting with the 299th Infantry Division at Torgovitsa and the 111th Infantry Division at Mlynov. This breakthrough led to the disorderly withdrawal of the 40th TD and the 228th SD regiment to Radov and further north.

The German 11th TD advanced in two battle groups, the tank group drove back the Soviet infantry of the 43rd TD and the 228th SD regiment to Krylov and Radov, and occupied Varkovichi. The German motorized brigade of the 11th TD, moving through Surmichi, met the marching columns of the Soviet 140th Infantry Division southeast of Lipa, which could not withstand the sudden collision and retreated in disarray to the south, to Tartak. The 43rd Tank Division of the 19th Mechanized Corps, with 79 tanks of the 86th Tank Regiment, broke through the defensive positions of the German 11th Tank Division and by 6 o'clock in the evening broke into the outskirts of Dubno, reaching the Ikva River. Due to the retreat on the left flank of the 140th Division of the 36th Rifle Corps, and on the right of the 40th Tank Division, both flanks of the 43rd Tank Division were unprotected, and units of the division, on the orders of the corps commander, began to withdraw from Dubno after midnight to the area to the west Smooth. From the south, from the Toporov area, to Radekhov the 19th Tank Division of the 10th Tank Division of the 15th Mechanized Corps of the General was advancing I. I. Karpezo with the task of defeating the enemy and connecting with units of the 124th and 87th rifle divisions, surrounded in the area of ​​Voinitsa and Milyatin. In the first half of the day on June 26, the 37th Tank Division of the Mechanized Corps crossed the Radostavka River and advanced forward. The 10th Panzer Division encountered anti-tank defenses at Kholuyev and was forced to withdraw. The corps units were subjected to a massive German air raid, during which the commander, Major General Carpezo, was seriously wounded. General's 8th Mechanized Corps D. I. Ryabysheva, having completed a 500-kilometer march since the beginning of the war and left half of the tanks and part of the artillery on the road due to breakdowns and air strikes, by the evening of June 25, he began to concentrate in the area Buska, southwest of Brody.

On the morning of June 26, the mechanized corps entered Brody with the further task of advancing on Dubno. Corps reconnaissance discovered German defenses on the river Ikwa and on the river Sytenka, as well as parts of the 212th motorized division of the 15th mechanized corps, which had moved out of Brody the day before. On the morning of June 26, the 12th Tank Division, Major General Mishanina crossed the Slonovka River and, having restored the bridge, attacked and captured the city by 16.00 hours Leshnev. On the right flank 34th Tank Division Colonel I.V. Vasiliev destroyed the enemy column, taking about 200 prisoners and capturing 4 tanks. By the end of the day, the divisions of the 8th mechanized corps had advanced 8-15 km in the direction of Berestechko, displacing units of the 57th Infantry and a motorized brigade of the 16th Tank Division of the enemy, which had retreated and entrenched themselves behind the Plyashevka River. The tank regiment of the 16th TD continued the offensive in the direction of Kozin. The Germans sent the 670th anti-tank battalion and a battery of 88-mm anti-aircraft guns to the battle area. The 212th Motorized Rifle Division of the Red Army did not receive an order to support the attack of the 8th MK. By evening, the enemy was already trying to counterattack parts of the mechanized corps. On the night of June 27, the mechanized corps received an order to leave the battle and begin concentration behind the 37th sk.

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  Actions of the parties in counterattacks since June 27

  Commander of the 5th Army, Major General M.I. Potapov, still in the midst of the battles of the previous day, not knowing about the breakthrough of the German 13th tank division near Lutsk, gives the order to the tank divisions of the 9th MK, which were at that time in the Novoselki-Olyka region, to stop moving west and turn south to Dubno. The corps completed the maneuver only at two o'clock in the morning on June 27, having taken the starting positions for the attack along the Putilovka River. The 19th Mechanized Corps in the morning of the same day also received an order to resume a counterattack fromSmooth on Mlynov And Dubno. Units of the 15th Mechanized Corps were supposed to reach Berestechko. On June 26-27, the Germans transported infantry units across the Ikva River and concentrated the 13th Tank, 299th Infantry, and 111th Infantry Divisions against the 9th and 19th Mechanized Corps.

  At dawn on June 27, the 24th Tank Regiment of the 20th Tank Division of Colonel Katukov from the 9th Mechanized Corps attacked units of the 13th German Tank Division on the move, capturing about 300 prisoners. During the day, the division itself lost 33 BT tanks. The offensive of the 9th MK Red Army floundered after the German 299th Infantry Division, advancing in the direction of Ostrozhets-Olyk, attacked the open western flank of the 35th TD of the Red Army at Malin. The withdrawal of this division to Olyka threatened the encirclement of the 20th TD of the Red Army, which was fighting with the motorized infantry brigade of the 13th TD in Dolgoshey and Petushki. With fighting, the 20th TD breaks through to Klevan. The tank divisions of the 19th MK Red Army were unable to go on the offensive and had difficulty repelling the attacks of the tank regiment of the reconnaissance battalion and the motorcycle battalion of the enemy's 13th TD on Rovno. The Soviet 228th Infantry Division, which had only a quarter of its ammunition on June 25, after two days of fighting found itself without ammunition, semi-encircled near Radov and during the retreat to Zdolbunov was attacked by reconnaissance units of the German 13th and 11th TD and 111th Infantry Division, during the retreat it was All artillery was abandoned. The division was saved from defeat only by the fact that the German 13th and 11th tank divisions were advancing in diverging directions and did not seek to destroy the 228th division. During the retreat and under air strikes, some of the tanks, vehicles and guns of the 19th Mechanized Corps were lost. The 36th Rifle Corps was incapable of combat and did not have a unified leadership (the headquarters made its way through the forests to its divisions from near Mizoch), so it was also unable to go on the attack. The German 111th Infantry Division was approaching the Dubno district from Mlynov. Near Lutsk, the German 298th Infantry Division launched an offensive with the support of tanks from the 14th Panzer Division.




V. Goncharov Tank battle of Dubno (June 1941)

Heavy tank, staggering, rides

On the skulls of other people's fighters.

They don't see anything in the world

Eyes plugged with lead.

But he goes to the tunnels of guns,

But he destroys the tank by touch,

The number of tons clenched into a fist -

Iron skeleton through concrete...

M. Kulchitsky, 1939

I. Theory and practice

The tragedy experienced by the Red Army in the summer of 1941 has long been repeatedly reflected in novels, memoirs and dry historical works. But it can be fully understood only by realizing how much the leadership of the Soviet Union and the Red Army believed in the power of their tank forces.

Soviet Russia became the sixth country in the world to organize the production of tanks of its own design. However, mass production of tracked armored vehicles in the USSR began only in 1931–1932, when the country's heavy industry reached a level that allowed for uninterrupted mass production of complex military equipment. The cruel magic of industrialization has produced yet another miracle. Within literally three or four years, the Soviet Union became the owner of the most powerful tank forces in the world. At the Kyiv maneuvers of 1935, the fighting qualities of these troops were shown to stunned foreign representatives in all their glory. Tanks jumped over ditches, parachuted from transport aircraft, immediately crossed rivers - in a word, they demonstrated many ways to quickly penetrate deep into enemy defenses.

However, having tanks is only half the battle. The main thing is to know how to use them. While other countries were debating whether tanks should support infantry or operate separately from it, Soviet military thought had been creating the theory of deep operations since the late 20s. True, contrary to popular belief, tanks did not immediately enter the deep operation system.

Even in the Field Manual of 1929 (PU-29), it was planned to create groups of long-range tanks (LD) to operate without infantry support directly in the depths of enemy positions. And already in 1930, the prominent theorist of tank forces K. B. Kalinovsky, in the article “Problems of maneuver warfare from the point of view of mechanization and motorization,” published in the newspaper “Red Star”, wrote:

“The deployment stage of an operational maneuver is depicted as follows. Mechanized formations, strategic cavalry (1st echelon of operational maneuver), rushing into the breakthrough together with powerful attack and bomber aircraft, and in oncoming collisions eliminate enemy operational reserves approaching on foot or in vehicles.

Disorganization of the enemy's rear - control centers, supply bases ... is carried out by raiding mechanized formations and strategic cavalry, accompanied by airborne assault forces.

At the same time, military formations (the second echelon of operational maneuver) are deploying a maneuver in vehicles (vehicle maneuver) supplied from the main command’s vehicle reserve...”




In the same year, the first experimental mechanized brigade appeared within the Red Army, which soon received the name Kalinovsky (after the tragic death of Konstantin Bronislavovich in 1931). Already in 1932, the first two mechanized corps were formed - the 11th and 45th (respectively, from the 11th Infantry Division of the Leningrad Military District and the 45th Infantry Division of the Kyiv Military District). Each corps consisted of two brigades of three battalions.

In the same year, the first “Combat Manual of Mechanized and Motorized Troops” appeared. It already took into account the possibility of using independent mechanized formations in the depths of the enemy’s defense in operational cooperation with higher combined arms formations (army and front). However, the main role tanks were supposed to play was precisely in suppressing and overcoming enemy defenses to their entire tactical depth. But in the draft of the temporary manual for motorized mechanized troops of the Red Army (1932), we were already talking about the actions of a mechanized formation in the operational rear and on enemy communications, as well as about raid operations. It was also pointed out that it was inappropriate to use mechanized formations to directly break through the enemy’s prepared defenses - direct infantry support tanks (NDS) were assigned to this purpose. It was assumed that a mechanized corps could also carry out defensive operations, but in this case attention was focused on mobile active defense. The military theory of that time denied the possibility and necessity of using tanks in defense - in the same 1932, military theorist S. N. Ammosov wrote that “Mechanized units are not capable of holding terrain for a long time; using them for this task is impractical and does not correspond to their main property - the ability to deliver strong deep blows.”

In 1934, the People's Commissar of Defense approved the “Temporary Instructions for Deep Combat” - the theory of deep combat finally received its practical form. “Deep battle” meant simultaneous massive impact on the entire depth of enemy defenses with the help of tanks, aircraft and artillery, thereby encircling and destroying the main enemy forces. All tanks were divided into those operating directly with the infantry (NPP), interacting with it in the tactical depth of enemy defense (long-range infantry support - DPP) and long-range tanks (LD), operating against the enemy’s operational reserves to a depth of 18–20 kilometers. Deeper operations against the enemy rear were to be carried out by army means - mechanized formations and strategic cavalry.

By the beginning of 1934, the Red Army had about 7,800 tanks - more than any other country. This year, two more mechanized corps were formed - the 7th in the Leningrad and 5th in the Moscow military districts. In addition, by 1936 the Red Army consisted of 6 separate mechanized brigades and 15 regiments as part of cavalry divisions. By the end of 1937, about 19.5 thousand tanks were produced in the Soviet Union, of which approximately 500 were sold abroad. Taking into account the inevitable decommissioning of some vehicles, the size of the tank fleet of the Red Army by 1938 can be estimated at approximately 17 thousand units - more than there were tanks in the rest of the world at that time.

Abandoned T-34 on the street of Lvov




However, by the end of the 30s, it became obvious that very soon a significant part of the Soviet tank armada would lose its combat effectiveness due to physical or moral obsolescence. And anti-tank defense has not stood still over the past years. Appearing during the First World War, and now widespread in all armies of the world, light and maneuverable anti-tank guns with a caliber of 35–47 mm at a direct fire distance could successfully fight vehicles protected by bulletproof (15–20 mm) armor. The cheapness of light anti-tank guns, even compared to field artillery, made it possible to widely supply troops with them - now there was no need to use divisional and corps guns to fight tanks. As a result, light tanks were practically defenseless in open battle.

The experience of the Spanish War, in which tanks and anti-tank artillery were massively used on both sides, turned out to be very contradictory. On the one hand, under concentrated fire from anti-tank guns, tanks failed en masse (not always, however, irrevocably), on the other hand, a well-organized tank attack very often achieved success if the necessary interaction with the infantry was established. The high speed of the tank, considered the best protection against anti-tank fire, could not always manifest itself.

As a result, it was concluded that it was necessary to reform the tank forces and a new approach to the characteristics of promising tanks. Immediately upon returning from Spain, D. G. Pavlov, appointed head of the Main Armored Directorate, formulated his requirements for new tanks as follows:

– For light vehicles – protection from fire from heavy machine guns, anti-tank rifles and 37 mm cannons at a distance of 600 meters or more, that is, 20–25 mm thick;

– For medium tanks – protection from fire from 37 mm guns at all distances, from fire from 47 mm guns – at distances of 800 meters or more, that is, a thickness of 40–42 mm;

– For heavy tanks – protection from fire from 47 mm anti-tank guns at all distances, that is, a thickness of at least 60 mm. At the same time, the possibility of further modernization with increasing the reservation by one stage was specifically discussed.

However, judging by the documents, the speed of tanks still worried the military much more than their armor protection: until the end of 1938, the military and production workers were discussing what kind of cruising tank should be, wheeled or tracked. Although a tank with anti-ballistic armor had already been designed in the USSR - it was the T-46-5 (aka T-111), equipped with 45-mm armor, which was proactively developed at the Kirov Plant (No. 185) in Leningrad on the basis of the new experimental T-46 tank . The new machine attracted the interest of the new head of the State Academic Technical University, but did not go into production due to the complexity and low-tech design. But based on the experience of its testing in 1939, an official decision was made to begin developing tanks with anti-ballistic armor.

As a result, all existing trends converged in the summer of 1939, when the tracked A-32 with 30 mm armor and a 76 mm gun showed almost identical performance characteristics in comparison with its “sibling” - the wheeled-tracked A-20 with 25 mm armor and a 45 mm cannon. After the armor was increased to 45 mm, the A-34 tank appeared, “advance” adopted for service in December 1939, and in May of the following year its mass production began under the designation T-34.

Almost simultaneously - by the autumn of 1939 - heavy tanks of new designs - T-100, SMK and KV - were completed and put into testing. The first two had two turrets with 76-mm and 45-mm cannons and 60 mm of armor; on the last, both guns were installed in one turret, making it possible to increase the armor to 75 mm.

At the same time, serious changes occurred in the structure of tank forces. In 1938, in anticipation of the transition to new models, tank production was reduced by 25–30%; in August of the same year, mechanized corps were renamed tank corps. As a result of the “Liberation Campaign” in Poland, it was decided to disband the existing tank corps as cumbersome and difficult to control, and instead switch to a brigade system. In the future, it was planned to begin the formation of tank divisions with a regular strength of 275 tanks and 49 armored vehicles. However, this reorganization was not completed before the start of the Finnish War.

The results of the Finnish War were again ambiguous. On the one hand, the first combat test of the experimental still heavy tanks T-100, SMK and KV was considered very successful - the new vehicles were capable of withstanding dozens of hits from 37-mm anti-tank shells without any damage and freely maneuvering on the battlefield several times crossing the line of enemy trenches. On the other hand, it turned out that heavy vehicles could not be used as “leaders” of armadas of light tanks, and there were too few of them for an independent breakthrough. Light tanks were shot at en masse by well-camouflaged Finnish anti-tank artillery; in addition, interaction with the infantry was extremely poorly established - the soldiers lay under machine-gun fire and did not follow the tanks.

The conclusion was obvious: a real tank must have anti-ballistic armor and independently lead infantry into battle.

Then came the spring of 1940 and the Wehrmacht's lightning campaign in France, during which tank strike weapons demonstrated their enormous power. Even before the end of the French campaign, at the very beginning of June 1940, the People's Commissariat of Defense ordered the creation of mechanized corps again. Now each corps was supposed to include two tank and one motorized division - 36,080 people, 1,031 tanks, 268 armored vehicles and 358 guns and mortars.

By the end of 1940, nine mechanized corps were created. In June 1941, the Red Army already had 20 mechanized corps, which were armed with 10,394 tanks - including 1,325 KV and T-34 vehicles. In total, by this time, about 2050 medium and heavy tanks of the new brands - KV and T-34 - had been produced, of which 1475 vehicles were located in the five western border districts.

Mechanized corps were supposed to be a weapon of an independent operation. It was assumed that they could break through the enemy’s defenses themselves, fight his artillery, destroy nearby rear areas and enter the operational space. However, the main way to use armored formations was to enter an already completed breakthrough for the further development of the operation. As the former head of the ABTU (who by that time had become the commander of the Western Special Military District) D. G. Pavlov said at a meeting of the top leadership of the Red Army at the end of December 1940:

“The tank corps, destroying everything in its path, will lead the motorized infantry and cavalry, and they will be followed by ordinary rifle units with full effort in order to speed up the speed of movement, quickly enter the operational space, capture and firmly hold the territory.”




Here's what it looked like in practice:

“Heavy tanks hit field and anti-tank artillery, medium tanks finish off anti-tank guns and machine guns. All this is done along the way. All units rush to an intermediate assembly area, usually designated after overcoming a tactical depth of 20–25 km. Here the battle formation is quickly adopted, data from all types of reconnaissance is received, and a short order is given in accordance with the situation. If it becomes known that the approaching enemy reserves have occupied the rear defensive zone, then the tank corps will attack it from the flanks and rear with the entire mass of tanks, artillery, and its motorized infantry. The bulk of aviation is rushing against this enemy. In any case, resistance must be broken, because the further course of events, the further development of actions against suitable reserves depends entirely on the speed of breaking the second defensive line. And this speed can always be created only through massive and rapid action by tanks. After breaking through the second defensive line, the third stage begins, which is characterized by the fact that it requires the most decisive and quick actions to defeat suitable reserves and destroy the main enemy group, on the way of whose retreat the mechanized corps will firmly stand and, together with units operating from the front, will destroy the enemy. The main enemy of the mechanized corps is the enemy’s motorized and tank units, which must be destroyed first.”

It is easy to see that tanks in this view are a universal combat weapon - they are the ones who destroy enemy infantry and artillery, as well as enemy tank and motorized units. “A tank is the same artillery, only more accurate, protected from fire and firing direct fire.” Pavlov had spoken before about the fact that tanks themselves are mobile artillery - at a meeting of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to summarize the experience of the Finnish campaign in April 1940. He believed that at least some of the artillery support functions could be taken over by heavy tanks. And Stalin then supported him, declaring that “tanks are moving artillery.”

It is characteristic that in his report Pavlov does not take into account the enemy’s opposition at all and does not mention the possibility of his counterattacks - even when it comes to the task of the mechanized corps “to stand on the escape route and, together with the troops operating from the front, encircle and destroy [the enemy].” Moreover, the report also paid minimal attention to the actions of its motorized units (of which exactly half were in the mechanized corps - four motorized rifle and one motorcycle regiment for five tank regiments). Motorized infantry is only mentioned here as something that goes in close proximity to tanks and sometimes accompanies them in an attack, but has no independent significance. Even the actions of the motorized division of the corps are said to be “can be successfully thrown forward or to the flank to pin down an enemy twice as superior in order to subsequently enable tank divisions to deliver the final blow to completely defeat the enemy.” Motorcycle regiment of the corps should “intercept the enemy’s escape routes, blow up bridges, capture the defile and act to pin down the enemy until the main attack of the corps is prepared”- that is, to conduct reconnaissance and maneuver actions to ensure the main strike.

Thus, in their views on the use of mechanized corps of the 1940 model, the Soviet command considered them to be the main striking force of tanks, and considered motorized infantry as something auxiliary, incapable of independent action without tank support. The tanks themselves were endowed with the features of a superweapon, capable of solving all the tasks of defeating the enemy at once. D. G. Pavlov himself in his report spoke about the need to take with you into an offensive operation only the minimum required amount of transport with fuel, ammunition, food, stipulating that “All other traffic must be brought down and left in the original area. It must be loaded with fuel and fire supplies and at the first opportunity ready to move to join the mechanized corps.” Other theorists went even further. Thus, I. Sukhov wrote in 1940:




“Technical means, even artillery, in order not to deprive the troops introduced into the breakthrough of their main property - mobility, are assigned to the extent of extreme necessity. Artillery support is being replaced by aviation support. For the same purpose, one should not clutter up mobile troops with the rear. If possible, it is necessary to make extensive use of local resources (except for ammunition), and in some cases organize, at least partially, the supply of mobile troops with the help of aviation.”

On the contrary, the German command had a completely different view of the combat use of mobile mechanized formations and formations. Back in 1937, in the book “Attention, Tanks!” G. Guderian said: “Interaction with other branches of the military is absolutely necessary for the armored forces, since they, like all other troops, are not able to independently solve all the tasks assigned to them without exception. Interoperability requirements impose certain obligations on armored units, as well as on other branches of the military, especially if they are intended for constant interaction.”

Later, in his work “Tanks - Forward,” summarizing the experience of German armored forces in World War II, Guderian wrote about the interaction of military branches in a tank formation as follows: “This interaction can be compared to an orchestra, in which various instruments can perform a concerto in its entirety only under the general guidance of a conductor. Depending on the nature of the work, first one or another instrument comes to the fore... In open areas, especially in the desert, tanks not only set the tone, but also perform an important solo part. On rough terrain with various obstacles, they fade into the background or temporarily do not play any role at all. In these conditions, motorized infantry and sappers come to the fore. Only the bass of the artillery is heard everywhere, sometimes reaching a crescendo.”

However, back in 1937, he characterized the importance of motorized infantry in armored units with the following aphoristic phrase:

“The task of the infantry or, even better, motorized riflemen is to immediately use the influence of the tank attack to move forward as quickly as possible and with their own actions complete the capture of the area captured by tanks and clear it of the enemy[emphasis added– V.G. ].»

From this it is clearly seen that the German armored forces were initially, even during the process of their construction, created as a finely balanced instrument, having as its main task the same as the infantry: occupying territory, or more precisely, key objects on it, control of which puts the enemy at a disadvantage and leads to his destruction. All other tank tasks were subordinated to achieving this goal.

At the same time, Soviet military leaders, fascinated by tank power, viewed mechanized troops as a means of directly defeating the enemy, destroying his manpower and equipment. Motorized infantry and even artillery attached to the mechanized corps played a subordinate role in this view; tanks were seen as the main means of achieving success.

But the need for special elaboration of motorized infantry tactics was emphasized by K. B. Kalinovsky. In 1931, shortly before his death, he noted:




“In general, it turns out, strange as it may seem, that a motorized formation... equipped with appropriate reconnaissance means, has greater independence than a similar mechanized formation... [But] from the point of view of offensive capabilities, the offensive ability of a mechanized formation is higher than that of a motorized one... The ability to hold terrain with a motorized one the connection is complete, but for a mechanized formation this ability will be almost zero, the strength of a mechanized formation will be in movement and in fire.”

“Thus, this [mechanized] formation will be characterized by high mobility to the battlefield, limited maneuverability, and sufficient ability to hold terrain.”

Alas, ten years later these words were forgotten. The Soviet military leadership viewed mechanized corps solely as an offensive weapon - forgetting that to achieve success it was not enough to capture a position, it was also necessary to hold it. This can be seen from a simple comparison of the states of Soviet and German armored formations. The German tank divisions of 1941 had a large number of motorized infantry - about 7,000 men in five battalions out of a total division strength of 13,700 men. It is characteristic that before the Polish campaign of 1939 there were more tanks in the division (about 300 versus 150–200), but there were only 2,850 motorized infantry. The experience of two maneuver campaigns brought considerable experience to the Wehrmacht, but the Red Army did not have such experience. Therefore, the Soviet tank division in 1940 had 10,940 people, but for 375 tanks in eight tank battalions there were only three motorized infantry battalions totaling about 3,000 people, as well as only 2,000 small arms. Against 2,100 cars and 1,300 motorcycles (half of them with sidecars) in the German tank division, we had only 1,360 vehicles in the tank division and 1,540 in the motorized division. At the same time, only the divisions in the mechanized corps of the formation approached full-time strength, and most of them did not even have the specified number of vehicles. The mechanized corps were also not equipped with anti-tank artillery; only on May 14, 1941, the leadership of the ABTU of the Red Army decided to equip the incomplete tank regiments of the late formation mechanized corps with 45-mm and 76-mm mechanized guns for use as anti-tank guns.

* * *

Total number of tanks, available in the Red Army by June 22, 1941, still serves as a reason for much speculation. This is especially true when comparing the number of Soviet tanks with the number of German ones. However, the matter was not as simple as it seems at first glance.

It is known that from 1928 to June 21, 1941, Soviet industry produced about 30 thousand tanks, wedges and vehicles based on them, of which approximately 500 vehicles were delivered abroad (Spain, China and Turkey). There were a little less than a thousand cars irrevocably lost during various military operations (including about 600 during the Finnish War). A small number of tanks and wedges were captured during the Polish campaign, as well as when the Baltic republics joined the USSR; some of these tanks were subsequently put into service with the Red Army.

According to data published by historians N. Zolotov and I. Isaev in 1993, as of June 1941, there were 23,106 tanks in the Red Army. That is, of all the tanks produced over 12 years (including 959 MS-1, 1627 double-turret T-26 and 7330 T-27, T-37A and T-38 tankettes), only about five thousand were written off due to wear and tear.

There are other numbers too. Thus, the well-known reference book “Classified as Classified” speaks of 22.6 thousand Red Army tanks in June 1941. On the contrary, M. Meltyukhov in the book “Stalin’s Missed Chance” gives a table of the number of tanks by military district, compiled according to RGASPI data, from which it follows that on June 1, 1941, the Red Army had as many as 25,479 tanks, of which 881 were in warehouses and repair bases tank.

In the second volume of the fundamental research “Domestic armored vehicles. XX century" contains a more detailed version of the table given by Meltyukhov, which differs in a number of numbers - it follows from it that taking into account warehouses, repair bases and all other storage places, on June 1, 1941, there were 25,850 tanks in the Red Army, of which 42 were in warehouses, and 629 is generally unclear where (column “impersonal”). However, from the same table it is clear that not only combat vehicles were taken into account, but all equipment manufactured at the tank base - including tractors, ARVs, engineer tanks, transporters, teletanks and various experimental vehicles. In addition, the total figure included 1,132 T-38 tanks, 2,318 T-37 tanks and 2,493 T-27 tankettes, an analogue of the French Renault UE. When comparing the tank fleet of the USSR with the tank fleet of Germany, these vehicles, naturally, should not be taken into account - the Germans simply did not have them, and their combat value was very low. Moreover, according to the order of the USSR NKO No. 0349 dated December 10, 1940, all T-27 tanks were withdrawn from rifle formations and transferred to battalions of medium and heavy tanks for tactical exercises (in order to preserve the materiel of the new vehicles) - that is, they were no longer used as combat tanks cars. Thus, we can assume that the discrepancy in the numbers is caused mainly by the incorrect registration of T-27 tankettes as combat vehicles - whereas by the summer of 1941 they were just training equipment.

Apparently, the most reliable and definitive source of information on the number of Soviet tanks should be considered the document given in the appendices to this publication - the report of the head of the Main Armored Directorate to the Main Military Council of the Red Army on the state of provision of armored and transport equipment to the Red Army on June 1, 1941. According to him, at that time the Red Army had a total of 23,268 tanks and wedges in service, of which 4,721 were armed only with rifle-caliber machine guns T-37, T-38 and double-turret T-26.

Number of combat-ready tanks in the Red Army as of June 1941 also remains the subject of fierce debate. In the Red Army, tanks were divided into four categories according to their condition. According to data first published back in 1961, of the number of vehicles of old brands, only 27% were combat-ready (1st and 2nd categories), another 44% of tanks required medium repairs in district workshops (3rd category), and 29 % – overhaul at tank industry factories (4th category). However, in the already mentioned work of N. Zolotov and I. Isaev, completely different figures are given - 80.9% of serviceable tanks of all brands and 19.1% of vehicles requiring medium and major repairs (including those in NPO warehouses and repair bases). In the border districts, the number of faulty vehicles was 17.5% of the total number of tanks, and in the internal districts - 21.8%.

It is possible that over time these figures will also be refuted by someone, and on the basis of equally rigorous archival sources. Note that even in aviation (where aircraft become obsolete and are written off much more often), the percentage of fully serviceable aircraft has always been much lower than 80.9% of the staff. One of the possible explanations for such a striking discrepancy between documents and reality is the traditional love for exaggerated reporting in our Fatherland. For example, reports from the troops in June 1941 indicate that many tanks that, according to reports, had undergone medium and even major repairs, in fact still turned out to be ineffective. Another example: according to the report of the commander of the 8th Mechanized Corps, Lieutenant General D. Ryabyshev, of the 932 tanks of the corps, 197 vehicles required factory (that is, major) repairs - and this is already 21.1% of the corps’ regular composition. Finally, we have already seen that the data given by Zolotov and Isaev did not take into account some of the cars available in the districts; it is possible that they were initially classified as 5th category - as scrap metal...

It should be noted that in order to recognize a vehicle as “in need of repair” (that is, belonging to the 3rd or 4th categories), according to NKO order No. 0283 of October 24, 1940, a decision of a special technical commission was necessary, the act of which was approved by the unit commander. This commission did not operate constantly, and something could generally fall outside its attention.

One way or another, by June 1941, there were 12,780 tanks and wedges in the five western military districts, of which no more than 10.5 thousand were operational. Among them were 469 KV and 850 T-34 tanks, 51 five-turret T-35 and 424 three-turret T-28. From May 31 to June 21, the factories shipped and sent to the troops another 41 KV and 238 T-34, but we do not know how many of them reached the border.

How many tanks did the enemy have at that moment? In total, up to June 1941, about 7,500 tanks were produced in Germany. In addition, a significant amount of armored vehicles were captured in France in 1940. The exact number of trophies is unknown, since there was no centralized recording of them.

How many total tanks were in the Wehrmacht by June 1941 is also not entirely clear. Müller-Hillebrant calls the figure 5640 tanks, M. Meltyukhov (with reference to the work of F. Khan) - 6292 tanks. Thus, the percentage of decommissioned and lost tanks in the Wehrmacht turned out to be almost the same as in the Red Army - 16 versus 14. But Soviet tanks were mass produced since 1930, while German ones - since 1936, that is, for the most part they were significantly newer…

The situation is a little simpler with tanks concentrated against the Soviet Union. The classic work of B. Müller-Hillebrand “German Land Army. 1933–1945” states that there were 17 tank divisions on the Soviet border, which included approximately 3,330 tanks, and about 250 more vehicles in the assault gun divisions. In addition, there were about 350 tanks in two OKH reserve tank divisions (2nd and 5th) assigned to the Eastern Front.

Since then, the figure 3580 + 350 has been repeated many times on the pages of various studies seeking to emphasize the multiple superiority of Soviet tank forces over German ones. To complete the picture, some “researchers” compared (and continue to compare) it not with the number of Soviet tanks on the western border, but with the total number of tanks in the USSR - 23-25 ​​thousand vehicles.

However, the second volume of Müller-Hillebrandt's work, from which the above data is taken, was first published in Frankfurt am Main back in 1956. And since then, many new studies have appeared that seriously correct the above figures.

So, for example, it turned out that Müller-Hillebrandt somewhere lost 160 35(t) tanks from the 6th Panzer Division of the 4th Panzer Group of Gepner - he has these vehicles listed in the Wehrmacht, but they are not listed on the Eastern Front at all.

In addition, the German troops in Northern Finland included two tank battalions silently mentioned by Müller-Hillebrant - the 40th and 211th, the latter was equipped with captured French tanks R-39 and H-39, and used French tanks as command vehicles. aka Somua S-35. In total, these battalions consisted of about 120 tanks. In addition, three battalions of flamethrower tanks were allocated for the Eastern Front - the 100th, 101st and 102nd, in total they had 173 tanks, with the last battalion consisting of heavy French B-1bis vehicles (24 flamethrowers and 6 conventional linear ) - so, contrary to popular belief, the Germans had heavy tanks on the Eastern Front. Müller-Hillebrandt also mentions flamethrower tanks, but in the column of their number on the Eastern Front there is a modest question mark...

Müller-Hillebrand also names the number of tanks in 17 German tank divisions on the Eastern Front (excluding two RGK divisions) - 3266 vehicles. But this is not true - only vehicles of tank regiments are taken into account here, without the “pioneer” battalions, which also had tanks. In total, 17 divisions had 3,470 vehicles, but if we add here the five separate tank battalions mentioned above, we already get 3,763 tanks.

Another type of Wehrmacht armored vehicles were assault and self-propelled guns. Assault guns in the Wehrmacht were reduced to separate divisions and batteries, and sometimes were assigned to elite motorized formations. In total, by June 1, 1941, there were 357 StuG.III in the East in thirteen divisions (184th, 185th, 190th, 191st, 192nd, 197th, 203rd, 201st, 21st 0-m, 226-m, 243-m, 244-m and 245-m) and five separate batteries, as well as in three batteries of assault guns of the motorized SS divisions “Reich” and “Totenkopf”, Leibstandarte (motorized brigade) SS “ Adolf Hitler", motorized regiment "Greater Germany" and the 900th motorized training brigade. As we see, the indicated number is one and a half times greater than what follows from Muller-Hillebrandt.

As for self-propelled guns, they were represented by a heavy 150-mm infantry gun on the chassis of the Pz.I tank and a 47-mm Panzer-jager.I anti-tank self-propelled gun on the same carriage. By the beginning of the war in the East, there were 36 of these first vehicles (in six tank divisions) and 175 “Panzerjagers” in five anti-tank divisions of the RGK (521st, 529th, 616th, 643rd and 670th) and two companies - in the 900th training brigade and in the Life Standard.

From captured vehicles, in addition to the 102nd battalion of flamethrower tanks and the 211th tank battalion in Finland, it is known about the presence in the East of three anti-tank divisions (559th, 561st and 611th), equipped with 47-mm guns mounted on database of captured French vehicles. In total, there were 91 vehicles - that is, only 302 self-propelled guns of three types instead of the “about 250” indicated by Muller-Hillebrandt. What is characteristic is that he correctly indicates the number of anti-tank divisions with “panzerjagers” – eight. Here you can also add 15 Somua S-35 tanks, which were part of the landing brigades of armored trains Nos. 26–31.

In addition, very little is known about the 37-mm anti-tank self-propelled guns converted from captured French Renault UE tankette tractors (analogous to our T-27). In December 1940, a decision was made to convert 700 of these self-propelled guns (out of 1,200 available in the Wehrmacht); they were to be supplied to anti-tank units of infantry divisions. There are photographs of these vehicles on the territory of the Soviet Union dating back to the summer of 1941 - but there are no further details.

Thus, in total we have reliable information about 4436 tanks and self-propelled guns available in the German invasion army. Taking into account the two tank divisions of the RGK, we get about 4800 tanks.

To this number it is worth adding tanks of the German allies. Romania had the most serious tank forces. The 1st Tank Regiment, which was part of the 1st Tank Division, was armed with 126 Czech LT-35s (aka German 35(t), designated R-2 in the Romanian army). The 2nd Tank Regiment, operating as part of the 3rd Army Corps of the 4th Romanian Army, consisted of 76 French R-35s - partly purchased, partly inherited from the Poles in 1939. In addition, from the same Poles, the Romanians received several dozen TKS wedges. In four cavalry brigades there were 35 Czech R-1 light machine-gun tanks (purchased from the Czechs AH-IVR), and in other units (mostly training) - 76 Renault FT, including 48 cannon and 28 machine gun.

Since the late 1930s, Renault UE wedges (Romanian name for Malaxa) were produced in Bucharest under a French license; some of these vehicles were given to the Romanians by the Germans after the surrender of France. In total, as of June 1941, there were about 180 of them, all of them were used as tractors for 37 mm anti-tank guns. In total, Romania had about 500 armored vehicles, of which 237 tanks and up to 200 wedges were used at the front.

At the beginning of the new war with the USSR, Finland had about 140 tanks and wedges, of which the troops (tank battalion of the 1st Jaeger Brigade of Colonel Lagus) had 118 vehicles - 2 medium, 74 light and 42 machine-gun wedges.

Hungary, having declared war on the Soviet Union on June 26, sent limited forces to the front - the so-called “Mobile Corps”, which included 60 Toldi light tanks and 95 37M tankettes - Italian CV 3/35. Slovakia also sent a small motorized group (“Piflusek’s group”) - at the end of June it had 62 light tanks (45 LT-35, 10 LT-38, 7 LT-40). You can also remember Italy, which sent one tank battalion with L6 light vehicles to the Eastern Front - 61 pieces.

In total, all of Germany's allies fielded about 500 tanks and over 300 tankettes against the USSR. In total, the Axis forces concentrated against the Soviet Union had about 5.5 thousand tanks by the end of June 1941. Thus, the “multiple” superiority of the Soviet tank armadas in fact turns into only twofold!

To understand what this meant in practice, it is necessary to compare other figures - the total number of opposing factions, the number of artillery, aircraft, automobiles and horse-drawn vehicles.

In principle, most of this data is not secret. In order not to go into a lengthy comparison of figures and sources, we present data from the official publication:




Notes:

* Including Finnish, Romanian and Hungarian troops - 900 thousand people, 5,200 guns and mortars, 260 tanks, 980 combat aircraft, 15 warships of the main classes.

** Including 12,135 50-mm mortars, 5,975 anti-aircraft guns.

*** Of these, 469 are KB tanks and 832 are T-34.




The given figures require some comments. In the work of B. Müller-Hillebrandt, already mentioned above, “German Land Army”, the number of German troops allocated for the Eastern campaign is estimated at 3,300,000 people (out of a total armed forces of 7,234,000 people). The 4th volume of the official German publication “The Third Reich in the Second World War” clarifies: in addition to the ground forces, 650,000 people were allocated from the Air Force and 100,000 from the Navy - therefore, the German army sent a total of 4,050,000 people. For some reason, the SS troops are not taken into account here (according to Müller-Hillebrandt they numbered 150,000 people), most of which were on the Eastern Front.

Romania, which entered the war at the same time as Germany, fielded about 360,000 people, Finland - 340,000, Hungary and Slovakia - 45 thousand people each. The total is about 800 thousand. Finnish aviation had 307 combat aircraft, almost all of them were thrown against the USSR. Romania had 620 combat aircraft, of which about 300 were sent to the front. Hungary had 363 combat aircraft, of which 145 aircraft took part in hostilities in the first two weeks of the war . The Slovak Air Force consisted of 120 aircraft, of which about 50 were sent to the front. As we can see, the official directory of the Russian Ministry of Defense noticeably (by 10%) overestimated the number of enemy troops - but underestimated the number of tanks it had by about the same amount.

However, many modern historians do not agree with the given number of Soviet troops. M. Meltyukhov, relying on data from the statistical reference book “Combat and numerical strength of the Armed Forces of the USSR during the Great Patriotic War,” argues that "grouping of Soviet troops on the western borders" was much larger - it amounted to 3289 thousand people.

In this case, we are dealing with direct forgery. The italicized phrase implies that the troops stationed on the border and who took part in the Border Battle are taken into account. Meanwhile, M. Meltyukhov includes in his calculations not only 153,608 people in the NKVD troops and 215,878 in the Navy, but also 201,619 people, 1,763 tanks and 2,746 guns and mortars in those formations that, at the beginning of the war, were transferred to the West from central and eastern districts. Moreover, here the author of “Stalin’s Lost Chance”, by force of will, reduced the German group by 488 thousand people and 359 tanks, which were allocated for the campaign, but did not go in the first echelon, being in the operational reserve or as part of the RGK. The result is amazing figures: belligerent Germany, preparing the attack in advance, involved 49% of its armed forces in it, while the USSR managed to pull 57% of its armed forces to the border - at the end of July, together with the fleet and NKVD troops, numbering 5,774,211 Human.

The reason for this aberration is simple - the border districts (Leningrad, Baltic, Western, Kiev and Odessa) extended far into the interior of the country, and not all the troops in them were combat troops. Here were located rear and transport structures, warehouses and administrative institutions, training and reserve units - in a word, everything that in the Third Reich was under the authority of the Reserve Army, the Todt Organization, internal structures of the ground forces, navy and air force, and at the first stage " Barbarossa" was not involved in any way. The analogue of the NKVD troops in Germany was the Felgendarmerie and security service (SD) units - but they, like the border troops, were naturally not reflected in the “invasion army”. German formations of the RGK, even those listed in the second echelon, were part of strike groups and, after them, advanced into the territory of the Soviet Union in full readiness for battle - while the units of the Red Army transferred to the West from the internal districts were still far from the border and even in Given the extremely difficult situation, the bulk of them were able to enter into battle only by mid-July - when the Border Battle had long ended.





BT-7 stuck in a swamp and abandoned. Southwestern Front, June 1941




An even more interesting picture emerges if we try to find out the degree of mobility of the opposing armies - that is, the level of their equipment with vehicles. In this regard, Müller-Hillebrant is very stingy - he only briefly mentions that the army in the East had about half a million cars. The number of vehicles in the Red Army as of June 22, 1941 is well known - 272,600 cars and motorcycles of all types (see Appendix to this collection). Based on the distribution of troops by district, it is unlikely that more than half of them were in the West.

In general, it can be stated that during the Border Battle, which unfolded in the first two weeks of the war and largely determined the further course of hostilities, the balance of forces was as follows. The Red Army outnumbered the enemy twice in tanks, but was at least one and a half, or even two times inferior to him in terms of manpower. The number of artillery on both sides was approximately equal, but the greater level of motorization of the German artillery should be taken into account.

Let's conduct a thought experiment: reduce the opposing armies to two proportionally equipped units. With approximately the same amount of artillery (8-10 guns of different calibers), a Soviet detachment of 500 people will have two tanks and one car, and will even be scattered over a large area. The German detachment, already concentrated for the attack, will have 800 people, only one tank, but three or four cars. It is clear that the outcome of the collision will not be decided by the tank, even if it turns out to be a mighty KV...


* * *

However, the characteristics of tanks are also important, so we’ll try to understand them too. Again, we often hear that the Germans could not put up anything against the Soviet T-34 and KV, and their Pz.III and Pz.VI in terms of combat qualities can only be compared with the T-26 and BT.

Alas, this is far from the case. The T-26 tank was descended from the British Vickers six-ton ​​tank, which appeared in 1926. It was adopted by the Red Army in 1931, and in 1933 it received a turret with a 45-mm cannon mod. 1932/34 (20-K), which traced its origins to the 19-K anti-tank gun. This same gun, in turn, came from the German 37-mm anti-tank gun from Rheinmetall - so Soviet and German tank and anti-tank guns of 37 and 45 mm caliber can be considered “cousins”; they had similar weight, rate of fire and armor penetration, differing only in the higher high-explosive effect of the 45-mm projectile.

The BT-5 and BT-7 tanks, based on the designs of the American engineer Christie, were armed with the same 45-mm cannon. Both tanks had 15 mm armor, only on the BT-7 its frontal part was increased to 20 mm. However, if the “infantry” T-26 with its 90-horsepower engine developed a speed of 35 km/h on the highway and 15 km/h on the country road and had a range of 170 km, then the wheeled-tracked BT was a cruising vehicle - with an engine from 365 to 450 hp Even on tracks, it could easily reach 50 km/h on the highway, and up to 35 km/h on a country road. Alas, during tests in 1940, the German Pz.III, having a formally weaker engine (320 hp), overtook both the T-34 and BT-7. It is worth mentioning that in the order of the NKO of the USSR dated December 11, 1938 on combat and political training of troops for 1939, it was recommended to increase the average marching speed of BT battalions to 20 km/h, and for other vehicles (that is, T-26 and T-28) – up to 14 km/h.

In September 1939, during the “Liberation Campaign” in Eastern Poland, Soviet troops, among other trophies, received two German tanks - a “deuce” and a “troika”. When firing at a Pz.III from a Soviet 45-mm tank gun, it turned out that even from a distance of 400 meters and at an angle of 30° to the normal, the 32-mm frontal armor of a German tank was penetrated by only 40% of armor-piercing shells, and at a greater distance or sharper angle hits they bounce off or ricochet. Specialists from the NIIBT test site came to the conclusion that “German cemented armor with a thickness of 32 mm is equivalent to 42–44 mm of homogeneous armor of the IZ type.”

Thus, the 45-mm cannons of Soviet tanks could only be dangerous for the 15-mm armor of the German Pz.I and Pz.II. Even the “Czech” 38 (t), starting with modification E, already had 50 mm frontal armor, so it was invulnerable to “forty-fives” at distances of half a kilometer or more. But the armor of the T-26 and BT penetrated everyone German guns, starting with the 20-mm KwK 30 assault rifle, whose armor-piercing projectile “took” 25 mm from a distance of 300 meters. Therefore, for BT vehicles, the main protection remained speed and maneuverability, but for the T-26 there was no protection at all - by 1941 these vehicles were hopelessly outdated. They could only be saved by shielding, which increased the weight to 13 tons and finally “eaten up” the already not brilliant performance characteristics.

Moreover, even the newest T-34 could not feel reliably protected. The sub-caliber projectile of the new German 50-mm anti-tank gun Pak 38 (in the tank version - KwK 38) at a distance of 500 meters pierced 78 millimeters of homogeneous armor, a conventional armor-piercing projectile - up to 50-60 mm. True, the enemy regiment did not have very many such guns - six in each infantry division and 9 in the tank division. However, by the end of June, the Germans managed to rearm most of their Pz.IIIs with these guns. At least about half of the KVs knocked out in battle were caused by 50-mm guns. And besides them, there were also 105-mm cannons (not to be confused with howitzers of the same caliber), and finally, the famous 88-mm anti-aircraft guns. The latter were in service exclusively with the Luftwaffe and were assigned to field troops only under operational subordination. Oddly enough, in terms of anti-tank warfare, this whim of Goering turned out to be extremely useful - the “flaks” were not dispersed among the units, but were subordinate to the divisional authorities and could be thrown into a tank-hazardous direction at any moment. Do not forget that all of the German artillery described above was motorized and therefore distinguished by high mobility - something that Soviet artillery could not boast of.

* * *

Let's summarize what has been said. The German tank divisions of 1941 were a well-functioning instrument of maneuver warfare, capable of seizing territory and holding it until motorized and then infantry units arrived. At the same time, German tank formations were able to effectively fight the majority of Soviet tanks, using both tank and anti-tank weapons. In principle, German tank crews sought to avoid collisions with enemy combat vehicles: until 1943, anti-tank defense in the Wehrmacht was entrusted to infantry units and anti-tank fighter divisions. However, this was not caused by the Germans realizing the vulnerability of their armored vehicles, as is commonly believed, but simply by the desire to use tanks more effectively for their inherent tasks elsewhere.

On the contrary, Soviet tank divisions could deliver powerful attacks - but even in the event of a successful offensive, they were not able to establish control over the captured territory and organize reliable defense on occupied lines without the support of rifle formations. Tank divisions equipped with old armored vehicles (and these were still the majority) were unable to fight the German Pz.III, Pz.IV and StuG.III vehicles, which made up about half of the enemy’s armored vehicles. At the same time, even the newest Soviet T-34s remained quite vulnerable to German tank and anti-tank artillery. The only machine that was qualitatively superior to all German analogues was the KV. Alas, it was a purely breakthrough machine, not a maneuver warfare machine; in terms of the technique of its use, the KV did not fit well into the concept of operations of the mechanized units of the Red Army that existed by 1941.

Thus, having spent enormous effort and money on creating tank armadas, the Soviet leadership received bulky, unbalanced formations that were of little use for carrying out real combat missions. Modern historians often repeat the mistake of the leaders of the Red Army of the late 1930s - forgetting that the queen of the fields is, after all, the infantry, and no one else. Given the appropriate means, infantry can more or less successfully fight tanks - but tanks are not at all designed to destroy infantry! Tanks can and should make a successful maneuver and disorganize the enemy’s defenses, but the task of destroying the defeated enemy will still fall on the rifle units.

And there was no longer enough time or money to train the rifle units of the Red Army and give them proper mobility. There could not be enough of them - after all, the Soviet Union began mobilization later, and in industrial terms it was significantly inferior to Germany. But even in the Wehrmacht, the number of mobile units was determined not by the desire of the ABTU and NPOs, but by the availability of the required number of vehicles. Forgetting the theoretical developments of the late 20s and lacking proper practical experience, the leadership of the Red Army chased a chimera and spent the efforts of the not very powerful Soviet industry on building a huge number of tanks, ignoring other combat vehicles. When the tank fleet of the 30s became outdated, everything started anew...

And the situation was very bad with the means of communication and control of mobile units and with the trained command staff for them.

When and where did the largest tank battle of the Great Patriotic War actually take place?


both as a science and as a social instrument, alas, it is subject to too much political influence. And it often happens that for some reason - most often ideological - some events are extolled, while others are forgotten or remain underestimated. Thus, the overwhelming majority of our compatriots, both those who grew up during the USSR and in post-Soviet Russia, sincerely consider the Battle of Prokhorovka, an integral part of the Battle of Kursk, to be the largest tank battle in history. But in fairness, it is worth noting that the largest tank battle of the Great Patriotic War actually took place two years earlier and half a thousand kilometers to the west. Within a week, two tank armadas with a total number of about 4,500 armored vehicles converged in the triangle between the cities of Dubno, Lutsk and Brody.

Counterattack on the second day of the war

The actual beginning of the Battle of Dubno, which is also called the Battle of Brody or the Battle of Dubno-Lutsk-Brody, was June 23, 1941. It was on this day that the tank corps - at that time they were usually called mechanized - corps of the Red Army, stationed in the Kiev Military District, launched the first serious counterattacks against the advancing German troops. Georgy Zhukov, a representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, insisted on counterattacking the Germans. Initially, the attack on the flanks of Army Group South was carried out by the 4th, 15th and 22nd mechanized corps, which were in the first echelon. And after them, the 8th, 9th and 19th mechanized corps, which advanced from the second echelon, joined the operation.

Strategically, the plan of the Soviet command was correct: to strike the flanks of the 1st Panzer Group of the Wehrmacht, which was part of Army Group South and was rushing towards Kyiv in order to encircle and destroy it. In addition, the battles of the first day, when some Soviet divisions - such as the 87th division of Major General Philip Alyabushev - managed to stop the superior forces of the Germans, gave hope that this plan could be realized.

In addition, the Soviet troops in this sector had a significant superiority in tanks. On the eve of the war, the Kiev Special Military District was considered the strongest of the Soviet districts, and in the event of an attack, it was assigned the role of executing the main retaliatory strike. Accordingly, the equipment came here first and in large quantities, and the training of the personnel was the highest. So, on the eve of the counterattack, the troops of the district, which by that time had already become the Southwestern Front, had no less than 3,695 tanks. And on the German side, only about 800 tanks and self-propelled guns went on the offensive - that is, more than four times less.

In practice, an unprepared, hasty decision on an offensive operation resulted in the largest tank battle in which Soviet troops were defeated.

Tanks fight tanks for the first time

When the tank units of the 8th, 9th and 19th mechanized corps reached the front line and entered battle from the march, this resulted in an oncoming tank battle - the first in the history of the Great Patriotic War. Although the concept of wars of the mid-twentieth century did not allow such battles. It was believed that tanks were a tool for breaking through enemy defenses or creating chaos on his communications. “Tanks do not fight tanks” - this is how this principle was formulated, common to all armies of that time. Anti-tank artillery, as well as carefully dug-in infantry, had to fight the tanks. And the battle of Dubno completely broke all the theoretical constructions of the military. Here, Soviet tank companies and battalions went literally head-on into German tanks. And they lost.

There were two reasons for this. Firstly, the German troops were much more active and smarter than the Soviet ones, using all types of communications, and the coordination of the efforts of various types and branches of troops in the Wehrmacht at that moment was, unfortunately, head and shoulders above that in the Red Army. In the battle of Dubno-Lutsk-Brody, these factors led to the fact that Soviet tanks often acted without any support and at random. The infantry simply did not have time to support the tanks, to help them in the fight against anti-tank artillery: the rifle units moved on their own and simply did not catch up with the tanks that had gone ahead. And the tank units themselves, at the level above the battalion, acted without general coordination, on their own. It often happened that one mechanized corps was already rushing west, deep into the German defense, and the other, which could support it, began to regroup or retreat from occupied positions...






Burning T-34 in a field near Dubno. Source: Bundesarchiv, B 145 Bild-F016221-0015 / CC-BY-SA



Contrary to concepts and instructions

The second reason for the mass destruction of Soviet tanks in the Battle of Dubno, which needs to be discussed separately, was their unpreparedness for tank combat - a consequence of those very pre-war concepts “tanks do not fight tanks.” Among the tanks of the Soviet mechanized corps that entered the battle of Dubno, light tanks accompanying infantry and raid warfare, created in the early to mid-1930s, were the majority.

More precisely - almost everything. As of June 22, there were 2,803 tanks in five Soviet mechanized corps - the 8th, 9th, 15th, 19th and 22nd. Of these, there are 171 medium tanks (all T-34), 217 heavy tanks (of which 33 KV-2 and 136 KV-1 and 48 T-35), and 2415 light tanks such as T-26, T- 27, T-37, T-38, BT-5 and BT-7, which can be considered the most modern. And the 4th Mechanized Corps, which fought just west of Brody, had another 892 tanks, but exactly half of them were modern - 89 KV-1 and 327 T-34.

Soviet light tanks, due to the specific tasks assigned to them, had bulletproof or anti-fragmentation armor. Light tanks are an excellent tool for deep raids behind enemy lines and operations on his communications, but light tanks are completely unsuited for breaking through defenses. The German command took into account the strengths and weaknesses of armored vehicles and used their tanks, which were inferior to ours in both quality and weapons, in defense, negating all the advantages of Soviet equipment.

German field artillery also had its say in this battle. And if, as a rule, it was not dangerous for the T-34 and KV, then the light tanks had a hard time. And even the armor of the new “thirty-fours” was powerless against the 88-mm Wehrmacht anti-aircraft guns deployed for direct fire. Only the heavy KVs and T-35s resisted them with dignity. The light T-26 and BT, as stated in the reports, “were partially destroyed as a result of being hit by anti-aircraft shells,” and did not simply stop. But the Germans in this direction used not only anti-aircraft guns in anti-tank defense.

The defeat that brought victory closer

And yet, Soviet tankers, even with such “inappropriate” vehicles, went into battle - and often won it. Yes, without air cover, which is why German aircraft knocked out almost half of the columns on the march. Yes, with weak armor, which was sometimes penetrated even by heavy machine guns. Yes, without radio communication and at your own peril and risk. But they walked.

They went and got their way. In the first two days of the counteroffensive, the scales fluctuated: first one side, then the other, achieved success. On the fourth day, Soviet tankers, despite all the complicating factors, managed to achieve success, in some areas throwing the enemy back 25-35 kilometers. In the evening of June 26, Soviet tankers even took the city of Dubno in battle, from which the Germans were forced to retreat... to the east!






Destroyed German tank PzKpfw II. Photo: waralbum.ru

And yet, the Wehrmacht’s advantage in infantry units, without which in that war tankers could only operate fully in rear raids, soon began to take their toll. By the end of the fifth day of the battle, almost all the vanguard units of the Soviet mechanized corps were simply destroyed. Many units were surrounded and were forced to go on the defensive on all fronts. And with each passing hour, the tankers increasingly lacked serviceable vehicles, shells, spare parts and fuel. It got to the point that they had to retreat, leaving the enemy with almost undamaged tanks: there was no time or opportunity to put them on the move and take them with them.

Today you can come across the opinion that if the leadership of the front, contrary to the order of Georgy Zhukov, had not given the command to move from offensive to defensive, the Red Army, they say, would have turned back the Germans at Dubno. I wouldn't turn back. Alas, that summer the German army fought much better, and its tank units had much more experience in active cooperation with other branches of the military. But the Battle of Dubno played its role in thwarting Hitler’s Barbarossa plan. The Soviet tank counterattack forced the Wehrmacht command to bring into battle reserves that were intended for an offensive in the direction of Moscow as part of Army Group Center. And after this battle the direction to Kyiv itself began to be considered a priority.

And this did not fit into the long-agreed German plans, it broke them - and broke them so much that the tempo of the offensive was catastrophically lost. And although the difficult autumn and winter of 1941 lay ahead, the largest tank battle had already spoken its word in the history of the Great Patriotic War. This, the battle of Dubno, echoed two years later on the fields near Kursk and Orel - and was echoed in the first volleys of victorious fireworks...