(Catacombs, Catacomb Church), the totality of illegal communities of the Russian Church, the church underground in the USSR in the 20-80s. 20th century The name "catacomb movement" comes from lat. catacumba - underground cemeteries, which served as shelters for Christians during the persecution of the first centuries of the Church's existence.

Religious continuation. living in illegal, "catacomb" conditions was typical in the USSR not only for Orthodox believers. In the regions of traditional spread of Islam, there were a significant number of unregistered Muslims. communities, Heb. the population had underground Jewish centers. The Catholics had their own history of existence in the underground. Church, Baptist and other Protestant. denominations, various religions. associations not recognized by the authorities. However, the term "catacomb movement" has become widespread in journalistic, memoir and partly in historical literature only in relation to the Russian Orthodox Church (including traditionally close religious groups). At the same time, the term "catacomb movement" is used in 2 meanings: all right. communities that existed outside the sphere of control of the Soviet authorities; only illegal groups that did not recognize the canonical supreme church authority.

Occurrence of K. d.

Shortly after the October Revolution of 1917, legal restrictions on religions. activities began to serve as an important part of the repressive policy of the Soviet government in relation to the Church. However, the deprivation of certain religions. org-tions of legally recognized status did not necessarily mean the cessation of their existence. Diverse church life continued in the illegal with t. sp. sphere authorities.

The first among religions. communities faced with delegalization pravosl. mon-ri. They were initially considered by the Soviet authorities only as economic organizations. Proclaimed at the beginning In 1918, the nationalization of church property served as a legal basis for the liquidation of the monasteries. The preservation of some monastic communities through formal transformation into agricultural artels only temporarily delayed their liquidation. In the instructions of the People's Commissariat of Agriculture and the People's Commissariat of Justice of the RSFSR dated October 30. 1919, it was said that monks and clergymen cannot be members of labor agricultural artels, as persons deprived of voting rights (“disenfranchised”). The main part of the mon-rei, preserved in the form of legal agricultural partnerships, was closed in 1919-1921.

Forced to leave the monasteries being liquidated by the authorities, the inhabitants tried to continue their monastic life in the world, to remain faithful to their vows. Illegal groups of monastics have become widespread. One of the first references to the "catacombs" in relation to church life in the USSR is connected precisely with the secret monastic community. In letters sent in 1923 from Petrograd, Metropolitan. Evlogy (Georgievsky) igum. Afanasia (Gromeko), “my catacombs”, “my catacomb church” was the name of the arranged igum. Athanasius in his own house a temple where divine services were performed by the monastic community that existed in secret from the authorities (Letters of Abbot Afanasia (Gromeko). 2005. P. 362-374). At the same time for igum. Athanasius, the term "catacombs" extended to all Orthodox Christians opposed to Renovationism. congregations that raised the name of Patriarch St. Tikhon. It is typical that in the 20-30-ies. 20th century the term "catacombs" to refer to illegal orthodox. communities was not generally accepted.

Illegal "home monasteries" usually appeared not far from the closed monasteries, in the surrounding villages and cities. In the villages of the Moscow region, the nuns of Moscow settled in the name of St. Alexy, man of God, wives. mon-rya, Zosimova near Moscow in the name of the Holy Trinity and in honor of the Smolensk Icon of the Mother of God "Hodegetria" wives. desert and Anosin Borisoglebsky wives. monastery. The sisters of Serafimov Diveevsky moved to the city of Murom in the name of the Holy Trinity of the female monastery, turning one of the city churches into “a kind of small Diveevsky metochion”. In Kirsanov (now the Tambov region), the nuns of the Orzhevsky Bogolyubsky Tisheninovsky wives. Mon-rya lived in communities of 4-6 people, instead of one closed large mon-rya, they formed many tiny ones. Inhabitants of women monasteries earned a living by sewing, gardening, became regents, treasurers of parish churches. Hieromonks closed men. mon-rei served as priests in parish churches, which turned out to be a kind of legal cover for the monastic communities that continued to exist secretly. So, the monks of the closed Optina in honor of the Entry into the Church of the Rev. Mother of God husband. the desert settled at the St. George Church in Kozelsk, the inhabitants of the Smolensk Icon of the Mother of God Zosimova husband. desert - at the parish churches of Moscow Vysokopetrovsky in the name of St. Peter, Metropolitan of Moscow, husband. mon-rya, monks of Koryazhma in the name of St. Nicholas the Wonderworker of the male monastery - at the cathedral of the city of Lalsk (now the village of the Kirov region), where the monks lived under the temple in the former. warehouse.

In addition to illegal communities founded by residents of closed monasteries, there were new communities that arose due to the desire for spiritual ascetic experience of young people who had not had the practice of monastic life before the revolution. From the very beginning, such communities were formed as secret ones. In the spring of 1922, with the blessing of the Metropolitan of Petrograd. ssmch. Benjamin (Kazansky), 2 unregistered monastic wives were created. communities - in St. Peterhof and in Petrograd, on Konnaya st. The Petrograd community was headed by the dean wives. mon-ray of the Petrograd diocese archim. Guriy (Egorov; later Metropolitan), a resident of the Alexander Nevsky Lavra, one of the leaders of the Alexander Nevsky Brotherhood, and the Old Peterhof - a priest. Varsonofy (Veryovkin). In 1932, the secret monastery of Staro-Peterhof was destroyed, but the underground monastic community, successively connected with the Alexander Nevsky Brotherhood, continued to exist under the hands of. archim. Guria, who settled with 10-15 students (both men and women), first in Biysk, and then in Tashkent and Fergana. In 1944, almost all members of the Central Asian. the monastic community went into open service, and archim. Guriy was appointed governor of the Trinity-Sergius Lavra - the 1st after its opening.

It is also known about other monastic communities, originally created as underground. So, in 1923 in Moscow at the temple of the former. Vysokopetrovsky monastery, a monastic community arose, the leaders of which were several. confessors closed Zosimova is empty. At the turn of the 20s and 30s. there was a growth of the "ascetic underground" at the expense of the churched intelligentsia. The number of Vysokopetrovsky community reached 170-200 people. It was the largest known in the past. time of secret monastic communities. It included both men and women. Despite the repressions and the loss of most of the confessors in the middle. 30s, the community existed until the end. 50s XX century, and some of its members survived to the beginning. 21st century (see article Ignatius (Puzik)). Inhabitants and nuns of the revealed secret mon-rei were arrested and exiled. At the end of their terms of imprisonment, many of them revived their communities, so the traditions of closed monasteries were not interrupted.

The transition of certain church communities to the Christian Church was a complex and multi-temporal, although interconnected process. After the adoption in Jan. 1918 of the decree of the Council of People's Commissars (SNK) of the RSFSR "On the separation of the church from the state and the school from the church", church institutions found themselves in a different legal position. Grassroots religions registered with local authorities enjoyed certain legal rights. communities - parishes. Diocesan bodies of church administration were initially recognized by the authorities as "private institutions", without the rights of a legal entity, but later they were deprived of this status as well. The central church administration - the patriarch and the Synod - did not receive any state. recognition and registration. However, in the first post-revolutionary years, the formal lack of legal status of the highest and diocesan church authorities did not have significant consequences, their activities were quite open.

Since 1922, when a campaign was launched to seize church valuables, and the renovationists, with the support of the state. bodies tried to seize the highest church authority, the lack of legal status of the highest and diocesan structures of the Orthodox Church acquired particular significance. The Soviet authorities insisted that the organs of the central and diocesan administration of the Patriarchal Church did not have proper registration and, consequently, were illegal. At the same time, the Renovationist Higher Church Administration was registered without hindrance. Immediately received an officer. registration and the Provisional Supreme Church Council, which appeared after the Gregorian schism organized by the OGPU in 1925. Accusation of "illegal activity", eg. in the organization of the diocesan office, often served as a pretext for the expulsion of bishops outside the diocese. Lack of registration in the state. organs created more and more serious problems for the Church. This made getting official. status desirable for many church leaders, which was used by state authorities. authorities to put pressure on the Orthodox. hierarchs in order to obtain certain concessions from them. As a condition for the provision of official status, the Soviet authorities demanded from the Patriarchal Church not only loyalty to the regime, but also the right to interfere in internal church affairs (primarily control over the appointment and movement of bishops). The result was a compromise "Declaration" in 1927 by the deputy patriarchal locum tenens, Met. Sergius (Stragorodsky; later Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia) and the Provisional Priest formed under him. Synod, after which it became possible to register the central and diocesan bodies of church administration.

"Declaration" of 1927 and subsequent decisions of Met. Sergius, adopted under pressure from the Soviet authorities, caused a church division. The majority of the clergy of the Russian Orthodox Church agreed with the position of Met. Sergius: the canonical existence of the Patriarchal Church in the USSR is impossible without the recognition of the official by the Soviet state. the status of church administration bodies and, consequently, the acceptance of conditions imposed by the authorities. At the same time, a significant part of the episcopate and clergy considered such a compromise with the Soviet authorities impossible and withdrew from obedience to the hierarchy of the ROC. In total, from the subordination of Met. Sergius was refused by more than 40 bishops with part of their flock. The most numerous and close-knit church movement, the opposition Metr. Sergius, was Josephianism, headed by Metropolitan. ex. Leningradsky Joseph (Petrovs). The total number of parishes that joined Josephism was approx. 2.5 thousand. Leningrad became the center of the movement, Josephism also became widespread in the Vyatka, Izhevsk, Novgorod, Voronezh, Tambov, Krasnodar, Kiev and Kharkov dioceses.

A prominent role in the church opposition was also played by the Andreev movement, headed by Bishop. Andrei (Ukhtomsky), who back in 1925 left the hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church and created his own non-canonical hierarchy through secret episcopal consecrations. The church communities of the Andreevites were especially active in Wed. Volga and Cis-Urals. Ep. Andrei was the first to use the term "true Orthodox Christians" in relation to his supporters, which in the 20-30s. 20th century most often used to refer to secret opposition church communities. Most of the other church oppositionists, often united in literature under the collective definition of “non-commemorating” (who did not commemorate the Soviet authorities and Metropolitan Sergius at divine services), did not belong to any church currents and were not organizationally connected with each other, although sometimes they distinguish with a greater or lesser base of their group - the Danilov group of those who do not remember, the Mechev group (followers of archpriest schmar. Sergiy Mechev), etc.

Opposition figures justified their break with Met. Sergius the greater importance of the freedom of church life over the presence or absence of a legal status for the Church. Although Mr. Joseph was not an opponent of the officers. registration of his hierarchy and was ready to comply with the legal requirements of the Soviet authorities, which did not go beyond the principles of the religion formally proclaimed in the USSR. freedom, but in opposition to Metr. Sergius in church circles clearly expressed a conscious readiness to move, if necessary, to hidden from the authorities (catacomb) forms of church service.

Josephism was considered by the Soviet authorities as the most dangerous church trend for them. Since 1928, several battles have been carried out against the Josephites. repressive campaigns. For 2-3 years, almost all the bishops of Joseph and about half of the clergy who supported them were imprisoned. Simultaneously with the repressions against the clergy, the Josephite churches were liquidated, while most of them were closed and only a small part was transferred to parishes in canonical jurisdiction. By 1931, the Josephites had only 9 active churches in Leningrad, and by 1932 there were practically no registered Josephite clergy there. In 1933 the last Josephite church was closed in Moscow. In the future, only a few legal parishes of the church opposition survived in the USSR. Faced with the impossibility of openly celebrating divine services, the parishes of the church opposition turned en masse to catacomb services. The clergy performed divine services and performed rites in secret. Thrones with antimins were arranged in private houses, access to which was open only to members of the communities.

According to the organs of the OGPU, the communities of the church opposition were "branches" of the counter-revolutionary illegal "True Orthodox Church" (TOC). Later in the literature, the opinion became widespread that with con. 20s 20th century in the USSR, a catacomb TOC operated with a numerous hierarchy, allegedly including a secret episcopate of the Josephite, Andreev and Danilov (according to the Danilov group) traditions. In present At the time, most authoritative researchers consider statements about the existence of the Catacomb Church as a special church organization with a hierarchical structure to be untrue. The church opposition was not a single org-tion, but a collection of autonomous communities and groups that maintained episodic contacts with each other. In a number of regions, illegal church communities that did not recognize Met. Sergius, was generally called by the name of the local opposition bishop: Buevtsy - supporters of Kozlovsky Bishop. Alexy (Buya) to the Center. Chernozem region, Victorians - followers of the Glazovsky ep. clergy Victor (Ostrovidov) in Wed. Volga and Cis-Urals, Uarovtsy, Yerofeyevtsy, Nektariyevtsy, etc.

K. d. in con. 20s - 30s 20th century

Repressions against church opposition coincided with a general tightening of anti-religions. policies of the Soviet state in order to deprive the Church of the possibility of legal existence. The main object of delegalization during this period were grassroots associations of believers. In Apr. In 1929, a decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR "On Religious Associations" was issued (similar legislative acts were adopted in other union republics). Orthodox parishes were now subject to mandatory re-registration according to new, tougher rules. The authorities had many possibilities for refusing to register a parish or removing it from it: convicting at least one member of the parish council of "counter-revolutionary activities"; the emergency state of the temple building (with a ban on its repair); the presence of an educational institution nearby; expediency of using the building of the state temple. or public organizations for their own purposes; the demands of the local "public" to close the church. The temple often became inactive even in the event of the arrest of the entire clergy, although a formal decision to remove it from registration might not have been made.

Mass closing of churches in 1928-1931. affected parishes in the canonical jurisdiction of the Russian Orthodox Church to no lesser extent than the communities of the church opposition. Over the years, the number of registered Orthodox communities (excluding Renovationists and Gregorians) has decreased from 28,000 to 23,000. The campaign to close churches was accompanied by mass repressions against the clergy. K ser. 30s 20th century deregistration of church communities has already become widespread. The authorities usually linked the abolition of churches in rural areas with the completion of the process of "total collectivization", since it was propagated that "the collectivized peasantry was unbelieving." In 1936, the country retained the registration of approx. 14 thousand parishes of the Russian Orthodox Church (of which 12.7 thousand in the RSFSR and 1.1 thousand in Ukraine). The most difficult year for the Church was the following year, 1937, when more than 8,000 Orthodox parishes lost their registration and were officially abolished. In the same year, the Soviet leadership considered the question of the final elimination of the legal structures of the Russian Church and the abolition of the decree of 1929 as "promoting the organization of churchmen." Although the proposals of a number of Soviet leaders on the complete delegation of the Church were not supported by the top party leadership, the closure of the remaining churches actively continued simultaneously with the repressions against the surviving clergy. In the beginning. 1939 official registration has been preserved for only approx. 100 churches in the RSFSR and 370 in Ukraine. In each diocese there were only a few. active churches, in many there are no dioceses left. The Renovationists found themselves in a similar situation, despite their active support for all the measures of the Soviet government; few legal parishes survived among the Gregorians.

Despite the efforts of the Soviet authorities to eradicate faith, during the All-Union Census of 1937, 57% of the adult population of the country openly declared their religiosity (2/3 of all residents in rural areas and 1/3 in cities). Since the few remaining temples could not satisfy the needs of believers, religions. life was forced to move into the illegal sphere. To con. 30s 20th century communities without official registration became the main form of organization of believers in the USSR. Divine services were conducted either by the surviving priests of local closed churches, or by wandering clerics. In the absence of clergy, the activities of communities deprived of legal status were, as a rule, reduced to joint prayers and reading liturgical books. The life of a secret community was organized around a former headman or regent or nuns of a neighboring closed monastery, and sometimes around a surviving shrine, most often an icon from a closed church. Divine services could be performed in the homes of parishioners (apparently, this happened in most cases), in revered places (in particular, near springs), in forests, in deserted areas, where hidden chapels were arranged in huts, dugouts or caves. Isolation, the absence of archpastoral and even often pastoral care led to the decline of religions. life of illegal communities. The repressed priests in the underground communities tried to be replaced by laymen, both men and women, impostor priests appeared. As a result, the sacraments disappeared altogether or were distorted beyond recognition. Correspondence baptisms and correspondence weddings were practiced in some communities. Liturgical rites were reduced or replaced by other works, most often akathists.

The vast majority of illegal parishes in the 30s. 20th century constituted communities loyal to the canonical supreme ecclesiastical authority. Communities that did not commemorate Met. Sergius, did not create a special trend in the church underground and existed on an equal footing with other secret parishes. Mn. communities, especially rural ones, were very remotely aware of the divisions in the Patriarchal Church and opposed themselves only to the Renovationists and in some cases to the Gregorians. In the world members of illegal religions. communities, as a rule, did not differ from those around them, led an ordinary life, although they tried to avoid activities that were contrary to their religions. principles. Eschatological groups occupied a special position. These movements arose and existed in the context of apocalyptic sentiments that in the post-revolutionary years swept wide sections of Russian, Ukrainian, Belarusian. peasantry. Such groups were characterized by a belief in the offensive after the revolution of the "kingdom of the Antichrist" and the expectation of the imminent end of the world, as well as the deification of their spiritual leaders, which brought them closer to the whips. Some eschatological groups already in the 20s. 20th century formed independent secret associations; other communities did not break ties with the Orthodox. parishes and visited functioning churches. In different regions of the country acted several. similar religions. currents: Johnnites, who deified rights. John of Kronstadt, Enochites, flyers, Fedorovites, Khakilevites, Poddubnovites, Selivestrovites, and others. Mn. eschatological communities, primarily the Joannites, adjoined Josephism, in which they were attracted by the rejection of any form of conciliation with the "satanic power." With the beginning of collectivization, the mood among members of such communities to leave, to isolate themselves from society, intensified. They did not hide their hostility to the Soviet regime, they boycotted the state. measures, did not join collective farms, evaded military service, refused to receive documents, get a job, send their children to school, etc.

It is not possible to accurately determine the number of illegal parishes that existed at that time. It should also be taken into account that the number of secret communities was not constant: their activity could be stopped, for example, in connection with the arrest of a priest or organizer of prayers, and then become active again. According to approximate estimates of researchers, in total there were about 10 thousand Orthodox Christians who did not have registration in the country. parishes. At the same time, ok. 600 such Orthodox communities operated in Belarus, at least 5 thousand - in Ukraine, more than 4 thousand - in the RSFSR (where the largest number of illegal parishes existed, apparently, in the Central Chernozem and Volga regions). Relig. activity without official registration was seen by the authorities as a manifestation of hostility towards the Soviet state. However, in reality, having become a mass and ubiquitous phenomenon, illegal church life by no means always led to persecution. Local authorities were often aware of the worship services performed by unregistered communities, but, not considering this a serious crime and not wanting to lose workers and spoil their accounts, they did not report this to higher authorities.

Illegal church life was exceptionally diverse. In fact, all forms of church activity that were prohibited by Soviet law turned out to be outside the bounds of legality. According to one of his contemporaries, “the life of the Church went underground... Not the Church itself, but her life, her activity” (Kiter 1998, p. 58). Spiritual education continued to develop underground. Despite the prohibitions, there were church educational circles for children and adults, and sometimes quite numerous. There were also higher educational institutions in the church underground. In particular, the MDA left Sergievsky Posad (now the city of Sergiev Posad) in the fall of 1919, but at least before the beginning. 1935 continued to work illegally in Moscow. Professors gave lectures in the back rooms of various Moscow churches, students wrote graduation papers, passed exams and received diplomas on the old forms of the MDA.

One of the most important during the period of repression was charitable activities, severely persecuted by the Soviet authorities. However, it was charity in the conditions of daily oppression of believers that became especially widespread. Assistance to the "disenfranchised", their families and repressed clergymen was both communal and individual. Communities helped their exiled or imprisoned pastors and parishioners. Often charitable activities were organized and coordinated by bishops - the archbishop. Augustine (Belyaev), archbishop. Bartholomew (Remov), bishop. Jonah (Lazarev), bishop. Stefan (Vinogradov) and others. Unique forms of charity arose. Shmch. Vladimir Ambartsumov organized assistance to the families of "disenfranchised" clergy, attaching them to families that stood firmer on their feet, to provide those in need of predetermined regular assistance. In some parishes, small parish hospitals and charity funds were organized.

The economic activities of the Church also moved into the illegal sphere. After the liquidation of church printing houses, religion began to actively develop. samizdat: they copied by hand or typewritten both pre-revolutionary publications and new works - documents of church journalism of the 20s. XX century, writings of authoritative pastors. The need for elementary items of church use (candles, prosphora, pectoral crosses, funeral chalices) was met by handicraft production. The volume of production of underground church workshops could be very significant. The creation of such workshops was persecuted by the authorities. The authorities also prevented the distribution of church utensils and literature made by believers.

K. d. in the 40s - early. 50s 20th century

The Great Patriotic War led to serious changes in relations between the state and the Church in the USSR. After the meeting on 4 Sept. 1943 of the head of the Soviet state I.V. Stalin with the patriarchal locum tenens, Met. Sergius (September 8, 1943 was elected Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia), the Church and the faithful received much greater opportunities than before for legal activities. During the war and post-war periods there was a return to the open church life of most of the underground communities. The reasons for such changes were both the interest of the Soviet authorities in strengthening their foreign policy reputation, and the patriotic position taken by the Russian Church during the war, including the majority of illegal communities.

Politics also played a role. military authorities in the occupied Soviet territories. The occupation authorities did not prevent the spontaneous mass opening of churches, the exit from the underground of secret clergy. In total, during the occupation, approx. 10 thousand temples. After the liberation of the occupied territories, about 70% of the churches that opened there received official orders from the Soviet authorities. registration, including 4.6 thousand churches - in Ukraine, 300 - in Belarus, more than 2 thousand - in the West. regions of the RSFSR. During the occupation, there was also a return of secret monastic communities to abandoned monasteries. So, the rector of Glinskaya is empty. archim. Nektary (Nuzhdin), who led the secret monastic community in Putivl after its closure, returned to the monastery with his spiritual children in 1942 and resumed monastic life there. In total, 54 monasteries appeared in the occupied territory (48 in Ukraine, 5 in the RSFSR and 1 in Belarus).

Legal parish life was also revived on the territory of the USSR, not affected by the occupation, but this process was much more difficult there. Parish communities from the beginning. 1944 actively applied for registration, but the authorities granted only approx. 20% of petitions - mainly where the requests of believers were especially numerous and persistent. In total in 1944-1947. in the territories not affected by the occupation, with the permission of the Soviet authorities, approx. 1.3 thousand churches. In 1948, the registration of new church communities was terminated; in 1949-1953 churches were closed, their number has decreased by about 1 thousand over the years (mainly due to churches in the former occupied territory). An important component of the legalization process was the entry into the open ministry of the clergy, who secretly performed divine services. In the 40s. 20th century unregistered clergy, who illegally provided for the population after the closure of churches, were the main personnel reserve of the Church. So, in the Ryazan diocese, approx. 80% of the priests who served here by 1951 were previously non-staff. Former secret priests filled the ranks of the episcopate. So it was with archim. Guriy (Egorov), with hier. John (Wendland), with Rev. Sergius Nikitin (late Bishop Stefan).

If in the previously occupied territories (Ukraine, Belarus, western regions of the RSFSR), in connection with the legalization of the vast majority of unregistered parishes, the activity of the church underground drops to a minimum, then in the remaining territory of the RSFSR, where the process of registering religions. communities were held back by the authorities, with ser. 40s 20th century there is an upsurge in church activity. New types of church activity outside the control of the authorities appeared, for example. worship performed by registered priests outside their parish (which has been banned since 1929). Church charity, economic activity, and pilgrimages to shrines gained wide scope. On the territory of the USSR there were several. dozens of illegal pilgrimage centers of regional significance, i.e., such places that were visited by residents of several. neighboring areas. The most notable centers were the well on the site of the Kursk Root empty. (from 7 to 15 thousand pilgrims in the 2nd half of the 40s of the XX century), lake. Svetloyar (Light, Holy) in the Gorky region. (up to 10 thousand pilgrims), p. Velikoretskoye in the Kirov region, Salt Key (Salt Keys) in the village. Tabynsky Bashkir ASSR (up to 10 thousand), "holy mountain" in Uryupinsk, Stalingrad region. There were many objects of pilgrimage of "local importance".

In the 40s. 20th century K. definitively polarizes. Approximately 2/3 of the unregistered communities sought to legalize themselves and return to church worship, to preserve traditions. religious culture. But the remaining third realized their underground position as the norm, forming a new "catacomb" religion. subculture, the features of which appeared in the pre-war period. During the Great Patriotic War, most of the few surviving figures of the church opposition - the "non-remembering" and the Josephites - reconciled with their communities with the hierarchy of the Moscow Patriarchate and switched to legal service. Dr. priests who belonged to the illegal church opposition were repressed during the re-intensified in the 40s. 20th century persecution of illegal religions. org-tions, including those from moderate "non-remembering" communities. So, for example, in 1943-1946. in Moscow, in the case of the “Anti-Soviet Church Underground”, priests of illegal church communities were identified and repressed, who recognized Bishop as their spiritual leader. clergy Athanasius (Sakharov), one of the most authoritative figures of the "non-remembering". While in prison, Athanasius reunited with the hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church after the Local Council of 1945 and called on his supporters to do the same. To con. 40s 20th century the communities of the church opposition practically lost the last priests who fed them. Left without pastors, these religions. communities, to-rye in the official. In Soviet documents, they were called org-tions of the TOC, joined with eschatological semi-sectarian groups, collectively called "True Orthodox Christians" (TOC).

The existing commonality of the TOC and the IPH as the isolationist wing of the KD was characterized by: anti-Soviet eschatologism (the identification of Soviet power with the power of the Antichrist); church-opposition moods (up to the proclamation of the canonical ROC as the "church of the wicked", the "church of Satan", and its ministers as "false prophets"); withdrawal, isolation from the outside world (ending with the practice of mass shutter); the special role of charismatic leaders. Within the framework of the "catacomb" subculture, a spiritual literature was formed, which justified the disengagement from the legal Church (various spiritual verses, "prophecies", for example, "Collection from the lists about St. Seraphim of Sarov", which received circulation at that time in the Central Chernozem region, etc. .). In con. 40s 20th century there is an increase in the activity of the radical church underground, which is especially evident in the Center. Chernozem region, where the traditions of both eschatological groups and the opposition Buev movement were developed. However, in 1950-1953. new repressions reduced the number of local catacomb groups by almost half.

The formation of the "catacomb" subculture led to an ambivalent attitude towards illegal church life on the part of the episcopate of the Russian Orthodox Church. In the 30s. 20th century the attitude of the legal episcopate to the underground forms of church life was benevolent. Many bishops of the Patriarchal Church participated in the activities of the church underground: they collaborated with educational institutions, ordained secret priests, and organized charity. This, of course, was not about the leadership of illegal church life, which was impossible in the conditions of the harsh repressive policy of the authorities. The interaction was carried out through the personal connections of the bishop and the illegal clergy. In the 40s. 20th century the episcopate sought to involve in the process of legalization a larger number of unregistered communities, as well as priests, in order to maximize the new opportunities that opened up for the Church, and also in order to prevent the degradation of church life, inevitable in the conditions of underground existence. At the same time, priests and members of opposition communities who evaded entering open service were criticized by the episcopate of the Russian Orthodox Church.

From the 2nd floor. 40s 20th century the term "catacombs" in relation to the secret existence of the Church in the USSR for the first time is widely used in the journalism of representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia (ROCOR). In émigré literature, K. d. was spoken of exclusively as an underground church organization that actively politically opposed the Soviet regime and, at the same time, was in opposition to the hierarchy of the Moscow Patriarchate (i.e., in fact, K. d. meant only groups of the TOC and IPH, which did not have , however, a centralized organization). Allegations of the existence in the USSR of a Catacomb Church opposed to the Moscow Patriarchate were used by the ROCOR leadership in ideological disputes with the ROC. Following the journalism of ROCOR, the term "catacomb movement" in a narrow, politicized sense also became widespread in foreign historiography of the post-war period (Fletcher. 1971 and others).

K. d. in the middle. 50s - 80s 20th century

After Stalin's death in 1953, the position of religions. org-tions in the USSR improved. There was a mass release from places of detention of convicted clergy and religions. figures. Since 1954, the registration of church parishes has resumed. Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR "On changing the procedure for opening prayer buildings" of February 17. 1955, it was allowed to register in a simplified manner actually operating religions. communities that had prayer houses at their disposal. The renewed process of legalizing the communities of the Russian Orthodox Church, which were forced to be in an illegal position, continued until 1958, when, at the initiative of N. S. Khrushchev, a new attack on the Church began and further legalization of the church underground became impossible. In 1959-1963. The authorities launched another campaign to close churches. More than 5,000 Orthodox Christians were deprived of registration. temples, withdrawn from the state approx. 4 thousand clergy. In parallel, there was a campaign to close Mon-Rei. By 1965, 41 monasteries were closed, more than 3 thousand monks and nuns were forced to leave their cloisters. Repressions against the leaders of underground church groups began with renewed vigor. Several thousands of members of the IPH communities were expelled under the anti-parasitism legislation. Nov 28 In 1958, the Central Committee of the CPSU adopted a resolution "On measures to stop the pilgrimage to the so-called "holy places"". The regional authorities were required to prevent pilgrimage to the unofficial. shrines. The holy springs were filled up, concreted, fenced off, and police cordons were set up around them. Adm. and judicial action. After Khrushchev's resignation in 1964, repressive actions against the Church and believers in their most extreme forms were stopped, but the general policy of the authorities to narrow the sphere of church life remained unchanged.

The consequences of "Khrushchev's persecution" for certain areas of illegal church life in the USSR were of a different nature and are assessed differently by researchers. So, for example, the question remains debatable - was the mass closure of churches in these years accompanied by the activation of the church underground? Judging by the currently available data, although in some regions (for example, in the Gorky region) during this period there was an increase in the number of unregistered communities, in the whole country there was an explosive growth of K. d., as was the case in the 30s gg. XX century, did not happen. This can be explained by the fact that, as a result of a number of social processes, the rural community enters the time of its final disintegration, which until this period remained the main social base of church life at the parish level, ensuring the viability of unregistered parishes. In general, in the 50-80s. 20th century illegal church life persisted in almost all of its forms. However, the scale has noticeably decreased and the circle of participants in illegal church activities has narrowed. If before the Great Patriotic War the underground remained the main way of preserving church life, now its center has finally moved from the illegal to the legal sphere.

In the beginning. 60s 20th century K. d. still remained quite numerous. According to official data, in 1961-1962. in the country there were over 700 unregistered Orthodox Christians. communities (about 7% of the ROC parishes). Some of the priests who were left without places after the closure of the churches continued to hold services illegally and fulfill the rites. The inhabitants of closed monasteries joined the ranks of illegal monasticism. So, the monks closed in 1961 Glinskoy is empty. moved to the Caucasus: some settled in the cities, others set up cells in the mountains. But the foundation of numerous "home monasteries" near closed monasteries was no longer discussed. The practice of ordination of secret priests by individual bishops to minister to unregistered communities also continued. In particular, in 1955 Archbishop. Guriy (Egorov) was ordained Fr. Nikolai Ivanov (1904-1990), in 1972 Metropolitan. John (Wendland) - Priest. Gleb Kaleda (1921-1994). Various forms of spiritual self-education, as well as church samizdat, were further developed. In the 60-70s. 20th century the concept of "catacomb" from emigrant literature passes into the works of domestic samizdat, but here, unlike foreign journalism, the term is used not only to refer to politicized religions. groups associated with dissidents, but also in a broad sense - all Orthodox. communities that exist without official. permission from the authorities.

The isolationist wing of the K. d. in the beginning. 60s 20th century presented ca. 200 religions communities, to-rye Soviet statistics were assigned to the CPI and CPI groups. In 1959-1961. The Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR organized expeditions to the Center. Chernozem region to study the existing there since the 20s. 20th century IPH communities. Among the "truly Orthodox" a division was found into "confessors" (about 30%), who considered it possible to reincarnate God into a man, and "scribes" (about 70%), who were faithful to the main canons of Orthodoxy. Churches. The IPH communities at that time were kept in the Center. Chernozem region and neighboring regions of Ukraine; in the south of the RSFSR - in the Rostov region, Krasnodar and Stavropol territories; on Wednesday. and V. Volga region, as well as in the south of the West. Siberia. K ser. 70s 20th century in the country there were no more than 130 illegal communities of the IPH, which united about 2.5 thousand people. Approximately half of the communities were concentrated in the Center. Chernozem. Research conducted in 1970-1973 and at the beginning 80s XX century., Revealed the split of the IPH into several. interpretations and a gradual decline in their activities, observed since the middle. 60s 20th century In the isolationist communities at this time, there was a rapid process of decline in numbers due to the practice of celibacy and the aging of group members. The last open actions of the IPH communities took place in 1981 in connection with the exchange of passports.

New illegal communities also appeared, referring themselves (most often self-proclaimed) to various traditions of the church opposition. Formed several groupings with hierarchical leadership. The largest "hierarchy" was created by the former living in the Krasnodar Territory. provincial priest. "schemetropolitan" Gennady Sekach, who was "ordained" by the "catacomb Bishop Seraphim" - the impostor Mikhail Pozdeev, who became famous even before the war. Together with his deputy "metropolitan" F. Gumennikov, G. Sekach performed more than 10 "episcopal consecrations". The communities of the Golyns were headed by the priest who declared himself "archbishop" Anthony. Tikhon Golynsky-Mikhailovsky, who claimed that in 1939 in the camp he was secretly consecrated by a group of imprisoned bishops and appointed head of the TOC. The "bishops" Dimitry Lokotkov in the Tyumen region referred themselves to the Andreev succession. and Theodosius Bakhmetiev in the Gorky region. The history of these and other catacomb groups in the 70s. XX century - Alfeevtsy, Vikentievtsy, Klimentovtsy, Pafnutevtsy, Eusebians, etc. - is not entirely clear and doubtfully documented. Self-styled "bishops" were usually recognized only by their supporters. Hieromonks Guriy (Pavlov), who headed the secret communities in Chuvashia, and in the past an ally of the opposition bishop, enjoyed considerable authority in the K. d. at that time. Nectarios (Trezvinsky), and Lazar (Zhurbenko), secretly ordained a priest (according to other sources - a deacon) by the Irkutsk bishop. Veniamin (Novitsky), and from the beginning. 70s 20th century gone illegal.

More and more active attempts are being made to establish contacts between the KD and ROCOR. During the 50-60s. 20th century The Church Abroad declared spiritual unity with the Catacomb Church. The Council of Bishops in 1971 gave a detailed definition of what ROCOR understood as the Catacomb Church: “The free part of the Russian Church, located outside the USSR, soul and heart with confessors of the faith, who are called “true Orthodox Christians” in anti-religious manuals, and in the hostel often called the "Catacomb Church", because they have to hide from civil power, just as in the first centuries of Christianity, believers hid in the catacombs. In 1976, the illegal church community in the Leningrad region, which was fed by the last surviving Josephite priest Michael Rozhdestvensky, sent a letter from the USSR with a request to join ROCOR and was accepted into the jurisdiction of the Church Abroad. In 1982, on behalf of the ROCOR Synod of Bishops, Bishop of Cannes. Barnabas (Prokofiev), who arrived in Moscow on a tourist visa, consecrated Lazar (Zhurbenko) as a bishop. Secretly representing ROCOR in the USSR, Bishop. Lazar fed ca. 50 illegal communities that identified themselves with different catacomb traditions.

After a fundamental change in state policy towards the Church in the 2nd half. 80s XX century, under M. S. Gorbachev, for religion. Life was no longer limited. All the conditions arose for the legalization of the communities of the Catholic Church. Unregistered parishes of the Russian Orthodox Church were given the opportunity to register, and secret priests were able to switch to open ministry. Clergymen who did not recognize the hierarchy of the Moscow Patriarchate also came out of the underground. Most of those who did not associate themselves with the ROC were Orthodox. communities joined ROCOR. In 1990 he moved to the legal position of Bishop. Lazar (Zhurbenko), at the same time, catacomb groups of priests joined ROCOR. Guria (Pavlov), who the following year was elevated to the rank of archimandrite and approved by the ROCOR Synod as a candidate for episcopal consecration, but joined one of the non-canonical Greek-Old Calendar jurisdictions (“Avksentiev Synod”), where he became “bishop of Kazan”. The ROCOR Synod of Bishops refused to recognize the canonicity of the "hierarchies" of Anthony Golynsky-Mikhailovsky, Gennady Sekach and other self-proclaimed catacomb "bishops". All clerics ordained by them could only be accepted into ROCOR through repeated consecration. Part of the former secret communities refrained from legalization, but even without official ones. registration, they had no obstacles to their activities on the part of the state. K. d. actually ceased to exist.

Arch.: GARF. F. 5263. Op. 1. D. 32, 891; F. R-9401. Op. 2. D. 236; F. 6991. Op. 1. D. 305, 321, 322, 352, 488; Op. 6. D. 630; F. 9401. Op. 2. D. 65, 236; RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 32. D. 142; Op. 125. D. 181, 593; Op. 132. D. 109; CA FSB RF. D. 1000256.

Lit .: Navaginsky S . Church underground: (About the Fedorovtsy sect). Voronezh, 1929; Andreev I.M. Notes on the catacomb church in the USSR. [Geor.,] 1947; Konstantinov D., prot. Persecuted Church. N.-Y., 1967; Fletcher W.S. The Russian Orthodox Church Underground, 1917-1970. L.; N.Y., 1971; Demyanov A.I. True Orthodox Christianity: Criticism of ideology and activity. Voronezh, 1977; Novoselov M. A. Letters to friends. M., 1994; Arseny (Zhadanovsky), bishop. Memories. M., 1995; Kaleda G., prot. Essays on the life of the Orthodox. people during the years of persecution: (Recollections and reflections) // AiO. 1995. No. 3(6). pp. 127-144; Shkarovsky M.V. Petersburg diocese during the years of persecution and loss: 1917-1945. SPb., 1995; he is. Josephism: A trend in the Russian Orthodox Church. SPb., 1999; he is. Russian Orthodox Church under Stalin and Khrushchev: (State-Church Relations in the USSR in 1939-1964). M., 1999; he is. Alexander Nevsky Brotherhood, 1918-1932 St. Petersburg, 2003; he is. The fate of the Josephite shepherds: the Josephite movement of the Russian Orthodox Church in the fate of its participants: Arkh. doc-you. St. Petersburg, 2006; Keither N . Orthodox Church in the USSR in the 1930s // DSC. 1998. No. 1. S. 44-63; Osipova I.I. "Through the fire of torment and the water of tears..." M., 1998; Chumachenko T. A. State, Orthodox Church, believers: 1941-1961 M., 1999; Protsenko P. G. Biography of Bishop. Barnabas (Belyaev). N. Novg., 1999; John (Wendland), Metropolitan Book. Fedor (Black). Metropolitan Gury (Egorov): East. essays. Yaroslavl, 1999; Vasilevskaya V. Ya. Catacombs of the 20th century: Rev. M., 2001; Damaskin (Orlovsky), igum. History Rus. Orthodox Churches in the documents of the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation // Dedicated to the 2000th anniversary of the Nativity of Christ. M., 2001. S. 78-112; Ignatius (Puzik), Mon. Eldership during the years of persecution: Prmch. Ignatius (Lebedev) and his spiritual family. M., 2001; Raphael (Karelin), Archim. The Mystery of Salvation: Conversations on the Spiritual Life: From the Rev. M., 2001; Beglov A.L. Church Underground in the USSR in the 1920s-1940s: Strategies for Survival // Odysseus: Man in History, 2003. M., 2003. P. 78-104; he is. Church evolution. life in underground conditions: Results of the 20th anniversary (1920-1940s) // AiO. 2003. No. 2(36). pp. 202-232; he is. Church opposition in the 1940s // There. 2006. No. 2(46). pp. 111-133; he is. Orthodox education in the underground: Pages of history // Ibid. 2007. No. 3(50). pp. 153-172; he is. In search of "sinless catacombs": Church. underground in the USSR. M., 2008; Zhuravsky A.V. In the name of truth and dignity of the Church: Biography and works of ssmch. Cyril (Kazansky) in the context of the East. events and church divisions of the twentieth century. M., 2004; Kosik O. V. Investigative case "Anti-Soviet church underground" (1943-1946) // EzhBK. 2004. S. 273-282; Igum letters. Athanasius (Gromeko) Met. Evlogy (Georgievsky): Archive of Met. Evlogy / Publication: N. T. Eneeva // Problems of history Rus. Abroad: Materials and Research. M., 2005. Issue. 1. S. 362-374; Mazyrin A. V., priest. Higher hierarchs on the succession of power in the Russian Orthodox Church in the 1920s-1930s. M., 2006; Kravetsky A. G. St. Afanasy Kovrovsky: Biogr. feature article. Vladimir, 2007; "Oh, Most Merciful... Stay with us relentlessly...": Vosp. believers of the True Orthodox (Catacomb) Church: Kon. 1920s - early. 1970s / Comp.: I. I. Osipova. M., 2008; Polyakov A.G. Victorian current in the Russian Orthodox Church. [Kirov], 2009.

A. L. Beglov, M. V. Shkarovsky

1. History

The Russian Catacomb Church of True Orthodox Christians (abbreviated RCC IPH) is a small non-canonical unregistered religious group declaring its succession (in terms of the "Andreev" hierarchy) from Archbishop Andrei of Ufa. The Russian Catacomb Church of True Orthodox Christians claims that it also includes groups of Old Believers - “Clementists” (in Siberia), “Belovodtsy”, “Josephites”, “Danilovites”, although there is no actual confirmation of this. True Orthodox Christians carry out active missionary work among communities of “alternative Orthodoxy”. Some researchers define it as pseudo-Orthodox.

The first documented appearance of the term "true Orthodox" refers to 1923 and is associated with the reaction of believers to the emergence of renovationism. In letters in defense of the Patriarch, St. Tikhon, who were sent to the Commission for Religious Affairs under the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the USSR from the Orthodox parishes of the North Caucasus, Central Asia and the Central Chernozem region, the believers called themselves "true Orthodox", thus opposing their communities, which remained faithful to the Patriarch, to the renovationist ones. However, then "true Orthodox" began to be called mainly religious groups that did not recognize the canonical supreme church authority and advocated the transition to secret (catacomb) forms of religions. life.

For the first time, Bishop Andrei (Ukhtomsky) began to use the term "truly Orthodox Christians" in this sense. Becoming one of the founders of the catacomb movement, from the beginning. 20s 20th century he practiced secret consecrations of vicar bishops for various dioceses. After the death of St. Tikhon (Ɨ 1925) bishop. Andrei did not agree with the transfer of control of the Church to the Patriarchal Locum Tenens, Met. ssmch. Peter (Polyansky) and subsequently did not recognize the canonical rights of the Deputy Locum Tenens, Metropolitan. Sergius (Stragorodsky), accusing both of compromising with the Soviet authorities. According to some reports, ep. Andrei, having broken with the Patriarchal Church, converted to the Old Believers (according to other sources, it was an attempt to join the Old Believers to Orthodoxy). It is from the Old Believers, according to modern researchers, ep. Andrei also borrowed the term "truly Orthodox Christians", which was found in the literature of the Old Believers. So, one of the self-names that has existed since the 18th century. the unpriestly consent of the runners - true Orthodox Christians wanderers (IPHS; see in Art. Wanderers).

The followers of ep. Andrey (Ukhtomsky), so-called. the Andreev movement, as part of the True Orthodox Christians, most actively manifested itself in the Urals and in the Middle Volga region. Initially, the Andreev communities did not differ in ritual from the Orthodox. parishes, they were nourished by a significant episcopate, leading the succession from ep. Andrei (Ukhtomsky); a feature of the Andreev bishops was the refusal to commemorate the Locum Tenens Metr. Peter, who was recognized as the head of the Church by another opposition Metr. Sergius church currents. In con. 20s almost all Andreev bishops were repressed. In 1931, the last remaining free Bishop of Staroufimsky was arrested. Avvakum (Borovkov), leader of the Avvakum movement in Chuvashia ("Union of the Orthodox Church of Chuvashia"). In 1937, the Andreevsky episcopate was almost completely destroyed in the course of mass repressions. The last known bishops of the Andreevites were Simon (Andreev; Ɨ 1942) and Peter (Ladygin; Ɨ 1957). Dr. persons who attributed to themselves episcopal succession from ep. Andrei (Ukhtomsky), apparently, were impostors, as, for example, the “Bishop of Tomsk” Kliment Loginov, who died in 1938, is considered the founder of the “Old Orthodox Church of True Orthodox Christians-Clementists”.

At the turn of the 20s and 30s. the term "True Orthodox Church" appears (in the documents of the TOC), which was used in relation to Josephism. Metropolitan Joseph (Petrovykh), who led this movement, opposed what was stated in the "Declaration" of 1927 by Metropolitan. Sergius (Stragorodsky) course towards the legalization of the Russian Orthodox Church in the Soviet Union. Feb. 1928 Metropolitan Joseph wrote to Archim. ssmch. Lev (Yegorov) that he and his supporters did not come out, do not come out and will never come out "from the bowels of the true Orthodox Church." Therefore, Mr. By “true Orthodox Church,” Joseph meant the entire Orthodox Church, and not some new church structure alternative to the Moscow Patriarchate. Supporters of Mr. Joseph was not recognized by the Provisional Patriarchal Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church, headed by Met. Sergius, but unlike the Andreevites, they continued to commemorate the Locum Tenens Metr. Peter. Thus, the Josephites did not consider themselves to be a separate “True Orthodox Church”, although during arrests during interrogations they confirmed that they were truly Orthodox Christians.

The ROCOR treated the groups of True Orthodox Christians in a completely different way, perceiving the secret "True Orthodox" communities as some kind of serious force, an alternative to the Moscow Patriarchate. In the Epistles of the ROCOR Bishops' Councils of the 1950s and 1960s. 20th century there were assurances of "spiritual unity with the Catacomb Church in the homeland." The ROCOR Council of Bishops in 1971, in its definition “On the Catacomb Church,” stated that “the free part of the Russian Church, located outside the USSR, heart and soul with confessors of the faith, who are called “true Orthodox Christians” in anti-religious manuals, and in the hostel are often called "Catacomb Church", because they have to hide from civil power, just as in the first centuries of Christianity, believers hid in the catacombs. The naive faith of ROCOR representatives in the large number and influence of True Orthodox Christians was shaken by the writer A. I. Solzhenitsyn, who was expelled from the USSR in 1974. ROCOR All-Diaspora Council, where he actually called the allegedly secretly existing True Orthodox Church in the USSR a myth, a pious dream of “no matter how sinless, so incorporeal catacombs.” In response to this statement, the publicist A. Levitin-Krasnov in the middle. 70s distributed articles about a large single True Orthodox Church, allegedly existing in a number of regions of the USSR, headed by the catacomb "bishop" Theodosius (it is not clear which of the leaders of the True Orthodox Christians of that time with that name was meant - Bakhmetiev or Gumennikov).

In 1976, the "truly Orthodox" community from the Luzhsky district of the Leningrad region. under the direction of St. Mikhail Rozhdestvensky, sent a letter abroad with a request to join ROCOR. The letter was considered by the ROCOR Primate, Met. Filaret (Voznesensky), after which the community of M. Rozhdestvensky was officially admitted to ROCOR. In the same year, the ROCOR Council of Bishops issued a “Message to the Russian People,” which said: “We are in awe of your feat, pastors of the modern Russian catacombs, pastors who did not seek legalization, performing their ministry in secret from the prince of this world, with the blessing of your courageous hierarchs." In 1978, a "truly Orthodox" mon. Anthony (A. A. Chernov) was received into ROCOR by Archbishop. Anthony (Bartoshevich). However, already in 1980, Chernov left ROCOR and moved to one of the Greek-Old Calendar jurisdictions. He opposed ROCOR with articles in which he accused its hierarchs of having links with the CIA and Freemasonry. Chernov also wrote that the well-known in the USSR catacomb figures Lazar (Zhurbenko) and Anthony Golynsky-Mikhailovsky were KGB agents specially introduced into the “true Orthodox movement”. In turn, the ROCOR Synod of Bishops in 1981 brought a similar accusation against Chernov.

After the collapse of the USSR and the actual loss of control over the activities of destructive sects in the states formed on the territory of the USSR, there was a rapid growth of schismatic pseudo-Orthodox communities. The tendency to identify oneself with various directions of the catacomb movement of true Orthodox Christians. in particular with the Josephites, Andreevites, Sekachevites, and others, was common to them. They identified themselves with these movements even if the new groups were not originally associated with the Catacomb communities. The use of the terms True Orthodox Christians and True Orthodox Church in the title gave the leaders of these groups the opportunity to claim continuity and connections with authoritative figures of church resistance to the Soviet regime. Unlike their predecessors, who united for the sake of secret church service, groups of true Orthodox Christians of the new formation did not hide their activities, they registered communities in the official. order, actively participated in political actions. As a rule, such groups were founded by former clerics of the Russian Orthodox Church and ROCOR, who went into schism due to conflicts with the hierarchy. These neo-catacomb communities began to be united in the reports of the Ministry of Justice of Russia under the common conditional name "True Orthodox Church".

2. Basic dogmatic provisions

The Catacomb Church of True Orthodox Christians recognizes itself as part of the Universal Orthodox Eastern Church. From the time of the Apostle Andrew, it existed as the Scythian Church, from the 3rd century as the Church of Goth (meaning Crimean Gothia, where Christianity has been established since the 4th century), from the 9th century as the Russian Metropolis of the Patriarchate of Constantinople, from 1448 autocephalous, from 1593 - the Moscow Patriarchate . Further, all Russian church cathedrals are recognized with the exception of the Greater Moscow. Since 1928 in a catacomb position. The "secret" cathedrals of 1948 (Chirchik) and 1961 (Nikolsky) are recognized. Sergianism is categorically rejected. True Orthodox Christians celebrate the same holidays as the Russian Orthodox Church.

In the Catacomb Church, the bishop elected by the flock is considered the highest hierarch. In conditions of persecution, the institution of "wandering priests" is introduced, who can travel in worldly clothes. The rank of deaconess is being revived. The head of the community can be a lay mentor (lay abbot).

Due to the lack of priests, true Orthodox Christians have abandoned most of the sacraments, and the sacraments of baptism, communion and repentance that they have preserved are performed in a simplified form. Often they are performed by older women, who are called nuns or blueberries.

True Orthodox Christians preach celibacy and asceticism. To an even greater extent than for other groups of the True Orthodox Church, they are characterized by eschatological sentiments.

True Orthodox Christians are strictly forbidden to be members of the Communist Party, Komsomol, pioneer, Islamic, Jewish organizations and participate in government elections, study and be teachers, engage in sports sections or art studios, go to the theater, serve in the army, smoke. Also, men are not allowed to shave their beards, and women are not allowed to cut their hair. Divine services can be performed at a minimum, that is, reduced to prayer and reading the Psalter. To celebrate the Eucharist, red grape wine and leavened bread are needed. Entry into the community is made through the rite of announcement and renunciation of previous delusions. Baptism is carried out through a three-fold immersion or full pouring.

With regard to marriage, the age of those getting married in the IPH has been reduced to 13 (for men) and 11 (for women) years, however, marriages with foreign elements (Jews and Negroid Hamites) are prohibited.

Subsequently, Ambrose Sievers rejected the veneration of icons and the authority of the Ecumenical Councils:

The IPH's attitude towards paganism is ambiguous, on the one hand there is a disgusting superstition, and on the other hand, "the ancient original religion of the forefather Noah."

The RCC IPH rejects the doctrine of the Trinity.

Worship. The divine service, in addition to the traditional one, includes prayers with lit crosses. June 22 is especially revered as the day of the Council of Russian Saints and the beginning of the Crusade against Bolshevism and the Second Civil War. January 8 is the day of the death of Konstantin Voskoboinik and August 19 is the day of the death of Bronislav Kaminsky (Holy New Martyr Boris Stratilat).

Petersburg saints. Saints who performed their deeds within the modern and historical territory of the St. Petersburg diocese Almazov Boris Alexandrovich

catacomb church

catacomb church

The canonical foundations of the Catacomb Church today apply to modern church communities of "Alternative Orthodoxy"

Historically, the Catacomb Church began to be called the totality of the Eucharistic communities headed by bishops, who did not recognize the authority of Metropolitan. Sergius (Stragorodsky) and the "Moscow Patriarchate" created by him. However, in the presence of a sensitive church conscience, the catacombists often lacked a clear awareness of their own position, which led them to an erroneous justification of essentially correct decisions. Replacing a clear canonical argument with moral or religious bitterness compromised the catacomb movement and gave its opponents a certain appearance of being right. I propose the following thesis for conciliar consideration. The canonical basis for the non-recognition of the Moscow Patriarchate as the sole center of government of the Russian Church is the lack of charisma of primatial authority in Metropolitan Sergius and his successors. It is this conviction, although not always clearly articulated, that became the basis of the canonical dispensation of the Catacomb Church.

The notion of only two types of Divine charisma has been firmly established in the church consciousness: the sacramental, inherent in the rank of a priest or bishop, and personal charisma, not associated with any specific conditions (“the spirit breathes where it wants”). However, the tragic post-revolutionary experience of the Russian Church brought to the fore the question of the third type of charisma - the specific charisma of church government. This question cannot be called simple or obvious. Doubt is often expressed: is there such a charisma that is institutionally inherent in the primatial service? Perhaps this ministry is purely administrative, human, not involving grace at all? Or does divine grace participate in church government, but only in the two forms indicated above - occult and personal? It was this understanding of the issue that became the basis for the false ecclesiological teaching for Metropolitan Sergius (Stragorodsky). The purpose of this teaching was purely pragmatic: it was supposed to give the appearance of canonical legitimacy to his claims to primatial authority.

The founders of the Catacomb Church held completely different views. The deeply realistic, Palamite in spirit experience of the charisma of the First Hierarch's power was remarkably expressed in the words of St. Cyril (of Kazan) addressed to Metropolitan Sergius:

“Your rights in it [in the Church] are only a reflection of the rights of Metropolitan. Peter and do not have independent light emission.

Such a perception was close and understandable to the majority of the Orthodox people, who had centuries-old experience of experiencing the charisma of royal service; this seemed all the more evident in relation to the authority of the Church. However, due to the fact that this experience has not yet been expressed in the form of a clear and generally accepted teaching, two decisive questions arise: firstly, in what way is the charisma of church authority manifested and, secondly, what are the conditions for acquiring this charisma?

The fundamental difference between administrative and charismatic power is most clearly manifested in such extreme measures to protect the church organism from foreign intrusions as "defrocking" and "excommunication from the Church." Can a power without grace in its nature cancel the hierarchical or hierarchical charism received by the right of apostolic succession? Is it in her power to invalidate the divine grace of baptism by cutting off one of the members of the mystical body of the Church by a simple administrative decision? Such assumptions sound almost blasphemous. It is obvious to the ecclesiastical consciousness that the divine charism can only be canceled by a power that is divine in nature. There is no "symmetry" between the right to transfer charisma and the right to take it away. Any bishop (in the presence of the second as a witness) may ordain a third, but he is not in a position to “cancel” the apostolic sacramental grace transmitted through him. Neither hierarchal charisma nor personal charisma (even if it exists) give the simple head of the church administration the strength to "take grace away" from a properly ordained bishop. Nor does he have the power to excommunicate anyone from the Church.

All he can do is to forbid the bishop or priest to perform divine services in the communities and temples subordinate to this administration. He can also express his (or joint with other bishops) conviction that this or that Christian, by his behavior or teaching, has himself separated himself from the Church. But the followers of Mr. Sergius, this amount of power seems insufficient. At the same time, they do not want to recognize the charismatic nature of the supreme ecclesiastical authority, as this would call into question their rights to such authority. As a result, their concept contains a glaring contradiction. On the one hand, they teach about the purely administrative nature of managerial power, on the other hand, they insist that its bearer has the power and the right to "eruption" and "excommunication". This is precisely the main self-proclaimed claim of Met. Sergius, this was and remains the very “sting of Sergianism”.

Speculating on the acute sensitivity of the church people to the question of "grace" or "gracelessness" of the clergy, Met. Sergius, literally "terrorizing" the people's conscience, mercilessly and unceremoniously cracked down on his church opponents. This is how his so-called “administrative” decrees sounded: “The sacraments performed ... by bishops who are in a state of prohibition are invalid. Those converting from these schisms, if the latter were baptized in the schism, should be received through the sacrament of Confirmation; ... those who died in Renovationism and the indicated schisms should not be buried, even at the strong request of their relatives, just as they should not be celebrated for the dead Liturgy. Those. all those who disagree with his ecclesiastical position - to re-baptize, remarry, not to be buried.

Only a few found in themselves sufficient spiritual firmness and depth of faith to, following St. Joseph (Petrovykh), say: “Let these orders be accepted by one all-suffering paper and all-encompassing insensible air, but not by the living souls of the faithful children of Christ.”

A particularly insidious reception by Metr. Sergius was to identify the canonical status of renovationism and the catacomb church. Indeed, the lack of grace of renovationism, condemned by Patriarch Tikhon, was recognized by the majority of the church people, which predetermined the collapse of this entire undertaking. In my youth, I heard the characteristic story of Natalia Mikhailovna Asafova, a contemporary of those events: “In the Cathedral of Christ the Savior, which belonged to the Renovationists, I saw a boy who was husking seeds and spitting husks right on the floor. When I shamed him, he replied, “Yes, it’s all the same to sanctify after them!” This boy knew what he was talking about: when the parish community returned the temple under the control of the "Tikhonov" hierarchy, the temple was consecrated anew!

Why, then, did the anathema of Patriarch Tikhon have effective force, while the acts of Met. Sergius could only accept "all-enduring paper and all-encompassing air"? From the standpoint of "administrative theory" there was no difference here. However, in fact, there is a cardinal difference, and it consists in the fact that Patriarch Tikhon had the charisma of primatial authority, and Met. Sergius did not have it. According to the meaning of the Decrees of the Great Council of 1917-18, an obligatory condition for the granting of primatial charism is the conciliar will of the Autocephalous Local Church, the very existence of which is the cause of all world Orthodoxy. The defrocking of a bishop from the rank or the excommunication of an ordinary layman from the Church is the taking away of a part of the apostolic grace or the cutting off of a member from the entire Universal Church. Therefore, the conditions under which the Lord endows the High Hierarch with this truly formidable power are so strict and obligatory. With its decisions, the Council of 1917-18. made a major contribution to the disclosure of the doctrine of the Church. In terms of the degree of influence on the future fate of Christianity, it can be compared with the Council of Nicaea. It can be said that we now live in the “post-Nicene era”, when the vast majority of hierarchs renounced the Nicene Confession of Faith, accepting heresy in a compromise form of “semi-Arianism”. And we have our Arius - in the person of Met. Sergius ... What can be said about today's "semi-Arians" ("semi-Sergians")?

In 1977, in the final lines of the book “The Tragedy of the Russian Church” it was written: “We think ... that with regard to the Council of 1945, the mercy of God covered all its flagrant canonical defects, and Patriarch Alexy was the real first hierarch, i.e. received the charisma of primatial authority. And now for the first time I confess before the Church: this statement of mine was erroneous. It took me 30 years to come to this conclusion, it was given to me with great difficulty, but now I cannot be moved from this position.

Now I would say this: "God's grace has preserved the Russian Church, despite the absence of primatial authority in Her." The psychological justification for my mistake at that time was the well-founded assumption that the main ailments of the Moscow Patriarchate were caused mainly by forceful pressure from the Soviet state. It was hoped that after the cessation of this pressure, deep healing of chronic church diseases would immediately begin. Liberation from state interference was a kind of "moment of truth" for the Moscow Patriarchate. And now we can say that the truth has become clear. It's been 20 years since freedom was gained, and nothing has changed on fundamental issues, if it hasn't gotten worse. The absence of catholicity and, in connection with this, the absence of a blessed church center has become a sad and obvious fact.

The canonical state of our Church today is such that it consists of a number of independent associations or groups, each of which is governed by its own ecclesiastical conscience, its own understanding of tradition and canons. One of these voluntary associations is also the Moscow Patriarchate, together with the church communities recognizing its authority. The members of each group elect their own leader or governing board, to whom they submit by mutual agreement, in order to maintain discipline, ease management and coordinate their actions. The existence of several such church associations (leaving aside the question of their "quality" for the time being) is a fact of today's life - and there are no guarantees that their number will not increase. It is possible that not all of these associations will turn out to be viable; worse, not all of them will be able to remain faithful to the foundations of Orthodoxy. All this can already be the subject of fraternal judgment, but is subject to a final assessment only at the canonical Local Council. One should not build illusions and underestimate the complexity of the situation: the process of restoring the unity destroyed by the Sergians will be very difficult. And now, in determining its position, each church group must do everything possible not to close the doors to themselves and others before this coming reunion.

Catacomb associations, in order to justify their canonicity, usually refer to the famous Decree No. 362 of November 10, 1920, issued by Patriarch Tikhon and the Supreme Church Council.

This decree prescribed the self-government of the dioceses in the absence of a general church center or the interruption of communication with it. Bishops were advised to unite, whenever possible, in independent groups for mutual assistance and joint resolution of issues of church life. Decree No. 362 remains valid even now. But one must be clear about the fact that this Decree did not introduce anything new into church law: it only authoritatively confirmed self-evident things that follow from the very nature of the Church. What else is left for bishops to do in such conditions? Even if this wonderful Decree did not exist, they would still be obliged to do what he prescribed, simply proceeding from their archpastoral duty. The absence of charismatic power in itself does not mean arbitrariness and anarchy. Thus, any bishop or priest who behaves unworthily or does not share the principled position of his church association may be banned from serving in the communities of this association. Thus, he is deprived of the right to preach or make any statements on behalf of this association. Moreover, if doubts arise about the correctness of ordinations or other sacraments, the head of the church association or the assembly of bishops may express their authoritative opinion on this matter. These measures are sufficient to maintain the necessary ecclesiastical discipline.

But if any of these voluntary associations dares to claim the fullness of their power over the entire Russian Church (“Russian” is the name given to one of its parts formed in 1943), then this can only be regarded as imposture and an attempt to usurp church power. . This is the "original sin" of Sergianism, which threatens to develop into an ecclesiological heresy in the form of a whole system of dogmatic justifications and justifications. Painful church divisions, inevitable in the then historical situation, Met. Sergius tried to oppose the mechanical disciplinary unity. And what is most terrible - with a blasphemous claim to the subordination of Divine grace to administrative orders and decrees: his entry into power was marked by an orgy of "eruptions" and "excommunications". Such a course of action contributes not to overcoming divisions, but, on the contrary, to their multiplication and deepening. Anticipating such devastating consequences of the church policy of Metropolitan Sergius, Saint Cyril (Kazansky) bitterly stated: “Caused by your activity, you are fixing the church dispute that is not yet clear for everyone as an irreconcilable church enmity.” And these methods of preserving church "unity" are used without hesitation by the spiritual heirs of Met. Sergius. Moreover, they themselves do not seem to believe in the effectiveness of their "excommunications". So many times the Moscow Patriarchate has subjected ROCOR hierarchs to all sorts of “prohibitions” that, according to its logic, there should not have been any traces of church grace left. And now, as if nothing had happened, they “reunite” with them and accept them “in their existing dignity” without any conditions! There is no doubt that the discussion and condemnation of not only false practice, but also the false teaching of Sergianism will be one of the main tasks of the upcoming full-fledged Local Council. A genuine reunification of the Orthodox Russian Church and the establishment of a canonical order in it will hardly be possible without the necessary clarification of the dogma about the Church.

You may ask: what about the “Local Councils”, which, although occasionally, are nevertheless organized by the Moscow Patriarchate? Without arguing about the name, one must be clear about the fact that they are essentially not such. And above all, because not all associations of the communities of the Russian Church are represented at them, but only one of them. However, today the situation has become so complicated that the question arises: which of the autonomous associations that have arisen are part of the Russian Church? I propose one more thesis for discussion: since the mystical Body of the Church is the church people, then the Local Church includes all those communities and their associations that voluntarily and consciously recognize it as their Church. The concept of “Local” has long lost its literal meaning: no one is surprised by the existence of communities of the Mokovo Patriarchate in Africa, consisting of local aborigines. So now we can talk about self-governing parts of the Russian Church, historically successive with the Orthodox Church of the Russian Empire, which has long gone beyond the territorial, state or national principle.

All the cathedrals of the Moscow Patriarchate were cathedrals of only one of the equal and autonomous parts of the Russian Church, an association that historically developed around Metropolitan. Sergius and his Synod. Today's overwhelming superiority of the Moscow Patriarchate in the number of episcopates and parishioners, not to mention the number of churches, is a historically temporary and accidental circumstance that in no way gives it the right to claim that it alone is the Russian Church. So, before the start of the war (before the annexation of the western regions), the Catacomb Church had significantly more bishops and ministered to a larger number of believers than the then Sergian patriarchate. As for the subsequent rapid growth of the Moscow Patriarchate, for the same "ecclesiologically insignificant" reasons, the Renovationist schism gained even greater power in its time. Most of the Russian churches (about 20 thousand, not counting Ukraine and Belarus) were placed at the disposal of the Renovationists. They had more than 100 dioceses, they had pompous "Local Councils", they had recognition from the Eastern Churches. And where are the updates now? They fulfilled the word of Scripture: "Do not rely on the prince, on the sons of men, in them there is no salvation" (Ps. 145: 3). The Renovationists are long gone, but they left a poisonous fruit: a deep distrust of the church people in any attempt at genuine renewal. They perverted the creative tasks of the Great Council, which were generated by the inner demands of church life, by the prophetic call of the Holy Spirit. In their irresponsible reformism, the Renovationists were driven by something completely different: a passionate enthusiasm for the revolutionary worldly elements or simply a cynical desire to please the new "masters of life." Single exceptions in the person of individual sincere reformers could not change the overall picture. The very term "renovation" was deeply and permanently compromised, and today it is used only as a curse. But this New Testament word has a deep and sacred meaning: “Be not conformed to this age, but be transformed by the renewing of your mind, that you may know what is the good, acceptable, and perfect will of God” (Rom. 12:2). The long-ripened, vitally necessary church reforms, the beginning of which was laid by the Great Council, were ruined by the Sergians in the bud - under the pretext of "reaction to renovationism." As a result, the Russian Church again found itself doomed to that disastrous spiritual stagnation, due to which the great Orthodox civilization collapsed twice in history - first in Byzantium, and then in Russia.

However, despite the steady and ardent striving of the Moscow Patriarchate to merge with the temporal authorities, it would be wrong for this reason to consider it “fallen away from the Church,” as some “hotheads” from ROCOR or the Catacombs claim. In itself, the desire to use state resources to expand the possibilities of the Church is a common thing in the history of Orthodoxy. Of course, for an alliance with the state, one sometimes had to pay an exorbitant price; besides, the church, which decided on such a “marriage” union, runs the risk of one day becoming a “widow”. Attempts to rapprochement with the state are not an ecclesiastical crime: such attempts, although forced, were made in their time by Patriarch Tikhon and Metropolitan Peter. A crime is committed when a church group that has received "exclusive" support from the state declares on this basis that it is in it that the entire fullness of the Local Church is embodied and begins to impose its will on everyone with the help of canonical violence. The Moscow Patriarchate, resorting to such violence, violates one of the key resolutions of the Great Council. This definition is dated 2/15 Aug. 1918 states: The Church cannot have any political position binding on all its members; on the other hand, no personal political views prevent a believer from being a full member of the Church.

Now I return to the theme of the canonicity of the cathedrals of the Moscow Patriarchate. My conclusion is that they could not be considered full-fledged Local Councils, even if there were no other associations in the Russian Church.

The decisive word on this issue was spoken by Archbishop Ermogen (Golubev) in his 1967 letter to Patriarch Alexy I, in connection with the 50th anniversary of the restoration of the patriarchate. Unfortunately, at that time the depth of ecclesiastical thought of Vl. Hermogen was not appreciated by anyone, although we all treated him with the deepest respect. But now it was his ideas that gave me the impetus to correct my old ecclesiological error, which was mentioned above. Vladyka Hermogenes, ordained hieromonk by Patriarch Tikhon himself, by his lonely and courageous opposition to the "Khrushchev persecution" showed a worthy example of the fulfillment of archpastoral duty. In those years when the total number of churches was halved, he did not allow a single church to be closed in two dioceses, for which, to please the authorities, Patriarch Alexy I was removed from service.

Considering the question of the participation of priests and laity in the Local Council, vl. Hermogen wrote:
“From a principled, church-canonical point of view, the question of the composition of the Council must first of all be decided depending on how the episcopate is formed. If the bishops were elected by the dioceses in accordance with the procedure established by church canons and, as a result, are the actual representatives of their dioceses, then, of course, the Council, as a representative body of the Church, may also consist of bishops alone. If bishops were not elected, as required by church canons, but were appointed in violation of them, then it is clear that the episcopate formed in such a manner cannot have either the canonical or moral right to represent those dioceses that did not elect him. In this case, the Local Council must necessarily include as full members not only bishops, but also duly elected clergy and laity.

Here Vladyka Hermogenes refers to the main disease of the Russian Church: a deep internal schism between the episcopate and the church people. This schism manifested itself already in the time of Patriarch Nikon; in the person of the Old Believers, the Russian Church lost its best part, and has never been able to fully recover from this blow. As a result of the Petrine reforms, this destructive schism deepened even more, bringing the Church into that state of protracted "paralysis" to which the Orthodox layman Fyodor Dostoevsky testified with bitterness. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the collapse of the Orthodox Monarchy in Russia was a direct consequence of this spiritual paralysis. And only the Great Council of 1917-18. became a truly prophetic effort to heal this bleeding wound in the very Body of the Church. Sergianism, however, brought to naught the results of this salvific effort and, under new conditions, returned to the habitual “tradition” that was destructive for the Church.

The essence of conciliar representation, of course, is not in the procedure for “choosing” bishops (this was only an intermediate step established by the Council to restore the lost churchness), but in the organic, inseparable connection of the bishop with his church community. In the Catacomb Church, it often happens that the bishop himself creates a community around himself - and, of course, without any elections, becomes its "actual representative", in the words of Vl. Hermogen. About the same, what is the situation in the Moscow Patriarchate, you all know firsthand. The episcopate here exists practically separately from the church people - he appoints himself, governs himself, judges himself. Real pastoral activity is carried out only by parish priests, who have absolutely no rights before the bishop, who do not have legalized forms of conciliar communion.
Prot. Pavel Adelheim. "Dogma about the Church".

However, as soon as the ruling bishop notices that the priest's connection with the community is becoming too deep, he immediately "transfers" him to another parish, or even dismisses him for the staff. Carried out under the pretext of combating “church disorders,” such actions are a cruel blow to the very heart of the resurgent church community. The motive of these actions is by no means in the desire of the bishop to help the community in overcoming the really existing parish diseases - leaderism and false eldership. The essence of the matter is that the sprouts of true ecclesiasticality, emerging in parishes, threaten the very principle of the existence of the hierarchy as a closed caste, dominating the Church from bureaucratic heights, sucking all resources out of it for their own benefit.

Being in fact in schism with its Church, the episcopate at the same time recognizes and declares itself as the "Church". I remember how in 1975 Father Gleb Yakunin and I wrote a letter to the Assembly of the WCC calling for support for confessors of the faith in Russia. Father John Meyendorff, as a member of the Organizing Committee, translated this letter into English and distributed it to all the delegates (and there were about 2000 of them!). As a result, it was vigorously discussed, although not in the stands, but on the sidelines. The head of the delegation of the Moscow Patriarchate, Metropolitan Nikodim (Rotov) (who tried to put the entire ecumenical movement under the control of the KGB) simply fled under the pretext of illness, leaving Metr. Juvenalia "fend off" questions and accusations. And this is what he said in an interview with a local newspaper:

“Priest Gleb Yakunin is banned, and the second author of the letter, Lev Regelson, has nothing to do with the Orthodox Church at all.”

What did he mean by that? Yes, exactly what I thought: the Church is bishops with a subordinate clergy, and the laity (i.e. the church people) have “nothing to do with the Church” at all! The people for the Moscow Patriarchate are simply “consumers of religious services”, and the “Church” is a kind of “combine for meeting the religious needs of the population”. And such a view of the Moscow Patriarchate completely coincided with the position expressed in the Soviet legislation on cults.

Until this situation in the Moscow Patriarchate changes radically and the gulf between the episcopate and the church people is not eliminated, there can be no talk of any canonical Local Councils of the Russian, or, even more so, the Russian Church. The ostentatious presence at the Council of 1945 of the laity, handpicked by the church authorities (and who, moreover, did not have the right to vote), essentially did not change anything. After all, ow. Hermogenes emphasizes that in the absence of a representative episcopate, the participation in the Council of clerics and laity "as full members", moreover, not appointed from above, but "appropriately elected" is necessary.

The Council of 1945 also committed other gross violations of church canons. Thus, Archbishop Luka (Voyno-Yasenetsky) insisted on the rule of electing the Patriarch by lot from three candidates who received the largest number of votes in a secret ballot (Determination of August 13, 1918). But just before the beginning of the Council, he inexplicably and suddenly fell ill. Voting was open and non-alternative. Such was the “catholicity”… But now the Moscow Patriarchate has generally proclaimed the rejection of these costly – and in the presence of freedom of speech and risky – performances in the form of regular “Local Councils”. The Moscow Patriarchate considered the “Bishops’ Councils” to be a more convenient form for resolving any issues, which became a kind of intradepartmental conferences of the episcopate. This reflects the actual state of affairs: the rest of the Church does not take any part in managing its own life, and the Moscow Patriarchate does not express any intention to allow it to take such part.

Since there can be no charismatic church authority in the absence of canonical Local Councils, there was no such authority in the Russian Church during the entire synodal era. Therefore, in particular, all synodal “anathemas” (regardless of whether they are deserved or undeserved) should be considered invalid. His Holiness Patriarch Tikhon became the first bearer of primatial authority after a centuries-old break. In addition, due to exceptional circumstances, the Council adopted an unprecedented decision: Patriarch Tikhon was instructed to choose at his own discretion three worthy successors for the role of head of the Church, keeping their names secret. In fact, all of them received a conciliar sanction for primatial authority, becoming a kind of "Co-patriarchs." Their names were announced at the funeral of Patriarch Tikhon: Metropolitans Kirill, Agafangel, Peter; the bishops present conciliarly confirmed their authority. There was no question of any practice of “inheriting power by will”. Although the letter of the canons was not observed, their essence was preserved and implemented in the new conditions. The meaning of the canons lies in the fact that the primatial authority is directly and directly rooted in church catholicity. This is not "ecclesiastical democracy": grace-filled power is given by God, but it is given only on the condition of the conciliar will. If there is no conciliarity, there is no charismatic power either.

Important practical conclusions follow from this understanding of the canonical situation in the Russian Church. In order not to recognize the power of the Moscow Patriarchate over oneself, in order to justify one’s position, one does not need, as is often done, to fall into bitterness and accuse the hierarchs of the Moscow Patriarchate of all mortal sins (for, unfortunately, the bishops of the Catacomb Church also have enough personal sins). There is also no need to exaggerate the importance of certain aspects of the activities of the Moscow Patriarchate (such as, for example, participation in ecumenism or too close cooperation with the authorities): even the refusal of the Moscow Patriarchate from these practices will not change its canonical status. A defensive or aggressive stance towards the Moscow Patriarchate is not justified in any way and is completely unproductive. For calm and fruitful church work, it is quite enough to realize the fact that any of the Catacomb churches, in the presence of a correctly ordained episcopate, has exactly the same canonical foundations for its existence as the Moscow Patriarchate itself. The concept of “schism,” which the leaders of the Moscow Patriarchate are so fond of using, in the current situation simply has no ecclesiological meaning. Reproaching Mr. Sergius is that he, “in violation of brotherly love”, applies the nickname “renegades and schismatics” to all those who disagree with him, Metropolitan. Cyril testified:

“I do not separate from anything holy and truly ecclesiastical; I am only afraid to approach and cling to what I recognize as sinful by its very origin, and therefore I refrain from fraternal communion with Metropolitan. Sergius and like-minded archpastors to him.

The Catacomb movement at its best is not a protest (“neo-Protestant”) movement against the Moscow Patriarchate, nor is it “alternative Orthodoxy,” as glib journalists dubbed it. This is the beginning of that revival of Orthodoxy, which the best people of Russia have been dreaming of for centuries. This is an attempt to create living, organic forms of churchness in order to realize that enormous spiritual potential that lurks in the depths of the Russian people, thirsting for the unclouded Truth of Christ. The nomenklatura of the Moscow Patriarchate, contrary to all its declarative statements, is least of all concerned about the true revival of Orthodoxy. The selfless efforts of individual clerics, and even more so of hierarchs, within the Moscow Patriarchate itself invariably meet with dull, stubborn resistance from this closed bureaucratic organization, driven by a powerful instinct for self-preservation. The only thing in which it shows indomitable energy is the possession of church property, this historical property of the entire Russian people, to which the Moscow Patriarchate, misleading the state authorities, lays claim to its exclusive rights. And this should not surprise anyone: the disposal of church buildings is the main source of the “power” of the Moscow Patriarchate, just as it was the source of the power of the Renovationists in its time.

In conclusion, I consider it necessary to emphasize once again: one of the most dangerous mistakes that the leaders of the catacomb movement can make is to start intimidating the believing people with statements about the “gracelessness of the sacraments” in other parts of the Russian Church. It is not worth imitating here the unworthy behavior of the Moscow Patriarchate, which is not stopped by the fear of committing a mortal sin: blasphemy against grace. After all, even in relation to such an obvious usurper and destroyer of the Church, which was Metropolitan. Sergius, Saint Cyril did not allow himself such accusations. Here is what he writes about it:

“For my part, the alleged lack of grace of the sacred rites and sacraments performed by the Sergians (may the Lord save us from such a thought) is not in the least suspected.” And he repeats this more than once in even stronger terms. In a letter to Mr. At the end of 1929, he speaks to Sergius “of the horror with which he pushed this thought away from himself,” and then continues: “You yourself note this horror of mine and, after this, introducing me to such slanderers, you are simply telling a lie.”

And, finally, the most difficult (but perhaps the most important) thing is to avoid the sectarian spirit with all your might, which is expressed, first of all, in the catacomb churches' intolerance towards each other. For, as the Lord said, “By this all will know that you are My disciples, if you have love for one another” (John 13:35). This, of course, is not about indulging the abuses of unscrupulous activists who arise like foam on the wave of church revival. This has always been the case in critical periods of church history, and the Russian Catacomb Church has accumulated vast experience in separating the true from the false in its own life. This experience teaches that one must not betray one's convictions and violate one's religious conscience "for the sake of the peace of the church" (the favorite "justification" for the repressions of the Moscow Patriarchate against its critics). Peace is never achieved in this way. “They say: Peace! World! But there is no peace” (Jer. 6:14). In our circumstances, it is among the most sincere and zealous "workers in the field of the Church" that differences of opinion are inevitable, sometimes deep and painful. They should not be bypassed or glossed over - but they should not become a reason for mutual negation and alienation. Of course, brotherly love in the absence of unanimity is a heavy cross, but without this no conciliar unity can be born.

– Many historians and publicists talk about the Catacomb Church, and often in everyday consciousness it is opposed to the Russian Orthodox Church – the Moscow Patriarchate. Was there such a phenomenon and is such a opposition legitimate?

- Such a phenomenon, undoubtedly, was, if communities that existed illegally are called catacomb communities. As for their opposition to the Moscow Patriarchate, this must be judged more subtly, more differentiated: the Catacomb communities were different. There were communities that turned out to be illegal or even created illegal from the very beginning due to persecution, due to the massive closure of churches - at the end of the 30s, almost all churches were closed, on average, there was one church per whole diocese. But even in the post-war years, when legal church life was restored to a certain extent, there were very few open churches in many remote dioceses. Under these conditions, church life often had an illegal character, despite the fact that some illegal communities did not oppose themselves to the Moscow Patriarchate. But there were other catacomb communities that were in fact in opposition to the Moscow Patriarchate, and this opposition had its own gradations. Some communities were in a severe break with the Patriarchate - Eucharistic communion with the clergy of the Moscow Patriarchate was considered unacceptable, unlawful. In these communities, over time, a sectarian spirit prevailed.

In general, if we keep in mind the origin of these communities, then there is not quite an adequate idea that they are connected mainly with the opposition of several bishops of the late 1920s to Metropolitan Sergius, with the so-called "uncommemorating" bishops; this representation is inaccurate. For the most part, the communities that were in the post-war years in rupture with the Moscow Patriarchate (they are sometimes called true Orthodox Christians) go back more to those church groups that found themselves in opposition to the canonical Church even earlier. Firstly, these were the so-called "Joannites", that is, unreasonable admirers of the righteous saint, who revered him for the Lord God and therefore found themselves outside the Church already in pre-revolutionary times. Then there was opposition to the Local Council of 1917–1918. Even then, communities appeared (at least clergymen and laity) that rejected the very reform of church government, the restoration of the patriarchate. But, perhaps, even more significant for the appearance of the catacomb communities, which were in opposition to the Patriarchate, was the name-glorifying movement, condemned by the Holy Synod on the eve of the Local Council of 1917-1918. All this was joined by the opposition at the end of the 1920s, connected with disagreement with the line that Metropolitan, then Patriarch Sergius, chose in his time.

But with the bishops-oppositionists of the late 20s - early 30s. these catacomb communities connected little. Only a few bishops of those who did not commemorate Metropolitan Sergius tried to create parallel centers of church life; I definitely know that Bishop Alexy (Buy) and Metropolitan Joseph (Petrovykh) were among them; in any case, he discussed such a possibility, documents on this subject have been preserved. But whether there were parishes, whether there were catacomb communities directly connected with him - I'm not entirely sure about this. Therefore, I repeat: with regard to such communities that were in tough, irreconcilable opposition to the Patriarchate, here, it seems to me, the stream coming from the opposition groups that arose before the end of the 20s was stronger, without any connection with the discussion about " Declaration" of Metropolitan Sergius.

But at the turn of the 50s - 60s. and in the 60s, as far as I know, the priests who illegally, clandestinely ministered to such communities often blessed their flocks, their children to visit the churches of the Patriarchate, to take communion and confess there; sometimes they pointed to the priests, who inspired them with more confidence than others. Thus, I am talking about another level of opposition. In one case, it simply did not exist, but there was a forced illegal status, in another there was a sharp opposition, a break in communication, in the third case - such a restrained opposition, which, in general, over time, when the page of history was turned, in the 90s years, in its relatively healthy part, has completely “vanished”, while our current “catacombs”, again filled with dubious personalities, are, of course, not communities of catacombs in the proper sense of the word, but schismatics who, although they adopt the name "Catacomb Church", armed with some other lofty and sonorous terms, but in reality they are just adventurers; they either left the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate or were simply impostors.

- If we talk about the church catacombs that were in communion with the Moscow Patriarchate, where did they replenish: were they specially ordained into the catacombs, or were they fed by supernumerary clergymen?

– I think that in the post-war years, cases of secret ordination by bishops who occupied pulpits and legally served were extremely rare; it was then very dangerous, first of all, not personally for them, but for the Church, and on the other hand, it had a certain space for legal existence. Nevertheless, there were such ordinations by the bishops of the Moscow Patriarchate, but for the most part at a later time, during the era of Khrushchev’s persecutions and in the early days after them. This is well known. Ecclesiastical Moscow knows Archpriest Gleb Kaleda very well, who was ordained in his time by Metropolitan John (Wendland). I read that Metropolitan Nikodim (Rotov), ​​who occupied a very high position in the Russian Church, ordained illegally. But it is natural that the majority in the catacombs were priests who were ordained earlier and found themselves outside the state: rarely - ordained in the pre-revolutionary years, often - ordained in the 20s, to a lesser extent - ordained by bishops who were in opposition, for example, Alexy (Buem) . In addition, the war played its part; church life in the occupied territories, cut off from the Moscow Patriarchate, was quite intense, and in the post-war years those priests who served in these territories were persecuted. Many of those who did not lose their freedom, nevertheless, for various reasons, did not have the opportunity to serve in open churches.

But this phenomenon was not as large-scale as it was represented, say, by the press of the Russian Church Abroad, which spoke of millions of Catacomb Christians, of thousands of communities. Maybe there were up to a thousand communities, but they were small.

– And speaking specifically, what catacomb monastic communities or simply secular parishes do you know?

- Unfortunately, I can hardly name any specific communities, except perhaps the priest Seraphim (Bityukov), and in the 30s - the now glorified Hieromartyr Sergius Mechev, the son of the great pastor of the holy righteous Alexis Mechev.

– Was Father Seraphim in communion with Metropolitan Sergius?

“Probably not, but I don't think there was a spirit of intransigence in his community. Those who left it were later in communion with the Patriarchate, but I assume that he personally was not in communion; he closely adjoined those bishops of the opposition who stopped communion with Metropolitan Sergius in the late 1920s.

– What is your opinion about the extent to which the catacomb movement is a search for a path to a full-fledged church life, even in an illegal position, and to what extent it was woven into a political background and the ability to be in opposition to the state?

– I would say that in those cases when it was about the impossibility of a legal existence, this movement was the only possible form of church life in a particular locality, and then it was not connected with any opposition, but simply with the absence of legal open churches. Such a situation was almost everywhere in the 1930s, and in the post-war years - in individual dioceses on the outskirts of the country: in Kazakhstan, in Siberia, in the Far East - with the almost complete absence of legal church life. There was also opposition associated with disagreement with the line of Metropolitan Sergius; I would call it church-political opposition, but this implies church politics, which, of course, could have a direct connection with the actual political position, but might not have such a direct connection.

If, say, we read the correspondence of St. Metropolitan Kirill, the most authoritative of those who did not agree with Metropolitan Sergius, the future Patriarch, then we will hardly see criticism in it that would be directed against the compromise line of Metropolitan Sergius in his relations with the authorities. All the criticism there goes in a different direction; we are talking about the scope of the powers of the Deputy Locum Tenens, and this issue is discussed in the canonical plane, that is, the legitimacy of the independent administration of Metropolitan Sergius without contacts with the Patriarchal Locum Tenens, Hieromartyr Metropolitan Peter, is called into question. Metropolitan Sergius insists that since these contacts are impossible, he is forced to take the entire initiative as the acting head of the Church bishop. And, for example, in the letters of Metropolitan Joseph (Petrovs), criticism of the compromise line of Metropolitan Sergius comes through quite clearly.

But the beginning of the opposition movement was not the moment of publication of the "Declaration"; after it, some time passed before the first appearance of the opposition of the “non-remembering”. And the "Declaration" itself did not cause criticism, and the fact of its publication did not become a reason for criticism either. But when Metropolitan Joseph, since the authorities did not allow him to live in Leningrad, as it was then called, was transferred to Odessa, this served as a signal for him and his admirers to start a controversy. Of course, this translation itself followed from the agreements that were concluded by Metropolitan Sergius with the authorities while he was imprisoned. Obviously, one of the conditions for the normalization of church-state relations was the agreement to dismiss those bishops who were not allowed by the authorities to live in the city where they occupied the cathedra, or those who had already been sent to camps and prisons. Metropolitan Sergius fulfilled this condition, that is, he fired, translated; whom he retired, whom he transferred to the place of exile - this is most of all the criticism of his line, and the "Declaration" became the object of criticism already in hindsight.

As for the most consistent and irreconcilable opposition, about which I have already said that it was acquiring a sectarian character, then the political moment itself was probably still transitory, and the matter consisted in deep ecclesiological errors, that is, in essence, this there was a split in its purest form, often with heretical overlays. It was a path that, to a certain extent, repeated our Old Believers, degenerating into priestlessness.

– It is known that in the post-war period and in the first half of the 1940s, a large number of catacomb priests entered the legal ministry. How can this movement be assessed, and did it somehow influence social and church life in the early years of the Patriarchate of His Holiness Alexy I?

– This happened after the Local Council elected Alexy (Simansky) as His Holiness Patriarch in 1945. Almost all the bishops who were then free participated in the Council, and this was the majority of the Russian episcopate, if we take into account the bishops who were in prison or in exile. Therefore, this election was very convincing and authoritative. I think that the very change of face on the Patriarchal Throne was already important, since as soon as there was a polemic with Metropolitan Sergius, this created some kind of personal relationship, perhaps personal hostility, which was already to a lesser extent directed towards the person of Patriarch Alexy I, although in 1927–28 a very important point for the Petrograd opposition was precisely the demand made on Metropolitan Sergius to remove from the Synod, in particular, Metropolitan Alexy.

It was not connected then with some big church-state policy; it’s just that the circle of those St. Petersburg priests who found themselves in opposition closely adjoined Metropolitan Joseph, although there were other moods in St. Petersburg: when Metropolitan Sergius appointed Metropolitan Joseph to the St. Petersburg see, there were quite a few admirers of the future Patriarch Alexy I among the clergy and laity, they knew well as the vicar of the diocese and wanted to see the metropolitan. And another circle of clergy and laity gladly received Metropolitan Joseph, clung to him and rallied around him. They did not approve of the future Patriarch Alexy, they found reason to accuse him of some inconsistency when the Renovationist schism broke out there in 1922: indeed, at first he behaved with the schismatics in a compromise, but in the end he did not submit to the Renovationist authorities and ended up in exile.

But the main arrows of criticism were nevertheless directed at the end of the 1920s. to Metropolitan Sergius, so the new face at the head of the Church was conducive to reconciliation. And of course, most of the healthy forces from the opposition stopped their opposition to the Patriarchate; the priests of this direction - as far as it was possible for them, as far as they were in a legal position, as far as the authorities could allow them to legally serve - entered the full jurisdiction of the Patriarchate. Of course, the most important and typical case, which served as a signal for many, is the then act of St. Athanasius (Sakharov).

- What next period in the life of the church catacombs can be singled out and how can it be characterized?