Détente of international tension causes of détente. The period of “détente” in the foreign policy of the USSR

Détente of international tension causes of détente. The period of “détente” in the foreign policy of the USSR

In the 1970s The severity of the confrontation between the Soviet and Western blocs has decreased; this process is commonly called “détente of international tension.” The USSR and the USA, embroiled in local conflicts in different parts of the world, needed a break. In addition, the new Soviet leader L.I. Brezhnev had no desire for rash undertakings outside the “traditional” Soviet sphere of influence. In addition, the USSR was already beginning to experience dependence on purchases of Western goods, and the West on Soviet oil. The USSR caught up with the USA in the nuclear sphere, and the Americans, having landed on the Moon in 1969, demonstrated their power in the matter of space exploration. Both blocs, NATO and the Warsaw Department, experienced a certain crisis during this period. (Romania occupied a special position in the ATS, and France left the ranks of the NATO military organization in the 1960s; Spain limited the activities of the American Air Force in its country after the emergency release of four thermonuclear bombs over the Spanish village of Palomares in 1966.) The Social Democratic government in Germany has expressed its readiness to recognize the inviolability of borders in the east.

Years of reduced international tension were followed by dangerous moments of mutual confrontation. A new round of tension occurred in the late 70s and early 80s. The entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan marked the end of détente. The arms race has resumed with renewed vigor. The Americans initiated the development of a space missile defense program, which greatly worried the USSR, which did not have sufficient means to fight back in space.

SALT I and ABM Treaties

As a result, in the 1970s. a gradual relaxation of international tension begins - a policy aimed at reducing the aggressiveness of the confrontation between socialist and capitalist countries. Back in 1967, consultations began on the possibility of reducing the scope of the arms race, which ended with the signing of the SALT I (strategic arms limitation) and ABM (limitation of missile defense systems) treaties in 1972. In them, the USSR and the USA established the maximum number of missile launch stops, including sea ones. The SALT I treaty was valid for five years, the ABM treaty had an unlimited validity period. The existing structure of ground-based ballistic missile groups was actually “frozen.” The countries committed themselves not to create more than two missile defense areas (the calculation was made that if one cannot defend oneself fully, then the readiness to launch a nuclear strike will also decrease).



Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

The most important achievement of “détente” was also the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in 1975, held in Helsinki. It culminated negotiations between the socialist camp and Western countries that began back in the 1960s. The USSR and its allies managed to achieve recognition of the principle of the inviolability of borders (and therefore the established territories of the countries of Eastern Europe, including the GDR), agreeing in return to recognize the principle of human rights and the right to the free exchange of information and contacts between people. In fact, the final act of the meeting (August 1, 1975) was tantamount to a post-war peace treaty. In Moscow it was regarded as a triumph of Soviet diplomacy, and the 10 principles of the act were even included in the text of the new Constitution of the USSR in 1977.

9 International relations in the 1950s–1960s. Crises in world politics in the early 1960s. Kholodnaya war.End of WW2: the authority and power of the USSR and the USA has increased, but in reality their power is not comparable. At 45 The USA was 4 times superior to the USSR in military power. The Soviet bloc was a country that was weakened economically and demographically. The USSR's foreign policy relied not on real indicators, but on the glory of military victories; the United States, on the contrary, occupies a leading place in the world economy. The confrontation was beneficial to both blocs for internal development. March '46 – Churchill’s speech in Fulton: the Western world is threatened by the danger of a new world war – from the USSR. An “iron curtain” fell over all of Europe (it was supplemented by the Truman Doctrine). Nuclear weapon. 49 – NATO (defense and peacekeeping mission). In turn, the USSR, Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany, Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Albania in May 55. create internal affairs forces as a means of neutralizing the threat to NATO. 49 - CMEA. 47 The Marshall Plan - its rejection further divided the world. An important problem is the German question. In '49 images Germany, GDR. There was the Berlin crisis, when after the currency reform in West Berlin, it was blocked for 300 days, the world was on the verge of open war. 48-49. After the death of Stalin - a thaw in international relations. 55 - an agreement with Austria after the withdrawal of all foreign troops from it. After the XX Congress of the CPSU 56. The dismantling of the Iron Curtain began. January '54 - meeting of the foreign ministers of the USA, England, France and the USSR in Berlin. 55 – German Chancellor K. Adenauder arrived in Moscow. 59 - Khrushchev’s visit to the USA, they agreed to meet in Paris in 60, but a few days before the meeting an American U-2 spy plane was shot down. 61 - Khrushchev meeting with Kennedy in Vienna. It was decided to establish a primary telephone connection. 12 August 61 2 Berlin crisis, a wall was built around West Berlin.

Relief of international tension

J. Carter and L. I. Brezhnev sign the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II), Vienna, June 18, 1979.

Relief of international tension(in the media it is often simply discharge) - a policy aimed at reducing the aggressiveness of the confrontation between the countries of the socialist and capitalist camps.

By the second half of the 1960s, a fairly stable bipolar political system had developed in the world: the Eastern and Western blocs, led by the USSR and the USA, reached a strategic balance based on the doctrine of mutually assured destruction (MAD, English. Mutual Assured Destruction) - The USSR caught up with the USA in the power of nuclear forces. In turn, the United States, during the Apollo program, landed on the Moon in 1969, demonstrating its victory in the “space race.”

Europe

At the same time, the ongoing nuclear arms race, the concentration of control of Western nuclear forces in the hands of the United States, and a number of incidents with nuclear weapons carriers caused increasing criticism of US nuclear policy. Contradictions in the principles of nuclear weapons management in the NATO command led to France's withdrawal from participation in the formation of the armed forces of this organization. On January 17, one of the largest incidents with nuclear weapons occurred: a US Air Force B-52 bomber, which caught fire while refueling in mid-air, made an emergency release of four thermonuclear bombs over the Spanish village of Palomares. After this incident, Spain refused to condemn France's withdrawal from NATO and limited the military activities of the US Air Force in the country, suspending the Spanish-American treaty on military cooperation; Negotiations to renew this treaty ended in failure.

USA

East

Soviet-Chinese gap. Border conflict on Damansky Island. Nixon's China talks (see Nixon's Visit to China (1972)). USSR fears about the creation of a Sino-American alliance.

From the 1972 treaties to the 1975 Helsinki Accords

    • January: the Soviet-American space experiment “Soyuz - Apollo” began.
    • June 23 and 25, Glassboro (USA): meetings between Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers A. N. Kosygin and US President L. B. Johnson.
    • On December 20, the Institute of the USA of the USSR Academy of Sciences was founded, in 1971 it was renamed the Institute of the USA and Canada of the USSR Academy of Sciences; since 1991 - Institute of the USA and Canada RAS.
  • , November 17, Helsinki: start of negotiations between the USSR and the USA on the limitation of strategic offensive weapons.
  • , September 30, Washington, signed:
    • Agreement between the USSR and the USA on measures to improve the direct communication line between the USSR and the USA;
    • Agreement on measures to reduce the risk of nuclear war between the USSR and the USA.
    • April 11: another Agreement was signed between the USSR and the USA on exchanges and cooperation in scientific, technical, educational, cultural and other fields.
    • May 22-30: Nixon’s visit to the USSR (the first official visit of a sitting US president to Moscow in the entire history of relations). Meeting of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee L. I. Brezhnev with R. Nixon. During the meeting the following were signed:
      1. Treaty between the USSR and the USA on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty);
      2. Interim Agreement between the USSR and the USA on Certain Measures in the Field of Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT-1);
      3. document “Fundamentals of relations between the USSR and the USA”;
      4. Agreement between the USSR and the USA on cooperation in the field of environmental protection;
      5. Agreement between the government of the USSR and the government of the USA on cooperation in the field of medical science and healthcare;
      6. Agreement between the government of the USSR and the government of the USA on cooperation in the field of science and technology (extended in 1977);
      7. Agreement between the USSR and the USA on cooperation in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes (extended in );
      8. Agreement between the government of the USSR and the government of the United States on the prevention of incidents on the high seas and in the airspace above it.
    • October 18, Washington, signed:
      1. Agreement between the government of the USSR and the government of the USA on trade;
      2. Agreement between the government of the USSR and the government of the United States on the settlement of Lend-Lease, mutual assistance and claims;
      3. Agreement between the government of the USSR and the government of the USA on the procedure for financing.
    • The American-funded project was closed.

Cultural and economic cooperation

End of discharge

  • 1979, December 25: Hafizullah Amin's palace is stormed by a group of Soviet special forces, and he himself is killed. Beginning of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
  • 1980
    • January 4: in connection with the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, US President John Carter announced the decision of the American administration to postpone the consideration and ratification of the SALT II Treaty in the US Senate; delay the opening of new American and Soviet consulates; stop or reduce the export of a number of goods to the USSR, including agricultural products (on January 8, an embargo was imposed on the supply of these products); suspend economic, scientific, technical and cultural exchanges between the USSR and the USA.
    • April 12: The US National Olympic Committee decides not to send a US team to the 1980 Olympics in Moscow. More than 60 countries joined the boycott of the Olympic Games.
    • August 6: A message is published about the adoption by the Carter administration of a “new nuclear strategy” formulated in Presidential Directive No. 59.
  • 1981
    • August 6: US President Ronald Reagan ordered full-scale production of neutron weapons.
    • November 30: Negotiations between the USSR and the USA on limiting nuclear weapons in Europe began in Geneva.
    • December 28: a statement by US President R. Reagan was published on the imposition of sanctions against the Soviet Union in connection with the events in Poland - to suspend flights of Aeroflot aircraft to the USA, to postpone a number of negotiations, to tighten the procedure for issuing permits for the sale of certain types of equipment to the USSR, to refuse from the extension of bilateral agreements that expired in 1981.

see also

Notes

Links

  • Artem Krechetnikov. “Reboot-1959”: first attempt - BBC-Russian.com, September 29, 2009

Categories:

  • Cold War
  • US history
  • Foreign policy of the USSR
  • The era of stagnation
  • Conflicts of 1972
  • 1972 in the USSR
  • 1972 in the USA

Wikimedia Foundation. 2010.

INTRODUCTION……………………………………………………………………………….3

PREREQUISITES AND THE BEGINNING OF INTERNATIONAL TENSION DELAY……………………………………………………………………………….….6

1.1 Reasons for detente and goals of the parties………………….…………......6

1.2 Moscow Treaty 1963 and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1968………………………………………………………………………………….….11

1.3 Treaty on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space of 1967………………………………………………………………………………......16

SOVIET-AMERICAN NEGOTIATIONS AND AGREEMENTS 1972-1979. AND CULTURAL-ECONOMIC COOPERATION….…18

2.1. SALT I Agreement and ABM Treaty……………………………………………………....…..18

2.2. SALT-2 Treaty……………………………………………………………………………….........23

2.3. Helsinki Accords 1975…………………………………….…….….....28

2.4. Cultural and economic cooperation between the USSR and the USA…………..…..…...34

COMPLETION OF DISCHARGE……………………………………………………………...….…38

3.1. Reasons for the short duration of discharge…………………………….……..……....38

3.2. From détente to confrontation……………………………………………..…......41

3.3. The influence of the détente process on the development of international relations.........45

CONCLUSION……………………………………………………………......48

LIST OF SOURCES USED…………………..………….....51

INTRODUCTION

Soviet-American relations are a complex and multifaceted phenomenon in world political history. Interest in the phenomenon of Soviet-American cooperation has not waned to this day. The reasons here are not only in the scientific interest of the relationship between the world's first country of the socialist system and the largest, richest and economically powerful country of capitalism, as is commonly believed in Soviet historiography. Interest in the problem of Soviet-American relations is manifested to the extent that the key to understanding modern Russian-American relations lies precisely in the Soviet period.

If you carefully trace the relationship between the USSR and the USA in retrospect, it becomes clear that the relationship between them appears to be a striking example of the struggle for leadership on the world stage. If we compare the USSR and the USA with each other according to a number of indicators (economic potential, resource, scientific and technical, territorial, etc.), then it becomes objective that both sides had sufficient potential for claims to world domination, and both Soviet Russia and the United States understood perfectly. The fear that one country would succeed in something or have more influence in the world than another constantly hovered in the ruling circles of both the USSR and the USA (for example, the desire of the Soviet Union to “catch up and overtake America”).

The most striking manifestation of the struggle for world domination is the so-called Cold War period. It is here that the aspirations of both sides to dominate the global space are clearly visible. And after the Cuban missile crisis, the world entered a new stage of the Cold War. Both sides were quite clearly aware of the mutual vulnerability of the blocs. Gradually the understanding came of the impossibility of using nuclear weapons in a world war, that in it “there cannot be a winner.” Therefore, the main content of the stage that began was the consistent leveling of the level of nuclear potentials between NATO and the Warsaw Warfare Division, the formation of strategic equality - parity - between the USSR and the USA. It is generally accepted that achieving parity was the essence of the process of “détente of international tension.” Détente of international tension is a policy aimed at reducing the aggressiveness of the confrontation between the countries of the socialist and capitalist camps. The term is used in relation to political processes in relations between the USSR and the USA from the late 50s to the end of the 70s. At the same time, it is important to evaluate this phenomenon in its entire historical context. “Détente” is a much more multifaceted phenomenon, covering not only the military-strategic area, but also the entire complex of East-West relations from environmental protection and cultural ties to foreign trade, which gave rise to a new climate in international relations and certain hopes in Soviet society. The core of “détente” was the more favorable Soviet-American relations than ever before, which for the first time since the war went beyond purely diplomatic contacts.

The purpose of this course work is to examine the process of Soviet-American cooperation during the détente of international tension.

In accordance with the set goal, the following tasks will be solved in the work:

1. Consider the prerequisites for the beginning of détente;

2. Study Soviet-American agreements and treaties concluded during the period of detente;

3. Analyze the reasons for the fragility of détente and its impact on the development of international relations.

The subject of the study is Soviet-American relations during the years of détente.

To achieve this goal, the following methods were used in the work: statistical, empirical research methods (observation, comparison), theoretical research methods (abstraction, analysis).

The course work consists of an introduction, three chapters, a conclusion, a list of references (19 titles), the total volume of work is 52 pages.

To write the work, various sources were used: teaching aids and monographs, collections of documents.

GLAVA 1

PREREQUISITES AND THE BEGINNING OF INTERNATIONAL TENSION DELAY

1.1 Reasons for detente and goals of the parties

In the second half of the 60s, both superpowers needed some respite and regrouping of forces. The USSR and the USA sought to maintain their dominance in the bipolar system of international relations. At the same time, they tried to develop some “rules of the game”: after the Cuban Missile Crisis, which almost led to the outbreak of World War III, East and West realized the need to gradually ease tensions in bilateral relations. The year 1962 made us realize how terrible the consequences of a nuclear war would be.

In addition, it was at the beginning of the “Brezhnev era” that the USSR reached military parity with the United States and could now talk with the Americans on equal terms. This was the reason that the entire second half of the 60s and the entire 70s went down in the history of Soviet-American relations as a time of “détente”, a certain warming of relations. At the same time, the Soviet leadership sought to establish genuine strategic parity and its recognition by Washington, and the American leadership sought to maintain its technological gap from the USSR.

In American historical and political literature, the thesis is very actively used that detente in Soviet-American relations in the first half of the 70s became possible, first of all, as a result of “changes” in the Soviet approach to relations with the United States. However, such statements do not correspond to reality.

The Soviet Union did not need to make any adjustments to its policies, since it constantly made concerted efforts to improve Soviet-American relations and the international situation as a whole. From the rostrum of the XXIV Congress of the CPSU it was clearly stated that the USSR was ready to maintain normal relations with the United States. “We proceed from the fact,” said the Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the Congress, “that improvement of relations between the USSR and the USA is possible. Our principled line in relation to capitalist countries, including the United States, is to consistently and fully implement in practice the principles of peaceful coexistence, develop mutually beneficial ties, and cooperate with those states that are ready for this in the field of strengthening peace, giving maximum sustainable nature of relationships with them. But we have to consider whether we are dealing with a genuine desire to resolve issues at the negotiating table or with attempts to pursue policies from a “position of strength.” Those. At the same time, peaceful coexistence was still interpreted as a form of class struggle.

At the turn of the 60s and 70s, the United States really had to undergo a significant reassessment of the foreign policy guidelines of the Cold War period. For the United States, the interventionist course resulted in a further weakening of its international positions and the collapse of attempts to stop the objective processes of historical development unfolding in the world. Under these conditions, the United States in the early 70s was forced to take the path of a certain improvement in relations with the USSR, developing peaceful cooperation with it in a number of areas, and above all in the area of ​​strategic arms limitation.

Among the objective reasons why the United States agreed to a certain normalization of relations with the USSR are the following:

    a change in the balance of forces in the world in favor of socialism, and above all the establishment of military-strategic parity between the USSR and the USA, between the Warsaw Pact Organization and NATO; the growth of the military-economic and political power of all socialist countries, their influence on the course of world events;

    the deepening of the general crisis of capitalism, the aggravation of inter-imperialist contradictions, the increased desire of a number of large Western states to pursue a more independent foreign policy course;

    the disappearance of the strategic “invulnerability” of the United States as a result of the emergence in the Soviet arsenal of effective means of delivering nuclear weapons over intercontinental distances;

    the general crisis of the conceptual guidelines of the post-war US foreign policy towards “containment”, “pushing back” socialism, which was most clearly expressed in the failure of US aggression in Southeast Asia, which not only seriously undermined the international prestige of the United States, narrowed its possibilities for foreign policy maneuvering, but and created a deep division in the country.

“The need to change our policy,” noted in the foreign policy message to Congress of then US President R. Nixon dated May 3, 1973, “was dictated by the expediency of bringing it into line not only with new realities in the world, but also with new sentiments in America. Many Americans were no longer willing to unconditionally support all aspects of the post-war US activities in the world, which were draining our financial and especially psychological resources... Opinions began to be expressed in our country that the United States should moderate global appetites and turn its face to internal problems, searching for ways to solve them. solutions. Consequently, the very foundation on which our policies rested is in jeopardy; the bipartisan consensus of the past regarding an active American globalism has now disintegrated.”

The Republican Nixon-Kissinger administration, which came to power in the United States in 1969, was forced to take a course toward more active adaptation to the new balance of power in the world, to eliminate the gap between the global foreign policy ambitions of the United States and its real capabilities by slightly reducing American foreign policy obligations. The main direction of this adaptation was the normalization of relations with the Soviet Union. Statements by American politicians at the time that the United States was “forced to coexist” with the USSR, that they were “doomed” to such coexistence, for a long period of time reflected Washington’s understanding of the depth and scale of the changes that had taken place in the world.

After N. Khrushchev was removed from power in October 1964, the Kremlin began to pursue a more cautious and realistic course in the international arena. Détente was intended to help consolidate the existing territorial and political structure in Europe and the West's recognition of the dominance of the USSR in its sphere of influence. In the early 70s, an important stimulus for détente was the emerging rapprochement between the United States and China. In the current situation, Moscow was interested in establishing stable Soviet-American relations.

Relief of international tension

But the advent of atomic weapons almost eliminated the danger of large-scale war. And immediately after Stalin's death, the danger of invasion began to rapidly decrease. Until the 1960s, some international provocations still continued: explosions at the headquarters of White Guard organizations, threatening rhetoric, attempts to support “our own”... But the scale was not at all the same.

The last large-scale episode that made the West shudder was the Cuban Missile Crisis... In October 1962, the USSR stationed itself in Cuba. That's why in Cuba they call it the "October Crisis" (Crisis de Octubre), and in the USA - “Cuban Missile Crisis” (Cuban missile crisis).

October 14, 1962, when a U-2 reconnaissance aircraft of the US Air Force, during one of its regular flights over Cuba, discovered Soviet medium-range P-12 and P-14 in the vicinity of the village of San Cristobal. US President John Kennedy created a special Executive Committee, which discussed possible ways to solve the problem. On October 22, Kennedy addressed the people, announcing the presence of Soviet “offensive weapons” in Cuba, which immediately caused panic in the United States. America began a “quarantine” (blockade) of Cuba.

The USSR first denied that there were these missiles in Cuba... then it argued that it was defending itself from the USA in this way. And the real threat of nuclear war looms over the world. All the more real because Kennedy was already ready to launch a massive bombing of Cuba. However, another U-2 flyby showed that several missiles had already been installed and were ready for launch. It became clear that the bombing would lead to one thing: missiles would be launched at America.

Then John Kennedy suggested that the Soviet Union dismantle the installed missiles and turn around the ships still heading to Cuba. In return: US guarantees not to attack Cuba and not overthrow the regime of Fidel Castro.

The Khrushchev government agreed. On October 28, 1962, the dismantling of the missiles began. The last Soviet missile left Cuba a few weeks later, and the blockade of Cuba was lifted on November 20.

For 38 days the world teetered on the brink of war, and this became the turning point of the entire Cold War. And after that, Khrushchev pounded his boot on the UN podium, yelling that he would show the West “Kuzka’s mother” and that the whole question was who would bury whom faster: the USSR or the West.

But the worst was over, and international détente began.

The term itself appeared in the early 70s of the 20th century. This is a tracing paper from the French detente (discharge). The essence of detente is that after the Cuban missile crisis, both sides finally realized that it would not be possible to destroy the enemy and remain unharmed. Doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (Mutual Assured Destruction) sounded like this: “it is impossible to destroy a strategic enemy without him delivering a blow, the consequences of which will be unacceptable to us.”

The USSR caught up with the USA in the power of nuclear forces.

The Vietnam War required enormous costs, gave rise to political opposition, and polarized society.

Social Democrat Willy Brandt came to power in Germany, fussily “repenting” for all the crimes of the Germans, committed and not committed. He also started the “new Eastern policy”. The Moscow Treaty between the USSR and Germany (1970) fixed the inviolability of the post-war borders, and the renunciation of the territorial claims of the Federal Republic of Germany to East Prussia and German lands, which were transferred to Lithuania, Poland and Czechoslovakia.

The cancellation of the draft deferment for students in the US Army sparked mass student protests. In 1970, police shot down a student demonstration at the University of Kent. 4 people, including 2 girls, were killed.

All these facts indicated that it was better to curtail the arms race and confrontation.

For the USSR, the Cuban Missile Crisis showed that it would not be possible to launch an attack on the United States through the territory of “friend Fidel.”

The implementation of the American Apollo program led to the American landing on the Moon in 1969. This means that it is not possible through space either.

And then there’s the break with China: the explosion of Mao’s aggressive demagoguery, the “cultural revolution,” calling them “revisionists,” territorial claims to the Far East and Siberia. In 1972, it came to a border conflict on Damansky Island, on the Amur. Having lost such an important strategic ally, the USSR became sad.

As a consequence of all these changes, on November 17, 1969, negotiations began between the USSR and the USA on the limitation of strategic offensive weapons in Helsinki.

Until 1979, there was a stream of agreements between the USSR and the USA, establishing increasingly closer relations between these countries, practically excluding the outbreak of hostilities.

On June 18, 1979, in Vienna, J. Carter and L. I. Brezhnev signed the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II).

Before Stalin's death and during the Cuban Missile Crisis, it was easy and simple to scare the allies with the Soviet threat. During the period of détente, it is much more difficult. It is no coincidence that it was at this time that Europe began to behave much more independently.

From the book Criminal Psychology author Poznyshev Sergey Viktorovich

Professor of the International Academy of Sciences in Toulouse Criminal Psychology Criminal types Preface INTRODUCTION. Criminal psychological study of the criminal, his tasks, necessity and significance. Crime always has two roots: one lies in the individual

From the book The Path to the Fool. Book one. Philosophy of Laughter. author Kurlov Grigory

“INNER LAUGHTER” DEPTH DISCHARGE OF LAUGHTER PROGRAMS WITH THIN SHELLS The uniqueness of the “Inner Laughter” technology lies in its accessibility, high efficiency, and most importantly - naturalness, although regarding the latter our mental programs can still express

From the book Mass and Power by Canetti Elias

From the book The Plateau Effect. How to overcome stagnation and move on by Sullivan Bob

2. Complete discharge The first power of the plateau, or When you see a tomato, say to yourself: “This will taste like a tomato.” But what if its taste reminds... raspberries? “I don’t understand what’s going on here at all. I'm shocked, I'm angry and I don't even know what to say." Jennifer Lopez was incredible

From the book My Research on Genosociograms and Anniversary Syndrome author Schutzenberger Anne Anselin

Intergenerational connections. The influence of family history on the personal history of the child I.Yu. Khamitova is a clinical psychologist, individual and family psychotherapist working in a systemic model, member of the Society of Family Consultants and Psychotherapists, the International Association

From the book The Pledge of Possibility of Existence author Pokrass Mikhail Lvovich

NEEDS FOR MODES OF ACTIVITY (SKILLS), NEEDS FOR ACTIVITY AND ACTIVE STATE (IN TENSION) The second direction in which the formation of acquired needs is carried out is the formation of needs for skills

From the book Conflict Management author Sheinov Viktor Pavlovich

EXAMPLE No. 60 (continued). NEUROTIC CONDITIONS - A WAY TO SATISFY THE NEED FOR TENSION If we look at neurotic symptoms as a manifestation of tension, causing the same tension as suffering about one’s own suffering,

From Machiavelli's book for women. The art of managing men for the Princess by Rubin Harriet

ABOUT THE INSUFFICIENTLY FORMED NEED FOR AN ACTIVE STATE - MOTIVATIONAL TENSION AND ABOUT THE CONDITIONS THAT CONTRIBUTE TO THIS IMFORMATION The natural need for activity and movement during life can develop, leading to the formation of greater or

From the book Me, Me and We Again by Little Brian

NOT INCLUDING THE NEED FOR TENSION IN THE SYSTEM OF PERSONAL SIGNIFICANCES We can also talk about the non-inclusion of the need for tension in the system of personal significances, about the lack of awareness of the need for it (which very often happens). Ignorance of tension as an object

From the author's book

MANIFESTATIONS OF INSUFFICIENT FORMATION OF THE NEED FOR TENSION Insufficient formation of the need for tension always manifests itself in specific circumstances. Insufficient in some, it can be extremely developed in others. EXAMPLE No. 65.

From the author's book

EXAMPLES OF INSUFFICIENTLY FORMED NEED FOR TENSION AS A SIGNAL OF THE POSSIBILITY OF MEETING OTHER NEEDS 1. Impulsivity inappropriate to the circumstances, when dissatisfaction that has just arisen requires immediate implementation. EXAMPLE No. 66.

From the author's book

2.2. Psychological mechanisms of spontaneous increase in tension Traps of perception Every person “reacts only to his own experience, but his experience is not at all what an objective outside observer can detect - it is only what the individual himself is there

From the author's book

X. Four Types of Strategic Tension Remember, confrontation is another form of relationship. This is one of the few types of relationships where power is not hidden. When entering a confrontation that you want to win, find the right tone. Strategic type tension

From the author's book

The Dynamics of Free Traits: Adaptation, Pretense, and Discharge I think that the prolonged expression of uncharacteristic free traits can have psychological and physiological consequences. This assumption has been confirmed by a number of scientific studies. Situations

How did the features of the Soviet system influence the foreign policy of the USSR in the second half of the 1960s - early 1980s?

Features of the Soviet system: totalitarianism, faith and active use of administrative methods of management, planned economy influenced foreign policy in such a way that the leadership of the USSR in foreign policy, as well as in domestic policy, tried to act from a position of strength. The foreign policy of the USSR was based on the thesis of a radical change in the balance of forces in the world in favor of the USSR and its allied countries. The positions of the United States and NATO were assessed as weakened. Such sentiments in the Soviet leadership intensified since the early 1970s, when they managed to achieve strategic parity with the United States in the military sphere. The approximate equality of forces deprived any of the superpowers of the possibility of victory in the war. The West's consent to negotiate a relaxation of international tension was regarded as evidence of its weakness and the success of Soviet diplomacy.

Name the reasons for the short duration of the discharge period.

The Soviet leadership regarded the Helsinki process solely as its own victory and tried to consolidate it. Moreover, it considered its results only from the point of view of recognition of borders in Europe and the principle of non-interference. Western countries believed that the key point was the observance of human rights in the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe. Both sides tried to use the new situation to change the balance of power in Europe and the world in their favor. That is why the détente was short-lived.

1. Reveal the role of the USSR in a number of regional conflicts in Africa, Asia and Latin America.

The USSR provided comprehensive assistance and support to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in its fight against American aggression. Since June 1967, after the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli war in the Middle East, the USSR took a pro-Arab position and sent weapons and military specialists to Egypt and Syria. The USSR took the side of India during its war with Pakistan in the mid-1960s. and in the Indo-Pakistani military conflict in 1971.

The long-term struggle for liberation from the Portuguese colonialists of Angola, Mozambique, Guinea (Bissau) with the support of the USSR in 1975 ended with the proclamation of their independence. In the internal struggle that unfolded in these countries, the USSR supported pro-Soviet groups and provided them with significant assistance, sending military advisers. In Angola and Mozambique, a course towards building socialism was proclaimed.

3. Give examples indicating the relaxation of international tension in the 1960s and 1970s.

1. Proposal from the Warsaw Pact countries to hold a pan-European Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and its holding

2. In May 1972, the first ever visit of the US President (R. Nixon) to Moscow: agreements were signed on the foundations of relations between the two countries, on the limitation of missile defense systems (BMD) and strategic offensive weapons (START).

3. Along with the agreement on the prevention of nuclear war signed in 1973 (during Brezhnev’s visit to the United States), they were the basis for the turn from confrontation to détente in East-West relations.

4. Signing on August 1, 1975 in Helsinki of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe by the heads of 33 European states, as well as the USA and Canada.

4. What is the “Brezhnev Doctrine” and how did it manifest itself?

The “Brezhnev Doctrine” was manifested in measures to ease international tension

5. Tell us about the development of relations between the USSR and the USA in the 1970s - early 1980s.

The foreign policy of the USSR was based on the thesis of a radical change in the balance of forces in the world in favor of the USSR and its allied countries. The positions of the United States and NATO were assessed as weakened. Such sentiments in the Soviet leadership intensified since the early 1970s, when they managed to achieve strategic parity with the United States in the military sphere. The approximate equality of forces deprived any of the superpowers of the possibility of victory in the war.

The West's consent to negotiate a relaxation of international tension was regarded as evidence of its weakness and the success of Soviet diplomacy.

The United States was indeed not only forced to reckon with new military-strategic realities, but also tried to get out of the Vietnamese deadlock. Not the least important role was played by the fact that, in the opinion of the West, the regimes in the USSR and in its allied countries are able to maintain their strength only in conditions of tough military and political confrontation, and in the conditions of normalization of relations they will be weakened.

At the turn of the 1960-1970s. A period called “détente of international tension” began.

In 1969, European states and NATO countries supported the proposal of the Warsaw Pact countries to hold a pan-European Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Visits of US President R. Nixon to the USSR and General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee of the USSR L. Brezhnev to the USA took place.

Agreements were signed on the fundamentals of relations between the two countries, on the limitation of missile defense systems (ABM) and strategic offensive weapons (START). Along with the agreement on the prevention of nuclear war signed in 1973, they were the basis for the turn from confrontation to détente in East-West relations.

Already from the beginning of the 1960s. The Soviet leadership, like the US leadership, sought to weaken direct military confrontation by transferring it to different regions.

The USSR provided comprehensive assistance and support to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in its fight against American aggression. Since June 1967, after the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli war in the Middle East, the USSR took a pro-Arab position and sent weapons and military specialists to Egypt and Syria. The USSR took the side of India during its war with Pakistan in the mid-1960s. and in the Indo-Pakistani military conflict in 1971.

The long-term struggle for liberation from the Portuguese colonialists of Angola, Mozambique, Guinea (Bissau) with the support of the USSR in 1975 ended with the proclamation of their independence. In the internal struggle that unfolded in these countries, the USSR supported pro-Soviet groups and provided them with significant assistance, sending military advisers. In Angola and Mozambique, a course towards building socialism was proclaimed.

Since 1974, after the overthrow of the monarchy and the outbreak of the Civil War in Ethiopia, the USSR began military support for the M.X. regime. Mariam, who proclaimed the socialist path of development of Ethiopia and tried to copy the Soviet model.

Long-term support of the USSR (with the help of Cuba) for the Nicaraguan rebels contributed to the overthrow of the reactionary regime of A. Somoza in 1979 and the coming to power of the Sandinista National Liberation Front led by D. Ortega.

All these local conflicts bore the mark of confrontation between the USSR and the USA, and the territories of the above countries became testing grounds for testing the effectiveness of Soviet and American weapons, the correctness of the plans and developments of their military command.

The detente was short-lived. Following the campaign in defense of human rights that began in the West, the USSR began to deploy medium-range nuclear missiles on the territory of the GDR and Czechoslovakia. This created an additional threat to Western European countries and changed the strategic balance of power in Europe and the world in favor of the USSR, which caused a violent reaction in the West. With the beginning of the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan (December 1979), the period of détente was completed.

6. Why by the beginning of the 1980s. Has China finally distanced itself from the USSR?

Problems in relations with China are mainly due to the country's greater or lesser independence in conducting domestic and foreign policy. The leadership of the USSR tried to dictate to the Chinese comrades how to lead the country and how to build relations with other countries. Since the late 1960s. Soviet-Chinese relations became so strained that armed conflicts broke out on the border.

Continue filling out the “Cold War” table in your notebook: stages, events, features.”- see after §28

2. Get acquainted with the “Declaration of Principles of Relations and Cooperation between Countries”, signed in Helsinki. Assess the significance of this document for overcoming the Cold War. Why couldn't the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe guarantee further rapprochement between the leading countries of the world?

The “Declaration of Principles of Relations and Cooperation between Countries”, signed in Helsinki, enshrines interstate agreements grouped into several sections:

in the international legal field: consolidating the political and territorial results of the Second World War, setting out the principles of relations between participating states, including the principle of the inviolability of borders; territorial integrity of states; non-interference in the internal affairs of foreign states;

in the military-political field: coordination of confidence-building measures in the military field (pre-notification of military exercises and major troop movements, presence of observers at military exercises); peaceful settlement of disputes;

in the economic field: coordination of the main areas of cooperation in the field of economics, science, technology and environmental protection;

in the humanitarian field: coordination of obligations on issues of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of movement, contacts, information, culture and education, the right to work, the right to education and health care; equality and the right of peoples to control their own destinies and determine their internal and external political status.

The final act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe could not guarantee further rapprochement of the leading countries of the world because these countries had different political and economic systems.

Influence on the development of Soviet foreign policy by the Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1957-1985. A.A. Gromyko is rated very highly by all participants in diplomatic relations and even by his opponents.

Diplomats and employees of the Soviet secret services who knew Gromyko noted that by nature, Andrei Andreevich was very reserved in everything that related to his personal life. Therefore, an invitation to his dacha for lunch to discuss diplomatic issues was a rare exception. According to Vyacheslav Kevorkov, such meetings usually concerned issues that were strictly confidential, even by Foreign Ministry standards, and took place on the cozy veranda of Gromyko’s country house. Kevorkov described the minister’s harsh and gloomy manner of conducting negotiations as follows: “It is impossible to prepare a living person for a meeting with Gromyko, as for death.”

The official biography, published in 2002 by the Russian Foreign Ministry, edited by Minister Igor Ivanov, speaks of Gromyko’s great services to the Soviet state, that he gained respect even from his political opponents, and in diplomatic circles Gromyko was called the “patriarch of diplomacy.” At the same time, Gromyko is called “a product of his era, its orders and ideas”, and “the absence of the brilliance and diplomatic grace that distinguished his predecessors Chicherin and Litvinov” is noted. It points to “Gromyko’s mistakes and misconceptions inherent in Soviet leaders of his generation,” “mistakes and wrong decisions.” This applies, first of all, to such dramatic pages of Soviet history as the entry of troops into Czechoslovakia (1968) and Afghanistan (1979). In the history of the suppression of the Prague Spring, Gromyko, who joined the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and began to influence key government decisions only in 1973, was responsible only for the foreign policy cover of the action. In 1979, Gromyko himself already shared political responsibility for the invasion of Afghanistan with Brezhnev, Andropov and Ustinov: if in March he still objected, in December, for still unclear reasons, he yielded to the pressure of his Politburo colleagues, who decided to send troops.

On October 19, 2014, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov called Gromyko “the great diplomat of the Soviet era”; he rated the comparison with Gromyko noted in the Western press as flattering for himself

4. Reveal the relationship between the foreign policy of the USSR and the internal problems of the country’s development.

The relationship between the foreign policy of the USSR and the country’s internal problems is direct:

support for developing countries, the arms race, and the preservation of the bloc of socialist countries required large financial costs. Consequently, these funds did not go to the country's development needs.

The following themes and problems were reflected in the posters of those years:

International détente

Fight for peace

Confrontation between two systems

6. “Perhaps the world is now at a crossroads, and the entire course of events in the coming years and even decades depends on how the Afghan crisis is resolved” (from an open letter from A.D. Sakharov). Why does the scientist give such an assessment of the participation of Soviet troops in the war in Afghanistan? Compare the Afghan conflict with the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962.

The scientist gives such an assessment of the participation of Soviet troops in the war in Afghanistan because he was convinced that all international conflicts in the context of the existence of atomic weapons should be resolved through diplomatic means. In addition, Afghanistan is a territory that in its entire history could never be conquered by anyone (it would take a lot of money and effort to conquer it), it is a key territory in terms of trade routes, a connecting territory between the East and the West. the solution to the Afghan problem meant the normalization of relations between the West and the East.

Despite this, the Afghan conflict is not comparable in intensity to the Caribbean crisis, because in the Caribbean conflict there was a real threat of the use of nuclear weapons.