Apparently, the prosperous period of development of interstate relations between Russia and Turkey has sunk into oblivion, at least until the change political regime from our southern neighbor. Together with the Russian bomber, which was shot down by the Turkish Air Force over Syria, numerous Russian-Turkish economic projects and trade and economic cooperation in general collapsed into oblivion.

At the same time, the Turkish side expresses a desire to further escalate tension in the already completely damaged relations between the two countries. So, just the other day, the Turkish leadership, having introduced the so-called. The Air Force's "orange" combat readiness regime gave its military pilots the right to shoot down Russian planes without notifying the command. On the other side. Türkiye has entered into openly provocative contact with the Kyiv junta and the Crimean Tatar renegades loyal to it. According to rumors, a decision was made to create a camp in the Kherson region with Turkish money to train military formations aimed at aggression against the Republic of Crimea.

Prior to this, Turkey had given obvious hints about the country’s ability to block Russian ships Straits, locking them in the Black Sea. In particular, “Turkish President R. Erdogan threatened to close the Bosphorus and Dardanelles to Russian ships, announcing that the country “is under military threat from Russia, and a fundamental decision has been made to close the Bosphorus and Dardanelles to all Russian ships located in the Black Sea and having a military purpose not only for Syria, but also for other countries flirting with the Russian side. The corresponding decision has been sent to the UN” (O. Sukhareva. Closing the straits will put an end to Hagia Sophia).

After this, the Russian side was forced to switch to the aviation method of ensuring the combat effectiveness of its aerospace forces in Syria, which is very costly and less effective compared to the sea route.

The project was developed by Russian engineers back in 1889–1892, and it provided Russia with the shortest access to the basin Indian Ocean, the Turkish Bosporus and Dardanelles straits turned out to be unnecessary for this purpose.

It is reported that preparations for the construction of the canal have already begun in Iran. The project, as we understand, is of the utmost strategic importance for our country in the context of Turkey and its straits falling to the side of ISIS. In addition, all the Caspian states are vitally interested in the implementation of the project: Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and even Uzbekistan (of course, if it can come to an agreement with its neighbors). There is also a group of potential European “users” for whom this canal will halve the traditional route through Turkish waters.

It must be said that it was the United States and its Western satellites, together with Turkey, that in every possible way prevented the implementation of the Caspian-Persian Gulf canal project. The ban on its construction has been one of the articles of anti-Iranian sanctions since 1997. In addition to lost economic benefits for Iran, Western “anti-channel” sanctions made it possible to maintain Russia’s dependence on Turkish sentiments. And at a certain moment, this dependence made itself felt in a very tangible way for Russia.

Perhaps ambitious and extremely attractive project The Caspian-Persian Gulf canal will nevertheless come to life in our days. Today the project is included among the highest priorities for Tehran. The finalization of this project is in full swing, in which not only Iranian but also foreign specialists, representing economically interested countries. Even the timing of the channel’s commissioning has been announced, which should take place in the 2020s.

Aidar Khairutdinov

Marat Elemesov

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The idea of ​​building a canal from the Caspian Sea to the Persian Gulf has been voiced by Tehran for several years now.

The other day in Russian media information has appeared that Iran, together with Russia, intends to build a canal connecting the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf. During the visit of the President of Kazakhstan to Iran, some media also reported about the possible participation of Kazakhstan in this project, but this issue was not directly raised during the negotiations between the two presidents. At the same time, experts believe that if Astana decides to participate in the project, it should calculate as much as possible all the economic and political risks associated with it.

The idea of ​​building a canal from the Caspian Sea to the Persian Gulf has been voiced by Tehran for several years. This initiative was first articulated by Tehran during the Qajar dynasty. At that time, the ambitious goal of transferring 500 million cubic meters of water from the Caspian Sea to the central regions of Iran, which are extremely dry, was announced. The preliminary cost of the project was estimated by experts at $7 billion. According to the head of the department of “Planning and Management of Sustainable Development” of the Academy of Public Administration under the President of Azerbaijan Chingiz Ismailova, the shipping channel must be more than 100 meters wide and have a depth of at least five meters. Such a canal requires a huge amount of water, at least 10% of the water of the Volga River, which provides 85% of the water of the Caspian Sea.

Iranian unfinished construction

According to experts, the project should pay off no earlier than in 7 years. Iran claims the canal as an alternative to the Turkish Straits and the Suez Canal, as well as the route through the Bosphorus - Dardanelles - Suez Canal and the Red Sea. Considering the current tense relations between the Russian Federation and Turkey, it would seem to Moscow that this project is beneficial.

Therefore, not so long ago, the Iranian Ambassador to Russia Mehdi Sanai during a meeting with students of St. Petersburg state university stressed that Iran is discussing the issue of laying a shipping canal from the Caspian Sea to the Persian Gulf together with Russia.

Meanwhile, the Iranian Embassy in Russia subsequently denied this statement, saying that the two countries do not yet cooperate in this area.

Obviously, this project still causes a lot of controversy, so a possible invitation to Astana should be considered extremely carefully, experts say.

Political scientist Sultanbek Sultangaliev noted that the possible inclusion of Kazakhstan in the project for the construction of the transcontinental canal Caspian Sea - Persian Gulf, first of all, can be assessed as a breakthrough of Iranian diplomacy in foreign policy, since the project itself is needed by the Iranian government to demonstrate to the world community its openness to international cooperation. As for the economic potential of the transcontinental canal, it is enormous, given that its commissioning will open up brilliant opportunities for quickly entering the gigantic market of the Arabian Peninsula and the Hindustan Peninsula for all Caspian countries, which now and in the medium term will have friendly relations with Iran, he noted He.

“The very existence of the canal will dramatically increase the geopolitical importance of Iran as a regional Asian power. Of course, financing the construction of the canal will be a serious problem, since the project is extremely costly and long-term, even taking into account the use of existing rivers. But the game, in my opinion, is worth the trouble. As for our country, the implementation of this project will significantly increase the export capabilities of Kazakhstan. It would be a good economic step to invest Kazakh funds in the construction of the canal, which will pay off over time. But again, the issue of investing in this project must be considered, first of all, from the point of view of the needs and requirements for the development of one’s own national production in this moment", - he said.

And I want it, and it injects me

Head of the Political Scientists Club “South Caucasus” Ilgar Velizade more skeptical. He noted that we need to remember the possible environmental damage that its implementation could cause to the region. In particular, Russia, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are at risk. Since the shallowest part of the Caspian Sea is located within these countries, and the relief of the lake is such that its general slope goes from north to south. Therefore, significant water intake will immediately affect the northern shallow part.

“Here I would give as an example the fate of Dead Kultuk Bay in Kazakhstan. In the process of decreasing water levels in the Caspian Sea in the middle of the 20th century, a significant part of it turned into a vast salt marsh, the area decreased from 15 thousand square kilometers to 500, the depth began to not exceed one meter. Afterwards, the lake level rose and Dead Kultuk began to recover, and the dried-up Kaydak Bay filled with water. Now the reverse process has begun again,” he commented.

Chairman Expert Council Support Fund scientific research"Workshop of Eurasian Ideas" Grigory Trofimchuk stressed that Kazakhstan is actively looking for new opportunities for the economy, which is in a difficult situation, so that this crisis does not become indefinite. In this context, it is worth considering the strengthening of work in the Iranian direction, he believes. For the same reason, Russia is also interested in some “southern” projects. However, according to him, we must remember that Iran is actually still in the regime of Western sanctions; it has only been provided with an easy raw material “gap”, with the help of which Washington plans to reduce the influence of the Russian Federation on energy market. All other attempts by Iran to enter new sites will, to one degree or another, be blocked. Iran, of course, can implement any projects on its own land; this is not prohibited. The whole question is what will happen at the exit of this Iranian channel, when it is completed, and what the geopolitical situation will look like by that time, he said.

“I think that by that time it will have worsened by an order of magnitude. The project would have been ideal from all sides if there had not been this main threat, if it had been built about forty years ago. In addition, you will have to keep in mind the terrorist threat at the southern exit of the canal. The importance of all other “gateways,” including the Suez Canal and the Turkish Straits, will not decrease, since we need to look at what groups of countries they connect or will connect. Probably only Georgia will be able to choose here, as it will have an alternative if it plans to expand cooperation with Africa or India. If we do not talk about new routes for the transfer of raw materials, the Iranian canal can also be useful within the framework of the normal economy, traditional trade between countries. But again, only if all these countries have cloudless political prospects and there is no common threat over them. In addition, we will have to keep in mind the growing dominance of the dollar, which does not add stability to the overall economic situation,” the expert said.

Is ecology a first or tenth order issue?

Ilgar Velizadeh insists on the environmental aspects of the project. He said that if the level of the Caspian Sea drops a few more meters, the Kara-Bogaz-Gol Bay will separate itself, and it may simply dry up. At the same time, the poisonous salts of Kara-Bogaz can be carried by winds over vast areas, and the environmental situation not only in the Caspian region, but also far beyond its borders can significantly deteriorate.

He believes that the plans announced by Tehran could significantly affect the process of shallowing the Caspian Sea and could cause serious environmental and material damage to the coastal Caspian countries.

If the shelf becomes shallow, it will be necessary to attract additional funds to dredge the waters of several important ports, such as Olya, Makhachkala, Aktau, Atyrau, Turkmenbashi, Alyat. Shallowing of the shelf can lead to increased evaporation from the water surface, the appearance of salt marshes and salt fields, mainly within the Kazakh part of the sea. And wind erosion will contribute to the spread of salt storms over hundreds of kilometers in coastal zone and inland, exacerbating the consequences of environmental problems. This process will affect the state of the fauna of the Caspian Sea. Traditional spawning grounds may be under threat valuable species fish,” he emphasized.

In turn, Grigory Trofimchuk believes that the environmental aspect is in the tenth place here, since countries need to survive, and urgently. The channel is certainly beneficial for Iran, since this project brings a whole group of partners into cooperation with it, which has not been the case for many years.

“Thus, as they say, no one forbids building, but the political risks are very high. Just look at these Russian projects like “Turkish Stream”, “Nord Stream 2”, to understand that it will not be easier here. In general, if such a channel appears, cooperation between Kazakhstan and Arab world, and this is the most understandable aspect of possible preferences,” he concluded.

Russia and Iran are again discussing the construction of a water canal from the Caspian Sea to the Persian Gulf. This will give Russia the shortest access to the Indian Ocean basin, bypassing the Turkish straits. The idea of ​​​​creating a competitor to the Bosporus and Dardanelles originated more than a century ago, but the project was hampered not only by its technical complexity, but also by geopolitics. Turkey and the United States clearly will not like the revival of the project.

Russia and Iran are discussing the issue of building a through shipping canal from the Caspian Sea to the Persian Gulf. Iranian Ambassador to Russia Mehdi Sanai said this at a meeting with students of St. Petersburg State University. “Yes, this issue is being discussed,” the ambassador answered the student’s question about laying a canal, without specifying details.

“Thanks to the canal from the Caspian Sea to the Indian Sea, the delivery of goods through Russia becomes half as long as the traditional route through Turkey”

The day before, Mehdi Sanai gave lectures to students about domestic policy and international relations of Iran in Russian.

The Caspian Sea is the largest enclosed body of water on Earth. Coastline is 7000 km and passes through the territory of Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Iran and Azerbaijan. It is possible to connect the Caspian Sea with the Persian Gulf only by laying a canal through the territory of Iran.

We are talking about a shipping route with a length of about 700 km. According to Iranian estimates made in 2012-2013, the construction of the artery will require at least $10 billion, and investments in the section connecting the northwest and southwest of Iran will be about $6 billion. However, the payback of the project may occur already in the fifth year of operation. Russia's transit revenues could amount to about $1.4 billion, Iran's - about $1.7 billion in the third or fourth year from the moment the canal is put into operation. They want to open the channel in the 2020s.

This canal is of strategic importance for Russia because it creates the shortest access to the Indian Ocean basin. Actually, all those countries that have access to the closed Caspian Sea also receive direct access to the ocean. Moreover, it is of interest to Northern and Western Europe, Finland and the Baltic. In fact, this vertical route could go from the Arctic to the Indian Ocean.

The main opponent of such a project, of course, was and remains Turkey, since the emergence of a canal from the Caspian Sea to the Persian Gulf creates direct competition with the Turkish Bosporus and Dardanelles straits. Thanks to the canal from the Caspian Sea to the Indian Sea, the delivery of goods through Russia becomes half as long as the traditional route through Turkey.

The Suez Canal will also suffer from the Russian-Iranian project. The canal from the Caspian Sea to the Persian Gulf, of course, will not replace it completely, since it is still convenient for Europe, the countries of the Middle East and North Africa, notes First Vice-President of the Russian Union of Engineers Ivan Andrievsky.

“From a technical point of view, the existing Suez and New Suez Canals are more convenient for ships, if only for the reason that they are lockless, and both seas - the Mediterranean and the Red - are at the same level. The Caspian-Persian Canal, in turn, should connect the Caspian Sea, located approximately 27–29 meters below sea level, which will require the installation of an entire system hydraulic structures, which will control the water level and prevent flooding,” he says.

“Russia still needs the strait between the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf more than anyone else,” adds Andrievsky.

However, the Suez Canal risks reduced utilization due to the new one. However, this could also happen in the event of implementation by Russia, Iran and India, which includes a land railway line along the western coast of the Caspian Sea, that is, it allows cargo to be transported in transit through Azerbaijan and then by car or by railway to Iran up to the port city of Bandar Abbas in the south of Iran, on the shores of the Persian Gulf, and further by sea to Mumbai. This project is now in full swing, new way They promise to open in 2016–2017.

Geopolitical factor

The idea of ​​laying such a canal is already much more than a hundred years old; the first developments by Russian engineers began not even in the 20th, but at the end of the 19th century. Why hasn't it been implemented yet? First of all, for geopolitical reasons. And this was largely due to the relations of the USSR and Russia with Turkey and Iran on the one hand and the US relations with Turkey and Iran on the other. At different times they either improved or worsened, and this directly influenced the development of the Russian-Iranian channel project.

The project was first discussed in the late 1890s. "First World War did not allow the resumption of Russian-Iranian negotiations on the project, and the subsequent normalization of relations between Turkey and Soviet Russia reduced the demand for the project. The RSFSR and the USSR provided military-technical and economic assistance Turkey during its confrontation with the Entente and Greece (1919–1923). In return, Ankara guaranteed in September 1924 that the Bosporus and Dardanelles would never be used to the detriment of the interests of the USSR,” the candidate says in his article in the Military-Industrial Courier economic sciences Alexey Chichkin.

In the 1930s, Soviet Russia's relations with Iran began to deteriorate, and after the death of Turkish President Kemal Ataturk, with Ankara. Iran and Türkiye then became closer to England, France and Germany. Therefore, the canal project was postponed. “Since April 1941, Turkey, under various pretexts, has been making it difficult for Soviet ships carrying military and other cargo for Yugoslavia, which was subjected to fascist aggression, to pass through the Bosporus and Dardanelles. The pro-Nazi policy of Turkey during the Great Patriotic War is also known. Patriotic War(until 1944 inclusive). All this prompted the USSR to return to the Caspian-Persian Gulf canal project. The project was finalized by the autumn of 1942, after the entry of Soviet and British troops into Iran in August - September 1941 and the coming to power in Tehran of anti-fascist forces led by Mahinshah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi,” says Chichkin.

“The Caspian-Persian Gulf highway, extremely beneficial to the USSR and Iran, encountered increasingly active opposition from the United States and NATO”

After the war, relations between the USSR and Turkey were bad, and things did not work out with Iran. Not only London, but also Washington began to influence Tehran. Since then, the United States has actively opposed the implementation of the Caspian-Persian Gulf canal construction project.

But since the mid-50s, Iran decided to pursue a policy of parity cooperation with both the USA and the USSR. Therefore, in the 60s, a Soviet-Iranian commission was created to study the canal issue. In 1963, during Leonid Brezhnev's visit to Tehran, an agreement was signed that created the legal basis for the implementation of the project. In 1968, USSR Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin visited Tehran and was shown a preliminary version of the channel.

“In those same years, American-Iranian meetings at top level, during which the United States directly or indirectly declared that the project did not correspond to the long-term interests of the United States and its NATO allies. This position was supported Saudi Arabia. In Iraq, on the contrary, they supported the project (providing the shortest route between this country and the USSR), which contributed to the normalization of relations between Baghdad and Moscow, which in 1974–1975 was crowned with a bilateral agreement “On Friendship and Good Neighborliness,” says Chichkin.

By this time, the United States had become an important buyer of Iran's oil and supplier of military equipment, and Turkey in the 60s began to reduce tariffs for the transit of Soviet cargo through the Bosporus and Dardanelles. Therefore, although the canal project moved forward, it was very slow. And in the late 70s, an internal political conflict began in Iran. “The Caspian-Persian Gulf highway, extremely beneficial to the USSR and Iran, encountered increasingly active opposition from the United States and NATO,” says Chichkin.

A new stage for the project began in the mid-90s, meetings between Russia and Iran on this issue resumed. In 1998, a joint expert group was created, and the following year the government of the Islamic Republic officially approved the revised feasibility study. However, sanctions against Iran again buried the project. As Chichkin notes, it was not without reason that in 1997 the United States extended anti-Iranian sanctions to the Caspian-Persian Gulf canal project. Punishment threatened all companies and countries that assisted Tehran in the implementation of this project.

It is not surprising that right now the water canal has become relevant again. Iran is getting rid of Western sanctions, and Russia has maintained friendly relations with Tehran. Relations with Turkey are experiencing a serious crisis. It's time to implement an ambitious infrastructure project.

Technical and environmental risks

However, this is clearly not a quick matter. The head of the Caspian Research and Information Center, Doctor of Geographical Sciences Chingiz Ismailov pointed to technical and ecological problems water artery "Caspian - Persian Gulf". In particular, the channel must be filled big amount water in a volume of 10% of the Volga River water. The Alborz mountain range in northern Iran also poses an obstacle.

Moreover, during construction work it will be necessary to evacuate a large number of the population and pay them significant compensation. Finally, a long canal through Iranian territory could cause floods, which in turn would lead to an increase in earthquakes in Iran, where they are already not uncommon.

“The main obstacle is distance. Even taking into account the minimum route, construction will drag on for decades, because a canal hundreds and thousands of kilometers long cannot be reinforced with concrete walls; new materials and technologies will be required, as well as time for their development and implementation. The channel will have to remain in working order long years", says Ivan Andrievsky.

Iran continues preparations for the construction of the Caspian-Persian Gulf shipping canal. The project is of strategic importance for Russia as well. But the West and Türkiye are preventing the construction of the canal, and the United States has included this project in the list of anti-Iranian sanctions.

“Since the 1890s, Russia’s relations with Iran were largely determined by the project of the Caspian - Persian Gulf shipping canal. Developed by Russian engineers in 1889-1892, the project provided Russia with the shortest access to the Indian Ocean. At the same time, the Turkish Bosporus and Dardanelles straits were unnecessary for this purpose,” emphasized candidate of economic sciences Alexey Chichkin.

The emergence of the project was facilitated by the refusal of England, France, Austria-Hungary and Germany to support Russian proposals in relation to the Bosphorus and Dardanelles. Russia in 1878 proposed to establish its control over these straits and place its military bases along the coast.

At that time more than half foreign trade Russia was carried out this way. “And it was along this route that the interventionists, supported by Turkey, repeatedly penetrated into the Black Sea and, accordingly, to the shores of Russia. But maintaining Russia’s dependence on this route is one of the strategic tasks of the West in this region. It is not for nothing that in 1997 the United States extended anti-Iranian sanctions to the canal project "Caspian - Persian Gulf". Companies and countries that assisted Tehran in the implementation of this project were subject to financial and other economic penalties. And although the United States is reviewing sanctions against Iran, it is not yet clear whether the ban on participation will be lifted. foreign companies this project,” Chichkin explained.

The joint Russian-Iranian commission for the construction of the canal, created in late XIX century, began work in 1904. But the parties could not agree on the status of the project and the canal. Russia insisted on the principle of extraterritoriality (by analogy with the Suez and Panama Canals, which at that time belonged to Britain and the United States, respectively).

The condominium status (joint management in equal shares) proposed by Iran for the channel did not suit Russia, since such a status did not give confidence in Iran’s unambiguously pro-Russian orientation. And the extraterritoriality made it possible to ensure the military-political security of the route.

In 1908, the parties suspended negotiations, which was facilitated by growing pressure on Iran from Turkey and Britain regarding the status of the new canal and the timing of its construction.

“The First World War did not allow the resumption of Russian-Iranian negotiations on the project, and the subsequent normalization of relations between Turkey and Soviet Russia decreased the demand for the project. The RSFSR and the USSR provided military-technical and economic assistance to Turkey during its confrontation with the Entente and Greece (1919–1923). In return, Ankara guaranteed in September 1924 that the Bosporus and Dardanelles would never be used to the detriment of the interests of the USSR,” Chichkin emphasized.

With the death of Turkish President Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in November 1938, anti-Soviet, or rather pan-Turkist, tendencies in Ankara's politics intensified sharply. “The best proof of this is Turkey’s participation in the Fuel plan, a project of joint aggression against the USSR with England and France, scheduled for mid-March 1940. The plan provided, in particular, for the passage of British and French military ships into the Black Sea,” the expert noted .

At the same time, in the late 1930s. Soviet-Iranian relations began to deteriorate, which was caused by the influence of England, Germany and Turkey on foreign policy Tehran. As a result, Iran intended to terminate the Soviet-Iranian Treaty of 1921 “On Friendship and Borders,” according to which (Article 6) the USSR had the right to send its troops into Iran in the event of a security threat.

“Since April 1941, Turkey, under various pretexts, has been making it difficult for Soviet ships with military and other cargo to pass through the Bosporus and Dardanelles for Yugoslavia, which was subjected to fascist aggression. Turkey’s pro-Nazi policy during the Great Patriotic War (up to 1944 inclusive) is also known. All this prompted the USSR to return to the project of the Caspian - Persian Gulf canal. The project was finalized by the fall of 1942 after the entry of Soviet and British troops into Iran in August-September 1941 and the coming to power in Tehran of anti-fascist forces led by Shahin Shah Mohammed Reza. “Pahlavi,” Chichkin explained.

Alarming events on the Soviet-German front, the threat of a Turkish attack on the USSR and the approach of German-Italian troops to the Suez Canal in 1942 helped revive the project to create the Caspian - Persian Gulf canal. The USSR and Iran considered the project as mutually beneficial and promising. The issue was discussed at the negotiations between Joseph Stalin and Mohammed Pahlavi on November 30, 1943 in Tehran.

Spring 1953 Soviet Union took a course towards normalizing relations with Turkey as opposed to difficult relations with Iran. However, from the second half of the 1950s. Iran decided to restore the policy of equal cooperation with the West and the USSR. In June-July 1956, an official visit of the Iranian government delegation led by Pahlavi to the USSR took place. The parties signed a number of economic agreements.

In addition, at the meeting of the then USSR Pre-Minister Nikolai Bulganin with Pahlavi, it was noted that the parties attach important studying the project for the construction of the Caspian - Persian Gulf shipping canal. But this item was not included in the final communiqué following the negotiations between the parties.

Nevertheless, in 1962, the USSR and Iran created a Soviet-Iranian commission to study the issue of the canal, and the then head of the Supreme Council of the USSR Leonid Brezhnev was familiarized with the commission’s proposals during his visit to Tehran in November 1963. “It was then that the parties created a legal basis to implement the project, signing agreements “On the joint use of water resources of border rivers” and “On the development of transit of Iranian goods through the territory of the USSR, and Soviet goods through the territory of Iran,” Chichkin explained.

In June 1965, Pahlavi’s next visit to the USSR took place, the parties agreed to speed up the development of the project, but again without mention in the final communiqué. A preliminary version of the construction of the canal was considered during the visit of USSR Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin to Tehran in April 1968. The parties once again approved the project.

However, in those same years, American-Iranian summit meetings became more frequent, during which the United States declared that the project did not correspond to the long-term interests of the United States and its NATO allies. This position was also supported by Saudi Arabia. Meanwhile, Iraq, on the contrary, supported a project that would provide this country with the shortest route to the USSR. This position of Iraq helped normalize relations between Baghdad and Moscow in 1974-1975. The parties signed a bilateral agreement on friendship and good neighborliness.

Since the fall of 1975, the United States began to develop plans to overthrow the Shah's regime and provoke the Iranian-Soviet and Iranian-Iraqi conflict. Tehran did not dare ignore the US position, since up to 70% of Iranian oil exports went overseas, and the US share in foreign investment in Iran exceeded 40%. “Supplies from the United States covered at least 60% of the needs of the Iranian Armed Forces for weapons and ammunition. And in general, the share of NATO countries in supplying the Iranian army reached 85%,” Chichkin emphasized.

At the same time, Türkiye, from the second half of the 1960s. began to reduce tariffs for the transit of Soviet goods through the Bosporus and Dardanelles. “This was important for the USSR, since in the 1960s at least 50% of the annual volume of exported Soviet oil was transported along this route. Secondly, the implementation of the canal project required colossal financial and technical resources, the allocation of which became problematic for the USSR for many reasons within - and external economic reasons,” Chichkin explained.

All this contributed to the fact that the USSR and Iran not only slowed down the strategic project, but preferred not to speed up its implementation. During Pahlavi’s visit to Moscow in October 1972 and Kosygin’s visit to Tehran in March 1973, the parties again, outside the communiqué, noted the mutual benefit of the channel, recommending clarification of a number of technical parameters.

The parties managed to expand the legal and technical basis for the construction of the canal; the USSR and Iran signed a “Program of Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation” for 15 years” and a memorandum “On Mutual Encouragement of Capital Investments”.

In the 1960-70s, over 60 industrial facilities were built in Iran with the help of the USSR, including one of the largest in the region, the Isfahan Metallurgical Plant, which borders Azerbaijan SSR almost 500-kilometer section of the Trans-Iranian gas pipeline.

The USA, Britain and Turkey insisted that the main export flow of Iranian gas pass through Turkey, but Moscow and Tehran in 1972-1973. agreed on the transit of Iranian gas to Europe for 20 years through the USSR. “These deliveries were supposed to begin in 1976, but the deterioration of the internal political situation and subsequent well-known events in Iran led to the mothballing of the project,” Chichkin noted.

The Caspian-Persian Gulf canal project, extremely beneficial for the USSR and Iran, encountered increasingly active opposition from the United States and NATO. And the Iran-Iraq war postponed the implementation of the project indefinitely.

Today Tehran considers this project as a priority; Iran is ready for negotiations on this issue. The Caspian - Persian Gulf canal directly connects not only Russia, but also other CIS and European countries to the Indian Ocean. This route is half as long as the water route through the Turkish Straits. Therefore, not only Iranian, but also foreign specialists are involved in finalizing the project. They intend to put the canal into operation in the 2020s.

“The Caspian - Persian Gulf shipping canal, passing entirely through Iran, is capable of providing the shortest access to the Indian Ocean basin from the North Atlantic, Baltic, Black Sea-Azov, Danube and Volga-Caspian basins. Iran needs this route not only as a transport corridor, but also as a source of supplying fresh water to the central arid regions of the country,” Chichkin emphasized.

In 1996-1997 Iran's Ministry of Roads and Transport sent a delegation to Russia with the intention of attracting investment or technology for the construction of the canal. Russia approved Iran's proposals, but suggested studying the environmental side of the project due to the uniqueness of the Caspian biological environment. The parties agreed that Iranian specialists would study Russian experience in hydraulic engineering construction. Delegations from Iran visited the White Sea-Baltic, Volga-Baltic, and Volga-Don canals. In 1998, Russia and Iran created a joint expert group to study the Trans-Iranian water project, and in 1999 Iran approved a revised feasibility study for the canal.

The length of the shipping route will be only about 700 km, including along the river beds of northwestern (Caspian) and southwestern Iran, including the international bed of the Shatt al-Arab River bordering Iraq - about 450 km. The required investments are about $10 billion, the full payback of the project is in the fifth year from the time of commissioning. The canal will provide transit revenues to Russia and Iran ($1.2-1.4 billion and $1.4-1.7 billion, respectively) starting from the third or fourth year of operation.

In the early 2000s. At the negotiations of the Russian-Iranian Commission on Trade and Scientific and Technical Cooperation, representatives of Iran offered Russia ways of financing the canal construction project, as well as the option of building cargo ("river-sea") and auxiliary vessels for the waterway.

“It is reasonable to assume that modern geopolitical factors, including the serious aggravation of relations with Russia provoked by Turkey, contribute to a more thorough study of options for Russia’s participation in the creation of such an important waterway,” Chichkin concluded.

Moscow and Tehran are discussing the possibility of building a canal between the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf, which will completely pass through Iranian territory.

The 700-kilometer structure could revive the ancient trade route “from the Varangians to the Persians.”

At stake are serious changes in transport logistics in Eurasia and billions of dollars in income for some countries and losses for others. What are the details so ambitious project and possible geopolitical consequences?

Last week, during a meeting with students at St. Petersburg University, Iranian Ambassador Mehdi Sanai told listeners that Moscow and Tehran are discussing the possibility of building a canal between the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf, which will pass entirely through Iranian territory. Subsequently, Sanai seemed to disown his words, however, if you think about it, the statement “they are not going to build” does not directly contradict the words “discussion is underway.” It is quite possible that the parties are considering various options, calculate the benefits and costs, so that the project can still take place. Moreover, the idea of ​​the Trans-Iranian Canal is by no means a figment of the imagination of an individual minister, but has been discussed by Russia and Iran for more than 100 years.

Since the time of the king

For the first time we thought about the practical implementation of the project back in turn of the 19th century- XX centuries. Having done extensive research work, Russian empire and then Persia came to the conclusion that laying a 700-kilometer " sea ​​route» quite realistic, but could not agree on legal status channel. St. Petersburg, as the main investor, insisted on the principle of extraterritoriality by analogy with the Suez and Panama Canals (the first at that time belonged to Britain and the USA, respectively). Persia, in turn, believed that it would be more fair to divide the concession 50% to 50%.

The negotiations successfully reached a dead end, and a long period of conflict began in Persia. political crisis, which ended only in 1925 with the overthrow of the Qajar dynasty and the accession of the Pahlavi dynasty, the first Shah of which ensured that his country was called “Iran” and not “Persia” abroad.

During the Pahlavi dynasty, the Persians, who became known as Iranians, tried to breathe new breath into the idea, but at that time the Soviet Union did not show any interest in the project. The fact is that the secular pragmatist Ataturk was closer and more understandable than the Iranian shahs, and relations between the USSR and Turkey began to develop in a friendly manner, and there was no reason to look for an expensive alternative to the Bosporus and Dardanelles.

The idea of ​​a trans-Iranian canal was again returned to during World War II in connection with the pro-Nazi policy of Turkey and the threat of the capture of the Suez Canal by German-Italian troops. During Tehran-43, the issue was raised at the negotiations between Stalin and M.R. Pahlavi.

However, even that time it did not come to real work - there were enough other priority tasks.

After the Second World War, Turkey's departure to NATO again updated the project, but it was hampered by political instability in Iran, which ended only with the final overthrow of the Shah's regime and the transformation of Iran into an Islamic republic.

The last time the possibility of building a canal was mentioned was in the early 2000s, but at that moment neither Russia nor Iran were strong enough to finance and implement such a large-scale project.

Geopolitics of the Trans-Iranian Canal

The consequences of the project, if implemented, are obvious: the Caspian Sea will cease to be “the largest salt lake in the world” and will gain access to the Indian Ocean, and Russia, like other countries in the region, will acquire another southern outlet to the World Ocean.

First of all and most importantly, the Trans-Iranian Canal will undermine Turkey’s monopoly over the Black Sea straits of the Bosporus and Dardanelles. And this, in turn, will lead to a significant reduction in Ankara’s role in the region.

Apparently, it was the worsening relations with Ankara on the Syrian issue that pushed Moscow and Tehran to return to this seemingly long-forgotten project. Turkey has known very well and for a long time what is almost its main trump card in the event of an open conflict with Russia, and it constantly threatens the possibility of using such a trump card in negotiations. Depriving Turkey of such geopolitical leverage would radically change Russian-Turkish relations.

Another consequence will be the creation of certain competition for the largest Suez Canal, the main connecting maritime artery between Asia and Western Europe.

The construction of the shortest waterway to the Indian Ocean basin from the North Atlantic along the Volga-Baltic route revives the ancient trade route “from the Varangians to the Persians” and radically changes the transport logistics of Eurasia.

Not to mention the fact that the entire Caspian region, as well as the navigable river system of Russia, will receive a powerful impetus for development.

Russia and Iran will increase their influence on other states in the region - the same Azerbaijan, which is now more focused on Turkey.

The canal will also strengthen maritime trade between European Russia and countries such as India and China. In this sense, it can be called the “water silk road”.

The project will be met with hostility by the Sunni monarchies of the Middle East and our dear Western partners - purely political reasons. None of these countries needs either the strengthening of Iran or the strengthening of Russia. Yes, the Suez Canal is controlled by Egypt, but both exits from the Mediterranean - to the Black Sea and the Atlantic - are under the supervision of NATO countries. And if they wish, Turkish, Spanish or English border guards can stick their noses into almost any cargo passing by their shores.

Gains and losses

As for the price and construction time, as well as possible profit, the easiest way is to focus on the Suez Canal. Now it brings Egypt about 5-7 billion dollars a year. In 2015, the construction of a 70-kilometer-long backup was completed to organize constant two-way traffic for ships. The project was completed in just a year and required $4 billion in funding. The Egyptian government hopes that thanks to the modernization of Suez, the country will earn 10-13 billion a year from transit by 2025.

Since 450 of the 700 kilometers of the Trans-Iranian Canal will pass along already existing navigable rivers, only 350 actually need to be “dug.” It can be assumed that implementation will require 10–15 billion dollars, and the profit will be about three billion per year. That is, the project will fully pay for itself in five years.

For Egypt, this is lost profit, and Cairo is unlikely to be delighted with such a prospect. For Turkey, this will be a disaster even from a purely financial point of view, since Ankara will lose most of its transit revenues.

But the most painful impact of the Trans-Iranian Canal will be on the UK and the USA, whose international influence is largely based on control of the main trade routes: this will limit their ability to control trade in the region. And there is no doubt that the project will meet with colossal resistance from Western countries, just as now in another part of the world the United States is doing everything to prevent the construction of the Nicaraguan Canal, which will become an alternative to the Panama route, which is still virtually controlled by the Americans.

We must be prepared and understand that as soon as substantive study of the details of the Caspian-Persian Gulf canal begins, we will learn a lot from the Western media about the terrible environmental damage it will cause, about its obvious commercial unprofitability and about the hardships it will bring to those suffering in Iran. peasants. The reason why the Iranian peasants will inevitably suffer will definitely be found.

That is why neither Moscow nor Tehran are currently ready to show all their cards and are trying to discuss this topic less - the example of Nicaragua is before our eyes. Both the Iranian and Russian authorities should prepare in advance for a barrage of criticism and severe pressure. On the other hand, neither Moscow nor Tehran are used to this, so one can hope that this time the canal project will still be implemented.