After the division took part in the defensive and offensive operations of the Battle of Kursk, it concentrated in the area of ​​​​the village of Koshelev.

On August 11, 1943, the 16th Division was transferred to another operational direction, from where the road to the Lithuanian SSR opened. The division was withdrawn from combat and from the 42nd Rifle Corps. She marched to the east, passed through the places she had conquered, and concentrated in the Verkhnyaya Boevka - Sukhoe - Kholodovo area 15 kilometers northwest of Kroma in the reserve of the 48th Army of the Central Front. On August 12, she was withdrawn from the 48th Army and transferred to the reserve of the commander of the troops of the Central Front. On August 21, she departed by rail for Tula for replenishment and rest. For three weeks, being in reserve at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the division hastily prepared for new important battles, receiving reinforcements in personnel, weapons, equipment and transport.

The leaders of the republic came to the division on September 14, got acquainted with the situation, mood, and state of the division.

On September 23, the division was raised by order, loaded onto railway trains and in five days along the route Tula - Moscow - Kunya was transported to the Velikiye Luki area on the Kalinin Front, where from September 27 it was included in the 2nd Guards Rifle Corps of the 4th Shock Division army (commander Major General V.I. Shvetsov (1898–1958).

During the 1943 operations to liberate Belarus and prepare for the liberation of the Baltic states, the Headquarters planned the Nevelsk operation - a strike in October 1943 at the junction of the German army groups North and Center with the forces of the 3rd and 4th shock armies.

The 4th Shock Army was supposed to advance during this operation on the right wing of the Kalinin Front. The basis of its strike force was the 2nd Guards Rifle Corps of Major General A.P. Beloborodova (1903–1990). The 16th division was included in the corps of the famous commander and took an active part in the Nevelsk, Gorodok and Ezerishchenskaya operations, liberating Belarus.

At the Kunya station, the arriving echelons were quickly unloaded, the regiments, one after another, set out on foot to a position south of the village of Avenishche, where the division entered the second echelon of the 2nd Guards Rifle Corps.

On October 5, 1943, Snechkus came to the division again. For the first time in his speech, there was a reminder to the soldiers that the division was already really close to Lithuania, that the Lithuanian people were waiting for the division’s fighters as liberators.

By October 8, the division was transported by rail and concentrated in the Usova-Sirotok-Ostrov area, 20 kilometers southeast of Nevel. But on October 10, the division again received orders to march and its first combat mission on the Kalinin Front. This was the order of the commander of the 2nd Guards Rifle Corps A.P. Beloborodov, on October 11, enter the battle at Lake Ordovo, expand the occupied bridgehead, advancing in the direction of the villages of Ezerishche, Rudnya, and liberate the village of Palkino. These positions were at the forefront of the Ezerishche grouping of our troops, blocking the narrow defile between lakes Ordovo and Ezerishche, as well as the road to the city of Gorodok, Vitebsk region.

On the same day, the division went on the offensive. The 167th regiment advanced on the village of Palkino, and the 156th on Lobok and Ezerishche. The Germans, with air strikes, strong mortar and machine gun fire, using five tanks and several self-propelled guns, did not allow the offensive of our troops to develop. The advance was 200–300 meters.

At night a roundabout maneuver was undertaken. A detachment of 195 soldiers from the 1st battalion of the 249th regiment was sent behind enemy lines. The detachment bypassed the forests of lakes Melkoe and Ordovo, went to the rear of the enemy’s defense near the village of Palkino, which in the morning was to be taken by a simultaneous attack of the regiments from the front and a strike by the detachment from the rear. But the regiments that went on the attack at 8 a.m. on October 12 were unable to break through, as they suffered heavy losses from heavy fire and air strikes. The attack from the front failed. It turned out that the corps headquarters had undertaken similar maneuvers more than once before, and the Germans could have expected such actions. The detachment, which found itself surrounded, was unable to break through the front line - only 47 soldiers and officers made it through, the rest died, and some were taken prisoner. The Germans immediately shot the prisoners.

On October 17, another detachment of soldiers from the 249th regiment, numbering 317 people, went behind enemy lines; it was armed with mortars and three anti-tank guns. Communication was provided by two radio operators with walkie-talkies. The detachment had the task, bypassing Lake Ordovo, to go through the forests to the area west of Pankra. The detachment, constantly maintaining contact with the command, successfully operated in the German rear, distracting enemy forces. Having occupied the enemy trenches, the soldiers repelled the Nazi counterattacks, destroying two tanks in the process. On the fourth day, having successfully completed the task, by order of the command, the detachment returned to the regiment.

On October 18, the 167th Regiment, after many days of heavy fighting, resumed the offensive and finally took the village of Palkino.

In general, the fighting was fierce, our offensive was unsuccessful, and the enemy continually launched counterattacks. Ultimately, the command of the 4th Shock Army came to the conclusion that attempts to break through the enemy’s defenses with a frontal attack did not produce positive results. The division, by order, stopped active operations and went on the defensive, successfully repelling several fierce counterattacks of the Nazis.

The ferocity of these battles was explained by the fact that the Nazis occupied positions that were very convenient for defense. They prepared the defense here in advance, equipping the area in engineering terms: they filled it with firepower. The reason for their desperate resistance was that the Ezerishche-Ordovo interlake, where the division was breaking through, led to important road junctions - Gorodok and Vitebsk, which the German command called “the gateway to the Baltic states.”

In the second half of October 1943, the 3rd and 4th shock armies again successfully went on the offensive.

They walked through the partisan region, through forests and swamps, in the direction of Polotsk and Pustoshka (Vitebsk region). The troops advanced 70–80 km and reached the approaches to Pustoshka and the distant approaches to Polotsk.

A risky front line configuration emerged. South of Nevel, the German defense was broken through in a very short area. The neck of the breakthrough north of the town of Ezerishche remained narrow - no more than 8–9 km along the front, including the water area of ​​lakes Nevel, Yemenets and Ordovo. It was through this narrow strip that all supplies of ammunition, fuel, and food were carried out for the two shock armies. The road was extremely vulnerable, because it was shot through not only by artillery and mortar fire, but in a number of areas by machine-gun fire from the enemy.

The German attempt to cut this road, so that the two shock armies would be in the bag, suggested itself and was only a matter of time.

Offensive battles in the Palkino-Lobok sector continued until the end of October. During this time, the division destroyed more than a thousand enemy soldiers and officers and a lot of military equipment. The enemy sought to eliminate our group that had broken through west of Nevel at any cost. The German command constantly brought reserves to the battlefield. The troops of the 4th Shock Army, and among them the 16th Lithuanian Division, built on their success south of Nevel, fighting in difficult conditions in the lake region.

With the capture of Nevel, directions of action to Polotsk and Vitebsk were opened for the Kalinin Front. Polotsk bordered on the vast Polotsk-Lepel partisan region. The Germans considered Vitebsk “the gateway to the Baltic states.” The loss of these two cities by the Germans brought Soviet troops to positions threatening the rear of Army Groups North and Center.

The town of Gorodok is located between Nevel and Vitebsk. Here, in an attempt to prevent further advance to the west of our advancing fronts, the Germans transferred two infantry divisions, removing them from near Leningrad, where they had to stop active operations, and from the southern wing of Army Group Center - five infantry and one tank divisions . The aviation group was strengthened.

Fierce fighting continued throughout November and December 1943 north and south of Nevel and east of Vitebsk.

The division participated in these battles until October 25. Separate units of the division and its artillery were used in battles north of Vitebsk. After heavy fighting, the division was relieved on October 25 by units of the 156th Infantry Division (II Formation) and withdrawn from the front line to rest, where it was stationed in the villages of Grishkovo, Matsilishche, and Krasny Bor. During these days, units and divisions of the division received reinforcements and put themselves in order.

On October 29, it left the 2nd Guards Rifle Corps and became directly subordinate to the commander of the 4th Shock Army.

The division, changing areas of concentration, by November 5, 1943, moved to the area of ​​Vysotskoye, Ovinishte, Vashchily. The division headquarters was located in the village of Kozly, Nevelsk district (10 kilometers northeast of Ezerishche). The division was at that moment in the reserve of the 4th Shock Army. But a few days later, early in the morning of November 8, she was alerted.

The Germans struck a strong blow at the junction of the 3rd and 4th shock armies, setting themselves the task of returning Nevel, capturing the inter-lake defile, closing the corridor through which the armies were in contact with the rear, and encircling them. The danger of encirclement became very real.

In this situation, at 7:30 a.m., the chief of staff of the 4th Shock Army began to transmit an urgent order from the chief of staff of the army to the commander of the Lithuanian division: “Under pressure from superior enemy forces, our units are fighting back. The division’s task is to stop the enemy’s advance and restore the original position.” At this moment the connection was lost. The regiments were alerted and deployed in the path of the advancing German divisions.

In fulfillment of the order to counterattack the German troops advancing from the village of Lobok and restore the situation, the division itself began to advance in the direction of Shchepikha, Borok and Blinki.

At noon on November 8, the regiments of the 16th Lithuanian Division met the enemy near the villages of Terpilovo, Belina, Blinki, Borok and height 191.6. On the evening of November 8, the Germans occupied the town of Borok. At all positions, the Lithuanian division defended its lines in a fierce battle.

The positions of the division's artillery regiment (commanded by Colonel Povilaitis Simonaitis) were located in the depths of the division's defense precisely in the direction in which the Nazis launched their attack. The advanced tanks that broke through, accompanied by infantry, unexpectedly appeared in front of the sixth battery of the regiment. When they were seen, they had already approached 500 meters. The outcome of the battle was decided in seconds, and the artillerymen instantly opened accurate fire. The first shot from Sergeant Stanislovaitis' gun knocked out the lead tank. The second tank exploded from artillery fire, after which the third tank disappeared from sight. Following this, the battery fired at the infantry, causing heavy losses. The artillerymen of the neighboring battery had to fight off tanks and infantry that came close to its firing positions with grenades. The fourth battery managed to knock out several enemy tanks, but suffered heavy losses. However, the Germans were unable to break through to the north here either.

Subsequent attacks by enemy tanks and infantry against the positions of the Lithuanian division were repelled with heavy losses for the Germans. In all positions, the Lithuanian division defended its lines in a fierce battle.

On November 9, the 167th Regiment (regiment commander Colonel Vladas Moteka) took the town of Borok from the Germans.

Sergei Kostyukovich, a participant in this battle who became a Belarusian academician after the war, recalls how V. Moteka behaved during the moments of repelling German counterattacks near the town of Borok: “He rode on a white horse from one battalion to another and in the most dramatic situations, maintaining a calm expression faces, encouraged the fighters with his whole appearance, as if saying: “Don’t be afraid, guys, be bold!”

During stubborn defensive battles from November 8 to 11, near the southern shore of the lake. Zaverezhye - Beliny - Borok - Blinky the division defended itself for four days, resorting to counterattacks and bayonet strikes, in fierce battles when the Germans even tried to resort to psychic attacks.

The situation developed in such a way that, due to the fierceness of the fighting, the rear divisions were unable to deliver food to the soldiers at the front lines, and the soldiers were left without food for several days.

The task assigned to the division was completed, and the original position of our defense was restored on this section of the front.

In these defensive battles, the division inflicted heavy losses on the enemy (up to 3 thousand people), held the line of defense, knocked out and burned 12 tanks. The Germans also lost many artillery pieces and vehicles and were driven back to their original positions. Together with other formations, the Lithuanian division thwarted the plan to encircle our 3rd and 4th armies. The situation on the isthmus was corrected thanks to the exceptional heroism of the tank destroyer regiment and three rifle divisions, including the 16th Lithuanian, which not only stopped the enemy’s advance towards Nevel, but also destroyed more than 10 thousand of his soldiers.

In these battles, the artillerymen of the 224th artillery regiment, who occupied positions in the sector of the 167th regiment between lakes Ordovo and Ezerische, especially distinguished themselves in the Lithuanian division. Under pressure from advancing German troops, the 167th Regiment was forced to retreat and take up new positions. The artillerymen of the 224th regiment, left for some time without infantry cover, held their positions and continued to fire.

Having honorably held its positions and covered the defenseless communications of the advancing armies, the division ensured further strategic success and saved the general situation on the front scale.

The enemy, having suffered heavy losses, went on the defensive. 175 soldiers and officers were awarded for courage and heroism shown in battle. The front commander expressed gratitude to all the personnel of the division.

On the night of November 12, the Lithuanian formation was withdrawn from the front line. Only the 224th Artillery Regiment and artillery units of the rifle regiments were left in firing positions. At the positions, the small rifle units of the 16th division were replaced by soldiers of the 29th division (third formation).

Military cemeteries along the Nevel-Gorodok highway and a memorial stone near the road on the hill in Dubische near the lake remained as a reminder of the cost of the victories that marked the division’s combat path. Here stands a monument to the fallen soldiers of the 16th Lithuanian Division, erected by its veterans after the war.

Nevel, who occupied a key position in the Vitebsk direction, was of enormous operational importance for the warring parties. With the liberation of this city, the functioning of the Dno-Novosokolniki-Nevel road, which allowed the Nazis to maneuver forces between army groups “Center” and “North”, stopped. At the junction of these two groupings of Hitler’s troops, a 20 km gap was formed, unfilled by troops. Realizing the danger of the current situation, the German command took all measures to eliminate the breakthrough of Soviet troops, recapture Nevel, and restore the situation at the front. The opponents hastily transferred 2 infantry divisions from near Leningrad, 5 infantry and a tank division from the southern wing of Army Group Center to this area. All squadrons of the 6th Air Fleet were also concentrated here. From October 11 to October 31, the Nazis' counterattacks came one after another. As a result, the enemy managed to stop the movement of the Red Army troops, but failed to return Nevel. However, the troops of the Kalinin Front, having lost 56,474 people killed, wounded and missing in the October battles, did not complete their task. They were forced to conduct a new regrouping of forces and prepare to continue the operation in the Vitebsk direction.

Preparations for the operation began long before it began. Despite the fact that Headquarters did not officially give orders for development, the operation was developed before the troops entered conditional positions. A.I. Eremenko recalls: “With the end of the Dukhovshchina-Demidov operation, the troops of the Kalinin Front developed an offensive against Vitebsk. The Nevelsk operation, which we had also planned in advance, came next. No written directive was issued regarding the preparation of this operation in order to maintain secrecy. However, the commanders of the 3rd and 4th shock armies were assigned tasks for its preparation.”

The closest reserves of the Wehrmacht amounted to up to four battalions and up to two infantry regiments.

In an effort to hold onto Belarus at all costs, the Nazi command concentrated enormous forces here and created a powerful, defense in depth. Cities and towns were transformed into strongholds. A perimeter defense was created around Vitebsk and other large settlements, which consisted of several trench-type defensive lines. Defensive structures were erected along the banks of the rivers.

Despite the generally favorable situation, the future operation seemed to be a difficult undertaking. This is how I.Kh. assessed the situation on the fronts. Bagromyan: “By the beginning of October 1943, the situation on the Soviet-German front was generally favorable for the Red Army. The troops of the Kalinin and Western fronts reached the approaches to Vitebsk, Orsha and Mogilev. The Central, Voronezh and Stepnoy fronts reached the middle reaches of the Dnieper and crossed everywhere him, having the task of continuing the liberation of Ukraine and the south of Belarus. By the same time, the troops of our Bryansk Front, having defeated a large enemy group, advanced 250 kilometers, reaching the upper reaches of the Dnieper north of Gomel."

The idea of ​​the operation was to quickly break through the German defenses, capture Nevel with a swift attack and take advantageous positions for further fighting. Suddenness and swiftness of action were of decisive importance. Any delay could lead to the failure of the operation, since in this case the German command would have time to transfer reserves to the threatened direction and strengthen the defense.

The difficulty in carrying out the operation lay, first of all, in the fact that the Nazis were able to significantly strengthen the Nevel area. A.I. Eremenko recalls: “Occupying defense in this area for 9-10 months, they created a well-developed engineering system of trenches, trenches, and full-profile communication trenches. The dugouts and bunkers had ceilings of several rolls. Our artillery reconnaissance spotted a large number of reserve positions for machine guns, mortars and guns."

The main goal of the offensive operation, in addition to occupying an important point, was to provide conditions for further actions in the direction of Gorodok and Vitebsk. The commander of the Kalinin Front recalled: “When planning the Nevelsk operation, it was intended to ensure a general offensive of the front in the direction of Vitebsk, as well as to create conditions for developing success in the southern direction to Gorodok, in the northern and northwestern direction - to capture the Novosokolniki resistance center. The attack on Nevel, in addition, distracted significant German forces; its success would have disrupted the enemy’s entire communications system.”

The main role in the offensive was to be played by the 3rd Shock Army. To ensure the solution to the main objective of the operation, Lieutenant General K.N. Galitsky included in the strike force four of the existing six rifle divisions, two of the three rifle brigades, all the tanks and almost all the artillery of the army. These forces were concentrated in a 4-kilometer area. The defense of the remaining 100-kilometer section of the army's front was entrusted to the remaining forces. In accordance with the plan of the operation, the option of deep operational formation of a strike group was chosen. The first echelon, intended to break through the German defense, included the 28th and 357th rifle divisions, reinforced by two mortar regiments. To develop success after breaking through the defense, the 78th Tank Brigade, the 21st Guards Rifle Division and three artillery regiments were assigned. The reserve (third echelon) consisted of the 46th Guards Rifle Division, 31st and 100th Rifle Brigades. The operation plan included 5 stages. At the first stage, it was necessary to secretly concentrate troops intended for the offensive in the initial areas and complete the accumulation of material resources, primarily ammunition, necessary for the operation. At the second stage, the troops quickly and secretly occupied their starting position in close proximity to the front line. The third stage included artillery preparation, attack, breaking through enemy defenses to a depth of 6-7 km to the river. Sixth, ensuring the entry into the breakthrough of the development echelon of success, which at the fourth stage, with a swift blow, was supposed to capture the inter-lake defile on the approaches to Nevel and take possession of the city. At the fifth stage, it was necessary to gain a foothold to the north and west of Nevel, organize a strong defense and be ready to repel counterattacks from suitable enemy reserves.

Lieutenant General K.N. Galitsky writes in his memoirs: “According to the artillery support plan for the operation, 814 guns and mortars were concentrated in the breakthrough area, which amounted to 91% of all those available in the army. The artillery was tasked with destroying enemy artillery and mortar batteries, suppressing firing points at the front line and in the depths of the defense, preventing counterattacks and preventing the approach of reserves. The artillery operations were organized as an artillery offensive, in which 1.5 hours were allocated for artillery preparation and 35 minutes for accompanying the attack with a barrage of fire."

In order to prevent a strike on the flank of the advancing army of K.N. Galitsky and cover its actions, the 4th shock army was supposed to advance south of Nevel. The attack was carried out by the 360th and 47th rifle divisions in the direction of Lake Ezerishche and further to Gorodok. The success was to be developed by the 236th and 143rd tank brigades. Their main task was to cut the Gorodok-Nevel highway.

For air support of the troops, the 211th attack and 240th fighter aviation divisions were allocated from the 3rd Air Army. While the infantry was preparing for the attack, the pilots had to carry out bombing and assault strikes on strong points located in the direction of the main attack. In the future, attack aircraft, under the cover of fighters, were to ensure the advancement of the 28th Infantry Division and the breakthrough development echelon. In addition, aviation was entrusted with the task of providing air cover for the strike group, disrupting enemy railway communications in the Polotsk - Dretun and Nevel - Gorodok sections, and conducting aerial reconnaissance in the direction of Pustoshka and Vitebsk in order to timely detect suitable German reserves.

From the memoirs of A.I. Eremenko: “By the end of the day on October 5, the troops were given the last orders to attack. Its start was scheduled for 10 o'clock on October 6, 1943.

By 3 o'clock on October 6, units and subunits of the 357th and 28th rifle divisions took their starting position and dug in 300 m from the enemy trenches. The sappers were finishing making passages in the minefields and cutting the wire. The enemy set up ambushes in two passes in the 28th division’s sector; sappers and infantry cover spotted them in a timely manner and drove them off with fire.”

In the very first hours, the operation achieved a favorable result for the Red Army. A breakthrough was quickly formed, where the tanks rushed; individual pockets of stubborn resistance were suppressed by the tactical advantage of the attackers. A.I. Eremenko recalled the results of the first day of the operation: “As a result of the successful actions of our troops on the first day of the operation, units of the 263rd Infantry and 2nd Air Field Divisions of the Nazis were driven out from the lines they occupied. The German command began hastily bringing new units from other sectors of the front to the breakthrough area. On October 7, units of the 58th Infantry Division appeared north of Nevel, arriving from the Krasnovaldaysk region, from the Volkhov Front sector.”

Careful two-month preparation led to the completion of the main task of the operation in one day. The Soviet command managed to hide the large-scale preparations for the operation, which allowed for surprise and ultimately led to success.

On October 8, 1943, soldiers of the 84th Rifle Corps (commander General S.A. Knyazkov) and a maneuver group led by Colonel P.F. Dremov was released by the police station. Liozno. By order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, five formations and units of the front were given the honorary names “Liozny”.

The Headquarters directive dated October 16, 1943 noted: “The troops of the Kalinin Front did not complete their assigned task - to capture Vitebsk by October 10. One of the reasons for this is the disorganized offensive of the front troops. The offensive is not carried out by all the forces of the front, more or less simultaneously, by separate armies on separate sectors of the front, which gives the enemy the opportunity to maneuver with his own forces and create powerful defense lines.

With the loss of Nevel, the Wehrmacht lost a major road junction, which fundamentally disrupted its entire communications system in this sector of the front and made it difficult to maneuver reserves. Subsequently, the gap in the German defense created by the penetration of Soviet troops caused a lot of concern to the German command. Hitler repeatedly demanded that the breakthrough be eliminated, but all attempts to carry out his order ended in failure. K. Tippelskirch wrote: “This gap has turned into a bleeding wound at the junction of both army groups.”

Commander of the Kalinin Front E.A. Eremenko writes in his memoirs: “As a result, the troops of the adjacent flanks of the 3rd and 4th shock armies brilliantly completed the task assigned to them. The city of Nevel, which had been under the heel of the German occupiers since July 16, 1941, was returned to the Motherland."

Thus, on October 6, after an hour and a half of artillery preparation, the right-flank armies of the Kalinin Front - the 3rd and 4th Shock Armies (commanders K.M. Galitsky and V.I. Shvetsov) went on the offensive. They delivered the main attack on Vitebsk from the north through Nevel at the junction of army groups “Center” and “North”. After two days of fighting, on October 7, a large center of enemy resistance, the city of Nevel was liberated. 320 settlements were also cleared. The main evidence of the events is the memoirs of A.I. Eremenko and K.M. Galitsky, who described in detail all the nuances of the operation.

Baltic divisions of Stalin Petrenko Andrey Ivanovich

4. Participation in the Nevelsk operation on October 7, 1943 (August - November 1943)

After the division took part in the defensive and offensive operations of the Battle of Kursk, it concentrated in the area of ​​​​the village of Koshelev.

On August 11, 1943, the 16th Division was transferred to another operational direction, from where the road to the Lithuanian SSR opened. The division was withdrawn from combat and from the 42nd Rifle Corps. She marched to the east, passed through the places she had conquered, and concentrated in the Verkhnyaya Boevka - Sukhoe - Kholodovo area 15 kilometers northwest of Kroma in the reserve of the 48th Army of the Central Front. On August 12, she was withdrawn from the 48th Army and transferred to the reserve of the commander of the troops of the Central Front. On August 21, she departed by rail for Tula for replenishment and rest. For three weeks, being in reserve at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the division hastily prepared for new important battles, receiving reinforcements in personnel, weapons, equipment and transport.

The leaders of the republic came to the division on September 14, got acquainted with the situation, mood, and state of the division.

On September 23, the division was raised by order, loaded onto railway trains and in five days along the route Tula - Moscow - Kunya was transported to the Velikiye Luki area on the Kalinin Front, where from September 27 it was included in the 2nd Guards Rifle Corps of the 4th Shock Division army (commander Major General V.I. Shvetsov (1898–1958).

During the 1943 operations to liberate Belarus and prepare for the liberation of the Baltic states, the Headquarters planned the Nevelsk operation - a strike in October 1943 at the junction of the German army groups North and Center with the forces of the 3rd and 4th shock armies.

The 4th Shock Army was supposed to advance during this operation on the right wing of the Kalinin Front. The basis of its strike force was the 2nd Guards Rifle Corps of Major General A.P. Beloborodova (1903–1990). The 16th division was included in the corps of the famous commander and took an active part in the Nevelsk, Gorodok and Ezerishchenskaya operations, liberating Belarus.

At the Kunya station, the arriving echelons were quickly unloaded, the regiments, one after another, set out on foot to a position south of the village of Avenishche, where the division entered the second echelon of the 2nd Guards Rifle Corps.

On October 5, 1943, Snechkus came to the division again. For the first time in his speech, there was a reminder to the soldiers that the division was already really close to Lithuania, that the Lithuanian people were waiting for the division’s fighters as liberators.

By October 8, the division was transported by rail and concentrated in the Usova-Sirotok-Ostrov area, 20 kilometers southeast of Nevel. But on October 10, the division again received orders to march and its first combat mission on the Kalinin Front. This was the order of the commander of the 2nd Guards Rifle Corps A.P. Beloborodov, on October 11, enter the battle at Lake Ordovo, expand the occupied bridgehead, advancing in the direction of the villages of Ezerishche, Rudnya, and liberate the village of Palkino. These positions were at the forefront of the Ezerishche grouping of our troops, blocking the narrow defile between lakes Ordovo and Ezerishche, as well as the road to the city of Gorodok, Vitebsk region.

On the same day, the division went on the offensive. The 167th regiment advanced on the village of Palkino, and the 156th on Lobok and Ezerishche. The Germans, with air strikes, strong mortar and machine gun fire, using five tanks and several self-propelled guns, did not allow the offensive of our troops to develop. The advance was 200–300 meters.

At night a roundabout maneuver was undertaken. A detachment of 195 soldiers from the 1st battalion of the 249th regiment was sent behind enemy lines. The detachment bypassed the forests of lakes Melkoe and Ordovo, went to the rear of the enemy’s defense near the village of Palkino, which in the morning was to be taken by a simultaneous attack of the regiments from the front and a strike by the detachment from the rear. But the regiments that went on the attack at 8 a.m. on October 12 were unable to break through, as they suffered heavy losses from heavy fire and air strikes. The attack from the front failed. It turned out that the corps headquarters had undertaken similar maneuvers more than once before, and the Germans could have expected such actions. The detachment, which found itself surrounded, was unable to break through the front line - only 47 soldiers and officers made it through, the rest died, and some were taken prisoner. The Germans immediately shot the prisoners.

On October 17, another detachment of soldiers from the 249th regiment, numbering 317 people, went behind enemy lines; it was armed with mortars and three anti-tank guns. Communication was provided by two radio operators with walkie-talkies. The detachment had the task, bypassing Lake Ordovo, to go through the forests to the area west of Pankra. The detachment, constantly maintaining contact with the command, successfully operated in the German rear, distracting enemy forces. Having occupied the enemy trenches, the soldiers repelled the Nazi counterattacks, destroying two tanks in the process. On the fourth day, having successfully completed the task, by order of the command, the detachment returned to the regiment.

On October 18, the 167th Regiment, after many days of heavy fighting, resumed the offensive and finally took the village of Palkino.

In general, the fighting was fierce, our offensive was unsuccessful, and the enemy continually launched counterattacks. Ultimately, the command of the 4th Shock Army came to the conclusion that attempts to break through the enemy’s defenses with a frontal attack did not produce positive results. The division, by order, stopped active operations and went on the defensive, successfully repelling several fierce counterattacks of the Nazis.

The ferocity of these battles was explained by the fact that the Nazis occupied positions that were very convenient for defense. They prepared the defense here in advance, equipping the area in engineering terms: they filled it with firepower. The reason for their desperate resistance was that the Ezerishche-Ordovo interlake, where the division was breaking through, led to important road junctions - Gorodok and Vitebsk, which the German command called “the gateway to the Baltic states.”

In the second half of October 1943, the 3rd and 4th shock armies again successfully went on the offensive.

They walked through the partisan region, through forests and swamps, in the direction of Polotsk and Pustoshka (Vitebsk region). The troops advanced 70–80 km and reached the approaches to Pustoshka and the distant approaches to Polotsk.

A risky front line configuration emerged. South of Nevel, the German defense was broken through in a very short area. The neck of the breakthrough north of the town of Ezerishche remained narrow - no more than 8–9 km along the front, including the water area of ​​lakes Nevel, Yemenets and Ordovo. It was through this narrow strip that all supplies of ammunition, fuel, and food were carried out for the two shock armies. The road was extremely vulnerable, because it was shot through not only by artillery and mortar fire, but in a number of areas by machine-gun fire from the enemy.

The German attempt to cut this road, so that the two shock armies would be in the bag, suggested itself and was only a matter of time.

Offensive battles in the Palkino-Lobok sector continued until the end of October. During this time, the division destroyed more than a thousand enemy soldiers and officers and a lot of military equipment. The enemy sought to eliminate our group that had broken through west of Nevel at any cost. The German command constantly brought reserves to the battlefield. The troops of the 4th Shock Army, and among them the 16th Lithuanian Division, built on their success south of Nevel, fighting in difficult conditions in the lake region.

With the capture of Nevel, directions of action to Polotsk and Vitebsk were opened for the Kalinin Front. Polotsk bordered on the vast Polotsk-Lepel partisan region. The Germans considered Vitebsk “the gateway to the Baltic states.” The loss of these two cities by the Germans brought Soviet troops to positions threatening the rear of Army Groups North and Center.

The town of Gorodok is located between Nevel and Vitebsk. Here, in an attempt to prevent further advance to the west of our advancing fronts, the Germans transferred two infantry divisions, removing them from near Leningrad, where they had to stop active operations, and from the southern wing of Army Group Center - five infantry and one tank divisions . The aviation group was strengthened.

Fierce fighting continued throughout November and December 1943 north and south of Nevel and east of Vitebsk.

The division participated in these battles until October 25. Separate units of the division and its artillery were used in battles north of Vitebsk. After heavy fighting, the division was relieved on October 25 by units of the 156th Infantry Division (II Formation) and withdrawn from the front line to rest, where it was stationed in the villages of Grishkovo, Matsilishche, and Krasny Bor. During these days, units and divisions of the division received reinforcements and put themselves in order.

On October 29, it left the 2nd Guards Rifle Corps and became directly subordinate to the commander of the 4th Shock Army.

The division, changing areas of concentration, by November 5, 1943, moved to the area of ​​Vysotskoye, Ovinishte, Vashchily. The division headquarters was located in the village of Kozly, Nevelsk district (10 kilometers northeast of Ezerishche). The division was at that moment in the reserve of the 4th Shock Army. But a few days later, early in the morning of November 8, she was alerted.

The Germans struck a strong blow at the junction of the 3rd and 4th shock armies, setting themselves the task of returning Nevel, capturing the inter-lake defile, closing the corridor through which the armies were in contact with the rear, and encircling them. The danger of encirclement became very real.

In this situation, at 7:30 a.m., the chief of staff of the 4th Shock Army began to transmit an urgent order from the chief of staff of the army to the commander of the Lithuanian division: “Under pressure from superior enemy forces, our units are fighting back. The division’s task is to stop the enemy’s advance and restore the original position.” At this moment the connection was lost. The regiments were alerted and deployed in the path of the advancing German divisions.

In fulfillment of the order to counterattack the German troops advancing from the village of Lobok and restore the situation, the division itself began to advance in the direction of Shchepikha, Borok and Blinki.

At noon on November 8, the regiments of the 16th Lithuanian Division met the enemy near the villages of Terpilovo, Belina, Blinki, Borok and height 191.6. On the evening of November 8, the Germans occupied the town of Borok. At all positions, the Lithuanian division defended its lines in a fierce battle.

The positions of the division's artillery regiment (commanded by Colonel Povilaitis Simonaitis) were located in the depths of the division's defense precisely in the direction in which the Nazis launched their attack. The advanced tanks that broke through, accompanied by infantry, unexpectedly appeared in front of the sixth battery of the regiment. When they were seen, they had already approached 500 meters. The outcome of the battle was decided in seconds, and the artillerymen instantly opened accurate fire. The first shot from Sergeant Stanislovaitis' gun knocked out the lead tank. The second tank exploded from artillery fire, after which the third tank disappeared from sight. Following this, the battery fired at the infantry, causing heavy losses. The artillerymen of the neighboring battery had to fight off tanks and infantry that came close to its firing positions with grenades. The fourth battery managed to knock out several enemy tanks, but suffered heavy losses. However, the Germans were unable to break through to the north here either.

Subsequent attacks by enemy tanks and infantry against the positions of the Lithuanian division were repelled with heavy losses for the Germans. In all positions, the Lithuanian division defended its lines in a fierce battle.

On November 9, the 167th Regiment (regiment commander Colonel Vladas Moteka) took the town of Borok from the Germans.

Sergei Kostyukovich, a participant in this battle who became a Belarusian academician after the war, recalls how V. Moteka behaved during the moments of repelling German counterattacks near the town of Borok: “He rode on a white horse from one battalion to another and in the most dramatic situations, maintaining a calm expression faces, encouraged the fighters with his whole appearance, as if saying: “Don’t be afraid, guys, be bold!”

During stubborn defensive battles from November 8 to 11, near the southern shore of the lake. Zaverezhye - Beliny - Borok - Blinky the division defended itself for four days, resorting to counterattacks and bayonet strikes, in fierce battles when the Germans even tried to resort to psychic attacks.

The situation developed in such a way that, due to the fierceness of the fighting, the rear divisions were unable to deliver food to the soldiers at the front lines, and the soldiers were left without food for several days.

The task assigned to the division was completed, and the original position of our defense was restored on this section of the front.

In these defensive battles, the division inflicted heavy losses on the enemy (up to 3 thousand people), held the line of defense, knocked out and burned 12 tanks. The Germans also lost many artillery pieces and vehicles and were driven back to their original positions. Together with other formations, the Lithuanian division thwarted the plan to encircle our 3rd and 4th armies. The situation on the isthmus was corrected thanks to the exceptional heroism of the tank destroyer regiment and three rifle divisions, including the 16th Lithuanian, which not only stopped the enemy’s advance towards Nevel, but also destroyed more than 10 thousand of his soldiers.

In these battles, the artillerymen of the 224th artillery regiment, who occupied positions in the sector of the 167th regiment between lakes Ordovo and Ezerische, especially distinguished themselves in the Lithuanian division. Under pressure from advancing German troops, the 167th Regiment was forced to retreat and take up new positions. The artillerymen of the 224th regiment, left for some time without infantry cover, held their positions and continued to fire.

Having honorably held its positions and covered the defenseless communications of the advancing armies, the division ensured further strategic success and saved the general situation on the front scale.

The enemy, having suffered heavy losses, went on the defensive. 175 soldiers and officers were awarded for courage and heroism shown in battle. The front commander expressed gratitude to all the personnel of the division.

On the night of November 12, the Lithuanian formation was withdrawn from the front line. Only the 224th Artillery Regiment and artillery units of the rifle regiments were left in firing positions. At the positions, the small rifle units of the 16th division were replaced by soldiers of the 29th division (third formation).

Military cemeteries along the Nevel-Gorodok highway and a memorial stone near the road on the hill in Dubische near the lake remained as a reminder of the cost of the victories that marked the division’s combat path. Here stands a monument to the fallen soldiers of the 16th Lithuanian Division, erected by its veterans after the war.