Chapter 6 “Barbarossa”: Russia Next While Hitler was busy conquering the West in the summer of 1940, Stalin, taking advantage of this circumstance, entered the territory of the Baltic states, and also moved towards the Balkans. At first glance, the relationship between

TASKS IN RELATION TO RUSSIA I. Introduction It is obvious that Russia, both as a force itself and as the center of the world communist movement, has now come to represent a very serious problem for US foreign policy, and in our country there is a deep

III. Main Objectives Our main objectives regarding Russia are really only the following two: a. Reduce the power and influence of Moscow to such an extent that it no longer poses a threat to the peace and stability of international

Barbarossa Fall"), the code name for Germany's war plan against the USSR (named after the Holy Roman Emperor Frederick I Barbarossa).

1940, after the defeat of the French army, the moment came that Hitler and his associates considered convenient for the implementation of their aggressive plans in the East. On July 22, 1940, the day of the French surrender, the Chief of the General Staff of the Army, General Franz Halder, received instructions from Hitler and the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Walter von Brauchitsch, to develop a plan for the invasion of the Soviet Union. The command of the ground forces (OKH) in July-December simultaneously developed several options, each independently. One of the options was developed by the German High Command (OKW) under the leadership of Alfred Jodl and his deputy, General Walter Warlimont, and was codenamed “Lossberg Study.” It was completed by September 15 and differed from the other option - General Marx - in that the main blow in it was determined on the northern sector of the front. When making the final decision, Hitler agreed with Jodl's considerations. By the time work on the plan options was completed, General Friedrich Paulus was appointed Deputy Chief of the General Staff, who was tasked with bringing all the plans together and taking into account the comments made by the Fuhrer. Under the leadership of General Paulus, in mid-December 1940, staff games and meetings of the military and Nazi leadership took place, where the final version of the Barbarossa plan was worked out. Paulus wrote in his memoirs: “The preparatory game for Operation Barbarossa was carried out under my leadership in mid-December 1940 for two days at the headquarters of the ground forces command in Zossen.

The main goal was Moscow. To achieve this goal and eliminate the threat from the north, Russian troops in the Baltic republics had to be destroyed. Then it was planned to take Leningrad and Kronstadt, and deprive the Russian Baltic Fleet of its base. In the south, the first target was Ukraine with the Donbass, and later the Caucasus with its oil sources. Special meaning OKW's plans included the capture of Moscow. However, the capture of Moscow had to be preceded by the capture of Leningrad. The capture of Leningrad served several military purposes: the elimination of the main bases of the Russian Baltic Fleet, the disabling of the city's military industry and the elimination of Leningrad as a concentration point for a counteroffensive against German troops advancing on Moscow. When I say that a decision was made, I do not mean that there was complete unity in the opinions of the responsible commanders and staff officers.

On the other hand, although little was said about this, the opinion was expressed that a rapid collapse of the Soviet resistance should be expected as a consequence of internal political difficulties, organizational and material weaknesses of the so-called “colossus with feet of clay...

“The entire territory in which operations will take place is divided by the Pripyat swamps into northern and southern half. The latter has a poor road network. The best roads and railways are on the Warsaw-Moscow line. Therefore, in the northern half there seem to be more favorable conditions to use a larger number of troops than in the south. In addition, a significant concentration of troops is planned in the Russian grouping in the direction of the Russian-German demarcation line. It must be assumed that immediately beyond the former Russian-Polish border there is a Russian supply base, covered by field fortifications. The Dnieper and Western Dvina represent the easternmost line on which the Russians will be forced to give battle.

If they retreat further, they will no longer be able to protect their industrial areas. As a result, our plan should be to prevent the Russians from creating a continuous defensive front west of these two rivers with the help of tank wedges. A particularly large strike force should advance from the Warsaw area towards Moscow. Of the envisaged three army groups, the northern one will need to be sent to Leningrad, and the southern forces will need to deliver the main blow in the direction of Kyiv. The final goal of the operation is the Volga and the Arkhangelsk region. A total of 105 infantry, 32 tank and motorized divisions should be used, of which large forces (two armies) will initially follow in the second echelon."

“We moved through frozen swamps, often the ice cracked and icy water got into my boots. My gloves were soaked through, I had to take them off and wrap my numb hands with a towel. I wanted to howl in pain.” From a letter German soldier, participant in the Russian campaign of 1941-42.

“The most important goal is to prevent the Russians from retreating while maintaining the integrity of the front. The offensive should be carried out so far to the east that Russian aircraft cannot carry out raids on the territory of the German Reich and so that, on the other hand, German aircraft can launch air strikes against the Russians military-industrial areas. To do this, it is necessary to achieve the defeat of the Russian armed forces and prevent their reconstruction. Already the first strikes must be delivered by such units that it is possible to destroy large enemy forces. Therefore, mobile troops should be used on the adjacent flanks of both northern army groups. deliver the main blow.

In the north, it is necessary to achieve encirclement of enemy forces located in the Baltic countries. To do this, the army group that will attack Moscow must have enough troops to be able to turn a significant part of its forces to the north. The army group advancing south of the Pripyat marshes must move out later and achieve encirclement of large enemy forces in Ukraine by performing an enveloping maneuver from the north... The number of troops of 130-140 divisions provided for the entire operation is sufficient."

The final version of the plan is set out in the directive of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (OKW) ´21 of December 18, 1940 (see.

Directive 21) and the “Directive for the Strategic Concentration and Deployment of Troops” of the OKH of January 31, 1941. The Barbarossa plan provided for “defeating Soviet Russia in a short-lived campaign even before the war against England is over.” The idea was “to split the front of the main forces of the Russian army, concentrated in the western part of Russia, with quick and deep strikes by powerful mobile groups north and south of the Pripyat swamps and, using this breakthrough, to destroy disunited groups of enemy troops.” At the same time, the main forces of the Soviet army were supposed to be destroyed west of the Dnieper, Western Dvina line, preventing them from retreating into the interior of the country. In the future, it was planned to capture Moscow, Leningrad, Donbass and reach the line Astrakhan, Volga, Arkhangelsk (see "A-A"). The Barbarossa plan outlined in detail the tasks of army groups and armies, the order of interaction between them, the tasks of the Air Force and Navy, issues of cooperation with allied states, etc.

It was planned to begin its implementation in May 1941, but due to operations against Yugoslavia and Greece, this date was postponed. In April 1941, the final order was given for the day of the attack - June 22.

A number of additional documents were developed to the OKW and OKH directives, incl.

part of the disinformation directive, which required that “the strategic deployment of forces for Operation Barbarossa be presented as the greatest disinformation maneuver in the history of war, aimed at diverting attention from the final preparations for the invasion of England.”

In accordance with the Barbarossa plan, by June 22, 1941, 190 divisions (including 19 tank and 14 motorized) of Germany and its allies were concentrated near the borders of the USSR. They were supported by 4 air fleets, as well as Finnish and Romanian aviation. The troops concentrated for the offensive numbered 5.5 million.

people, about 4,300 tanks, over 47 thousand field guns and mortars, about 5,000 combat aircraft. Army groups were deployed: "North" consisting of 29 divisions (all German) - in the zone from Memel (Klaipeda) to Gołdap; "Center" consisting of 50 divisions and 2 brigades (all German) - in the zone from Goldap to the Pripyat marshes; "South" consisting of 57 divisions and 13 brigades (including 13 Romanian divisions, 9 Romanian and 4 Hungarian brigades) - in the strip from the Pripyat swamps to the Black Sea. The army groups had the task of attacking respectively general directions to Leningrad, Moscow and Kyiv. The German Army Norway and 2 Finnish armies were concentrated in Finland and Norway - a total of 21 divisions and 3 brigades, supported by the 5th Air Fleet and Finnish aviation.

They were given the task of reaching Murmansk and Leningrad. There were 24 divisions left in the OKH reserve.

Despite the initial significant successes of the German troops, the Barbarossa plan turned out to be untenable, since it was based on the false premise of the weakness of the Soviet Union and its armed forces.

Excellent definition

Incomplete definition ↓

The fascist aggression against the Soviet Union, called the “Barbarossa Plan” after the Roman emperor, was a fleeting military campaign pursuing one single goal: to defeat and destroy the USSR. The final date for the end of hostilities was supposed to be the fall of 1941.

A year before in December 1941, late in the evening the Fuhrer signed directive number 21. It was printed in nine copies and was kept in the strictest confidence.

The directive received a code name - Plan Barbarossa. It provided for the completion of the campaign to defeat the USSR even before the end of the war against Great Britain.

What was this document and what goals did Plan Barbarossa pursue? It was a carefully designed aggression directed against the Soviet Union. With its help, Hitler, intending to achieve world domination, had to remove one of the main obstacles to his imperial goals.

The main strategic objects were Moscow, Leningrad, Donbass and the Central Industrial Region. At the same time, the capital was given a special place; its capture was considered decisive for the victorious outcome of this war.

To destroy the USSR, Hitler planned to use all German ground forces, with the exception of only those that were supposed to remain in the occupied territories.

The Barbarossa plan provided for the release of the forces of the fascist air force to assist the ground forces of this eastern operation, so that the ground part of the campaign could be completed as quickly as possible. At the same time, the directive ordered to minimize the destruction of eastern Germany by enemy aircraft by any means.

Marine fighting against the Northern, Black Sea and Baltic Soviet fleets were to be carried out by the ships of the Reich Navy together with the naval forces of Romania and Finland.

For a lightning attack on the USSR, the Barbarossa plan considered the participation of 152 divisions, including tank and motorized divisions, and two brigades. Romania and Finland intended to field 16 brigades and 29 ground divisions in this campaign.

The armed forces of the Reich's satellite countries were to operate under a single German command. Finland's task was to cover the northern troops, which were to attack from Norwegian territory, as well as to destroy Soviet troops on the Hanko Peninsula. At the same time, Romania was supposed to tie up the actions of the Soviet troops, helping the Germans from the rear areas.

The Barbarossa plan set certain goals, which were based on pronounced class contradictions. This was the idea of ​​​​starting a war, which turned into the destruction of entire nations with the unlimited use of methods of violence.

Unlike the military invasions of France, Poland and the Balkans, the blitz campaign against the Soviet Union was prepared very carefully. Hitler's leadership spent enough time and effort to develop the Barbarossa plan, so defeat was ruled out.

But the creators were unable to accurately assess the strength and strength of the Soviet state and, based on the exaggeration of the economic, political and military potential of the fascist empire, they underestimated the power of the USSR, the combat capability and morale of its people.

Hitler's “machine” was gaining momentum for victory, which seemed very easy and close to the leaders from the Reich. That is why the fighting had to be a blitzkrieg, and the offensive was a continuous advance deep into the USSR, and at very high speed. Short breaks were provided only to tighten up the rear.

Moreover, the Barbarossa plan completely excluded any delays due to resistance from the Soviet Army. The reason for the failure of this seemingly victorious plan was excessive confidence in one’s own strength, which, as history has shown, destroyed the plans of the fascist generals.

Hitler openly proclaimed that his goal was German world domination. Everyone who took the hysterical Nazi leader seriously understood that his rise to power would inevitably lead to a new European and then world war.

From election to election, Hitler's National Socialist Workers' Party of Germany gained more and more votes and was already one step away from power. All the resistance of the Comintern, under pressure from Stalin and the Western Communist parties, which threw all their strength into the fight against the Social Democrats, was split at the most decisive moment and the Nazi party, having received only a third of the votes in the parliamentary elections of 1933, seized state power in Germany. Hitler became chancellor, assumed unlimited powers, crushed the Social Democrats and Communists by force, and established a fascist dictatorship in the country. A state appeared in the center of Europe, striving to redistribute the world and ready to sweep away everything in its path with armed force.

Germany began implementing its program to equip the army with the latest weapons in 1936. The aggressiveness of Hitler's foreign policy was intensified by the growth of the country's military power. Its officially declared goal was the annexation of all neighboring territories of states in which the majority of the population was German. This could only be achieved by breaking the post-war boundaries by force or the threat of force. None of the large European countries, neither England nor France, were ready to fight for the interests of the small countries of Europe, to which Germany had territorial claims. The powers that were once part of the Entente for the sake of maintaining peace in Europe (especially in cases where this sacrifice had to be made by others).

That is why Hitler so brazenly and freely violated the terms of the Versailles Peace Treaty: he created the largest Western Europe army and armed it with modern military equipment; sent troops into the border areas with France; annexed Austria to his Reich; obtained from the French and English governments the transfer of the Judicial Region and Czechoslovakia to Germany. (With the loss of this mountain range, which surrounded the flat regions of the country on three sides, Czechoslovakia became militarily defenseless - a strip of defensive fortifications built in the Sudeijskie Mountains fell into the hands of the aggressor without a fight).

The successes of the German aggressors attracted other countries to their side, whose leaders also dreamed of conquest; By the end of the 1930s, a military alliance between Germany, Italy and Japan had formed (called the Anti-Comintern Pact). Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria were inclined to cooperate with Hitler. At the beginning of 1939, it became clear that the world would not be able to get along with fascism - Germany occupied, dismembered and turned Czechoslovakia into its colony, seized the Memel region (Lithuania Minor - the region of modern Klaipeda) from Lithuania, and made claims against Poland; Italy subjugated Albania. Hitler was choosing a new victim in Europe, Mussolini was targeting North Africa, Japan occupied one by one the provinces of China and developed plans to seize British and French possessions in Asia.

Plan "Barbarossa"

Preparing for the attack, Hitler and his leadership did not expect to tinker with the USSR for long. He expected to complete the entire campaign to enslave our Motherland within a few months. For these purposes, a plan was developed, which was called the “Barbarossa” plan, drawn up in the spirit of the “Lightning War,” which had already brought success more than once.

The strengths of the Wehrmacht were the high professionalism of the officers, internal organization and good training of all branches of the military. Nevertheless, for Hitler, an attack on the USSR was an extremely risky business, both for objective reasons and, according to sound calculations, it promised very little chance of success. Even by concentrating ¾ of its own armed forces on the Soviet border with the addition of the army of its allies, Germany could not achieve equality of forces of the Red Army opposing it, especially in technology (in addition, German intelligence in its reports erroneously downplayed the deployment of Soviet troops and the economic capabilities of the USSR. So in the book “50 Years of the Armed Forces of the USSR” says: In fact, in the western European districts alone there were 170 divisions and 2 brigades of the Soviet army. A particularly big miscalculation was made by the Nazis when determining the number of Soviet troops stationed in the internal districts).

Strategic reserves, materials and ammunition to conduct such great war There were clearly not enough, and there was nowhere to take them - except in the captured enemy territory. With such an unfavorable balance of forces, the Germans could only count on the stunning surprise of the attack and the absolute unpreparedness of the Soviet troops to defend their own territory from unexpected aggression.

The plan for Operation Barbarossa provided for just such a strike with all available forces - while creating superiority in narrow, decisive sectors of the front. The task was to encircle and destroy the main forces of the Red Army in fast-moving border battles; “The retreat of combat-ready enemy troops into the wide expanses of Russian territory had to be prevented.”

The essence of what Hitler conceived in the Barbarossa plan boiled down to the following: On the evening of December 18, 1940, Hitler signed a directive on the deployment of military operations against the USSR, which received the serial number No. 21 and the symbol variant “Barbarossa” (Fall “Barbarossa”). It was made in only nine copies, three of which were presented to the commanders-in-chief of the armed forces (ground forces, air force and navy), and six were locked in OKW safes.

Directive No. 21 set out only the general plan and initial instructions for waging war against the USSR and did not represent a complete war plan. The war plan against the USSR is a whole complex of political, economic and strategic measures of the Hitlerite leadership. In addition to the directive, the plan also included orders from the Supreme High Command and the main commands of the armed forces on strategic concentration and deployment, logistics, preparation for the theater of military operations, camouflage, disinformation and other documents. Among these documents, the directive on the strategic concentration and deployment of ground forces of January 31, 1941 was especially important. It specified and clarified the tasks and methods of action of the armed forces set out in Directive No. 21.

Plan Barbarossa was intended to defeat the Soviet Union in one short campaign before the war against England was over. Leningrad, Moscow, the Central Industrial Region and the Donetsk Basin were recognized as the main strategic objects. A special place in the plan was given to Moscow. It was assumed that its capture would be decisive for the victorious outcome of the war. According to the plan of the German General Staff, with success in the western regions of the USSR, the German army could capture Moscow in the fall. “The ultimate goal of the operation,” the directive said, is to reach the Volga-Arkhangelsk line by winter and create a protective barrier against Asian Russia. There was no intention of going any further. Thus, if necessary, the last industrial region and the last military-industrial base of the USSR remaining with the Russians in the Urals should be destroyed by massive bombing from the air, with the help of aviation. To defeat the Soviet Union, it was planned to use all German ground forces, excluding only the formations and units necessary to conduct occupation service in the enslaved countries.

The German Air Force was tasked with “releasing such forces to support the ground forces during the eastern campaign so that we could count on a quick completion ground operations and at the same time limit to a minimum the destruction of the eastern regions of Germany by enemy aircraft.” For combat operations at sea against the three Soviet fleets - the Northern, Baltic and Black Sea - it was planned to allocate a significant part of the warships of the German Navy and the navies of Finland and Romania.

According to the Barbarossa plan, 152 divisions (including 19 tank and 14 motorized) and two brigades were allocated for the attack on the USSR. Germany's allies 29 infantry divisions and 16 brigades. Thus, a total of 190 divisions were allocated. In addition, two-thirds of the air force available in Germany and significant naval forces were involved in the war against the USSR. The ground forces intended to attack the Soviet Union were consolidated into three army groups: “South” - the 11th, 17th and 6th field armies and the 1st tank group; “Center” - 4th and 9th field armies, 2nd and 3rd tank groups; "North" - 16th and 18th and 4th tank groups. The 2nd Separate Field Army remained in the OKH reserve; Army Norway was given the task of operating independently in the Murmansk and Kandalash directions.

Plan Barbarossa contained a somewhat refined assessment of the Soviet Armed Forces. According to German data, by the beginning of the German invasion (on June 20, 1941), the Soviet Armed Forces had 170 rifle, 33.5 cavalry divisions and 46 mechanized and tank brigades. Of these, as stated by the fascist command, 118 rifle, 20 cavalry divisions and 40 brigades were stationed in the western border districts, 27 rifle, 5.5 cavalry divisions and 1 brigade in the rest of the European part of the USSR, and 33 divisions and 5 brigades in the Far East. It was assumed that Soviet aviation consisted of 8 thousand combat aircraft (including about 1,100 modern ones), of which 6 thousand were in the European part of the USSR.

Hitler's command assumed that Soviet troops deployed in the west would use field fortifications on the new and old state borders, as well as numerous water barriers for defense, and would enter the battle in large formations west of the Dnieper and Western Dvina rivers. At the same time, the Soviet command will strive to maintain air and naval bases in the Baltic states, and rely on the Black Sea coast with the southern wing of the front. “If the operation develops unfavorably south and north of the Pripyat marshes,” it was noted in the Barbarossa plan, “the Russians will try to stop the German offensive along the line of the Dnieper and Western Dvina rivers. When attempting to eliminate German breakthroughs, as well as possible attempts to withdraw endangered troops beyond the Dnieper and Western Dvina lines, one should take into account the possibility of offensive actions by large Russian formations using tanks.”

According to the Barbarossa plan, large tank and motorized forces, using aviation support, were supposed to launch a swift attack to great depths north and south of the Pripyat marshes, break through the defenses of the main forces of the Soviet Army, presumably concentrated in the western part of the USSR, and destroy disunited groups of Soviet troops. North of the Pripyat marshes, an offensive of two army groups was planned: “Center” (commander Field Marshal F. Bock) and “North” (commander Field Marshal V. Leeb). Army Group "Center" delivered the main blow and was supposed to concentrate the main efforts on the flanks where the 2nd and 3rd tank groups were deployed, carry out a deep breakthrough with these formations north and south of Minsk, and reach the Smolensk area planned for connecting tank groups . It was assumed that with the entry of tank formations into the Smolensk region, the preconditions would be created for the destruction by field armies of the Soviet troops remaining between Bialystok and Minsk. Subsequently, when the main forces reached the line of Roslavl, Smolensk, Vitebsk, Army Group Center had to act depending on the situation developing on its left wing. If the neighbor on the left failed to quickly defeat the troops defending in front of him, the army group was supposed to turn its tank formations to the north and conduct an attack eastward towards Moscow with field armies. If Army Group “North” was able to defeat the Soviet Army in its offensive zone, Army Group “Center” was to immediately strike Moscow. Army Group North received the task, advancing from eastern Prussia, to deliver the main blow in the direction of Daugavpils, Leningrad, to destroy the troops of the Soviet Army defending in the Baltic States and, by capturing ports on the Baltic Sea, including Leningrad and Kronstadt, to deprive the Soviet Baltic Fleet of its bases. If this group of armies was unable to defeat the grouping of Soviet troops in the Baltic states, the mobile forces of Army Group Center, the Finnish Army and formations transferred from Norway were supposed to come to its aid. Army Group North, thus strengthened, was to achieve the destruction of the Soviet troops opposing it.

According to the German command, the operation of the reinforced Army Group North provided Army Group Center with freedom of maneuver to capture Moscow and solve operational-strategic tasks in cooperation with Army Group South. To the south of the Pripyat marshes, an offensive was planned by Army Group South (commanded by Field Marshal G. Rundschtedt). It delivered one strong blow from the Lublin area in the general direction of Kyiv and further south along the bend of the Dnieper. As a result of the strike, in which powerful tank formations were to play the main role, it was supposed to cut off the Soviet troops located in western Ukraine, from their communications on the Dnieper, seize crossings across the Dnieper in the Kyiv area and south of it. This ensured freedom of maneuver to develop an offensive in the eastern direction in cooperation with troops advancing to the north, or to advance to the south of the Soviet Union in order to capture important economic regions.

The troops of the right wing of Army Group South (11th Army) were supposed to create a false impression of deployment large forces on the territory of Romania, pin down the opposing Red Army troops, and later, as the offensive on the Soviet-German front develops, prevent the organized withdrawal of Soviet formations beyond the Dnieper.

The Barbarossa plan was intended to use the principles of combat that had proven themselves in the Polish and Western European campaigns. However, it was emphasized that, unlike actions in the West, the offensive against the Red Army must be carried out simultaneously along the entire front: both in the direction of the main attacks and in secondary sectors. “Only in this way,” said the directive of January 31, 1941, “will it be possible to prevent the timely withdrawal of combat-ready enemy forces and destroy them west of the Dnieper-Dvina line.

The plan took into account the possibility of active counteraction by Soviet aviation to the advance of German ground forces. From the very beginning of hostilities, the German Air Force was tasked with suppressing the Soviet Air Force and supporting the offensive of ground forces in the directions of the main attacks. To solve these problems at the first stage of the war against the USSR. Attacks on the rear industrial centers of the USSR were planned to begin only after the Red Army troops were defeated in Belarus, the Baltic states and Ukraine.

The offensive of Army Group Center was planned to be supported by the 2nd Air Fleet, the South by the 4th Air Fleet, and the North by the 1st Air Fleet. The Navy of Nazi Germany had to defend its coast and prevent the ships of the Soviet Navy from breaking through from the Baltic Sea. At the same time, it was envisaged to avoid major naval operations until the ground forces captured Leningrad as the last naval base of the Soviet Baltic Fleet. Subsequently, the naval forces of Nazi Germany were tasked with ensuring freedom of navigation in Baltic Sea and supplying the troops of the northern wing of the ground forces.

The attack on the USSR was planned to be carried out on May 15, 1941. Thus, according to the plan, the immediate strategic goal of the Nazis in the war against the USSR was the defeat of the Red Army troops in the Baltic states, Belarus and Right Bank Ukraine. The subsequent goal was to capture Leningrad in the north, the Central Industrial Region and the capital of the Soviet Union in the center, and capture all of Ukraine and the Donetsk basin in the south as quickly as possible. The ultimate goal of the eastern campaign was the entry of fascist German troops to the Volga and Northern Dvina.

On February 3, 1941, at a meeting in Berchtesgaden, Hitler, in the presence of Keitel and Jodl, heard a detailed report from Brauchitsch and Haider on the plan for war against the USSR. The Fuhrer approved the report and assured the generals that the plan would be successfully implemented: “When the implementation of Plan Barbarossa begins, the world will hold its breath and freeze.” The armed forces of Romania, Hungary and Finland - allies of Nazi Germany - were to receive specific tasks just before the start of the war. The use of Romanian troops was determined by the Munich plan, developed by the command of German troops in Romania. In mid-June, this plan was brought to the attention of the Romanian leadership. On June 20, the Romanian dictator Antonescu issued an order based on it to the Romanian armed forces, which outlined the tasks of the Romanian troops.

Before the outbreak of hostilities, Romanian ground forces were supposed to cover the concentration and deployment of German troops in Romania, and with the outbreak of war, pin down the group of Soviet troops located on the border with Romania. With the withdrawal of the Red Army from the Prut River line, which was believed to follow the offensive of the German Army Group South, the Romanian troops had to move on to energetic pursuit of the Red Army units. If the Soviet troops managed to hold their positions on the Prut River, the Romanian formations would have to break through the Soviet defense in the Tsutsora, New Bedraz sector.

The tasks for the Finnish and German troops deployed in Northern and Central Finland were determined by the OKW directive of April 7, 1941 and announced by the operational directives of the Finnish General Staff, as well as the directive of the commander of the Army “Norway” of April 20. The OKW directive stipulated that the Finnish armed forces, before the advance of Hitler's troops, were to cover the deployment of German formations in Finland, and with the Wehrmacht going on the offensive, to pin down Soviet groups in the Karelian and Petrozavodsk directions. With Army Group North reaching the Luga River line, Finnish troops had to launch a decisive offensive on the Karelian Isthmus, as well as between Lakes Onega and Ladoga, in order to connect with the German armies on the Svir River and in the Leningrad region. The German troops deployed on the territory of Finland, according to the directive of the commander of the Army “Norway”, were given the task of attacking in two groups (each consisting of a reinforced corps): one on Murmansk, the other on Kandalaksha. The southern group, having broken through the defenses, was supposed to reach White Sea to the Kandalaksha area then advance along the Murmansk railway to the north in order to, in cooperation with the northern group, destroy the Soviet troops located on the Kola Peninsula and capture Murmansk and Polyarnoye. Aviation support for Finnish and German troops advancing from Finland was entrusted to the German 5th Air Fleet and the Finnish Air Force.

At the end of April, the political and military leadership of Nazi Germany finally set the date of the attack on the USSR: Sunday, June 22, 1941. The postponement from May to June was caused by the need to redeploy forces that participated in the aggression against Yugoslavia and Greece to the borders of the USSR. In preparing for the war against the USSR, Hitler's leadership outlined major measures to restructure its armed forces. They concerned primarily the ground forces. It was planned to increase the number of divisions of the active army to 180 and increase the reserve army. By the beginning of the war against the USSR, the Wehrmacht included a reserve army and SS troops, and should have had about 250 fully equipped divisions.

Particular attention was paid to strengthening mobile troops. It was planned to deploy 20 tank divisions instead of the existing 10 and increase the level of infantry motorization. For this purpose, it was planned to allocate an additional 130 thousand tons of steel for the production of military trucks, all-terrain vehicles and armored vehicles at the expense of the fleet and aviation. Big changes were planned in the production of weapons. According to the planned program, the most important task was the production of the latest models of tanks and anti-tank artillery. It was also envisaged to significantly increase the production of aircraft of those designs that had stood the test during battles in the West.

Great importance was attached to the preparation of the theater of military operations. The directive of August 9, 1940, codenamed “Aufbau Ost” (“Construction in the East”), outlined the transfer of supply bases from west to east, the construction of new railways and highways, training grounds, barracks, etc. in the eastern regions. , expansion and improvement of airfields, communication networks. In preparations for aggression against the USSR, the Nazi leadership assigned the most important place to ensuring the surprise of an attack and the secrecy of every preparatory measure, whether it concerned economic restructuring, strategic planning, preparing a theater of military operations or the deployment of armed forces. All documents related to planning the war in the east were prepared in secrecy. An extremely narrow circle of people was allowed to develop them. The concentration and rapid deployment of troops was planned to be carried out in compliance with all camouflage measures. However, Hitler's leadership understood that it was impossible to completely hide the concentration of a multi-million army with a huge amount of military equipment near the Soviet borders. Therefore, it resorted to a broadly conceived political and operational-strategic camouflage of the impending aggression, recognizing the number one task of misleading the government of the USSR and the command of the Red Army about the plan, scale and time of the outbreak of aggression.

Both the operational-strategic leadership and the Abwehr (intelligence and counterintelligence) took part in the development of measures to disguise the concentration of Wehrmacht troops in the East. The Abwehr developed a directive, signed on September 6, 1940, which specifically outlined the goals and objectives of disinformation. Instructions for the secrecy of preparations for war were contained in the Barbarossa plan. But perhaps the treacherous tactics of the Nazis are most fully revealed by the directive on disinformation of the enemy, issued by the OKW on February 15, 1941. “The purpose of disinformation is,” the directive stated, “to hide the preparations for Operation Barbarossa.” This main goal should form the basis of all measures to disinformation the enemy.” The camouflage measures were planned to be carried out in two stages. The first stage - until approximately mid-April 1941 - included the camouflage of general military preparations not related to the massive regrouping of troops. The second stage - from April to June 1941 - camouflage the concentration and operational deployment of troops near the borders of the USSR.

The first stage was intended to create a false impression regarding the true intentions of the German command, using various kinds of preparations for the invasion of England, as well as for Operation Marita (against Greece) and Sonnenblum (in North Africa).

The initial deployment of troops to attack the USSR was planned to be carried out under the guise of conventional armies of movement. At the same time, the goal was to create the impression that the center of concentration of armed forces was in the south of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Austria and that the concentration of troops in the north was relatively small.

At the second stage, when, as noted in the directive, it would no longer be possible to conceal preparations for an attack on the Soviet Union, the concentration and deployment of forces of the eastern campaign were planned to be presented in the form of false events, allegedly carried out with the aim of diverting attention from the planned invasion of England. Hitler’s command presented this diversionary maneuver as “the greatest in the history of war.” At the same time, work was carried out aimed at preserving the impression among the personnel of the German armed forces that preparations for the landing in England were continuing, but in a different form - the troops allocated for this purpose were being withdrawn to the rear until a certain point. “It was necessary to keep even those troops destined for action directly in the East in confusion about the plans for as long as possible.” Great importance was attached, in particular, to the dissemination of disinformation information about non-existent airborne corps, supposedly intended for the invasion of England. The upcoming landing on the British Isles should have been evidenced by such facts as the assignment of English translators to military units, the release of new English topographic maps, reference books, etc. Rumors spread among the officers of Army Group South that German troops would allegedly be transferred to Iran to fight a war for the British colonies.

The OKW directive on disinformation of the enemy indicated that the greater the concentration of forces in the east, the more efforts must be made to keep public opinion astray about German plans. In the instructions to the OKW chiefs of staff dated March 9, it was recommended that the Wehrmacht be deployed in the east and as defensive measures to ensure the rear of Germany during the landing in England and operations in the Balkans.

Hitler's leadership was so confident in the successful implementation of the plan that, around the spring of 1941, it began the detailed development of further plans for conquest of world domination. In the official diary of the Supreme High Command of the Nazi forces for February 17, 1941, Hitler’s demand was stated that “after the end of the eastern campaign, it is necessary to provide for the capture of Afghanistan and the organization of an attack on India.” Based on these instructions, OKW headquarters began planning Wehrmacht operations for the future. These operations were planned to be carried out in the late autumn of 1941 and winter of 1941/42. Their plan was set out in draft directive No. 32 “Preparation for the period after the implementation of the Barbarossa plan”, sent to the ground forces, air force and navy on June 11, 1941.

The project envisaged that after the defeat of the USSR, the Wehrmacht would seize British colonial possessions and some independent countries in the Mediterranean, Africa, the Near and Middle East, invade the British Isles, and launch military operations against America. Hitler's strategists expected to begin the conquest of Iran, Iraq, Egypt, and the region already in the fall of 1941 Suez Canal, and then India, where it was planned to link up with Japanese troops. The fascist German leadership hoped, by annexing Spain and Portugal to Germany, to quickly accept the siege of the islands. The development of Directive No. 32 and other documents indicates that after the defeat of the USSR and the solution of the “English problem,” the Nazis intended, in alliance with Japan, to “eliminate the influence of the Anglo-Saxons in North America.”

The capture of Canada and the United States was supposed to be carried out by landing large amphibious assault forces from bases in Greenland, Iceland, the Azores and Brazil - on the east coast of North America and from the Aleutian and Hawaiian Islands - on the west. In April - June 1941, these issues were repeatedly discussed at the highest German headquarters. Thus, the fascist German leadership, even before the aggression against the USSR, outlined far-reaching plans for conquest of world domination. The key positions for their implementation, as it seemed to the Nazi leadership, were provided by the campaign against the USSR.

In contrast to the preparation of campaigns against Poland, France and the Balkan states, the war against the USSR was prepared with special care and over a longer period of time. The aggression against the USSR according to the Barbarossa plan was planned as a short-lived campaign, the final goal of which - the defeat of the Red Army and the destruction of the Soviet Union - was proposed to be achieved in the fall of 1941.

The fighting was supposed to be carried out in the form of a blitz - krieg. At the same time, the offensive of the main strategic groupings was presented in the form of a continuous offensive at a rapid pace. Short pauses were allowed only to regroup troops and bring up lagging rear forces. The possibility of stopping the offensive due to the resistance of the Crane Army was excluded. Excessive confidence in the infallibility of their plans and plans “hypnotized” the fascist generals. Hitler's machine was gaining momentum to win victory, which seemed so easy and close to the leaders of the “Third Reich”.

But even if the plan to defeat the Red Army had succeeded, it would hardly have been possible to consider the war over. Almost two hundred million people in the vast expanses of their country had the opportunity to resist foreign invasion for years, bleeding most of the German army. Therefore, Hitler constantly emphasized that the war in the East is fundamentally different from the war in the West - the final victory in Russia can only be achieved with incredible cruelty to the population, the “depopulation” of vast territories, the evictions and extermination of tens of millions of people. A terrible threat loomed over the peoples of the USSR.

The nature of the war.

It would be wrong to think that the second World War arose by chance or as a result of mistakes of some statesmen, although mistakes took place in the top leadership of the country, at the very beginning of the war, when Stalin hoped for friendship with Hitler. In fact, the war arose as an inevitable result of the development of world economic and political forces, that is, due to the uneven development of capitalist countries, which led to a sharp disruption within the world system. Moreover, those countries that were provided with raw materials and markets made attempts to change the situation and redistribute “spheres of influence” in their favor by using an armed attack. As a result of this, hostile camps arose, and a war began between them.

Thus, as a result of the first crisis of the capitalist system of the world economy, the First World War arose, from this we can conclude that the Second World War arose as a result of a second or other disagreement between states.

But the Second World War is not a copy of the first; on the contrary, the Second World War is significantly different from the first in nature. The main fascist states - Germany, Japan, Italy - before attacking the allied countries, destroyed the last remnants of bourgeois-democratic freedoms, established a brutal terrorist regime, trampled on the principle of sovereignty and free development of small countries, declared a policy of seizing foreign lands as their own politics and declared publicly that they were seeking global domination of the fascist regime throughout the world.

By capturing Czechoslovakia and the central regions of China, the Axis states showed that they were ready to carry out their threat to enslave all freedom-loving peoples. In view of this, the Second World War against the Axis states, unlike the First World War, from the very beginning took on the character of an anti-fascist war of liberation, one of the tasks of which was also the restoration of democratic freedoms.

The entry of the Soviet Union into the war against fascist Germany and its allies could only strengthen, and indeed strengthened, the anti-fascist and liberation character of the Second World War. On this basis, an anti-fascist coalition was formed between the Soviet Union, the USA, Great Britain and other freedom-loving states, which later played a decisive role in the defeat of the fascist army. The war was not and could not be an accident in the life of peoples, it turned into a war of peoples for their existence and that is why it could not be fleeting, lightning fast. This is the case regarding the origin and nature of the Second World War.

Causes of defeats in the summer and autumn of 1941

Many historians believe that before the war the USSR did everything possible to strengthen the country's defense capabilities, including the creation of powerful Armed Forces. However, the Red Army was not brought to full combat readiness on the eve of the war. The troops did not occupy defensive lines along the Western border of the USSR in a timely manner. There were serious shortcomings in the organization of border defense. The main blame for all the mistakes and miscalculations made in the pre-war period lies with Stalin and, to a much lesser extent, with the military.

In his first address to to the Soviet people On July 3, 1941, Stalin explained everything that happened by the “unexpectedness” of the attack, the complete readiness of German troops for an attack, and the war experience that they acquired in Western campaigns. Also, the cause of the disaster was that before the war, the Red Army troops were in camps, on training grounds, at the stage of reorganization, replenishment, redeployment and movement. However, upon deeper examination of the reasons for the defeat in the summer and autumn of 1941, it turns out that the matter is not only about miscalculations and the timing of Germany’s attack on the USSR.

One of the main reasons for the defeat was the border battle in the summer of 1941. Its result was the defeat of the Red Army in the Western districts, our losses in manpower and equipment, the loss of a significant part of the country's territory, which led to the distress of the people, great economic damage, and the protracted nature of the war. The unpreparedness of the troops to repel the first strike of the enemy due to Stalin’s stubborn (stubborn) reluctance to analyze intelligence data (some of the data is given), his manic, inexplicable in the light of intelligence data, demand not to succumb to provocations, not to give Hitler a reason to declare the USSR an aggressor.

According to the commanders G.K. Zhukov and a number of other marshals, in order to win a border battle it was necessary to create groupings of forces, keep them in the necessary areas combat-ready and combat-ready and capable of carrying out an offensive. They did not carry out further forecasting of events.

An analysis of the diplomatic and other efforts of the Soviet leadership of that period allows us to identify the most important conditions, the achievement of which was considered necessary to repel enemy aggression: a) the exclusion of a war on two fronts - against Germany and Japan; b) exception crusade Western countries against the USSR; the presence of allies in the fight against Hitler, in the limit - the formation of an anti-Hitler coalition; c) removal state border from vital facilities of the country, primarily from Leningrad; d) strengthening the combat capability of the Red Army, equipping it with modern weapons; e) creation of such a structure of the army and navy, such an initial formation of their groupings, in order to repel the first strike of the enemy (but taking into account conditions “a” and “c”), and then transfer military operations to enemy territory to finally disrupt the aggression.

Among the most important reasons for the defeat of the Red Army in the summer of 1941 is “the cause of mass panic among the troops” at the beginning of the Patriotic War. These are flights from positions, and in hopeless situations - surrender or suicide. The realization of the fact that all the military propaganda that trumpeted the power of the Red Army and our readiness for war, that in the event of war we would fight “with little blood on foreign territory,” turned out to be a lie. The Soviet soldier felt the hard way that he was not an “atom” great army, having meaningful tactics and strategy, he is cannon fodder in the hands of incompetent and confused military commanders. And then the popular consciousness, of all the reasons for military failures, singled out one - treason, at the very top, in the leadership of the country and the army. Each new defeat revived this panic mood, which neither political agencies nor foreign detachments could cope with.

The situation was aggravated by the fact that the commanders of the defeated units and formations of the Red Army, who were surrounded and made their way to their own, were influenced by the same sentiments about treason and could not explain anything to the soldiers. Thus, in the author’s manuscript of the memoirs of Marshal K.K. Rokossovsky, fully published only in recent years, many pages are devoted to a description of the “shock” that our troops experienced in the summer of 1941 and from which they could not recover for “a long time.” In November 1941, the commander of the defeated Soviet division, Kotlyarov, before shooting himself, left a note containing the following words: “General disorganization and loss of control. The higher headquarters are to blame. Move behind the anti-tank obstacle. Save Moscow. There are no prospects ahead." Documents dedicated to the Battle of Moscow and many other documentary evidence about the events of 1941 tell about similar sentiments.

Consequently, the main conclusion, the real reasons that caused the events of 1941 to develop in such an incomprehensible and incomprehensible way, lies not in Stalin’s personal miscalculations, which many military leaders talk about in their memoirs, but in other circumstances. Historians, politicians, diplomats and military men, who created in their works the image of Stalin - a cunning, calculating, insidious intriguer (which corresponds to the image of an “outstanding politician” in historical literature), contradict themselves by attributing to his personal initiative all those orders that led to the collapse army on the eve of war. Having reached the highest power, Stalin would not have voluntarily committed actions that could not be explained logically - the very formulation of the question in this vein is anti-scientific.