Panorama of the Russian-Byzantine War (941-944). Virtual tour of the Russian-Byzantine War (941-944). Attractions, map, photos, videos. Igor's march on Constantinople

In 941, according to Greek sources - “The Life of Basil the New”, the chronicle of the successor George Amartol, the message of the Cremonese bishop Liutprand, as well as Russian chronicles 1 that followed the Greek messages 2, a new Russian-Byzantine feud for a long time disrupted the course of peaceful relations between the two countries . New world was concluded only in 944.

The “Life of Basil the New” says that the Bulgarians and the strategist of Chersonesos reported to Constantinople about the movement of the Russian army, the Russians entered the empire, fought its lands all the way to Paphlagonia (Asia Minor), brutally ruining everything in their path. The 40,000-strong army of the domestique of Pamphira, the army of the patrician Phocas from Macedonia and the strategos Theodore from Thrace, who came from the east, pushed back the Russians, and they, plunging into the boats, “ran away”. This was followed by a naval battle, in which the Greeks burned the Russian ships with “Greek fire.” Some of the Russians burned, some drowned in the sea, the survivors moved back, but along the way many of them fell ill “from a terrible relaxation of the stomach” and died. Those who reached Rus' told their relatives about the difficult trials that befell them 3 .

The successor of George Amartol narrates that the Russians in mid-June arrived on the Greek shores with 10 thousand ships and that the Russian fleet included “skedi, in the verb, from the Varangian family,” that is, ships of Varangian origin. The Russians entered the Bosphorus and here, on the closest approaches to the Byzantine capital, near the town of Hieron, they were met by Greek ships that used “fire.” Igor's fleet was defeated, after which the remaining Russian ships retreated towards Asia Minor. Only in September did the Greek commanders manage to oust the Russians from Asia Minor, and they were defeated in the second naval battle when they tried to escape from the Greeks who were pursuing them 4 .

Liutprand is very brief in his report, but he also notes the difficult situation of Byzantium and the enormous efforts that the empire had to make to repel the Russian attack. The Byzantine fleet at this time went to fight the Arabs, and the Greeks had to practically form a fleet anew, reviving already abandoned ships. Everything was decided by a naval battle, where the Greeks used fire 5 .

“The Tale of Bygone Years” also reports that in 941, with 10 thousand ships, “Igor went to the Greeks.” The Bulgarians sent news to Constantinople about the movement of the Russian army. While Byzantium was gathering forces, the Russians fought the “Bithynian countries”, devastated and captured the lands along the “Pontus” right up to Paphlagonia, carried out the destruction of the suburbs of Constantinople, located on the banks of the Bosphorus, and brutally dealt with the overrun population. In fierce battles on land and sea, the Russians were defeated by troops arriving from the provinces and “returned to their own” 6 .

The Russian chronicle, softening the story of the defeat of Igor’s army, conveys it very close to the text of the life. However, both the “Tale of Bygone Years” and the “Novgorod First Chronicle” did not report the fact of the defeat of the Russians at Hieron immediately upon their arrival at Constantinople, they passed over in silence the history of the subsequent long and stubborn struggle of part of the Russian army against the Greeks in Asia Minor until September and presented the entire campaign in such a way that the defeat of Igor’s fleet from “Greek fire” was supposedly the end of the campaign.

N. Ya. Polova and especially Ya. N. Shchapov convincingly showed the meaning of the persistent defense by Russian chroniclers of a different version of the campaign, different from that of the Greek chronicles. They included in the chronicles the official, princely concept of the campaign (Ya. N. Shchapov), which was probably created back in the 10th century. and within the framework of which the fact of Igor’s flight to his homeland with part of the troops did not fit, while a significant part of the Russian forces continued to fight in Asia Minor 7.

The subsequent account of events - the story of Igor’s second campaign against Byzantium - and the text of the Russian-Byzantine treaty of 944 were preserved only as part of the “Tale of Bygone Years” 8, although echoes of Igor’s two campaigns against the Greeks, as we wrote about above, are also found in “The First Novgorod Chronicle.” The treaty of 944, without causing such heated and uncompromising disputes in historiography as the previous diplomatic agreements between Rus' and Byzantium, nevertheless gave rise to many controversial problems, hypotheses, and conjectures in historical science.

In domestic historical works of the 18th - first half of the 19th century V. the history of Igor's two campaigns against Byzantium and the conclusion of the Russian-Byzantine treaty of 944 was presented mainly informatively, in full agreement with the chronicle data 9 . But already at that time, in some works there was a desire to take a research approach to solving the unclear aspects of the events of 941-944. Thus, V.N. Tatishchev tried to substantiate the reason for the new Russian-Byzantine feud, noting that Igor moved against the Greeks because they “did not want to pay what was due to Olga.” M. M. Shcherbatov expressed the idea that the initiative for negotiations in 944 came from Igor, as evidenced by the sending of the Russian embassy to Constantinople; the articles of the treaty of 944 only confirmed “the previous ones, carried out under Oleg with additions.” I. N. Boltin did not agree with this interpretation of the treaty of 944 and noted that it was actually a different agreement, it contained many new articles.

At the beginning of the 19th century. A. A. Shletser, true to his “skeptical” concept of the Russian-Byzantine treaties of the 10th century, tried to cast a shadow of falsification on the treaty of 944. Schletser’s arguments here are not new: silence about the agreed sources, except for the “Tale of Bygone Years”, and primarily Byzantine chronicles; the strange disorder he found in the articles of agreement; “dark text”, which we owe to “the stupidity and negligence of the scribes.”

However, Schletser’s doubts did not find support among domestic historians of the 19th century. N.M. Karamzin believed the chronicle and noted that relations between Byzantium and Russia broke down only after 935, since that year Russian soldiers still participated in the expedition of the Greek fleet to the West "2.

G. Evers considered the treaty of 944 (as well as 911) in terms of the general development of diplomatic norms of the 10th century. He noted that both agreements were preceded by preliminary agreements regarding them. Such negotiations with Igor in Kyiv were carried out by Greek ambassadors sent to Rus' by Romanus I Lecapinus, and already in Constantinople a “formal peace treaty” was concluded, the registration of which took place according to the same international scheme as the registration of the agreement of 911. However, in 944 “Only the Greeks are introduced speaking and proposing conditions,” it is they, as the victors, who prescribe the conditions, and the agreement of 944 reflects only the interests of Byzantium; it was an addition to the “main agreement” - 911. Repeating articles that remained in force were not included in the agreement of 944. 13

N.A. Lavrovsky, like G. Evers, believed that the treaty of 944 was a reflection of the development of international diplomatic practice of that time, but drew attention to some features of this charter. It is not as precise as the Act of 911: the Russian side speaks in the introduction and conclusion, and the entire article-by-article text comes on behalf of the Greeks.

Lavrovsky noted a smaller number of Greek words in the text of the agreement, and - unlike Schletser - a greater order of words in sentences, which, in his opinion, indicates either the richer experience of the drafters and translators of the agreement, or that it was an addition to the act 911, which was compiled hastily. That is why it does not contain the rigid formalities of strict translation; its language is simple and natural 14.

V.V. Sokolsky did not agree with G. Evers, noting that the agreement of 944 cannot be considered an addition to the act of 911, that it was completely independent in nature, since it included entirely the articles of previous agreements, but the articles did not included in the treaty of 944, should, in his opinion, be considered not to have retained force and canceled 15.

I.I. Sreznevsky also assessed the 944 treaty as a stereotypical international agreement. It was originally written in Greek and then translated into Russian, which to a certain extent limited the manifestation of the Russian linguistic element in the text of the treaty. I. I. Sreznevsky considered many terms of treaties to be translated, and classified as purely Russian only those that were repeated in other Russian monuments 16.

S. A. Gedeonov paid much attention to the document. Following G. Evers and N.A. Lavrovsky, he looked at it from the point of view of the international diplomatic system, but also revealed some features of the monument. The text reflected in the chronicle, believed S. A. Gedeonov, is a Greek copy from a copy coming from Rus' to the Greeks, and a Bulgarian translation of a copy coming from the Greeks to Rus'. The combination of two different letters by the chronicler constituted, in his opinion, the agreement of 944; This is evidenced by the fact that Rus' speaks at the beginning and end of the treaty, and the entire specific part of the act is stated on behalf of Byzantium 17.

D. I. Ilovaisky tried to determine the cause of the Russian-Byzantine conflict in 941, suggesting that it consisted in the beginning of the struggle between Rus' and Byzantium for Bulgaria, where civil strife was taking place at that time. He believed that the cause of the clash could also arise from contradictions in Crimea. As for the treaty of 944, according to D.I. Ilovaisky, “confirmation of Oleg’s treaties” was combined with a number of new conditions, in particular about the “Korsun country.” “Obviously, the enterprising Igor,” notes the historian, “ managed to spread Russian domination in this region...” 18

S. M. Solovyov believed that the agreement only confirmed the brief, perhaps oral, conditions concluded on the Danube immediately after the end of the campaign. It was not as beneficial for Rus' as the treaty of 911: “... the advantage on the side of the Greeks is clearly visible; there are more restrictions and restrictions for Russians” 19.

V.I. Sergeevich agreed that the treaty of 944 was created on the model of other international diplomatic documents early Middle Ages. Using the comparative historical method, he compares the Russian-Byzantine treaties of 911, 944, 971. with the cross-kissing charters of Russian princes of a later time, as well as with the sacra of the Greco-Persian treaty of 562. He considers the charter of 944 to be the first such Russian document.

The principled position of A. Dimitriou on Russian-Byzantine treaties is stated above. He considered the agreement of 944 as a type of imperial chrisovul, but believed that chrysovul itself was not preserved, and only a separate charter came to us, coming from the Russian side to the Greeks. The treaty of 944 was interpreted by A. Dimitriou as beneficial for the empire. He emphasized that the text of this document is simpler and clearer than the text of the 911 agreement, and explained this by a higher level of translation 21.

D. Ya. Samokvasov was the first to express an opinion about the treaty of 944 as equal and mutually beneficial, confirming and updating the agreement of 907. He saw this update as a number of additional ones - compared to the treaties of 907 and 911. - articles; the same articles, which were omitted in the document of 944, continued, in his opinion, to operate without change. One of the main arguments in favor of this assumption, D. Ya. Samokvasov considered the silence of the source about the resumption of Byzantium’s payment of the annual tribute - “ways” of Rus', as is clear from the chronicle text for 941: if the Article on the payment of tribute - “ways” continues to be in force , not indicated in the treaty of 944, this indicates the possible effect of other omitted articles 22.

A.V. Longinov believed that the agreement of 944 was built on the same principles as the agreement of 911: it was preceded by preliminary negotiations, as with the conclusion of the agreement of 911; two authentic charters were developed, coming from the Greek and Russian sides; there is a coincidence in the introductory and final parts of the documents, where the Russian side takes the floor; the final version of the agreement, as in 911, was carried out in Byzantium, which was the initiator of the agreement; the execution of treaties is the same: a duplicate of the charter coming from the Greeks was delivered to Kyiv for ratification, with its translation into Russian, and the original remained in Constantinople. The Russians swore an oath on the text coming from the Russian side, which was preserved in the princely archive. The treaty of 944 itself, according to A.V. Longinov, is a confirmation of the agreement of 907. This is a bilateral, equal treaty. Like D. Ya. Samokvasov, A. V. Longinov considered the articles of previous agreements that were not included in this agreement to be valid. Comparing the treaty of 944 with diplomatic acts of the 12th-13th centuries, he noted that it reveals some international stereotypes, indicating the similarity of this document with the monuments of Eastern European diplomacy of the early Middle Ages 2 .

D. M. Meichik, analyzing the legal foundations of the treaties of 911 and 944, recognized that they expressed the synthesis of Russian and Byzantine law with the leading role of the Greek element, reflected mainly the guiding significance of Byzantine diplomacy and the range of its “moral feelings and legal concepts" In the treaties of 911 and 944. he saw the Russians' inept attempt to master diplomatic concepts and categories unfamiliar to them 24.

A. A. Shakhmatov examined the treaties of 911 and 944. as a result of the chronicler’s compilation work. And he transferred his method of analysis to the letter of 944 in connection with the study of the formula “Equal to another meeting...”, which comes at the beginning of the document. A. A. Shakhmatov believed that on the basis of these words the chronicler artificially created a version about the appearance of Byzantine ambassadors in Kyiv and the sending of a Russian embassy to Constantinople. “Conscious alteration” of the text about the events of 944 and the treaty itself - this is the conclusion of A. A. Shakhmatov. The dark places in the document, the confusion in the text with possessive pronouns, in his opinion, indicate that “the translators had difficulty coping with the editorial task that lay before them - to change the form of the contracts.” A. A. Shakhmatov also believed that the chronicler invented Igor’s second campaign against the Greeks in order to explain the subsequent appearance of the Russian-Byzantine treaty, and the second campaign itself was borrowed from the “Life of Basil the New” 25.

The treaty of 944 was assessed in general courses on Russian history by M. K. Lyubavsky (1916) and A. E. Presnyakov (1918). M.K. Lyubavsky considered the charter of 944 a trade agreement, which, with “some minor changes,” repeated Oleg’s agreement. The same idea was essentially expressed by A.E. Presnyakov 26 .

Soviet historiography to a certain extent reflected the different points of view on the treaty of 944 that existed in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Thus, V. M. Istrin in 1924 repeated the idea that the norms of Greco-Roman international law are not applicable to ancient Rus': the treaty of 944, like 911, was translated from Greek much later - already in the 11th century. , and in the 10th century. it had no practical value for the Kyiv princes and was needed only by the Greeks. V. M. Istrin considered the charter of 944 to be a copy coming from Rus' to the Greeks; the Greek original, in his opinion, was irretrievably lost, which is also explained by the lack of interest among the Russians in these documents 27.

S.P. Obnorsky, having studied the linguistic basis of the treaties of 911 and 944, convincingly refuted the point of view of V.M. Istrin about the later translation of these documents and proved that the translations appeared simultaneously with the drawing up of the acts themselves. At the same time, he showed how the level of translation had changed over 30 years: the treaty of 944 was translated relatively well, the Russians of that time had already mastered many stereotypical international concepts and terms and the latter were no longer translated from Greek language; The Bulgarian linguistic element is less noticeable here, “but the Russian linguistic element noticeably makes itself felt in it.” M. A. Shangin, analyzing individual articles of the document, came to the conclusion that “almost every article of the Greek-Russian treaties finds justification in Byzantine law.” He showed how articles devoted to Kherson fishermen and issues of assistance during shipwrecks reflected international legal norms 28 .

B. D. Grekov in his book “Kievan Rus” outlined the chronicle version of two campaigns of Rus' against Byzantium in 941 and 944. And. Analyzing the agreement of 944, he came to the conclusion that it expressed “a new balance of power between the contracting parties.” Rus', in his opinion, was forced to abandon its previous advantages, had to henceforth pay trade duties and took on a number of obligations towards the Greeks: the defense of Byzantium from enemies, and in particular the defense of Crimea 29 . Thus, B.D. Grekov considered the agreement of 944 a diplomatic act beneficial only to Byzantium, a document reflecting the advantages of only one side.

A year later, in comments to the academic publication “The Tale of Bygone Years,” D. S. Likhachev approached the question differently. Objecting to A. A. Shakhmatov in connection with his assumption that Igor’s second campaign against Byzantium was invented by the chronicler, D. S. Likhachev pointed out that the treaty of 944 testifies in favor of the reality of the second campaign, since it is “beneficial for the Russian side." As for the coincidence of individual phrases in the “Life of Basil the New” and the chronicle text about the events of 944, as pointed out by A. A. Shakhmatov, it, according to D. S. Likhachev, “does not indicate anything” 30.

Two years later, A. A. Zimin again supported the version that the treaty of 944 reflected the failure of the Russian campaign of 941. 31

A number of historians (A. Yu. Yakubovsky, V. V. Bartold, B. N. Zakhoder, N. Ya. Polovoy, M. I. Artamonov, A. P. Novoseltsev and some others), as noted above, considered the events of 941 -944 in close connection with the eastern policy of Rus', and in particular with the attitude of Kyiv towards the Khazar Kaganate, the peoples of the North Caucasus, the Muslim states of Transcaucasia and Iran. Thus, N. Ya. Polovoi believed that Igor organized “two grandiose campaigns” against the Greeks and “concluded an agreement with Byzantium that was beneficial for Rus'.” Combined with the aggressive campaign against Berdaa, these events “then placed the Russian state at the center of the entire political life of Eastern Europe” 32.

By the way, N. Ya. Polova not only, in our opinion, convincingly proved the reality of the message in the Russian chronicle about the second campaign against Byzantium, but also gave interesting considerations regarding the dating of this campaign, attributing it to 943. This year, N. believed. Ya. Polova, Byzantium suffered a grave diplomatic defeat, as it was forced to agree to the conclusion of an unfavorable and low-honorable peace. Since the campaign of 943 was not completed, in his opinion, it was not reflected in the Byzantine chronicles 33.

M.I. Artamonov, analyzing the same events and also through the prism of the eastern policy of Rus', came to a completely opposite conclusion. He believed that the military performance of Rus' against Byzantium in the 40s of the 10th century. was undertaken with the knowledge and sympathy of Khazaria, whose conflict with the empire began in the 30s of the 10th century. protracted nature; but this offensive ended in the complete defeat of Rus', and the treaty of 944 reflected the political advantage of the empire. In it, Byzantium dictated its terms to Rus'; the latter’s obligations are “unilateral”, and the very tone of the document is “directive” in relation to Kyiv. This is exactly how M.I. Artamonov assessed, in particular, the articles related to the fate of Chersonese: they talk about Rus'’s obligations “to break the alliance with the Khazars and act against them on the side of Byzantium” 34 .

M.V. Levchenko tried to identify the causes of the new Russian-Byzantine conflict, pointing to the strengthening of the foreign policy positions of the empire in the 20-30s of the 10th century. and her possible desire to free herself from the heavy obligations of the treaty of 907, and above all providing the Russians with duty-free trade on the territory of Byzantium. He came to the strange, in our opinion, conclusion that the campaign of 941 “cannot be considered as an aggressive act on the part of Rus',” which was forced to take retaliatory measures “to protect vital economic interests.” M.V. Levchenko noted the large scale of the campaign of 941 (by sea and by land), the great strain of the Byzantine military machine to repel the invasion, but was skeptical about the version of the chronicle that the Russians eventually achieved Byzantium’s resumption of the payment of the annual tribute, since the treaty of 944 contains no information on this matter. M.V. Levchenko assessed the treaty of 944 as a completely independent document, only including a number of previous articles. It is less beneficial to Rus' than the treaty of 911, but does not at all have the character of unilateral Russian obligations, as A. Dimitriou and some other scientists argued; it also contains direct obligations of Byzantium: about receiving Russian ambassadors and merchants, allocating them a place to stay, providing food and monthly food, equipment for the return journey; This also includes Byzantium’s obligation to provide military assistance to Rus'. It cannot be said, notes M. V. Levchenko, that the Igor Treaty is limited only to trade subjects: “... it contains articles regulating foreign policy relations between Byzantium and Russia” 35 .

Detailed analysis events 941-944 and an analysis of the treaty of 944 was given by V. T. Pashuto. He believed that Igor had violated the previous allied relations. Based on the negotiations between the Greeks and Igor, the Byzantines’ proposal to pay more tribute than Oleg took, directions expensive gifts Pechenegs - allies of Igor V. T. Pashuto came to the conclusion that “Byzantium’s interest in maintaining peaceful trade and political ties with Russia is obvious.” He views the 944 agreement as “a treaty of perpetual peace, mutual assistance and trade.” The obligation of mutual assistance is formulated in the articles on providing the Russian prince with soldiers, “as great as he needs,” and, accordingly, assistance from the Russians to the emperor upon written request. V. T. Pashuto assessed the articles about the “Korsun Country” from the standpoint of the general strengthening of the influence of Rus' in Crimea, and saw the strengthening of relations between the two states, the further development of political and economic ties between them in the articles on the regulation of embassy and trade contacts. V. T. Pashuto assessed the treaty of 944 as an independent, equal bilateral agreement 36 .

S. M. Kashtanov, based on the classification of F. Delger and I. Karayannopoulos, compares the act of 944 with the scheme of chrisovuls drawn up by Byzantium after negotiations between its ambassadors in another country. The first part of the charter of 944 is similar to S. M. Kashtanov’s definition of the powers of ambassadors of another country, which is typical for chrisovuls of this type. One piece of text in the initial part of the letter and one piece of text in its final part, containing the oath of baptized and unbaptized Rus' to keep and observe the agreement, S. M. Kashtanov interprets as an oath promise to comply with the terms of the agreement, which was given to the Byzantine emperor by the other side. The texts contained in the letter on behalf of the Russians, according to the observation of S. M. Kashtanov, together form the oath and credentials of the ambassadors. The text, coming from the Greeks, contains, first of all, the terms of the agreement and information about the methods of its approval. Thus, in the text of the oath and credentials there are no contractual clauses, which is typical for chrisovuls, where the terms of the agreement are outside the text of the oath record of foreign ambassadors. He also connects with this circumstance the nature of the exchange of copies of the treaty of 944. Since the oath and credentials of the ambassadors did not contain the terms of the treaty, it means that a copy of the treaty needed confirmation by the Russian government and was sent to Igor to take the oath on it. Further, S. M. Kashtanov suggests (and this, in our opinion, is the most important thing in the author’s construction), after the prince sealed this copy, “the Byzantine ambassadors took it and handed it to the Russians... Some kind of copy from the approved charter of the ambassadors could stay in Rus'” 37.

A.G. Kuzmin in one of his last works also touched upon the events of 941-945. and again skeptically assessed a number of news from the Russian chronicle. Thus, he noted: “The indication that the Greeks agreed to pay an even greater tribute than to Oleg clearly contradicts the content of the actual agreement.” Without questioning the authenticity and integrity of the agreement, A.G. Kuzmin believes that confusion with pronouns occurred in it because the chronicler “seemed to be unable to keep his sources under control.” At the same time, this very confusion of the Greek and Russian opposites of the treaty is, in his opinion, an indirect sign of the originality of the sources 38.

In Soviet generalizing works, the treaty of 944 also did not receive an unambiguous consideration. “Essays on the history of the USSR. The period of feudalism” reflected the point of view of B.D. Grekov. The “History of Byzantium” notes that the initiative to conclude an agreement belonged to Byzantium, whose ambassadors, having met Igor’s army on the Danube, managed to persuade the Russians to peace; that the content of the agreement of 944 is more favorable for the empire than the agreement of 911. The multi-volume “History of the SSSD” mentions two campaigns of Rus' against Byzantium in the 40s (941 and 944) and notes that in both cases Igor went to Greeks at the head of Russian troops, “reinforced by mercenary Pechenegs and Varangians.” It is said about the agreement of 944 that it provided for broad trade ties with the empire and was based, like the U11 agreement, on “Russian pokon”.

Foreign historiography has focused on the events of 941-944. incomparably less attention than the history of the Russian attacks on Constantinople in 860 and 907. In general courses and special works There are informative messages on this subject. The assessment of the Russian-Byzantine war of 941 and the treaty of 944 is devoted to articles or sections of articles by K. Bartova, A. Boak, I. Swiętsitsky, S. Mikutsky, A. Gregoire and P. Orgels, I. Sorlen, D. Miller, as well as sections in the books of D. Obolensky, articles by D. Shepard, F. Wozniak 40.

K. Bartova, who paid attention to the famous Jewish-Khazar correspondence of the 10th century, draws a connection between the data of the so-called Cambridge document and the events of 941-944, believing that the mysterious Helgu is one of Igor’s governors, who continued to fight after the prince returned to his homeland . A. Boak notes the grandeur of the campaign of 941, the secrecy of its preparation, the “specific” goal - the capture of Constantinople - and the elimination of the threat of a new invasion by Emperor Roman I Lecapinus through diplomatic means. He considers the 944 treaty to be a full-blooded, comprehensive agreement that “widely renewed earlier treaties.” It, according to A. Boak, reflected the interest of the Kyiv princes in trade with Byzantium 4 .

I. Swiętsitsky, comparing the treaties of 907, 911, 944, shows that the agreement of 944 was closely connected with previous acts, developed and supplemented the diplomatic norms of previous treaties. In his opinion, the Greek ambassadors brought a ready-made draft agreement to Kyiv, and Igor in response sent an embassy to Constantinople, which had the Russian draft agreement in its hands. I. Sventsitsky believes that we have before us an equal interstate agreement, in the development of which both parties took an active part

S. Mikutsky, analyzing the text of the agreement of 944, drew attention to the fact that the beginning of the document and its conclusion come on behalf of Rus', while the main text - the articles of the agreement - on behalf of Byzantium; that the text of the treaty at the same time mentions its drafting in two charters - Russian and Greek. In this regard, S. Mikutsky suggests that the Russian charter is essentially a reworking of the Greek original: the imperial formula at the beginning of the document and at its conclusion is omitted and replaced by text coming from the Russian side, a list of ambassadors and preamble by the Russian author. The main part - the articles of the agreement - remained unchanged, as did the confirmation of the imperial charter. And all this is tied together with Russian additions at the end - Igor's oath and sanctions. Since the articles, writes S. Mikutsky, reflect the interests of the Greeks, have the character of mercy on their part, do not give any rights to Rus', but only impose obligations on it, in its content the document is close to the imperial chrisovul. However, S. Mikutsky draws attention to the fact that the confirmation formula found in the treaty of 944 does not appear in the chrysovuli 43.

A. Gregoire and P. Orgels analyze the history of the campaign of 941 in accordance with data from Byzantine sources and show that after the defeat in the naval battle of Hieron, Russian troops retreated to the southwest of Asia Minor and continued military operations there. The authors noted the scale of the campaign and the stress that the empire had to endure to overcome the Russian invasion 44 .

I. Sorlen supports those scientists who are inclined to distrust the “Tale of Bygone Years” regarding the report of the second Russian campaign against Constantinople and consider it the fruit of a compilation of information from the chronicle of George Amartol about the Ugric campaign against the Byzantine capital in 943 and data from the “Life of Basil the New” . She is convinced of the authenticity of the treaty of 944 and notes that it is an undoubted translation from Greek, and more correct than in the case of the treaty of 911. In her opinion, both charters were drawn up in the imperial office, as evidenced by the mention of Russian Christians, who were allegedly given priority over the pagans, and the presence in the charter of obligations not only of Rus', but also of Byzantium (regarding the provision of trade rights to the Russians). The main part of the agreement - the obligations of Rus' - was taken from the imperial chrisovul, to which, at the request of the Russians, a preamble and a final part were added. Thus, I. Sorlen also holds the opinion of the artificial origin of the text of the agreement placed in the chronicle, its compilation from heterogeneous parts 45.

Based on an analysis of the articles of the treaty, I. Sorlen quite rightly asserts that they reflect the development of the Russian diplomatic tradition: mentions of Russian written documents of identification indicate, in her opinion, that the Russian princes in the middle of the 10th century. “they began to create offices” and took control of trade with Byzantium. She believes that the new treaty canceled trade tariff benefits for the Russians and introduced some trade restrictions as a result of Igor's defeat. I. Sorlen considers the article of the 944 treaty on military assistance to Rus' from Byzantium to be the fruit of the negligence of the translator, who distorted the text, since here, according to the author, we should be talking about the obligations of Rus' not to attack the possessions of Byzantium in the Crimea and to help in this region of the empire . At the same time, she rightly points out that the treaty of 944 reflected a change in the nature of relations between Rus' and Byzantium compared to 911: Rus' becomes an “allied power” for the empire, I. Sorlen defends the very controversial thesis that in the treaty of 944 d. the parties pursued primarily economic goals 46 .

D. Miller in the general article “Byzantine treaties and their development: 500-1025.” considered Russian-Byzantine treaties, including the agreement of 944, on an equal basis with Byzantine-Arab, Bulgarian and other agreements of the early Middle Ages, defining them as “trade and political treaties of the 10th century.” He showed that Russian-Byzantine treaties include all the most significant components of diplomatic agreements concluded by Byzantium with other states, and some aspects of these agreements in Russian-Byzantine treaties are presented most clearly, and in particular they provide “the most complete description of trade rights ” as a means of Byzantine diplomacy to resolve relations with another power. D. Miller also highlights such features of these acts as the precise definition of the parties participating in the negotiations and their representatives, who are named; statement of intentions of the negotiators; their vows; detailed content of articles; information on the procedure for ratifying the agreement. In his opinion, only the Byzantine-Persian treaty of 562 can to some extent be compared in this sense with the Russian-Byzantine treaties.

Analyzing such an aspect of the diplomatic agreements of Byzantium with the “barbarian” states as an agreement on alliance and mutual assistance, D. Miller showed that the agreement of 944 made a step forward compared to the agreement of 911 and Rus' from a state that allowed the hiring of its people for military service in Byzantium, became a genuine and equal military ally of the empire. He notes the international nature of other articles included in the agreement of 944, and in particular the articles on the procedure for registering Russians coming to Byzantium. The procedure for ratifying the treaty of 944 reminds D. Miller of the procedure that accompanied the conclusion of the Byzantine-Arab treaty of 687: then two copies of treaty documents were also drawn up, they were exchanged, and the corresponding oaths of allegiance to the “concluded agreement” were given 48. No unilateral obligations Rus', there is no talk of any comparison with the chrysovuli in the work of D. Miller.

D. Obolensky, true to his idea of ​​the empire drawing neighboring countries and peoples into a kind of Byzantine community of states 49, also viewed Russian-Byzantine treaties through this prism. He considered the Russian campaign of 941 a Viking-style expedition, unexpected and treacherous, and is silent about the second campaign; Naturally, he also bypasses questions about negotiations on the Danube, about tribute, etc. D. Obolensky views the Treaty of 944 as a major success for Byzantium in eliminating the Russian danger, which had been growing since the 9th century. The empire gradually neutralized this danger with the help of skillful diplomacy. In his opinion, the treaty of 944 reflected Byzantium's concerns about its Crimean possessions and showed how the empire, in relations with Russia, changed the balance of power in its favor.

Thus, a review of the literature concerning the events of 941-944. and the Russian-Byzantine treaty of 944, states serious and fundamental disagreements between historians on the key problems of this aspect of the history of ancient Rus'.

It is noteworthy that the study of the history of the campaign of 941 is carried out in isolation from the history of the development and content of the treaty of 944, which, as a rule, is associated only with the history of Igor’s second (in 944 or 943) campaign against Byzantium.

There is no unity on such questions as: is the 944 treaty just an addition to the 911 agreement, or is it a politically independent and integral diplomatic document? Does it represent a semblance of the imperial chrysobulus, or is it a bilateral, equal interstate treaty? Was this text deposited in the chronicle in its entirety, or was it put together by later scribes and editors who assembled from various documents what became part of the “Tale of Bygone Years” as the Russian-Byzantine treaty of 944?

It is also not clear who benefits from this agreement - Byzantium? Rus'? What “new balance of power” (“changed balance of power”) did this treaty reflect?

Some private questions related to the history of the document’s development also remain controversial: on whose initiative was it concluded - the Russians or the Greeks? Did the previous articles of the treaties of 907 and 911, not specified in the treaty of 944, continue to remain in force? Can Byzantium’s obligation to pay tribute to Rus' be included among these articles not included in the treaty?

Finally, researchers, as a rule, did not pose the following questions: what is the place of the treaty of 944 in the system of both Byzantine and Russian diplomacy? How does it relate to the Russian-Byzantine treaties of the 60s of the 9th century, 907, 911? What is the level of diplomacy of ancient Rus' in comparison with its sprouts in the 9th - early 10th centuries? reflected this diplomatic act?

It is these controversial or under-researched issues that this chapter is devoted to.

Russian-Byzantine War 941-944- Prince Igor’s unsuccessful campaign against Byzantium and his repeated campaign in , which ended in a peace treaty in .

N. Ya. Polovoy offers the following reconstruction of events: Khalga was one of Igor’s governors. While he was fighting Pesach, Igor decided to make peace with the Khazars, recalled Khalga from Tmutarakan and marched on Constantinople. That is why Khalga so firmly holds her promise to Pesach to fight Roman. Part of the Russian army with governor Khalga passed by ships past Chersonesus, and the other part with Igor along the coast of Bulgaria. From both places news came to Constantinople about the approaching enemy, so Igor did not manage to take the city by surprise, as happened with the first Rus raid in 860.

Igor's first trip. 941

Sources on the campaign of 941

Most detailed story Liutprand wrote about the first naval battle:

Igor's second campaign. 943

All information about Igor’s 2nd campaign and the subsequent peace treaty is contained only in Russian chronicles.

PVL dates the campaign to 944: " In the year 6452. Igor gathered many warriors: Varangians, Rus, and Polyans, and Slovenians, and Krivichi, and Tivertsi, - and hired the Pechenegs, and took hostages from them, - and went against the Greeks in boats and on horses, seeking revenge for myself. "

The Byzantine emperor was warned about the attack and sent ambassadors to meet the Russians and Pechenegs. Negotiations took place somewhere on the Danube. Igor agreed to take a rich tribute and returned to Kyiv, sending his Pecheneg allies to fight against the Bulgarians. The decision was influenced by the recent defeat at sea; the warriors at the council spoke as follows: “ Does anyone know who to overcome: whether we or they? Or who is in alliance with the sea? We are not walking on land, but in the depths of the sea: death is common to all.»

Historians date the campaign to 943 (N. M. Karamzin, B. A. Rybakov, N. Ya. Polovoy). The Novgorod First Chronicle of the younger edition, which contains fragments of an 11th-century chronicle, erroneously dates Igor's campaign to 920 and reports a second campaign a year later, which corresponds to 943 according to the more accurate Byzantine chronology. Feofan’s successor, under the same year, mentions the great campaign of the “Turks”, which ended in a peace treaty with Byzantium. By "Turks" the Greeks usually meant

Per year 6449 (941). Igor went against the Greeks. And the Bulgarians sent news to the king that the Russians were coming to Constantinople: ten thousand ships. And they came and sailed and began to ravage the country of Bithynia, and captured the land along the Pontic Sea to Heraclius and to the Paphlagonian land, and they captured the entire country of Nicomedia, and they burned the entire Court. And those who were captured - some were crucified, while others, setting them as a target, were shot with arrows, wringing their hands back, tied them up and drove iron nails into their heads. Many holy churches were set on fire and a lot of wealth was seized on both banks of the Court. When warriors came from the east - Panfir the Demestic with forty thousand, Phocas the Patrician with the Macedonians, Fedor the Stratelates with the Thracians, and with them the high-ranking boyars, they surrounded Rus'. The Russians, after consulting, came out against the Greeks with weapons, and in a fierce battle they barely defeated the Greeks. The Russians returned to their squad in the evening and at night, getting into the boats, sailed away. Theophanes met them in boats with fire and began to shoot fire at the Russian boats with pipes. And a terrible miracle was seen. The Russians, seeing the flames, threw themselves into the sea water, trying to escape, and so those who remained returned home. And, having come to their land, they told - each to their own - about what had happened and about the fire of the rooks. “It’s like the Greeks have lightning from heaven,” they said, “and by releasing it, they burned us; That’s why they didn’t overcome them.” Igor, having returned, began to gather many soldiers and sent them overseas to the Varangians, inviting them to attack the Greeks, again planning to go against them.

SOME WONDERFUL FIRE, JUST LIGHTNING OF THE HEAVEN

The chronicler knows the Russian legend and the Greek news about Igor’s campaign against Constantinople: in 941, the Russian prince went by sea to the shores of the Empire, the Bulgarians gave the news to Constantinople that Rus' was coming; The protovestiary Theophanes was sent against her, who burned Igor's boats with Greek fire. Having suffered defeat at sea, the Russians landed on the shores of Asia Minor and, as usual, greatly devastated them, but here they were caught and defeated by the patrician Barda and the domestic John, rushed into boats and set off for the shores of Thrace, were overtaken on the road, and again defeated by Theophanes and his small the remnants returned back to Rus'. At home, the fugitives justified themselves by saying that the Greeks had some kind of miraculous fire, like heavenly lightning, which they launched at the Russian boats and burned them.

But on the dry route, what was the reason for their defeat? This reason can be discovered in the legend itself, from which it is clear that Igor’s campaign was not similar to Oleg’s enterprise, carried out by the united forces of many tribes; It was more like a raid by a gang, a small squad. That there were few troops, and contemporaries attributed the reason for the failure to this circumstance, is shown by the words of the chronicler, who immediately after describing the campaign says that Igor, having come home, began to gather a large army, sent overseas to hire the Varangians to go again to the Empire.

The chronicler places Igor’s second campaign against the Greeks under the year 944; this time he says that Igor, like Oleg, gathered a lot of troops: Varangians, Rus, Polyans, Slavs, Krivichs, Tiverts, hired the Pechenegs, took hostages from them, and set out on a campaign on boats and horses to avenge the previous defeat . The Korsun people sent a message to Emperor Roman: “Rus is coming with countless ships, the ships have covered the entire sea.” The Bulgarians also sent the message: “Rus is coming; Pechenegs were also hired.” Then, according to legend, the emperor sent his best boyars to Igor with a request: “Do not go, but take the tribute that Oleg took, and I will add more to it.” The emperor sent expensive fabrics and a lot of gold to the Pechenegs. Igor, having reached the Danube, convened a squad and began to think with it about the imperial proposals; the squad said: “If the king says so, then what do we need even more? Without fighting, let's take the gold, silver and pavoloks! How do we know who will win, us or them? After all, it is impossible to come to an agreement with the sea in advance, we are not walking on land, but in the depths of the sea, one death for all.” Igor listened to the squad, ordered the Pechenegs to fight the Bulgarian land, took gold and pavoloks from the Greeks for himself and the entire army, and went back to Kyiv. In the next year, 945, an agreement was concluded with the Greeks, also, apparently, to confirm the brief and, perhaps, oral efforts concluded immediately after the end of the campaign.

Kyiv - CAPITAL, RULER - IGOR

In Igor’s treaty with the Greeks we read, among other things, that the Russian Grand Duke and his boyars can annually send as many ships as they want to the great Greek kings, with ambassadors and guests, that is, with their own clerks and free Russian merchants. This story of the Byzantine emperor clearly shows us the close connection between the annual turnover of political and economic life Rus'. The tribute that the Kiev prince collected as a ruler at the same time constituted the material of his trade turnover: having become a sovereign, like a horse, he, like a Varangian, did not cease to be an armed merchant. He shared the tribute with his squad, which served him as an instrument of control and constituted the government class. This class acted as the main lever in both directions, both political and economic: in the winter it ruled, visited people, begged, and in the summer it traded in what it collected during the winter. In the same story by Konstantin, the centralizing significance of Kyiv as the center of the political and economic life of the Russian land is vividly outlined. Rus', the government class with the prince at its head, with its overseas trade turnover supported the ship trade among the Slavic population of the entire Dnieper basin, which found sales at the spring fair of one-trees near Kiev, and every spring it attracted here from different angles countries along the Greco-Varangian route, merchant boats with goods from forest fur hunters and beekeepers. Through such a complex economic cycle, a silver Arab dirhem or a gold clasp of Byzantine work came from Baghdad or Constantinople to the banks of the Oka or Vazuza, where archaeologists find them.

SWORE BY PERUN

It is remarkable that Varangian (Germanic) mythology did not have any influence on Slavic, despite the political dominance of the Varangians; this was for the reason that the pagan beliefs of the Varangians were neither clearer nor stronger than the Slavic ones: the Varangians very easily changed their paganism for the Slavic cult if they did not accept Greek Christianity. Prince Igor, a Varangian by origin, and his Varangian squad already swore by the Slavic Perun and worshiped his idol.

"DON'T WALK, BUT TAKE TRIBUTE"

One of the reasons for the catastrophic defeat of “Tsar” Helga and Prince Igor in 941 was that they could not find allies for the war with Byzantium. Khazaria was absorbed in the fight against the Pechenegs and could not provide effective assistance to the Rus.

In 944, Prince Igor of Kiev launched a second campaign against Constantinople. The Kiev chronicler did not find any mention of this enterprise in Byzantine sources, and in order to describe the new military expedition, he had to “paraphrase” the story of the first campaign.

Igor failed to take the Greeks by surprise. The Korsuns and Bulgarians managed to warn Constantinople about the danger. The Emperor sent “the best boyars” to Igor, begging him: “Do not go, but take the tribute that Oleg received, and I will add more to that tribute.” Taking advantage of this, Igor accepted the tribute and went home. The chronicler was sure that the Greeks were frightened by the power of the Russian fleet, for Igor’s ships covered the entire sea of ​​“beschisla”. In fact, the Byzantines were worried not so much by the Russian fleet, the recent defeat of which they had not forgotten, but by Igor’s alliance with the Pecheneg horde. The nomadic camps of the Pechenezh Horde spread over a vast area from the Lower Don to the Dnieper. The Pechenegs became the dominant force in the Black Sea region. According to Constantine Porphyrogenitus, the attacks of the Pechenegs deprived the Rus of the opportunity to fight with Byzantium. The peace between the Pechenegs and the Rus was fraught with a threat to the empire.

In preparation for the war with Byzantium, the Kiev prince “hired” the Pechenegs, i.e. sent rich gifts to their leaders, and took hostages from them. Having received tribute from the emperor, the Rus sailed to the east, but first Igor “commanded the Pechenegs to fight the Bulgarian land.” The Pechenegs were pushed to war against the Bulgarians, perhaps, not only by the Rus, but also by the Greeks. Byzantium did not abandon its intention to weaken Bulgaria and once again bring it under its rule. Having completed hostilities, the Russians and Greeks exchanged embassies and concluded a peace treaty. It follows from the agreement that the area of ​​special interests of Byzantium and Rus' was Crimea. The situation on the Crimean peninsula was determined by two factors: the long-standing Byzantine-Khazar conflict and the emergence of a Norman principality at the junction of the Byzantine and Khazar possessions. Chersonesus (Korsun) remained the main stronghold of the empire in Crimea. The Russian prince was forbidden to “have volosts,” that is, to seize the possessions of the Khazars in the Crimea. Moreover, the treaty obliged the Russian prince to fight (“let him fight”) with the enemies of Byzantium in the Crimea. If “that country” (Khazar possessions) does not submit, in this case the emperor promised to send his troops to help the Rus. In fact, Byzantium set the goal of expelling the Khazars from Crimea by the hands of the Rus, and then dividing them from their possession. The agreement was implemented, although more than half a century late. Principality of Kyiv went to Tmutarakan with the cities of Tamatarcha and Kerch, and Byzantium conquered the last possessions of the Khazars approximately in the Surozh region. In this case, King Sfeng, uncle, provided direct assistance to the Byzantines Prince of Kyiv…

Peace treaties with the Greeks were created favorable conditions for the development of trade and diplomatic relations between Kievan Rus and Byzantium. The Rus received the right to equip any number of ships and trade in the markets of Constantinople. Oleg had to agree that the Rus, no matter how many of them came to Byzantium, had the right to enlist in the imperial army without any permission from the Kyiv prince...

Peace treaties created conditions for the penetration of Christian ideas into Rus'. At the conclusion of the treaty of 911, there was not a single Christian among Oleg’s ambassadors. The Russians sealed the “harat” with an oath to Perun. In 944, in addition to the pagan Rus, Christian Rus also participated in negotiations with the Greeks. The Byzantines singled them out, giving them the right to be the first to take the oath and taking them to “ cathedral church" - Saint Sophia Cathedral.

A study of the text of the treaty allowed M.D. Priselkov to suggest that already under Igor, power in Kyiv actually belonged to the Christian party, to which the prince himself belonged, and that negotiations in Constantinople led to the development of conditions for the establishment new faith in Kyiv. This assumption cannot be reconciled with the source. One of the important articles of the treaty of 944 read: “If a Christian kills a Rusyn, or a Rusyn kills a Christian,” etc. The article certified that the Rusyns belonged to the pagan faith. The Russian ambassadors lived in Constantinople for quite a long time: they had to sell the goods they brought. The Greeks used this circumstance to convert some of them to Christianity... The treaty of 944, drawn up by experienced Byzantine diplomats, provided for the possibility of the adoption of Christianity by the “princes” who remained during the negotiations in Kyiv. The final formula read: “Whoever transgresses (the agreement - R.S.) from our country (Rus. - R.S.), whether a prince or anyone else, whether baptized or unbaptized, may not have help from God.. ."; who violated the agreement “let him be cursed by God and Perun.”

Skrynnikov R.G. Old Russian state

THE TOP OF ANCIENT RUSSIAN DIPLOMACY

But what is amazing! This time, Rus' insisted - and it’s hard to find another word here - on the appearance of Byzantine ambassadors in Kyiv. The period of discrimination against the northern “barbarians” ended, who, despite their resounding victories, obediently wandered to Constantinople for negotiations and here, under the watchful eyes of the Byzantine clerks, formulated their contractual demands, put their speeches on paper, carefully translated diplomatic stereotypes unfamiliar to them from Greek, and then they looked in fascination at the splendor of the Constantinople temples and palaces.

Now the Byzantine ambassadors had to appear for the first negotiations in Kyiv, and it is difficult to overestimate the importance and prestige of the agreement reached. ...

Essentially, the tangle of the entire Eastern European politics of those days unraveled here, in which Rus', Byzantium, Bulgaria, Hungary, the Pechenegs and, possibly, Khazaria were involved. Here negotiations took place, new diplomatic stereotypes were developed, the foundation was laid for a new long-term agreement with the empire, which was supposed to regulate relations between countries, reconcile or at least smooth out the contradictions between them...

And only then the Russian ambassadors moved to Constantinople.

It was a big embassy. Gone are the days when the five Russian ambassadors opposed the entire Byzantine diplomatic routine. Now a prestigious representative of a powerful state, consisting of 51 people - 25 ambassadors and 26 merchants, was sent to Constantinople. They were accompanied by armed guards and shipmen...

The title of Russian Grand Duke Igor sounded differently in the new treaty. The epithet “bright”, which the Byzantine clerks awarded Oleg with such far from naive calculation, got lost and disappeared somewhere. In Kyiv, apparently, they very quickly figured out what was what and realized what an unenviable position he was putting the Kyiv prince in. Now, in the treaty of 944, this title is not present, but Igor is called here as in his homeland - “Grand Duke of Russia.” True, sometimes in articles, so to speak, the concepts “grand duke” and “prince” are used in working order. And yet it is quite obvious that Rus' tried to achieve a change here too and insisted on a title that did not infringe on its state dignity, although, of course, it was still far from reaching such heights as “tsar” and emperor.”

Rus', step by step, slowly and persistently won diplomatic positions. But this was especially clearly reflected in the procedure for signing and approving the agreement, as stated in the agreement. This text is so remarkable that there is a temptation to quote it in its entirety...

For the first time we see that the treaty was signed by the Byzantine emperors, for the first time the Byzantine side was instructed by the treaty to again send its representatives to Kyiv in order to take an oath on the treaty on the part of the Russian Grand Duke and his husbands. For the first time, Rus' and Byzantium undertake equal obligations regarding the approval of the treaty. Thus, from the beginning of the development of a new diplomatic document until the very end of this work, Rus' stood on an equal footing with the empire, and this itself was already a remarkable phenomenon in the history of Eastern Europe.

And the agreement itself, which both sides worked out with such care, became an extraordinary event. Diplomacy of that time does not know of a document that was more ambitious, comprehensive, and embraced economic, political, and military-alliance relations between countries.

The reasons for the war between Prince Igor and Byzantium

The reasons for the Constantinople campaign of 941 remained a mystery to the ancient Russian chronicles, which limited themselves to simply recording the fact: “Igor went against the Greeks.” This is natural, since the reign of Oleg II remained out of sight of the compilers of The Tale of Bygone Years. Historiography also did not say anything significant about this. Usually, the campaign of 941 was simply put on a par with other Russian raids on Byzantium and was seen as a continuation of Russian expansion on the Black Sea, which began in the first third of the 9th century. At the same time, they lost sight of the fact that the treaty of 911 fully satisfied the political ambitions and trade interests of the Rus, and therefore it was pointless to seek its revision on their part. And indeed, subsequent Russian-Byzantine agreements do not reveal any “progress” in the field of state-trade conditions for “Rus”, reproducing, with minor exceptions, the text of the agreement of 911.

It was suggested that thirty years (from 911 to 941) was the period of time during which the “eternal peace” applied in accordance with the traditions of Byzantine diplomacy, after which the Russians had to forcefully seek the renewal of the trade agreement ( Petrukhin V.Ya. Slavs, Varangians and Khazars in southern Russia. On the problem of the formation of the ancient Russian state // The most ancient states Of Eastern Europe. M., 1995. P. 73). But this guess is not supported by facts. A simple glance at the chronology of the Rus' campaigns against Byzantium (860, 904, 911, 941, 944, 970-971, 988/989, 1043) immediately reveals that the thirty-year interval is as random as any other. Moreover, the treaty of 911 does not contain even a hint of a specific period of its validity, and the treaty of 944 was concluded “for the whole summer, until the sun shines and the whole world stands.”

The campaign of 941 will continue to look like causeless aggression until the Russian land of Prince Igor ceases to be identified with the power of the “bright princes”, and Oleg II is given a place in Russian history. The events of 941 are directly related to Oleg's defeat in Crimea in 939 and his subsequent expulsion from Kyiv. The Kiev princely family used the opportunity to end the formal dependence of the Russian land on " the bright prince" To do this, Igor needed to receive international recognition of his status as a sovereign ruler - the Grand Duke of Russia, the “Archon of Russia.” The best patent for this title at that time was an agreement with Byzantium, but it, apparently, was slow in issuing it or put forward some conditions that were unacceptable to Kyiv. That is why Igor was going to disturb the borders of the empire. In the same way, Otto I in the second half of the 60s and early 70s. X century had to forcefully wrest recognition of his imperial title from Byzantium.

Number of Russian fleet

Most sources greatly exaggerate the size of the Russian fleet that launched the raid on Constantinople. Our chronicles, based on information from the Successor Theophanes and George Amartol, name an unthinkable figure - 10,000 rooks. The German ambassador Liutprand, who visited Constantinople several years after the defeat of the Russian flotilla, learned from conversations with eyewitnesses that the Russians had “a thousand or even more ships.” The Byzantine writer Lev Grammatik, who writes about the invasion of the 10,000-strong Russian army, assesses the strength of the Rus even more modestly. From the Tale of Bygone Years it is known that the Russian boat could accommodate about forty people. The construction of large military ships that could accommodate up to four dozen soldiers is distinguished precisely by Slavic maritime traditions. Thus, characterizing the armed forces of Croatia, Konstantin Porphyrogenitus writes that in addition to a very large foot army, the Croatian ruler can field 80 sagenas (large rooks) and 100 kondurs (boats). Each sagen, according to the emperor, accommodated about 40 people, in large kondurs up to 20, in small ones - up to 10 (“On the management of the empire”).

So the 10,000-strong Russian flotilla is reduced to 250 boats. But even here it must be taken into account that a significant part of the Rus flotilla was made up of the allied naval squads of the princes of Tauride Rus'. Igor was not at all eager to get involved in real war with Byzantium. The raid, undertaken by a small force, was supposed to be of a demonstrative nature. It was not the intention of the Kyiv prince to cause serious military and material damage to the empire, which could prevent the immediate resumption of friendly relations immediately after the completion of the campaign.

Defeat at the walls of Constantinople

The campaign began in the spring of 941.

Around mid-May, Igor sailed from Kyiv on his boats. holding on coastline, about three weeks later he reached the Bulgarian coast, where he was joined by a flotilla of Taurian Rus, who arrived here from the eastern Crimea. The reliability of this route of the Russian army is confirmed in the Greek Life of Vasily the New. The report of the Kherson strategist, it says there, “announcing their [Rus] invasion and that they were already approaching these [Kherson] regions,” reached Constantinople a few days after the news of this “spread... in the palace and between residents of the city." Consequently, the mayor of Kherson was late in warning about the danger and someone else was the first to raise the alarm in Constantinople.
The Tale of Bygone Years says that the news of the Russian invasion was first brought to Roman I by the Bulgarians (Byzantium was then on friendly terms with Bulgaria; the Bulgarian Tsar Peter was the son-in-law of Roman I (by his granddaughter) and received from him the title of “Basileus of the Bulgarians”) , and then the Korsun people (Chersonese). These testimonies are especially interesting because the ancient Russian chronicler attributes the raid on Constantinople to Igor alone. But then what does the Kherson strategist have to do with it? After all, Kherson was not on the way from the mouth of the Dnieper to Constantinople, and Igor had absolutely no need to “approach these areas.” The imaginary contradiction, however, is easily eliminated if we consider that in the campaign of 941 the Rus had not one, but two starting points: Kyiv and eastern Crimea. The sequence of notifications about the Rus' invasion indicates that the Kherson strateg was alarmed only when he saw the ships of the Tauride Rus sailing past his city, en route to join the Kyiv flotilla, which, having left the Dnieper into the Black Sea, immediately headed for the shores of Bulgaria. Only with such a development of events could the Bulgarians turn out to be more efficient messengers of trouble than the head of the Byzantine outpost in the Northern Black Sea region.

On June 11, the Russians camped near Constantinople, in full view of the city's inhabitants. Talking about the beginning of the campaign, Greek sources are silent about the usual violence of the Rus against the civilian population. Nothing is said either about the looted goods, while regarding the previous Russian raids on Constantinople there are consistent reports from different sources about general robbery and “huge booty.” Apparently, Igor kept his soldiers from robberies and murders, so as not to close the path to a quick, as he hoped, reconciliation with Roman with excessive cruelty.

So several days passed in inactivity. The Russians remained in their camp, doing nothing. It was as if they were inviting the Greeks to attack them first. However, the Greeks had nothing to oppose them from the sea, since Roman I sent the Greek fleet to defend the Mediterranean islands from Arab attacks. Of course, Igor was well aware of this, and his slowness is most likely explained by the fact that he was waiting for the Greeks to respond to the proposals already conveyed to them to “renew the old world.”

However, Constantinople was in no hurry to enter into negotiations with the newly-minted “Archon of Russia.” According to Liutprand, Emperor Romanus spent many sleepless nights, “tormented by thoughts.” Not long before, he was not averse to playing the “Russian card” in the game with Khazaria. Since then, his views on the advisability of using the military resources of the Russian land to protect the interests of the empire in the Northern Black Sea region have hardly changed (a number of articles from the treaty of 944 confirm this). But considerations of prestige, presumably, kept Roman from yielding to open pressure. The divine basileus of the Romans could not allow himself to be spoken to in the language of dictate. He feverishly sought means that would lift the siege of the city. Finally, he was informed that a dozen and a half had been found in the port of Constantinople. hellandiy(large military vessels that could accommodate about 100 oarsmen and several dozen soldiers), written off due to their disrepair. The emperor immediately ordered the ship's carpenters to renew these vessels and put them in order as quickly as possible; in addition, he ordered the installation of flamethrowing machines (“siphons”) not only on the bows of ships, as was usually done, but also on the stern and even along the sides. Patrician Theophan was entrusted with command of the newly created fleet ( Patrick- a court title of the highest rank, introduced in the 4th century. Constantine I the Great and existed until the beginning of the 12th century).

Siphon

The half-rotten squadron did not look very impressive even after repairs. Feofan decided to take her out to sea no sooner than he “strengthened himself with fasting and tears.”

Seeing the Greek ships, the Russians raised their sails and rushed towards them. Feofan was waiting for them in the bay of the Golden Horn. When the Rus approached the Faros lighthouse, he gave the order to attack the enemy.

The pitiful appearance of the Greek squadron must have amused Igor a lot. It seemed that defeating her would be a matter of just half an hour. Filled with contempt for the Greeks, he moved one Kyiv squad against Theophanes. The destruction of the Greek flotilla was not his intention. Liutprand writes that Igor “commanded his army not to kill them [the Greeks], but to take them alive.” This order, very strange from a military point of view, could only be due to political considerations. Probably, at the end of the victorious battle, Igor intended to return Byzantium its captured soldiers in exchange for concluding an alliance treaty.

Igor's Russes boldly approached the Greek ships, intending to board them. Russian boats surrounded Feofan's ship, which was sailing ahead. battle formation Greeks At this moment, the wind suddenly died down, and the sea became completely calm. Now the Greeks could use their flamethrowers without interference. The instant change in weather was perceived by them as help from above. Greek sailors and soldiers perked up. And from Feofan’s ship, surrounded by Russian boats, fiery streams poured out in all directions*. Flammable liquid spilled onto the water. The sea around the Russian ships seemed to suddenly flare up; several rooks burst into flames at once.

* The basis of “liquid fire” was natural pure oil. However, his secret “was not so much in the ratio of the ingredients included in the mixture, but in the technology and methods of its use, namely: precise definition the degree of heating of the hermetically sealed boiler and the degree of pressure on the surface of the air mixture forced by bellows. IN right moment the valve that locked the outlet from the boiler to the siphon was opened, a lamp with an open fire was brought to the outlet, and it was thrown out with force flammable liquid ignited, erupted onto enemy ships or siege engines" ( Konstantin Porphyrogenitus. On managing an empire (text, translation, commentary) / Ed. G.G. Litavrin and A.P. Novoseltseva. M., 1989, note. 33, p. 342).

The action of "Greek fire". Miniature from the Chronicle of John Skylitzes. XII-XIII centuries

The effect of the terrible weapon shocked Igor’s warriors to the core. In an instant, all their courage disappeared, the Russians were seized by panic. “Seeing this,” writes Liutprand, “the Russians immediately began to throw themselves from their ships into the sea, preferring to drown in the waves rather than burn in flames. Others, burdened with armor and helmets, sank to the bottom and were no longer seen, while some who stayed afloat burned even in the middle of the sea waves.” The Greek ships that arrived in time “completed the rout, sank many ships along with their crew, killed many, and took even more alive” (Continued by Theophanes). Igor, as Lev the Deacon testifies, escaped with “hardly a dozen rooks” (it’s unlikely that these words should be taken literally), which managed to land on the shore.

The quick death of Igor's army demoralized the rest of the Rus. The Black Sea princes did not dare to come to his aid and took their boats to the coast of Asia Minor, to shallow waters. The heavy Greek hellands, which had a deep landing, were unable to pursue them.

Division of the Russian army

Contrary to the triumphant tone of the Byzantine chronicles, the Greek victory in the strait was more spectacular than decisive. Only one, the Kiev, part of the Russian fleet was subjected to defeat - quick, but hardly final -; the other, the Tauride one, survived and did not cease to be a serious threat to the Greeks. It is not for nothing that the Life of Vasily the New ends the description of the first stage of the Russian campaign with the simple remark that the Rus were not allowed to approach Constantinople. However, the rejoicing of the Constantinople people was genuine. The general holiday was enlivened by an exciting spectacle: by order of Roman, all the captured Rus were beheaded - perhaps as violators of the oath promises of 911.

Both parts of the divided Russian army lost all contact with each other. Apparently, this explains the strange contradiction that is revealed when comparing the coverage of the events of 941 in Old Russian and Byzantine sources. According to the latter, the war with the Russians falls into two stages: the first ended with the June defeat of the Russian fleet near Constantinople; the second continued in Asia Minor for another three months and ended in September with the final defeat of the Rus. Old Russian sources telling about Igor’s campaign against the Greeks go back to Byzantine ones (mainly to the Chronicle of George Amartol and the Life of Basil the New). But in in this case This is not a simple compilation, so common for ancient Russian chronicles. It turns out that “the compilers of the first Russian chronographs, who used the Chronicle of Amartol and the Life of Vasily the New, not only copied from them information about Igor’s first campaign, but considered it necessary to supplement this information from some Russian source (which partially already took place when translating the Life of Vasily the New into Russian) and make such rearrangements in the text of the Chronicle and Life that changed them beyond recognition" ( Polova N.Ya. On the issue of Igor’s first campaign against Byzantium (Comparative analysis of Russian and Byzantine sources) // Byzantine temporary book. T. XVIII. M., 1961. P. 86). The essence of these changes and rearrangements boils down to the fact that Byzantine news about the second stage of the campaign of 941 (in Asia Minor) was either completely discarded or explained in its own way. In the Tale of Bygone Years, the second stage of the war is obscured by adding the Asia Minor provinces of Byzantium to the list of those areas that were devastated from the very beginning of the campaign: Igor “increasingly fought the Bithynia country, and fought along the Pontus to Iraklia and to the Faflogonian land [Paphlagonia], and the whole country of Nicomedia was captured, and the whole Court was burned.” The “Greek Chronicler” forces Igor to make two campaigns - first near Constantinople, then to Asia Minor. Thus, Russian chronicles end the description of Igor’s first campaign with a single naval battle at Constantinople and the prince’s return to Kyiv. Obviously, the chroniclers, correcting the information from Greek monuments about the campaign of 941, relied on the stories of the Kyiv participants alone, preserved in oral traditions.

So, Igor with the remnants of his army, barely coming to his senses after the defeat, immediately began to retreat. Not a trace remained of the peaceful mood of the Russians. They took out their rage at the defeat they suffered on a Byzantine village called Stenon*, which was plundered and burned to the ground. However, Igor’s army was unable to cause major destruction to the Greeks due to its small numbers. News of Russian robberies on the European shore of Pontus in Byzantine chronicles is limited to the message about the burning of Stenon.

* In Byzantine sources, Stenon is called: 1) a village on the European shore of the Bosphorus; 2) the entire European shore of the Bosphorus ( Polova N.Ya. On the question of Igor's first campaign against Byzantium. P. 94). In this case we mean the first meaning. The attack on Stenon could not have been carried out by the Taurian Rus, who sailed, according to Theophanes’ Successor, “to Sgora,” an area on the Asia Minor coast of the Bosphorus - another evidence of the division of the Russian fleet.

In July, Igor with the remnants of his squad arrived at the “Cimmerian Bosporus”, that is, in the “Russian” Taurida, where he stopped awaiting news of his Black Sea comrades.

War off the coast of Asia Minor

Meanwhile, the rest of the Russian fleet scurried along the coast of Bithynia, locked in shallow water by Theophanes' squadron. A ground army was hastily equipped to help the Byzantine naval commander in Constantinople. But before his arrival, the inhabitants of the Asia Minor coast, among whom were many descendants of the Slavs, who formed here in the 8th - 9th centuries. numerous Bithynian colony*, found themselves in the power of the Rus. According to the Tale of Bygone Years, extreme eastern regions, subjected to raids by the Rus, were Nicomedia and Paphlagonia. One Byzantine document dating from about 945 confirms the chronicle information. In a letter from the disgraced Metropolitan of Nicaea, Alexander, to the new Metropolitan of this city, Ignatius, the former bishop recalls his “help to your [Ignatius] Nicomedians in the name of philanthropy during the invasion...” ( Litavrin G.G. Byzantium, Bulgaria, Ancient Rus' (IX - early XIII century). St. Petersburg, 2000. P. 75).

* In the middle of the 7th century. many Slavic tribes, who invaded the Balkans, recognized the supremacy of the Byzantine emperor. A large Slavic colony was stationed by the imperial authorities in Bithynia as military personnel.

And help to the residents of local cities and villages in the summer of 941 was absolutely necessary, because the Russians finally gave themselves complete freedom. Their cruelty, fueled by a thirst for revenge for their burned and executed comrades, knew no bounds. Feofan’s successor writes with horror about their atrocities: the Russians set the entire coast on fire, “and some prisoners were crucified on a cross, others were driven into the ground, others were set up as targets and shot with arrows. They tied the hands of prisoners from the priestly class behind their backs and drove iron nails into their heads. They also burned many holy temples.”

The blood of civilians flowed like a river until the patrician Bardas Phocas arrived in depopulated Bithynia “with horsemen and selected warriors.” The situation immediately changed not in favor of the Russians, who began to suffer defeat after defeat. According to the Continuer Theophanes, “the Dews sent a sizeable detachment to Bithynia to stock up on provisions and everything necessary, but Varda Phokas overtook this detachment, completely defeated it, put it to flight and killed his warriors.” At the same time, the domestique of the schol * John Kurkuas “came there at the head of the entire eastern army” and, “appearing here and there, killed many who had broken away from their enemies, and the Dews retreated in fear of his onslaught, no longer daring to leave their ships and make forays."

* Domestik schol - the title of the governor of the eastern (Asia Minor) provinces of Byzantium.

About another month passed like this. The Russians could not find a way out of the sea trap. Meanwhile, September was drawing to a close, “the Russians were running out of food, they were afraid of the advancing army of the domestique of the schools of Kurkuas, his intelligence and ingenuity, and they were no less afraid of naval battles and the skillful maneuvers of the patrician Theophan and therefore decided to return home.” One dark September night, the Russian fleet tried to slip unnoticed past the Greek squadron to the European shore of the Bosphorus. But Feofan was on the alert. A second naval battle ensued. However, to be precise, there was no battle in the proper sense of the word: the Greek Helandians simply chased after the fleeing Russian boats, pouring liquid fire on them - “and many ships were sunk, and many of the Ros were killed by the mentioned husband [Theophanes].” The Life of Vasily the New states: “those who escaped from the hands of our fleet died on the way from a terrible relaxation of the stomach.” Although Byzantine sources tell of the almost complete extermination of the Rus, some part of the Russian fleet, apparently, still managed to hug the Thracian shore and hide in the darkness.

The defeat of the Russian flotilla. Miniature from the Chronicle of John Skylitzes. XII-XIII centuries

“Olyadny” (Olyadiya (Old Russian) - boat, ship) fire, the effects of which the Russians experienced for the first time in 941, became the talk of the town in Rus' for a long time. The Life of Vasily says that Russian soldiers returned to their homeland “to tell what happened to them and what they suffered at the behest of God.” The living voices of these people scorched by fire were brought to us by the Tale of Bygone Years: “Those who returned to their land told about what had happened; and they said about the fire of the fire that the Greeks have this lightning from heaven; and, letting it go, they burned us, and for this reason they did not overcome them.” These stories are indelibly etched in the memory of the Russians. Leo the Deacon reports that even thirty years later, Svyatoslav’s warriors still could not remember liquid fire without trembling, since “they heard from their elders” that with this fire the Greeks turned Igor’s fleet into ashes.

Russian-Byzantine War 941-944- Prince Igor’s unsuccessful campaign against Byzantium in 941 and a repeated campaign in 943, which ended in a peace treaty in 944.

On June 11, 941, Igor’s fleet was scattered at the entrance to the Bosphorus by a Byzantine squadron that used Greek fire, after which fighting continued for another 3 months on the Black Sea coast of Asia Minor. On September 15, 941, the Russian fleet was finally defeated off the coast of Thrace while trying to break through to Rus'. In 943, Prince Igor gathered a new army with the participation of the Pechenegs and led them on a campaign to the Danube to the northern borders Byzantine Empire. This time things did not come to military clashes; Byzantium concluded a peace treaty with Igor, paying tribute.

Background and role of the Khazar Khaganate

The Cambridge document (a letter from a Khazar Jew from the 2nd half of the 10th century) connects the Russian campaign against Constantinople with the events that took place in Khazaria shortly before. Around the 930s, the Byzantine Emperor Romanus began a campaign against the Jews. In response, the Khazar Kagan, professing Judaism, “ overthrew the multitude of the uncircumcised" Then Roman, with the help of gifts, persuaded someone Halgu, called " Tsar of Russia", raid over the Khazars.

Khalga captured Samkerts (near the Kerch Strait), after which the Khazar military leader Pesach came out against him and Byzantium, who ravaged three Byzantine cities and besieged Chersonese in the Crimea. Then Pesach attacked Khalga, recaptured the spoils of the one from Samkerets and entered into negotiations from the position of the winner. Khalga was forced to agree to Pesach's demand to start a war with Byzantium.

The further development of events in the Cambridge document generally coincides with the description of Prince Igor’s campaign against Byzantium, known from Byzantine and Old Russian sources, but with an unexpected ending:

There were attempts to identify Khalga with Oleg the Prophet (S. Shekhter and P.K. Kokovtsov, later D.I. Ilovaisky and M.S. Grushevsky) or Igor himself (Helgi Inger, “Oleg the Younger” by Yu.D. Brutskus). Such identifications, however, led to a contradiction with all other reliable sources on the 941 campaign. According to the Cambridge document, Rus' became dependent on Khazaria, but ancient Russian chronicles and Byzantine authors do not even mention the Khazars when describing events.

N. Ya. Polovoy offers the following reconstruction of events: Khalga was one of Igor’s governors. While he was fighting Pesach, Igor decided to make peace with the Khazars, recalled Khalga from Tmutarakan and marched on Constantinople. That is why Khalga so firmly holds her promise to Pesach to fight Roman. Part of the Russian army with governor Khalga passed by ships past Chersonesos, and the other part with Igor along the coast of Bulgaria. From both places news came to Constantinople about the approaching enemy, so Igor was not able to take the city by surprise, as happened with the first Russian raid in 860.

Igor's first trip. 941

Sources on the campaign of 941

The raid on Constantinople in 941 and subsequent events of the same year are reflected in the Byzantine Chronicle of Amartol (borrowed from Theophanes' Continuer) and the Life of Basil the New, as well as in the historical work of Liutprand of Cremona (Book of Retribution, 5.XV). Messages from ancient Russian chronicles (XI-XII centuries) are based generally on Byzantine sources with the addition individual parts, preserved in Russian legends.

Defeat at Hieron

Feofan’s successor begins the story of the raid:

The raid did not come as a surprise to Byzantium. The Bulgarians and later the strategist of Kherson sent news about him in advance. However, the Byzantine fleet fought the Arabs and defended the islands in the Mediterranean, so that according to Liutprand, only 15 dilapidated helandia (a type of ship) remained in the capital, abandoned due to their disrepair. The Byzantines estimated the number of Igor's ships at an incredible 10 thousand. Liutprand of Cremona, relaying the story of an eyewitness, his stepfather, named a thousand ships in Igor’s fleet. According to the Tale of Bygone Years and the testimony of Liutprand, the Russians first rushed to plunder the Asia Minor coast of the Black Sea, so that the defenders of Constantinople had time to prepare a rebuff and meet Igor’s fleet at sea at the entrance to the Bosporus, near the city of Hieron.

The most detailed account of the first naval battle was left by Liutprand:

Amartol adds that the defeat of Igor after the attack of the fiery Chelandia was completed by a flotilla of Byzantine warships: dromons and triremes. It is believed that the Russians encountered Greek fire for the first time on June 11, 941, and the memory of this was preserved for a long time among Russian soldiers. An Old Russian chronicler of the early 12th century conveyed their words as follows: “ It’s as if the Greeks had heavenly lightning and, releasing it, burned us; that is why they did not overcome them.“According to the PVL, the Russians were first defeated by the Greeks on land, only then there was a brutal defeat at sea, but, probably, the chronicler brought together the battles that took place in different time in different places.

According to PVL and Liutprand, the war ended here: Igor returned home with the surviving soldiers (according to Leo the Deacon, he had barely 10 ships left). Emperor Roman ordered the execution of all captured Russians.

Fighting in Asia Minor

Byzantine sources (Chronicle of Amartol and the life of Basil the New) describe the continuation of the 941 campaign in Asia Minor, where part of the Russian army retreated after the defeat at Hieron. According to Feofan's successor, fighting on south coast The Black Blight developed as follows:

Thus, throughout the entire summer of 941, Russian troops plundered the Asia Minor coast of the Black Sea, until the main forces of the Byzantine army arrived. PVL reports about 40 thousand warriors in the eastern army of the Domestic Kurkuas, in addition to the detachments of Bardas Phokas (from Macedonia) and the stratilate Fedor (from Thrace). The fighting was carried out by the Russians in raids from boats, which were inaccessible to Byzantine warships in the shallow waters of Asia Minor. During an attempt to break into Rus', undertaken on the evening of September 15, 941, the Russian fleet was discovered at sea and destroyed near the city of Kila (Κοιλία) near the entrance to the Bosphorus. The fate of the Russian army after the second defeat at sea remained unknown. It is unlikely that many managed to return to Rus', since Russian chronicles are silent about such a development of events.

Old Russian sources rearranged the narrative in such a way that all military operations ended with the first and only naval defeat. The historian N. Ya. Polovoy explains this fact by the fact that after the defeat at Hieron Russian army divided. Part of the army with Igor returned to Rus'; only their fate was reflected in Russian chronicles, but most of the fleet escaped in shallow waters off the coast of Asia Minor, where Greek ships could not get close due to deep draft. As the commander of the remaining part of the Russian army in Asia Minor, N. Ya. Polovoy considers Khalga, known from the above-mentioned Khazar source, who fought with Byzantium for 4 months. Also, fighting in Amartol continued for 4 months, from June to September 941.

Historian G. G. Litavrin suggests that the Rus also penetrated through shallow waters into the Bosphorus and the Sea of ​​Marmara and completely dominated there, which led to a severance of communication between the European and Asian shores.

Igor's second campaign. 943

All information about Igor’s 2nd campaign and the subsequent peace treaty is contained only in Russian chronicles.

PVL dates the campaign to 944: “ In the year 6452. Igor gathered many warriors: Varangians, Rus, and Polyans, and Slovenians, and Krivichi, and Tivertsi, - and hired the Pechenegs, and took hostages from them, - and went against the Greeks in boats and on horses, seeking revenge for myself. »

The Byzantine emperor was warned about the attack and sent ambassadors to meet the Russians and Pechenegs. The negotiations took place somewhere on the Danube. Igor agreed to take a rich tribute and returned to Kyiv, sending his Pecheneg allies to fight against the Bulgarians. The decision was influenced by the recent defeat at sea; the warriors at the council spoke as follows: “ Does anyone know who to overcome: whether we or they? Or who is in alliance with the sea? We are not walking on land, but in the depths of the sea: death is common to all.»

Historians date the campaign to 943 (N.M. Karamzin, B.A. Rybakov, N.Ya. Polovoy). The Novgorod First Chronicle of the younger edition, which contains fragments of the 11th century chronicle, erroneously dates Igor’s campaign to 920 and reports a second campaign a year later, which corresponds to 943 according to a more accurate Byzantine chronology. Feofan’s successor, under the same year, mentions the great campaign of the “Turks”, which ended in a peace treaty with Byzantium. By “Turks,” the Greeks usually meant the Hungarians, who began raiding Byzantium in 934, and it is possible that the ancient Russian chronicler confused the Hungarians with the Pechenegs. At least Theophanes’ Successor reports that after the treaty with the “Turks” in 943, peace lasted for 5 years.

Russian-Byzantine treaty. 944

The next year after Igor’s campaign, Emperor Roman sent envoys to Igor to restore peace. PVL dates the peace treaty to 945, but the mention of Roman's name in the treaty points to 944. In December 944, Romanus was overthrown by his sons, Stephen and Constantine, who were immediately removed from power by the new emperor Constantine Porphyrogenitus.

The text of the Russian-Byzantine treaty, which has a military-commercial nature, is fully quoted in the PVL. First of all, it regulates the conditions of stay and trade of Russian merchants in Byzantium, determines the exact amounts of monetary fines for various offenses, and establishes ransom amounts for captives. It also formulated a provision on mutual military assistance between the Russian Grand Duke and the Byzantine kings.

The next year after the conclusion of the treaty, Grand Duke Igor was killed by the Drevlyans.