Exactly 70 years ago, on February 13, 1945, after heavy fighting, the city of Budapest was captured, and the German group that defended it was liquidated. The commander of the defense of the Hungarian capital was captured along with his headquarters. In honor of this victory, a salute was given in Moscow with 24 artillery salvoes from 324 guns. We talk about the events of those days with Deacon Vladimir Vasilik, Associate Professor at the Institute of History of St. Petersburg State University.

- Father Vladimir, what preceded the military operations on the territory of Hungary?

Since the spring of 1944, the Hungarian leadership, trying to get out of the war, began secret negotiations with the West. When Hitler found out about this, he sent German troops into Hungary, supposedly “to help the Hungarians,” but in fact to occupy the country if the Hungarian government tried to leave the game.

However, the Hungarians were influenced by the Romanian events of August 1944, when Ion Antonescu was removed from power and communist-led military units and volunteer units took control of Bucharest. After which King Mihai I announced a change of power in Romania, a cessation of hostilities against the USSR and a truce with Great Britain and the USA.

On August 29, 1944, under the influence of the Romanian events, the Hungarian government of General Lakotos openly declared the need to negotiate not only with the British and Americans, but also with the Soviet Union.

- How did they react to this in Berlin?

Instantly! Several more German divisions were introduced into Hungarian territory. However, Admiral Horthy, who served as ruler (regent) of the Kingdom of Hungary, continued separate negotiations, offering the United States and Great Britain a truce on the terms of preventing Soviet troops stationed at the country’s borders from entering Hungary. Having been refused, he entered into negotiations with Stalin, who demanded that he enter the war on the side of the anti-Hitler coalition. As a result, on October 15, 1944, the Horthy government announced a truce with the USSR.

However, Admiral Horthy, unlike King Mihai of Romania, failed to bring his country out of the war. A German-backed coup d'etat took place in Budapest, and Horthy's son was kidnapped by the SS detachment led by the famous saboteur Otto Skorzeny and taken hostage. Then Skorzeny captured the admiral himself. Under the threat of shooting his son and his own destruction, a few days later the admiral transferred power to the leader of the pro-German Arrow Cross party, Ferenc Szalasi, and was taken to Germany.

After Szalasi came to power, mass actions began to exterminate hundreds of thousands of Hungarian Jews and Gypsies and deport them to Germany

After Szalasi came to power, mass actions began to exterminate hundreds of thousands of Hungarian Jews and Gypsies and deport them to Germany. The massacres in Hungary are considered one of the last episodes of the Holocaust. In the wake of violence and genocide, Szálasi called on Hungarians to resist the “Russian invasion.” Unfortunately, a considerable part of the Hungarian people responded to this call, as well as to participation in the genocide of Jews and Gypsies.

For many years, for the sake of the imaginary “friendship of peoples” and the preservation of the socialist camp, we were bashfully silent about this. Meanwhile, the fierceness of the Hungarian resistance was not inferior to the German one in the defense of East Prussia and Berlin. And Hungary, among all of Hitler’s allies, resisted the Soviet Union the longest - until March 1945 inclusive.

- What, in your opinion, caused such fierce resistance?

On the one hand, there is the long-standing Slavic-Hungarian antagonism, on the other, the complicity of many Hungarians in Nazi crimes and the fear of revenge. Indeed, on the Eastern Front, the Hungarians often behaved even worse than even the Germans. These factors, coupled with Szalasi's intense propaganda and the threat of reprisals against deserters and their families, led to fierce resistance. Yes, six thousand Hungarians fought on our side, but 22 Hungarian divisions fought against us. This is more than 300 thousand people! They began to surrender en masse to Soviet troops only in March 1945...

Hitler desperately held on to Hungary. Firstly, for political reasons, since it was his last ally. Secondly, Hungary covered the approaches to Austria. And Hitler was always more Austrian than German. The economic background also had its significance: the Hungarian oil region of Nagykanizsa was important to Hitler. Romanian oil had been lost to him since September 1944, and in Germany the Allies regularly bombed plants producing synthetic fuel. And now proven oil reserves in Nagykanizh are 22 million tons.

Besides, Budapest is the key to Vienna. But the Germans did not want to surrender Vienna under any circumstances. After all, Vienna is Hitler's hometown. A significant part of the Germans who fought in Hungary belonged to the SS. They understood that after their crimes it was difficult for them to hope for leniency. In addition, they received the Fuhrer's order and carried it out fanatically. We must not forget about the German barrier detachments, penal battalions and the order to shoot and hang deserters and repress their families in Germany. The secret is simple: a totalitarian machine of suppression.

- The battle for Hungary was particularly stubborn.

Yes, indeed, the Hungarian operation turned out to be the bloodiest, merciless, difficult and lengthy among all the Red Army operations in Eastern Europe. At first, the operation was entrusted to the 2nd Ukrainian Front alone. Later, when our troops encountered extremely stubborn resistance, we had to use the 3rd and 4th Ukrainian Front, allied Romanian, Bulgarian and Yugoslav divisions.

German and Hungarian troops not only defended themselves, but also went on the offensive. At times the situation was reminiscent of our failures in 1941–1942. The commander of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, Marshal Tolbukhin, even had to use the defensive experience of the Battle of Stalingrad and Kursk. And this was literally in the last months of the war!

Soviet troops tried to spare the city and its citizens, unlike the allies and the Germans themselves

The battle for Budapest was particularly fierce. Soviet troops tried to spare the city and its citizens, unlike the allies and the Germans themselves, who used scorched earth tactics.

As is known, on December 29, 1944, the front commanders of the Soviet Union, Marshals Malinovsky and Tolbukhin, presented an ultimatum to the Budapest garrison, inviting the Germans to surrender and promising life and treatment of prisoners in accordance with international conventions. The enemy committed a serious war crime by ordering the execution of our envoys Miklos Steinmetz and Ivan Ostapenko. Then the assault began. However, it took a whole month and a half to finally take Budapest. Pest fell on January 18, Buda on February 13. Numerous destructions and casualties among the civilian population are entirely on the conscience of the German and Hungarian command.

- But after the capture of Budapest, fighting continued on the territory of Hungary?

Yes, we must not forget about the German offensive in the area of ​​Lake Balaton in March 1945! Here the Red Army had to conduct its last major defensive operation. The Wehrmacht counteroffensive (which also included the 24th Hungarian Infantry Division) was codenamed “Spring Awakening.” During it, the Nazi leadership planned to push our troops back beyond the Danube, thereby eliminating the threat to Vienna and the southern regions of Germany. In addition, in the area of ​​Lake Balaton itself there were some of the last oil fields available to the Germans...

The enemy was still very strong, despite the terrible losses of 1943–1944. Its strength was experienced to a much lesser extent by the allies in the Ardennes, but, unlike them, we did not flee before the enemy in Hungary and did not ask anyone for help. Hitler threw considerable forces into Hungary. Suffice it to say that Sepp Dietrich’s famous “Totenkopf” tank division took part in the Balaton operation.

- You mentioned that Hungarian troops fought together with German troops against the Red Army.

Yes, the troops of Hungary, which joined the Nazi coalition back in November 1940, took part in the attack on the USSR as part of Operation Barbarossa in 1941. They took part in battles on the Eastern Front - in particular in the Battle of Stalingrad, where they suffered catastrophic losses.

But there were also Hungarians who fought on the side of the Red Army. On December 21–22, 1944, the first session of the Provisional National Assembly took place in liberated Debrecen, which formed the Provisional National Government. It consisted of Laszlo Rajk, Kalman Kis, and then Janos Kadar. In general, the government was formed on a coalition basis; in addition to the communists, it included representatives of the Social Democratic, Democratic, and National Peasant Parties.

On January 20, 1945, the new government concluded an armistice agreement with the USSR and then declared war on Germany. As a result, two divisions were created, which subsequently formed the basis of the Hungarian People's Army and came under the operational subordination of the 3rd Ukrainian Front. Together with Soviet troops, they liberated Hungary from Nazism.

Thanks to the liberation by the Red Army, Hungary was saved from fascism and freed from indemnities and reparations.

- What is the attitude towards the liberation mission of the Red Army in Hungary today?

Given the global political changes, of course, there are attempts to revise history here too. However, they are somewhat less aggressive than, for example, in Poland. The attitude towards the liberation mission of the Red Army is primarily dictated by the media, which are directly dependent on the European mass media, and they tend to attribute the mission of liberators to the allies, but not to the USSR. Nevertheless, there are many people in Hungary who are grateful to Russia for the liberation from fascism, and I am sure that descendants will preserve this memory.

- What did the liberation of Hungary mean for the Orthodox Church?

The Hungarians pursued an anti-Orthodox policy and brutally dealt with Orthodox Serbs. Suffice it to mention that the Hopovo monastery on the territory of Serbia, before the departure of the Germans and Hungarians, was burned and the main temple was blown up. The liberation of Hungary by Soviet troops was welcomed by Orthodox minorities - Serbs, Romanians and Rusyns, as they hoped for a revival of Orthodox life, including. and on Hungarian soil.

- What losses did the Germans suffer during the Budapest operation and what kind of losses did we suffer?

By the beginning of the Budapest operation, the 2nd Ukrainian Front consisted of 5 Soviet and 2 Romanian combined arms, 1 tank and 1 air army. The Soviet troops were opposed by the German Army Group South, consisting of 35 divisions, including 9 tank and motorized divisions and 3 brigades, as well as the remnants of the Hungarian army.

The irretrievable losses of the Red Army during the Budapest operation amounted to more than 80 thousand people, more than 240 thousand people were wounded. 1,766 tanks and self-propelled artillery units were lost. Enemy losses amounted to up to 50 thousand killed and 138 thousand captured.

In the Balaton defensive operation, the losses of the 3rd Ukrainian Front amounted to more than 32 thousand people, of which 8.5 thousand were irrevocable. According to Soviet data, the enemy lost over 40 thousand people, more than 300 guns and mortars, about 500 tanks and assault guns, and over 200 aircraft during the counterattack.

- Last question: what is the memory of the liberation of Hungary?

These are monuments to liberating soldiers, including the executed parliamentarians Miklos Steinmetz and Ivan Ostapenko. This is the song “Enemies burned their home” (words by M. Isakovsky, music by M. Blanter). It ends like this:

The soldier got drunk, a tear rolled down,
A tear of unfulfilled hopes,
And there was a glow on his chest
Medal for the City of Budapest.

The troops of the 2nd Ukrainian (commander - Marshal of the Soviet Union Rodion Malinovsky) and part of the forces of the 3rd Ukrainian Front (commander - Marshal of the Soviet Union Fedor Tolbukhin) with the aim of liberating Budapest began on October 29, 1944. Ground troops were supported by aviation and the Danube military flotilla (commander - Rear Admiral Georgy Kholostyakov).

In the Budapest operation, the 1st Bulgarian Army (since January 1945), Romanian units and the Hungarian volunteer Buda Regiment fought alongside Soviet troops.

The troops of the two fronts were opposed by Army Group South (commander - Colonel General Johannes Friesner) and part of the forces of Army Group F - a total of 51 German and Hungarian divisions and two brigades.

By the time the operation began, the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front reached the Chop, Szolnok, Baya line, where they were opposed by the troops of the Nazi Army Group South, as well as parts of the Hungarian army. The troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, having liberated Belgrade, were preparing to advance into Transdanubian Hungary.

The enemy created a deep defense on the approaches to Budapest, consisting of three contours, which rested their flanks on the Danube River north and south of the city (an integral part of the Margarita defensive line).

At the end of October, units of the 2nd Ukrainian Front launched a frontal attack with the aim of capturing Budapest, but the forces for this were not enough. The offensive was stopped. In early December, the troops of the left wing of the front reached the Danube north and northwest of Budapest, cutting off the Budapest enemy group’s escape route to the north. By this time, the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front had crossed the Danube, reached the area northeast of Lake Balaton and created conditions for joint actions with the 2nd Ukrainian Front.

Having launched an offensive on December 20, Soviet troops broke through the enemy’s defenses north and southwest of Budapest and, building on their success, united in the Esztergom area on December 26, completing the encirclement. Subsequently, the battles for the city were fought by a specially created Budapest group of troops (commander - Lieutenant General Ivan Afonin, then Lieutenant General Ivan Managarov) with the participation of Hungarian volunteers.

Of the European capitals taken by Soviet troops, Budapest took first place in terms of the duration of street fighting.

The irretrievable losses of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts and the Danube Military Flotilla amounted to more than 80 thousand people, sanitary losses - more than 240 thousand people.

The successful completion of the Budapest operation dramatically changed the strategic situation and made it possible to develop deep coverage of the southern flank of the Nazi troops. Hungary emerged from the war on the side of Nazi Germany. A threat was created to the communications of the Balkan enemy group, which was forced to accelerate the withdrawal of its troops from Yugoslavia. The troops of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts were given the opportunity to develop an offensive in Czechoslovakia and Vienna.

On June 9, 1945, by Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the medal “For the Capture of Budapest” was established. It was awarded to direct participants in the assault on the city, as well as organizers and leaders of military operations. About 370 thousand people were awarded the medal "For the Capture of Budapest".

The material was prepared based on information from open sources

Additional

As part of the Budapest strategic operation, the following were carried out: Kecskemet-Budapest, Szolnok-Budapest, Nyiregyhaza-Miskolcska, Esztergom-Komarno, Székesfehérváro-Esztergom front-line offensive operations, as well as the assault on Budapest. The duration of the Budapest operation was 108 days, the width of the combat front was 420 km, the depth of advance of Soviet troops was 250-400 km, the average daily rate of attack was 2.5-4 km.

As a result of the Debrecen operation of 1944, the troops of the Second Ukrainian Front (40th, 27th, 53rd, 7th Guards, 46th Armies, 6th Guards Tank Army, 5th Air Army, 1st, 4th Romanian Army, cavalry mechanized group I.A. Pliev, 2nd, 4th Guards Mechanized Corps, total number of 712 thousand people) under the command of R.Ya. Malinovsky reached the line of Chop, Szolnok, Baya, where they were opposed by the troops of the German Army Group South (German 8th and 6th Field Armies, 2nd Tank Army, 3rd Hungarian Army) under the command of Colonel General G Friesner. At the same time, the troops of the Third Ukrainian Front under the command of F.I. Tolbukhin, having completed the Belgrade operation, moved to the southern regions of Hungary. The enemy created a deep defense on the approaches to Budapest, consisting of three contours, which rested their flanks on the Danube River north and south of the city of Budapest. It was an integral part of the Margarita defensive line, which ran from the Drava River along the southwestern coast of lakes Balaton and Velence to the Danube bend near the city of Vac and further along the Czechoslovak-Hungarian border. The city itself was turned into a fortress. By the beginning of the operation, the southeastern approaches to Budapest were defended by the troops of the 3rd Hungarian Army, reinforced by one tank and one motorized German division, and the main forces of Army Group South operated in the Nyiregyház-Miškolc direction.

Taking this circumstance into account, the Soviet command decided to deliver the main blow with the forces of the 46th Army, 2nd and 4th Guards Mechanized Corps southeast of Budapest and capture it. The 7th Guards Army was supposed to launch an auxiliary attack from the area northeast of the city of Szolnok and seize a bridgehead on the western bank of the Tisza River. The remaining forces of the front received the task of advancing in the direction of Miskolc in order to pin down the opposing enemy troops and prevent their transfer to the Budapest area. The Third Ukrainian Front was supposed to complete the concentration of the main forces in the area of ​​the Yugoslav Banat and at the same time, with its advanced units, seize bridgeheads on the right bank of the Danube in Hungary.

On October 29, the troops of the left wing of the Second Ukrainian Front broke through the enemy’s defenses and, after the 2nd and 4th Guards Mechanized Corps entered the battle, began to advance westward. On November 2, mechanized corps came out from the south to the near approaches to Budapest, but were unable to break into the city on the move. The enemy transferred three tank and one mechanized divisions here from the Miskolc area, which strengthened resistance on the approaches to the capital of Hungary. On November 4, the Headquarters ordered the command of the Second Ukrainian Front to expand the offensive zone in order to defeat the Budapest enemy group with attacks from the north, northeast, and south.

On November 11-26, 1944, front troops broke through the enemy defenses between the Tisza and the Danube and, having advanced in a northwestern direction up to 100 km, approached the outer defensive perimeter of Budapest, but this time they were unable to capture the city. With the permission of the Headquarters, the offensive was suspended. On December 5, Soviet troops resumed the offensive, during which they reached the Danube north and northwest of Budapest and cut off the enemy’s escape route to the north. The 46th Army, with the help of the Danube Military Flotilla, crossed the Danube, captured a bridgehead on the right bank, and launched an offensive from here to bypass Budapest from the south.

Having transferred reinforcements, the enemy launched counterattacks on December 7, which were repelled by the troops of the 46th Army. But after reaching the Margarita line, they were forced to go on the defensive. The 57th Army of the Third Ukrainian Front, which crossed the Danube on November 7–9, reached the area south of Lake Balaton by December 9. From the second half of November on the right bank of the Danube, the 4th Guards Army, which arrived as part of the Third Ukrainian Front, began fighting on the right bank of the Danube, whose troops united in the area of ​​Lake Velence with the 46th Army (from December 12 as part of the Third Ukrainian Front). The Budapest enemy group was enveloped by Soviet troops from the north and southwest.

On December 12, the Headquarters ordered the Second and Third Ukrainian Fronts to encircle and defeat the enemy group in Budapest and capture the capital of Hungary. The offensive began on December 20. By the end of December 26, the troops of the Second and Third Ukrainian Fronts united in the Esztergom area, completing the encirclement of the Budapest enemy group. However, its liquidation was delayed, since the troops of the Third Ukrainian Front had to repel three counterattacks of the enemy, who was trying to release the encircled forces and restore the defenses along the Danube.
Despite the enemy's superiority in tanks, the troops of the Third Ukrainian Front pushed the counterattack group of German troops back to their original positions. This was facilitated by the offensive of the main forces of the Second Ukrainian Front on Komarno in the first half of January 1945. From December 27, 1944 to February 13, 1945, the battle for Budapest was fought by a specially created Budapest group of troops (three rifle corps, nine artillery brigades) from the Second Ukrainian Front. The Budapest group of troops was first commanded by I.M. Afonin, then I.M. Managarov. The battles ended with the liquidation of the 188,000-strong enemy group and the capture of Budapest. Meanwhile, the 27th, 40th, 53rd armies, Pliev's cavalry-mechanized group, and formations of Romanian troops entered the territory of Czechoslovakia.

The military-political results of the Budapest operation were the defeat of the German Army Group South, the capture of Budapest, and the withdrawal of Hungary from the war; Favorable conditions were created for an offensive in Czechoslovakia and in the Vienna direction. The threat to the communications of enemy troops in Yugoslavia that arose as a result of the operation forced the German command to accelerate their withdrawal. By decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated June 9, 1945, the medal was established

During October 1944, Soviet troops, during the Debrecen operation, liberated one third of the territory of Hungary and created favorable conditions for the development of an offensive in the Budapest direction. It was here, in the center and on the left wing of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, that its strongest group was located - the 53rd, 7th Guards and 46th armies (31 rifle divisions in total), 2 tank and 3 mechanized corps, as well as the Romanian 1 1st Army (2 infantry and 1 cavalry divisions).

They were opposed in a strip 250 km wide by 11 enemy divisions, mostly Hungarian, from Army Group South. The main forces of the German and Hungarian troops - 31 divisions and 3 brigades - were deployed to repel attacks by the 38th Army of the 4th Ukrainian Front and the army formations of the right wing of the 2nd Ukrainian Front.

Taking into account the current situation, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command made a decision: with the forces of the center and left wing of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, continue the offensive without an operational pause, quickly defeat the enemy in the area between the Tissa and Danube rivers, and then immediately capture Budapest. Thus began, which lasted from October 29, 1944 to February 13, 1945.

Distribution of forces on the approaches to the city

The German-Hungarian command on the approaches to Budapest created a defense in depth, consisting of three defensive lines, which rested their flanks on the Danube River north and south of the city. The Budapest defense area was an integral part of the Margarita defensive line, which ran from the Drava River along the southwestern coast of lakes Balaton and Velence to the Danube bend near the city of Vac and further along the Czechoslovak-Hungarian border. The city itself was turned into a fortress. By the beginning of the operation, the southeastern approaches to Budapest were defended by troops of the 3rd Hungarian Army, reinforced by German tank and motorized divisions.

The Supreme Commander-in-Chief's plan for the operation was to deliver the main attack on Budapest from the southeast and east. This decision was predetermined by the fact that this direction was the most convenient for the advance of Soviet troops and was covered by relatively weak enemy forces.

The commander of the 2nd Ukrainian Front decided to deliver the main blow with the forces of the 46th Army, 2nd and 4th Guards Mechanized Corps southeast of Budapest and capture it. The 7th Guards Army was supposed to launch an auxiliary attack from the area northeast of the city of Szolnok and seize a bridgehead on the western bank of the Tisza River. The remaining forces of the front received the task of advancing in the direction of Miskolc in order to pin down the opposing enemy troops and prevent their transfer to the Budapest area.

Marshal F.I. Tolbukhin planned to complete the concentration of the main forces in the area of ​​the Yugoslav city of Banat and at the same time, with advanced units, to seize bridgeheads on the right bank of the Danube in Hungary.

The offensive begins on October 29

The offensive began on October 29. On the left wing of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, the 46th Army under the command of Lieutenant General I.T. Shlemin broke through the defenses on the first day and, introducing mechanized corps, began a rapid advance. On November 2, these corps were already 15 km southeast of Budapest, but they were unable to enter the city on the move. The reason was that the German command quickly transferred three tank and motorized divisions to Budapest, which, having occupied defensive lines, were able to stop the advance of Soviet troops. In the center and on the right wing of the front, Soviet troops encountered serious enemy resistance when crossing the Tisza River.

The Supreme High Command headquarters was forced to point out to the commander of the 2nd Ukrainian Front that further attempts to attack Budapest in a narrow area with limited forces could lead to unjustified losses and expose the troops operating in this direction to a flank attack from the enemy from the northeast. On November 4, the Headquarters demanded that Marshal R. Ya. Malinovsky accelerate the withdrawal of front troops to the right bank of the Tisza in order to defeat the Budapest enemy group with attacks from the north, northeast and south. In order to strengthen the troops of the center of the front, a regrouping of the 6th Guards Tank Army of Lieutenant General A. G. Kravchenko and the cavalry mechanized group of Lieutenant General I. A. Pliev, who had previously operated in the direction of Debrecen - Nyiregyhaza, began here.

Another attempt to enter the city

Following these instructions, the front troops resumed their offensive on November 11. It lasted 16 days. However, it was not possible to cut up and defeat the Budapest group east of the city. The second attempt to capture Budapest was unsuccessful. After the regrouping of the tank army, the troops of the center of the front went on the offensive and crossed the Tisza River by November 10. Developing the offensive, mobile troops captured the city of Hatvan on November 26, and by the end of November - the city of Eger, thereby leveling the front line, which was occupied by the left wing troops that had previously advanced to Budapest.

Thus, the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front achieved significant success by the end of November. At the same time, it should be noted that the main task - to defeat the enemy group in Budapest - was not completed by the front troops. The enemy managed to create a dense defense on the immediate approaches to Budapest, transferring 12 divisions from the 4th Ukrainian Front to the Budapest direction, the offensive of which developed extremely slowly at the end of October - the first half of November. The headquarters demanded that its commander conduct an offensive with full effort in order to quickly reach the line of the Ondava River. Following this instruction, the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front broke through the enemy’s defenses in the second half of November, captured the cities of Humenne and Michalovce on November 26, and advanced units began crossing the Ondava River.

On December 5, 1944, the 2nd Ukrainian Front resumed its offensive. For eight days, the troops of the center and left wing tried to encircle the enemy by encircling from the north and southwest. At the same time, the mobile formations of the front reached the Ipel River, bordering Czechoslovakia, together with the 7th Guards Army of Colonel General M.S. Shumilov, they reached the left bank of the Danube near the city of Vac (20 km north of Budapest) and, advancing from Vac in a southerly direction, overcame the first and second lines of the outer defense of Budapest. At the same time, the 46th Army crossed the Danube 15 km south of the city and captured a bridgehead 14 km along the front and 10–16 km in depth. But due to lack of forces and fierce enemy resistance, she was unable to reach the Hungarian capital from the southwest. Thus, the third attempt to capture Budapest was unsuccessful.

Regrouping of troops

At this time, the troops of Marshal F.I. Tolbukhin were completing their regrouping from Belgrade to Budapest. Their complete concentration in the area of ​​​​the cities of Bahia, Machac, Sombor (135–180 km south of Budapest) was completed by November 25–26. In parallel with the regrouping, the front crossed the Danube with part of its forces in the concentration area and captured an important bridgehead.

Relying on it, the 57th Army of Lieutenant General M. N. Sharokhin and the 4th Guards Army of Army General G. F. Zakharov went on the offensive on November 27, liberated the Transdanubian part of Hungary and Yugoslav territory between the Danube and Drava rivers and by 9 December reached the milestone of Lake Velence, Lake Balaton, the city of Bartsch (80 km south of Lake Balaton). This created a real opportunity to strike at the rear of the Budapest enemy group from the west. In order to prepare for such a strike, Marshal F.I. Tolbukhin ordered the front troops to gain a foothold on the achieved lines in front of the enemy defensive line “Margarita”.

The Germans defended stubbornly

The German command took all measures to prevent the capture of Budapest by Soviet troops and the withdrawal of its last ally from the war. Thanks to the OKH reserve, new formations and regrouping, it increased the composition of Army Group South from 38 to 51 divisions and brigades. Nevertheless, the enemy was inferior to the Soviet troops in strength and means. Thus, the strike group of the 3rd Ukrainian Front outnumbered the enemy in men by 3.3 times, in guns by 4.8 times, in tanks and self-propelled guns by 3.5 times.

Assessing the composition and distribution of German and Hungarian troops in directions, the Soviet command came to the conclusion that the enemy intended not only to retain Budapest, but also to prevent the Red Army from entering Czechoslovakia and Austria. In such a situation, on December 12, the Supreme High Command Headquarters decided with the troops of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts to first of all defeat the Budapest group and capture the city of Budapest. To this end, she ordered Marshal R. Ya. Malinovsky to transfer the 46th Army with reinforcements to Marshal F. I. Tolbukhin and assigned tasks to both fronts to prepare for joint actions. The essence of the plan was to use the forces of two fronts to break through the enemy’s defenses to the north and southwest of Budapest and, advancing towards each other, to encircle the enemy group, and then to capture the city with simultaneous attacks from the west and east.

The offensive, which began on December 20, developed successfully. By the end of December 26, the troops of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts united at Esztergom (35 km northwest of Budapest), completing the encirclement of the 188,000-strong enemy group (about 10 divisions and a number of units of various types of troops). Having created an external front of encirclement and pushing the enemy west of Budapest, Soviet troops simultaneously tightened the ring around the city. The enemy, blocked in the forests northwest of Budapest, was destroyed by the end of December.

Ultimatum of surrender

On December 29, the command of both fronts, in order to avoid further bloodshed and destruction of Budapest, presented an ultimatum to the encircled troops to surrender. However, the enemy command not only rejected this humane act, but also ordered the murder of the envoys captains M. Steinmetz and I. A. Ostapenko, committing a blatant act of dishonor and violation of international law on the inviolability of envoys. Then Soviet troops began to eliminate the encircled enemy. But this process turned out to be lengthy.

During January 1945, the troops of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts had to fight heavy battles to repel counterattacks of German troops, whose goal was to release their Budapest group and restore the front line along the Danube. The German command, having concentrated almost half of all tank and motorized divisions available on the Soviet-German front near Budapest, launched three strong counterattacks against the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front from January 2 to 26.

When repelling the first counterattack, launched from January 2 to January 7, 1945 from the area southeast of the city of Komarno along the southern bank of the Danube, the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front were greatly assisted by the active actions of the troops of the left wing of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, especially the 6th th Guards Tank Army. The rapid entry of this army into the Komarno region forced the German command to abandon the plan to break through to Budapest. In addition, three rifle divisions and an anti-tank destroyer brigade were transferred to the 3rd Ukrainian Front from the 2nd Ukrainian Front.

The enemy launched the third counterattack on January 18 from the area southwest of the city of Székesfehérvár. He managed to reach the Danube, and then approach Budapest from the south at a distance of 25 km. In the fierce battles that unfolded, the troops of Marshal F.I. Tolbukhin, despite the superiority of the German troops in tanks, not only stopped their advance, but also threw them back to their original positions. A significant role in this was played by the skillful maneuver of the Soviet troops, the rapid creation of new defensive lines along the enemy’s advance paths and the offensive of the troops of the right wing of the 2nd Ukrainian Front in the direction of Komarno, to the rear of the enemy’s counterattack group.

In repelling enemy counterattacks, aviation from both fronts provided great assistance to the ground forces. During January 1945, only the 17th Air Army (Colonel General of Aviation V.A. Sudets) of the 3rd Ukrainian Front flew over 14 thousand sorties. In tense moments, the 5th Air Army (Colonel General of Aviation S.K. Goryunov) of the 2nd Ukrainian Front was also involved in attacks on enemy troops.

Directly in the city, the battles were fought by a specially created Budapest group of troops, headed by Lieutenant General I.M. Afonin (since January 22 - Lieutenant General I.M. Managarov). It consisted of four rifle corps from both fronts and, until January 18, the Romanian army corps. Budapest was a fortress prepared by the Nazis for long-term defense. It was surrounded by barbed wire, surrounded by all kinds of fortifications and barriers, and cut with trenches. The city had large reserves of material resources.

Food, fuel and ammunition were delivered to the defending garrison by air. Hitler ordered to fight for the city to the last soldier. The battles for the liberation of the eastern part of the city (Pest) took place from December 27 to January 18, and the western part (Buda) - from January 20 to February 13. Many Hungarian soldiers and officers took part in the battles for the liberation of Buda, who voluntarily went over to the side of the Soviet troops. According to the memoirs of General S. M. Shtemenko, these Hungarian volunteer soldiers “words did not diverge from deeds.” It was from their number, according to incomplete data, that about 600 people died a heroic death in the battles for the liberation of Budapest from the occupiers. The remaining Hungarian volunteers - a total of about 3,200 people - formed the basis of the Buda Volunteer Regiment.

The conditions of the assault were a severe test for the residents of Budapest. The commander of the 9th SS Corps, who was in the besieged capital of Hungary, characterizing their mood, wrote with fear in his diary on January 10: “The civilian population is in an extremely agitated state. People practically do not receive food, large sections of the city are left without water, lighting... discontent is growing.”

Although the Soviet offensive developed slowly, the position of the encircled enemy became worse and worse. If at first 40–45 planes delivered the necessary supplies every day, then from January 20 the supply was disrupted by Soviet aviation. On February 13, the enemy group in Budapest, having lost up to 50 thousand killed and 138 thousand prisoners, ceased to exist.

Capture of Budapest and results

This concluded the Budapest offensive operation. During its course, Soviet troops advanced from 120 to 240 km, liberated about 45% of the territory of Hungary (and taking into account the Debrecen operation - 74%) and created the conditions for a further offensive in Czechoslovakia. With the arrival of Soviet troops at the Nesmey line, Lake Balaton, favorable conditions developed for launching subsequent attacks on the enemy in the Vienna direction.

The most important result was that the Soviet troops forced the German command to transfer a large number of formations, especially tank and motorized ones, to the southern flank of the Soviet-German front, which were urgently needed to repel the Red Army’s offensive in the Warsaw-Berlin direction in January-February 1945.

These results were achieved at great cost. The losses of Soviet troops amounted to 320,082 people, of which 80,082 were killed, 1,766 tanks and self-propelled guns, 4,127 guns and mortars, 293 combat aircraft.

The population of the Hungarian capital, who had survived not only the fascist occupation, but also 108 difficult days of the blockade, greeted the Soviet soldiers with relief, although with conflicting feelings. There was the influence of fascist propaganda, which instilled fear in the population and portrayed Soviet soldiers in the image of “red devils,” as well as rumors about Stalin’s camps and the activities of the NKVD. At the same time, the information that “among the Russian liberators there are Hungarians” who went over to their side gave people hope.

The destruction of the German group in the Hungarian capital accelerated the process of expelling the Nazi occupiers from the country, increased unrest in the Hungarian army, and the transition of its soldiers to the partisans or to the side of the Red Army. The total number of Hungarians who fought with weapons in their hands on the side of the Soviet troops against the Germans, according to Hungarian historians, was approximately 6–6.5 thousand people. But it is also true that about 11 divisions of the 1st and 3rd Hungarian armies fought together with the German troops against the Red Army. The mass surrender of their soldiers and officers began only with the completion of the liberation of Hungarian territory. For example, from March 28 to March 30 alone, 45 thousand Hungarians were captured in the areas bordering Austria. Hungary actually remained an ally of Germany until the Red Army completely captured its territory.

The offensive actions of Soviet troops in the autumn and winter of 1944–1945 in the southwestern direction led to a radical change in the entire political situation in the Balkans. To Romania and Bulgaria, which were previously withdrawn from the war, another state was added - Hungary. With the withdrawal of Hungary from the war, the bloc of fascist states completely collapsed.

The Soviet government highly appreciated the actions of the troops in the Budapest operation. On June 9, 1945, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR established the medal “For the Capture of Budapest,” which was awarded to 350 thousand people. 79 formations and units received the honorary name of Budapest.