General Staff of the Russian Federation. What is the GRU (Main Intelligence Directorate): history of creation, structure, command. strategic human intelligence

14.08.2020

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Igor Korobov was born on August 3, 1956 in the city of Vyazma, Smolensk region. In 1977, he graduated with honors from the flight department of the Stavropol Higher Military Aviation School of Air Defense Pilots and Navigators named after Air Marshal Sudets.

In November 1977, Lieutenant Igor Korobov arrived on assignment for further service in the 518th Fighter Aviation Berlin Order of Suvorov Regiment, the 10th Separate Red Banner Air Defense Army stationed in the city of Arkhangelsk. In 1980, he was selected for further service in the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR.

In 1985, Korobov received additional education, successfully graduating from the Military-Diplomatic Academy of the Soviet Army. He served in military service in various leadership positions. He was the first deputy head of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, supervising strategic intelligence issues. In particular, all foreign management residencies were under the jurisdiction of Igor Valentinovich. Graduated from the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces.

In January 2016, by decree of the President of the Russian Federation, Igor Valentinovich Korobov was appointed head of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation - Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

In early February 2016, the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, Army General Sergei Shoigu, presented Lieutenant General Igor Korobov with the personal standard of the Chief of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

In May 2017, for the courage and heroism shown in the performance of military duty, Colonel General Igor Valentinovich Korobov was awarded the title of Hero of the Russian Federation with a special distinction - the Gold Star medal.

Korobov made a visit to the United States on January 27-28, 2018, together with the head of the FSB Bortnikov and the head of the SVR Naryshkin. They all met in Washington with CIA Director Pompeo, and it was the most high-status and representative meeting of the heads of American and Russian intelligence services. The parties discussed the threat of the return of Islamic State militants from Syria, who had previously arrived to fight in Syria from other countries.

Speaks several foreign languages. Married. Has two daughters.

The head of the main directorate of the Russian General Staff, Igor Valentinovich Korobov, died on November 21, 2018 after a serious and long illness.

Ermolin Anatoly

February 23 is Defenders of the Fatherland Day. But after the terrorist attack in Domodedovo, which was preceded by explosions in the metro, on the railway, in the air, it is simply ridiculous to say that the Russian state protects its citizens. Although this is precisely protection from internal and external threats - the main function of the state, what we pay taxes for. There are many reasons for this. The first and main thing is corruption, which permeated the entire vertical of power from bottom to top, including the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Lubyanka. The explosives were brought to Domodedovo from the North Caucasus by bus, without hindrance passing all possible checkpoints and checks - exactly the same way as bombs were brought to the theater in Dubrovka 8 years ago. The price is hundreds of human lives. The second reason, closely linked to the first, is the inability of the authorities to formulate a clear, substantiated concept of national interests and to identify real challenges. The concept of national security formulated by the Security Council still sees NATO and the United States as the main enemy. Hence the complete chaos in organizations whose job is to obtain information about threats before they become bloody facts of our lives.

A striking example of this is the situation with the institution that was once the country's second most important intelligence service: the GRU, the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces. The New Times looked into what is happening to our security and to those who are called upon to protect it.

The GRU headquarters on Khodynka is a complex of buildings with an area of more than 70 thousand square meters. meters, the construction of which was completed in 2006, is almost deserted. Noisy empty corridors and complete uncertainty. The destruction of the GRU was preceded by a media campaign that few noticed. Already after the first arrest of GRU Colonel Vladimir Kvachkov in 2005 in connection with assassination attempt on Anatoly Chubais rumors spread that inside the service militant terrorist groups are formed(Kvachkov’s last arrest in December 2010 turned these rumors into real accusations).

["Rossiyskaya Gazeta", 02/04/2011, "The court recognized the arrest of Vladimir Kvachkov as legal": The capital's Lefortovo court on Friday recognized as legal the decision to prosecute reserve colonel Vladimir Kvachkov. He is accused of attempted armed rebellion and facilitating terrorist activities. […] Let us recall that Kvachkov was taken into custody on December 23 by a decision of the Lefortovo Court of Moscow at the request of the Investigative Department of the FSB of Russia. The court authorized his detention until February 23. He is charged under serious articles of the Criminal Code - promoting terrorist activities and attempted armed rebellion. The colonel, if the court finds him guilty, faces 20 years in prison. […]
The former military intelligence officer himself suggests that the basis for his new persecution was the testimony of his colleague from Tolyatti.
- According to the documents that exist, in Tolyatti a man armed with (I emphasize) a crossbow for 10 thousand rubles sent a group to Vladimir, which was preparing an armed rebellion there. He was the head of the Togliatti branch of the People's Militia of Minin and Pozharsky. He was arrested. After 10 days of interrogation, he testified against me,” Kvachkov told reporters. - Insert K.ru]

Films like the series “Spy Games” began to appear on the screens, exposing traitors among the top of the GRU, organizing endless conspiracies, drawing up hit lists of oligarchs and politicians, trading right and left the military secrets of the Motherland. Naturally, they were exposed by “close neighbors” (as the KGB was called in Soviet times, while the GRU was called “distant neighbors”), that is, the Federal Security Service. How could it be otherwise, if comes from this service Has he been ruling the country for 10 years now? Since all the main events took place “under the carpet,” citizens simply did not see that a powerful propaganda campaign was underway to prepare for the liquidation of the GRU.

Camber

GRU officers consider the destruction of the military intelligence system a fait accompli. A little more than three months ago, on November 5, 2010, celebrating their professional holiday in the Crocus City banquet hall, veterans and active officers of the service, one after another, raised toasts to the “blessed memory” of the intelligence agency with which their personal and professional were connected fate.

The GRU is historically the most secret intelligence service of the intelligence community, first of the USSR and then of Russia. That is why it is the most vulnerable. Even veterans can talk about its problems only when, as they say, they’ve had enough, and despair turns out to be stronger than the habit of living under the heading “secret”. The current situation is such that there seems to be nothing left to lose.

Lieutenant General Dmitry Gerasimov, the former head of the GRU department who led all special forces brigades, said in an interview with The New Times: “I am deeply convinced that the GRU special forces collapsed absolutely deliberately. Of the 14 brigades and two training regiments of the GRU, at best, no more than four brigades remained. At the same time, one must understand that this is no longer GRU special forces, but ordinary military reconnaissance, part of the Ground Forces. One of the best brigades, Berdskaya, was liquidated. With great difficulty we managed to defend the 22nd Brigade, which in peacetime received the high rank of “Guards”. This is our most combat-ready formation, constantly fighting in the most critical areas in Afghanistan, Chechnya and other “hot spots”. I can say that the so-called “osnaz” - electronic reconnaissance units - have also been eliminated. Essentially, we are building a military that sees and hears nothing.”

According to rough estimates by experts, of the 7 thousand officers who served in the GRU during Soviet times, now less than 2 thousand remain in the structure. According to intelligence officers with whom The New Times spoke, the GRU stayed afloat until its former chief, General, left it army Valentin Korabelnikov: after his forced resignation at the end of the summer of 2009, the final purge of the GRU began.

A high-ranking GRU employee, who resigned together with Korabelnikov from the central apparatus of military intelligence, told The New Times on condition of anonymity that he considers the collapse of the service a deliberate action: “The first attempts to systematically weaken the GRU were made under Pavel Grachev. At the initial stage, the main blow was dealt to the “base”, as a result of which all the radio-electronic intelligence centers that existed in the USSR were liquidated both on the territory of our country, with the exception of the Transcaucasian direction, and at Russian military bases. Further, all the main lines of work of the GRU, from strategic and human intelligence to auxiliary units and the Military Diplomatic Academy, which trained intelligence officers both for the apparatus of military attaches and for the illegal residencies of the GRU, were gradually weakened and reduced.”

It is known that in the specialized research institute of the GRU, all development and research work (OKR and R&D) has been stopped. At the Military Diplomatic Academy (MDA), reductions in teaching staff have begun. According to the interlocutor of The New Times, the number of “extractive units” of the GRU, responsible for intelligence and strategic intelligence on the territory of foreign countries, has been reduced by 40%. Perhaps the leadership of the Ministry of Defense has its own reasons for this, but it was done so clumsily that today a huge number of intelligence officers performing official duties outside of Russia already know that they actually have nowhere to return. This not only deprives them of any motivation for further work, but also turns them into potential targets for recruitment by foreign intelligence services.

Mass layoffs are taking place among the most experienced GRU officers, who are dismissed on formal grounds in connection with reaching the length of service established by law. Unlike the SVR, which has a sufficient number of specialized educational institutions for recruiting and intelligence training of very young people, the specifics and traditions of the GRU require that only the most experienced military officers, whose age at the time of joining the GRU is already at least 30– 35 years. The dismissal of such specialists is an obvious waste of the “gold reserve” of the Russian intelligence community.

Strangers among our own

Today, GRU combat employees can be found both in expensive offices and at train stations, where they work as loaders, in shops, among repairmen or general workers. They speak mostly obscenely about the reform of their former service, but sometimes they squeeze out correct definitions.

“The GRU empire is dying,” says the “professor,” an imposing middle-aged man in a starched shirt, in appearance a typical representative of the creative bohemia. “I have this image in my eyes: a professional athlete whose legs and arms were amputated, his eye was knocked out and his eardrum was damaged. He is still alive, he understands everything, he still sees something, he hears with difficulty, his heart is still beating, but he will no longer be able to be reborn.” "Professor" is an analyst with extensive experience in human intelligence. Fluent in several European languages and Arabic, he has traveled to more than 50 countries. Dismissed as unnecessary. Now unemployed.

"Furniture assembler" - space intelligence officer. About 40 years old. Well-mannered, educated, military bearing, correct literary speech and competence unusual for a worker are striking. He works part-time in an Italian furniture salon. Assembles imported furniture and installs household appliances. “It’s disgusting to see how our pathetic attempts to save at least something from the Soviet cosmonautics are passed off as achievements of recent years,” he says irritably. - This is necessary: Serdyukov (Minister of Defense) is advertising the Resurs satellite! They are still Soviet-made and are stored in warehouses. And they were made not for the military, but for oil workers. There is no resolution at all, it’s hard to distinguish a cruiser from an aircraft carrier, and it gets completely confused in armored vehicles.”

“We and military intelligence are two very different things, but the GRU special forces were merged into the Ground Forces,” says a well-built man, about fifty years old. - But we were the most productive: and Khattab, And Basayev- our work". Senior GRU special forces officer, awarded four military orders. Extensive experience in special events around the world. He carried out special missions in Yugoslavia and fought in the North Caucasus for many years. Is no longer needed.

But the heaviest blow fell on the GRU agents. Against the backdrop of public support for the SVR after failure of an illegal foreign intelligence network, associated today with the name of Anna Chapman, nothing is being done demonstratively to protect GRU agents captured on the territory of Georgia and other Transcaucasian states. All the latest failures of military intelligence are used only to justify the ineffectiveness of the GRU. According to The New Times' interlocutors, as a result of this approach, a number of agents recruited on the territory of the states of South-West Asia have already been executed.

The formal reason for the systematic attack on the GRU was the army’s unpreparedness for an armed conflict with Georgia. Thus, according to the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Colonel General Anatoly Nogovitsyn, who commanded a group of Russian troops during the Russian-Georgian armed conflict in August 2008, a surprise for the General Staff was the presence on the Georgian side of Soviet air defense systems such as the Buk air defense system and modern Western air defense systems. airspace control, which made it possible to cause serious damage to the Russian Air Force. According to current officers of the GRU central apparatus, at a meeting of the leadership staff following the war, without mincing words, the Minister of Defense accused military intelligence of not possessing the necessary intelligence information. Meanwhile, the intelligence officers themselves claim that their information was simply not considered when assessing the operational situation and making decisions by the country's top leadership. According to them, military intelligence sent all the necessary information, including information about the supply of modernized Buk systems to Ukraine. So both the Ministry of Defense and the country’s top government leadership were at least aware of the situation. Or it could have been known if the GRU had paid attention to the information. But: the chief of military intelligence has lost the right to directly report personally to the president, and the information he sends passes through at least two filters - through the chief of the General Staff and the minister of defense. In the context of military reform, when there is a redistribution of resources and money, when generals of different branches of the military are fighting to maintain their posts and feeders, the one who has direct access to the “ear” wins. The GRU, a constant and long-standing competitor of the KGB and those who succeeded the committee, was deprived of this access.

Don't ask why

According to a former high-ranking officer of the GRU central apparatus, “even very big people” who try to answer the question of what is the point in destroying the institution of military intelligence, at best end up in retirement, at worst, they die under unclear circumstances, as happened with General GRU Major Yuri Ivanov, who was responsible for organizing military intelligence throughout the Caucasus region. The body of 53-year-old General Ivanov, the country's most important secret keeper, who, according to the official version, was on vacation in Syria, was strangely discovered in the coastal waters of Turkey in August 2010.

["Komsomolskaya Pravda", 08/30/2010, "The mysterious death of a GRU general": The deputy chief of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff, Major General Yuri Ivanov, was buried on August 28. On the same day, an obituary appeared in the official press organ of the Ministry of Defense, the Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper. Meanwhile, the general died on August 6 - he drowned while diving and his body was found in Turkish territorial waters in the Mediterranean Sea. It is also known that Yuri Ivanov was on a business trip to Syria, which borders Turkey.
There are three main versions of the death of a high-ranking intelligence officer. The first is heart problems that arose during deep-sea diving (Ivanov was quite seriously interested in diving). However, the 53-year-old general was in good health and had never complained about the “motor” before. The second is a malfunction of underwater equipment. Here there may be questions - whether it was rented, brought with us, or borrowed from Russian specialists in Syria itself. The Turkish side did not transfer any data on the equipment to Russia.
The third version is an assassination attempt. Scouts of this level quite rarely die naturally (unless due to old age). Previously, Yuri Ivanov headed the intelligence service of the North Caucasus District and visited Chechnya several times. […]
And in Syria, the general was clearly carrying out a mission that corresponds to his high position. Most likely he was inspecting a Russian maintenance base located in the port of Tartus. By 2011, a full-fledged overseas naval base should appear there, and it would be impossible to do without the participation of intelligence in its activities. - Insert K.ru]

As an interlocutor told The New Times, veterans of the service cite three reasons that explain not only the death of the general, but in general the entire amount of measures to eliminate military intelligence.

First: the main business of the customers of the so-called GRU reform is related to money laundering and offshore companies. And only the GRU strategic intelligence could pose a threat to this business, since it had the ability to control and monitor such actions. And at the same time, she did not belong to the KGB-FSB-SVR corporation.

Second: a certain informal “special service” has already been formed in Russia, serving the interests of a narrow group of people who actually govern the country. The people working for this structure are not gathered together, but serve in a variety of divisions of various special services of the Russian Federation. For the successful functioning of such a “network system of the elite,” it is important to solve one difficult task: to destroy all alternative sources of intelligence information capable of independent comparative analysis.

Third: competition. The positions of the FSB and SVR can be protected by the country's top leadership, close to these special services. The interests of the GRU are alien to these people. The example of the United States, where there are more than a dozen different independent intelligence services, is not accepted as an argument. The ability to provide a competitive advantage to “our own” is more important than solving real intelligence problems.

The New Times' interlocutors see another problem that can be solved by destroying the GRU. It is closely connected with the interests of influential non-military groups related to unresolved hotbeds of tension, for example, in the Caucasus. The fact is that there is a certain specificity of the actions of special forces groups and their fundamental difference from the tactics of military reconnaissance officers. The main advantage of the GRU special forces is the combination of operational skills in obtaining information with combat operations, including the use of special means. Special forces intelligence officers, unlike military intelligence officers, are capable of operating both in the city - as an illegal underground, and in the forest - as a classic sabotage unit. Employees of such a unit, as a by-product of their activities, can gain access to very confidential information about real channels and sources of funding, about federal contacts of their “wards,” etc. But competitors from the Lubyanka have no guarantees of loyalty to the secret police intelligence officers.

Fools and agents

“This is all abstruse and conspiracy theory,” says former GRU employee, member of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, Colonel Vitaly Shlykov, to whom The New Times outlined the arguments of his former colleagues, military intelligence officers. The main problem, Shlykov is convinced, is “cowardly sabotage of the reform of the armed forces carried out by Minister Serdyukov on the part of individual “arrogant generals.” According to Shlykov, the situation that has developed in military intelligence cannot be classified as a collapse, since nothing terrible is happening there. Highly professional special forces, the expert answers General Gerasimov, in general, in his opinion, should not be subordinate to military intelligence: an independent body should be created, which should be entrusted with command of special forces, as is customary in most of the most developed countries of the world, Shlykov believes. As for the virtually destroyed global electronic intelligence network of the GRU, then, according to the expert, today Russia, with all its desire, cannot play the geopolitical role that belonged to the USSR during the Cold War, just as there is no global confrontation between the two camps. So why spend huge amounts of money on this?

Strategic and human intelligence intelligence is a completely different matter, according to Shlykov. Russia cannot lose this resource. But he is convinced that in the GRU there was a situation where the value of an agent was leveled by unqualified analytics: “Agents - yes, they were valuable, but there were fools in charge of them!” A recognized expert in the field of military development believes that the GRU, which had a huge information and analytical service (it included 6 thematic directorates and 6 departments in the structure of the 7th directorate, working only through NATO), for a long time abused the exclusive right to analysis and interpretation of the information obtained, without giving the opportunity to work in this area for other analytical groups, for example, such as the center headed by the former head of the SVR and former Minister of Foreign Affairs, academician Yevgeny Primakov (The New Times was unable to obtain Primakov’s comment). “It was high time to demonopolize the information obtained,” says Colonel Shlykov.

Demonopolized. Together with the entire GRU system.

* Pavel Grachev was the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation in 1992–1996.

** These are the bases “Lourdes” in Cuba, “Vostok” in Vietnam, “Zvezda” in Burma, “Ramona” in the DPRK, “Horizon” in Mongolia.

*** For all military personnel, this age occurs after 25 calendar years of service and on average it occurs at 42-45 years.

**** Self-propelled anti-aircraft missile system for combating air targets at low and medium altitudes.

Failures of Russian military intelligence from 2000 to 2011

2000, Japan

On September 7, 2000, representatives of Japanese counterintelligence arrested Captain 3rd Rank Shigehiro Hagisaki during dinner in a Tokyo restaurant with Russian military attaché Viktor Bogatenkov.

For a long time, a Japanese officer conveyed to a representative of Russian military intelligence information about units and formations of the US Navy stationed on the territory of his country. After the arrest of Shigehiro Hagisaki, the Russian intelligence officer was expelled from the country.

2001, Bulgaria

At the end of March 2001, three GRU officers were expelled from Bulgaria: military attaché Captain 1st Rank Vladimir Lomakin, his deputy Colonel Sergei Vlasenko and embassy adviser Boris Smirnov.

This event was preceded by the detention by counterintelligence agencies of the former head of the analytical department of the Bulgarian military intelligence service, as well as the director of the secret archive service of the country's Ministry of Defense. According to local press reports, it was these Bulgarian intelligence officers who transmitted information about the situation in the Balkans to Russian intelligence officers. In addition, they could transmit information regarding the mothballed intelligence network of the Bulgarian special services, data on the abuse of influential persons and politicians, information about wanted documents, persons, etc. Embassy adviser Boris Smirnov was also accused of trying to bring people who were friendly towards Russia into the Bulgarian national parliament.

2004, Germany

At the end of 2004, in the city of Amorbach, German counterintelligence agencies detained the Consul General of the Russian Federation in Hamburg, Alexander Kuzmin.

Information about military systems, about the latest German weapons, as well as governing documents of the Bundeswehr was provided to him by an agent who later turned out to be a double agent. After his arrest and transfer to the Russian side, Alexander Kuzmin left Germany.

2004, Qatar

On February 13, 2004, in the capital of Qatar, Doha, the car of the ex-president of the unrecognized republic of Ichkeria Zelimkhan Yandarbiev was blown up. Two bodyguards died on the spot, Yandarbiev’s 13-year-old son Daud was wounded, and the separatist leader himself was taken with serious injuries to the intensive care unit of one of the city hospitals, where he later died on the operating table. On February 18, 2004, local law enforcement authorities detained three employees of the Russian diplomatic mission in Qatar on suspicion of organizing a terrorist act: Secretary of the Russian Embassy in Qatar Alexander Fetisov (later released by local authorities), Anatoly Belashkov and Vasily Bogachev. The last two returned to their homeland only in December 2004 after long negotiations with the Qatari side.

2005, Germany

Russian military intelligence officer Alexander Parfentyev, who served as an employee of the military attache at the Russian embassy in Berlin, was detained in the spring of 2005. The German side claimed that Parfentiev managed to recruit a Bundeswehr officer and organize the collection of information. But later, the German soldier decided to turn himself in to the counterintelligence authorities. On March 10, 2005, before a meeting with the agent, the Russian diplomat was detained by German counterintelligence agencies. After being detained and handed over to the Russian side, GRU officer Parfentyev left Germany.

2007, Austria

In June 2007, Vladimir Vozhzhov, deputy head of the international cooperation department of Roscosmos, was detained by Austrian counterintelligence agencies. He was in Vienna as a member of the Russian delegation that arrived at a meeting of the UN Committee on Outer Space. After a harsh reaction from the Russian Foreign Ministry (Vladimir Vozhzhov had diplomatic immunity, but the Austrian side demanded that Moscow deprive him of this status and transfer it to local justice), the Roscosmos representative was expelled from Austria.

According to the Austrian press, the source of the Russian intelligence officer was Austrian Air Force non-commissioned officer Harald Z., who served in a helicopter squadron. He began collaborating with Russian military intelligence back in 1995. According to one version of local media, Harald had information about the combat readiness of the country's Air Force aircraft fleet, the availability of fuel and ammunition in military warehouses, information about the friend-or-foe recognition system, as well as about the radio frequencies used in the Austrian Air Force. According to another version, Harald handed over to the Russian intelligence officer the technical documentation of the new Tiger combat helicopter, which is in service with a number of European countries. Another source of information for Vozhzhov could be the owner of an engineering consulting company, Werner Franz G. (a citizen of Germany), who from 1992 to 2007 was the manager of one of the world's largest aircraft manufacturing companies, Eurocopter.

History of the Main Intelligence Directorate

The history of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Armed Forces begins on November 1, 1918, when a secret order of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic (RVSR) approved the staff of the Field Headquarters, which consisted of six departments, including the Registration Directorate (Registrupr). It was the first centralized and full-fledged intelligence agency of the Soviet republic. Since the order was announced on November 5, this date is celebrated as Military Intelligence Day.

On April 4, 1921, by order of the RVSR No. 785/141, the Register was transformed into the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army Headquarters (Razvedupr). It is generally accepted that the period from 1921 to 1924 is the actual beginning of the history of the Main Intelligence Directorate.

During the same period, the residencies of the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army Headquarters and the Foreign Department of the GPU (the prototype of the future Foreign Intelligence Service - the main source of political information for the country's leadership) were merged. However, the effectiveness of the joint residency was low, so subsequently everything returned to its place, and the military-political leadership of the country again had two independent sources of information.

In November 1922, the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army Headquarters was transformed into the Intelligence Department. However, the reorganization carried out did not justify itself, since the new structural unit did not meet either the real volumes or the nature of the assigned intelligence tasks. In connection with this, the Intelligence Directorate was re-established in 1924. In 1926, when all directorates of the Red Army headquarters became numbered, the Intelligence Directorate was assigned a number. This is how the Fourth Directorate appeared.

Then came the war. In April 1943, the country's leadership decided to create the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army and the Main Intelligence Directorate, which was directly subordinate to the People's Commissar of Defense.

This division of military intelligence remained until the end of the Great Patriotic War. In June 1945, it was decided to reorganize the military intelligence system and create the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army.

From the mid-1960s until the 1990s - the best period in the history of the GRU. Management staff is growing, logistics are a priority. Particular attention began to be paid to military-technical reconnaissance, the first orbital constellations were created, belts of radar stations were built, huge areas of antenna fields grew, unique space control facilities were built, and each fleet received the latest radio and electronic reconnaissance ships.

With the advent of the 1990s, the reduction of the GRU began.

The first special-purpose military units were created back in 1764 at the proposals of A. Suvorov, M. Kutuzov, and P. Panin. These units were called huntsmen. The soldiers were engaged in tactical exercises, carried out military operations in the mountains, carried out ambushes and raids.

How did it all begin?

In 1811, a separate corps of internal guards was created, which was charged with protecting and restoring order within the state. In 1817, thanks to the actions of Alexander I, a rapid response detachment of mounted gendarmes was opened. The year 1842 was marked by the emergence of battalions of plastuns from the Cossacks, who, through their combat operations, trained many generations of future special forces.

Special forces in the 20th century

The 20th century began with the creation of the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs - GUGSH (Main Directorate of the General Staff). In 1918, intelligence and special-purpose units were formed, subordinate to the Cheka. In the 30s, airborne assault and sabotage units were created.

The new special forces were given serious tasks: reconnaissance, sabotage, the fight against terror, disruption of communications, energy supply, transport and much more. Of course, the fighters were supplied with the best uniforms and new equipment. The preparation was serious and individual programs were used. The special forces were classified.

In 1953 the mouth occurred. And only 4 years later 5 separate special-purpose companies were created, to which the remnants of the old ones joined in 1962. In 1968, they began to train professional intelligence officers, and then, by the way, the famous company number 9 appeared. Gradually, the special forces turned into a powerful force defending their state.

Nowadays

Now the GRU is a special foreign intelligence agency of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, whose goals are to provide intelligence information, the necessary conditions for the implementation of a successful policy, as well as assistance in the economic, military-technical development of the Russian Federation.

The GRU includes 13 main departments, as well as 8 auxiliary ones. The first, second, third and fourth main departments deal with issues of interaction with different countries. The Fifth Directorate is an operational reconnaissance point. The sixth department deals with the Seventh division, which resolves issues that have arisen with NATO. The remaining six departments of the GRU deal with sabotage, development of military technologies, management of the military economy, strategic doctrines, nuclear weapons and information warfare. The intelligence department also has two research institutes located in Moscow.

Special Forces Brigades

GRU special forces brigades are considered the most trained units in the Russian Armed Forces. In 1962, the first GRU special forces detachment was formed, whose tasks included the destruction of nuclear missiles and deep reconnaissance.

The second separate brigade was formed from September 1962 to March 1963 in Pskov. The personnel successfully participated in the exercises "Horizon-74" and "Ocean-70" and in many others. The special forces of the second brigade were the first to participate in the Dozor-86 airborne training and went through the Afghan and Chechen wars. One of the detachments took part in resolving the conflict in South Ossetia from 2008 to 2009. The permanent location is Pskov and Murmansk regions.

In 1966, the 3rd Guards Separate GRU Special Forces Brigade was created. The composition took part in battles in Tajikistan, in the Chechen wars, in Afghanistan, and in a peacekeeping mission in Kosovo. Since 2010, the brigade has been located in a military camp in the city of Tolyatti.

In the city of Stary Krym in 1962, the 10th GRU special forces brigade was formed. The military took part in the Chechen wars and in the Georgian-Ossetian conflict of 2008. In 2011, the brigade was awarded a state award for its services in the development and conduct of military operations. Place of deployment - Krasnodar region.

The 14th brigade, which was created in 1963, is located here. The personnel were repeatedly thanked for the excellent conduct of the exercises and for their participation in combat operations in Afghanistan and the Chechen wars.

The 16th GRU special forces brigade was formed in 1963. In 1972, its members participated in extinguishing fires in the Central Black Earth Zone, for which they were awarded a Certificate of Honor from the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR. In 1992, a detachment of the brigade was engaged in protecting government facilities on the territory of Tajikistan. The 16th Special Forces Brigade took part in the Chechen wars, peacekeeping operations in Kosovo, and performed demonstration exercises in Jordan and Slovakia. Place of deployment - the city of Tambov.

The year 1976 was marked by the emergence of the 22nd Guards Separate GRU Special Forces Brigade. Location is Rostov region. The composition took part in the Chechen and Afghan wars, in the Baku events of 1989, and in resolving the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh.

In the Chita region in 1977, the 24th separate brigade was formed. Special forces took part in the Chechen war, and several units fought in Afghanistan. By orders of the heads of the Soviet Union in the 80-90s. The brigade carried out secret operations in hot spots. At the moment, the train is located in the city of Novosibirsk.

In 1984, on the basis of the 791st company, the 67th separate special forces brigade was created. The personnel participated in military operations in Chechnya, Bosnia, Afghanistan, and Karabakh. Previously, the unit was located in Kemerovo, but now they are talking about its disbandment.

Russian GRU special forces. Primary selection

How to get into the GRU? Special forces are the dream of many boys. Dexterous, fearless warriors, it would seem, are capable of anything. Let's face it, joining a special forces unit is difficult, but possible.

The main condition for consideration of a candidacy is military service. Then a series of selections begins. Basically, officers and warrant officers are recruited into the special forces of the GRU of the Russian Federation. An officer must have a higher education. Recommendations from reputable employees are also needed. It is advisable for the candidate to be no older than 28 years old and have a height of at least 175 cm. But there are always exceptions. As for physical training, the quality of its implementation is strictly monitored, rest is kept to a minimum.

Basic requirements for the applicant’s physical fitness

The physical standards that must be passed successfully are as follows:

Run 3 km in 10 minutes.
100 meters in 12 seconds.
Pull-ups on the bar - 25 times.
Abdominal exercises - 90 times in 2 minutes.
Push-ups - 90 times.
A set of exercises: abs, push-ups, jumping up from a crouching position, moving from a crouched position to a lying position and back. Each individual exercise is performed 15 times in 10 seconds. The complex is performed 7 times.
Hand-to-hand combat.

In addition to passing the standards, work with a psychologist, a full medical examination, and a lie detector test are carried out. All relatives must be checked; in addition, written consent to the candidate’s service will need to be obtained from the parents. So how to get into the GRU (special forces)? The answer is simple - you need to prepare from childhood. Sport must firmly enter the life of a future fighter.

I'm in a special forces unit. What awaits me? Psychological side

From the first day, the soldier is taught in every possible way that he is the best. As the coaches say, this is the most important moment. In the barracks itself, fighters often conduct secret checks on each other, which helps to always be in combat readiness.

To strengthen the spirit and form the character of the recruit, they are taught hand-to-hand combat. From time to time he is put into battle against a stronger opponent in order to teach him how to fight even with an opponent who is obviously superior in preparation. Soldiers are also taught to fight using all sorts of improvised means, even a tightly rolled newspaper. Only after a warrior has mastered such materials does he train in striking techniques.

Once every six months, soldiers are checked for readiness for further service. Soldiers are left for a week without food. Warriors are in constant motion, they are not allowed to sleep all the time. Thus, many fighters are eliminated.

Physical side of the service

A warrior trains every day, without weekends or holidays. Every day you need to run 10 km in less than an hour, and with additional weight on your shoulders (about 50 kg).

Upon arrival it takes 40 minutes. This includes finger push-ups, fist push-ups, and jumping jacks from a seated position. Basically, each exercise is repeated 20-30 times. At the end of each cycle, the fighter pumps the abs a maximum of times. Hand-to-hand combat training takes place every day. Strikes are practiced, agility and endurance are developed. Training GRU special forces is serious, hard work.

Special forces outfit

The GRU special forces uniform has different types to match the tasks being carried out. At the moment, important parts of a fighter’s “wardrobe” include belts, as well as belt-shoulder systems. Functional vests include several types of equipment pouches. The belt can be adjusted in volume; a synthetic insert is used to increase its strength. The shoulder-belt system includes straps and straps that are designed to distribute the load between the hip joint and shoulders. Of course, this entire unloading system comes in addition to everyday uniform and body armor.

How to get into the GRU (special forces)?

Only guys with excellent health and excellent physical fitness get into special forces. A good help for a conscript will be the presence of the “Fit for the Airborne Forces” mark. Some experienced fighters answer the question: “How to get into the GRU (special forces)?” They answer that you need to go to the nearest Intelligence Department and declare yourself.

For officers, general military training is conducted at the Novosibirsk Higher Military Command School, and special training takes place at the Military Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. The Academy includes adjunct courses and Higher Academic Courses. Higher education is a mandatory requirement for inclusion in the ranks of officers.

Electronic, space and radio intelligence. Includes the Space Intelligence Center - on Volokolamsk Highway, the so-called “K-500 facility”. It included four departments:

The 1st - radio intelligence department - was engaged in intercepting and decrypting messages from communication channels of foreign states. He led the so-called special-purpose units (abbreviated as OSNAZ), which were part of the military districts and groups of Soviet troops in Hungary, the GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia. Under the leadership of the radio intelligence department, OSNAZ performed the functions of intercepting messages from the communication networks of foreign countries - objects of radio intelligence surveillance by the GRU. For these purposes, the 1st Department of the 6th Directorate had at its disposal 300 people plus 1.5 thousand other military and civilian employees.

The 2nd - the radio-technical intelligence department of the 6th GRU directorate - used the services of the same interception stations and carried out electronic surveillance of the same countries as the 1st. However, the subject of interest of the 2nd Department was radio, telemetry and other electronic signals emitted by military control, detection and tracking equipment. To intercept these signals, he deployed OSNAZ in military districts and groups of troops of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

The 3rd - technical support department - was responsible for maintaining interception stations, the equipment of which was located in the buildings of Soviet embassies, consulates and trade missions around the world, as well as separately located interception stations in Cuba, Vietnam, Burma and Mongolia.

The 4th - the tracking department of the 6th GRU directorate - monitored around the clock all the information that it obtained through radio intelligence. The main task of the department was to monitor the military situation in the world and especially significant changes in the US military. Each department officer was responsible for his own observation target, among them were the US Strategic Air Command, the US Tactical Air Command and others. Based on the data received from the tracking department, the operational duty officer of the 6th Directorate compiled a daily information report, which, in turn, was included in the final information report of the entire GRU.

The main facilities at the disposal of the radio intelligence service are:

Radio and satellite communications center located near Moscow. It received, including via satellite communication channels, information from 11 strategic electronic intelligence complexes located in the USSR and from 4 foreign ones. The central radio intelligence station in the city of Klimovsk near Moscow, where a service for tracking and primary processing of radio intelligence data worked around the clock. Radio interception and electronic intelligence centers in Lourdes (Cuba), Cam Ranh Bay (Vietnam), Rangoon (Burma) and Mongolia. Information from these centers and those located on the territory of the USSR flowed to the central radio intelligence station in the city of Klimovsk.

Information flows from the central radio intelligence station, from tactical intelligence objects in military districts, groups of forces and in fleets were sent to the apparatus of the 6th Directorate, where, on their basis, daily reports were prepared that arrived at the GRU command post, created in 1962 during the Cuban War. crisis, and also included in the daily intelligence reports of the GRU. In addition, reports from the 6th Directorate were sent to the GRU information service, where they were accumulated and analyzed. The USSR radio reconnaissance fleet in its best years consisted of 62 ships. (Source "Empire GRU").

Officers of this department were part of residencies in the capitals of foreign countries and were engaged in intercepting and decrypting transmissions on government and military information networks. In addition, electronic intelligence regiments stationed on Soviet territory, as well as electronic intelligence services of military districts and fleets, were subordinate to this department. Thus, this department has at its disposal radio reconnaissance ships, satellites and radio interception centers. For example, during the last war in Yugoslavia in April 1999, the Black Sea Fleet reconnaissance ship Liman openly appeared in the Adriatic Sea, and a few months later it was replaced by Kildin. Such ships have no missile, artillery, or torpedo weapons. Only radio, electronic and hydroacoustic reconnaissance equipment.

In addition to the 6th Directorate, the activities of several other GRU divisions and services were related to radio intelligence. Thus, the GRU command post, which carried out round-the-clock monitoring for signs of an impending attack on the USSR, also used information that was received by the 6th Directorate. The information support departments carried out the work of assessing intelligence reports coming from the 6th Directorate. The decryption service was engaged in cryptanalysis of intercepted encrypted messages. It was directly subordinate to the head of the GRU and was located on Komsomolsky Prospekt in Moscow. The main task of the decryption service was to read encrypted messages from tactical military communications networks. A special GRU computer center processed incoming information, which was obtained by radio intelligence using computer technology. The Central Research Institute in Moscow developed specialized equipment for conducting radio reconnaissance, and the GRU operational and technical department was responsible for its production and maintenance. Foreign radio interception centers are operated by the Sixth Directorate of the GRU together with FAPSI, for example, the famous radio-electronic center in Lourdes in Cuba. In 2001, by decision of Russian President V.V. Putin, it was closed and dismantled.

As for the GRU Space Intelligence Directorate, it collects intelligence data using satellites. The Directorate directs the actions of OSNAZ - Special Purpose Units subordinate to the First and Second Divisions of the Sixth Directorate of the GRU, whose functions are radio and electronic intelligence. The analysis and processing of the information obtained in this way is entrusted to the so-called “Dozor system”, which is located in the central building of the GRU on Khoroshevskoye Shosse (“object K 200”).

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Registration Mar 26, 2012 Messages 1

Knowing

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An interesting publication. However, some of the Administration has disappeared somewhere, for example, Analysts were lost, Departments and specializations were added, the Office was “moved” to Khodyn instead of the street. Sorge... For some reason Ogarkov is not mentioned, but the founding fathers should be honored, as it were...
It turns out that we also have secrets from the Pindos attaches that we could push out

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So if you add it, then they’ll add it too)))
Actually, in the light of the interests of the Forum, it is worth noting that this kind of service had no desire to “falsify” documents certifying anything and everything. Technological operations of this nature - of course - took place, but with the aim of better developing technological cycles. It was on the basis of "Gryzov" that the technology for replacing photos on docks appeared without re-gluing, but by washing off the old one and applying a new layer of emulsion (essentially gelatin with chemicals). At the same time, the advantage was that there was no need to make molds for the "embossings" (accordingly, the need to apply repeated embossing), the ability to bring the photo in line with the “age” and condition of the document, and so on.
And so everything was based on “doubles” manufactured in the corresponding “yards”. Not excluding Goznak. At one time, a group of comrades received the SySySyR Hero Stars, who brought to their alma mater a whole load of fabulous wealth in the form of “Uncle Sam” passport books from an Arab country, supplied by this same Uncle even with paper from the US Federal Treasury... Then they apparently came to their senses, and bombed everything to their American mother...

Last edited: Mar 27, 2012

Roger731

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And why, I'm sorry, "Bats"? Well, some of them are colloquially called “Batmen,” but this has nothing to do with the office or their attributes.
The silhouette that everyone takes for a bat is actually the silhouette of an eagle owl.

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dacota08

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GRU (Main Intelligence Directorate) of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces
Unlike the former KGB of the USSR, the organizational structure of the GRU was practically never advertised or published anywhere. And perhaps the only source of information on this issue is the book “Soviet Military Intelligence” by former GRU captain V. Rezun (V. Suvorov), who fled to England in 1978, published in London in 1984. Of course, this source is far from flawless in terms of accuracy. However, for lack of a better one, the structure of the GRU in the 70s. mainly cited from this book.
The main complex of GRU headquarters buildings was located (and is still there) in Moscow in the Polezhaevskaya metro area, on the territory of the Central Airfield (formerly Khodynskoye Field). The main building - a 9-story structure made of glass and concrete, originally intended for a military hospital - was called “glass” in local slang, and after the appearance of Suvorov’s books it began to be called (mainly by journalists) “aquarium”.
In addition, on the territory of Moscow and below it there is a decryption (crypto-analytical) service, a Space Intelligence Center, receiving and transmitting long-distance communication centers, and long-range reconnaissance radio centers. The head of the GRU, or the 2nd Main Directorate of the General Staff, subordinate directly to the chief of the General Staff, was his deputy in status, and his position corresponded to the military rank of army general. In the mid-70s. he had one first deputy and several deputies, each of them oversaw one or more GRU departments. More specifically, at the time of V. Rezun’s escape, the head of the GRU, Army General P.I. Ivashutin, had one first and seven “simple” deputies, namely: - first deputy head of the GRU, Colonel General A.G. Pavlov, subordinate to which were all the “extractive” bodies involved in collecting information; - head of the information service, Colonel General A.V. Zotov, who was responsible for all the “processing” bodies of the GRU; - Head of the GRU Political Department, Lieutenant General G.I. Dolin; - Head of the Electronic Intelligence Department, Lieutenant General A. Paliy; - Head of Fleet Intelligence, Admiral L.K. Bekrenev; - Head of the Space Intelligence Directorate, Aviation Lieutenant General V.A. Shatalov; - Head of the Military Diplomatic Academy, Colonel General V.I. Meshcheryakov; - Head of the Personnel Department, Colonel General S.I. Izotov. In addition, the GRU command post and a group of especially important agents and “illegals” were directly subordinate to the head of the GRU.
In the 70s The GRU consisted of 16 directorates. Of these, most were “numbered” - from 1 to 12, but some, such as the personnel department, did not have numbers. The departments directly involved in the collection and processing of intelligence information were divided into directions, and the auxiliary departments into departments. Directions and departments were in turn divided into sections. The GRU also had directions and departments that were not part of the directorates.
The position of head of a department corresponded to the military rank of lieutenant general, the position of deputy head of a department, head of a direction or department corresponded to the rank of major general. The positions of deputy head of a direction or department, head of a section and his deputy - to the rank of colonel. Ordinary section employees held the positions of senior operational officers and operational officers. The military rank corresponding to the position of senior operational officer is colonel, and the position of operational officer is lieutenant colonel. Depending on their function, GRU units were divided into mining, processing and auxiliary. Extractive bodies were those directly involved in the collection of intelligence information.
As already mentioned, they were subordinate to the first deputy chief of the GRU and included four departments:
The 1st GRU Directorate carried out human intelligence in Western Europe. It included five areas, each of which was engaged in human intelligence on the territory of several countries;
The 2nd Directorate was engaged in human intelligence in North and South America;
The 3rd Directorate conducted human intelligence in Asian countries;
4th Directorate - in Africa and the Middle East. The staff of each of the listed departments, according to V. Rezun, consisted of approximately 300 officers in the Center and the same number abroad.
In addition to these four directorates, there were also four separate areas that were not part of the directorates and were also subordinate to the first deputy chief of the GRU:
The 1st direction of the GRU conducted intelligence reconnaissance in Moscow. The officers who served in this direction were engaged in recruiting agents among foreign military attaches, members of military, scientific and other delegations, businessmen and other foreigners visiting Moscow. Another important task of the 1st direction was the introduction of GRU officers into Soviet official institutions, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Academy of Sciences, Aeroflot, etc. Positions in these institutions were subsequently used as legal cover during intelligence work abroad.
The 3rd direction of the GRU conducted human intelligence in national liberation movements and terrorist organizations.
The 4th direction of the GRU was engaged in human intelligence from the territory of Cuba, primarily against the United States, in this case it interacted with Cuban intelligence. In many respects, it duplicated the activities of the 2nd GRU Directorate.
The 5th Directorate of the GRU, or the Directorate of Operational-Tactical Intelligence, was also “extractive” and reported to the first deputy chief of the GRU. However, the specificity of its activities was that it did not engage in independent human intelligence, but supervised the work of the intelligence departments of the headquarters of military districts and fleets. The intelligence departments of military districts and naval intelligence were directly subordinate to the 5th Directorate. The latter, in turn, was subordinate to four naval intelligence departments.
It should be noted that if the intelligence departments of the headquarters of the military districts were directly subordinate to the Directorate of Operational-Tactical Intelligence, then the intelligence departments of the headquarters of the fleets - Northern, Pacific, Black Sea and Baltic - were combined into a single structure known as fleet intelligence. This was due to the fact that if each military district had a strictly defined area of responsibility, then the ships of the Soviet fleets operated in almost all points of the world's oceans, and each ship had to constantly have complete information regarding the potential enemy.
Therefore, the chief of naval intelligence was the deputy chief of the GRU and led the four intelligence directorates of the naval headquarters, as well as the naval space intelligence directorate and information service. But in his daily activities he obeyed the orders of the 5th Directorate of the GRU. In addition, the GRU had two more departments involved in collecting information - the 6th Directorate and the Space Intelligence Directorate. However, since these departments, although they obtained and partially processed information, did not conduct human intelligence, they were not subordinate to the first deputy chief of the GRU.
The 6th GRU Directorate carried out electronic intelligence. Officers of this department were part of residencies in the capitals of foreign countries and were engaged in intercepting and decrypting transmissions on government and military information networks. In addition, electronic intelligence regiments stationed on Soviet territory, as well as electronic intelligence services of military districts and fleets, were subordinate to this department.
In addition to the 6th Directorate, the activities of several other GRU divisions and services were related to radio intelligence. Thus, the GRU command post, which carried out round-the-clock monitoring for signs of an impending attack on the USSR, also used information that was received by the 6th Directorate. The information support departments carried out the work of assessing intelligence reports coming from the 6th Directorate. The decryption service was engaged in cryptanalysis of intercepted encrypted messages. It was directly subordinate to the head of the GRU and was located on Komsomolsky Prospekt in Moscow.
The main task of the decryption service was to read encrypted messages from tactical military communications networks. A special GRU computer center processed incoming information, which was obtained by radio intelligence using computer technology. The Central Research Institute in Moscow developed specialized equipment for conducting radio reconnaissance, and the GRU operational and technical department was responsible for its production and maintenance. As for the GRU Space Intelligence Directorate, it collected intelligence data using satellites. The processing organs of the GRU, which were sometimes called the information service, were engaged in the processing and analysis of incoming materials. The position of head of the information service corresponded to the rank of colonel general, and he himself was deputy head of the GRU.
Subordinate to him were six information departments, the Institute of Information, the fleet information service and the information services of the intelligence departments of the headquarters of military districts. The areas of work of each of these divisions were as follows:
The 7th Directorate consisted of six departments and studied NATO. Each department and each section was responsible for researching individual trends or aspects of NATO activities.
The 8th Directorate studied individual countries around the world, regardless of whether the country belonged to NATO or not. At the same time, special attention was paid to issues of political structure, armed forces and economics.
The 9th Directorate researched military technologies and was directly connected with the Soviet military-industrial complex.
The 10th Directorate studied the war economy around the world, including the arms trade, military production and technological advances of various countries, production and stockpiles of strategic resources.
The 11th Directorate studied the strategic concepts and strategic nuclear forces of all those countries that possess them or may create them in the future. This department carefully monitored any signs of increased activity in the actions of strategic nuclear forces in any region of the globe.
There is no exact information about what the 12th Directorate was doing. The GRU Institute of Information functioned independently of the directorates and reported directly to the head of the information service. Unlike the departments listed above, which studied secret documents obtained through intelligence, electronic or space intelligence, the institute studied open sources of information: the press, radio and television.
GRU units that were not directly involved in the extraction or processing of intelligence materials were considered auxiliary. These divisions included the political department, personnel department, operational and technical department, administrative department, communications department, financial department, first department, eighth department, archive department.
In addition, the GRU had several research institutes and educational institutions. Their functions were as follows: The Operational and Technical Directorate was engaged in the production of intelligence equipment - cryptographic means, equipment for microphotography, radio devices, listening equipment, weapons, poisons, etc. Several research institutes and specialized enterprises were under his control. The administrative department was responsible for providing the GRU with foreign currency. The Communications Directorate was busy organizing radio and other communications between the GRU and foreign residencies. The finance department performed legal financial activities in the Soviet Union.
The first special department of the GRU was engaged in forging passports, identity cards, driver's licenses, military documents, police documents, etc.
The Eighth Division of the GRU was the most secret of all the secret divisions of the GRU. He was engaged in encryption and decryption. The archives department is perhaps the most interesting of all the departments. In its basements, millions of registration cards of illegal immigrants, GRU officers, secret residents, information about successful and unsuccessful recruitment of foreigners, dossiers of various government and military figures from different countries, etc. were stored and are still stored.
However, the foundation of the GRU was made up of intelligence departments and intelligence departments in armies and military districts, as well as special forces units subordinate to them. Their structure during the period described was as follows: At the headquarters of military districts and groups of Soviet troops abroad, reconnaissance was carried out by the 2nd Directorate, consisting of five departments:
The 1st Department supervised the work of intelligence departments, armies subordinate to the district and other units.
The 2nd Department was engaged in human intelligence in the area of responsibility of the district.
The 3rd Department supervised the activities of the reconnaissance and sabotage units of the district.
The 4th department processed intelligence information.
The 5th department carried out radio reconnaissance. In addition, the intelligence department of the district headquarters included several more auxiliary units. The organization of intelligence at the army level was the same as in the district. Only instead of the intelligence department at army headquarters there was a 2nd (intelligence) department, which in turn consisted of five groups. As already mentioned, the expansion of the scope of military intelligence activities and the increase in the tasks assigned to it required more serious and professional training of highly qualified personnel. Therefore, educational institutions of the GRU in the 60-70s. great attention was paid.
The main forge of Soviet military intelligence personnel was the Military Diplomatic Academy (in the jargon of military intelligence officers, a “conservatory”), which was located in Moscow on Narodnogo Opolcheniya Street. The position of head of the academy corresponded to the military rank of colonel general, and in terms of his status he was deputy head of the GRU. Candidates for admission to the academy were selected mainly among military officers, and before receiving admission to the entrance exams, they underwent a comprehensive test for trustworthiness and moral qualities over the course of two to three years.
The Military Diplomatic Academy consisted of three numbered faculties:
1st - Special Intelligence Faculty - trained intelligence officers who were supposed to be used in legal residencies.
2nd - Military Diplomatic Faculty - trained military attaches.
The 3rd Faculty was engaged in the training of operational-tactical intelligence officers assigned to the headquarters of military districts. Although it was officially believed that the 1st faculty trained students who were to work under civilian cover (employees of embassies, trade missions, merchant fleet, Aeroflot, etc.), and the 2nd faculty studied those who were intended to be used As employees of the military attache, their programs were quite similar. In addition, very often graduates of the 1st faculty were sent to the military attache, and vice versa. But the Military Diplomatic Academy was not the only educational institution that trained personnel for military intelligence.
In addition to it, the GRU also had a number of educational institutions: - the seventh Advanced Training Course for Officers (KUOS); - Higher reconnaissance and command courses for advanced training of command personnel (VRK UKS); - faculties in military universities and departments of intelligence courses and disciplines in various military educational institutions (Navy Intelligence Department at the Naval Academy, intelligence department at the Academy of the General Staff, intelligence department at the M.V. Frunze Military Academy, intelligence department at the Military -Naval Academy, special department of the Military Academy of Communications, Military Institute of Foreign Languages, Cherepovets Higher Military School of Communications, special department of the Higher Naval School of Radio Electronics, special forces department of the Ryazan Higher Airborne School, intelligence department of the Kiev Higher Military Command School, special department 2 of the Kharkov Higher Military Aviation Technical School, faculty of special intelligence (since 1994) and faculty of military intelligence at the Novosibirsk Higher Military Command School).
Head of the GRU of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces Valentin Vladimirovich Korabelnikov.
Genus. 01/04/1946. Colonel General. Born in the Tambov region. He graduated from the Minsk Higher Engineering Anti-Aircraft Missile School (1969), the Military Academy (1974), and the Military Academy of the General Staff (1988). He served in the troops and the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces. In 1991-1997 - head of the department, first deputy head of the Main Directorate of the General Staff. Specialist in the field of substantiating requirements and building an information support system for making military and military-political decisions. Head of research to determine directions for the development of information tools and systems. Author of scientific works on problems of information support for preparation and decision-making. Corresponding member of the department "Technical means of reconnaissance and target designation" of the Russian Academy of Missile and Artillery Sciences. Graduated from the Military Diplomatic Academy under the USSR Ministry of Defense. He worked for more than 20 years in the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces. From 1992 to 1997, he was the first deputy chief of the GRU of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces. During the hostilities on the territory of the Chechen Republic, he repeatedly traveled to the combat zone. In May 1997, during the medical examination preceding the dismissal of Colonel General Fyodor Ladygin, he was acting head of the GRU. In May 1997 Appointed head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces. August 20, 1997 Was introduced to the Coordination Interdepartmental Council for Military-Technical Cooperation of the Russian Federation with Foreign States. Since December 31, 1997 - member of the Supervisory Board for the activities of the Rosvooruzhenie and Promexport companies. In July 1999, V. Korabelnikov received gratitude from President B. Yeltsin for his significant contribution to the process of resolving the conflict in the Yugoslav region of Kosovo. September 6, 1999 He was included in the Commission under the President of the Russian Federation on military-technical cooperation with foreign states.

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