The year of the liberation of Belarus from the Nazi invaders. Liberation of Belarus from the Nazi invaders. The Belarusian operation is the biggest defeat of Germany in history

The main operation of the summer campaign of 1944 took place in Belarus. The Belarusian offensive operation, carried out from June 23 to August 29, 1944, became one of the largest military operations in all of mankind. It was named in honor of the Russian commander of the Patriotic War of 1812 P.I. Bagration. During the “fifth Stalinist strike,” Soviet troops liberated the territory of Belarus, most of the Lithuanian SSR, as well as eastern Poland. The Wehrmacht suffered heavy losses, German troops were defeated in the area of ​​Vitebsk, Bobruisk, Mogilev, and Orsha. In total, the Wehrmacht lost 30 divisions east of Minsk, about half a million soldiers and officers killed, missing, wounded and captured. The German Army Group Center was defeated, and Army Group North in the Baltics was cut in two.

Situation at the front

By June 1944, the line of the Soviet-German front in the northeast reached the line Vitebsk - Orsha - Mogilev - Zhlobin. At the same time, in the southern direction the Red Army achieved enormous success - the entire Right Bank of Ukraine, Crimea, Nikolaev, Odessa was liberated. Soviet troops reached the state border of the USSR and began the liberation of Romania. Conditions were created for the liberation of all of Central and South-Eastern Europe. However, by the end of spring 1944, the Soviet offensive in the south slowed down.

As a result of successes in the southern strategic direction, a huge protrusion was formed - a wedge facing deep into the Soviet Union (the so-called “Belarusian Balcony”). The northern end of the ledge rested on Polotsk and Vitebsk, and the southern end on the Pripyat River basin. It was necessary to eliminate the “balcony” in order to exclude the possibility of a flank attack by the Wehrmacht. In addition, the German command transferred significant forces to the south, and the fighting became protracted. Headquarters and the General Staff decided to change the direction of the main attack. In the south, the troops had to regroup their forces, replenish units with manpower and equipment, and prepare for a new offensive.

The defeat of Army Group Center and the liberation of the BSSR, through which the shortest and most important routes to Poland and large political, military-industrial centers and food bases (Pomerania and East Prussia) of Germany passed, had enormous military-strategic and political significance. The situation in the entire theater of military operations changed radically in favor of the Soviet Union. Success in Belarus was best ensured by our subsequent offensive operations in Poland, the Baltic states, Western Ukraine and Romania.

Column of Su-85 on Lenin Square in liberated Minsk

Operation plan

In March 1944, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief invited Rokossovsky and reported on the planned major operation, inviting the commander to express his opinion. The operation was called “Bagration”, this name was proposed by Joseph Stalin. According to General Headquarters, the main actions of the summer campaign of 1944 were to unfold in Belarus. To carry out the operation, it was planned to attract the forces of four fronts: the 1st Baltic, 1st, 2nd and 3rd Belorussian fronts. The Dnieper military flotilla, long-range aviation and partisan detachments were also involved in the Belarusian operation.

At the end of April, Stalin made the final decision regarding the summer campaign and the Belarusian operation. The Head of the Operations Directorate and Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Alexey Antonov, was ordered to organize work on planning front-line operations and begin concentrating troops and material resources. Thus, the 1st Baltic Front under the command of Ivan Bagramyan received the 1st Tank Corps, the 3rd Belorussian Front under Ivan Chernyakhovsky received the 11th Guards Army, the 2nd Guards Tank Corps. In addition, the 5th Guards Tank Army (Stavka reserve) was concentrated in the offensive zone of the 3rd Belorussian Front. The 28th Army, 9th Tank and 1st Guards Tank Corps, 1st Mechanized Corps and 4th Guards Cavalry Corps were concentrated on the right flank of the 1st Belorussian Front.

In addition to Antonov, only a few people, including Vasilevsky and Zhukov, were involved in the direct development of the plan for Operation Bagration. Substantive correspondence, telephone or telegraph conversations were strictly prohibited. One of the primary tasks in preparing the Belarusian operation was its secrecy and misinformation of the enemy regarding the planned direction of the main attack. In particular, the commander of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, Army General Rodion Malinovsky, was ordered to conduct a demonstrative concentration of troops behind the right flank of the front. The commander of the 3rd Baltic Front, Colonel General Ivan Maslennikov, received a similar order.

Alexey Antonov, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, leading developer of the plan for the Belarusian operation

On May 20, Vasilevsky, Zhukov and Antonov were summoned to Headquarters. The plan for the summer campaign was finally approved. First, the Leningrad Front () was supposed to strike in the area of ​​the Karelian Isthmus. Then in the second half of June they planned to launch an offensive in Belarus. Vasilevsky and Zhukov were responsible for coordinating the actions of the four fronts. Vasilevsky was entrusted with the 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian fronts, Zhukov - the 1st and 2nd Belorussian fronts. At the beginning of June they left for the troops.

According to the memoirs of K.K. Rokossovsky, the offensive plan was finally worked out at Headquarters on May 22-23. The considerations of the command of the 1st Belorussian Front about the offensive of the troops of the left wing of the 1st Belorussian Front in the Lublin direction were approved. However, the idea that the troops on the right flank of the front should launch two main attacks at once was criticized. Members of the Headquarters believed that it was necessary to deliver one main blow in the direction of Rogachev - Osipovichi, so as not to disperse forces. Rokossovsky continued to stand his ground. According to the front commander, one blow had to be delivered from Rogachev, the other from Ozarichi to Slutsk. At the same time, the enemy’s Bobruisk group fell into the “cauldron”. Rokossovsky knew the terrain well and understood that the movement of the armies of the left flank in one direction in heavily swampy Polesie would lead to the offensive stalling, the roads would be clogged, and the front troops would not be able to use all their capabilities, since they would be introduced into the battle in parts. Convinced that Rokossovsky continued to defend his point of view, Stalin approved the operation plan in the form proposed by the headquarters of the 1st Belorussian Front. It must be said that Zhukov refutes this story by Rokossovsky. According to him, the decision to launch two strikes by the 1st Belorussian Front was made by Headquarters on May 20.

On May 31, front commanders received a directive from Headquarters. The goal of the operation was to cover two flank attacks and destroy the enemy group in the Minsk area. Particular importance was attached to the defeat of the most powerful enemy flank groups that held defenses in the areas of Vitebsk and Bobruisk. This provided the possibility of a rapid offensive by large forces in converging directions towards Minsk. The remaining enemy troops were supposed to be thrown back to an unfavorable area of ​​operations near Minsk, cut off their communications, encircle and destroy them. The Stavka plan provided for the delivery of three strong blows:

Troops of the 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian fronts attacked in the general direction of Vilnius;
- the forces of the 2nd Belorussian Front, in cooperation with the left wing of the 3rd Belorussian Front and the right wing of the 1st Belorussian Front, advanced in the direction Mogilev - Minsk;
- formations of the 1st Belorussian Front advanced in the direction of Bobruisk - Baranovichi.

At the first stage of the operation, the troops of the 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian fronts were supposed to defeat the enemy’s Vitebsk group. Then introduce mobile formations into the breakthrough and develop an offensive to the west towards Vilnius - Kaunas, covering the Borisov-Minsk group of the Wehrmacht with the left flank. The 2nd Belorussian Front was supposed to destroy the enemy’s Mogilev group and advance in the Minsk direction.

At the first stage of the offensive, the 1st Belorussian Front was supposed to destroy the enemy’s Zhlobin-Bobruisk group with the forces of its right flank. Then introduce tank-mechanized formations into the breakthrough and develop an offensive towards Slutsk - Baranovichi. Part of the front's forces were supposed to cover the enemy's Minsk grouping from the south and south-west. The left flank of the 1st Belorussian Front struck in the Lublin direction.

It should be noted that initially the Soviet command planned to strike to a depth of 300 km, defeat three German armies and reach the line Utena, Vilnius, Lida, Baranovichi. The tasks for the further offensive were set by Headquarters in mid-July, based on the results of the identified successes. At the same time, at the second stage of the Belarusian operation, the results were no longer so brilliant.

Fighting for Belarus

Preparing the operation

As Zhukov noted in his memoirs, to support Operation Bagration, it was necessary to send up to 400 thousand tons of ammunition, 300 thousand tons of fuel and lubricants, and up to 500 thousand tons of provisions and fodder to the troops. It was necessary to concentrate in given areas 5 combined arms armies, 2 tank and one air armies, as well as units of the 1st Army of the Polish Army. In addition, 6 tank and mechanized corps, more than 50 rifle and cavalry divisions, more than 210 thousand marching reinforcements and over 2.8 thousand guns and mortars were transferred to the fronts from the Headquarters reserve. It is clear that all this had to be translated and transported with great precautions so as not to reveal the plan of the grandiose operation to the enemy.

Particular attention was paid to camouflage and secrecy during the immediate preparation of the operation. The fronts switched to radio silence. At the forefront, excavation work was carried out, which imitated the strengthening of the defense. Concentrations of troops and their transfer were carried out mainly at night. Soviet planes even patrolled the area to monitor compliance with camouflage measures, etc.

Rokossovsky in his memoirs pointed to the great role of reconnaissance at the front line and behind enemy lines. The command paid special attention to air, military of all types and radio reconnaissance. More than 400 searches were carried out in the armies of the right flank of the 1st Belorussian Front alone; Soviet intelligence officers captured more than 80 “languages” and important enemy documents.

On June 14-15, the commander of the 1st Belorussian Front conducted classes on the upcoming operation at the headquarters of the 65th and 28th armies (the right wing of the front). Representatives of the Headquarters were present at the headquarters game. Corps and division commanders, artillery commanders and commanders of the army's combat arms were involved in the drawing. During the classes, issues of the upcoming offensive were worked out in detail. Particular attention was paid to the nature of the terrain in the offensive zone of the armies, the organization of the enemy’s defense and ways to quickly break through to the Slutsk-Bobruisk road. This made it possible to close the escape routes for the Bobruisk group of the enemy’s 9th Army. In the following days, similar classes were conducted in the 3rd, 48th and 49th armies.

At the same time, extensive educational and political preparation of Soviet troops was carried out. During the classes, fire missions, attack tactics and techniques, and offensive operations in cooperation with tank and artillery units, with aviation support, were practiced. The headquarters of units, formations and armies worked out issues of control and communications. Command and observation posts were moved forward, a surveillance and communications system was created, the order of movement and control of troops during the pursuit of the enemy was clarified, etc.

Soviet Valentine IX tanks move into combat positions. 5th Guards Tank Army. Summer 1944

The Belarusian headquarters of the partisan movement provided great assistance in preparing the offensive operation. A close connection was established between the partisan detachments and the Soviet troops. The partisans received instructions from the “mainland” with specific tasks, where and when to attack the enemy, which communications to destroy.

It should be noted that by mid-1944, partisan detachments were operating in most of the BSSR. Belarus was a real partisan region. There were 150 partisan brigades and 49 separate detachments operating in the republic with a total number of an entire army - 143 thousand bayonets (already during the Belarusian operation almost 200 thousand partisans joined the Red Army units). The partisans controlled vast territories, especially in wooded and swampy areas. Kurt von Tippelskirch wrote that the 4th Army, which he commanded from the beginning of June 1944, found itself in a huge forested and swampy area that extended to Minsk and this area was controlled by large partisan formations. German troops were never able to completely clear this territory in all three years. All crossings and bridges in this inaccessible area covered with dense forests were destroyed. As a result, although German troops controlled all major cities and railway junctions, up to 60% of the territory of Belarus was under the control of Soviet partisans. Soviet power still existed here, regional and district committees of the Communist Party and the Komsomol (All-Union Leninist Communist Youth Union) worked. It is clear that the partisan movement could only hold on with the support of the “mainland”, from where experienced personnel and ammunition were transferred.

The offensive of the Soviet armies was preceded by an unprecedented scale attack by partisan formations. On the night of June 19-20, the partisans began massive actions to defeat the German rear. The partisans destroyed the enemy's railway communications, blew up bridges, set up ambushes on the roads, and disabled communication lines. On the night of June 20 alone, 40 thousand enemy rails were blown up. Eike Middeldorf noted: “In the central sector of the Eastern Front, Russian partisans carried out 10,500 explosions” (Middeldorf Eike. Russian campaign: tactics and weapons. - St. Petersburg, M., 2000). The partisans were able to carry out only part of their plan, but this was enough to cause a short-term paralysis of the rear of Army Group Center. As a result, the transfer of German operational reserves was delayed for several days. Communication along many highways became possible only during the day and only accompanied by strong convoys.

Strengths of the parties. Soviet Union

Four fronts connected 20 combined arms and 2 tank armies. A total of 166 divisions, 12 tank and mechanized corps, 7 fortified areas and 21 separate brigades. About one-fifth of these forces were included in the operation in its second stage, approximately three weeks after the start of the offensive. At the start of the operation, Soviet troops numbered about 2.4 million soldiers and commanders, 36 thousand guns and mortars, more than 5.2 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns and over 5.3 thousand aircraft.

The 1st Baltic Front of Ivan Bagramyan included: the 4th Shock Army under the command of P.F. Malyshev, the 6th Guards Army of I.M. Chistyakov, the 43rd Army of A.P. Beloborodov, the 1st Tank building of V.V. Butkov. The front was supported from the air by the 3rd Air Army of N.F. Papivin.

The 3rd Belorussian Front of Ivan Chernyakhovsky included: the 39th Army of I. I. Lyudnikov, the 5th Army of N. I. Krylov, the 11th Guards Army of K. N. Galitsky, the 31st Army of V. V. Glagolev, the 5th Guards Tank Army of P. A. Rotmistrov, the 2nd Guards Tank Corps of A. S. Burdeyny, the cavalry mechanized group of N. S. Oslikovsky (it included the 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps and the 3rd Guards Mechanized Corps). From the air, the front troops were supported by the 1st Air Army of M. M. Gromov.

The 2nd Belorussian Front of Georgy Zakharov included: the 33rd Army of V.D. Kryuchenkin, the 49th Army of I.T. Grishin, the 50th Army of I.V. Boldin, the 4th Air Army of K.A. Vershinina.

1st Belorussian Front of Konstantin Rokossovsky: 3rd Army of A.V. Gorbatov, 48th Army of P.L. Romanenko, 65th Army of P.I. Batov, 28th Army of A.A. Luchinsky, 61- I Army of P. A. Belov, 70th Army of V. S. Popov, 47th Army of N. I. Gusev, 8th Guards Army of V. I. Chuikov, 69th Army of V. Ya. Kolpakchi, 2 1st Tank Army of S.I. Bogdanov. The front also included the 2nd, 4th and 7th Guards Cavalry Corps, the 9th and 11th Tank Corps, the 1st Guards Tank Corps, and the 1st Mechanized Corps. In addition, the 1st Army of the Polish Army Z. Berling and the Dnieper Military Flotilla of Rear Admiral V.V. Grigoriev were subordinate to Rokossovsky. The front was supported by the 6th and 16th air armies of F.P. Polynin and S.I. Rudenko.

Member of the military council of the 1st Belorussian Front, Lieutenant General Konstantin Fedorovich Telegin (left) and front commander, Army General Konstantin Konstantinovich Rokossovsky at the map in the front command post

German forces

The Soviet troops were opposed by Army Group Center under the command of Field Marshal Ernst Busch (from June 28 Walter Model). The army group included: the 3rd Panzer Army under the command of Colonel General Georg Reinhardt, the 4th Army of Kurt von Tippelskirch, the 9th Army of Hans Jordan (he was replaced by Nikolaus von Forman on June 27), the 2nd Army of Walter Weiss (Weiss ). Army Group Center was supported by aviation from the 6th Air Fleet and partially from the 1st and 4th Air Fleets. In addition, in the north, Army Group Center was joined by the forces of the 16th Army of Army Group North, and in the south by the 4th Tank Army of Army Group Northern Ukraine.

Thus, the German forces numbered 63 divisions and three brigades; 1.2 million soldiers and officers, 9.6 thousand guns and mortars, over 900 tanks and assault guns (according to other sources 1330), 1350 combat aircraft. The German armies had a well-developed system of railways and highways, which allowed troops to maneuver widely.

German command plans and defense system

The “Belarusian balcony” blocked the road to Warsaw and further to Berlin. The German group, when the Red Army went on the offensive in the northern and southern directions, could launch powerful flank attacks on Soviet troops from this “balcony”. The German military command was mistaken about Moscow's plans for the summer campaign. While Headquarters had a fairly good idea of ​​the enemy forces in the area of ​​the proposed offensive, the German command believed that the Red Army could only deliver an auxiliary blow in Belarus. Hitler and the High Command believed that the Red Army would again launch a decisive offensive in the south, in Ukraine. The main blow was expected from the Kovel area. From there, Soviet troops could cut off the “balcony”, reaching the Baltic Sea and encircling the main forces of Army Group Center and North and pushing Army Group Northern Ukraine back to the Carpathians. In addition, Adolf Hitler feared for Romania - the oil region of Ploiesti, which was the main source of “black gold” for the Third Reich.” Kurt Tippelskirch noted: “Army groups Center and North were predicted to have a “quiet summer.”

Therefore, in total there were 11 divisions in the reserves of Army Group Center and army reserves. Of the 34 tank and motorized divisions that were available on the Eastern Front, 24 were concentrated south of Pripyat. Thus, in the Army Group “Northern Ukraine” there were 7 tank and 2 tank-grenadier divisions. In addition, they were reinforced by 4 separate battalions of Tiger heavy tanks.

In April 1944, the command of Army Group Center proposed shortening the front line and withdrawing the armies to more convenient positions across the Berezina River. However, the high command, as before, when it was proposed to withdraw troops to more convenient positions in Ukraine or withdraw them from Crimea, rejected this plan. The army group was left in its original positions.

German troops occupied a well-prepared and deeply echeloned (up to 250-270 km) defense. The construction of defensive lines began back in 1942-1943, and the front line was finally formed during stubborn battles in the spring of 1944. It consisted of two stripes and was based on a developed system of field fortifications, resistance nodes - “fortresses,” and numerous natural lines. Thus, defensive positions usually ran along the western banks of numerous rivers. Their crossing was made difficult by wide swampy floodplains. The wooded and swampy nature of the area and the many bodies of water seriously worsened the ability to use heavy weapons. Polotsk, Vitebsk, Orsha Mogilev, Bobruisk were turned into “fortresses”, the defense of which was built taking into account the possibility of all-round defense. The rear lines ran along the Dnieper, Drut, Berezina rivers, along the line Minsk, Slutsk and further to the west. Local residents were widely involved in the construction of field fortifications. The weakness of the German defense was that the construction of defensive lines in the depths was not completed.

In general, Army Group Center covered the strategic East Prussian and Warsaw directions. The Vitebsk direction was covered by the 3rd Tank Army, the Orsha and Mogilev direction by the 3rd Army, and the Bobruisk direction by the 9th Army. The front of the 2nd Army passed along Pripyat. The German command paid serious attention to replenishing the divisions with manpower and equipment, trying to bring them to full strength. Each German division had approximately 14 km of front. On average, there were 450 soldiers, 32 machine guns, 10 guns and mortars, 1 tank or assault gun per 1 km of front. But these are average numbers. They differed greatly in different sectors of the front. Thus, in the Orsha and Rogachev-Bobruisk directions, the defense was stronger and more densely saturated with troops. In a number of other areas that the German command considered less important, the defensive formations were much less dense.

Reinhardt's 3rd Panzer Army occupied a line east of Polotsk, Bogushevskoe (about 40 km south of Vitebsk), with a front length of 150 km. The army included 11 divisions (8 infantry, two airfield, one security), three brigades of assault guns, the von Gottberg battle group, 12 separate regiments (police, security, etc.) and other formations. All divisions and two regiments were in the first line of defense. There were 10 regiments in reserve, mainly engaged in protecting communications and counter-guerrilla warfare. The main forces defended the Vitebsk direction. As of June 22, the army numbered more than 165 thousand people, 160 tanks and assault guns, more than 2 thousand field and anti-aircraft guns.

The 4th Army of Tippelskirch occupied the defense from Bogushevsk to Bykhov, having a front length of 225 km. It consisted of 10 divisions (7 infantry, one assault, 2 tank-grenadier - 25th and 18th), a brigade of assault guns, the 501st heavy tank battalion, 8 separate regiments and other units. Already during the Soviet offensive, the Feldherrnhalle tank-grenadier division arrived. There were 8 regiments in reserve, which performed tasks of protecting rear areas, communications and fighting partisans. The most powerful defense was in the Orsha and Mogilev directions. As of June 22, the 4th Army had more than 168 thousand soldiers and officers, about 1,700 field and anti-aircraft guns, 376 tanks and assault guns.

Jordan's 9th Army defended itself in the zone south of Bykhov to the Pripyat River, with a front length of 220 km. The army included 12 divisions (11 infantry and one tank - the 20th), three separate regiments, 9 battalions (security, sapper, construction). The first line consisted of all divisions, the Brandenburg regiment and 9 battalions. The main forces were located in the Bobruisk area. There were two regiments in the army reserve. By the beginning of the Soviet offensive, the army had more than 175 thousand people, about 2 thousand field and anti-aircraft guns, 140 tanks and assault guns.

The 2nd Army occupied defense along the line of the Pripyat River. It consisted of 4 divisions (2 infantry, one Jaeger and one security), a corps group, a tank-grenadier brigade, and two cavalry brigades. In addition, the Hungarian 3 reserve divisions and one cavalry division were subordinate to the 2nd Army. The army group command's reserve included several divisions, including security and training divisions.

The Soviet command was able to maintain preparations for a major offensive operation in Belarus until its very beginning. German aviation and radio intelligence usually noticed large transfers of forces and concluded that an offensive was approaching. However, this time the Red Army’s preparations for the offensive were missed. The secrecy mode and disguise did their job.

Destroyed tanks of the 20th division in the Bobruisk area (1944)

To be continued…

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In 1944, the Red Army was able to liberate Belarus. The actions of the Soviet armies to liberate Belarus went down in history as “Operation Bagration”. The Soviet command began developing an operation plan in the spring of 1944. It was supposed to break through the German defenses on 6 sectors of the front, encircle and destroy the Vitebsk, Bobruisk group of troops and successively defeat the Orsha and Mogilev group of Germans.

The second stage of “Operation Bagration” involved a strike by three Belarusian fronts in one direction towards Minsk, followed by the encirclement and destruction of enemy troops. The third stage of hostilities involved the expansion of the offensive front, the complete liberation of Belarus and the withdrawal of Soviet troops to the western, pre-war border of the USSR.

On June 23, 1944, the line of the Belarusian front ran: east of Polotsk - Vitebsk - east of Orsha, Mogilev and Bobruisk, along Pripyat. Troops of the 1st Baltic, 1st, 2nd and 3rd Belorussian fronts were stationed in this area. The number of Soviet troops reached 1.4 million people, who had at their disposal 31 thousand guns, 5.2 thousand tanks, and more than 5 thousand aircraft. The general coordination of the actions of Soviet troops in this sector was carried out by and.

In Belarus, Soviet troops were opposed by a powerful German group under the command of Field Marshal Bush (from July 28 Model). The number of troops under Bush's leadership was 1.2 million people, which had at its disposal 9.5 thousand guns, 900 tanks, 1.4 thousand aircraft.

On June 23, troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front launched an offensive south of the city of Vitebsk. At the same time, north of Vitebsk, the 43rd Army of the 1st Baltic Front delivered a strong blow. Moving towards each other, the Red Army soldiers surrounded 5 German motorized divisions and destroyed them by the 27th. Developing the offensive, the city of Lepel was liberated on June 28. Meanwhile, the fighters of the 3rd Belorussian Front made a decisive push forward, and by July 1 liberated Borisov. As a result of fierce bloody battles, units of the Second Belorussian Front broke through the enemy’s defenses in a wide area. On June 28, Mogilev was liberated. Then the fighters of the second Belorussian Front moved towards Minsk. The troops of the First Belorussian Front with their pressure forced units of the 9th German Army to retreat. By June 29, the Germans were surrounded in the Bobruisk area, where fighters of the 1st Belarusian Front destroyed 6 enemy divisions.

As a result of the offensive and subsequent pursuit of the enemy, on parallel directions, east of Minsk, a large German group of up to 100 thousand people was surrounded. On July 3, Soviet troops liberated Minsk from the Germans. A large surrounded German group was destroyed on July 11. The battles went down in the history of the Second World War as the “Minsk Cauldron”.

During the 12 days of the offensive in Belarus, the Red Army soldiers advanced 280 kilometers to the west and liberated most of the country, including Minsk. Since July 5, Soviet troops, closely coordinating their actions, carried out a number of successful operations: Siauliai, Vilnius, Kaunas, Bialystok, Lublin-Brest. During these hostilities, serious damage was inflicted on the German Army Group Center. By the end of the summer of 1944, the territory of Belarus was cleared of German troops. Soviet troops also partially liberated the lands of Lithuania and Latvia. At the end of the summer, Red Army soldiers entered Poland and managed to approach the borders of East Prussia.

Belarusian strategic offensive operation "Bagration"

"The greatness of a victory is measured by the degree of its difficulty."

M. Montaigne

Belarusian offensive operation (1944), “Operation Bagration” - a large-scale offensive operation of the Great Patriotic War, carried out from June 23 to August 29, 1944. It was named in honor of the Russian commander of the Patriotic War of 1812 P.I. Bagration. One of the largest military operations in the history of mankind.

In the summer of 1944, our troops were preparing for the final expulsion of the Nazi invaders from Russian soil. The Germans, with the despair of the doomed, clung to every kilometer of territory still remaining in their hands. By mid-June, the Soviet-German front ran along the line Narva - Pskov - Vitebsk - Krichev - Mozyr - Pinsk - Brody - Kolomyia - Iasi - Dubossary - Dniester Estuary. On the southern sector of the front, fighting was already taking place beyond the state border, on the territory of Romania. On May 20, 1944, the General Staff completed the development of the plan for the Belarusian offensive operation. It was included in the operational documents of the Headquarters under the code name “Bagration”. The successful implementation of the plan for Operation Bagration made it possible to solve a number of other, no less strategically important tasks.

1. Completely clear the Moscow direction from enemy troops, since the front edge of the ledge was 80 kilometers from Smolensk;

2. Complete the liberation of the entire territory of Belarus;

3. Reach the coast of the Baltic Sea and the borders of East Prussia, which made it possible to cut the enemy’s front at the junctions of army groups “Center” and “North” and isolate these German groups from each other;

4. Create favorable operational and tactical prerequisites for subsequent offensive actions in the Baltic states, Western Ukraine, in the East Prussian and Warsaw directions.

On June 22, 1944, on the third anniversary of the start of the Great Patriotic War, reconnaissance in force was carried out in sectors of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian Fronts. The final preparations for the general offensive were being made.

The main blow in the summer of 1944 was delivered by the Soviet Army in Belarus. Even after the winter campaign of 1944, during which Soviet troops occupied advantageous positions, preparations began for an offensive operation under the code name “Bagration” - one of the largest in terms of military-political results and the scope of operations of the Great Patriotic War.

The Soviet troops were tasked with defeating Hitler's Army Group Center and liberating Belarus. The essence of the plan was to simultaneously break through the enemy’s defenses in six sectors, encircle and destroy the enemy’s flank groups in the area of ​​Vitebsk and Bobruisk.

One of the largest strategic operations of the Second World War was carried out by troops of the 1st Baltic, 3rd, 2nd and 1st Belorussian fronts with the participation of the Dnieper military flotilla. The 1st Army of the Polish Army operated as part of the 1st Belorussian Front. Based on the nature of the combat operations and the content of the tasks performed, the Belarusian strategic operation is divided into two stages. At the first stage (June 23–July 4, 1944), the following front-line offensive operations were carried out: Vitebsk-Orsha, Mogilev, Bobruisk, Polotsk and Minsk. At the second stage (July 5–August 29, 1944), the following frontal offensive operations were carried out: Vilnius, Siauliai, Bialystok, Lublin-Brest, Kaunas and Osovets.

The operation began on the morning of June 23, 1944. Near Vitebsk, Soviet troops successfully broke through the enemy’s defenses and already on June 25 surrounded five of his divisions to the west of the city. Their liquidation was completed by the morning of June 27. The position on the left flank of Army Group Center's defense was destroyed. Having successfully crossed the Berezina, it cleared Borisov of the enemy. The troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front advancing in the Mogilev direction broke through the strong and deeply echeloned enemy defenses prepared along the Pronya, Basya, and Dnieper rivers, and liberated Mogilev on June 28.

On the morning of June 3, a powerful artillery barrage, accompanied by targeted air strikes, opened the Belarusian operation of the Red Army. The first to attack were the troops of the 2nd and 3rd Belorussian and 1st Baltic fronts.

On June 26, tankers of General Bakharov made a breakthrough to Bobruisk. Initially, the troops of the Rogachev strike group encountered fierce enemy resistance.

Vitebsk was taken on June 26. The next day, the troops of the 11th Guards and 34th armies finally broke the enemy's resistance and liberated Orsha. On June 28, Soviet tanks were already in Lepel and Borisov. Vasilevsky set the task for General Rotmistrov’s tankers to liberate Minsk by the end of July 2. But the honor of being the first to enter the capital of Belarus fell to the guardsmen of the 2nd Tatsin Tank Corps of General A.S. Burdeyny. They entered Minsk at dawn on July 3. Around noon, tankmen from the 1st Guards Tank Corps of the 1st Belorussian Front made their way to the capital from the southeast. The main forces of the 4th German Army - the 12th, 26th, 35th Army, 39th and 41st Tank Corps - were surrounded east of the city. They included more than 100 thousand soldiers and officers.

Undoubtedly, the command of Army Group Center made a number of grave mistakes. First of all, in terms of maneuvering on our own. During the first two days of the Soviet offensive, Field Marshal Bush had the opportunity to withdraw troops to the Berezina line and thereby avoid the threat of their encirclement and destruction. Here he could create a new line of defense. Instead, the German commander allowed an unjustified delay in issuing the order to withdraw.

On July 12, the surrounded troops capitulated. 40 thousand soldiers and officers, 11 generals - commanders of corps and divisions - were captured by the Soviets. It was a disaster.

With the destruction of the 4th Army, a huge gap was opened in the German front line. On July 4, the Supreme Command Headquarters sent a new directive to the fronts, containing the requirement to continue the offensive without stopping. The 1st Baltic Front was supposed to advance in the general direction of Siauliai, reaching Daugavpils with its right wing and Kaunas with its left. Before the 3rd Belorussian Front, the Headquarters set the task of capturing Vilnius and part of the forces - Lida. The 2nd Belorussian Front received orders to take Novogrudok, Grodno and Bialystok. The 1st Belorussian Front developed an offensive in the direction of Baranovichi, Brest and further to Lublin.

At the first stage of the Belarusian operation, the troops solved the problem of breaking through the strategic front of the German defense, encircling and destroying flank groups. After successfully solving the problems of the initial stage of the Belarusian operation, the issues of organizing continuous pursuit of the enemy and maximizing the expansion of breakthrough areas came to the fore. On July 7, fighting took place on the Vilnius-Baranovichi-Pinsk line. The deep breakthrough of Soviet troops in Belarus created a threat to Army Group North and Army Group Northern Ukraine. Favorable preconditions for an offensive in the Baltic states and Ukraine were evident. The 2nd and 3rd Baltic and 1st Ukrainian fronts began to destroy the German groups opposing them.

The troops of the right wing of the 1st Belorussian Front achieved great operational successes. By June 27, they surrounded over six enemy divisions in the Bobruisk area and, with the active assistance of aviation, the Dnieper military flotilla and partisans, by June 29 they completely defeated them. By July 3, 1944, Soviet troops liberated the capital of Belarus, Minsk. To the east they surrounded 105 thousand German soldiers and officers. The German divisions that found themselves encircled tried to break through to the west and southwest, but were captured or destroyed during the battles that lasted from July 5 to July 11. The enemy lost over 70 thousand people killed and about 35 thousand captured.

With the entry of the Soviet Army to the Polotsk-Lake Naroch-Molodechno-Nesvizh line, a huge gap 400 kilometers long was formed in the strategic front of the German troops. The Soviet troops had the opportunity to begin pursuing the defeated enemy troops. On July 5, the second stage of the liberation of Belarus began; The fronts, closely interacting with each other, successfully carried out five offensive operations at this stage: Siauliai, Vilnius, Kaunas, Bialystok and Brest-Lublin.

The Soviet Army one by one defeated the remnants of the retreating formations of Army Group Center and inflicted major damage on the troops transferred here from Germany, Norway, Italy and other areas. Soviet troops completed the liberation of Belarus. They liberated part of Lithuania and Latvia, crossed the state border, entered the territory of Poland and approached the borders of East Prussia. The Narew and Vistula rivers were crossed. The front advanced westward by 260-400 kilometers. It was a victory of strategic importance.

The success achieved during the Belarusian operation was promptly developed by active actions in other directions of the Soviet-German front. By August 22, Soviet troops reached the line west of Jelgava, Dobele, Siauliai, Suwalki, reached the outskirts of Warsaw and went on the defensive. During the June-August 1944 operation in Belarus, the Baltic states and Poland, 21 enemy divisions were completely defeated and destroyed. 61 divisions lost more than half of their strength. The German army lost about half a million soldiers and officers killed, wounded and captured. On July 17, 1944, 57,600 German soldiers and officers captured in Belarus were escorted through the central streets of Moscow.

Duration – 68 days. The width of the combat front is 1100 km. The depth of advance of Soviet troops is 550-600 km. Average daily rate of advance: at the first stage - 20-25 km, at the second - 13-14 km.

Results of the operation.

The troops of the advancing fronts defeated one of the most powerful enemy groups - Army Group Center, its 17 divisions and 3 brigades were destroyed, and 50 divisions lost more than half of their strength. The Byelorussian SSR, part of the Lithuanian SSR and the Latvian SSR were liberated. The Red Army entered the territory of Poland and advanced to the borders of East Prussia. During the offensive, the large water barriers of the Berezina, Neman, and Vistula were crossed, and important bridgeheads on their western banks were captured. Conditions were provided for striking deep into East Prussia and into the central regions of Poland. To stabilize the front line, the German command was forced to transfer 46 divisions and 4 brigades to Belarus from other sectors of the Soviet-German front and the west. This made it much easier for the Anglo-American troops to conduct combat operations in France.

In the summer of 1944, on the eve and during Operation Bagration, which aimed to liberate Belarus from the Nazi occupiers, the partisans provided truly invaluable assistance to the advancing Soviet army. They captured river crossings, cut off the enemy's escape routes, blew up rails, caused train wrecks, made surprise raids on enemy garrisons, and destroyed enemy communications.

Soon, Soviet troops began to defeat a large group of fascist German troops in Romania and Moldova during the Iasi-Kishinev operation. This military operation of the Soviet troops began in the early morning of August 20, 1944. Within two days, the enemy's defenses were broken through to a depth of 30 kilometers. Soviet troops entered the operational space. The large administrative center of Romania, the city of Iasi, was taken. The operation was attended by the search of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts (commanding army generals R.Ya. Malinovsky and F.I. Tolbukhin), sailors of the Black Sea Fleet and the Danube River Flotilla. The fighting took place over an area of ​​more than 600 kilometers along the front and up to 350 kilometers in depth. More than 2 million 100 thousand people, 24 thousand guns and mortars, 2 and a half thousand tanks and self-propelled artillery units, and about 3 thousand aircraft took part in the battles on both sides.

BELARUSIAN OPERATION 1944 (code name “Bagration”), one of the largest strategic offensive operations of the Red Army in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-45. The goal is to defeat the German Army Group Center (commander - Field Marshal E. Busch, from June 28 - Field Marshal V. Model; a total of 1.2 million people, 9.5 thousand guns and mortars, 900 tanks and assault guns , 1350 aircraft), which had a deeply echeloned (250-270 km) defense, based on a developed system of field fortifications and natural boundaries, and liberate Belarus. Conducted from June 23 - August 29 by the forces of the 1st Belorussian (commander - Army General, from June 29 Marshal of the Soviet Union K.K. Rokossovsky), 2nd Belorussian (commander - Colonel General, from July 28 Army General G.F. Zakharov), 3rd Belorussian (commander - Colonel General, from June 26 Army General I. D. Chernyakhovsky), 1st Baltic (commander - Army General I. Kh. Bagramyan) fronts; The 1st Belorussian Front also included the 1st Polish Army (from July 21, the 1st Army of the Polish Army; Lieutenant General Z. Berling) and the Dnieper Military Flotilla (Rear Admiral V.V. Grigoriev). On the Soviet side, 2.4 million people took part in the Belarusian operation (with 36.4 thousand guns and mortars, 5.2 thousand tanks and self-propelled artillery units, 6.8 thousand combat aircraft). Partisan units and formations played an active role in the Belarusian operation. The coordination of the actions of the fronts was carried out by representatives of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command - Marshals of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevsky.

Soviet troops broke through the enemy's defenses simultaneously in six sectors, encircled and destroyed his groups in the areas of Vitebsk (June 27) and Bobruisk (June 28-29), defeated the German Orsha and Mogilev groups, and then surrounded and defeated part of Army Group Center to the east Minsk (July 12). During the further offensive, large German groups were surrounded and destroyed near Vilnius (July 13) and Brest (July 28). By August 29, Soviet troops reached the line Jelgava - Dobele - Siauliai - Suwalki - Prague (a suburb of Warsaw) - the Vistula River, where they went on the defensive. Army Group Center suffered a crushing defeat. Advancing in a zone of more than 1,100 km, Soviet troops advanced westward to a distance of 550-600 km.

The successful completion of the Belarusian operation created favorable preconditions for the Pskov-Ostrov operation of 1944, the Lvov-Sandomierz operation of 1944, the Baltic operation of 1944, the Iasi-Kishinev operation of 1944, the liberation of South-Eastern Europe and Poland. The Belarusian operation made a significant contribution to the development of Soviet military art: parallel and frontal pursuit of the enemy to a depth of 200-250 km from the front edge followed by encirclement, massing of artillery (150-200 guns and mortars per 1 km of the breakthrough area) and a new method of artillery supporting the attack of infantry and tanks - a double shaft of fire.

Lit.: Soviet military art in the Belarusian operation of 1944 // Military Historical Journal. 1984. No. 4; Plotnikov Yu. V. Liberation of Belarus. M., 1984; Adair R. Hitler’s greatest defeat: the collapse of Army Group Center, June 1944. L., 2000; Operation "Bagration". Liberation of Belarus. M., 2004.

In the summer of 1944, the Soviet army began the final liberation of Belarus from the Germans. The main content of the plan for Operation Bagration was an organized offensive on several fronts, which was supposed to throw the Wehrmacht forces outside the republic. Success allowed the USSR to begin the liberation of Poland and East Prussia.

The day before

The Bagration strategic plan was developed in accordance with the situation that developed in Belarus at the beginning of 1944. The Red Army has already liberated part of the Vitebsk, Gomel, Mogilev and Polesie regions of the republic. However, its main territory was still occupied by German units. A protrusion formed at the front, which in the Wehrmacht was called the “Belarusian balcony.” The headquarters of the Third Reich did everything possible to hold this important strategic area for as long as possible.

For defense, a new network of lines about 250 kilometers long was created. They consisted of trenches, wire fences, and anti-tank ditches were promptly dug in some areas. The German command even managed to increase its own contingent in Belarus, despite the scarcity of human resources. According to Soviet intelligence data, there were just over a million Wehrmacht troops in the region. What could Operation Bagration oppose to this? The plan was based on an attack by more than one and a half million Red Army soldiers.

Plan approval

Preparations for the operation to defeat the Germans in Belarus began at the direction of Stalin in April 1944. At the same time, the General Staff began to concentrate troops and materiel on the corresponding sector of the front. The original Bagration plan was proposed by General Alexei Antonov. At the end of May he prepared a draft of the operation.

At the same time, key commanders on the western front were summoned to Moscow. These were Konstantin Rokossovsky, Ivan Chernyakhovsky and Ivan Bagramyan. They reported on the current situation in their sectors of the front. Georgy Zhukov and (representatives of the High Command Headquarters) also took part in the discussion. The plan was clarified and finalized. After this, on May 30 it was approved

“Bagration” (the plan was named after the general of the year) was based on the following plan. The enemy's defenses had to be simultaneously broken through on six sectors of the front. After this, it was planned to encircle German formations on the flanks (in the area of ​​​​Bobruisk and Vitebsk), and attack in the direction of Brest, Minsk and Kaunas. After the complete defeat of the army group, the 1st Belorussian Front was supposed to go to Warsaw, the 1st Baltic Front to Konigsberg, and the 3rd Belorussian Front to Allenstein.

Guerrilla actions

What ensured the success of Operation Bagration? The plan was based not only on the execution of orders from Headquarters by the army, but also on its active interaction with the partisans. To ensure communication between them, special operational groups were created. On June 8, the partisans operating underground received orders to prepare for the destruction of the railways located in the occupied territory.

On the night of June 20, more than 40 thousand rails were blown up. In addition, the partisans derailed the Wehrmacht echelons. Group "Center", finding itself under a coordinated attack by the Soviet army, was unable to bring reserves to the front line in time due to the paralysis of its own communications.

Vitebsk-Orsha operation

On June 22, the active phase of Operation Bagration began. It was no coincidence that the plan included this date. The general offensive resumed exactly on the third anniversary. The 1st Baltic Front and the 3rd Belorussian Front were used to carry out the Vitebsk-Orsha operation. During it, the defenses on the right flank of the Center group were collapsed. The Red Army liberated several regional centers of the Vitebsk region, including Orsha. The Germans were retreating everywhere.

On June 27, Vitebsk was cleared of the enemy. The day before, the German group operating in the city area was subjected to numerous intense artillery and air strikes. A significant part of the German military personnel was surrounded. Attempts by some divisions to break out of encirclement ended in failure.

On June 28, Lepel was released. As a result of the Vitebsk-Orsha operation, the Red Army managed to almost completely destroy the enemy's 53rd Army Corps. The Wehrmacht lost 40 thousand people killed and 17 thousand captured.

Liberation of Mogilev

The Bagration military plan adopted by the Headquarters stated that the Mogilev operation was to be a decisive blow to the Wehrmacht positions. There were slightly fewer German forces in this direction than in other sectors of the front. Nevertheless, the Soviet offensive here was very important, as it cut off the enemy’s path to retreat.

In the Mogilev direction, German troops had a well-prepared defense system. Every small settlement located near the main roads was turned into a stronghold. The eastern approaches to Mogilev were covered by several defensive lines. Hitler, in his public speeches, stated that this city must be held at all costs. It was now possible to leave him only with the personal consent of the Fuhrer.

On June 23, after artillery strikes, the forces of the 2nd Belorussian Front began to cross the defensive line built by the Germans along its banks. Dozens of bridges were built across the river. The enemy almost did not resist, as he was paralyzed by artillery. Soon the upper section of the Dnieper in the Mogilev region was crossed. The city was taken on June 28 after a rapid advance. In total, more than 30 thousand German soldiers were captured during the operation. The Wehrmacht forces initially retreated in an organized manner, but after the capture of Mogilev this retreat turned into a stampede.

Bobruisk operation

The Bobruisk operation was carried out in the southern direction. It was supposed to lead to the encirclement of German units, for which Headquarters was preparing a large-scale cauldron. The plan for Operation Bagration stated that this task was to be carried out by the 1st Belorussian Front, commanded by Rokossovsky.

The offensive near Bobruisk began on June 24, that is, a little later than on other sectors of the front. There were many swamps in this region. The Germans did not expect the Red Army soldiers to overcome this swamp at all. However, the complex maneuver was still carried out. As a result, the 65th Army made a quick and stunning strike against an enemy who was not expecting trouble. On June 27, Soviet troops established control over the roads to Bobruisk. The assault on the city began. Bobruisk was cleared of Wehrmacht forces by the evening of the 29th. During the operation, the 35th Army and 41st Tank Corps were destroyed. After the successes of the Soviet army on the flanks, the road to Minsk opened for it.

Polotsk strike

After success in Vitebsk, the 1st Baltic Front, under the command of Ivan Bagramyan, began the next stage of the offensive against German positions. Now the Soviet army had to liberate Polotsk. This is what they decided at Headquarters when coordinating Operation Bagration. The capture plan had to be carried out as quickly as possible, since a strong Army Group North was located in this area.

The attack on Polotsk was carried out on June 29 by the forces of several strategic Soviet formations. The Red Army was helped by partisans who unexpectedly attacked small scattering German detachments from the rear. Attacks from both sides brought even greater confusion and chaos into the enemy’s ranks. The Polotsk garrison decided to retreat before the cauldron closed.

On July 4, the Soviet army liberated Polotsk, which was also strategically important because it was a railway junction. This defeat of the Wehrmacht led to personnel purges. The commander of Army Group North, Georg Lindemann, lost his position. The German leadership, however, could do nothing more. Even earlier, on June 28, the same thing happened to Field Marshal Ernst Busch, commander of Army Group Center.

Liberation of Minsk

The successes of the Soviet army allowed Headquarters to quickly set new tasks for Operation Bagration. The plan was to create a boiler near Minsk. It was formed after the Germans lost control of Bobruisk and Vitebsk. The German 4th Army stood east of Minsk and was cut off from the rest of the world, firstly, by Soviet troops advancing from the north and south, and secondly, by natural obstacles in the form of rivers. To the west the river flowed. Berezina.

When General Kurt von Tippelskirch ordered an organized retreat, his army had to cross the river using a single bridge and a dirt road. The Germans and their allies were attacked by partisans. In addition, the crossing area was shelled by bombers. The Red Army crossed the Berezina on June 30. Minsk was liberated on July 3, 1944. In the capital of Belarus, 105 thousand Wehrmacht troops were surrounded. More than 70 were killed, and another 35 were captured.

March to the Baltics

Meanwhile, the forces of the 1st Baltic Front continued their advance to the northwest. The soldiers under the command of Bagramyan were supposed to break through to the Baltic and cut off Army Group North from the rest of the German armed forces. The Bagration plan, in short, assumed that for the operation to be successful, significant reinforcement was needed on this section of the front. Therefore, the 39th and 51st armies were transferred to the 1st Baltic Front.

When the reserves finally fully reached the forward positions, the Germans managed to pull together significant forces to Daugavpils. Now the Soviet army did not have such a pronounced numerical advantage as at the initial stage of Operation Bagration. The plan for a lightning war by that time was almost completed. The soldiers had one last push left to finally liberate Soviet territory from the occupiers. Despite local slippage in the offensive, Daugavpils and Siauliai were liberated on July 27. On the 30th, the military cut the last railway leading from the Baltic states to East Prussia. The next day, Jelgava was recaptured from the enemy, thanks to which the Soviet army finally reached the sea coast.

Vilnius operation

After Chernyakhovsky liberated Minsk and defeated the 4th Wehrmacht Army, Headquarters sent him a new directive. Now the forces of the 3rd Belorussian Front had to liberate Vilnius and cross the Neman River. The execution of the order began on July 5, that is, a day after the end of the battle in Minsk.

In Vilnius there was a fortified garrison consisting of 15 thousand soldiers. In order to retain the capital of Lithuania, Hitler began to resort to the usual propaganda moves, calling the city “the last fortress.” Meanwhile, the 5th Army broke through 20 kilometers on the first day of its offensive. The German defense was slack and loose due to the fact that all the divisions operating in the Baltic States were badly battered in previous battles. However, on July 5, the Nazis still tried to carry out a counterattack. This attempt ended in nothing. The Soviet army was already approaching the city.

On the 9th, it captured strategically important points - the station and the airfield. The infantry and tank crews began the decisive assault. The capital of Lithuania was liberated on July 13. It is noteworthy that the soldiers of the 3rd Belorussian Front were assisted by Polish soldiers of the Home Army. Shortly before the fall of the city, she raised an uprising in it.

End of operation

At the final stage of the operation, the Soviet army completed the liberation of the western Belarusian regions located near the border with Poland. On July 27, Bialystok was recaptured. Thus, the soldiers finally reached the pre-war state borders. On August 14, the army liberated Osovets and took a bridgehead on the Narew River.

On July 26, Soviet units found themselves in the suburbs of Brest. Two days later there were no German occupiers left in the city. In August, the offensive began in eastern Poland. The Germans knocked it over near Warsaw. On August 29, a directive from the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command was published, according to which units of the Red Army were to go on the defensive. The offensive was stopped. The operation is completed.

After the Bagration plan was completed, the Second World War entered its final stage. The Soviet army completely liberated Belarus and could now launch a newly organized offensive in Poland. Germany was approaching final defeat. This is how the great war ended in Belarus. The Bagration plan was implemented as quickly as possible. Gradually, Belarus came to its senses, returning to peaceful life. This country suffered from the German occupation perhaps more than all other Soviet republics.